@smartledger/bsv 9.21.0 → 9.22.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +94 -0
- package/README.md +19 -19
- package/bsv-gdaf.min.js +44 -44
- package/bsv-ltp.min.js +29 -29
- package/bsv-smartcontract.min.js +1 -1
- package/bsv.bundle.js +42 -42
- package/bsv.min.js +42 -42
- package/docs/AUDIT_SCOPE.md +7 -7
- package/docs/MODULE_REFERENCE_COMPLETE.md +27 -27
- package/docs/advanced/UTXO_MANAGER_GUIDE.md +1 -1
- package/docs/audit-rfq/cure53.txt +2 -2
- package/docs/audit-rfq/ncc-group.txt +2 -2
- package/docs/audit-rfq/trail-of-bits.txt +2 -2
- package/docs/getting-started/INSTALLATION.md +23 -23
- package/docs/getting-started/QUICK_START.md +7 -7
- package/docs/migration/FROM_BSV_1_5_6.md +5 -5
- package/lib/gdaf/zk-prover.js +70 -13
- package/lib/transaction/sighash.js +33 -3
- package/lib/transaction/transaction.js +47 -7
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/version.js +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -7,6 +7,100 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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## [Unreleased]
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## [9.22.1] - 2026-10-06
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### Changed — signing many inputs is no longer quadratic in the number of inputs
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No behavioural change. **Verified byte-identical**: the same nine transactions signed before and
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after produce the same bytes and the same txid, including the `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and `SIGHASH_NONE`
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cases that take different preimage branches.
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The FORKID preimage's `hashPrevouts`, `hashSequence` and `hashOutputs` were recomputed on every
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sighash, and each costs a pass over all inputs or all outputs. They are **identical for every input
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of a transaction**, so signing *n* inputs ran three O(n) digests *n* times:
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| inputs | 9.22.0 | 9.22.1 |
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|---|---|---|
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| 100 | 0.9 s | 0.5 s |
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| 1,000 | 10.7 s | 8.9 s |
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| 3,000 | 70.1 s | 39.7 s |
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| 5,000 | **194.2 s** | **~100 s** |
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`Transaction#sign` now opens a cache for the duration of one call and removes it in a `finally`, so
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nothing survives the call and **there is no invalidation to get wrong**. The alternative — memoizing
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on the transaction and clearing at each of the 11 sites that mutate inputs or outputs — was rejected
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for exactly that reason: a missed site yields a *wrong signature*, which is a different class of
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failure from a stale fee.
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The window covers the apply loop as well as signature collection, because `applySignature` →
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`addSignature` **re-verifies** each signature before applying it, which recomputes the preimage —
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measured larger than collection at 5,000 inputs (68.7 s against 50.3 s). Widening it is safe
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because the apply loop only changes each input's *script*, and none of the three digests depends on
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a script: `hashPrevouts` covers outpoints, `hashSequence` covers sequence numbers, `hashOutputs`
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covers outputs.
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`SIGHASH_SINGLE` is deliberately **not** cached: it hashes the one output at the input's index, so
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it differs per input, and a shared value would sign every input over the same output. A test asserts
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that `SIGHASH_SINGLE` still produces a distinct script per input.
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**It is still superlinear** — per-input cost goes from 4.84 ms at 100 inputs to 20.50 ms at 5,000 —
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so something else in the per-input path remains O(n). The signature re-verification on apply is the
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largest remaining term. This release halves the cost; it does not make signing linear, and a
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consolidation sweep over tens of thousands of coins will still feel it.
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Found while answering a consumer that batches a daily settlement of up to 5,000 inputs.
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## [9.22.0] - 2026-10-06
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### Security — the membership commitment was over a non-injective encoding
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9.20.0 fixed the headline forgery in `ZKProver.verifyMembershipProof` — a verifier that compared
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only prover-supplied values with each other — and **left a second forgery in place.** The
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commitment was `sha256(JSON.stringify(member) + ':' + salt)`, and `JSON.stringify` is not
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injective:
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```js
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JSON.stringify(null) === JSON.stringify(NaN) === JSON.stringify(Infinity) // '"null"'
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JSON.stringify({ a: 1, b: undefined }) === JSON.stringify({ a: 1 }) // '{"a":1}'
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```
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So a prover could claim `NaN` was a member of `[null]`, or `{a:1,b:undefined}` a member of
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`[{a:1}]`, and **every recomputed commitment matched.** Key order was the mirror of the same flaw:
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two spellings of one object committed differently, so a legitimate caller could be refused.
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Members and claimed values are now encoded with **RFC 8785 canonical JSON** (`bsv.JCS`, already in
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this library) over a value domain validated recursively — null, boolean, finite number, string,
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array, and plain objects of those. JCS sorts keys and refuses non-finite numbers and `undefined`
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outright; the recursive check adds the one case JCS does not catch, an `undefined` **property
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value**, which it drops exactly as `JSON.stringify` does. Anything outside the domain throws, and
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the verifier answers `false` — the honest verdict for a value this construction cannot commit to
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unambiguously.
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`generateMembershipProof` also no longer refuses object members. It compared with
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`set.includes(value)`, which is reference equality, so generating a proof for a structurally equal
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object threw `Value not in set` and the function was unusable with object members at all.
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Membership is now structural, over the same canonical form the commitment uses.
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**Found by red-teaming the 9.20.0 fix, not by a test.** That is the second time in two releases
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that a fix closed the stated problem and left an adjacent one standing, and both were found by
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someone looking at the fix rather than at the original report.
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### Still open, and stated rather than fixed
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An external review of these releases raised three limits worth recording, none of which this
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release closes:
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- **A `null` deletes a claim rather than editing it.** `anchor.blockTime` and `anchor.blockHeight`
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are checked only when non-null, because a certificate issued before confirmation legitimately
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carries nulls. So a tamper can *remove* a field to avoid its check. A strict mode that requires
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them, or a verdict that distinguishes "not verified" from "verified", is the proper answer.
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- **Several checks establish consistency, not authenticity.** `anchor.blockHeight` equalling
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`spv.blockHeight` can be satisfied by editing both; `createdAt` being canonically formatted says
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nothing about when the certificate was issued; `opts.network` compares a name. These bound what a
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tamper can do without a trusted chain source — they do not authenticate the claims.
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- **The TSC `index < 2^nodes.length` bound does not prove the index is below the real transaction
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count.** A tighter bound needs a trustworthy count, which the certificate does not carry.
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## [9.21.0] - 2026-10-05
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### Added — `opts.network` on `NotaryHash.verify`, opt-in
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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Bitcoin SV library with an interpreter-verified script engine.
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[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
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[](LICENSE)
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[](STABILITY.md)
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@@ -155,44 +155,44 @@ const bsv = require('@smartledger/bsv') // 128 modules
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### **Core Modules**
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| Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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| **bsv.min.js** |
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| **bsv.bundle.js** |
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| **bsv.min.js** | 1070KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.min.js` |
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| **bsv.bundle.js** | 1070KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.bundle.js` |
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### **W3C Verifiable Credentials**
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| Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
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| **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
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### **Smart Contract & Development**
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| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
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| **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
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| **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
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| **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-security.min.js` |
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### **Legal & Compliance**
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| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
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| **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1070KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
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### **Advanced Cryptography**
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| **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
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### **Utilities**
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| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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| **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
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| **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-message.min.js` |
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| **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
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```html
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<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.
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<script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.22.1/bsv.min.js"></script>
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<script>
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</script>
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---
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**SmartLedger-BSV v9.
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**SmartLedger-BSV v9.22.1**
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