@smartledger/bsv 9.19.0 → 9.20.0

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Files changed (20) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +81 -0
  2. package/README.md +19 -19
  3. package/bsv-gdaf.min.js +22 -22
  4. package/bsv-smartcontract.min.js +1 -1
  5. package/bsv.bundle.js +24 -24
  6. package/bsv.min.js +24 -24
  7. package/docs/AUDIT_SCOPE.md +7 -7
  8. package/docs/MODULE_REFERENCE_COMPLETE.md +27 -27
  9. package/docs/advanced/UTXO_MANAGER_GUIDE.md +1 -1
  10. package/docs/audit-rfq/cure53.txt +2 -2
  11. package/docs/audit-rfq/ncc-group.txt +2 -2
  12. package/docs/audit-rfq/trail-of-bits.txt +2 -2
  13. package/docs/getting-started/INSTALLATION.md +23 -23
  14. package/docs/getting-started/QUICK_START.md +7 -7
  15. package/docs/migration/FROM_BSV_1_5_6.md +5 -5
  16. package/lib/gdaf/zk-prover.js +80 -10
  17. package/lib/notaryhash/certificate.js +31 -0
  18. package/lib/notaryhash/index.js +61 -3
  19. package/package.json +1 -1
  20. package/version.js +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -7,6 +7,87 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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  ## [Unreleased]
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+ ## [9.20.0] - 2026-10-05
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+
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+ A security release. One verifier accepted a forged proof outright; another accepted eight tampered
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+ certificates. Both defects are the same shape: **a field that looks checked and is not.**
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+
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+ ### Security — `ZKProver.verifyMembershipProof` accepted a forged proof
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+
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+ It took the proof alone and returned
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+
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+ ```js
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+ proof.setCommitments.includes(proof.valueCommitment) && proof.isMember
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+ ```
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+
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+ where **every value in that expression came from the prover**. Nothing bound the commitments to a
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+ set the verifier knew, nothing opened the value commitment, and `isMember` was the prover's own
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+ claim. So this returned `true`:
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+
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+ ```js
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+ verifyMembershipProof({ type: 'MembershipProof',
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+ setCommitments: ['x'], valueCommitment: 'x', isMember: true })
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+ ```
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+
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+ A forgery needed no key, no salt and no set. This is the same defect `verifyAgeProof` and
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+ `verifyRangeProof` had before 8.2.0, in the one function that fix did not reach.
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+
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+ The verifier now takes `(proof, opening, set)`: the **verifier** supplies the set it believes in,
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+ the holder supplies `{ value, salt }`, both commitments are recomputed, the prover's array must
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+ equal the verifier's set commitment-for-commitment in order — so a prover cannot append one — and
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+ membership is decided against the verifier's set. `proof.isMember` is no longer consulted.
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+ `generateMembershipProof` now returns the `salt` so a holder can build the opening.
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+
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+ This is **not zero-knowledge and cannot be**, consistent with this module's header note. One salt
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+ covers every member, so a verifier holding the set and the salt can recompute every commitment, and
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+ a low-entropy set is not hidden from anyone who sees the proof. The honest claim is "this value is
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+ in a set the verifier already holds" — a membership *check*. A caller needing the value or set
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+ hidden needs a different primitive; per-attribute fresh salts under an issuer-signed RFC 6962 root
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+ is the construction to reach for.
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+
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+ Reported against 9.19.0 by a consumer that had reviewed these proofs in July and re-tested them.
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+ **No test in this repository covered the forged path** — the suite count did not move when the fix
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+ landed.
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+
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+ ### Security — `NotaryHash.verify` accepted eight tampered certificates
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+ Each is a single edited field, covered by no signature and checked by nothing, on one real mainnet
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+ batch certificate (block 954784):
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+
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+ | case | change | now |
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+ |---|---|---|
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+ | T01 | `anchor.blockTime` + 3600 | refused |
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+ | T02 | `anchor.blockTime` − 100000000 | refused |
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+ | T03 | `anchor.blockHeight` − 1000 | refused |
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+ | T05 | `anchor.vout` = 1 (a payment output) | refused |
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+ | T06 | `anchor.vout` = 99 (past the last output) | refused |
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+ | T07 | `spv.merkleProof.index` + 2^(nodes+3) | refused |
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+ | T19 | `createdAt` `.000Z` → `.123Z` | refused |
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+ | T20 | `createdAt` `.000Z` → `Z` | refused |
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+
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+ The rules now enforced:
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+
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+ - **`anchor.blockTime` must equal the time in the 80-byte header**, and `anchor.blockHeight` must
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+ equal `spv.blockHeight`. A `null` is not a claim — a certificate issued before confirmation
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+ legitimately carries nulls, and only a stated value is checked.
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+ - **The record is read from `anchor.vout` and no other output.** Scanning every output made
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+ `anchor.vout` decorative: it could name a payment output, or one past the end, and the record was
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+ still found elsewhere in the transaction.
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+ - **A TSC `index` must fit its path.** A path of n nodes addresses at most 2^n leaves, so a larger
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+ index describes a tree the path cannot belong to.
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+ - **`createdAt` must be the canonical rendering of its second**, in the reference format. The
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+ proofHash commits to `createdAtUnix`, so `...04.000Z`, `...04.527Z` and `...04Z` produce the
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+ **same** commitment — the sub-second component is not covered by the proof at all. Applied to the
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+ reference format only: certificates written by 8.3.0–9.8.0 carry a millisecond component, exist
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+ in the wild, and are still read.
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+
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+ Verified against an external 27-case oracle with seven pinned mainnet headers: **27/27 agreement**,
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+ with both honest cases still accepted.
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+
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+ Found and measured independently by two consumer sessions — the verification API that uses this
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+ library as a second, independent anchor verifier, and the NotaryHash SDK session whose SPEC the
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+ rules come from. The eight were reproduced here with a separate harness before any change.
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+
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  ## [9.19.0] - 2026-10-03
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  ### Security — `merkle.leafIndex` was not validated against the path beside it
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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  Bitcoin SV library with an interpreter-verified script engine.
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- [![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-9.19.0-blue.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
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+ [![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-9.20.0-blue.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smartledger/bsv)
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  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)
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  [![Stability](https://img.shields.io/badge/9.x%20stable%20until-2027--09--01-brightgreen.svg)](STABILITY.md)
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@@ -155,44 +155,44 @@ const bsv = require('@smartledger/bsv') // 128 modules
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  ### **Core Modules**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **bsv.min.js** | 1067KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv.min.js` |
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- | **bsv.bundle.js** | 1067KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv.bundle.js` |
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+ | **bsv.min.js** | 1068KB | Core BSV + SmartContract | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv.bundle.js** | 1068KB | Everything in one file | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv.bundle.js` |
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  ### **W3C Verifiable Credentials**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
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- | **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
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- | **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
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- | **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
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+ | **🟢 bsv-didweb.min.js** | 166KB | **DID:web generation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-didweb.min.js` |
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+ | **🟢 bsv-vcjwt.min.js** | 166KB | **VC-JWT issue/verify** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-vcjwt.min.js` |
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+ | **🟢 bsv-statuslist.min.js** | 256KB | **StatusList2021 revocation** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-statuslist.min.js` |
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+ | **🟢 bsv-anchor.min.js** | 164KB | **BSV anchoring (hash-only)** | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-anchor.min.js` |
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  ### **Smart Contract & Development**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-security.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-smartcontract.min.js** | 141KB | Complete covenant framework | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-smartcontract.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-covenant.min.js** | 35KB | Covenant operations | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-covenant.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-script-helper.min.js** | 33KB | Custom script tools | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-script-helper.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-security.min.js** | 32KB | Security enhancements | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-security.min.js` |
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  ### **Legal & Compliance**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1067KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-ltp.min.js** | 544KB | Legal Token Protocol | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-ltp.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-gdaf.min.js** | 1068KB | Digital Identity & Attestation | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-gdaf.min.js` |
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  ### **Advanced Cryptography**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-shamir.min.js** | 177KB | Threshold Cryptography | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-shamir.min.js` |
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  ### **Utilities**
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  | Module | Size | Use Case | CDN |
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  |--------|------|----------|-----|
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- | **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-message.min.js` |
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- | **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-ecies.min.js** | 139KB | Encryption | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-ecies.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-message.min.js** | 34KB | Message signing | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-message.min.js` |
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+ | **bsv-mnemonic.min.js** | 320KB | HD wallets | `unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv-mnemonic.min.js` |
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  ```html
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- <script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.19.0/bsv.min.js"></script>
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+ <script src="https://unpkg.com/@smartledger/bsv@9.20.0/bsv.min.js"></script>
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  <script>
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  const key = bsv.PrivateKey.fromRandom()
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  </script>
@@ -240,4 +240,4 @@ MIT
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  ---
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- **SmartLedger-BSV v9.19.0**
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+ **SmartLedger-BSV v9.20.0**