@smartledger/bsv 9.0.0 → 9.1.1

package/test/gdaf/canonicalize.js

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-'use strict'
-
-/* global describe, it */
-
-var expect = require('chai').expect
-var bsv = require('../../')
-var AttestationSigner = require('../../lib/gdaf/attestation-signer')
-var AttestationVerifier = require('../../lib/gdaf/attestation-verifier')
-
-// A stable test key (do NOT use in production / do not fund this address).
-var TEST_WIF = 'KxRd1XXYZYuQc7uDdLN418Ds3NCxRLghQrcYecPPcB6ka5Z5dNZT'
-var VICTIM_WIF = 'L5EBpijRWptdvC7gfTRGfTuEBwLKQvPgqgSvn4Bi4ps5CqxLP7ow'
-
-function baseCredential () {
-  return {
-    '@context': ['https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1'],
-    id: 'urn:uuid:00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001',
-    type: ['VerifiableCredential', 'UniversityDegreeCredential'],
-    issuer: 'did:smartledger:placeholder',
-    issuanceDate: '2025-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
-    credentialSubject: {
-      id: 'did:smartledger:subject',
-      degree: { type: 'BachelorDegree', name: 'Bachelor of Science' },
-      gpa: '2.0'
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-describe('GDAF canonicalization', function () {
-  describe('_canonicalizeJSON', function () {
-    it('includes nested object keys in the serialization', function () {
-      var canonical = AttestationSigner._canonicalizeJSON(baseCredential())
-      // Regression guard for the replacer-array bug: credentialSubject MUST NOT
-      // collapse to "{}", and the nested claims must appear in the output.
-      expect(canonical).to.not.contain('"credentialSubject":{}')
-      expect(canonical).to.contain('Bachelor of Science')
-      expect(canonical).to.contain('"gpa":"2.0"')
-    })
-
-    it('is independent of input key order', function () {
-      var a = { issuer: 'did:x', credentialSubject: { gpa: '4.0', degree: 'PhD' } }
-      var b = { credentialSubject: { degree: 'PhD', gpa: '4.0' }, issuer: 'did:x' }
-      expect(AttestationSigner._canonicalizeJSON(a))
-        .to.equal(AttestationSigner._canonicalizeJSON(b))
-    })
-
-    it('preserves array order (arrays are order-significant)', function () {
-      var a = AttestationSigner._canonicalizeJSON({ type: ['A', 'B'] })
-      var b = AttestationSigner._canonicalizeJSON({ type: ['B', 'A'] })
-      expect(a).to.not.equal(b)
-    })
-
-    it('produces a different hash when a nested claim is tampered', function () {
-      var original = baseCredential()
-      var tampered = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(original))
-      tampered.credentialSubject.degree.name = 'Doctor of Philosophy'
-      tampered.credentialSubject.gpa = '4.0'
-
-      var h1 = AttestationSigner._hashCredential(original).toString('hex')
-      var h2 = AttestationSigner._hashCredential(tampered).toString('hex')
-      expect(h1).to.not.equal(h2)
-    })
-  })
-
-  describe('sign / verify round-trip', function () {
-    it('verifies an untampered credential', async function () {
-      var signer = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(TEST_WIF))
-      var credential = signer.createCredential({
-        id: 'did:smartledger:subject',
-        degree: { type: 'BachelorDegree', name: 'Bachelor of Science' },
-        gpa: '2.0'
-      }, { type: 'UniversityDegreeCredential' })
-
-      var signed = signer.signCredential(credential)
-      var result = await AttestationVerifier.verifyCredential(signed)
-      expect(result.checks.signature).to.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects an issuer-spoofed credential (signer DID != issuer)', async function () {
-      // Attacker signs with their own key but claims a different issuer.
-      var attacker = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(TEST_WIF))
-      var credential = attacker.createCredential({
-        id: 'did:smartledger:subject',
-        degree: { type: 'BachelorDegree', name: 'Bachelor of Science' }
-      }, { type: 'UniversityDegreeCredential' })
-
-      // A different "trusted authority" the attacker wants to impersonate.
-      var victim = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(VICTIM_WIF))
-      expect(victim.did).to.not.equal(attacker.did)
-
-      var signed = attacker.signCredential(credential)
-      // Forge the issuer field. The proof (verificationMethod) still points at
-      // the attacker's DID, but the credential now claims the victim issued it.
-      signed.issuer = victim.did
-
-      var result = await AttestationVerifier.verifyCredential(signed)
-      expect(result.checks.signature).to.equal(false)
-      expect(result.valid).to.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('enforces the trustedIssuers allow-list (rejects untrusted issuer)', async function () {
-      var signer = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(TEST_WIF))
-      var signed = signer.signCredential(signer.createCredential(
-        { id: 'did:smartledger:subject', degree: 'BSc' },
-        { type: 'UniversityDegreeCredential' }
-      ))
-
-      // Allow-list contains a different DID than the actual issuer.
-      var other = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(VICTIM_WIF))
-      var rejected = await AttestationVerifier.verifyCredential(signed, {
-        trustedIssuers: [other.did]
-      })
-      expect(rejected.checks.issuer).to.equal(false)
-      expect(rejected.valid).to.equal(false)
-
-      // Same credential passes when its issuer IS on the allow-list.
-      var accepted = await AttestationVerifier.verifyCredential(signed, {
-        trustedIssuers: [signer.did]
-      })
-      expect(accepted.checks.issuer).to.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects a credential whose nested claims were tampered after signing', async function () {
-      var signer = AttestationSigner(bsv.PrivateKey.fromWIF(TEST_WIF))
-      var credential = signer.createCredential({
-        id: 'did:smartledger:subject',
-        degree: { type: 'BachelorDegree', name: 'Bachelor of Science' },
-        gpa: '2.0'
-      }, { type: 'UniversityDegreeCredential' })
-
-      var signed = signer.signCredential(credential)
-      // Forge the subject's claims while keeping the original signature/proof.
-      signed.credentialSubject.degree.name = 'Doctor of Philosophy'
-      signed.credentialSubject.gpa = '4.0'
-
-      var result = await AttestationVerifier.verifyCredential(signed)
-      expect(result.checks.signature).to.equal(false)
-    })
-  })
-})

package/test/gdaf/zk_prover.js

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-'use strict'
-
-/* global describe, it */
-
-// This module had ZERO test coverage, and carried three defects that coverage would have
-// caught immediately. Each is pinned below as the attack that worked, not as a paraphrase
-// of the fix, so a regression reproduces the exploit rather than merely failing a check.
-//
-// It is also not zero-knowledge, and the tests say so where it matters: the range and age
-// commitments can only be verified by opening them, which reveals the committed value.
-
-require('chai').should()
-var bsv = require('../..')
-var ZK = require('../../lib/gdaf/zk-prover')
-var Hash = require('../../lib/crypto/hash')
-
-var CRED = {
-  id: 'urn:x',
-  credentialSubject: { name: 'Alice', partyAffiliation: 'DEM', eligible: true }
-}
-
-describe('ZKProver', function () {
-  describe('range proofs', function () {
-    // The original read `return proof.inRange === true` — a boolean the prover writes
-    // about itself. valueCommitment was never consulted, so this forgery verified.
-    it('rejects a forged proof that merely claims inRange', function () {
-      var forged = {
-        type: 'RangeProof',
-        range: { min: 18, max: 120 },
-        valueCommitment: '00'.repeat(32),
-        proofHash: 'de'.repeat(32),
-        inRange: true
-      }
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(forged, 18, 120).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects an honest proof presented without its opening', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateRangeProof(41, 18, 120)
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(proof, 18, 120).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('accepts an honest proof with its opening', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateRangeProof(41, 18, 120)
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(proof, 18, 120, proof.opening).should.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    // The commitment must actually bind the value: a lie about what was committed to
-    // has to fail even though the range and structure are right.
-    it('rejects an opening that does not match the commitment', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateRangeProof(41, 18, 120)
-      var lie = { value: 12, salt: proof.opening.salt }
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(proof, 18, 120, lie).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects a value outside the stated range even if the commitment opens', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateRangeProof(41, 18, 120)
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(proof, 50, 120, proof.opening).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('returns a strict boolean', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateRangeProof(41, 18, 120)
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof(proof, 18, 120, proof.opening).should.be.a('boolean')
-      ZK.verifyRangeProof({}, 18, 120).should.be.a('boolean')
-    })
-  })
-
-  describe('age proofs', function () {
-    var BIRTH = new Date('1985-01-01T00:00:00Z')
-
-    it('rejects a forged proof that merely claims meetsRequirement', function () {
-      var forged = {
-        type: 'AgeProof',
-        minimumAge: 18,
-        meetsRequirement: true,
-        birthDateCommitment: '00'.repeat(32),
-        challengeResponse: 'anything-non-empty'
-      }
-      ZK.verifyAgeProof(forged, 18).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects an honest proof presented without its opening', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateAgeProof(BIRTH, 18)
-      ZK.verifyAgeProof(proof, 18).should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('accepts an honest proof with its opening', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateAgeProof(BIRTH, 18)
-      ZK.verifyAgeProof(proof, 18, proof.opening).should.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects an opening that does not match the commitment', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateAgeProof(BIRTH, 18)
-      ZK.verifyAgeProof(proof, 18, { birthDate: '2015-01-01', salt: proof.opening.salt })
-        .should.equal(false)
-    })
-  })
-
-  describe('selective disclosure', function () {
-    // THE LEAK. One salt covered every leaf and travelled in the proof, so the sibling
-    // hashes on the Merkle path could be brute-forced back into the withheld fields.
-    // Disclosing only the name recovered id, partyAffiliation and eligible.
-    it('does not leak the withheld fields to someone holding the proof', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-
-      // Everything an attacker gets: the proof's salts and the Merkle path.
-      var salts = proof.disclosedFields.map(function (f) { return f.salt })
-      var siblings = []
-      proof.merkleProofs.forEach(function (mp) {
-        mp.proof.forEach(function (n) { siblings.push(n.hash) })
-      })
-
-      function leaf (p, v, s) {
-        return Hash.sha256(Buffer.from(p + ':' + JSON.stringify(v) + ':' + s, 'utf8')).toString('hex')
-      }
-      function node (a, b) {
-        return Hash.sha256(Buffer.from(a + b, 'hex')).toString('hex')
-      }
-
-      var paths = ['id', 'credentialSubject.partyAffiliation', 'credentialSubject.eligible']
-      var values = ['urn:x', 'DEM', 'REP', 'IND', true, false]
-      var recovered = []
-
-      salts.forEach(function (s) {
-        // Direct leaf siblings.
-        paths.forEach(function (p) {
-          values.forEach(function (v) {
-            if (siblings.indexOf(leaf(p, v, s)) !== -1) recovered.push(p)
-          })
-        })
-        // Internal nodes: brute-force the pair beneath them.
-        paths.forEach(function (p1) {
-          values.forEach(function (v1) {
-            paths.forEach(function (p2) {
-              values.forEach(function (v2) {
-                if (siblings.indexOf(node(leaf(p1, v1, s), leaf(p2, v2, s))) !== -1) {
-                  recovered.push(p1, p2)
-                }
-              })
-            })
-          })
-        })
-      })
-
-      recovered.should.deep.equal([], 'recovered withheld fields: ' + recovered.join(', '))
-    })
-
-    it('never ships the master salt, which would reopen every leaf', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-      ;(proof.salt === undefined).should.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    // The generated salt used to be dropped on the floor: the proof returned the
-    // (undefined) `salt` ARGUMENT rather than the one createMerkleTree produced, so a
-    // proof made without an explicit salt could never verify.
-    it('verifies a proof generated without an explicit salt', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'])
-      var result = ZK.verifySelectiveProof(proof, proof.credentialRoot)
-      result.valid.should.equal(true, JSON.stringify(result.errors))
-    })
-
-    it('verifies a proof generated with an explicit salt', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-      ZK.verifySelectiveProof(proof, proof.credentialRoot).valid.should.equal(true)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects a tampered disclosed value', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-      proof.disclosedFields[0].value = 'Mallory'
-      ZK.verifySelectiveProof(proof, proof.credentialRoot).valid.should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects a proof checked against the wrong root', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-      ZK.verifySelectiveProof(proof, '00'.repeat(32)).valid.should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    it('rejects a field whose salt has been stripped', function () {
-      var proof = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'aa'.repeat(16))
-      delete proof.disclosedFields[0].salt
-      ZK.verifySelectiveProof(proof, proof.credentialRoot).valid.should.equal(false)
-    })
-
-    // Deterministic trees are still available for callers that need them, without the
-    // single-salt weakness that made them dangerous.
-    it('is deterministic given the same master salt', function () {
-      var a = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'bb'.repeat(16))
-      var b = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'bb'.repeat(16))
-      a.credentialRoot.should.equal(b.credentialRoot)
-    })
-
-    it('gives different roots for different master salts', function () {
-      var a = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'bb'.repeat(16))
-      var b = ZK.generateSelectiveProof(CRED, ['credentialSubject.name'], 'cc'.repeat(16))
-      a.credentialRoot.should.not.equal(b.credentialRoot)
-    })
-  })
-
-  // The module is reachable from the public GDAF surface, so the fixes above are not
-  // internal-only.
-  it('is exposed on the GDAF instance', function () {
-    var g = new bsv.GDAF()
-    ;(typeof g.zkProver.verifyRangeProof).should.equal('function')
-  })
-})