@smartledger/bsv 8.3.0 → 9.0.0

package/lib/covenant/helpers.js

@@ -23,42 +23,42 @@ var Signature = require('../crypto/signature')
 // SIGHASH_ALL | SIGHASH_FORKID — the BSV default these covenants are built for.
 var SIGHASH = Signature.SIGHASH_ALL | Signature.SIGHASH_FORKID // 0x41
 
-// Post-Genesis consensus + STANDARD RELAY flags — what mainnet miners actually
-// enforce. Includes SCRIPT_VERIFY_MINIMALDATA (every push must be minimal) and
-// SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S (canonical signatures). Verifying with these flags locally
-// mirrors mainnet relay/consensus policy, so a covenant that passes here is
-// expected to be accepted on broadcast — catch non-relayable scripts before then.
-function flags () {
-  var I = Interpreter
-  return I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_MINIMALDATA |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY |
-    I.SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY |
-    I.SCRIPT_ENABLE_SIGHASH_FORKID |
-    I.SCRIPT_ENABLE_MAGNETIC_OPCODES |
-    I.SCRIPT_ENABLE_MONOLITH_OPCODES |
-    // REQUIRED, not optional. pushTxCore emits OP_RIGHT/OP_LEFT — see
-    // extractHashOutputs and assertSighashType — and those bytes (180/181) are
-    // upgradable NOPs on the network until Chronicle activates. Without this
-    // flag the interpreter treats them as no-ops, exactly as a pre-Chronicle
-    // node does, and the covenant does not verify.
-    //
-    // Stated plainly: OP_PUSH_TX covenants built by this library DEPEND on
-    // Chronicle and cannot be spent on a pre-Chronicle chain. That was
-    // previously invisible because the interpreter ran the string opcodes
-    // unconditionally — more permissively than the network.
-    I.SCRIPT_ENABLE_CHRONICLE
-}
-
 /**
- * Opt into post-Genesis script limits (needed by OP_PUSH_TX covenants).
- * Thin wrapper over Interpreter.useGenesisLimits (added in 4.1.0).
+ * Current BSV mainnet consensus + standard relay flags — what miners actually
+ * enforce. A covenant that verifies here is expected to be accepted on broadcast.
+ *
+ * This DELEGATES to Interpreter.mainnetFlags() rather than assembling a list, and
+ * that is the whole point. Until 8.4.0 it was hand-assembled, and the hand-written
+ * list omitted the three UTXO-ERA flags — SCRIPT_GENESIS, SCRIPT_UTXO_AFTER_GENESIS
+ * and SCRIPT_UTXO_AFTER_CHRONICLE. It carried SCRIPT_ENABLE_CHRONICLE, which enables
+ * the string opcodes, so the omission was easy to miss: the opcodes ran, and only the
+ * *limits* were wrong.
+ *
+ * The era flags are what the interpreter derives its data limits from. Without them
+ * every covenant was verified under PRE-GENESIS rules — a 520-byte element cap that
+ * BSV removed in February 2020. An OP_PUSH_TX preimage is ~585 bytes, so this
+ * library's flagship feature could not verify against its own harness, and
+ * `enableGenesis()` existed to paper over it by raising process-wide statics. That
+ * was treating the symptom: raising the statics cannot enable post-Genesis
+ * arithmetic (only the era flags can) and it weakens pre-Genesis validation, turning
+ * 15 of the reference node's 22 SCRIPTNUM_OVERFLOW vectors into false accepts.
+ *
+ * Delegating also means the covenant path tracks consensus automatically instead of
+ * drifting the next time an era activates. `mainnetFlags()` is the same function the
+ * Interpreter uses for a no-flags verify(), so "verify locally" and "what the network
+ * does" cannot diverge again without both moving together.
+ *
+ * Two flags in the old list are deliberately gone: SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
+ * and SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY. Genesis reverted OP_CLTV/OP_CSV to
+ * upgradable NOPs for outputs created after it (see interpreter.js, the
+ * `isAfterGenesis()` short-circuit), so once the era flags are present these two
+ * change nothing. Keeping them would have implied a time-lock guarantee mainnet does
+ * not provide, which is why the CLTV-based locks were removed in 9.0.0.
+ *
+ * NULLFAIL is gained, which is strictly stricter.
  */
-function enableGenesis (max) {
-  return Interpreter.useGenesisLimits(max)
+function flags () {
+  return Interpreter.mainnetFlags()
 }
 
 /**
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ function scriptNum (n) {
 module.exports = {
   SIGHASH: SIGHASH,
   flags: flags,
-  enableGenesis: enableGenesis,
   verify: verify,
   rawPreimage: rawPreimage,
   sighashDigest: sighashDigest,

package/lib/covenant/pushtx.js

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  * Optimal parameters: private key a = 1, ephemeral k = 1  =>  r = Gx,
  *   s = (e + Gx) mod n,  pubkey P = 02||Gx,  e = HASH256(preimage).
  *
- * Requires post-Genesis limits — call SmartContract.enableGenesis() (a.k.a
- * Interpreter.useGenesisLimits()) before verifying these scripts.
+ * Verifies under mainnet consensus flags with no opt-in (8.4.0+). Earlier versions
+ * required SmartContract.enableGenesis() first; that call is now a deprecated no-op.
  */
 
 var Script = require('../script')

package/lib/custom-script-helper.js

@@ -71,22 +71,6 @@ class CustomScriptHelper {
     return script;
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Create a time-locked script (CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY)
-   * @param {number} lockTime - Block height or timestamp
-   * @param {Script} baseScript - Base script to execute after time lock
-   * @returns {Script} Time-locked script
-   */
-  static createTimelockScript(lockTime, baseScript) {
-    const lockTimeBuffer = Buffer.from(lockTime.toString(16).padStart(8, '0'), 'hex').reverse();
-    
-    return new Script()
-      .add(lockTimeBuffer)
-      .add(Opcode.OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY)
-      .add(Opcode.OP_DROP)
-      .add(baseScript.toBuffer());
-  }
-
   /**
    * Create a conditional script (IF/ELSE/ENDIF)
    * @param {Script} ifScript - Script to execute if condition is true

package/lib/notaryhash/index.js

@@ -241,6 +241,26 @@ NotaryHash.verifyBatchInclusion = function (certificate) {
     var m = certificate.merkle
     if (!m) return { valid: false, errors: ['batch certificate has no merkle proof'] }
 
+    // THE LEAF IS proofHash, NOT canonicalBytes.
+    //
+    // BRC-220 §On-chain record says the batch tree is RFC 6962 and writes
+    // `leaf = SHA256(0x00 ‖ d)` — but that is RFC 6962's own generic notation for the
+    // construction, and the spec never binds `d` to a value. `canonicalBytes` appears
+    // once in the whole document, in the proofHash definition, and nowhere in the batch
+    // text.
+    //
+    // So this is a choice the implementation had to make, and it is:
+    //
+    //     leaf = SHA-256(0x00 ‖ proofHash) = SHA-256(0x00 ‖ SHA-256(canonicalBytes))
+    //
+    // The other reading — d = canonicalBytes — is equally sound cryptographically and
+    // produces a DIFFERENT root. A certificate built that way fails inclusion here with
+    // no error naming the cause: the fold simply does not reach the root. Anyone building
+    // batches with the exported NotaryHash.Merkle must use proofHash as the leaf datum.
+    //
+    // Reasoning and the proposed spec text: docs/BRC220_BATCH_LEAF_AMENDMENT.md.
+    // Enforced by test/notaryhash/batch_leaf.js, which checks that a canonicalBytes-leaf
+    // tree is rejected rather than trusting the comment.
     var leafData = Buffer.from(certificate.proofHash, 'hex')
     var path = (m.path || []).map(function (node) {
       return Buffer.isBuffer(node) ? node : Buffer.from(node, 'hex')

package/lib/notaryhash/merkle.js

@@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ var $ = require('../util/preconditions')
  * root. Every non-power-of-two tree depends on getting this right.
  */
 
+/**
+ * For BRC-220 batch mode the leaf datum `d` is a certificate's **proofHash**, so a leaf
+ * is `SHA-256(0x00 ‖ proofHash)`. The spec writes `leaf = SHA256(0x00 ‖ d)` using
+ * RFC 6962's generic notation and never binds `d`; passing `canonicalBytes` instead is
+ * equally sound and yields a different root, which NotaryHash.verifyBatchInclusion will
+ * reject. See docs/BRC220_BATCH_LEAF_AMENDMENT.md.
+ */
+
 var Merkle = {}
 
 /** Prefix bytes, per RFC 6962 §2.1. */

package/lib/notaryhash/suites.js

@@ -146,7 +146,23 @@ Suites.register('ECDSA-secp256k1', {
 
     var ecdsa = new ECDSA()
     ecdsa.hashbuf = payloadHash
-    ecdsa.endian = 'little'
+    // NO endian override. `payloadHash` is the scalar, big-endian, exactly as the
+    // 32 bytes are given — which is what every other ECDSA implementation does and
+    // what BRC-220 means by "signs the payloadHash".
+    //
+    // 8.3.0 set `endian = 'little'` here, which made ECDSA reverse the digest before
+    // reducing it to the scalar. That is Bitcoin's message-signing convention, not
+    // this protocol's, and it is why lib/crypto/ecdsa.js offers the option at all.
+    //
+    // The effect was on the VERIFY side: a signature produced the way BRC-220
+    // specifies was rejected, and the only signatures accepted were ones made with
+    // bsv's own little-endian convention. Every test in this repo signed that way
+    // too, so the module and its tests were self-consistent and wrong together —
+    // the exact failure shape test/notaryhash/encoding.js warns about in its header.
+    //
+    // test/notaryhash/interop.js now pins this against @noble/curves, which shares
+    // no verification code with lib/crypto/ecdsa.js. A second implementation is the
+    // only thing that can catch a defect where the code and its tests agree.
     ecdsa.pubkey = pubkey
     ecdsa.sig = sig
     return ecdsa.verify() === true

package/lib/ordinals/ordlock.js

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  *   OP_ENDIF
  *   [OP_FALSE OP_IF "ord" … OP_ENDIF]   // optional inert inscription envelope
  *
- * Requires post-Genesis limits: call SmartContract.enableGenesis() before verifying.
+ * Verifies under mainnet consensus flags with no opt-in (8.4.0+).
  */
 var P = require('../covenant/pushtx')
 var H = require('../covenant/helpers')

package/lib/smart_contract/debugger.js

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
  * Step-traces a locking/unlocking pair through Script.Interpreter and records the
  * stack + alt-stack after every opcode, so you can watch an OP_PUSH_TX covenant
  * build its signature and enforce its constraints. Uses the interpreter's
- * stepListener hook. Call SmartContract.enableGenesis() first for OP_PUSH_TX
- * covenants (their preimage element / opcode count exceed pre-Genesis limits).
+ * stepListener hook. No opt-in is needed since 8.4.0: covenants verify under mainnet
+ * consensus flags, whose era bits lift the pre-Genesis element and opcode caps.
  */
 
 var Interpreter = require('../script/interpreter')

package/lib/smart_contract/dsl.js

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
  *   // c.unlock(spendTx, satoshis) -> grinds + returns the preimage unlock Script
  *
  * Each clause compiles to one preimage-field check on top of a single OP_PUSH_TX
- * authentication; clauses AND together. Requires post-Genesis limits at verify
- * time (SmartContract.enableGenesis()).
+ * authentication; clauses AND together. Verifies under mainnet consensus flags with
+ * no opt-in (8.4.0+).
  */
 
 var PushTx = require('../covenant/pushtx')

package/lib/smart_contract/index.js

@@ -70,9 +70,6 @@ SmartContract.trace = function (unlockingScript, lockingScript, opts) {
 
 // --- Covenant convenience API (v4.2.0) ---
 // Opt into post-Genesis script limits (required by OP_PUSH_TX covenants).
-SmartContract.enableGenesis = function (max) {
-  return SmartContract.CovenantHelpers.enableGenesis(max)
-}
 // Verify an unlocking/locking pair through the consensus interpreter.
 SmartContract.verifyScript = function (unlockingScript, lockingScript, opts) {
   return SmartContract.CovenantHelpers.verify(unlockingScript, lockingScript, opts)

package/lib/smart_contract/locks.js

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ var H = require('../covenant/helpers')
 var Script = require('../script')
 var Opcode = require('../opcode')
 var signInput = H.signInput
-var n = H.scriptNum
 
 /** Hash-lock: reveal a preimage whose SHA-256 matches a digest. */
 function hashLock (secret) {
@@ -36,20 +35,6 @@ function p2pkh (privateKey) {
   }
 }
 
-/** CLTV absolute time-lock: <locktime> CLTV DROP <pk> CHECKSIG. */
-function timeLockCLTV (privateKey, locktime) {
-  var pub = privateKey.toPublicKey()
-  var lock = new Script()
-    .add(n(locktime)).add(Opcode.OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY).add(Opcode.OP_DROP)
-    .add(pub.toBuffer()).add(Opcode.OP_CHECKSIG)
-  return {
-    lock: lock,
-    meta: { name: 'cltv-timelock', locktime: locktime },
-    // Caller must set spend.nLockTime >= locktime and input sequence < 0xffffffff.
-    unlock: function (spend, sats) { return new Script().add(signInput(spend, privateKey, 0, lock, sats)) }
-  }
-}
-
 /** m-of-n multisig. */
 function multisig (m, privateKeys) {
   var pubs = privateKeys.map(function (k) { return k.toPublicKey() })
@@ -68,33 +53,8 @@ function multisig (m, privateKeys) {
   }
 }
 
-/** HTLC: hash-OR-timeout. */
-function htlc (opts) {
-  var digest = Hash.sha256(opts.secret)
-  var lock = new Script()
-    .add(Opcode.OP_IF)
-    .add(Opcode.OP_SHA256).add(digest).add(Opcode.OP_EQUALVERIFY)
-    .add(opts.receiver.toPublicKey().toBuffer()).add(Opcode.OP_CHECKSIG)
-    .add(Opcode.OP_ELSE)
-    .add(n(opts.timeout)).add(Opcode.OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY).add(Opcode.OP_DROP)
-    .add(opts.sender.toPublicKey().toBuffer()).add(Opcode.OP_CHECKSIG)
-    .add(Opcode.OP_ENDIF)
-  return {
-    lock: lock,
-    meta: { name: 'htlc', digest: digest.toString('hex'), timeout: opts.timeout },
-    unlockClaim: function (spend, sats) {
-      return new Script().add(signInput(spend, opts.receiver, 0, lock, sats)).add(opts.secret).add(Opcode.OP_1)
-    },
-    unlockRefund: function (spend, sats) {
-      return new Script().add(signInput(spend, opts.sender, 0, lock, sats)).add(Opcode.OP_0)
-    }
-  }
-}
-
 module.exports = {
   hashLock: hashLock,
   p2pkh: p2pkh,
-  timeLockCLTV: timeLockCLTV,
-  multisig: multisig,
-  htlc: htlc
+  multisig: multisig
 }

package/lib/smart_contract/pels.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * the slice preimage[104 : len-52] is exactly the `scriptlen||script` half of a
  * TxOut, so the next output is `<newValue:8-LE> || preimage[104:len-52]`.
  *
- * Requires post-Genesis limits (SmartContract.enableGenesis()).
+ * Verifies under mainnet consensus flags with no opt-in (8.4.0+).
  */
 
 var P = require('../covenant/pushtx')

package/lib/smart_contract/token.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  *       surrounding output bytes and the token's value; the covenant binds them
  *       into the committed hashOutputs. Value conservation is left to the network.
  *
- * Requires post-Genesis limits (SmartContract.enableGenesis()).
+ * Verifies under mainnet consensus flags with no opt-in (8.4.0+).
  */
 
 var BN = require('../crypto/bn')

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@smartledger/bsv",
-  "version": "8.3.0",
+  "version": "9.0.0",
   "description": "🚀 Complete Bitcoin SV development framework with legally-recognizable DID:web + W3C VC-JWT toolkit, Legal Token Protocol (LTP), Global Digital Attestation Framework (GDAF), StatusList2021 revocation, and 16 flexible loading options. Standards-based credentials with ES256/ES256K support, on-chain BSV anchoring, and comprehensive Bitcoin SV API. Perfect for legal tokens, verifiable credentials, DeFi, smart contracts, and secure Bitcoin applications.",
   "author": "SmartLedger Technology <hello@smartledger.technology> (https://smartledger.technology)",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/codenlighten/smartledger-bsv#readme",
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
     "vectors:sv-tx": "node tools/sv-tx-report.js",
     "vectors:sv-sighash": "node tools/sv-sighash-report.js",
     "conformance:generate": "node conformance/generate.js",
+    "check:readme": "node scripts/check-readme-accuracy.js",
     "lint:ratchet": "node scripts/lint-ratchet.js",
     "lint:ratchet:update": "node scripts/lint-ratchet.js --update",
     "test": "mocha",
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@
     "test:browser": "echo 'Open tests/standalone-modules-test.html in browser for comprehensive testing'",
     "test:bundle": "echo 'Open tests/bundle-completeness-test.html in browser to verify bundle completeness'",
     "preimage:extract": "node examples/preimage/extract_preimage_bidirectional.js",
-    "prepublishOnly": "npm run build-all",
+    "prepublishOnly": "npm run build-all && npm run check:readme",
     "sync-cdn": "node scripts/sync-cdn-urls.js",
     "version": "node scripts/sync-cdn-urls.js && node scripts/sync-version.js && node scripts/gen-esm-wrapper.js && git add README.md docs version.js index.mjs",
     "test:browser:ci": "node tests/browser-smoke-runner.js"

package/test/build/esm_wrapper.js

@@ -43,9 +43,30 @@ describe('ESM wrapper (index.mjs)', function () {
     var bsv = require('../..')
     var names = gen.exportableNames(bsv)
     names.length.should.be.above(100)
-    // SmartUTXO is an accessor (deprecated getter) and must be excluded.
-    names.should.not.include('SmartUTXO')
-    Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(bsv, 'SmartUTXO').get.should.be.a('function')
+  })
+
+  // The library currently has NO accessor properties — bsv.SmartUTXO, the last one,
+  // was removed in 9.0.0. The exclusion rule still matters: re-exporting a getter as a
+  // named ESM binding evaluates it at import time, which for a deprecated accessor
+  // means a warning (or worse, a side effect) fires on a bare `import`. Testing that
+  // against a synthetic accessor keeps the guarantee under test instead of letting it
+  // rot untested until someone adds a getter back.
+  itFromCheckout('excludes accessor properties from the named bindings', function () {
+    var bsv = require('../..')
+    var probe = '__esmAccessorProbe__'
+    var touched = false
+    Object.defineProperty(bsv, probe, {
+      configurable: true,
+      enumerable: true,
+      get: function () { touched = true; return 1 }
+    })
+    try {
+      var names = gen.exportableNames(bsv)
+      names.should.not.include(probe)
+      touched.should.equal(false, 'exportableNames must not invoke the getter')
+    } finally {
+      delete bsv[probe]
+    }
   })
 
   it('resolves real ESM default + named imports natively', function () {
@@ -55,9 +76,9 @@ describe('ESM wrapper (index.mjs)', function () {
       'PrivateKey === bsv.PrivateKey && typeof crypto.ECDSA === "function") ? 0 : 3)')
   })
 
-  it('does not emit the SmartUTXO deprecation warning at import (getter excluded)', function () {
-    // Re-exporting the getter would trip its console.warn at import time; stderr
-    // must be empty for a bare `import './index.mjs'`.
+  it('emits nothing on stderr at import', function () {
+    // Re-exporting a deprecated getter would trip its console.warn at import time;
+    // stderr must be empty for a bare `import './index.mjs'`.
     var res = spawnSync(process.execPath,
       ['--input-type=module', '-e', 'import ' + JSON.stringify('./index.mjs') + ';'],
       { cwd: ROOT, encoding: 'utf8' })
@@ -65,9 +86,12 @@ describe('ESM wrapper (index.mjs)', function () {
     res.stderr.should.equal('')
   })
 
-  it('keeps deprecated getters reachable via the default export only', function () {
+  it('no longer exposes bsv.SmartUTXO, which was removed in 9.0.0', function () {
+    // Deliberately asserted rather than dropped: the namespace export is gone, and the
+    // module is reached by direct import — require('@smartledger/bsv/lib/smartutxo') —
+    // which is what its deprecation warning instructed from 4.0.1 onward.
     runEsm(
       'import bsv from ' + JSON.stringify('./index.mjs') + ';' +
-      'process.exit(("SmartUTXO" in bsv) ? 0 : 3)')
+      'process.exit(("SmartUTXO" in bsv) ? 3 : 0)')
   })
 })

package/test/data/brc220-batch-vector.json

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+{
+  "_comment": "BRC-220 batch-mode golden vector. Generated by tools/gen-brc220-batch-vector.js; do not hand-edit. Every value is derived from the labelled preimages recorded on each proof, so the file is reproducible from scratch in any language. THE POINT OF THIS FILE: BRC-220 writes the batch leaf as SHA256(0x00 || d) and never says what d is. This vector fixes d = proofHash. The `rejectedReading` block records what the same five proofs produce under d = canonicalBytes — equally sound cryptographically, a different root, and therefore not interoperable. An implementation matching `rejectedReading.root` has made the other choice, which is exactly the confusion this vector exists to make visible. This is a conformance target produced by @smartledger/bsv, not external validation. The tree beneath it is externally anchored: the RFC 6962 construction is verified against the published Certificate Transparency roots in test/notaryhash/merkle.js. n = 5 deliberately: RFC 6962 splits at the largest power of two BELOW n, so this splits 4/1 (a midpoint split would give 2/3 and a different root), and the odd count exercises the rule that the last leaf is never duplicated.",
+  "spec": "BRC-220",
+  "tree": "RFC 6962",
+  "leafDatum": "proofHash",
+  "leafRule": "leaf = SHA-256(0x00 || proofHash); node = SHA-256(0x01 || left || right)",
+  "leafCount": 5,
+  "root": "abb53eb3b2e3530d51685c6813bb85c85892d2f214c2dc504029d071434ac074",
+  "onChainRecordTail": {
+    "_comment": "The batch record is \"NOTARYHASH\" | u8(1) | u8(2) | merkleRoot(32) | u32be(leafCount).",
+    "merkleRoot": "abb53eb3b2e3530d51685c6813bb85c85892d2f214c2dc504029d071434ac074",
+    "leafCountU32be": "00000005"
+  },
+  "rejectedReading": {
+    "_comment": "What d = canonicalBytes yields over the SAME five proofs. Recorded so the divergence is checkable, not to endorse it.",
+    "leafDatum": "canonicalBytes",
+    "root": "4a59ade74941e4d6ca4b7c9f610e0a01a0c3f24cfa94efe816e53ef85f99e324"
+  },
+  "proofs": [
+    {
+      "leafIndex": 0,
+      "keyPreimage": "BRC-220/batch-vector/key/0",
+      "payloadPreimage": "BRC-220/batch-vector/payload/0",
+      "algorithm": "ECDSA-secp256k1",
+      "hashAlgorithm": "SHA-256",
+      "encoding": "raw",
+      "payloadHash": "c61d9c7e35b46dc1ceea30094e1a2809d45d16014fa70ccfc75fc4d6f672643b",
+      "publicKey": "02ce29a831e3d359386c7f70ef7fd85a75d79168d546dd8a60a520df0e24c65ef3",
+      "signature": "1026f99510a52863e43e3e5a57395c9838a3e44a768932d35b460a287630c24e3bc3b81e1bb2cb7c834f5be97936a6a49ff9eb7adaae7670e32d6bc3a5c067cf",
+      "createdAt": "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+      "createdAtUnix": 1767225600,
+      "canonicalBytes": "0000000e4e6f74617279486173682f312e30010000000f45434453412d736563703235366b31000000075348412d32353600000020c61d9c7e35b46dc1ceea30094e1a2809d45d16014fa70ccfc75fc4d6f672643b0000002102ce29a831e3d359386c7f70ef7fd85a75d79168d546dd8a60a520df0e24c65ef3000000401026f99510a52863e43e3e5a57395c9838a3e44a768932d35b460a287630c24e3bc3b81e1bb2cb7c834f5be97936a6a49ff9eb7adaae7670e32d6bc3a5c067cf000000006955b900",
+      "proofHash": "83f3f73ebc5146b96cce1ee0b6ed4fd251a933a5332fbe5e5ab80da7920fe2c9",
+      "leafHash": "27547ba238fba426b766979a4a46cd97578945cf450c113e45b487291cb56ba4",
+      "leafHashUnderRejectedReading": "ab0ee539d3e08e07a6aac157af2d3df5da5f637c5c360fa158a00d14c6644f05",
+      "path": [
+        "7cd7c9b4bc74dcc5d586f7b04f1f7bdf025a15f7e173dba021c8ed7fd84acdbf",
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