@slicedearth/whoisleuth-cli 2.3.0 → 2.5.1

package/lib/risk-scoring.mjs

@@ -1,345 +1,2 @@
-import { calibrateExternalIntelligenceRisk } from "./external-intelligence-risk.mjs";
-import { buildScoreEvidenceQuality, } from "./scoring-evidence-quality.mjs";
-const RISK_STATES = new Set(['registered', 'for_sale', 'expiring']);
-const STATE_LABELS = Object.freeze({
-    for_sale: 'for sale',
-    expiring: 'expiring/pending delete',
-    registered: 'registered',
-});
-// Version 8 keeps unreviewed whole-page similarity as visible review context
-// without assigning it Risk points. Reviewed favicon and official-asset
-// observations remain bounded within the brand-presentation family, generic
-// operational properties remain supporting context, and missing evidence never
-// contributes points.
-export const RISK_MODEL_VERSION = 8;
-export const RISK_REVIEW_THRESHOLD = 70;
-const CURRENT_RISK_MODEL = Object.freeze({
-    modelVersion: RISK_MODEL_VERSION,
-    includePageBaselineMatch: false,
-});
-const RISK_MODEL_V7 = Object.freeze({
-    modelVersion: 7,
-    includePageBaselineMatch: true,
-});
-const RISK_STATE_BASE = Object.freeze({
-    registered: 6,
-    for_sale: 4,
-    expiring: 5,
-});
-const FAMILY_CAPS = Object.freeze({
-    'domain-resemblance': 20,
-    'brand-presentation': 24,
-    'credential-lure': 18,
-    'external-intelligence': 18,
-    'operational-support': 12,
-});
-const REMOVABLE_RISK_FAMILY_MAP = Object.freeze({
-    'brand-presentation': true,
-    'credential-lure': true,
-    'domain-resemblance': true,
-    'external-intelligence': true,
-    'operational-support': true,
-});
-const REMOVABLE_RISK_FAMILIES = Object.freeze(Object.keys(REMOVABLE_RISK_FAMILY_MAP));
-const HIGH_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS = new Set([
-    'unicode_homoglyph',
-    'unicode_homoglyph_depth_2',
-    'dictionary',
-    'dictionary_token_replacement',
-]);
-const MEDIUM_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS = new Set(['ascii_homoglyph', 'bitsquatting', 'tld_embedding', 'tld_typo', 'tld_substitution']);
-const LOW_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS = new Set([
-    'character_addition',
-    'character_omission',
-    'character_duplication',
-    'character_transposition',
-    'pluralization',
-    'www_prefix',
-    'hyphenation',
-    'separator_omission',
-    'word_reordering',
-    'keyboard_substitution',
-    'keyboard_insertion',
-    'vowel_swap',
-]);
-export const RISK_MUTATION_TYPES = Object.freeze([
-    ...HIGH_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS,
-    ...MEDIUM_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS,
-    ...LOW_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS,
-]);
-export function normalizeRiskModelVersion(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value > 0 && value <= 1000 ? value : null;
-}
-function formatAge(days) {
-    if (days < 60)
-        return `${Math.round(days)}d old`;
-    const years = days / 365.25;
-    return years < 1 ? `${Math.round(days / 30)}mo old` : `${years.toFixed(1)}y old`;
-}
-function mutationContext(mutationTypes) {
-    if (!Array.isArray(mutationTypes))
-        return null;
-    const bounded = mutationTypes.slice(0, 30);
-    if (bounded.some((value) => typeof value === 'string' && HIGH_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS.has(value))) {
-        return { label: 'High-similarity or phishing-term candidate context', delta: 18 };
-    }
-    if (bounded.some((value) => typeof value === 'string' && MEDIUM_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS.has(value))) {
-        return { label: 'Lookalike candidate context', delta: 12 };
-    }
-    if (bounded.some((value) => typeof value === 'string' && LOW_CONTEXT_MUTATIONS.has(value))) {
-        return { label: 'Generated variation candidate context', delta: 8 };
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-function hasBoolean(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'boolean';
-}
-function scoreQuality(input) {
-    const observedFamilies = ['registration'];
-    const expectedFamilies = ['registration', 'operational-support'];
-    if (Array.isArray(input.mutationTypes) || hasBoolean(input.idnReferenceMatch))
-        observedFamilies.push('domain-resemblance');
-    if (input.hasActiveBrandProfile === true)
-        expectedFamilies.push('domain-resemblance', 'brand-presentation');
-    if ([input.faviconMatch, input.faviconNearMatch, input.reusesOfficialAssets, input.pageBaselineMatch].some(hasBoolean)) {
-        observedFamilies.push('brand-presentation');
-    }
-    if ([input.hasPasswordField, input.hasExternalFormAction].some(hasBoolean) || typeof input.phishingLanguageMatch === 'string') {
-        observedFamilies.push('credential-lure');
-    }
-    if (calibrateExternalIntelligenceRisk(input.threatIntelligence, input.domain).eligibleProviderCount > 0) {
-        observedFamilies.push('external-intelligence');
-    }
-    if ([input.hasMx, input.hasSpf, input.hasDmarc].some(hasBoolean)
-        || typeof input.activityStatus === 'string'
-        || typeof input.domainAgeDays === 'number')
-        observedFamilies.push('operational-support');
-    if (input.scanDepth === 'deep')
-        expectedFamilies.push('credential-lure');
-    return buildScoreEvidenceQuality(input, {
-        expectedDepth: 'deep',
-        observedFamilies,
-        expectedFamilies,
-    });
-}
-// Risk prioritizes a registered lookalike/typosquat domain for analyst review.
-// It is a heuristic indicator, never a maliciousness or safety verdict.
-function explainRiskScoreInternal(input, excludedFamily, model) {
-    const state = input.availability ?? input.state;
-    if (typeof state !== 'string' || !RISK_STATES.has(state))
-        return null;
-    const factors = [];
-    const familyTotals = new Map();
-    const add = (family, label, requestedDelta) => {
-        if (family === excludedFamily)
-            return 0;
-        const current = familyTotals.get(family) ?? 0;
-        const cap = FAMILY_CAPS[family] ?? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;
-        const delta = Math.max(0, Math.min(requestedDelta, Math.max(0, cap - current)));
-        const capped = delta !== requestedDelta;
-        factors.push({ family, label: capped ? `${label} (family cap reached)` : label, delta });
-        familyTotals.set(family, current + delta);
-        return delta;
-    };
-    add('registration', `Base context for “${STATE_LABELS[state] ?? state}”`, RISK_STATE_BASE[state] ?? 0);
-    const mutation = mutationContext(input.mutationTypes);
-    if (mutation)
-        add('domain-resemblance', mutation.label, mutation.delta);
-    if (input.idnReferenceMatch === true)
-        add('domain-resemblance', 'IDN skeleton matches an official Brand Profile domain', 20);
-    if (input.faviconMatch === true)
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Favicon matches an official Brand Profile site', 18);
-    else if (input.faviconNearMatch === true)
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Favicon resembles an official Brand Profile site', 14);
-    if (input.reusesOfficialAssets === true)
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Official asset-host relationship observed', 6);
-    if (model.includePageBaselineMatch && input.pageBaselineMatch === true) {
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Multiple independently compared page-identity components match the official baseline', 14);
-    }
-    if (typeof input.phishingLanguageMatch === 'string' && input.phishingLanguageMatch.trim()) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'Suspicious urgency language observed', 8);
-    }
-    if (input.hasPasswordField === true && input.hasExternalFormAction === true) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'Password form submits to an external origin', 10);
-    }
-    else if (input.hasPasswordField === true) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'Login/password form present', 5);
-    }
-    else if (input.hasExternalFormAction === true) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'External form destination observed without a password field', 0);
-    }
-    const external = calibrateExternalIntelligenceRisk(input.threatIntelligence, input.domain);
-    if (external.factor)
-        add('external-intelligence', external.factor.label, external.contribution);
-    const primaryFamilies = ['domain-resemblance', 'brand-presentation', 'credential-lure', 'external-intelligence']
-        .filter((family) => (familyTotals.get(family) ?? 0) > 0);
-    if (primaryFamilies.length >= 2) {
-        add('corroboration', `Corroborating context across ${primaryFamilies.length} independent evidence families`, primaryFamilies.length >= 3 ? 18 : 10);
-    }
-    const hasIndependentContext = primaryFamilies.length > 0;
-    const supporting = (label, delta) => {
-        add('operational-support', hasIndependentContext ? label : `${label}; neutral without independent suspicious context`, hasIndependentContext ? delta : 0);
-    };
-    if (input.activityStatus === 'active')
-        supporting('Active website observed', 4);
-    if (input.hasMx === true)
-        supporting('Mail server configured', 4);
-    if (input.hasSpf === true && input.hasDmarc === true)
-        supporting('SPF and DMARC records present', 1);
-    else if (input.hasSpf === true || input.hasDmarc === true)
-        supporting('SPF or DMARC record present', 0);
-    if (typeof input.domainAgeDays === 'number' && Number.isFinite(input.domainAgeDays) && input.domainAgeDays >= 0) {
-        if (input.domainAgeDays < 90)
-            supporting(`Recently registered (${formatAge(input.domainAgeDays)})`, 6);
-        else if (input.domainAgeDays < 365)
-            supporting(`Registered under a year ago (${formatAge(input.domainAgeDays)})`, 2);
-    }
-    if (typeof input.privacyProtected === 'boolean') {
-        add('registration', 'Registration privacy is neutral context', 0);
-    }
-    const rawScore = Math.round(factors.reduce((total, factor) => total + factor.delta, 0));
-    const score = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, rawScore));
-    const familyOrder = [
-        'registration', 'domain-resemblance', 'brand-presentation', 'credential-lure',
-        'external-intelligence', 'corroboration', 'operational-support',
-    ];
-    return {
-        modelVersion: model.modelVersion,
-        score,
-        rawScore,
-        capped: score !== rawScore,
-        factors,
-        families: familyOrder
-            .filter((id) => familyTotals.has(id))
-            .map((id) => ({ id, contribution: familyTotals.get(id) ?? 0, cap: FAMILY_CAPS[id] ?? null })),
-        evidenceQuality: scoreQuality(input),
-    };
-}
-export function explainRiskScore(input) {
-    return explainRiskScoreInternal(input, null, CURRENT_RISK_MODEL);
-}
-export function buildRiskScoreSensitivity(input) {
-    const baseline = explainRiskScoreInternal(input, null, CURRENT_RISK_MODEL);
-    if (!baseline)
-        return null;
-    const removableFamilies = REMOVABLE_RISK_FAMILIES
-        .filter((family) => baseline.families.some((item) => item.id === family && item.contribution > 0));
-    const scenarios = removableFamilies.map((excludedFamily) => {
-        const result = explainRiskScoreInternal(input, excludedFamily, CURRENT_RISK_MODEL);
-        const score = result?.score ?? baseline.score;
-        return Object.freeze({ excludedFamily, score, difference: score - baseline.score });
-    }).sort((left, right) => left.score - right.score || left.excludedFamily.localeCompare(right.excludedFamily));
-    const minimumScenarioScore = scenarios[0]?.score ?? baseline.score;
-    const thresholdState = baseline.score < RISK_REVIEW_THRESHOLD
-        ? 'below'
-        : minimumScenarioScore < RISK_REVIEW_THRESHOLD ? 'crosses' : 'stable_above';
-    return Object.freeze({
-        version: 1,
-        baselineScore: baseline.score,
-        reviewThreshold: RISK_REVIEW_THRESHOLD,
-        minimumScenarioScore,
-        thresholdState,
-        scenarios: Object.freeze(scenarios),
-        limitations: Object.freeze([
-            'Each scenario removes one observed evidence family and recalculates family caps and corroboration; it does not predict missing evidence.',
-            'The sensitivity review qualifies prioritisation only and does not determine maliciousness, safety, ownership, or intent.',
-        ]),
-    });
-}
-export function computeRiskScore(input) {
-    return explainRiskScore(input)?.score ?? null;
-}
-// Retained only for deterministic offline comparison of reviewed calibration
-// datasets. Runtime lookups always use the current model above.
-export function explainRiskScoreV7(input) {
-    return explainRiskScoreInternal(input, null, RISK_MODEL_V7);
-}
-// Retained only for deterministic offline comparison of reviewed calibration
-// datasets. Runtime lookups always use the current model above.
-export function explainRiskScoreV6(input) {
-    const state = input.availability ?? input.state;
-    if (typeof state !== 'string' || !RISK_STATES.has(state))
-        return null;
-    const legacyBase = { registered: 10, for_sale: 5, expiring: 8 };
-    const factors = [];
-    const totals = new Map();
-    const add = (family, label, delta) => {
-        factors.push({ family, label, delta });
-        totals.set(family, (totals.get(family) ?? 0) + delta);
-    };
-    add('registration', `Base score for “${STATE_LABELS[state] ?? state}”`, legacyBase[state] ?? 0);
-    const contextual = new Set();
-    const context = mutationContext(input.mutationTypes);
-    if (context) {
-        add('domain-resemblance', context.label, context.delta);
-        contextual.add('domain-resemblance');
-    }
-    if (input.faviconMatch === true) {
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Favicon matches an official Brand Profile site', 18);
-        contextual.add('brand-presentation');
-    }
-    else if (input.faviconNearMatch === true) {
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Favicon resembles an official Brand Profile site', 14);
-        contextual.add('brand-presentation');
-    }
-    if (input.reusesOfficialAssets === true) {
-        add('brand-presentation', 'Official asset-host relationship observed', 6);
-        contextual.add('brand-presentation');
-    }
-    if (typeof input.phishingLanguageMatch === 'string' && input.phishingLanguageMatch.trim()) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'Suspicious urgency language observed', 8);
-        contextual.add('credential-lure');
-    }
-    if (input.hasPasswordField === true) {
-        add('credential-lure', 'Login/password form present', 5);
-        contextual.add('credential-lure');
-    }
-    if (contextual.size >= 2)
-        add('corroboration', `Corroborating context across ${contextual.size} distinct evidence families`, contextual.size >= 3 ? 20 : 10);
-    const external = calibrateExternalIntelligenceRisk(input.threatIntelligence, input.domain);
-    if (external.factor)
-        add('external-intelligence', external.factor.label, external.contribution);
-    if (input.activityStatus === 'active')
-        add('operational-support', 'Active site in use', 8);
-    if (input.hasMx === true)
-        add('operational-support', 'Mail server configured', 8);
-    if (input.hasSpf === true && input.hasDmarc === true)
-        add('operational-support', 'SPF and DMARC records present', 3);
-    else if (input.hasSpf === true || input.hasDmarc === true)
-        add('operational-support', 'SPF or DMARC record present', 1);
-    if (input.privacyProtected === true)
-        add('registration', 'WHOIS privacy protected', 3);
-    if (typeof input.domainAgeDays === 'number' && Number.isFinite(input.domainAgeDays) && input.domainAgeDays >= 0) {
-        if (input.domainAgeDays < 90)
-            add('operational-support', `Recently registered (${formatAge(input.domainAgeDays)})`, 10);
-        else if (input.domainAgeDays < 365)
-            add('operational-support', `Registered under a year ago (${formatAge(input.domainAgeDays)})`, 4);
-    }
-    const rawScore = Math.round(factors.reduce((total, factor) => total + factor.delta, 0));
-    const score = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, rawScore));
-    return {
-        modelVersion: 6,
-        score,
-        rawScore,
-        capped: score !== rawScore,
-        factors,
-        families: [...totals].map(([id, contribution]) => ({ id, contribution, cap: null })),
-        evidenceQuality: scoreQuality(input),
-    };
-}
-export function riskTone(score) {
-    if (score === null)
-        return 'neutral';
-    if (score >= RISK_REVIEW_THRESHOLD)
-        return 'danger';
-    if (score >= 40)
-        return 'warn';
-    return 'neutral';
-}
-export function formatScoreBreakdown(explained, separator = '\n') {
-    if (!explained)
-        return '';
-    const parts = explained.factors.map((factor) => `${factor.label} ${factor.delta >= 0 ? '+' : ''}${Math.round(factor.delta)}`);
-    parts.push(`Total ${explained.score} · Risk model v${explained.modelVersion} · evidence ${explained.evidenceQuality.state}`);
-    return parts.join(separator);
-}
+// Retained public import; the runtime-neutral implementation lives in the domain layer.
+export * from "../packages/analysis/risk-scoring.mjs";

package/lib/rpki-evidence.mjs

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ function record(value) {
         : null;
 }
 function normalizeAsn(value) {
-    const text = typeof value === 'string' ? value.trim().replace(/^AS/iu, '') : value;
-    const number = Number(text);
-    return Number.isInteger(number) && number >= 0 && number <= 4_294_967_295 ? number : null;
+    const number = typeof value === 'number' ? value
+        : typeof value === 'string' && value.length <= 16 && /^(?:AS)?\d{1,10}$/iu.test(value.trim())
+            ? Number(value.trim().replace(/^AS/iu, '')) : NaN;
+    return Number.isSafeInteger(number) && number >= 0 && number <= 4_294_967_295 ? number : null;
 }
 function normalizeAuthorization(value) {
     const source = record(value);
@@ -21,7 +22,8 @@ function normalizeAuthorization(value) {
     const parsedPrefix = parseIpPrefix(prefix);
     const asn = normalizeAsn(source.asn ?? source.asID ?? source.origin);
     const maxLengthValue = source.maxLength ?? source.max_length ?? parsedPrefix?.length;
-    const maxLength = Number(maxLengthValue);
+    const maxLength = typeof maxLengthValue === 'number' ? maxLengthValue
+        : typeof maxLengthValue === 'string' && /^\d{1,3}$/u.test(maxLengthValue) ? Number(maxLengthValue) : NaN;
     const maximum = parsedPrefix?.family === 4 ? 32 : 128;
     if (!parsedPrefix || asn === null || !Number.isInteger(maxLength)
         || maxLength < parsedPrefix.length || maxLength > maximum)
@@ -49,8 +51,9 @@ function reviewRpkiRoute(input) {
     const baseLimitations = Object.freeze([
         'This offline review evaluates an explicitly supplied route prefix and origin ASN against an analyst-supplied VRP snapshot.',
         'It does not collect BGP announcements, establish route ownership, or prove that the snapshot was current or complete.',
+        'AS0 authorisations do not authorise an announcement. An AS0 route origin is invalid input; snapshot validation and signature verification remain external to this review.',
     ]);
-    if (!route || originAsn === null || !rows) {
+    if (!route || originAsn === null || originAsn === 0 || !rows) {
         return Object.freeze({
             schema: RPKI_EVIDENCE_SCHEMA,
             version: RPKI_EVIDENCE_VERSION,

package/lib/safe-fetch.mjs

@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ import * as net from 'node:net';
 import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { Agent, fetch as undiciFetch } from 'undici';
 import { MAX_OUTBOUND_REDIRECTS } from "./outbound-request-bounds.mjs";
+import { MAX_OUTBOUND_HTTP_URL_CHARACTERS } from "../packages/contracts/http-url.mjs";
+import { ipv6Groups } from "../packages/contracts/ip-address.mjs";
 const MAX_REDIRECTS = MAX_OUTBOUND_REDIRECTS;
-const MAX_SAFE_FETCH_URL_LENGTH = 4096;
+const MAX_SAFE_FETCH_URL_LENGTH = MAX_OUTBOUND_HTTP_URL_CHARACTERS;
 const MAX_SAFE_FETCH_ADDRESS_CANDIDATES = 64;
 const REDIRECT_STATUSES = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);
 async function defaultSafeFetchRequest(url, options) {
@@ -70,47 +72,6 @@ function isPrivateIpv4(ip) {
         return true; // multicast/reserved
     return false;
 }
-// Expands a valid IPv6 address string to its full 8-group, zero-padded hex
-// form - e.g. "::1" -> all-zero groups ending in "0001". Needed because the
-// same address can be written multiple ways (a "::" shorthand for a run of
-// zero groups, an embedded IPv4 tail as either dotted-decimal or two hex
-// groups), and a hostile authoritative DNS server - the exact threat this
-// module exists to guard against - is free to choose whichever string form
-// it wants. Checking string prefixes on the as-written form (the previous
-// approach) only catches whichever form happened to be anticipated; e.g.
-// "::ffff:127.0.0.1" and "::ffff:7f00:1" are the same address, but only the
-// first was recognized as IPv4-mapped loopback.
-function expandIpv6Groups(ip) {
-    const hasDoubleColon = ip.includes('::');
-    const [headStr, tailStr] = hasDoubleColon ? ip.split('::') : [ip, undefined];
-    // A dotted-decimal segment (the tail of "::ffff:127.0.0.1") is two
-    // 16-bit groups' worth of bits - convert it to hex groups first so the
-    // rest of this function only ever deals with plain hex.
-    const toHexGroups = (part) => {
-        if (!part)
-            return [];
-        return part.split(':').flatMap((group) => {
-            if (!group.includes('.'))
-                return [group];
-            const bytes = group.split('.').map(Number);
-            const [first = -1, second = -1, third = -1, fourth = -1] = bytes;
-            if (bytes.length !== 4
-                || [first, second, third, fourth].some((byte) => !Number.isInteger(byte)))
-                return [];
-            return [
-                (((first << 8) | second) >>> 0).toString(16),
-                (((third << 8) | fourth) >>> 0).toString(16),
-            ];
-        });
-    };
-    const headGroups = toHexGroups(headStr);
-    const tailGroups = hasDoubleColon ? toHexGroups(tailStr) : [];
-    if (!hasDoubleColon)
-        return headGroups.map((g) => g.padStart(4, '0').toLowerCase());
-    const missing = 8 - headGroups.length - tailGroups.length;
-    const middleGroups = new Array(Math.max(missing, 0)).fill('0');
-    return [...headGroups, ...middleGroups, ...tailGroups].map((g) => g.padStart(4, '0').toLowerCase());
-}
 function groupsToIpv4(hiGroup, loGroup) {
     const hi = parseInt(hiGroup, 16);
     const lo = parseInt(loGroup, 16);
@@ -119,7 +80,7 @@ function groupsToIpv4(hiGroup, loGroup) {
     return [(hi >> 8) & 0xff, hi & 0xff, (lo >> 8) & 0xff, lo & 0xff].join('.');
 }
 function isPrivateIpv6(ip) {
-    const groups = expandIpv6Groups(ip.toLowerCase());
+    const groups = ipv6Groups(ip);
     if (groups.length !== 8)
         return true; // couldn't parse cleanly - fail closed
     const [g0 = '', g1 = '', g2 = '', g3 = '', g4 = '', g5 = '', g6 = '', g7 = '',] = groups;
@@ -319,6 +280,47 @@ async function raceWithSignal(promise, signal) {
         void promise.then((value) => { signal.removeEventListener('abort', abort); resolve(value); }, (error) => { signal.removeEventListener('abort', abort); reject(error); });
     });
 }
+// Request bodies that can be replayed must be owned before the first await.
+// Streams and multipart encoders remain valid for one request, never a replay.
+function ownedRequestBody(body) {
+    if (body instanceof URLSearchParams)
+        return new URLSearchParams(body);
+    if (body instanceof ArrayBuffer)
+        return body.slice(0);
+    if (ArrayBuffer.isView(body))
+        return Uint8Array.from(new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength));
+    return body;
+}
+function redirectedRequest(options, status, source, destination) {
+    const next = { ...options, headers: new Headers(options.headers) };
+    const method = (options.method ?? 'GET').toUpperCase();
+    if ((status === 301 || status === 302) && method === 'POST'
+        || status === 303 && method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD') {
+        next.method = 'GET';
+        next.body = null;
+        for (const name of ['content-encoding', 'content-language', 'content-location', 'content-type', 'content-length', 'transfer-encoding'])
+            next.headers.delete(name);
+    }
+    else if (next.body != null && !(typeof next.body === 'string' || next.body instanceof Blob
+        || next.body instanceof URLSearchParams || next.body instanceof ArrayBuffer || ArrayBuffer.isView(next.body))) {
+        throw new Error('Refusing to replay a streaming or multipart request body after a redirect');
+    }
+    if (source.origin !== destination.origin) {
+        // This collector is not a general authenticated browser. Do not forward a
+        // caller's body or custom credentials to another authority or a downgrade.
+        if (next.body != null || !['GET', 'HEAD'].includes((next.method ?? 'GET').toUpperCase())) {
+            throw new Error('Refusing to forward a request body or mutation across origins');
+        }
+        const publicHeaders = new Set(['accept', 'accept-encoding', 'accept-language', 'user-agent', 'range']);
+        for (const name of [...next.headers.keys()])
+            if (!publicHeaders.has(name))
+                next.headers.delete(name);
+        next.credentials = 'omit';
+        next.referrer = '';
+        next.referrerPolicy = 'no-referrer';
+    }
+    return next;
+}
 // Detailed form of the shared safe request engine. It follows redirects
 // manually under the same DNS validation and connection-pinning policy as
 // safeFetch(), while retaining a bounded hop trace for consumers that need
@@ -343,10 +345,14 @@ async function safeFetchDetailed(url, options = {}, dependencies = {}) {
     const hops = [];
     let currentUrl = requestedUrl;
     let redirectCount = 0;
+    let requestOptions = { ...options, headers: new Headers(options.headers),
+        ...(options.body !== undefined ? { body: ownedRequestBody(options.body) } : {}) };
     while (true) {
         const parsed = new URL(currentUrl);
         const hostname = resolutionHostname(parsed);
-        const signal = options.signal ?? null;
+        const signal = requestOptions.signal ?? null;
+        if (signal?.aborted)
+            throw abortError(signal);
         const records = normalizePublicAddressCandidates(await raceWithSignal(resolveAddresses(hostname), signal), hostname);
         if (signal?.aborted)
             throw abortError(signal);
@@ -354,7 +360,7 @@ async function safeFetchDetailed(url, options = {}, dependencies = {}) {
         const hopStartedAt = now();
         // `dispatcher` is a supported undici extension used to pin the connection.
         // Keep the non-standard property local to this request boundary.
-        const fetchOptions = { ...options, redirect: 'manual', dispatcher };
+        const fetchOptions = { ...requestOptions, redirect: 'manual', dispatcher };
         let response;
         try {
             response = await request(currentUrl, fetchOptions);
@@ -384,6 +390,7 @@ async function safeFetchDetailed(url, options = {}, dependencies = {}) {
         if (nextUrl && redirectCount < maxRedirects) {
             await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => { });
             await closeDispatcher(dispatcher);
+            requestOptions = redirectedRequest(requestOptions, response.status, parsed, new URL(nextUrl));
             redirectCount += 1;
             currentUrl = nextUrl;
             continue;
@@ -418,8 +425,8 @@ async function safeFetch(url, options = {}, redirectsLeft = MAX_REDIRECTS) {
 // them can be made to hold an arbitrarily large body in memory. `truncated`
 // tells the caller whether the real body was actually cut short - callers
 // that need well-formed content (e.g. JSON) should treat that as a hard
-// failure rather than parsing a partial blob; callers that only need to
-// scan for a substring (e.g. plain-text/HTML matching) can safely ignore it.
+// failure rather than parsing a partial blob. Partial-evidence consumers may
+// use the prefix, but must preserve its incomplete scope.
 async function readTextCapped(res, maxBytes, options = {}) {
     const hasher = options.includeSha256 === true ? crypto.createHash('sha256') : null;
     const result = (text, truncated, bytesRead) => ({

package/lib/scoring-evidence-quality.mjs

@@ -1,107 +1,2 @@
-export const SCORE_EVIDENCE_QUALITY_VERSION = 1;
-const MAX_SOURCES = 24;
-const MAX_FAMILIES = 12;
-const SOURCE_ID_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/u;
-const COMPLETE_STATES = new Set(['complete', 'not_found', 'success']);
-const LIMITED_STATES = new Set(['partial', 'unknown']);
-const UNAVAILABLE_STATES = new Set(['error', 'rate_limited', 'unavailable']);
-const SKIPPED_STATES = new Set(['skipped', 'unsupported']);
-const ACCEPTED_SOURCE_STATES = new Set([
-    ...COMPLETE_STATES,
-    ...LIMITED_STATES,
-    ...UNAVAILABLE_STATES,
-    ...SKIPPED_STATES,
-]);
-function boundedFamilyList(value) {
-    const output = new Set();
-    for (const item of value.slice(0, MAX_FAMILIES * 2)) {
-        const normalized = String(item).trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9_-]+/gu, '-').slice(0, 64);
-        if (SOURCE_ID_RE.test(normalized))
-            output.add(normalized);
-        if (output.size >= MAX_FAMILIES)
-            break;
-    }
-    return [...output].sort();
-}
-function sourceCoverage(value) {
-    if (!Array.isArray(value))
-        return [];
-    const output = [];
-    const seen = new Set();
-    for (const candidate of value.slice(0, MAX_SOURCES * 4)) {
-        if (!candidate || typeof candidate !== 'object' || Array.isArray(candidate))
-            continue;
-        const item = candidate;
-        const source = typeof item.source === 'string' ? item.source.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
-        const state = typeof item.state === 'string' ? item.state.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
-        if (!SOURCE_ID_RE.test(source) || seen.has(source))
-            continue;
-        if (!ACCEPTED_SOURCE_STATES.has(state))
-            continue;
-        seen.add(source);
-        output.push({ source, state });
-        if (output.length >= MAX_SOURCES)
-            break;
-    }
-    return output;
-}
-function scanDepth(value) {
-    return value === 'deep' || value === 'fast' ? value : 'unknown';
-}
-function observedFreshness(value) {
-    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length > 64)
-        return 'unknown';
-    return Number.isFinite(Date.parse(value)) ? 'observed' : 'unknown';
-}
-export function buildScoreEvidenceQuality(input, options) {
-    const depth = scanDepth(input.scanDepth);
-    const coverage = sourceCoverage(input.sourceCoverage);
-    const completeSources = coverage.filter((item) => COMPLETE_STATES.has(item.state)).length;
-    const limitedSources = coverage.filter((item) => LIMITED_STATES.has(item.state)).length;
-    const unavailableSources = coverage.filter((item) => UNAVAILABLE_STATES.has(item.state)).length;
-    const skippedSources = coverage.filter((item) => SKIPPED_STATES.has(item.state)).length;
-    const observedFamilies = boundedFamilyList(options.observedFamilies ?? []);
-    const expectedFamilies = boundedFamilyList(options.expectedFamilies ?? []);
-    const observedSet = new Set(observedFamilies);
-    const missingFamilies = expectedFamilies.filter((family) => !observedSet.has(family));
-    const limitations = [];
-    let state = 'complete';
-    if (!coverage.length || depth === 'unknown')
-        state = 'unknown';
-    else if (unavailableSources || limitedSources)
-        state = 'partial';
-    else if (options.expectedDepth === 'deep' && depth !== 'deep')
-        state = 'limited';
-    if (missingFamilies.length && state === 'complete')
-        state = 'limited';
-    if (options.expectedDepth === 'deep' && depth !== 'deep') {
-        limitations.push('A fast or unknown-depth observation does not evaluate every website and mail scoring family.');
-    }
-    if (limitedSources || unavailableSources) {
-        limitations.push('One or more score-relevant sources were partial, unavailable, or indeterminate.');
-    }
-    if (skippedSources) {
-        limitations.push('One or more reported sources were skipped or unsupported and did not contribute to the score.');
-    }
-    if (!coverage.length)
-        limitations.push('Source-level coverage was not supplied with this score.');
-    if (missingFamilies.length)
-        limitations.push(`No usable observation was supplied for: ${missingFamilies.join(', ')}.`);
-    const boundedLimitations = [
-        ...limitations.slice(0, 5),
-        'Evidence coverage qualifies the score; it never adds points or turns missing evidence into a negative finding.',
-    ];
-    return Object.freeze({
-        version: SCORE_EVIDENCE_QUALITY_VERSION,
-        state,
-        scanDepth: depth,
-        freshness: observedFreshness(input.observedAt),
-        completeSources,
-        limitedSources,
-        unavailableSources,
-        skippedSources,
-        observedFamilies: Object.freeze(observedFamilies),
-        missingFamilies: Object.freeze(missingFamilies),
-        limitations: Object.freeze(boundedLimitations),
-    });
-}
+// Retained public import; the runtime-neutral implementation lives in the domain layer.
+export * from "../packages/analysis/scoring-evidence-quality.mjs";