@slicedearth/whoisleuth-cli 1.36.1 → 1.43.0

package/docs/cli-reference.md

@@ -0,0 +1,1336 @@
+# WHOISleuth CLI reference
+
+This complete reference documents every supported command contract. For a
+short installation and first-use path, start with the [CLI guide](cli.md).
+
+The first-party command-line interface runs the same local classification and
+lookup modules as the Express and serverless adapters. It does not call the
+hosted WHOISleuth deployment.
+
+`whoisleuth --help` displays the copyright, AGPL-3.0-only licence, and official
+source location. It groups commands by investigation, discovery, saved-evidence,
+integrity, and calibration workflows. `whoisleuth <command> --help` displays the
+command's purpose, focused invocation, example, and collection boundary without
+printing the full command list. `whoisleuth commands --json` exposes those same
+contracts as a stable local catalogue for wrappers and terminal tooling.
+Packaged copies include `LICENSE`, `NOTICE`, and
+`TRADEMARKS.md` alongside the CLI documentation.
+
+## Installation
+
+Public releases require Node.js 24 or later and install the `whoisleuth`
+command:
+
+```bash
+npm exec --yes --ignore-scripts --package=@slicedearth/whoisleuth-cli -- whoisleuth --help
+npm install --global --ignore-scripts @slicedearth/whoisleuth-cli
+whoisleuth doctor
+```
+
+Update and verify an existing global installation with:
+
+```bash
+npm install --global --ignore-scripts @slicedearth/whoisleuth-cli@latest
+whoisleuth --version
+```
+
+The scoped package and application share one semantic version. The package runs
+locally and does not call the hosted WHOISleuth deployment. Networked commands
+contact only the sources described by their collection profile; offline review,
+comparison, verification, completion, and manual commands remain local.
+
+## Commands
+
+```bash
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup AS13335 --json
+printf 'example.com\n' | node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --plan --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --summary
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --verbose
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --markdown --output lookup.md
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --json --strict-exit --events
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.test --deep --observer workstation-a --vantage office-egress --json > office.json
+cat domains.txt | node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk --jsonl
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --csv --registered-only
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --domains --inconclusive-only
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --queries --errors-only
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --concurrency 4
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --deep --checkpoint bulk-checkpoint.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts bulk domains.txt --deep --checkpoint bulk-checkpoint.json --resume
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts ct-search 'example brand' --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts discover example.com --preset common --jsonl
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts discover example.test --dictionary private-terms.txt --snapshot discovery-state.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts discover-scan example.test --scan-limit 50 --checkpoint candidate-scan.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts discover-scan example.test --deep --scan-limit 20 --resolver 192.0.2.53 --observation-snapshot observed-candidates.json --csv
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts posture example.com --selectors selector1 --retired-selectors selector0 --mail-profile defensive-no-mail --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts http example.com --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts tls example.com --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts registry-support example.uk --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts registry-doctor lookup.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts registry-cohort saved-lookups.jsonl --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts registry-scaffold --profile example-profile --suffix test --scenario registered
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts risk-calibrate calibration.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookalike-calibrate reviewed-candidates.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts verify-artifact workspace.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts verify-artifact lookup.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts verify-artifact workspace-encrypted.json --passphrase-file passphrase.txt --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts source-report lookup.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts inspect-archive workspace.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts inspect-archive workspace.json --search example.invalid --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts sign-artifact response-packet.json --private-key-file analyst-private.pem > response-packet.signed.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts ct-intake certificate-events.json --json > external-findings.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts map-observations observation-mapping.json --json > external-findings.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts oam-export external-findings.json --json > asset-bridge.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts manifest lookup.json comparison.json --workflow 'domain review' --json > investigation-manifest.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts verify-signature response-packet.signed.json --public-key-file analyst-public.pem
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts lookup example.com --deep --json > lookup.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts compare lookup.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts page-compare official.json candidate.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts mail-review bulk.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts review-evidence dnssec-evidence.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts review-evidence trust-store-comparison.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts domain-control domain-control-input.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts assurance domain-assurance-input.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts change-packet domain-change-packet-input.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts sharing-review response-packet.json --marking amber --recipient-scope organization --purpose 'Reviewed incident handoff' --human-reviewed --personal-data-reviewed --redactions-confirmed --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts workflow-plan domain-triage example.test --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts workflow-run domain-triage example.test --approve-network --json --output run.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts brief lookup.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts case-pack cases.json --audience trusted --reviewed --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts monitor-once control-manifest.json --previous prior-control.json --junit
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts diff first-lookup.json second-lookup.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts reconcile office.json mobile.json external.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts timeline first-observation.json second-observation.json latest-observation.json --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts export lookup.json > evidence.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts export lookup.json --markdown > evidence.md
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts export lookup.json --html > evidence.html
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts doctor
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts doctor --network --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts commands --json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts completion zsh
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts completion powershell
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts manual | man -l -
+```
+
+These examples run from a checked-out repository; replace
+`node bin/whoisleuth.mts` with `whoisleuth` after installation. The root
+application package remains private. A separate scoped CLI archive is assembled
+from the exact executable dependency closure, installed in a temporary
+directory, and smoke tested with:
+
+```bash
+npm run cli:package:check
+```
+
+The check includes only the executable, reachable TypeScript modules, CLI
+guide, licence, notices, and trademark terms. It excludes application routes,
+deployment adapters, tests, and development tools. Direct runtime dependencies
+are pinned to the exact versions exercised by the reviewed repository lockfile.
+The package and its dependencies require no lifecycle scripts, so the install
+examples disable them explicitly.
+Its generated manifest stays private. Release-candidate assembly is a separate
+explicit operation and never publishes from a developer checkout. Use the
+scoped package name; an unqualified `npx whoisleuth` is not this project.
+
+Lookup defaults to the conservative fast profile. `--deep` must be requested
+explicitly and can add bounded WHOIS, DNS, website, TLS, registrar RDAP, and
+observed-network IP RDAP work for a domain. The browser Console's optional
+security.txt and external intelligence selections are not CLI flags; the CLI
+does not run those actions implicitly.
+
+For a directly entered public IP address, `lookup --deep` can also run one
+bounded reverse-DNS query. Terminal output shows the explicit source state and
+up to five normalised PTR names; JSON retains up to eight. PTR names are
+operator-published routing context, not proof of hosting control or ownership.
+Fast lookups do not run this query.
+
+`lookup --plan` performs classification and prints a versioned preflight without
+starting collection. It lists the normalised target, selected fast or deep
+mode, planned source families, conditional operations, and the data each family
+may receive. The plan cannot predict live feature configuration, cache state,
+redirects, referrals, source availability, or an exact request count. It can be
+combined with `--json`, but not with report, detail, strict-exit, progress-event,
+or quiet options.
+
+Only one query is accepted by `lookup`. Multiple-input processing belongs to
+the explicit `bulk` command rather than being silently inferred by `lookup`.
+Standard input is capped at 4 KiB and must contain one non-empty line.
+
+`registry-support` is an offline catalogue view. It accepts one domain, bare
+suffix, or leading-dot suffix as an argument or on stdin and makes no network
+request. Its output is described below.
+
+`doctor` is offline by default. It checks the Node runtime, platform, terminal
+capabilities, and availability of offline command families. `doctor --network`
+adds independent bounded public-DNS, HTTPS/RDAP bootstrap, and WHOIS port 43
+checks against fixed IANA diagnostic infrastructure. The three probes run
+within the same per-probe ceiling so one stalled transport does not block the
+others. The report retains only state, HTTP status, and a bounded explanation,
+not resolved addresses or response content. A failed optional network check
+returns the partial-failure exit code rather than claiming that all CLI
+collection is unavailable.
+
+`completion bash`, `completion zsh`, `completion fish`, and `completion
+powershell` print static shell completion scripts to stdout. The command does
+not edit a shell profile or make a network request. Review the generated script
+before sourcing it or placing it in the relevant shell completion directory.
+`manual` prints a generated roff manual page and likewise changes no local
+configuration.
+
+`commands` prints the installed command catalogue without running collection or
+reading evidence. `commands --json` emits version 1 of the
+`whoisleuth.cli.command-catalogue` schema, including each command's usage,
+example, declared collection mode, collection scope, and boundary. This is the
+supported discovery contract for local wrappers; it is not a permission grant
+or a substitute for focused help.
+
+Focused command help and the generated manual classify every operation as
+offline or networked and state the relevant target, input, and concurrency
+ceiling. These labels describe observable behaviour rather than granting
+authorisation. The packaged `DISCLOSURE` defines the intended defensive scope;
+operators remain responsible for law, provider terms, and authorisation.
+
+## Deployment boundary
+
+The CLI runs locally. The serverless deployment publishes only `frontend/build`
+and packages functions only from `netlify/functions`, so `bin/` and `cli/` are
+not part of the hosted static site or function bundle. The application root and
+ordinary package-check candidate remain private. Explicitly reviewed CLI
+release candidates can be published under the scoped public package described
+in the installation section.
+
+Commands that query RDAP, WHOIS, DNS, HTTP, TLS, or Certificate Transparency do
+so directly from the machine running the CLI. They do not use the hosted login,
+hosted session, or deployment usage controls; upstream providers can see and
+rate-limit the local machine's network address. Offline `discover`, `compare`,
+`page-compare`, `mail-review`, `review-evidence`, `domain-control`, `assurance`, `change-packet`,
+`sharing-review`, `workflow-plan`, `brief`, `case-pack`, `registry-cohort`,
+`registry-scaffold`, `diff`, `reconcile`, `timeline`,
+`risk-calibrate`, `lookalike-calibrate`, `registry-doctor`, `verify-artifact`, `source-report`,
+`map-observations`, `oam-export`, `export`,
+`commands`, `completion`, and `manual` operations make no network requests. Commands write
+to stdout unless the analyst deliberately selects a local output file.
+
+## Output
+
+Human-readable terminal output is the default. On an interactive terminal it
+uses restrained semantic colour, groups Lookup evidence by purpose, wraps
+prose to the detected terminal width, and shows transient progress on stderr
+for slower collection. State remains explicit in text, so colour is never the
+only distinction. Redirected terminal output, JSON, and JSONL contain no ANSI
+sequences or progress text. `--no-color` and a non-empty conventional
+`NO_COLOR` environment variable disable colour; `WHOISLEUTH_NO_PROGRESS=1`
+disables the transient indicator. Command examples remain one copyable line
+even when prose is wrapped for a narrow terminal.
+
+Every command accepts `--output <file>` as a safer alternative to shell
+redirection. WHOISleuth buffers bounded output, creates a private temporary file
+beside the destination, syncs it, and publishes it atomically with mode `0600`.
+An existing destination is refused. `--force` is valid only with `--output` and
+allows an intentional atomic replacement. A failed or cancelled command does
+not publish a partial output file. Output is capped at 32 MiB.
+
+`--config <file> --profile <name>` reads a strict version-1 local configuration
+document of at most 64 KiB. Without `--config`, the path is
+`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/whoisleuth/config.json`. A profile may contain no more than
+16 safe defaults drawn from `--no-color`, `--summary`, `--verbose`, `--fast`,
+`--concurrency`, `--observer`, and `--vantage`. It cannot supply a target,
+Deep mode, output path, network approval, failure policy, credential, or
+arbitrary argument. Explicit command options override profile defaults from
+the same group.
+
+Lookup, Bulk, and `monitor-once` can emit bounded JUnit XML. Owned-domain
+Posture can emit SARIF only when `--owned-domain` confirms the passive target
+boundary. The reports contain categorical source or posture findings rather
+than raw evidence. Supported network commands accept an explicit comma-
+separated `--fail-on` policy from `source-failure`, `inconclusive`, `danger`,
+and `material-drift`; a match returns the partial-result exit code after the
+normal output is emitted.
+
+`lookup --markdown` and `lookup --html` build the existing normalised evidence
+report directly after one completed domain lookup. They do not start a second
+collection. These report formats reject IP and ASN inputs before collection;
+JSON and terminal output remain available for those query types.
+
+Lookup terminal output supports three detail levels. The standard view keeps
+the normal bounded evidence summary. `--summary` keeps the source states and
+key findings while omitting endpoints and supporting detail. `--verbose` adds
+the document generation time and the existing bounded per-source collection
+timings. These switches are presentation-only and cannot be combined with
+`--json`; they do not change collection or the result document.
+
+`--json` writes one versioned document to standard output:
+
+```json
+{
+  "schema": "whoisleuth.cli.lookup",
+  "version": 1,
+  "generatedAt": "2026-07-14T00:00:00.000Z",
+  "mode": "fast",
+  "query": "example.com",
+  "type": "domain"
+}
+```
+
+The complete document also carries the normalised `rdap`, `whois`,
+`availability`, and `diagnostics` sections returned by the shared lookup
+orchestrator. Machine output goes to stdout. Usage and lookup errors go to
+stderr, so redirected JSON is not mixed with diagnostics.
+
+Human-readable domain lookup output separately shows the registrar RDAP status
+and endpoint whenever the shared lookup diagnostics represent that follow-up.
+Deep mode may report success, unsupported, not found, or an explicit failure;
+fast mode reports the existing skipped state. IP, ASN, and lookup responses
+without registrar diagnostics remain unchanged. These source states are
+provenance only and do not decide availability or imply safety.
+
+When a deep domain response includes registry interpretation version 1, the
+terminal summary also shows the lifecycle label, separately attributed RDAP and
+WHOIS disclosure states, reconciliation state, and complete, partial, and
+unavailable publication counts. It does not print published contact routes.
+The JSON document retains the bounded interpretation and its limitations.
+
+A deep domain lookup can also show the status, selected public address, and
+registered network name from the bounded observed network context. It uses the
+same address and IP RDAP source represented in the JSON document. This is
+point-in-time edge or network-registration context, not proof of the origin
+host, hosting control, ownership, intent, or maliciousness. Fast and compact
+commands do not run the enrichment.
+
+The deep terminal summary also reports the website activity state, page title,
+DNS, HTTP, and TLS source states, bounded publisher-declared structured
+identity entities, up to six bounded technology indicators, a browser-library
+profile count, and the four passive security-posture counts.
+These are concise projections of the same evidence already present in the
+lookup response. The browser-library line counts apparent components and
+catalogue advisory matches without retaining script references or raw
+signatures. These summaries make no extra request, omit raw evidence
+descriptions, and do not turn a technology or advisory match, or a missing
+posture signal, into proof of exploitability, hosting control, ownership, or
+maliciousness. Use `--json` when the full bounded evidence, limitations, and
+source diagnostics are required.
+
+`lookup --strict-exit` is an opt-in automation policy. It still emits the
+ordinary complete output document, but returns exit code 4 when a requested
+diagnostic source is partial, unavailable, rate-limited, timed out, or failed.
+The default exit contract remains unchanged, so inconclusive source health does
+not silently break existing scripts.
+
+`lookup --events` and `bulk --events` write versioned
+`whoisleuth.cli.progress` version 1 JSONL lifecycle events to stderr while the
+ordinary final result stays on stdout. Events contain only the command,
+sequence, time, source state or Bulk item index, categorical failure reasons,
+and final exit status. They do not contain a target, query, endpoint, file
+path, error detail, or evidence value. Human progress and error text are
+suppressed while events are active. `--events` cannot be combined with
+`--output`, because the final event must describe the same completed stdout
+delivery observed by the caller.
+
+Pressing Ctrl-C asks an in-flight Lookup or Bulk run to stop, suppresses any
+partial final result, flushes an enabled Bulk checkpoint, and exits with code
+130. Already started network operations remain subject to their existing hard
+timeouts while the shared in-process API unwinds; the executable terminates
+after CLI cleanup. A second Ctrl-C removes any known unpublished temporary
+output file on a best-effort basis before exiting immediately.
+
+Bulk can persist compact progress with `--checkpoint <file>`. A new checkpoint
+is private, bounded to 16 MiB, versioned, and tied to the exact ordered input
+and scan mode by SHA-256. It stores only compact per-item results, never full
+Lookup responses. Reusing the same path is refused unless `--resume` is also
+specified. Resume revalidates the complete untrusted document and skips only
+the exact completed rows; changed input, mode, schema, digest, or malformed
+results fail closed.
+
+If checkpoint persistence fails after collection, WHOISleuth still emits the
+completed final result, reports the checkpoint limitation, and exits with code
+4. The last successfully published checkpoint remains available, but it may
+not contain the final completed items.
+
+`diff <left.json> <right.json>` compares two different saved domain Lookup
+documents entirely offline. It reuses the bounded Bulk comparison model for
+registration, DNS, page identity, mail, certificate, and relationship fields,
+keeps missing and unavailable evidence distinct, and makes no ownership or
+maliciousness inference. The output records both original observation times.
+
+`lookup --observer <label> --vantage <label>` can add two bounded analyst labels
+to a saved Lookup document. The labels identify the person or process that ran
+the observation and the collection context chosen by that analyst; they are
+not verified identities, network measurements, or proof of independent
+collection. They do not change which sources are queried.
+
+`reconcile <observation.json> <observation.json> [...]` accepts from 2 to 5
+saved Lookup documents for the same domain and compares their bounded fields
+offline. It keeps agreement, disagreement, and non-comparable evidence
+separate, retains observation times and optional analyst labels, and copies no
+filenames or raw registration payloads. Distinct complete label pairs are
+reported as labelled collection contexts only; majority agreement is not
+treated as truth or authority.
+
+`timeline <observation.json> <observation.json> [...]` accepts from 2 to 20
+saved Lookup documents for one domain, orders them by their validated
+observation times, and compares each adjacent pair offline. The 32 MiB aggregate
+input ceiling is enforced while files are read and again by the timeline
+builder. Output retains normalised field states and observation times but no
+input filenames or raw registry payloads. A difference can reflect a domain
+change or changed collection conditions, so the command makes no current-state,
+ownership, intent, safety, or maliciousness conclusion.
+
+When diagnostics version 5, 6, 7, or 8 reports a documented registry collection
+constraint, terminal output also shows the suffix, WHOIS and RDAP access
+profiles, and the bounded limitation. This is static access-policy context: it
+does not make another request, and restricted, unpublished, or unavailable
+machine access is not evidence that a domain is unregistered or safe.
+
+## Exit codes
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+| ---: | --- |
+| 0 | Command completed. Individual sources may still be partial or inconclusive; inspect diagnostics. |
+| 2 | Invalid command, option, input, or stdin shape. |
+| 3 | The requested lookup, collection, or comparison operation could not run. |
+| 4 | A bounded operation completed partially, such as Bulk item failures or failed explicit Doctor network checks. |
+| 70 | Unexpected CLI bootstrap failure. |
+| 130 | The analyst cancelled the command. No partial final result was emitted. |
+
+This release supports `lookup`, `bulk`, `ct-search`, `ct-intake`, `map-observations`, `oam-export`, `discover`, `discover-scan`, `posture`,
+`http`, `tls`, `registry-support`, `registry-doctor`, `registry-cohort`, `registry-scaffold`, `risk-calibrate`,
+`lookalike-calibrate`, `verify-artifact`,
+`inspect-archive`, `manifest`, `sign-artifact`, `verify-signature`, `source-report`,
+`compare`, `page-compare`, `mail-review`, `review-evidence`, `brief`, `case-pack`, `domain-control`,
+`monitor-once`, `assurance`, `change-packet`, `sharing-review`, `workflow-plan`, `workflow-run`, `diff`, `reconcile`, `timeline`,
+`export`, `doctor`, `commands`, `completion`, and `manual`. Additional command families
+are added as separate bounded increments rather than exposing incomplete
+aliases.
+
+## Registry capability coverage
+
+`registry-support` projects the embedded, versioned registry compatibility
+catalogue for one domain or suffix. It distinguishes an explicit
+fixture-backed or access-documented suffix profile from the generic IANA
+discovery profile and reports the RDAP and WHOIS discovery/access paths,
+WHOIS query and parser profiles, fixture scenarios,
+verification references, documentation references, and the catalogue's
+limitation. The same document includes a dated, official-source aggregate of
+generic, generic-restricted, sponsored, and infrastructure RDAP coverage. That
+snapshot is separate from the suffix profile and from live reachability.
+
+Terminal output is bounded and control-safe. `--json` emits version 3 of the
+`whoisleuth.cli.registry-support` schema. Unknown but syntactically valid
+suffixes retain the generic `discovery_only` profile; malformed input exits
+with code 2. The command never probes a registry or tests current reachability.
+Coverage is context only and cannot decide registration, availability,
+ownership, safety, or maliciousness.
+
+`registry-doctor [lookup.json]` compares one saved domain Lookup with the same
+reviewed local capability profile. It reports whether RDAP and WHOIS collection
+states align with allowed, permission-required, or unsupported access, counts
+bounded normalised publication fields, and reports publication-quality context
+for object identity, base conformance, redaction metadata, required self links,
+and event consistency. A missing identifier or metadata field is a publication
+omission, not a failed lookup. The command is offline, makes no retry, and
+cannot establish current registry reachability.
+
+`registry-cohort [lookups.json|lookups.jsonl]` aggregates from 1 to 500 saved
+Lookups into suffix and capability-profile cohorts. It retains only target-free
+counts for source alignment and publication-quality states. A cohort with
+fewer than five samples is labelled insufficient rather than treated as a
+quality result, and repeated observations from one environment are not assumed
+representative.
+
+`registry-scaffold --profile <id> --suffix <suffix> --scenario <state>` emits
+one bounded, sanitised synthetic fixture scaffold from the installed registry
+catalogue. The three supported states are `registered`, `not_found`, and
+`inconclusive`. It does not fetch a live response, include a real target, or
+alter the embedded catalogue.
+
+The offline RDAP supplied-evidence review implements the request shape defined
+by RFC 9536 for `resources`, `domains`, `nameservers`, and `entities`. It also
+validates a supplied server's `reverse_search_properties_mapping` response
+before preparing a request. Only registered IANA property paths and exact
+supported resource/property pairs are accepted. Preparing the request neither
+proves that a particular server supports it nor sends a reverse search; active
+execution remains gated on a reviewed server policy, privacy boundary, and
+deterministic fixtures.
+
+The separate maintenance command `npm run rdap-extensions:drift` compares the
+pinned official RDAP extension fixture with the reviewed local interpretation
+catalogue entirely offline. `--live` performs one bounded manual fetch from the
+fixed official CSV URL and reports added, removed, renamed, status-changed,
+unrecognized, and local-only identifiers. `--json` emits
+`whoisleuth.rdap-extension-drift-audit` version 1. Drift exits with status 1 and
+requires specification and fixture review; the command never enables an
+extension, changes authority or availability logic, or issues reverse search.
+
+`npm run service-dependencies:audit` validates the passive service-dependency
+catalogue entirely offline. It checks the catalogue digest, duplicate
+identifiers and target suffixes, evidence classes, source and licence
+treatment, source dates, and a fixed 180-day review age. `--json` emits
+`whoisleuth.service-dependency-signature-audit` version 1. A stale or changed
+signature requires manual provider and benign-fixture review; the command
+never resolves a target, checks an account, or tests claimability.
+
+## Offline Risk calibration
+
+`risk-calibrate` replays a versioned analyst-labelled fixture dataset through
+the exact Risk model shared with the web application. It does not perform a
+lookup, contact the hosted deployment, persist the dataset, alter model weights,
+choose a threshold, or tune the model automatically. The report compares fixed
+thresholds from 40 through 90 and identifies 70 as the current review band. It
+also reports F1, balanced accuracy, Wilson 95% intervals, deliberately small
+scan-depth and review-reason strata, and a current-versus-previous model replay.
+Strata with fewer than 20 included labels are marked insufficient rather than
+presented as reliable performance estimates.
+
+The JSON report derives a bounded `interoperabilityTags` list from the
+analyst-owned disposition and review reason. The mapping uses reviewed MISP
+taxonomy terms only where the meaning is unambiguous. Tags do not change a
+score, disposition, or case, and no MISP service is contacted.
+
+Input is capped at 2 MiB and 500 records. Each record requires a unique bounded
+ID, an ASCII DNS hostname, one existing analyst disposition, and a strict
+whitelist of current scoring inputs. Unknown fields are discarded; arrays,
+strings, ages, booleans, provider records, and external findings are revalidated
+and bounded before scoring. The accepted dataset envelope is:
+
+```json
+{
+  "schema": "whoisleuth.risk-calibration-dataset",
+  "version": 2,
+  "records": [
+    {
+      "id": "fixture-1",
+      "domain": "login.example.test",
+      "analystDisposition": "confirmed_abuse",
+      "reviewReasonCode": "confirmed_credential_abuse",
+      "evidence": {
+        "availability": "registered",
+        "mutationTypes": ["dictionary"],
+        "hasPasswordField": true
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+`confirmed_abuse` is treated as a positive calibration label; `false_positive`
+and `expected` are negative labels. `unreviewed`, `suspicious`, and
+`closed_no_action` remain contextual and are excluded from threshold quality
+metrics, as are records for which Risk is not applicable. Terminal output caps
+its record list at 100 while `--json` retains the complete bounded report,
+factor breakdowns, score bands, confidence intervals, bounded strata, model
+comparison counts, and per-threshold confusion metrics. Analyst
+dispositions and heuristic scores are review context: neither proves
+maliciousness or safety.
+
+The authenticated Monitor workspace can deliberately create the accepted
+dataset from explicitly selected cases. Selection is available only when a case
+has a reviewed disposition and retained normalised evidence. That local export
+contains the case ID, domain, disposition, optional reviewed reason code, and a
+bounded whitelist of current scoring inputs. A matched review-language signal
+is exported as a fixed indicator, not as captured page text. It excludes notes,
+tags, assertions, actions, contacts, raw
+source data, provider payloads, and stored Risk scores. Before download, a local
+review step shows the selected, included, and excluded counts, the domains and
+dispositions that will be written, and the excluded evidence classes. The CLI
+still validates every exported record and never trains, tunes, or changes the
+Risk model.
+
+## Lookalike review-yield calibration
+
+`lookalike-calibrate [dataset.json]` summarises reviewed candidate outcomes by
+mutation family without retaining domains, candidate identifiers, analyst
+notes, or evidence values in its output. Input uses
+`whoisleuth.lookalike-calibration-input` version 1, is capped at 2 MiB and 5,000
+unique opaque records, and requires one reviewed disposition plus from 1 to 12
+bounded mutation-family identifiers per record.
+
+The report keeps exact disposition counts, review-lead rate, false-positive
+rate, and a per-family sample state. Fewer than 20 reviewed observations remains
+`insufficient`. The command is diagnostic only: it does not tune candidate
+generation, filtering, ranking, or Risk, and a useful historical yield does not
+establish that a current candidate is malicious or safe.
+
+## Offline artefact verification
+
+`verify-artifact` validates a supported local artefact without printing its
+evidence contents. Input is capped at 15 MiB. It currently recognises ordinary
+and encrypted workspace archives, case-response packets, acquisition-decision
+exports, domain-comparison exports, Bulk mail-exposure exports, and Bulk review
+manifests. Reviewed CLI case packs are checked against their canonical digest,
+bounded browser-importable case collection, audience, and review marker. The
+command also verifies the internal digests of a complete investigation
+capsule, including its evidence, brief, graph, and optional analyst-record
+projections, and that capsule can be passed to `sign-artifact`. It also validates the bounded versioned structure of saved CLI
+Lookup JSON. Because saved Lookup documents do not embed a checksum or
+signature, that result is reported as `structure_valid` with content integrity
+explicitly unchecked. Saved Lookup validation retains its stricter 8 MiB
+document ceiling.
+
+For an ordinary workspace archive, the command validates the versioned
+structure, section byte counts, record counts, and per-section checksums. For a
+supported signed review artefact, it validates the declared SHA-256 digest. An
+encrypted archive without `--passphrase-file` can establish only that the
+envelope is structurally valid; it reports `envelope_valid` and explicitly
+leaves authenticated encryption and inner checksums unchecked.
+
+Supplying a separate passphrase file, capped at 1 KiB, allows authenticated
+decryption followed by the ordinary workspace checks. The passphrase is never
+accepted as a command-line value, printed, or retained. Verification detects
+changes against the artefact's declared contract; it does not authenticate the
+analyst or establish that an observation was accurate or remains current.
+
+## Privacy-safe source reliability report
+
+`source-report` summarises source states, durations, truncation, and rate-limit
+counts from one version-1 CLI Lookup, Bulk, or Bulk-item document, a JSON array
+of up to 100 such documents, or an array containing only previously generated
+source-reliability reports. Lookup documents and reports cannot be mixed.
+Merged reports preserve exact state and sample totals and add bounded ranges
+for each input report's median and p95 duration, a bounded source timeline,
+fast/deep/unknown cohorts, and the earliest and latest valid report generation
+times. Exact duplicate reports are rejected so one saved report is not
+accidentally counted twice. Per-source failure, partial, truncation, and
+rate-limit rates remain separate. The command does not pretend that aggregate
+timing distributions can reconstruct the original target-level samples. Input
+is capped at 12 MiB and traversal, source, duration, and output counts are
+bounded.
+
+The report retains only fixed source identifiers and aggregate operational
+counts. It does not output targets, queries, endpoints, source limitations, raw
+evidence, or provider payloads. Observation-envelope duration and the
+potentially overlapping Lookup timing are reported separately and never added
+together. It is a local engineering diagnostic, not analytics, a source-quality
+score, or evidence that a collector is currently healthy.
+
+## Workspace archive inspection
+
+`inspect-archive` verifies an ordinary or encrypted workspace archive and then
+reports its versioned sections, counts, byte sizes, and checksum states without
+printing stored records. An encrypted archive requires
+`--passphrase-file`; passphrases are never accepted on the command line.
+
+An optional `--search` is exact and case-insensitive across a fixed allowlist
+of target fields. Default matches disclose only the section, field name, and a
+SHA-256 digest. `--reveal` must be selected explicitly to print the matched
+value. Notes, contacts, raw evidence, arbitrary object fields, and partial text
+search are excluded. Unicode domain searches are canonicalized to their
+DNS-safe ASCII form before exact comparison. `--require-match` makes a
+no-match result fail for automation and is valid only with `--search`.
+Traversal, input size, matches, depth, arrays, and strings are bounded.
+
+Version 2 of the inspection report adds a content digest over the ordered
+section identifiers, schema versions, record counts, and normalised section
+content. It deliberately excludes JSON formatting and each section envelope's
+export time, so two separately exported archives with the same retained
+workspace content have the same identity. `--expect-content-digest <sha256:digest>`
+fails when that identity differs, which supports deliberate transfer checks
+without printing records. Matching digests detect equivalent retained content;
+they do not authenticate who created it or establish that its evidence is
+accurate or current. The report separately identifies the source archive
+version and the installed reader version.
+
+## Optional evidence-package signing
+
+`sign-artifact` signs a locally verified case-response packet or supported
+review manifest with an externally managed Ed25519 private key:
+
+```bash
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts sign-artifact packet.json --private-key-file analyst-private.pem > packet.signed.json
+node bin/whoisleuth.mts verify-signature packet.signed.json --public-key-file analyst-public.pem
+```
+
+The signed package embeds the public key, key identifier, signature time, and
+original artefact. Verification first checks the exact package field set and
+signature, then the artefact's own checksums or manifest. A result is reported
+as `signature_valid`; signer trust is separately reported as `trusted_key` or
+`embedded_key_only`. Without a separately supplied trusted public key,
+verification establishes only that the package is internally self-consistent.
+WHOISleuth does not generate, store, recover, rotate, publish, or establish
+trust in signing keys.
+
+## Reproducible investigation manifest
+
+`manifest <artefact.json> [...] --workflow <label>` reads from 1 to 16 ordered
+JSON artefacts and emits `whoisleuth.investigation-manifest` version 1. Each
+entry records its sequence, bounded schema and version metadata, exact UTF-8
+content digest, canonical JSON digest, and byte count. The manifest also records
+the installed CLI version and can include an externally calculated
+`--configuration-digest sha256:...` without copying configuration values.
+
+Source paths, filenames, command-line arguments, and artefact contents are not
+retained. Individual artefacts are capped at 15 MiB and the ordered set at
+32 MiB. The manifest carries its own canonical integrity digest, works with
+`verify-artifact`, and can be passed to `sign-artifact`. Reproduction still
+requires the exact digested artefacts, compatible source services, and any
+separately held configuration; matching digests do not establish observation
+accuracy or freshness.
+
+## Bulk lookup
+
+`bulk` accepts a newline-delimited file or stdin. It preserves input order,
+removes case-insensitive duplicates, and returns a result for every retained
+query. Input is capped at 1 MiB. Fast mode is capped at 500 queries with four
+workers by default. Deep mode is capped at 50 queries with two workers by
+default. Explicit concurrency cannot exceed eight in fast mode or three in
+deep mode.
+
+Bulk uses the shared compact lookup response, so it does not retain raw RDAP
+objects or WHOIS response bodies. `--json` returns one bounded collection;
+`--jsonl` emits one self-contained versioned item per line. `--domains` emits
+only successfully normalised domain names, while `--queries` preserves the
+selected bounded input queries and is suitable for an exact retry queue.
+Version 2 adds a
+bounded `dnsSummary` projection for observed A, AAAA, NS, and MX records plus
+null MX, SPF, and DMARC state. `--csv` writes fixed columns for automation,
+including the DNS summaries and explicit outcome.
+
+`--registered-only`, `--inconclusive-only`, and `--errors-only` are mutually
+exclusive output filters. The first retains registered, for-sale, and expiring
+authority-aware states. The second retains unknown authority states and failed
+rows. The third retains only rows whose lookup operation failed, which is useful
+for producing an exact retry queue without treating an inconclusive successful
+lookup as an operational error. Filtering does not change collection and never
+converts an unavailable or failed source into an unregistered result. Machine
+documents record collected and emitted counts. A mixture of successful and
+failed queries exits with code 4 while preserving every collected result before
+output filtering. For example, `bulk domains.txt --queries --errors-only`
+produces only the exact failed inputs while retaining the partial-failure exit.
+
+## Certificate Transparency search
+
+`ct-search` accepts one keyword as an argument or on stdin and calls the same
+bounded Certificate Transparency module as the web application. It contacts
+the upstream public log search service directly from the local machine; it
+does not call the hosted WHOISleuth deployment. Quote a multi-word keyword so
+the shell passes it as one argument.
+
+Terminal output summarises certificate rows, observed hostnames, canonical
+registrable-domain matches, observation times, bounded certificate-issuance
+groups, and completeness. An issuance group contains names observed together
+in one public certificate record; a cross-domain group is a review lead, not
+an attribution or ownership finding. Terminal output shows at most 100 matches
+and five hostnames per match, with explicit omission notes. `--json` returns
+the complete bounded structured result in the versioned
+`whoisleuth.cli.ct-search` schema. The certificate-group cap is reported
+separately from the registrable-domain result cap. CT observations do not prove
+that a website is active or malicious.
+
+## Local certificate event intake
+
+`ct-intake [events.json]` reads `whoisleuth.ct-event-batch` version 1 entirely
+offline. Each source-qualified event supplies a log identifier, observation
+time, certificate SHA-256 digest, one or more DNS names, completeness, and
+optional issuer, expiry, and limitations. Unknown fields, malformed names,
+unsupported completeness values, and oversized batches are rejected.
+
+JSON output uses the existing `whoisleuth.external-findings` version 3 contract
+and can be deliberately imported into the browser Console. Wildcard names are
+normalised to their base DNS name, exact event/domain duplicates are removed,
+and deterministic output is capped at 100 findings, 25 domains, and 20 findings
+per domain to match the browser import boundary. Omission is stated in each
+retained finding when the supplied batch exceeds those limits. The command
+makes no request and treats every certificate event as a review lead, not proof
+that the certificate was served, requested, or controlled by the named domain.
+
+## Declarative observation interchange
+
+`map-observations [mapping.json]` reads
+`whoisleuth.external-observation-mapping` version 1 and applies one strict,
+declarative profile to at most 500 local records. The profile selects bounded
+dotted field paths for the domain, summary, observation time, optional
+reference, and optional completeness. It fixes one source, evidence class, and
+finding category for the batch. Profiles cannot contain scripts, templates,
+computed expressions, network endpoints, or executable callbacks. Prototype
+paths and unknown fields are rejected.
+
+The resulting JSON is the existing browser-compatible
+`whoisleuth.external-findings` version 3 contract. It retains source identity,
+observation time, completeness, and limitations, while stating that field
+semantics were not independently verified. Deterministic output is capped at
+100 findings, 25 domains, and 20 findings per domain. The command makes no
+request and never interprets an omitted field as a negative observation.
+
+`oam-export [external-findings.json]` projects that strict findings document
+into `whoisleuth.open-asset-model-bridge` version 1. It uses the documented
+[OWASP Open Asset Model](https://github.com/owasp-amass/open-asset-model)
+vocabulary for bounded `FQDN`, `IPAddress`, and `TLSCertificate` assets plus
+`dns_record` and `san_dns_name` relations. Only typed A, AAAA, and SHA-256
+certificate observations create infrastructure assets or relations. Other
+findings remain represented by their FQDN asset.
+
+This bridge wrapper is not a claim that every receiving implementation accepts
+one universal native serialisation. Receivers must validate the projection
+against their supported model version. WHOISleuth preserves source and
+completeness as discovery metadata, does not invent a confidence score, and
+does not treat an edge as proof of ownership, control, coordination, intent,
+safety, or maliciousness.
+
+## Lookalike discovery
+
+`discover` runs the same pure, bounded lookalike generator as the Discover
+tool without making network requests. It accepts a brand label or a
+domain with one suffix label. The default TLD set is `com,net,org`; replace it
+with `--tlds com,net` when narrower coverage is wanted.
+
+Generation presets are `common`, `impersonation`, and `all` (the default).
+Keyboard-aware mutations support `qwerty` (the default), `azerty`, and
+`qwertz`; `--keyboard all` uses their bounded combined neighbour set, including
+adjacent number-row keys. Supply a UTF-8 text file with
+`--dictionary terms.txt` to add up to 100 local terms when
+using the `impersonation` or `all` preset. Dictionary input is capped at 4,096
+bytes and individual terms at 32 characters. Machine output records accepted
+and rejected term counts but never copies the private terms into its metadata.
+
+Use `--families <ids>` instead of `--preset` to run an exact comma-separated
+selection. Supported IDs are `character_addition`, `character_omission`,
+`character_duplication`, `character_transposition`, `pluralization`,
+`tld_embedding`, `www_prefix`, `hyphenation`, `separator_omission`,
+`word_reordering`, `keyboard_substitution`, `keyboard_insertion`, `vowel_swap`,
+`bitsquatting`, `ascii_homoglyph`, `unicode_homoglyph`,
+`unicode_whole_label`, `unicode_homoglyph_depth_2`, `dictionary`,
+`dictionary_token_replacement`, `tld_typo`, and `tld_substitution`. Machine
+output records the normalised custom selection. A custom dictionary file
+requires `dictionary` or `dictionary_token_replacement` in that selection.
+
+`--domains` writes the unique candidate names only. `--snapshot <file>` keeps
+one private, versioned local observation of the normalised seed, generation
+configuration, custom-dictionary digest, and candidate set. The first run
+creates the snapshot; later runs report added and removed candidates before
+atomically replacing it. The snapshot never stores private dictionary terms.
+Use the same command from a local scheduler such as cron or a system timer to
+perform repeatable discovery runs. WHOISleuth does not install a scheduler,
+run a background daemon, or infer that an added candidate is registered,
+active, available, or malicious.
+
+Dotted subdomain permutations are intentionally excluded because the lookup
+pipeline validates a hostname's registrable parent. The CLI does not present
+authoritative parent registration evidence as proof that a generated hostname
+exists.
+
+Terminal output is capped at 200 candidates with an explicit notice. Versioned
+JSON and JSONL use `whoisleuth.cli.discover` schema version 2 and retain the
+complete bounded candidate set and mutation provenance. Internationalised
+candidates show the DNS-safe ASCII form and readable Unicode form together in
+terminal output. The Impersonation and All presets can add up to six
+deterministic whole-label Unicode candidates when every letter has a reviewed
+same-script replacement. The command generates candidates only. It does not
+claim that a domain is registered, active, or malicious.
+
+`unicode_homoglyph_depth_2` is an explicit `--families` option and is never
+enabled by a preset. It replaces exactly two ASCII letters with characters
+from the same reviewed script, ranks curated mappings first, and returns at
+most 256 candidates. JSON and terminal output report generated candidates,
+cross-script or invalid combinations omitted by policy, and lower-ranked
+label variants omitted by the family or overall generation budget.
+
+## Supervised candidate scan
+
+`discover-scan` composes the same bounded generator with the compact Lookup
+collector. Unlike `discover`, it is an explicitly networked command. It selects
+the first deterministic candidates up to `--scan-limit`, processes fixed
+chunks sequentially, and retains each registration and DNS source state. Fast
+mode is the default and accepts at most 500 candidates. Explicit `--deep` mode
+is capped at 50 candidates and concurrency 3 because it can add WHOIS, DNS,
+HTTP, TLS, page, and technology work for every selected candidate.
+
+Use `--chunk-size 1-100`, `--concurrency 1-8`, and the existing private
+`--checkpoint <file> [--resume]` boundary to control a run. The checkpoint is
+tied to the exact ordered candidate set and scan mode. A new generation order,
+limit, or mode requires another checkpoint. `--resolver` accepts at most three
+literal IPv4 or IPv6 recursive-resolver addresses and applies them only to DNS
+observations in this local run. Resolver hostnames and automatic third-party
+resolver selection are not supported. The selected resolvers can observe the
+queried candidates and may apply their own logging and retention policies.
+
+An optional newline-delimited `--allowlist` accepts at most 500 domains and 64
+KiB. Matching candidates remain in evidence and are labelled `suppressed` in
+the review queue; the full list and unmatched entries are not copied into
+output, while each matching scanned candidate necessarily exposes that match.
+Allowlisting never deletes a result or asserts that it is safe. Output filters
+select registered, inconclusive, acquisition-review, or
+suppressed rows without changing whole-run counts or source health. JSON,
+JSONL, CSV, and domain-list forms retain mutation provenance and explicit
+review lanes. The queue provides next manual actions, not automatic lookup,
+acquisition, blocking, submission, or enforcement.
+
+Deep compact results can group exact shared addresses, nameservers, and mail
+servers observed across at least two candidates. These bounded relationships
+are pivot leads only. Common hosting, delivery, registrar, and mail services
+can produce the same relationship without common ownership or control.
+
+`--observation-snapshot <file>` keeps a private versioned local projection of
+registration state, confidence, and bounded A, AAAA, NS, MX, null-MX, SPF, and
+DMARC summaries for the exact candidate set, mode, and resolver selection.
+Version 2 records registration and DNS observation times and latest component
+states separately; version 1 is read and normalised on the next write. A later
+identical run reports material field changes only for components collected
+with enough completeness to support the comparison. If registration or DNS is
+partial or unavailable, the prior usable evidence for that component is
+preserved and the attempt is reported as unavailable rather than converting
+missing data into a removal. Raw registry
+records, contacts, page content, and request details are excluded. Snapshot
+differences are review prompts, not proof of ownership, control, intent,
+safety, or maliciousness.
+
+## Domain posture audit
+
+`posture` runs the standard-profile form of the owned-domain DNS and
+email-security audit used by Brand Profiles. It queries registry status and
+DNSSEC evidence, nameserver delegation, SPF, DMARC, MX, CAA, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT,
+and BIMI directly from the local machine. Literal SPF include and redirect
+branches are expanded within fixed depth, policy-query, DNS-term, void-answer,
+cycle, and time bounds. External DMARC reporting authorisation and external
+nameserver, mail, SPF, and reporting dependencies are separately reported.
+Supply up to ten known active and retired DKIM selectors in total with
+`--selectors selector1,selector2` and `--retired-selectors selector0`;
+selectors cannot be reliably discovered from DNS, so no-selector output
+reports DKIM as not checked. Use `--mail-profile standard`,
+`--mail-profile defensive-no-mail`, or `--mail-profile parked` to make the
+intended mail posture explicit rather than inferring it from DNS.
+
+Terminal output shows each pass, review, action, or informational result and
+caps displayed records at five per check with an explicit omission notice.
+Versioned JSON retains the complete bounded report, including SPF traversal,
+DMARC authorisation, and dependency provenance. Warnings and dangers are
+findings rather than command failures; transient resolver or policy-fetch
+failures remain informational and should be retried before changing DNS.
+
+## HTTP intelligence
+
+`http` runs the same bounded safe homepage probe used by a deep lookup. It
+tries HTTPS before HTTP, follows only validated public-network redirects, caps
+each attempt at six seconds, and captures at most 300,000 response bytes for
+hashing and metadata. A non-success HTTP response still proves that a web
+service answered; failure of both schemes remains inconclusive rather than
+evidence that no website exists.
+
+The command reports normalised redirect, response, content, selected security-
+header, body-hash, completeness, and attempt provenance. Captured homepage text
+is never written to terminal or JSON output. Query strings are removed by the
+shared HTTP evidence normalizer, and terminal values are additionally bounded
+and control-safe.
+
+## TLS intelligence
+
+`tls` runs the same bounded one-connection TLS collector used by deep lookups.
+It resolves the hostname once through the public-address guard, validates every
+answer, connects directly to the first validated address on port 443, and keeps
+the original hostname for SNI and certificate identity checking. Resolution
+and handshake work share a five-second deadline.
+
+The report retains the negotiated protocol, ALPN and cipher, runtime trust and
+hostname checks, certificate validity, bounded subject and issuer names, SANs,
+SAN class counts, signature algorithm and OID, extended-key-usage purposes,
+classified Authority Information Access presence counts, SHA-256 certificate
+and public-key fingerprints, a bounded certificate chain, and neutral
+findings. AIA responder and issuer locations are classified as HTTP, HTTPS, or
+other and then discarded; they are not retained or followed. The collector
+stores no certificate bytes, session material, or application data and does
+not enumerate supported protocol or cipher suites.
+A failed collection is inconclusive rather than proof that no TLS service
+exists.
+
+## Registry-source comparison
+
+`compare` reads one version-1 `whoisleuth.cli.lookup` domain document from a
+file or stdin and emits a version-3 `whoisleuth.cli.compare` document. Its
+primary comparison reconciles normalised registry RDAP and WHOIS fields. When
+the saved deep lookup also represents the optional registrar RDAP follow-up,
+an additional sibling comparison reconciles the portable registry and
+registrar RDAP publication fields. The command does not repeat the lookup,
+contact the hosted deployment, or treat a conflict as a command failure. Use a
+deep lookup when multiple sources are wanted; a fast lookup deliberately
+records WHOIS as skipped, and comparison preserves that state as unavailable
+rather than misreporting RDAP-only publication.
+
+Input is capped at 8 MiB and must retain the lookup schema, mode, source
+diagnostics, and normalised parsed source sections. Per-value, list, and event
+bounds are revalidated because saved JSON is treated as untrusted input. A
+successful registrar source must include a normalised object and agree with
+its diagnostic status. Raw RDAP JSON, registrar contacts and source-specific
+handles, WHOIS response bodies, availability evidence, and unrelated lookup
+fields are not copied into the comparison result.
+
+When the saved Lookup contains valid version-5, version-6, or version-7, context-only
+registry-access diagnostics, version 3 retains their bounded suffix, access profiles, and
+limitation. Terminal output labels the same collection context explicitly.
+It explains source reachability only and cannot decide registration,
+availability, ownership, safety, or maliciousness. Older documents and saved
+lookups without that context do not gain a registry-access field.
+
+Terminal and versioned JSON output cover domain identity, registry object ID,
+registrar, registrar IANA ID, lifecycle dates, DNSSEC, statuses, and name
+servers. The shared comparison model normalises harmless case, punctuation,
+ordering, and date-precision differences while distinguishing conflicts,
+one-source publication, redaction, incomplete sources, and unavailable
+sources. This is source reconciliation, not an availability, ownership, or
+maliciousness decision.
+
+## Static page comparison
+
+`page-compare <left.json> <right.json>` reads two different version-1 saved
+Deep domain Lookup documents and compares the already-retained static page
+identity, exact and perceptual favicon evidence, technology identifiers, TLS
+issuer label, and TLS public-key fingerprint. DOM structure is compared first
+by its exact bounded tag-sequence digest, then, when both captures provide it,
+by a parse5-tokenized structural SimHash. It makes no request and requires
+complete supported static page-identity observations on both sides.
+
+Each page component remains independent. Exact, similar, overlapping,
+different, unavailable, and partial evidence are not collapsed into a score.
+Matching components are investigative relationships rather than proof of
+copying, common ownership, control, intent, safety, or maliciousness. Static
+comparison does not execute JavaScript; use the optional local rendered
+capture package only when that additional active behaviour is authorised.
+
+## Passive mail exposure review
+
+`mail-review [bulk.json|bulk.jsonl]` reads version-2 Bulk output locally and
+summarises MX, null MX, SPF, DMARC, and mail-provider relationships. It keeps
+authenticated mail, authentication gaps, incomplete authentication evidence,
+no explicit MX, null MX, and incomplete DNS evidence as separate states.
+Shared-provider relationships are based only on the registrable domain of an
+observed MX hostname and do not establish shared ownership or control.
+
+The command makes no DNS or SMTP request and retains no source path. It does
+not test message acceptance, relay behaviour, mailbox existence, catch-all
+behaviour, SMTP banners, or whether a mail server is rogue, safe, or malicious.
+
+An analyst may add a bounded `tlsaEvidence` object to a version-2 Bulk item for
+offline DANE review. It must name the exact `_25._tcp.<mx-host>` service, and
+that host must occur in the same item's retained MX evidence. A certificate
+association match is complete only when `dnssecState` is `validated`. TLSA
+usages 0 and 1 additionally require `pkixValidationState: "validated"`.
+Usages 0 and 2 compare against the bounded `authorityMaterials` array; usages
+1 and 3 compare against the supplied leaf certificate or SPKI. Mismatched
+service names, missing certificate roles, unvalidated prerequisites, malformed
+material, and truncation remain invalid, partial, or untrusted rather than
+becoming a DANE match.
+
+## Offline supplied-evidence review
+
+`review-evidence [evidence.json]` accepts one version-1 JSON input and performs
+only deterministic local parsing, comparison, or request planning. Input is
+capped at 16 MiB. The command never retrieves DNS, opens SMTP, contacts an
+RDAP server, submits a resolver query, or looks up an address in a hosted
+GeoIP service.
+
+Supported input schemas are:
+
+- `whoisleuth.dnssec-evidence-input`: compares bounded DS and DNSKEY records,
+  recalculates DNSKEY key tags and supported DS digests, and reviews supplied
+  RRSIG validity windows at `observedAt`. `consistent` describes only the
+  supplied DS/DNSKEY relationship. It does not authenticate a chain to a root
+  trust anchor, validate RRSIG cryptography, or prove that a missing record is
+  absent.
+- `whoisleuth.tlsa-evidence-input`: binds TLSA records to one explicit
+  `_port._transport.hostname` service and compares supplied leaf or authority
+  certificate/SPKI bytes. `matched` requires independently validated DNSSEC;
+  PKIX-TA and PKIX-EE usages also require an independently validated PKIX path.
+  The command does not retrieve the certificate or negotiate STARTTLS.
+- `whoisleuth.rdap-search-input`: normalises a supplied RDAP search-help
+  response and prepares an exact supported reverse-search request without
+  sending it. If the document also contains a previously obtained `response`,
+  the command checks its bounded property mappings against the reviewed
+  registration and reports omitted or unrecognised mappings without treating
+  the response as authoritative or complete.
+- `whoisleuth.rpki-route-input`: compares a route prefix and origin ASN with a
+  bounded analyst-supplied VRP set.
+- `whoisleuth.local-geoip-query`: queries an analyst-supplied bounded prefix
+  database whose source, version, and licence metadata remain in the result.
+- `whoisleuth.local-mmdb-query`: with an explicit `--mmdb <database-file>`,
+  queries one analyst-supplied MaxMind DB file locally. The query document must
+  carry `address`, `sourceLabel`, `databaseVersion`, and `license`. WHOISleuth
+  does not bundle, download, update, license, transmit, or retain the database.
+  The nested result uses the same address, network, country, region, city, ASN,
+  source, and limitation fields as the bounded JSON-prefix path. This mode is
+  CLI-only because a hosted or browser deployment cannot open an analyst's
+  local file; its JSON result remains portable to website-compatible evidence
+  archives and reports.
+- `whoisleuth.encrypted-dns-plan-input`: validates an explicitly reviewed
+  encrypted-DNS provider contract and prepares a bounded query plan. It does
+  not execute the plan.
+- `whoisleuth.zone-intent.input`: parses either a deliberately supported,
+  bounded BIND master-file subset or normalised DNS records and compares it
+  with one separately attributed observation. TXT values are reduced to
+  SHA-256 digests, unsupported directives and records remain rejected, and an
+  incomplete observation never becomes a missing-record conclusion. The
+  review does not contact a resolver or apply a DNS change.
+- `whoisleuth.domain-portfolio.input`: reviews up to 500 analyst-supplied
+  domain inventory rows for exact registrar, DNS, mail, certificate and
+  recovery concentration, renewal-review gaps and internal recovery-domain
+  dependencies. Account labels and provider assignments remain analyst
+  assertions, and the review makes no provider or account request.
+- `whoisleuth.domain-change.input`: compares bounded, separately labelled
+  authority and resolver observations; reviews CDS, CDNSKEY and CSYNC
+  publication consistency; inventories supplied SRV services and ACME
+  dependencies; and records TLS key continuity, stapling, embedded timestamp,
+  and HSTS preload context. TXT values are retained only as SHA-256 digests.
+  The result is an offline review gate, not a DNSSEC validation, preload-list
+  lookup, certificate-authority request, or permission to apply a change.
+- `whoisleuth.dns-convergence.input`: compares the latest supplied observation
+  from at least two labelled resolvers or network vantages. It preserves
+  converged, divergent, unexpected, incomplete, and insufficient record-set
+  states, can compare against optional expected values, and projects a simple
+  observation-time plus TTL cache horizon. It does not query DNS or decide
+  which divergent value is authoritative, and supplied TTLs do not reveal
+  actual cache age or resolver refresh policy.
+- `whoisleuth.nameserver-preflight.input`: reviews an intended nameserver set
+  against separately attributed direct-service observations before a
+  delegation change. It checks authoritative service, the served NS set, SOA
+  evidence, public addresses and in-bailiwick glue readiness without querying
+  DNS, opening a socket or changing registry configuration.
+- `whoisleuth.trust-store-comparison.input`: compares an already-observed,
+  bounded certificate-chain SHA-256 fingerprint set with up to 16
+  analyst-supplied trust-store snapshots. Each snapshot carries its own name,
+  version, source, review time, completeness, and no more than 2,048 anchor
+  fingerprints. Exact intersections, complete non-observations, and
+  inconclusive inputs remain separate. A match does not build or validate a
+  certificate path, and non-observation does not mean a client would reject
+  the chain because served chains commonly omit their root.
+
+The common output is `whoisleuth.cli.offline-evidence-review` version 1. It
+retains the nested result's explicit state and limitations. A locally
+consistent relationship is not converted into a claim about current
+publication, ownership, safety, or maliciousness.
+
+`review-evidence --strict-exit` is an opt-in local automation boundary. It
+returns the partial-failure exit code when an input family exposes an explicit
+failed `gate`, or when a zone-intent comparison is incomplete or contains a
+difference, missing value or unexpected value. Other evidence families retain
+their ordinary exit behaviour; the flag does not invent a pass/fail policy for
+them. JSON is still emitted before the exit status is selected.
+
+## Domain control manifests
+
+`domain-control [input.json]` builds or reviews a bounded desired-state
+manifest without making a request or changing configuration. A manifest input
+uses `whoisleuth.domain-control-manifest-input` version 1, includes an expiry,
+and may record expected nameservers, DS, MX, CAA, TLS issuer, TLS SPKI
+fingerprint, registrar-lock preference, and a renewal-review date for up to 100
+domains. Empty fields mean unconfigured; they do not require a record to be
+absent.
+
+The emitted `whoisleuth.domain-control-manifest` version 1 is normalised and
+protected by a canonical SHA-256 digest. It can also be passed to
+`sign-artifact` for an optional local Ed25519 signature. Integrity and
+signature verification detect changes and authenticate possession of the
+selected key; neither establishes that the desired state is correct. Manifest
+input and verification reject unknown fields, and verification rejects
+non-canonical content rather than returning a shape that differs from the
+normalised contract covered by the digest.
+
+A review input uses `whoisleuth.domain-control-review-input` version 1 and
+contains one manifest plus separately attributed observations. Only a complete
+`observed` field may produce `drift`. Partial, unavailable, unsupported, and
+missing observations remain inconclusive, and unrelated observations are
+counted but ignored. The review performs no DNS, RDAP, HTTP, TLS, SMTP, or
+registrar request.
+
+## Domain assurance review
+
+`assurance [input.json]` reviews one bounded analyst-authored workflow entirely
+offline. Version 1 inputs remain supported. Version 2 adds optional
+`customChecks` to retirement inputs and remains the current normalised output
+version. The input uses `whoisleuth.domain-assurance.input` and one of three
+fixed kinds:
+
+- `planned-change` records a bounded window, evidence-backed milestones,
+  rollback criteria, and post-change checks;
+- `recovery-dependencies` reviews up to 100 domains across registrar, DNS,
+  mail, certificate, and recovery providers and highlights exact provider
+  concentration; and
+- `retirement` checks the fixed decommissioning controls without treating an
+  unchecked item as complete. Version 2 can add up to 20 analyst-defined checks,
+  each with a bounded identifier, label, expected boolean, and true, false, or
+  null observed value.
+
+Provider labels, readiness confirmations, evidence references, and expected
+states remain analyst assertions. The output preserves incomplete and
+needs-review states and gives every negative state an explicit review reason.
+The versioned input rejects unknown fields and contradictory evidence attached
+to an unfinished check. It stores no credentials, makes no request, and changes
+no registrar, DNS, mail, certificate, or recovery configuration.
+
+## Domain change assurance packet
+
+`change-packet [input.json]` combines one pre-change domain review, one
+post-change domain review, and one planned-change assurance input for the same
+domain. The input uses `whoisleuth.domain-change-packet.input` version 1. The
+command revalidates each nested contract, summarises changed authoritative
+record sets, and emits `whoisleuth.domain-change-packet` version 1 with a
+canonical SHA-256 integrity digest.
+
+The packet is ready only when both supplied observation reviews and the change
+plan pass their own bounded gates. Partial or unavailable evidence remains a
+review reason. Packet assembly performs no collection or configuration change,
+and digest validity does not authenticate the analyst. A reviewed packet can be
+passed to `sign-artifact` when the operator has an independently managed
+Ed25519 signing-key lifecycle.
+
+## Pre-sharing review
+
+`sharing-review [artifact.json]` performs a redacted local preflight before an
+analyst deliberately shares an artefact. The analyst must select a TLP 2.0
+marking, a recipient scope, and a bounded purpose. Optional confirmations record
+human review, personal-data review, and redaction review. The command validates
+supported artefact integrity where possible, detects stricter embedded TLP
+markings, and reports only key-category counts plus bounded, control-free schema
+and integer version metadata. It emits no content values and copies no raw
+evidence.
+
+An imported stricter marking cannot be downgraded by the requested marking, and
+recipient scope is checked against the effective marking. Evading this local
+preflight remains possible, so the result is a review aid rather than access
+control, legal advice, or recipient authorisation.
+
+## Fixed investigation plans
+
+`workflow-plan <recipe> <domain|brand>` turns one of four fixed recipes into a
+versioned `whoisleuth.cli.investigation-plan` document. Supported recipes are
+`domain-triage`, `lookalike-review`, `owned-domain-review`, and
+`historical-comparison`. Each step names an existing CLI command, carries its
+arguments as a JSON array, declares whether it is offline or networked, and
+marks network-disclosure or analyst-selection approval gates.
+
+The command is plan-only. It does not execute a step, construct a shell script,
+interpret a placeholder as a file path, read an artefact, make a request,
+change a case, or submit evidence. Analysts deliberately run selected commands
+after reviewing their collection boundaries. This provides repeatable
+domain-specific workflows without an arbitrary automation or plugin surface.
+
+## Local handoffs and one-shot monitoring
+
+`brief [lookup.json]` reads one saved Lookup and emits version 2 of the bounded
+`whoisleuth.cli.lookup-brief` contract. It separates retained facts,
+contradictions, incomplete source states, and manual actions. Each action
+states its evidence basis and expected outcome; it does not run the action or
+create a case.
+
+`case-pack [cases.json] --audience <internal|trusted|public> --reviewed` reads a
+browser case export containing at most 25 normalised cases, applies the selected
+redaction boundary, and emits a browser-importable case collection with a
+canonical SHA-256 digest and redaction manifest. It refuses an invalid,
+duplicate, larger, or generated package above the browser's 2 MiB import limit
+rather than silently omitting records or evidence. Trusted output removes notes,
+recipient values, and manual-pivot targets. Public output additionally removes
+actions and analyst assertions. The review flag records an explicit choice; it
+does not prove recipient authorisation or factual correctness.
+
+`verify-artifact` recognises the complete case-pack envelope before browser
+import. It checks the canonical digest, supported case-export schema, bounded
+case count, report count, audience and explicit review marker without printing
+case contents. This detects a changed hand-off file but does not authenticate
+the analyst, recipient, source observations, or review decision.
+
+`monitor-once [manifest.json]` performs one bounded Deep control review for at
+most 20 manifest domains with concurrency capped at three. An optional
+`--previous` checkpoint adds local first/last-observed comparison. It is not a
+daemon or scheduler, retains compact normalised observations rather than raw
+payloads, and keeps failed collection incomplete. JSON, JUnit, and explicit
+failure policies are supported.
+
+`workflow-run <recipe> <subject>` executes only concrete steps from the four
+installed fixed recipes. Network steps require `--approve-network` for that
+invocation. Analyst-selection placeholders always pause. A bounded `--resume`
+state must match the exact recipe and subject, cannot add commands or shell
+syntax, and is not evidence that earlier results remain current.
+
+## Optional local rendered capture
+
+`packages/web-capture` is a private repo-local Playwright package, not part of
+the distributable core CLI or hosted application. It requires an explicit
+authorisation flag and one new output directory:
+
+```bash
+npm run capture:local -- https://example.test --output-dir ./capture-example --authorize-rendered-capture
+npm run capture:compare -- ./official/manifest.json ./candidate/manifest.json --json
+```
+
+It writes a fixed 1024x768 PNG, screenshot SHA-256 and perceptual dHash, a DOM
+digest containing hashes and bounded element counts rather than markup or page
+text, and a version-2 `whoisleuth.web-capture-manifest` compatible with the
+Cases importer. Version-1 manifests remain importable.
+
+Rendered capture executes page JavaScript. It caps HTTP(S) requests and request
+hostnames, blocks downloads, service workers, WebSockets, non-read methods,
+credentials, non-default ports, and private or reserved addresses, and retains
+no request path, query, headers, bodies, cookies, credentials, DOM markup, or
+page text. The browser connection is not pinned to the address checked before
+each hostname's first request, so DNS rebinding remains a residual risk. Use a
+disposable network-restricted environment for untrusted targets.
+
+The separate offline comparison command accepts two selected version-2 local
+capture manifests. It first verifies each referenced screenshot and DOM digest
+against its declared size, SHA-256, screenshot dimensions, and perceptual hash;
+it also validates bounded source and limitation metadata and requires the DOM,
+manifest, and source collection times to agree. It then
+compares screenshot distance, exact rendered DOM and visible-text digests,
+bounded element counts, page identity, technologies, and request-domain sets.
+It does not recrawl either target, reveal the input paths, or collapse the
+independent components into a similarity or maliciousness score. A missing
+perceptual hash remains unavailable rather than becoming a visual difference.
+
+## Lookup evidence export
+
+`export` converts one version-1 `whoisleuth.cli.lookup` domain document from a
+file or stdin into the same versioned `whoisleuth.lookup-evidence` JSON package
+produced by the web Lookup tool. It performs no lookup and writes only to
+stdout, so use ordinary shell redirection when a file is wanted. Pretty JSON is
+the default; `--compact` emits one compact JSON line for pipeline use, while
+`--markdown` produces a readable source-attributed summary and `--html`
+produces a self-contained printable report. Compact, Markdown, and HTML output
+are mutually exclusive.
+
+The saved input is capped at 8 MiB and revalidated using the same schema,
+source-status, parsed-data, scalar, list, and event boundaries as `compare`.
+The export retains query context, source diagnostics, normalised registry data,
+raw registry RDAP JSON, the raw WHOIS referral chain, availability analysis,
+and the shared registry-source comparison. Version 23 can add the exact local
+SSLBL comparison already represented by a deep full Lookup. Version 21 adds the bounded registry
+lifecycle, disclosure, publication-quality, reconciliation, and abuse-routing
+interpretation derived from the already-collected sources. Registrar RDAP raw
+data, contacts, entities, links, notices, and source-specific handles remain
+excluded. Schema version 20 replaces selected security-policy values in
+retained HTTP evidence
+with presence-only markers and can include fixed response-policy findings from
+an already-represented deep lookup. Version 19 additionally retains the bounded credential-surface projection
+when the saved deep lookup represents it. Version 18 retains the bounded structured identity projection
+when the saved deep lookup represents it. Version 17 retains the normalised portable-field comparison, explicit
+source-health states, a strict bounded projection of observed network
+registration, an optional normalised security.txt disclosure source, HTTPS
+service-binding publications, and the passive browser-library profile when the
+saved deep lookup represents them. Raw IP RDAP payloads, security.txt response
+bodies, script references, matched script content, and contact entities remain
+excluded.
+
+Markdown output summarises query context, assessment state, registry sources,
+source reconciliation, network observations, and collection diagnostics. It
+escapes all upstream text as untrusted content, bounds displayed values and
+lists, and deliberately omits raw RDAP JSON and full WHOIS response bodies.
+Use JSON when the complete evidence package or machine processing is required.
+The browser Console reuses this bounded Markdown renderer for domain results
+after first reducing the typed Lookup response to the known normalised fields
+needed by the report. It separately offers bounded IP and ASN summaries from
+their normalised RDAP and source-health fields; IP reports can also include
+bounded reverse-DNS context already collected by Lookup. The browser action
+does not change the CLI input or output contract.
+When a version-5, version-6, or version-7 lookup records a documented registry-access constraint, both
+Markdown and HTML include that context in collection diagnostics without
+changing its non-authoritative interpretation. Both formats also include the
+selected address and bounded network registration when present, together with
+the edge-versus-origin limitation.
+
+HTML uses the same bounded summary model as Markdown. The generated document
+contains inline styling for screen and print, but no scripts, forms, active
+links, or external resources. A restrictive embedded Content Security Policy
+provides defence in depth when the local file is opened in a browser. All
+registry values are HTML-escaped and displayed as text.
+
+This is a deliberately rich evidence package. Raw registry sources can contain
+publicly published contact data, and deep availability evidence can contain
+bounded website, DNS, mail, page-identity, and TLS observations. Review and
+secure the output before sharing it. The CLI does not add browser-only IDN
+profile analysis, so that optional evidence field is `null`.