@sleepy_panda_srl/portulan 0.1.3 → 0.3.0

package/cli/control-chars.mjs

@@ -4,103 +4,6 @@
 //   git ls-files --cached --others --exclude-standard -z | node cli/control-chars.mjs [--exempt <path>]...
 //
 // Exit 0 every scanned file is clean · 1 one is not · 2 could not run.
-//
-// **1 is RESERVED for a finding**, which is a promise the entry block at the foot of this file keeps
-// rather than a description of what node does by default: an uncaught error would otherwise leave node
-// to exit 1, and the recipe reads 1 as *a scanned file carries a control character* — a judged verdict
-// about a tree, from a run that judged nothing (#208). **Scanned, not tracked**: the listing is
-// `--cached --others --exclude-standard`, so it is the tracked set PLUS everything new and not ignored,
-// which is the point — a byte is caught before it is committed. This line said "tracked" when #208 wrote
-// it, adding a fresh carrier to the narrowing #170 already had on the roster; swept here with the rest.
-//
-// ## Why this exists
-//
-// A raw NUL shipped inside `../.portulan/verify/workflow-filters.mjs` as the separator in a template
-// literal, where the escape `\u0000` was meant. A reviewer caught it; nothing in this repository did, and
-// the reason is the part that matters (issue #68):
-//
-//   * `file` classified the source as *binary data*.
-//   * `grep -n "identity = "` against the line that plainly contains that text exited **1** — a silent
-//     false negative. `docs.sh` — the DEFAULT recipe, the one a Stop-gate runs when nothing more
-//     specific applies — is built out of `grep` throughout, so the tool most likely to have shown the
-//     byte is the tool the byte silences. (Named rather than counted, and that took two goes: the
-//     first draft said *every* recipe in that directory was built out of `grep`, and FIVE invoke it
-//     zero times — two of them carrying the word only in comments, which is why the number was three
-//     for three days; the correction then asserted `seventeen invocations`, a figure taken from a word
-//     count that included comments. A number nothing regenerates is a claim that rots — #77. Copilot
-//     found the first, in three carriers; I found the second auditing my own fix.)
-//   * `git` rendered the diff as text only because the byte sat past its first 8000 bytes. A few
-//     hundred lines earlier and the whole instrument would have arrived in review as `Binary files
-//     differ` — a file nobody could read, in a pull request that looked complete.
-//
-// It then reproduced twice more while being fixed. Three tools noticed across the whole incident and
-// none of them was ours, which is `a-mandate-nothing-checks-is-already-broken.md` with the mandate
-// left implicit: nobody had ever written down that a tracked file may not carry one.
-//
-// ## What counts, and the one thing that does not
-//
-// Every byte in the C0 range — `0x00`–`0x1F` — except **TAB** and **LF**, plus **DEL** (`0x7F`),
-// plus every **C1** control character, `U+0080`–`U+009F`.
-// DEL is not in C0 and is the same defect: invisible, and printed by `cat -v` as `^?`.
-//
-// **C1 was the half this could not see until #207**, and the gap was not theoretical: a planted U+009B
-// (CSI — the byte that opens a terminal escape sequence) left the recipe green, measured at the
-// retrospective pass over #167. C1 arrives as TWO UTF-8 bytes, `0xc2` then `0x80`–`0x9f`, so a per-byte
-// C0 test cannot reach it however carefully it is written.
-//
-// **Format characters are deliberately still out** — zero-width space, the bidi marks, word joiner,
-// BOM (`U+200B`–`U+200F`, `U+2060`–`U+206F`, `U+FEFF`). They are a different question, not a smaller
-// one: unlike C1 they appear legitimately in prose, so a rail over them needs an exemption mechanism far
-// busier than the named-path list below, and that is a proposal rather than an addition here.
-//
-// **CR is refused**, which is a decision rather than an oversight. No tracked file in this repository
-// carries one, so the rail costs nothing today and stops CRLF arriving unnoticed in a tree that is
-// uniformly LF. A repository that wants CRLF wants it declared, not discovered.
-//
-// ## Bytes, never text
-//
-// The scan reads a `Buffer` and never decodes it. Decoding invalid UTF-8 yields U+FFFD, which both
-// hides bytes and invents a character that was not there — and this is the one check in the repository
-// whose entire subject is what the bytes actually are. It is exact rather than approximate for a reason
-// the encoding gives for free: no C0 byte and no `0x7F` ever appears inside a multi-byte UTF-8
-// sequence, whose continuation bytes are all `>= 0x80`. So a byte scan and a character scan agree here,
-// and only the byte scan can be trusted to.
-//
-// ## Why the exemption is a NAMED PATH and never a content sniff
-//
-// Issue #68 offers two scopes: tracked text files — `git ls-files` plus a binary test — or an allow-list
-// of extensions. **The binary test is refused, and the incident is why:** every binary sniff in general
-// use is keyed on NUL, which is exactly the byte that motivated this check. `file` called the defective
-// source *binary data*; git's own heuristic reads the first 8000 bytes for a NUL. A check that skipped
-// what those call binary would have skipped the one file it exists to catch — a fail-open by
-// construction, in the shape `a-checkers-coverage-is-measured-not-named.md` describes.
-//
-// An extension allow-list is refused for the reason this repository always refuses one: it is a door
-// every future file type walks through in silence.
-//
-// What is left is a declaration. `--exempt <path>` names ONE path, is repeatable, and the workspace's
-// recipe supplies it — so a binary asset arriving in this tree costs one reviewable line rather than a
-// permanently red gate, and it costs it in a pull request where somebody sees it. The declaration is
-// AUDITED, because an exemption nobody checks is the allow-list defect this project has already paid
-// for once (`cli/vendor.mjs`, round 13 of #164 — the carve-out permitted a thing that was not a file).
-// Three outcomes, each exit 2 and none a quiet pass:
-//
-//   * an exempted path that is not in the list at all is **stale**;
-//   * an exempted path that is tracked and not on disk was **never read**, so this run cannot say
-//     whether the exemption is live — which is a different fact from either of the others and was
-//     reported as *dead* until Copilot separated them;
-//   * an exempted path carrying no control character is **dead**, because an exemption that is not
-//     load-bearing is one nobody will notice has stopped being true.
-//
-// **One limit, stated rather than left to be found:** an exemption is matched by the path as the file
-// list spells it, and `--exempt` values arrive through `argv` already decoded. So a pathname that is
-// not valid UTF-8 cannot be exempted — but it cannot be scanned either; `splitList` refuses the whole
-// run over it at exit 2, so there is no silent gap here, only a repository this tool would decline to
-// judge until the name is changed.
-//
-// Zero dependencies, no network, no install step — same constraints as ./doctor.mjs and ./index.mjs.
-// It is not one of the eight subcommands `../docs/vision.md` names, and is not wired behind the entry
-// point, for the same reason `./plugin-lint.mjs` is not: whether it joins them is the maintainer's call.
 
 import fs from "node:fs";
 import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
@@ -117,14 +20,7 @@ const TAB = 0x09;
 const LF = 0x0a;
 const DEL = 0x7f;
 
-/**
- * The C0 mnemonics, so a finding names the byte rather than printing it.
- *
- * Printing the character would reproduce the defect inside the report — the incident did exactly that
- * twice while being fixed, once in the README paragraph describing it and once in the shell command
- * carrying the commit message. A check whose output can carry the thing it checks for is a check that
- * can silence its own next run.
- */
+/** C0 mnemonics, so a finding names its byte rather than printing the defect into the report. */
 const NAMES = [
     "NUL", "SOH", "STX", "ETX", "EOT", "ENQ", "ACK", "BEL",
     "BS", "TAB", "LF", "VT", "FF", "CR", "SO", "SI",
@@ -132,22 +28,10 @@ const NAMES = [
     "CAN", "EM", "SUB", "ESC", "FS", "GS", "RS", "US",
 ];
 
-/** `0x00` → `NUL`, `0x7f` → `DEL`. Never the character itself. */
 export const nameOf = (byte) => (byte === DEL ? "DEL" : (NAMES[byte] ?? `0x${byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")}`));
 
-/** Is this byte one a tracked file may not carry? TAB and LF are the whole allowance. */
 export const isForbidden = (byte) => byte !== TAB && byte !== LF && (byte < 0x20 || byte === DEL);
 
-/**
- * The C1 mnemonics, `0x80`–`0x9f`, indexed from `0x80`.
- *
- * C1 is the half this check could not see until #207. These are control characters by every definition
- * that matters here — invisible, semantically active in terminals (`CSI` opens an escape sequence), and
- * unreachable by the byte test above, because in UTF-8 they arrive as **two** bytes, `0xc2` followed by
- * `0x80`–`0x9f`, and neither of those is in C0.
- *
- * Measured at the retrospective pass over #167: a planted U+009B left this recipe green.
- */
 const C1_NAMES = [
     "PAD", "HOP", "BPH", "NBH", "IND", "NEL", "SSA", "ESA",
     "HTS", "HTJ", "VTS", "PLD", "PLU", "RI", "SS2", "SS3",
@@ -157,66 +41,24 @@ const C1_NAMES = [
 
 const C1_LEAD = 0xc2;
 
-/**
- * Is a C1 control character encoded at `i`? Two bytes, `0xc2` then `0x80`–`0x9f`.
- *
- * **This is the one place the scan looks at more than one byte, and it stays a byte test rather than
- * becoming a decode.** Decoding is refused for the reason the header gives — U+FFFD both hides bytes and
- * invents characters — and it is not needed: `0xc2` is a two-byte lead whose only continuations are
- * `0x80`–`0xbf`, so this sequence is unambiguous without decoding anything around it.
- */
+/** `0xc2` never occurs mid-sequence in UTF-8, so a C1 control is found without decoding. */
 const isC1At = (buffer, i) => buffer[i] === C1_LEAD && buffer[i + 1] >= 0x80 && buffer[i + 1] <= 0x9f;
 
-/** `0x9b` → `U+009B CSI`. The code point, never the character — `nameOf`'s rule on the other range. */
 export const nameOfC1 = (second) => `U+00${second.toString(16).toUpperCase()} ${C1_NAMES[second - 0x80]}`;
 
-/**
- * Bytes rendered for a message, with everything outside printable ASCII as `\xNN` — **never raw**.
- *
- * `nameOf`'s rule, applied to a run of bytes instead of to one. It lives beside it because it is the
- * same rule and was learned the same way.
- */
 const escapeBytes = (buffer) =>
     [...buffer]
         .map((b) => {
-            // The backslash is escaped FIRST, and that is the whole reason this is not a one-liner: a
-            // filename literally containing the characters `\`, `x`, `f`, `f` would otherwise render
-            // exactly like the byte `0xff`, so the message meant to remove an ambiguity would carry
-            // one. `\\` is unambiguous and reads correctly beside the `\xNN` escapes.
+            // A backslash is doubled, so a name holding the text `\xff` cannot read as the byte `0xff`.
             if (b === 0x5c) return "\\\\";
             return b >= 0x20 && b < DEL ? String.fromCharCode(b) : `\\x${b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")}`;
         })
         .join("");
 
-/**
- * A pathname as it may be PRINTED. **Every message in this file that names a path goes through here.**
- *
- * Git tracks a filename of any bytes but NUL and `/` — measured, not assumed: a file named
- * `we<LF>ird.md` is trackable, and `git ls-files -z` emits that newline raw. So a report interpolating
- * a filename directly could **print the very bytes this check exists to catch** into a CI log, and a
- * newline in a name would break the one-line-per-file contract every consumer of this output reads by.
- *
- * That is `nameOf`'s own argument turned on the other half of the line: *a check whose output can carry
- * the thing it checks for is a check that can silence its own next run.* The escaping shipped for the
- * undecodable-path case in round 3 and was not applied to the six places that name an ordinary path —
- * a fix missing its siblings, the third time in this pull request. Copilot, #167, suppressed channel.
- */
+/** Every path a message names goes through here: git allows any byte but NUL and `/` in a name. */
 const displayPath = (file) => escapeBytes(Buffer.from(file, "utf8"));
 
-/**
- * Every forbidden byte in a buffer, as `{ offset, byte, name, line, column }`.
- *
- * **`offset` is 0-based; `line` and `column` are 1-based.** The three are not on one scale and saying
- * so is not pedantry — `offset` is an index into the buffer, so it is 0-based by construction, while
- * a line number that started at 0 would disagree with every editor and every other message in this
- * repository. Copilot found the mismatch stated the other way on #167 round 1, in a test NAME, which
- * is where a reader looks for the contract.
- *
- * **`column` counts BYTES**, likewise stated rather than left to be discovered: a line holding a
- * three-byte em dash has a byte column larger than its character column, and this check's own subject
- * is claims that outrun their measurement — the distinction the `plan` rail already makes about
- * `awk`'s `length()`.
- */
+/** Each forbidden byte: `offset` is 0-based, `line` and `column` 1-based, and `column` counts bytes. */
 export function scanBytes(buffer) {
     const found = [];
     let line = 1;
@@ -232,20 +74,6 @@ export function scanBytes(buffer) {
             found.push({ offset: i, byte, name: nameOf(byte), line, column: i - lineStart + 1 });
             continue;
         }
-        // C1, and reported at the LEAD byte: that is where the character starts, and an offset pointing
-        // at the continuation would send a reader one byte past the thing they are looking for. `i` is
-        // not advanced — the continuation is `0x80`–`0x9f`, which no other branch here matches, so there
-        // is nothing to skip and the line counting stays a single rule.
-        //
-        // `byte` is the byte AT `offset`, which for C1 is the lead `0xc2` — not the continuation that
-        // says which C1 this is. The first draft put the continuation here and left `offset` on the
-        // lead, so one record answered "where" and "what" about two different bytes: a reader seeking
-        // `byte` at `offset` would not find it. Nothing consumes the field today — the locator prints
-        // `name`, `line`, `column` and `offset` — so this is latent rather than a live wrong message,
-        // and that is exactly why it is worth fixing now: an unread field is where an untrue one
-        // survives. `name` already carries which character it is, via the continuation, so nothing is
-        // lost. The C0 branch above sets `byte` to the byte at its own offset; both branches now mean
-        // the same thing by the same key. Copilot, #251 round 1.
         if (isC1At(buffer, i)) {
             found.push({ offset: i, byte: buffer[i], name: nameOfC1(buffer[i + 1]), line, column: i - lineStart + 1 });
         }
@@ -253,23 +81,7 @@ export function scanBytes(buffer) {
     return found;
 }
 
-/**
- * The bytes git tracks for one path, or `null` when the path is not on disk.
- *
- * **A symlink is read as its target's BYTES, not through it.** Those bytes are the blob git stores, and
- * they are the thing this check is asked about; following the link would scan a file that may not be in
- * the repository at all, and a dangling one would be an error about the wrong thing. Bytes rather than
- * the string `readlinkSync` hands back by default — see the branch below for what that default cost.
- *
- * Only `ENOENT` is `null` — a file tracked in the index and deleted from the working tree, which is an
- * ordinary state and the one `../.portulan/verify/json.sh` already skips. Every other errno means the
- * process could not look, and *could not look* reported as *looked and found nothing* is the failure
- * `a-checker-must-refuse-what-it-cannot-check.md` is about.
- *
- * Anything that is neither a regular file nor a symlink — a FIFO, a socket, a device node, a directory
- * — is refused rather than guessed at, which is `./vendor.mjs`'s rule in `./vendor.mjs`'s words: this
- * reads neither by guessing at it.
- */
+/** The bytes git stores for a path (a symlink's target path, not its target), or `null` when not on disk. */
 export function bytesOf(file) {
     let stat;
     try {
@@ -284,13 +96,7 @@ export function bytesOf(file) {
 
     if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
         try {
-            // `"buffer"`, not the default string. `readlinkSync` decodes as UTF-8 by default, so a
-            // target git stores as raw bytes came back U+FFFD-substituted and was re-encoded into
-            // DIFFERENT bytes — which both breaks this function's own "never decodes" promise and can
-            // hide a control byte sitting in the target. That is the identical defect `splitList`
-            // was just repaired for, two functions below, in the same push that repaired it: a fix
-            // arriving without its sibling, which is the class `0020` names. Copilot found it in the
-            // suppressed channel on the very next round.
+            // `"buffer"`: the default decodes as UTF-8 and alters a target that is not valid UTF-8.
             return fs.readlinkSync(file, "buffer");
         } catch (cause) {
             throw new ControlCharsError(`cannot read the symlink ${displayPath(file)} — ${cause.code ?? cause.message}`);
@@ -313,22 +119,6 @@ export function bytesOf(file) {
     }
 }
 
-/**
- * Scan a list of paths.
- *
- * Returns `{ findings, unusable, scanned, skipped, exempted }`. A finding is
- * `{ file, count, first }` — one per offending file rather than one per byte, because a genuinely
- * binary asset holds thousands and a report that prints them all is a report nobody reads. The count
- * is stated beside the first, so nothing is dropped in silence.
- *
- * `unusable` holds the exemptions this run could not show to be doing their job, each with its own
- * `why`. It was called `stale` while it carried two cases and gained a third — *not read* — which is
- * not staleness at all, so the name went with the meaning rather than after it.
- *
- * **An empty list is refused.** Zero files scanned and a green report is the enumeration fail-open this
- * repository has fixed five times (`verify-preconditions-fail-closed.md`), and it is the failure this
- * check is most exposed to: its whole input arrives through a pipe.
- */
 export function inspect(files, { exempt = new Set() } = {}) {
     if (files.length === 0) {
         throw new ControlCharsError(
@@ -340,8 +130,6 @@ export function inspect(files, { exempt = new Set() } = {}) {
     const findings = [];
     const seen = new Set();
     const carrying = new Set();
-    // Listed and NOT READ — tracked, absent from the working tree. Kept apart from `carrying` because
-    // the audit below must not read one as the other; see there.
     const unread = new Set();
     let scanned = 0;
     let skipped = 0;
@@ -362,16 +150,6 @@ export function inspect(files, { exempt = new Set() } = {}) {
         findings.push({ file, count: bad.length, first: bad[0] });
     }
 
-    // The audit, in three directions rather than two. An exemption naming nothing in the list is stale
-    // and one over a clean file is dead — but between them sits a third case the first draft collapsed
-    // into the second: a file that is tracked, absent from the working tree, and therefore NEVER READ.
-    // `seen` had it, `carrying` did not, so it was reported *carries no control character, so the
-    // exemption is dead* — a specific claim about a file nothing opened, which would send the
-    // maintainer to delete an exemption that is still load-bearing. That is this check's own subject
-    // and #92's class exactly: a verdict about something never examined. Copilot, suppressed channel.
-    //
-    // It stays exit 2 rather than passing quietly: an exemption nothing could verify is not a verified
-    // exemption, which is `a-checker-must-refuse-what-it-cannot-check.md`.
     const unusable = [];
     for (const file of exempt) {
         if (!seen.has(file)) unusable.push({ file, why: "is not in the scanned set" });
@@ -392,31 +170,7 @@ export function inspect(files, { exempt = new Set() } = {}) {
 // The command
 // ===========================================================================================
 
-/**
- * The NUL-separated list `git ls-files -z` writes, split at the BYTE level.
- *
- * Returns `{ paths, undecodable }`. A trailing separator yields no empty entry.
- *
- * **The split and the decode are two different fail-opens, and only the first was closed.** `-z` was
- * chosen so a filename could not reach this scanner mis-SPELLED — git C-quotes a control character in
- * the line-based form regardless of `core.quotePath`, so the alternative delivers `"we\nird.md"` as one
- * printable line rather than two, and the loss is the name and not the split (#209, measured; an earlier
- * version of this sentence said "could not be mis-split", which named a failure git already prevents) —
- * but the list was then decoded
- * whole with `readFileSync(0, "utf8")`, and git allows a pathname to be **any bytes except NUL and
- * `/`**. Node replaces an invalid sequence with U+FFFD, so such a name arrived here as a *different
- * string*, `bytesOf` looked for that string, got `ENOENT`, and the file was counted as *tracked and
- * not on disk* — **skipped, and the run reported green over a file nothing had read**, with a
- * plausible sentence in the summary saying so. A silent skip is the exact failure this whole check
- * exists to catch, one layer up: `grep` went quiet on the NUL, and this went quiet on the name.
- * Copilot found it on #167 in both channels at once — the thread on the production read, the
- * suppressed note on the same decode in the live-tree test.
- *
- * So the bytes are split as bytes, and each chunk is kept only if it **round-trips** through UTF-8.
- * Anything else is returned as `undecodable` for the caller to refuse over — never repaired, never
- * dropped. `a-checker-must-refuse-what-it-cannot-check.md`: a path this tool cannot represent is one
- * it would look for under a different name.
- */
+/** `git ls-files -z` output, split as bytes; a name that fails a UTF-8 round trip is `undecodable`. */
 export function splitList(input) {
     const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(input) ? input : Buffer.from(input, "utf8");
     const paths = [];
@@ -427,9 +181,7 @@ export function splitList(input) {
         if (i > start) {
             const chunk = buffer.subarray(start, i);
             const text = chunk.toString("utf8");
-            // The round trip is the test, not a regex for U+FFFD: a filename may legitimately CONTAIN
-            // U+FFFD, and rejecting that would be a false red on a name git stores exactly as given.
-            // Re-encoding answers the only question that matters — did anything change on the way in.
+            // A round trip rather than a U+FFFD test: a filename may itself contain U+FFFD.
             if (Buffer.from(text, "utf8").equals(chunk)) paths.push(text);
             else undecodable.push(chunk);
         }
@@ -444,15 +196,7 @@ export function run(argv, stdin, say = (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n
         if (argv[i] === "--exempt") {
             const file = argv[i + 1];
             i += 1;
-            // Only a MISSING value is refused. The first draft also rejected anything starting with
-            // `--`, copied from `./index.mjs`'s `--pack-root` — and here that guard blocks a path git
-            // can perfectly well track, in the one mechanism this whole check rests on: a file named
-            // `--asset.bin` could never be exempted, with no workaround. It buys nothing either, and
-            // that is the deciding half rather than the rarity: the mistake it was aimed at — a
-            // forgotten value, `--exempt --other` — is already caught by the exemption AUDIT, which
-            // says `--exempt --other is not in the scanned set` and exits 2. A guard whose only job is
-            // already done elsewhere, at the cost of a capability, is one to delete. Copilot, #167,
-            // suppressed channel.
+            // Only a missing value is refused: a path git tracks may start with `--`.
             if (file === undefined) {
                 say("  ✗ --exempt needs a path");
                 return 2;
@@ -464,9 +208,6 @@ export function run(argv, stdin, say = (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n
         }
     }
 
-    // Refused before anything is scanned, and refused rather than skipped. Exit 2 is the honest code:
-    // the tree may be perfectly clean, and this run cannot say so — which is the difference between a
-    // verdict and a failure to reach one.
     const { paths, undecodable } = splitList(stdin);
     if (undecodable.length) {
         for (const chunk of undecodable) {
@@ -489,18 +230,11 @@ export function run(argv, stdin, say = (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n
         return 2;
     }
 
-    // The stale-exemption audit is a defect in the declaration rather than a verdict about a file, so
-    // it exits 2 — the same code, and the same reasoning, as a stale entry in `index.sh`'s WORKSPACES.
     if (result.unusable.length) {
         for (const s of result.unusable) say(`  ✗ --exempt ${displayPath(s.file)} ${s.why}`);
         return 2;
     }
 
-    // The locator leads with line and byte column — 1-based, the numbers an editor shows — and gives
-    // the buffer offset after them, saying it is 0-based. The first draft printed `byte 19 (line 1,
-    // byte column 20)` and named neither base, so the two numbers looked like a contradiction about
-    // the same position. A message that has to be decoded is the failure this whole check is about,
-    // one layer up. Copilot, round 1 on #167, which found the same mismatch in a test name.
     for (const f of result.findings) {
         say(
             `  ✗ ${displayPath(f.file)}: ${f.count} control character(s) — first at line ${f.first.line}, ` +
@@ -521,14 +255,9 @@ export function run(argv, stdin, say = (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n
 if (import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1] ?? "").href) {
     let stdin;
     try {
-        // **No encoding.** `readFileSync(0, "utf8")` decoded the whole list before anything could
-        // check it, which is where the U+FFFD substitution happened — see `splitList`. The bytes
-        // arrive as bytes and the decode is per path, with a round trip deciding.
+        // Bytes, not text: decoding here would turn a name that is not valid UTF-8 into another name.
         stdin = fs.readFileSync(0);
     } catch (cause) {
-        // A terminal with nothing piped into it, most often. Refused with the usage line rather than
-        // an empty list, which `inspect` would refuse anyway — but as "the enumeration failed", which
-        // is a diagnosis of the wrong thing.
         process.stderr.write(
             `control-chars: cannot read the file list from stdin — ${cause.code ?? cause.message}\n` +
                 "usage: git ls-files --cached --others --exclude-standard -z | " +
@@ -537,25 +266,7 @@ if (import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1] ?? "").href) {
         process.exitCode = 2;
         stdin = null;
     }
-    // `process.exitCode` rather than `process.exit`: this writes its findings to stdout, and exiting
-    // outright can truncate a pipe that has not drained. `./plugin-lint.mjs` settled that already.
-    //
-    // **1 is reserved for a finding, so everything unhandled is 2** (#208). An uncaught error here used
-    // to leave node to exit **1**, which `../.portulan/verify/control-chars.sh` reads as this tool's
-    // documented "a scanned file carries a control character" — a judged verdict about a tree, produced
-    // by a run that judged nothing. The direction was always safe; the SENTENCE was false, which is the
-    // shape this file's own recipe cites `compile.sh` for. The stack still prints, because a crash is a
-    // defect in this tool and hiding it would trade one wrong report for another.
-    //
-    // **The test that binds this forces the crash from OUTSIDE the module** — a `node --import` preload
-    // that makes `fs.lstatSync` return a stat-shaped object with no `isSymbolicLink`, so the TypeError
-    // lands in `bytesOf`'s one unwrapped call: the `try` there covers the `lstatSync` CALL, and
-    // `stat.isSymbolicLink()` sits outside it. That is deliberate — it keeps the fault injection out of
-    // the shipped code, where a test-only `main()` export or an env-gated throw would both have added a
-    // surface whose only caller is this block. **The coupling is worth knowing before it bites:** if a
-    // later change wraps `stat.isSymbolicLink()` inside that `try`, the preload stops producing an
-    // uncaught error and the test goes red for a reason that has nothing to do with this arm. The repair
-    // then is a NEW fault seam, never a revert of the wrapping.
+    // `exitCode`, not `exit()`, so stdout drains; anything uncaught exits 2, because 1 means a finding.
     if (stdin !== null) {
         try {
             process.exitCode = run(process.argv.slice(2), stdin);