@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.92 → 0.9.0-preview.94

package/src/tools-list-json-schema.test.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ import { registerTools } from "./tools.js";
 
 async function connect() {
   const server = new McpServer({ name: "list-tools-test", version: "1" });
-  registerTools(server, undefined, "net_list_tools", "u_list_tools", "u_list_tools", false, "tok_list_tools");
+  // 没有用户 / 节点身份的调用者 = tools/list 不按角色过滤(#478),这里要的正是「每个登记的工具」。
+  registerTools(server, undefined, "net_list_tools", null, "u_list_tools", false, "tok_list_tools");
   const client = new Client({ name: "list-tools-client", version: "1" });
   const [ct, st] = InMemoryTransport.createLinkedPair();
   await server.connect(st);

package/src/tools.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { pendingInboxCount } from "./inbox-count.js";
 import { getUserNetworkRole, createNetworkTokenForNode } from "./auth.js";
 import { addAgentNetworkScope, addNetworkScope, addOwnTrafficScope, canRestWriteNetwork, canRestWriteNetworkAsHuman, getUserNetworkIds, resolveRestNetworkScope, singleNetworkId, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
 import { canMessageAgent, restrictedNetworkIds, RESTRICTED_MEMBER_TOOLS, type AgentRef } from "./agent-access.js";
+import { listedToolFilter, scopeToolsList, type ToolCaller } from "./tool-audience.js";
 import { broadcastVerdict, dispatchVerdict, humanOnlyVerdict, NODE_TOOL_CLASS, nodeDecide, nodeIdentity, nodePermissionDeniedBody, writeVerdict, type NodeIdentity, type Verdict } from "./node-permissions.js";
 import { restrictedMemberAttachmentsDenied } from "./restricted-files.js";
 import { errorBody } from "./requirements-errors.js";
@@ -258,7 +259,7 @@ function guardNodePermissionTools(server: McpServer, tokenId: string, networkId:
   }
 }
 
-export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetworkId?: string | null, enforceUserId?: string | null, callerAlias?: string | null, callerTokenIsNetwork = false, callerTokenId?: string | null) {
+export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetworkId?: string | null, enforceUserId?: string | null, callerAlias?: string | null, callerTokenIsNetwork = false, callerTokenId?: string | null, listing: { includeProtocol?: boolean } = {}) {
   // 多用户 Agent 权限:用户令牌调用者在哪些网络里是受限成员(只看授权 Agent)。
   // 网络令牌不会走到这里 —— 受限成员的网络令牌在 resolveToken 就被拒了。
   const restrictedNets = enforceUserId && !callerTokenIsNetwork && !enforceNetworkId ? restrictedNetworkIds(enforceUserId) : [];
@@ -1166,7 +1167,7 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
       if (node_id) {
         try {
           const nodeRuntime = ag?.includes(":") ? ag.split(":")[1] + "-sdk" : ag ?? null;
-          upsertNodeWithSec1Guard({
+          const upserted = upsertNodeWithSec1Guard({
             node_id,
             callerNetworkId: effectiveNetId ?? null,
             callerUserId: enforceUserId ?? null,
@@ -1181,6 +1182,11 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
             hostname: hn ?? null,
             config_snapshot: cfgSnap ?? null,
           });
+          // The session row above already took node_id; a refused identity claim
+          // must not leave this session pointing at another node's row.
+          if (upserted.result === "refused" && upserted.reason === "identity_mismatch") {
+            db.run("UPDATE sessions SET node_id = NULL WHERE resume_id = ?1 AND node_id = ?2", [resume_id, node_id]);
+          }
         } catch {}
       }
 
@@ -5957,6 +5963,8 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
     parent_id: z.string().max(200).optional().describe("children of this requirement ('none' = top level)"),
     department_id: z.string().max(64).optional().describe("owner (or its Agent's owner) in this department or below"),
     top_level: z.boolean().optional(), q: z.string().max(200).optional(),
+    overdue: z.boolean().optional().describe("true = open tasks past their due (date-only due: before today, Asia/Shanghai); false = everything else"),
+    due_within_days: z.number().int().min(0).max(365).optional().describe("open tasks not yet overdue, due by the end of today + N days (0 = later today)"),
     limit: z.number().int().min(1).max(1000).optional().describe(`page size, default ${REQ_LIST_MCP_DEFAULT_LIMIT}`),
     cursor: z.string().max(600).optional().describe("next_cursor from the previous page"),
     view: z.enum(["full", "summary"]).optional().describe("default summary (no description / checklist bodies; has_description, checklist_count instead); full = everything"),
@@ -5966,7 +5974,7 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
   server.registerTool(
     "requirements_list",
     {
-      description: `List requirement tasks in your network, newest first. Defaults (MCP): view='summary' (no description / checklist bodies; has_description, checklist_count instead; ~0.5 KB per task) and ${REQ_LIST_MCP_DEFAULT_LIMIT} per page; has_more + next_cursor → pass cursor. Full text: requirements_get, or view='full' with a small limit (≤ 1000). Filters: seq (#N), status, project_id ('none'), owner / agent_owner ('user:<id>' / 'node:<id>' / 'none'), tag (exact), updated_since (ISO), external_ref, parent_id / top_level, department_id (owner in it or below), include_archived; q searches title / description / people / project / tags (terms ANDed). Rows carry children {total, done}. changes=true (with updated_since) returns only tasks changed since then, archived included, plus deleted ids and server_time for the next updated_since. Unknown parameters are rejected (-32602).`,
+      description: `List requirement tasks in your network, newest first. Defaults (MCP): view='summary' (no description / checklist bodies; has_description, checklist_count instead; ~0.5 KB per task) and ${REQ_LIST_MCP_DEFAULT_LIMIT} per page; has_more + next_cursor → pass cursor. Full text: requirements_get, or view='full' with a small limit (≤ 1000). Filters: seq (#N), status, project_id ('none'), owner / agent_owner ('user:<id>' / 'node:<id>' / 'none'), tag (exact), updated_since (ISO), overdue / due_within_days (open tasks only), external_ref, parent_id / top_level, department_id (owner in it or below), include_archived; q searches title / description / people / project / tags (terms ANDed). Rows carry children {total, done}. changes=true (with updated_since) returns only tasks changed since then, archived included, plus deleted ids and server_time for the next updated_since. Unknown parameters are rejected (-32602).`,
       // Strict: registerTool honours a constructed object's unknownKeys (server.tool() would strip them silently).
       inputSchema: z.strictObject(reqListShape, {
         error: (iss: any) => iss.code === "unrecognized_keys"
@@ -5982,6 +5990,8 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
       if (args.include_archived) q.set("include_archived", "1");
       if (args.top_level) q.set("top_level", "1");
       if (args.changes) q.set("changes", "1");
+      if (args.overdue !== undefined) q.set("overdue", args.overdue ? "1" : "0");
+      if (args.due_within_days !== undefined) q.set("due_within_days", String(args.due_within_days));
       return requirementsCall("GET", `/api/requirements?${q}`, args.network_id);
     },
   );
@@ -6133,6 +6143,12 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
     },
     async ({ id, text, network_id }) => requirementsCall("POST", `/api/requirements/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/comments`, network_id, { text }),
   );
+
+  // #478:tools/list 只列这个调用者真能用的工具(tool-audience.ts)。只滤列表,tools/call 不变。
+  const caller: ToolCaller = callerTokenIsNetwork
+    ? { kind: "node", tokenId: callerTokenId ?? null, networkId: enforceNetworkId ?? null, includeProtocol: listing.includeProtocol === true }
+    : enforceUserId ? { kind: "user", includeProtocol: listing.includeProtocol === true } : { kind: "unknown" };
+  scopeToolsList(server, listedToolFilter(caller));
 }
 
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -6164,7 +6180,7 @@ export interface UpsertNodeWithSec1GuardInput {
 }
 export type UpsertNodeOutcome =
   | { result: "inserted" | "updated"; node_id: string }
-  | { result: "refused"; reason: "cross_network" | "token_node_mismatch" | "owner_mismatch"; existingNet: string | null; callerNet: string | null }
+  | { result: "refused"; reason: "cross_network" | "token_node_mismatch" | "owner_mismatch" | "identity_mismatch"; existingNet: string | null; callerNet: string | null }
   | { result: "skipped"; reason: "missing_node_id" };
 
 const _norm = (x: string | null | undefined) => (x === null || x === undefined ? "default" : x);
@@ -6193,8 +6209,8 @@ export function trustedConfigSnapshotForNode(
 
 export function upsertNodeWithSec1Guard(input: UpsertNodeWithSec1GuardInput): UpsertNodeOutcome {
   if (!input.node_id) return { result: "skipped", reason: "missing_node_id" };
-  const existing = db.get<{ network_id: string | null; owner_user_id: string | null }>(
-    "SELECT network_id, owner_user_id FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1",
+  const existing = db.get<{ network_id: string | null; owner_user_id: string | null; alias: string | null; config_path: string | null }>(
+    "SELECT network_id, owner_user_id, alias, config_path FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1",
     input.node_id,
   );
   const callerNet = input.callerNetworkId;
@@ -6217,6 +6233,20 @@ export function upsertNodeWithSec1Guard(input: UpsertNodeWithSec1GuardInput): Up
   if (existing?.owner_user_id && input.callerUserId !== existing.owner_user_id) {
     return { result: "refused", reason: "owner_mismatch", existingNet: existing.network_id, callerNet };
   }
+  // A node_id copied into another node's config (or a hand-backfilled id that
+  // collides) must not relabel the row: the upsert below would COALESCE the
+  // reporter's alias over the owner's. A legit rename moves nodes.alias itself
+  // (rename.ts), so "different alias AND a different config file" is never the
+  // same node. Unowned legacy rows are exactly where this collision lives.
+  if (
+    existing?.alias && input.alias && existing.alias !== input.alias
+    && existing.config_path && input.config_path && existing.config_path !== input.config_path
+  ) {
+    console.warn(
+      `[commhub] 🚫 report_status node upsert refused (identity_mismatch): node_id=${input.node_id} row-alias=${existing.alias} reporter-alias=${input.alias}`,
+    );
+    return { result: "refused", reason: "identity_mismatch", existingNet: existing.network_id, callerNet };
+  }
 
   // Legacy / first-write paths: row missing OR network_id NULL → claim.
   const isLegacy = !existing