@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.73 → 0.9.0-preview.74

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sleep2agi/commhub-server",
-  "version": "0.9.0-preview.73",
+  "version": "0.9.0-preview.74",
   "description": "CommHub Server — AI Agent communication hub with MCP protocol, multi-network isolation, user auth, and MCP tools (17 collaboration-core + node/provider ops tools; authoritative list: docs-site/docs/api/mcp-tools.md).",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.ts",

package/src/agent-acl-http.test.ts

@@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ describe("granted member sees and messages ONLY what was granted", () => {
 describe("requirements: agent references alice cannot see are hidden and protected", () => {
   let reqId = "";
   test("a card owned by Z shows agent_owner=null to alice, Z to admin", async () => {
+    // 这一组测的是「看不见的 Agent 引用被隐去、不能被改」,不是任务范围:alice 按 RFC-038 §9 之前的语义能改全网的卡。
+    db.run("UPDATE network_members SET task_access = 'all' WHERE network_id = ?1 AND user_id = ?2", [NET, aliceId]);
     const c = await send(adminToken, "POST", "/api/requirements", { name: "card", network_id: NET, agent_owner: { kind: "node", id: Z.node }, participants: [{ kind: "node", id: Z.node }, { kind: "user", id: aliceId }] });
     expect(c.status).toBe(201);
     reqId = c.body.requirement.id;

package/src/auth.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 import { db, generateId, hashPassword, verifyPassword, hashToken, generateToken, generateUserToken, generateNetworkToken, uuidv4 } from "./db.js";
 import { WEAK_PASSWORDS } from "./password-dict.js";
 import { NETWORK_REST_COLUMNS, NETWORK_REST_SELECT, sqlColumns } from "./rest-projections.js";
-import { deleteAgentGrants, isAgentRestricted } from "./agent-access.js";
+import { deleteAgentGrants, isAgentRestricted } from "./agent-access.js"; import { deleteTaskGrantsForMember, NEW_MEMBER_TASK_ACCESS, type TaskAccessMode } from "./task-access.js"; // 一行两个 import:文档钉着 auth.ts 的行号
 
 // Round-6 A1 hardening — dummy hash for username-enumeration timing
 // close. We compute ONE scrypt hash of a throwaway password and reuse
@@ -586,6 +586,8 @@ export function getNetworkMembers(networkId: string) {
     `SELECT nm.user_id, nm.role, nm.joined_at, nm.invited_by, u.username, u.display_name,
             CASE WHEN u.role = 'admin' OR nm.role IN ('owner', 'admin') OR nm.agent_access = 'all' THEN 'all' ELSE 'granted' END AS agent_access,
             (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM network_member_agent_grants g WHERE g.network_id = nm.network_id AND g.user_id = nm.user_id) AS agent_grant_count,
+            CASE WHEN u.role = 'admin' OR nm.role IN ('owner', 'admin') OR nm.task_access = 'all' THEN 'all' ELSE 'scoped' END AS task_access,
+            (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM network_member_project_grants pg WHERE pg.network_id = nm.network_id AND pg.user_id = nm.user_id) AS task_project_count,
             (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM network_member_group_grants gg WHERE gg.network_id = nm.network_id AND gg.user_id = nm.user_id) AS agent_group_count
      FROM network_members nm JOIN users u ON nm.user_id = u.user_id
      WHERE nm.network_id = ?1 ORDER BY nm.joined_at`,
@@ -624,15 +626,17 @@ export function usernameCollidesWithAgent(networkId: string, userId: string): bo
 }
 
 // 新成员默认 agent_access='granted'(零 Agent 权限),owner/admin 角色不看这一列。
-export function addNetworkMember(networkId: string, userId: string, role: string, invitedBy?: string, opts: { agentAccess?: "all" | "granted" } = {}): { ok: boolean; error?: string } {
+export function addNetworkMember(networkId: string, userId: string, role: string, invitedBy?: string, opts: { agentAccess?: "all" | "granted"; taskAccess?: TaskAccessMode } = {}): { ok: boolean; error?: string } {
   if (!MEMBER_ROLES.has(role)) return { ok: false, error: "invalid role" };
   const agentAccess = opts.agentAccess === "all" ? "all" : "granted";
+  // 任务范围:新成员默认 NEW_MEMBER_TASK_ACCESS(task-access.ts 一处定义)。
+  const taskAccess: TaskAccessMode = opts.taskAccess === "all" || opts.taskAccess === "scoped" ? opts.taskAccess : NEW_MEMBER_TASK_ACCESS;
   if (!db.get("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", userId)) return { ok: false, error: "user not found" };
   const existing = db.get<any>("SELECT 1 FROM network_members WHERE network_id = ?1 AND user_id = ?2", networkId, userId);
   if (existing) return { ok: false, error: "user already a member" };
   if (usernameCollidesWithAgent(networkId, userId)) return { ok: false, error: "username_collides_with_agent_alias" };
-  db.run("INSERT INTO network_members (network_id, user_id, role, invited_by, agent_access) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5)",
-    [networkId, userId, role, invitedBy || null, agentAccess]);
+  db.run("INSERT INTO network_members (network_id, user_id, role, invited_by, agent_access, task_access) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6)",
+    [networkId, userId, role, invitedBy || null, agentAccess, taskAccess]);
   return { ok: true };
 }
 
@@ -649,6 +653,7 @@ export function removeNetworkMember(networkId: string, userId: string): { ok: bo
   if (member.role === "owner") return { ok: false, error: "cannot remove owner" };
   db.run("DELETE FROM network_members WHERE network_id = ?1 AND user_id = ?2", [networkId, userId]);
   deleteAgentGrants(networkId, userId);
+  deleteTaskGrantsForMember(networkId, userId);
   return { ok: true };
 }
 
@@ -686,8 +691,8 @@ export function joinByInvite(inviteCode: string, userId: string): { ok: boolean;
   if (existing) return { ok: false, error: "already a member of this network" };
   if (usernameCollidesWithAgent(invite.network_id, userId)) return { ok: false, error: "username_collides_with_agent_alias" };
   // Add member + increment used count
-  db.run("INSERT INTO network_members (network_id, user_id, role, invited_by, agent_access) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, 'granted')",
-    [invite.network_id, userId, invite.role, invite.created_by]);
+  db.run("INSERT INTO network_members (network_id, user_id, role, invited_by, agent_access, task_access) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, 'granted', ?5)",
+    [invite.network_id, userId, invite.role, invite.created_by, NEW_MEMBER_TASK_ACCESS]);
   db.run("UPDATE network_invites SET used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE invite_code = ?1", [inviteCode]);
   // 受限成员不能持有网络令牌(resolveToken 会拒),别签一个用不了的。
   if (isAgentRestricted(userId, invite.network_id)) return { ok: true, network_id: invite.network_id, role: invite.role };
@@ -704,7 +709,9 @@ export function getUserAllNetworks(userId: string) {
   return db.all<any>(
     `SELECT ${sqlColumns(NETWORK_REST_COLUMNS, "n")}, nm.role as member_role,
             -- 多用户 Agent 权限:客户端据此显示「还没有被分配任何 Agent,请联系管理员」。
-            CASE WHEN u.role = 'admin' OR nm.role IN ('owner', 'admin') OR nm.agent_access = 'all' THEN 'all' ELSE 'granted' END AS agent_access
+            CASE WHEN u.role = 'admin' OR nm.role IN ('owner', 'admin') OR nm.agent_access = 'all' THEN 'all' ELSE 'granted' END AS agent_access,
+            -- 任务权限(RFC-038 §9):客户端据此显示只读提示与「还没有与你相关的任务」。
+            CASE WHEN u.role = 'admin' OR nm.role IN ('owner', 'admin') OR nm.task_access = 'all' THEN 'all' ELSE 'scoped' END AS task_access
      FROM networks n JOIN network_members nm ON n.network_id = nm.network_id
      JOIN users u ON u.user_id = nm.user_id
      WHERE nm.user_id = ?1 ORDER BY nm.role = 'owner' DESC, n.created_at`,
@@ -827,6 +834,8 @@ const NETWORK_CLEANUP_TABLES = [
   "node_create_requests", "node_start_requests", "node_stop_requests", "node_rules_requests",
   "node_config_updates", "rename_txn", "probe_results", "agent_telemetry", "completions",
   "task_events", "task_terminal_events", "scheduled_task_runs", "external_schedule_edits",
+  // 标签颜色:网络本身的元数据(标签本体在 requirements 行里,那张表是阻断项)。
+  "network_tags",
 ];
 
 function tableExists(name: string): boolean {

package/src/dm-file-scope-http.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+// 人与人私信的文件只给私信里的人看(owner 2026-09-30「给人好像发不了图片」的后续)。
+//
+// 规则:文件上传时带 `?purpose=dm`(App 私信输入框这么传)= 它第一次用途就是私信 → 私信文件(index scope=dm)。
+// 私信文件只有上传者、带着它的私信的收发双方、管理员能下载;同网络的其他成员和节点令牌(Agent)都 404
+// (与其它拒绝同一个形状,不泄露文件存在)。不带 purpose 上传的文件 —— 例如先在 agent 会话里发过 —— 永远不会
+// 变成私信文件,之后转进私信也照旧全网成员可见。私信文件只能由看得见它的人再转发。
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeAll, afterAll } from "bun:test";
+import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { tmpdir } from "os";
+import { register, addNetworkMember } from "./auth.js";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+const DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "anet-dm-file-scope-"));
+const PW = "DmFileScopePassw0rd!";
+let BASE = "";
+let hub: any = null;
+let NET = "";
+type U = { token: string; id: string };
+let admin: U, alice: U, bob: U, carol: U, dave: U;
+let adminNtok = "";
+
+const auth = (t: string) => ({ Authorization: `Bearer ${t}` });
+async function upload(token: string, body: string, query: string) {
+  const form = new FormData();
+  form.append("file", new Blob([new TextEncoder().encode(body)], { type: "image/png" }), "shot.png");
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/upload?network_id=${NET}${query}`, { method: "POST", body: form, headers: auth(token) });
+  return { status: res.status, body: await res.json().catch(() => null) as any };
+}
+async function uploadId(token: string, body: string, query = "") {
+  const r = await upload(token, body, query);
+  expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+  return r.body.file_id as string;
+}
+async function dm(from: U, to: U, fileId: string, message = "") {
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/dm`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { ...auth(from.token), "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ network_id: NET, to_user_id: to.id, message, attachments: [{ type: "file", file_id: fileId, name: "shot.png", mime: "image/png" }] }),
+  });
+  return { status: res.status, body: await res.json().catch(() => null) as any };
+}
+const fileStatus = async (token: string, fileId: string, method = "GET") =>
+  (await fetch(`${BASE}/api/files/${fileId}`, { method, headers: auth(token) })).status;
+const entry = (fileId: string) => JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(DIR, "uploads", ".index", `${fileId}.json`), "utf8"));
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(DIR, "hub.db");
+  process.env.COMMHUB_UPLOADS_DIR = join(DIR, "uploads");
+  process.env.HOST = "127.0.0.1";
+  const stamp = Date.now();
+  const a = register(`dmfs_admin_${stamp}`, PW);
+  db.run("UPDATE users SET role = 'admin' WHERE user_id = ?1", [a.user!.user_id]);
+  admin = { token: a.token!, id: a.user!.user_id };
+  adminNtok = a.network_token!;
+  NET = a.network_id!;
+  // alice / bob / carol see every agent (agent_access=all) — the members for whom a network-scoped file was readable
+  // before, i.e. where the gap was. dave is a restricted member (only granted agents).
+  const mk = (name: string, agentAccess: "all" | "granted"): U => {
+    const r = register(`${name}_${stamp}`, PW);
+    expect(addNetworkMember(NET, r.user!.user_id, "member", admin.id, { agentAccess }).ok).toBe(true);
+    return { token: r.token!, id: r.user!.user_id };
+  };
+  alice = mk("dmfs_alice", "all"); bob = mk("dmfs_bob", "all"); carol = mk("dmfs_carol", "all"); dave = mk("dmfs_dave", "granted");
+  const mod: any = await import("./server.js");
+  hub = mod.bootServer({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1" });
+  BASE = `http://127.0.0.1:${hub.port}`;
+}, 30_000);
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  try { hub?.stop?.(true); } catch {}
+  try { rmSync(DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+});
+
+describe("upload ?purpose=dm", () => {
+  test("marks the index entry; absent purpose writes no scope key (old shape)", async () => {
+    expect(entry(await uploadId(alice.token, "p1", "&purpose=dm")).scope).toBe("dm");
+    expect("scope" in entry(await uploadId(alice.token, "p2"))).toBe(false);
+  });
+  test("an unknown purpose is refused, not silently treated as network scope", async () => {
+    const r = await upload(alice.token, "p3", "&purpose=DM");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("bad_purpose");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("a DM file is readable only by the people in the DM", () => {
+  test("alice → bob: alice and bob read it; carol (same network, not in the DM) and agents get 404; admin reads", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "alice-to-bob", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(alice, bob, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(alice.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(bob.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid, "HEAD")).toBe(404);
+    expect(await fileStatus(adminNtok, fid)).toBe(404);
+    expect(await fileStatus(admin.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+  });
+  test("bob → alice (other direction): same rule", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(bob.token, "bob-to-alice", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(bob, alice, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(bob.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(alice.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+  });
+  test("a restricted member in the DM reads it both ways; out of it, not", async () => {
+    const toDave = await uploadId(alice.token, "alice-to-dave", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(alice, dave, toDave)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(dave.token, toDave)).toBe(200);
+    const fromDave = await uploadId(dave.token, "dave-to-alice", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(dave, alice, fromDave)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(alice.token, fromDave)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(bob.token, fromDave)).toBe(404);
+    const other = await uploadId(alice.token, "alice-to-bob-2", "&purpose=dm");
+    await dm(alice, bob, other);
+    expect(await fileStatus(dave.token, other)).toBe(404);
+  });
+  test("before it is sent, only the uploader reads it", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "draft", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect(await fileStatus(alice.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(bob.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+  });
+  test("the DM thread still returns the attachment to both sides", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "thread", "&purpose=dm");
+    await dm(alice, bob, fid, "看图");
+    const t = await (await fetch(`${BASE}/api/dm?network_id=${NET}&with=${alice.id}`, { headers: auth(bob.token) })).json() as any;
+    expect(JSON.parse(t.messages[0].meta_json).attachments[0].file_id).toBe(fid);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("nobody unlocks a DM file by putting its id into their own DM", () => {
+  test("carol DMs alice's DM file to bob → 403, and she still can't read it", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "secret", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(alice, bob, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    const r = await dm(carol, bob, fid);
+    expect(r.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("attachment_not_accessible");
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+  });
+  test("bob (who received it) may forward it to carol, and then carol reads it", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "forwardable", "&purpose=dm");
+    expect((await dm(alice, bob, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await dm(bob, carol, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("files whose first use was not a DM keep their scope", () => {
+  test("uploaded in an agent chat, then forwarded into a DM → still readable by every member", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "agent-chat-first");
+    // first use: an agent task (what ChatScreen does: upload without purpose, send_task with the file id)
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO tasks (task_id, from_name, to_name, status, content, network_id, meta_json) VALUES (?1, ?2, 'dmfs-agent', 'delivered', 'see image', ?3, ?4)`,
+      [`t_dmfs_${Date.now()}`, "dmfs_alice", NET, JSON.stringify({ attachments: [{ type: "file", file_id: fid }] })],
+    );
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect((await dm(alice, bob, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect("scope" in entry(fid)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(bob.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(adminNtok, fid)).toBe(200);
+  });
+  test("an old app's DM upload (no purpose) behaves exactly as before", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "old-app");
+    expect((await dm(alice, bob, fid)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("index entry integrity", () => {
+  test("a hand-edited unknown scope makes the entry invalid (404), never network-wide", async () => {
+    const fid = await uploadId(alice.token, "tamper", "&purpose=dm");
+    const path = join(DIR, "uploads", ".index", `${fid}.json`);
+    writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify({ ...entry(fid), scope: "public" }));
+    expect(await fileStatus(alice.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+    expect(await fileStatus(carol.token, fid)).toBe(404);
+  });
+});

package/src/human-dm.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import { getUserNetworkRole } from "./auth.js";
 import { isAgentRestricted } from "./agent-access.js";
 import { pushUserEvent, hasUserSubscribers } from "./push.js";
 import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
-import { FILE_ID_REGEX, indexEntryPath, validateAttachments, validateIndexEntry } from "./uploads.js";
+import { DM_FILE_SCOPE, FILE_ID_REGEX, indexEntryPath, validateAttachments, validateIndexEntry, type UploadIndexEntry } from "./uploads.js";
 import { restrictedMemberCanUseFile } from "./restricted-files.js";
 import { redactMessageRow } from "./redact-tokens.js";
 
@@ -57,10 +57,16 @@ export function sendHumanDm(input: HumanDmSendInput): HumanDmSendResult {
   for (const a of attachments.attachments) {
     const fileId = (a as { file_id?: string }).file_id;
     if (!fileId) continue;
+    const entry = networkFileEntry(networkId, fileId);
     const usable = restricted
       ? restrictedMemberCanUseFile(sender.userId, sender.username, networkId, fileId)
-      : fileInNetwork(networkId, fileId);
+      : !!entry;
     if (!usable) return { ok: false, error: "attachment_not_accessible", status: 403 };
+    // 私信文件只能由看得见它的人转发:否则任何成员把别人私信里的 file_id 塞进一条自己发出的私信,
+    // 就成了「私信参与者」而解锁它。上传者本人、以及已经在某段私信里收到/发出过它的人可以转。
+    if (entry?.scope === DM_FILE_SCOPE && entry.owner_id !== sender.userId && !dmParticipantSeesFile(sender.userId, networkId, fileId)) {
+      return { ok: false, error: "attachment_not_accessible", status: 403 };
+    }
   }
 
   const clientRequestId = typeof input.clientRequestId === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,80}$/.test(input.clientRequestId)
@@ -107,15 +113,36 @@ export function sendHumanDm(input: HumanDmSendInput): HumanDmSendResult {
   return { ok: true, message: redactMessageRow(row), delivered };
 }
 
-/** 不受限的成员带附件:文件必须属于这个网络(防把别的网络的 file_id 塞进来)。 */
-function fileInNetwork(networkId: string, fileId: string): boolean {
-  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) return false;
+/** 带附件:文件必须属于这个网络(防把别的网络的 file_id 塞进来)。返回它的索引条目,不属于 → null。 */
+function networkFileEntry(networkId: string, fileId: string): UploadIndexEntry | null {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) return null;
   const path = indexEntryPath(fileId);
-  if (!path || !existsSync(path)) return false;
+  if (!path || !existsSync(path)) return null;
   try {
     const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
-    return validateIndexEntry(entry) && entry.file_id === fileId && entry.network_id === networkId;
-  } catch { return false; }
+    return validateIndexEntry(entry) && entry.file_id === fileId && entry.network_id === networkId ? entry : null;
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 这个用户是不是某段带着这个文件的私信里的一方(收到的或发出的)。私信文件(scope=dm)的下载只认它
+ * 和上传者本人(server.ts authorizeFileDownload)。LIKE 只做预筛,真正的判定按 attachments 键解析。
+ */
+export function dmParticipantSeesFile(userId: string, networkId: string, fileId: string): boolean {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) return false;
+  const needle = `%"${fileId.replace(/_/g, "\\_")}"%`;
+  const rows = db.all<{ meta_json: string | null }>(
+    `SELECT meta_json FROM user_inbox
+      WHERE network_id = ?1 AND kind = '${HUMAN_DM_KIND}' AND (user_id = ?2 OR sender_user_id = ?2)
+        AND meta_json LIKE ?3 ESCAPE '\\' LIMIT 50`,
+    networkId, userId, needle,
+  );
+  return rows.some((row) => {
+    try {
+      const list = JSON.parse(row.meta_json ?? "null")?.attachments;
+      return Array.isArray(list) && list.some((a: any) => a && typeof a === "object" && a.file_id === fileId);
+    } catch { return false; }
+  });
 }
 
 /** 我和某人的私信记录(双向),新的在前。before = 上一页最后一条的 created_at。 */

package/src/member-audit-network-id-http.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+// 成员增 / 改角色 / 移出 的审计行必须带 network_id —— HTTP 集成测试(真实 Bun.serve,私有端口,临时库)。
+//
+// 之前这三条 logAudit 没传 networkId,audit_log.network_id 恒为 NULL:
+// 按网络归属审计时它们整批丢失,而同一组路由里的 member_agent_grants_changed 一直带着。
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeAll, afterAll } from "bun:test";
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "fs";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { tmpdir } from "os";
+import { register } from "./auth.js";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+const DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "anet-member-audit-"));
+let BASE = "";
+let hub: any = null;
+
+const PW = "AuditTestPassw0rd!x";
+let ownerToken = "";
+let NET = "";
+let bobId = "";
+
+async function send(token: string, method: string, path: string, payload?: unknown): Promise<{ status: number; body: any }> {
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, {
+    method,
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    body: payload === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(payload),
+  });
+  const text = await res.text();
+  let body: any = null;
+  try { body = JSON.parse(text); } catch {}
+  return { status: res.status, body };
+}
+
+const auditRow = (action: string) =>
+  db.get("SELECT network_id, target_id FROM audit_log WHERE action = ?1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1", action) as
+    { network_id: string | null; target_id: string | null } | null;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(DIR, "hub.db");
+  process.env.COMMHUB_UPLOADS_DIR = join(DIR, "uploads");
+  process.env.HOST = "127.0.0.1";
+
+  const owner = register(`audit_owner_${Date.now()}`, PW, undefined, "Owner");
+  expect(owner.ok).toBe(true);
+  ownerToken = owner.token!;
+  NET = owner.network_id!;
+  const bob = register(`audit_bob_${Date.now()}`, PW, undefined, "Bob");
+  expect(bob.ok).toBe(true);
+  bobId = bob.user!.user_id;
+
+  const mod: any = await import("./server.js");
+  hub = mod.bootServer({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1" });
+  BASE = `http://127.0.0.1:${hub.port}`;
+}, 30_000);
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  try { hub?.stop?.(true); } catch {}
+  try { rmSync(DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+});
+
+describe("成员审计行带 network_id", () => {
+  test("member_added", async () => {
+    const r = await send(ownerToken, "POST", `/api/networks/${NET}/members`, { user_id: bobId, role: "member" });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    const row = auditRow("member_added");
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row!.network_id).toBe(NET);
+  });
+
+  test("member_role_changed", async () => {
+    const r = await send(ownerToken, "PUT", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${bobId}`, { role: "viewer" });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    const row = auditRow("member_role_changed");
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row!.network_id).toBe(NET);
+  });
+
+  test("member_removed", async () => {
+    const r = await send(ownerToken, "DELETE", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${bobId}`);
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    const row = auditRow("member_removed");
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row!.network_id).toBe(NET);
+  });
+
+  test("GET /api/audit-log(本人的审计)里这三条的 network_id 都是该网络", async () => {
+    const r = await send(ownerToken, "GET", "/api/audit-log?limit=200");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    const mine = (r.body.logs as any[]).filter(e => ["member_added", "member_role_changed", "member_removed"].includes(e.action));
+    expect(mine.map(e => e.action).sort()).toEqual(["member_added", "member_removed", "member_role_changed"]);
+    for (const e of mine) expect(e.network_id).toBe(NET);
+  });
+});