@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.7 → 0.9.0-preview.8

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sleep2agi/commhub-server",
-  "version": "0.9.0-preview.7",
+  "version": "0.9.0-preview.8",
   "description": "CommHub Server \u2014 AI Agent communication hub with MCP protocol, multi-network isolation, user auth, and 17 MCP tools.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.ts",

package/src/ack-create-request.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
+import { registerTools } from "./tools.js";
+
+// RFC-026 §9.3 D2 / #338 PR3 — ack_create_request HANDLER tests.
+//
+// 通信龙 pre-review caught B1 + B2: my first cut of PR3 added a new daemon
+// ack status `runtime_capability_check_failed` to create-node-daemon.ts but
+// the hub's zod enum only accepted ["started", "failed", "rejected"] — the
+// new status was silently zod-rejected on the hub side and the daemon's
+// `.catch(()=>{})` swallowed the rejection. The PR body also claimed
+// `daemon_capability_lied` audit was written when in fact the action wasn't
+// in the audit enum and no insert ran.
+//
+// This handler-driven suite drives the registered MCP tool through
+// registerTools() so a daemon's exact ack shape (status + runtime field)
+// flows through the real zod schema + handler branch + audit insert. It
+// would have caught the lane-recurring "single component passes but cross-
+// component path stays broken" failure mode immediately.
+
+const NET = "net_ack_t";
+const DAEMON_NODE_ID = "node_ack_daemon";
+const DAEMON_ALIAS = "ack-daemon";
+const DAEMON_USER = "u_ack_owner";
+const DAEMON_TOKEN_ID = "tok_ack_daemon";
+const DAEMON_TOKEN_HASH = "hash_ack_daemon";
+
+interface ToolHandler { (args: any, extra?: any): Promise<{ content: Array<{ type: "text"; text: string }> }>; }
+interface AckReply { ok?: boolean; error?: string; status?: string; }
+
+function cleanup() {
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM node_create_requests WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM nodes WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM api_tokens WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM network_members WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", [DAEMON_USER]); } catch {}
+}
+
+beforeEach(cleanup);
+afterAll(cleanup);
+
+function seedDaemonWorld() {
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO users (user_id, username, password_hash, role, created_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, 'x', 'user', datetime('now'))`,
+    [DAEMON_USER, DAEMON_USER],
+  );
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO networks (network_id, network_name, owner_id, created_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, datetime('now'))`,
+    [NET, NET, DAEMON_USER],
+  );
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO network_members (user_id, network_id, role, joined_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, 'owner', datetime('now'))`,
+    [DAEMON_USER, NET],
+  );
+  // daemon node — must exist for resolveCallerDaemonTokenBound to bind.
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id, created_at, updated_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, datetime('now'), datetime('now'))`,
+    [DAEMON_NODE_ID, DAEMON_ALIAS, DAEMON_ALIAS, NET],
+  );
+  // daemon ntok — bound to the daemon node via name='node:<alias>'.
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO api_tokens (token_id, user_id, network_id, scope, name, token_hash, expires_at, revoked_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'network', ?4, ?5, NULL, NULL)`,
+    [DAEMON_TOKEN_ID, DAEMON_USER, NET, `node:${DAEMON_ALIAS}`, DAEMON_TOKEN_HASH],
+  );
+}
+
+function seedCreateRequest(opts: {
+  request_id: string,
+  child_token_id?: string,
+  status?: "pending" | "delivered" | "succeeded" | "failed",
+  child_name?: string,
+  runtime?: string,
+}) {
+  const childName = opts.child_name ?? `child_${opts.request_id}`;
+  if (opts.child_token_id) {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO api_tokens (token_id, user_id, network_id, scope, name, token_hash, expires_at, revoked_at)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'network', ?4, ?5, NULL, NULL)`,
+      [opts.child_token_id, DAEMON_USER, NET, `node:${childName}`, `hash_${opts.child_token_id}`],
+    );
+  }
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO node_create_requests
+       (request_id, daemon_node_id, child_name, network_id, runtime, model, flags_json, env_keys, status, child_token_id, created_at, created_by_token)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, 'x', '{}', '[]', ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9)`,
+    [
+      opts.request_id, DAEMON_NODE_ID, childName, NET,
+      opts.runtime ?? "claude-agent-sdk",
+      opts.status ?? "delivered",
+      opts.child_token_id ?? null,
+      Date.now(),
+      DAEMON_TOKEN_ID,
+    ],
+  );
+}
+
+/** Build a server with registerTools wired as if the daemon's ntok bound. */
+function buildAckHandler(): ToolHandler {
+  const server = new McpServer({ name: "test", version: "0" }) as any;
+  const tools: Record<string, ToolHandler> = {};
+  const origTool = server.tool.bind(server);
+  server.tool = (name: string, _desc: string, _schema: any, handler: ToolHandler) => {
+    tools[name] = handler;
+    return origTool(name, _desc, _schema, handler);
+  };
+  const origRegisterTool = server.registerTool?.bind(server);
+  if (origRegisterTool) {
+    server.registerTool = (name: string, _cfg: any, handler: ToolHandler) => {
+      tools[name] = handler;
+      return origRegisterTool(name, _cfg, handler);
+    };
+  }
+  registerTools(
+    server,
+    /* clientIP */ undefined,
+    /* enforceNetworkId */ NET,
+    /* enforceUserId */ DAEMON_USER,
+    /* callerAlias */ DAEMON_ALIAS,
+    /* callerTokenIsNetwork */ true,
+    /* callerTokenId */ DAEMON_TOKEN_ID,
+  );
+  const h = tools["ack_create_request"];
+  if (!h) throw new Error("ack_create_request tool not registered");
+  return h;
+}
+
+async function callAck(handler: ToolHandler, args: any): Promise<AckReply> {
+  const r = await handler(args);
+  return JSON.parse(r.content[0].text) as AckReply;
+}
+
+function readRequest(request_id: string) {
+  return db.get<{ status: string; error: string | null; acked_at: number | null }>(
+    `SELECT status, error, acked_at FROM node_create_requests WHERE request_id = ?1`,
+    request_id,
+  );
+}
+
+function readToken(token_id: string) {
+  return db.get<{ revoked_at: string | null }>(
+    `SELECT revoked_at FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1`,
+    token_id,
+  );
+}
+
+function readAuditRows(action: string, target_id: string) {
+  return db.all<{ action: string; network_id: string; target_id: string; detail: string }>(
+    `SELECT action, network_id, target_id, detail FROM audit_log
+     WHERE action = ?1 AND target_id = ?2 ORDER BY id DESC`,
+    [action, target_id],
+  );
+}
+
+describe("ack_create_request HANDLER — B1 schema accepts runtime_capability_check_failed", () => {
+  test("schema accepts runtime_capability_check_failed + runtime field (no zod reject)", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b1_accept";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    const reply = await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      error: "child died within 5000ms post-spawn",
+      runtime: "codex-sdk",
+    });
+    // PR3 v1 BUG: hub zod enum rejected this status → reply.ok=false /
+    // tool would even throw before getting here. Now must accept.
+    expect(reply.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(reply.status).toBe("runtime_capability_check_failed");
+  });
+
+  test("request flips to terminal runtime_capability_check_failed status", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b1_terminal";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId, status: "delivered" });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      error: "boom",
+      runtime: "codex-sdk",
+    });
+    const row = readRequest(reqId);
+    expect(row?.status).toBe("runtime_capability_check_failed");
+    expect(row?.error).toBe("boom");
+    expect(row?.acked_at).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  test("child ntok is revoked on capability-check-failed (same teardown as 'failed')", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b1_revoke";
+    const childTok = "tok_ack_child_b1";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId, child_token_id: childTok });
+    expect(readToken(childTok)?.revoked_at).toBeNull();
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      runtime: "codex-sdk",
+    });
+    expect(readToken(childTok)?.revoked_at).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("ack_create_request HANDLER — B2 audit_log daemon_capability_lied", () => {
+  test("writes daemon_capability_lied audit row with runtime + daemon + error in detail", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b2_audit";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      error: "OPENAI_API_KEY unset",
+      runtime: "codex-sdk",
+    });
+    const rows = readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId);
+    // PR3 v1 BUG: action wasn't in auditCreateNode enum → 0 rows + no
+    // surface for ops to spot lying daemons. Now must write exactly 1.
+    expect(rows.length).toBe(1);
+    expect(rows[0].network_id).toBe(NET);
+    const detail = JSON.parse(rows[0].detail);
+    expect(detail.runtime).toBe("codex-sdk");
+    expect(detail.daemon_node_id).toBe(DAEMON_NODE_ID);
+    expect(detail.error).toBe("OPENAI_API_KEY unset");
+    expect(typeof detail.acked_at).toBe("number");
+  });
+
+  test("does NOT write daemon_capability_lied on generic 'failed' ack (status discriminates)", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b2_no_audit_on_failed";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "failed",
+      error: "child died immediately after spawn",
+    });
+    const rows = readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId);
+    expect(rows.length).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  test("does NOT write daemon_capability_lied on 'started' (happy path silence)", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b2_no_audit_on_started";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    await callAck(handler, { request_id: reqId, status: "started", child_pid: 12345 });
+    const rows = readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId);
+    expect(rows.length).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  test("runtime field nullable if daemon omitted it (older daemon back-compat)", async () => {
+    // Older daemon (preview.10 and earlier) wouldn't send `runtime`.
+    // The hub must still accept + audit, just with runtime=null.
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b2_nullable_runtime";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    const reply = await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      error: "child died",
+    });
+    expect(reply.ok).toBe(true);
+    const rows = readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId);
+    expect(rows.length).toBe(1);
+    const detail = JSON.parse(rows[0].detail);
+    expect(detail.runtime).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("error string is truncated to 500 chars in audit detail (defense vs giant payload)", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_b2_trunc";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    const giant = "x".repeat(900);
+    await callAck(handler, {
+      request_id: reqId,
+      status: "runtime_capability_check_failed",
+      error: giant,
+      runtime: "codex-sdk",
+    });
+    const rows = readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId);
+    expect(rows.length).toBe(1);
+    const detail = JSON.parse(rows[0].detail);
+    expect(detail.error.length).toBe(500);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("ack_create_request HANDLER — pre-existing happy-path stays green (regression)", () => {
+  test("status='started' still flips acked_at without terminal teardown", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_started_regression";
+    const childTok = "tok_ack_child_started";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId, child_token_id: childTok });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    const reply = await callAck(handler, { request_id: reqId, status: "started", child_pid: 7777 });
+    expect(reply.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(reply.status).toBe("awaiting_register");
+    const row = readRequest(reqId);
+    // 'started' doesn't flip to terminal; status stays 'delivered'.
+    expect(row?.status).toBe("delivered");
+    expect(row?.acked_at).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    // child ntok is NOT revoked on 'started'.
+    expect(readToken(childTok)?.revoked_at).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("status='failed' still revokes child + flips to failed (no audit_log daemon_capability_lied)", async () => {
+    seedDaemonWorld();
+    const reqId = "cr_ack_failed_regression";
+    const childTok = "tok_ack_child_failed";
+    seedCreateRequest({ request_id: reqId, child_token_id: childTok });
+    const handler = buildAckHandler();
+    const reply = await callAck(handler, { request_id: reqId, status: "failed", error: "fork failed" });
+    expect(reply.ok).toBe(true);
+    const row = readRequest(reqId);
+    expect(row?.status).toBe("failed");
+    expect(row?.error).toBe("fork failed");
+    expect(readToken(childTok)?.revoked_at).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(readAuditRows("daemon_capability_lied", reqId).length).toBe(0);
+  });
+});

package/src/create-node.ts

@@ -273,7 +273,12 @@ export function resolveCallerDaemonTokenBound(opts: {
 // lifecycle event. Best-effort: never throw out (calling tool should
 // continue even if audit insert fails for any reason).
 export function auditCreateNode(input: {
-  action: "create_node_dispatched" | "create_node_rejected" | "create_node_succeeded" | "create_node_sweeper_revoked";
+  action:
+    | "create_node_dispatched"
+    | "create_node_rejected"
+    | "create_node_succeeded"
+    | "create_node_sweeper_revoked"
+    | "daemon_capability_lied";   // RFC-026 §9.3 D2 — daemon declared runtime support, child died before serving
   user_id?: string | null;
   username?: string | null;
   network_id?: string | null;

package/src/tools.ts

@@ -298,11 +298,17 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
         // discovery (#337 extracts this field). "host_supervisor" =
         // anet daemon. Default-stripping zod would drop this otherwise.
         role: z.string().max(64).optional().nullable(),
-        // RFC-026 §9.3 — daemon self-declare. Promoted to first-class
-        // columns by PR2 so list_host_supervisors reads them directly
-        // (no per-call snapshot JSON parse). Soft caps avoid abuse.
-        runtimes_supported: z.array(z.string().max(64)).max(16).optional(),
-        allowed_secret_keys: z.array(z.string().max(64)).max(64).optional(),
+        // RFC-026 §9.3 / #338 PR3 — daemon self-declare nested under
+        // `daemon_capabilities` (canonical shape per existing hub reads
+        // at tools.ts:2010/2075 — PR1/PR2 placed these top-level, hub
+        // never saw them, max_concurrent_children stayed default + the
+        // allowlists stayed unenforced. PR3 nit ① per 通信龙).
+        // Soft caps avoid abuse via attacker daemon.
+        daemon_capabilities: z.object({
+          runtimes_supported: z.array(z.string().max(64)).max(16).optional(),
+          allowed_secret_keys: z.array(z.string().max(64)).max(64).optional(),
+          max_concurrent_children: z.number().int().min(1).max(1000).optional(),
+        }).optional(),
       }).optional().describe("RFC-024 — masked node config snapshot"),
     },
     async ({ resume_id, alias, status, task, output, score, progress, server: srv, hostname: hn, agent: ag, project_dir: pd, version: ver, tmux_name: tmux, node_id, session_id, config_path, channels, model: mdl, node_name: nn, network_id: netId, host, process_telemetry: proc, config_snapshot: cfgSnap }) => {
@@ -1999,21 +2005,26 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
       }
 
       // Read daemon's host_supervisor capability + allowlist from its
-      // last reported config_snapshot. P1 simplification: we accept
-      // (allowed_runtimes empty / allowed_secret_keys absent) as
-      // "accept any in the global enum"; P2 will tighten when daemon
-      // self-publishes its own allowlist via daemon_capabilities.
+      // last reported config_snapshot. PR3 (#338) canonical path is
+      // `daemon_capabilities.runtimes_supported` (RFC-026 §9.3).
+      // Pre-PR3 daemons (preview.10 and earlier) place these at the
+      // TOP level of the snapshot rather than nested — those reads
+      // return undefined here and `daemonAllowedRuntimes` stays null
+      // (permissive — no allowlist enforcement); they fall back to
+      // §4.2.2 structural validation only, identical to pre-PR3
+      // behavior. No regression on in-flight daemons.
       let daemonAllowList = new Set<string>();
       let daemonAllowedRuntimes: string[] | null = null;
       try {
         const snap = daemon.config_snapshot ? JSON.parse(daemon.config_snapshot) : null;
-        if (snap?.daemon_capabilities?.allowed_secret_keys) {
-          daemonAllowList = new Set(snap.daemon_capabilities.allowed_secret_keys);
+        const caps = snap?.daemon_capabilities;
+        if (Array.isArray(caps?.allowed_secret_keys)) {
+          daemonAllowList = new Set(caps.allowed_secret_keys);
         }
-        if (Array.isArray(snap?.daemon_capabilities?.allowed_runtimes)) {
-          daemonAllowedRuntimes = snap.daemon_capabilities.allowed_runtimes;
+        if (Array.isArray(caps?.runtimes_supported)) {
+          daemonAllowedRuntimes = caps.runtimes_supported;
         }
-      } catch { /* permissive P1 fallback */ }
+      } catch { /* permissive fallback */ }
 
       // §4.2.2 — structural validation (catches name/runtime/model/
       // flag injection at the hub edge). Daemon repeats this; double
@@ -2243,14 +2254,22 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
   // record fork-side info.
   server.tool(
     "ack_create_request",
-    "Daemon acks a create-node request (called after fork). status='started' or 'failed'. RFC-026.",
+    "Daemon acks a create-node request (called after fork). status='started' | 'failed' | 'rejected' | 'runtime_capability_check_failed'. RFC-026 §9.3 D2.",
     {
       request_id: z.string().min(1).max(200),
-      status: z.enum(["started", "failed", "rejected"]),
+      // RFC-026 §9.3 D2 — runtime_capability_check_failed signals the
+      // daemon spawned the child OK but it died within FAIL_FAST_MS
+      // (5s in agent-node v2.5.0-preview.11+), indicating a
+      // declaration↔reality gap on this daemon's runtimes_supported.
+      // Treated terminal like 'failed' but fires a distinct audit_log
+      // action so dashboards can highlight "lying daemons" separately
+      // from generic spawn failures.
+      status: z.enum(["started", "failed", "rejected", "runtime_capability_check_failed"]),
       error: z.string().max(1000).optional(),
       child_pid: z.number().int().optional(),
+      runtime: z.string().max(64).optional(),   // populated by daemon when status=runtime_capability_check_failed
     },
-    async ({ request_id, status, error: ackError, child_pid: _pid }) => {
+    async ({ request_id, status, error: ackError, child_pid: _pid, runtime: ackRuntime }) => {
       const callerDaemon = resolveCallerDaemonTokenBound();
       if (!callerDaemon.ok) {
         return { content: [{ type: "text" as const, text: JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: callerDaemon.error }) }] };
@@ -2276,7 +2295,8 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
         );
         return { content: [{ type: "text" as const, text: JSON.stringify({ ok: true, status: "awaiting_register" }) }] };
       }
-      // failed / rejected — revoke child-ntok + mark request terminal
+      // failed / rejected / runtime_capability_check_failed — revoke
+      // child-ntok + mark request terminal.
       if (row.child_token_id) {
         db.run(`UPDATE api_tokens SET revoked_at = datetime('now') WHERE token_id = ?1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`, [row.child_token_id]);
       }
@@ -2284,6 +2304,23 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
         `UPDATE node_create_requests SET status = ?1, error = ?2, acked_at = ?3 WHERE request_id = ?4 AND status IN ('pending', 'delivered')`,
         [status, ackError || null, ackedAt, request_id],
       );
+      // RFC-026 §9.3 D2 — surface declaration↔reality gap on a
+      // distinct audit_log action so dashboards / operators can spot
+      // chronically-lying daemons separate from generic spawn-failed.
+      if (status === "runtime_capability_check_failed") {
+        auditCreateNode({
+          action: "daemon_capability_lied",
+          user_id: null,
+          network_id: row.network_id,
+          target_id: request_id,
+          detail: {
+            daemon_node_id: row.daemon_node_id,
+            runtime: ackRuntime || null,
+            error: ackError ? ackError.slice(0, 500) : null,
+            acked_at: ackedAt,
+          },
+        });
+      }
       return { content: [{ type: "text" as const, text: JSON.stringify({ ok: true, status }) }] };
     },
   );
@@ -2838,16 +2875,23 @@ export function upsertNodeWithSec1Guard(input: UpsertNodeWithSec1GuardInput): Up
     ],
   );
   if (input.config_snapshot) {
-    // RFC-026 §9.3 / #338 PR2 — promote daemon self-declare fields to
-    // first-class indexable columns alongside the snapshot blob. The
-    // snapshot stays the source of truth for non-list reads; the columns
-    // exist so `list_host_supervisors` doesn't JSON.parse on every call.
-    // typeof-narrow the array fields (don't trust shape per
-    // [[feedback_typeof_narrow_extracted_fields]]; zod has already
-    // narrowed, but the input.config_snapshot type is `unknown` here).
+    // RFC-026 §9.3 / #338 PR2+PR3 — promote daemon self-declare fields
+    // to first-class indexable columns alongside the snapshot blob.
+    // The snapshot stays the source of truth for non-list reads; the
+    // columns exist so `list_host_supervisors` doesn't JSON.parse on
+    // every call. typeof-narrow per
+    // [[feedback_typeof_narrow_extracted_fields]] — zod narrowed but
+    // input.config_snapshot is typed `unknown` here.
+    //
+    // PR3 nit ①: read from nested `daemon_capabilities.*` (canonical
+    // per RFC §9.3 + matches existing hub create_node reads at
+    // tools.ts:2010/2075). PR2 ate from top-level keys, which the
+    // hub create_node path never read → max_concurrent_children
+    // backpressure was dead config + allowlist enforcement bypassed.
     const snap = input.config_snapshot as Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    const runtimesRaw = snap?.runtimes_supported;
-    const allowedRaw = snap?.allowed_secret_keys;
+    const caps = (snap?.daemon_capabilities ?? null) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    const runtimesRaw = caps?.runtimes_supported;
+    const allowedRaw = caps?.allowed_secret_keys;
     const runtimesJson = Array.isArray(runtimesRaw) && runtimesRaw.every(s => typeof s === "string")
       ? JSON.stringify(runtimesRaw)
       : null;