@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.7 → 0.9.0-preview.70

package/src/rest-identity.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// REST from_session identity binding.
+//
+// Both transports resolve the same `api_tokens` row through resolveToken, and
+// auth.ts already states the invariant:
+//
+//   "Network-bound node tokens are an identity boundary: they must not spoof
+//    another node via from_session."
+//
+// tools.ts enforced it for MCP (defaultFrom + fromIdentityMismatchReply).
+// POST /api/task did not — it took `body.from` verbatim, so any node holding
+// its own ntok_ could claim another node's alias. That value is stored on the
+// task row and, once sender labels reach the copresence TUIs, rendered to a
+// human as an attribution.
+//
+// This is the same decision expressed as a pure function so every credential
+// kind is a directly constructible test input rather than a hand-assembled
+// Request (the #503 convention in this codebase).
+
+export interface RestIdentityInput {
+  /** Raw bearer token, only its prefix matters (`ntok_` = network-bound). */
+  token: string;
+  /** `api_tokens.name`; for node tokens it is `node:<alias>`. */
+  tokenName: string | null | undefined;
+  /** Username resolved from the authenticated token. */
+  authenticatedUsername?: string | null;
+  /** Caller-supplied `body.from`. */
+  requestedFrom: unknown;
+}
+
+export type RestIdentityResult =
+  | { ok: true; fromSession: string }
+  | {
+      ok: false;
+      error: "from_session_identity_mismatch";
+      message: string;
+      tokenAlias: string;
+      requestedFromSession: string;
+    };
+
+/** Alias a token is bound to, or null when it is not node-scoped. */
+export function nodeAliasForToken(token: string, tokenName: string | null | undefined): string | null {
+  if (!token.startsWith("ntok_")) return null;
+  if (typeof tokenName !== "string" || !tokenName.startsWith("node:")) return null;
+  const alias = tokenName.slice("node:".length).trim();
+  return alias || null;
+}
+
+export function resolveRestFromSession(input: RestIdentityInput): RestIdentityResult {
+  const alias = nodeAliasForToken(input.token, input.tokenName);
+  const requested = typeof input.requestedFrom === "string" ? input.requestedFrom.trim() : "";
+
+  // A network-bound token whose name we cannot resolve to an alias (`node:`,
+  // `node:   `, or a name that was never node-scoped) is the degenerate case.
+  // We know it IS a node credential; we just cannot tell WHICH node. Letting it
+  // claim anything is the worst available option, so refuse the claim outright
+  // rather than falling through to the unbound path.
+  //
+  // Production always writes `node:${nodeName}`, so this costs nothing real —
+  // but "we couldn't identify you, so you may call yourself anything" is
+  // exactly the fail-open shape this change exists to remove.
+  if (!alias && input.token.startsWith("ntok_")) {
+    if (requested) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        error: "from_session_identity_mismatch",
+        message: "network token has no resolvable node alias and may not claim a from_session",
+        tokenAlias: "",
+        requestedFromSession: requested,
+      };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, fromSession: "api" };
+  }
+
+  // A user-token client normally does not need to repeat its identity in every
+  // request. Prefer an explicit, backwards-compatible claim when present;
+  // otherwise attribute the task to the authenticated username. Falling back
+  // to the transport label `api` is reserved for legacy auth contexts where
+  // the server genuinely has no user identity.
+  if (!alias) {
+    const authenticatedUsername = typeof input.authenticatedUsername === "string"
+      ? input.authenticatedUsername.trim()
+      : "";
+    return { ok: true, fromSession: requested || authenticatedUsername || "api" };
+  }
+
+  // Node token claiming somebody else — refuse rather than silently rewrite,
+  // so a misconfigured caller is visible instead of quietly relabelled.
+  if (requested && requested !== alias) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: "from_session_identity_mismatch",
+      message: "network token from_session does not match token-bound node alias",
+      tokenAlias: alias,
+      requestedFromSession: requested,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Node token, no claim or a matching one: bind to the token's own alias.
+  return { ok: true, fromSession: alias };
+}

package/src/rest-projections.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/**
+ * Stable REST row projections.
+ *
+ * These lists deliberately mirror the fields already exposed by the public
+ * endpoints before #311.  Keeping them in one place makes the wire contract
+ * independent from future ALTER TABLE migrations: adding a storage-only
+ * column must never silently add a REST response key.
+ */
+export const NETWORK_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "network_id", "network_name", "owner_id", "description", "settings",
+  "created_at", "updated_at", "visibility", "max_members",
+] as const;
+
+export const SESSION_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "resume_id", "alias", "tmux_name", "server", "ip", "hostname", "agent",
+  "project_dir", "version", "status", "task", "output", "progress", "score",
+  "cpu_load_1min", "cpu_cores", "mem_total_gb", "mem_used_gb", "mem_avail_gb",
+  "disk_total_gb", "disk_used_gb", "disk_avail_gb", "process_rss_bytes",
+  "process_rss_mb", "process_cpu_pct", "process_uptime_seconds",
+  "process_in_flight_count", "network_id", "registered_at", "updated_at",
+  "node_id", "session_id", "config_path", "channels", "last_seen_at", "model",
+  "external_schedules", "rules_file_capable", "skills_capable", "files_capable",
+  "logs_capable",
+] as const;
+
+export const AUDIT_LOG_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "id", "user_id", "username", "action", "target_type", "target_id", "detail",
+  "ip", "network_id", "created_at",
+] as const;
+
+export const TASK_EVENT_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "id", "task_id", "from_status", "to_status", "event_type", "actor", "detail",
+  "created_at", "network_id",
+] as const;
+
+export const TASK_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "task_id", "from_node_id", "from_name", "to_node_id", "to_name", "priority",
+  "status", "content", "result", "in_reply_to", "requires_response", "scope",
+  "created_at", "delivered_at", "started_at", "runtime_submitted_at", "consumed_at", "completed_at", "expires_at",
+  "network_id", "parent_task_id", "meta_json", "thread_id", "turn_id",
+] as const;
+
+export const COMPLETION_REST_COLUMNS = [
+  "id", "session_name", "task", "result", "artifacts", "score",
+  "duration_minutes", "network_id", "completed_at",
+] as const;
+
+// Storage projection for scheduled-task rows. `created_by` and
+// `schedule_json` are intentionally selected for server-side auth/decoding,
+// then removed by decodeRow before the REST response is serialized.
+export const SCHEDULED_TASK_STORAGE_COLUMNS = [
+  "schedule_id", "network_id", "created_by", "name", "target_node_id",
+  "target_alias", "task_content", "priority", "schedule_type", "schedule_json",
+  "timezone", "overlap_policy", "misfire_policy", "status", "next_run_at",
+  "last_run_at", "revision", "created_at", "updated_at",
+] as const;
+
+export function sqlColumns(columns: readonly string[], qualifier?: string): string {
+  return columns.map((column) => qualifier ? `${qualifier}.${column}` : column).join(", ");
+}
+
+export const NETWORK_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(NETWORK_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const SESSION_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(SESSION_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const AUDIT_LOG_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(AUDIT_LOG_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const TASK_EVENT_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(TASK_EVENT_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const TASK_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(TASK_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const COMPLETION_REST_SELECT = sqlColumns(COMPLETION_REST_COLUMNS);
+export const SCHEDULED_TASK_STORAGE_SELECT = sqlColumns(SCHEDULED_TASK_STORAGE_COLUMNS);

package/src/rest-write-network-resolution.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// #819 — `resolveRestWriteNetworkId` 是 network-scope.ts 里唯一没有任何测试点名的
+// 导出函数。同文件的五个兄弟各有 1-2 个测试文件点名它们:
+//
+//   resolveRestNetworkScope  1        canRestWriteNetwork  1
+//   singleNetworkId          2        addNetworkScope      1
+//   getUserNetworkIds        1        resolveRestWriteNetworkId  🔴 0
+//
+// 而它决定的是**一次 REST 写入落到哪个网络**。它的 docstring 说明了一条不显然的
+// 规则:管理员的**读**作用域按设计是全局的(networkIds=null),所以它本身表达不了
+// 「这个管理员恰好只属于一个网络」;而**写**不能继承这个歧义 —— 只有在确实只有
+// 一个成员关系时才用它,0 个或 ≥2 个都必须显式指定网络。
+//
+// 🔴 这条规则的两半都要钉:
+//   - **放行那半**(admin + 恰好 1 个成员关系 → 用它)如果坏了,会退化成「管理员
+//     写任何东西都要显式带 network_id」——很吵,但**安全**,所以没人会急着修;
+//   - **收紧那半**(admin + 0 或 ≥2 → null)如果坏了,一次写入会**落到一个没被
+//     指定的网络里**,而调用方看到的是成功。
+//
+// 只写反向断言是不够的:一个「永远返回 null」的实现能通过所有「收紧」用例。
+// 所以每一条收紧断言都配了正控。
+//
+// Run: COMMHUB_DB=/tmp/819-rest-write-scope.db bun test src/rest-write-network-resolution.test.ts
+
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { resolveRestNetworkScope, resolveRestWriteNetworkId, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
+
+const NET_A = "net_819_a";
+const NET_B = "net_819_b";
+const U_SINGLE = "u819_single";   // 只属于 NET_A
+const U_MULTI = "u819_multi";     // 属于 NET_A + NET_B
+const U_NONE = "u819_none";       // 一个都不属于
+const ALL_USERS = [U_SINGLE, U_MULTI, U_NONE];
+
+function cleanup() {
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM network_members WHERE network_id IN (?1, ?2)", [NET_A, NET_B]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM networks WHERE network_id IN (?1, ?2)", [NET_A, NET_B]); } catch {}
+  for (const u of ALL_USERS) {
+    try { db.run("DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", [u]); } catch {}
+  }
+}
+
+function seed() {
+  for (const u of ALL_USERS) {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO users (user_id, username, password_hash, role, created_at)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, 'x', 'user', datetime('now'))`,
+      [u, u],
+    );
+  }
+  db.run(`INSERT INTO networks (network_id, network_name, owner_id, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?1, ?2, datetime('now'))`, [NET_A, U_SINGLE]);
+  db.run(`INSERT INTO networks (network_id, network_name, owner_id, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?1, ?2, datetime('now'))`, [NET_B, U_MULTI]);
+  const member = (u: string, net: string, role: string) =>
+    db.run(`INSERT INTO network_members (user_id, network_id, role, joined_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, datetime('now'))`, [u, net, role]);
+  member(U_SINGLE, NET_A, "owner");
+  member(U_MULTI, NET_A, "member");
+  member(U_MULTI, NET_B, "owner");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => { cleanup(); seed(); });
+afterAll(() => { cleanup(); });
+
+/** 管理员的读作用域:全局(networkIds=null),这正是歧义的来源。 */
+const ADMIN_SCOPE: RestNetworkScope = { networkIds: null };
+const scopeOf = (...ids: string[]): RestNetworkScope => ({ networkIds: ids });
+const ctx = (userId: string) => ({ userId, networkId: null });
+
+describe("#819 resolveRestWriteNetworkId — 作用域里就能确定时,直接用它", () => {
+  test("作用域恰好一个网络 → 用那一个(与是不是 admin 无关)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(NET_A), ctx(U_MULTI), false)).toBe(NET_A);
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(NET_A), ctx(U_MULTI), true)).toBe(NET_A);
+  });
+
+  test("作用域两个网络 → 歧义,null(即使调用者是 admin)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(NET_A, NET_B), ctx(U_MULTI), true)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  // 🔴 这一条我一开始断错了,留下来当记录:我以为「作用域为空数组 → null」,
+  // 实测是 NET_A。原因是 `[]` 过不了 singleNetworkId,于是落到 admin 的成员关系
+  // 回退分支,而 U_SINGLE 恰好只有一个成员关系。
+  //
+  // 而 `networkIds: []` 在 resolveRestNetworkScope 里有确切含义:`:46` 那一行,
+  // **非 admin 请求了一个自己没有角色的网络** —— 它带着 `denied: "access denied
+  // to requested network"`。也就是说 `[]` 不是「没指定」,是「明确被拒」。
+  //
+  // 现在**没有**问题,因为那一行只对非 admin 产生(admin 在 `:42` 就提前返回
+  // networkIds:null 了),而非 admin 走到这里必然 null —— 见下一条。
+  //
+  // 但它是一个潜伏的形状:如果将来有任何路径让 admin 拿到 networkIds: [],
+  // 这次写入会**忽略那条明确的拒绝**,回退到他的单一成员关系。所以两条都钉住:
+  // 当前行为,以及那条让它安全的前提。
+  test("作用域为空数组 + admin + 恰好一个成员关系 → 回退到成员关系(当前行为,记录)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(), ctx(U_SINGLE), true)).toBe(NET_A);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 让上一条安全的前提:空数组作用域只由非 admin 产生,而非 admin → null", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(), ctx(U_SINGLE), false)).toBeNull();
+    // 前提本身也断一次:resolveRestNetworkScope 对 admin 从不产出空数组。
+    const adminScope = resolveRestNetworkScope(NET_B, ctx(U_NONE), true);
+    expect(adminScope.networkIds).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("#819 admin 的全局读作用域不能替写入决定网络", () => {
+  test("🔴 admin + 恰好 1 个成员关系 → 用那一个(放行那半)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(ADMIN_SCOPE, ctx(U_SINGLE), true)).toBe(NET_A);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 admin + 2 个成员关系 → null,必须显式指定(收紧那半)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(ADMIN_SCOPE, ctx(U_MULTI), true)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 admin + 0 个成员关系 → null(不能因为读是全局的就随便挑一个)", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(ADMIN_SCOPE, ctx(U_NONE), true)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("非 admin + 全局作用域 → null(这种组合本身就不该发生,fail closed)", () => {
+    // 正控在上面那条「admin + 单成员 → NET_A」:如果实现改成永远 null,那条会红。
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(ADMIN_SCOPE, ctx(U_SINGLE), false)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("没有 authCtx + 全局作用域 → null", () => {
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(ADMIN_SCOPE, null, true)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("#819 作用域优先于成员关系回退", () => {
+  test("作用域说 NET_B,而该用户唯一的成员关系是 NET_A → 结果是 NET_B", () => {
+    // 归属由作用域决定,不由「他碰巧属于哪个网络」决定。
+    // 如果实现把两者的优先级搞反,这条会返回 NET_A。
+    expect(resolveRestWriteNetworkId(scopeOf(NET_B), ctx(U_SINGLE), true)).toBe(NET_B);
+  });
+});

package/src/restricted-files.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// 多用户 Agent 权限 —— 受限成员与上传文件。
+// 文件按网络归属;受限成员(只看授权 Agent 的成员)在受限网络里不能凭 file_id 读网络里任意文件,
+// 也不能把自己看不见的 file_id 塞进发给授权 Agent 的任务(那等于借 Agent 的网络令牌去读)。
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { addOwnTrafficScope, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
+import { FILE_ID_REGEX, indexEntryPath, validateIndexEntry } from "./uploads.js";
+
+/**
+ * 受限成员能不能看见这个文件:只认**对方(授权 Agent / 给他发私信的人)放进来**的附件 ——
+ *   user_inbox 里发给自己的私信附件;
+ *   授权 Agent 发给自己的任务 / inbox 行的 attachments;
+ *   自己发给授权 Agent 的任务上,Agent 回复写进的 reply_attachments。
+ * 自己随任务带出去的 attachments **不算**:否则把任意 file_id 塞进自己的任务就能「解锁」别人的文件。
+ */
+export function restrictedMemberSeesFile(userId: string, username: string, networkId: string, fileId: string): boolean {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) return false;
+  const listed = (metaJson: string | null | undefined, key: "attachments" | "reply_attachments"): boolean => {
+    if (!metaJson) return false;
+    try {
+      const list = JSON.parse(metaJson)?.[key];
+      return Array.isArray(list) && list.some((a: any) => a && typeof a === "object" && a.file_id === fileId);
+    } catch { return false; }
+  };
+  // LIKE 只做预筛(file_id 只含 [A-Za-z0-9_-],`_` 转义后逐字匹配),真正的判定在 listed() 里按键解析。
+  const needle = `%"${fileId.replace(/_/g, "\\_")}"%`;
+  for (const row of db.all<{ meta_json: string | null }>(
+    "SELECT meta_json FROM user_inbox WHERE user_id = ?1 AND network_id = ?2 AND meta_json LIKE ?3 ESCAPE '\\' LIMIT 50",
+    userId, networkId, needle,
+  )) {
+    if (listed(row.meta_json, "attachments")) return true;
+  }
+  const scope: RestNetworkScope = { networkId, networkIds: null, agentRestriction: { userId, username, networkIds: [networkId] } };
+  const taskParams: unknown[] = [needle];
+  const taskSql = addOwnTrafficScope("SELECT from_name, to_name, meta_json FROM tasks WHERE meta_json LIKE ?1 ESCAPE '\\'", taskParams, scope, { from: "from_name", to: "to_name", fromNodeId: "from_node_id", toNodeId: "to_node_id" });
+  for (const row of db.all<{ from_name: string; to_name: string; meta_json: string | null }>(taskSql + " LIMIT 50", ...taskParams)) {
+    if (row.to_name === username && listed(row.meta_json, "attachments")) return true;
+    if (row.from_name === username && listed(row.meta_json, "reply_attachments")) return true;
+  }
+  const inboxParams: unknown[] = [needle];
+  const inboxSql = addOwnTrafficScope("SELECT session_name, meta_json FROM inbox WHERE meta_json LIKE ?1 ESCAPE '\\'", inboxParams, scope, { from: "from_session", to: "session_name" });
+  for (const row of db.all<{ session_name: string; meta_json: string | null }>(inboxSql + " LIMIT 50", ...inboxParams)) {
+    if (row.session_name === username && listed(row.meta_json, "attachments")) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/** 受限成员能不能用这个文件(下载 / 当附件转给 Agent):自己传的,或 restrictedMemberSeesFile。 */
+export function restrictedMemberCanUseFile(userId: string, username: string, networkId: string, fileId: string): boolean {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) return false;
+  const path = indexEntryPath(fileId);
+  if (!path || !existsSync(path)) return false;
+  let entry: any;
+  try { entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8")); } catch { return false; }
+  if (!validateIndexEntry(entry) || entry.file_id !== fileId) return false;
+  if (entry.network_id !== networkId) return false;
+  if (entry.owner_id === userId) return true;
+  return restrictedMemberSeesFile(userId, username, networkId, fileId);
+}
+
+/**
+ * 受限成员发给 Agent 的任务 / 消息里的附件:每个 file_id 都必须是他自己能用的文件。
+ * 返回第一个不合格的 file_id(调用方回 403),全部合格返回 null。
+ */
+export function restrictedMemberAttachmentsDenied(userId: string, username: string, networkId: string, raw: unknown): string | null {
+  if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return null;
+  for (const item of raw) {
+    const fileId = item && typeof item === "object" ? (item as { file_id?: unknown }).file_id : undefined;
+    if (fileId === undefined) continue;
+    if (typeof fileId !== "string" || !restrictedMemberCanUseFile(userId, username, networkId, fileId)) return String(fileId);
+  }
+  return null;
+}

package/src/retention.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 //   COMMHUB_DB=/tmp/test-retention.db bun test src/retention.test.ts
 
 import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { sweepNodeRequestContent, type NodeRequestSweepResult } from "./node-request-retention.js";
 
 export type RetentionConfig = {
   // High-frequency telemetry; default = 7 days.
@@ -52,6 +53,9 @@ export type SweepResult = {
     tasks: number;
     audit_log: number;
   };
+  // node_rules_requests: file bytes purged by age / after read, rows deleted
+  // after 30 days. Fixed policy (privacy, not disk) — no env opt-out.
+  nodeRequests: NodeRequestSweepResult;
   vacuum: {
     walCheckpointPagesMoved: number | null;
     incrementalFreedPages: number | null;
@@ -178,6 +182,8 @@ export function sweepRetention(cfg: RetentionConfig = readRetentionConfig()): Sw
     cfg.auditLogDays,
   );
 
+  const nodeRequests = sweepNodeRequestContent();
+
   // VACUUM:
   //   - wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE): trims the WAL file. Works on every
   //     SQLite DB regardless of auto_vacuum setting. Useful after
@@ -230,6 +236,7 @@ export function sweepRetention(cfg: RetentionConfig = readRetentionConfig()): Sw
       tasks,
       audit_log: auditLog,
     },
+    nodeRequests,
     vacuum: { walCheckpointPagesMoved, incrementalFreedPages, errored },
   };
 }
@@ -249,11 +256,13 @@ export function startRetentionSweeper(
         r.deletes.inbox +
         r.deletes.tasks +
         r.deletes.audit_log;
-      if (totalDeletes > 0 || r.vacuum.errored) {
+      const nr = r.nodeRequests;
+      if (totalDeletes > 0 || nr.purged > 0 || nr.deleted > 0 || nr.timedOut > 0 || r.vacuum.errored) {
         console.log(
           `[commhub retention] swept in ${r.durationMs}ms — ` +
             `telemetry=${r.deletes.agent_telemetry} events=${r.deletes.task_events} ` +
             `inbox=${r.deletes.inbox} tasks=${r.deletes.tasks} audit=${r.deletes.audit_log} ` +
+            `nodeReqPurged=${nr.purged} nodeReqDeleted=${nr.deleted} nodeReqTimedOut=${nr.timedOut} ` +
             `walPages=${r.vacuum.walCheckpointPagesMoved} freedPages=${r.vacuum.incrementalFreedPages}`,
         );
       }

package/src/rules-file-duplicate-alias.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+// Duplicate-alias node rows vs the node pull/ack paths (field report).
+//
+// Re-creating a node under the same alias leaves the old `nodes` row behind, so
+// one alias can own several rows in a network. The pull/ack tools used to
+// resolve the caller by `WHERE alias = ? AND network_id = ?` + `db.get`, i.e.
+// the first row SQLite yields — the stale one. Field shape: the client queued a
+// rules-file read for the live node, the node pulled with its own (bound)
+// token, the hub looked under the stale node_id, answered `request: null`, and
+// the read timed out with only `[rules-file] doorbell received` in the node log.
+//
+// 跑法：cd server && COMMHUB_DB=/tmp/rules-dup.db bun test src/rules-file-duplicate-alias.test.ts
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js";
+import { InMemoryTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/inMemory.js";
+import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { registerTools } from "./tools.js";
+
+const NET = "net_rules_dup";
+const USER = "u_rules_dup_owner";
+const ALIAS = "rules-dup-node";
+// Inserted first → the row a plain `db.get` on the alias returns.
+const STALE_ID = "node_rules_dup_stale";
+const LIVE_ID = "node_rules_dup_live";
+const STALE_TOKEN = "tok_rules_dup_stale";
+const LIVE_TOKEN = "tok_rules_dup_live";
+const UNBOUND_TOKEN = "tok_rules_dup_unbound";
+
+function cleanup() {
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM node_rules_requests WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM node_config_updates WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM nodes WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM api_tokens WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM network_members WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1", [NET]); } catch {}
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", [USER]); } catch {}
+}
+
+function seedWorld(opts: { liveSession?: boolean } = {}) {
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO users (user_id, username, password_hash, role, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, 'x', 'user', datetime('now'))`,
+    [USER, USER],
+  );
+  db.run(`INSERT INTO networks (network_id, network_name, owner_id, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, datetime('now'))`, [NET, NET, USER]);
+  db.run(`INSERT INTO network_members (user_id, network_id, role, joined_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, 'owner', datetime('now'))`, [USER, NET]);
+  // Stale row first (older created_at AND lower rowid), live row second.
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, '2026-09-16 01:40:40', '2026-09-16 01:40:40')`,
+    [STALE_ID, ALIAS, ALIAS, NET],
+  );
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id, created_at, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, '2026-09-16 01:42:46', '2026-09-16 01:42:46')`,
+    [LIVE_ID, ALIAS, ALIAS, NET],
+  );
+  for (const [tok, bound, hash] of [
+    [STALE_TOKEN, STALE_ID, "hash_rules_dup_stale"],
+    [LIVE_TOKEN, LIVE_ID, "hash_rules_dup_live"],
+    [UNBOUND_TOKEN, null, "hash_rules_dup_unbound"],
+  ] as const) {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO api_tokens (token_id, user_id, network_id, scope, name, token_hash, expires_at, revoked_at, bound_node_id) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'network', ?4, ?5, NULL, NULL, ?6)`,
+      [tok, USER, NET, `node:${ALIAS}`, hash, bound],
+    );
+  }
+  if (opts.liveSession !== false) {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO sessions (resume_id, alias, network_id, node_id, status, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, 'idle', datetime('now'))`,
+      [`sdk-${LIVE_ID}`, ALIAS, NET, LIVE_ID],
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+type Identity = { alias: string; isNetworkToken: boolean; tokenId: string };
+const asUser: Identity = { alias: USER, isNetworkToken: false, tokenId: "tok_rules_dup_user" };
+const asLive: Identity = { alias: ALIAS, isNetworkToken: true, tokenId: LIVE_TOKEN };
+const asStale: Identity = { alias: ALIAS, isNetworkToken: true, tokenId: STALE_TOKEN };
+const asUnbound: Identity = { alias: ALIAS, isNetworkToken: true, tokenId: UNBOUND_TOKEN };
+
+async function connect(id: Identity) {
+  const server = new McpServer({ name: "rules-dup-test", version: "1" });
+  registerTools(server, undefined, NET, USER, id.alias, id.isNetworkToken, id.tokenId);
+  const client = new Client({ name: "rules-dup-client", version: "1" });
+  const [ct, st] = InMemoryTransport.createLinkedPair();
+  await server.connect(st);
+  await client.connect(ct);
+  const call = async (name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+    const r: any = await client.callTool({ name, arguments: args });
+    const first = r.content?.[0];
+    if (!first || first.type !== "text") throw new Error(`no text result from ${name}`);
+    return JSON.parse(first.text);
+  };
+  const close = async () => { await client.close(); await server.close(); };
+  return { call, close };
+}
+
+function queuedNodeId(requestId: string): string | undefined {
+  return db.get<{ node_id: string }>("SELECT node_id FROM node_rules_requests WHERE request_id = ?1", requestId)?.node_id;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => { cleanup(); });
+afterAll(cleanup);
+
+describe("duplicate alias — rules file pull/ack", () => {
+  test("field case: read queued for the live node_id is pulled and acked by the live node's bound token", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    const n = await connect(asLive);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { node_id: LIVE_ID });
+      expect(enq).toMatchObject({ ok: true, op: "read" });
+      const pulled = await n.call("get_rules_file_request", {});
+      expect(pulled).toEqual({ ok: true, request: { request_id: enq.request_id, op: "read" } });
+      const ack = await n.call("ack_rules_file_request", { request_id: enq.request_id, status: "done", file_name: "AGENTS.md", exists: true, content: "# live" });
+      expect(ack).toMatchObject({ ok: true, status: "done" });
+      expect(await u.call("get_rules_file_result", { request_id: enq.request_id })).toMatchObject({ status: "done", content: "# live" });
+    } finally { await u.close(); await n.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("a token bound to the stale row can neither pull nor ack the live node's request", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    const stale = await connect(asStale);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { node_id: LIVE_ID });
+      expect(await stale.call("get_rules_file_request", {})).toEqual({ ok: true, request: null });
+      expect(await stale.call("ack_rules_file_request", { request_id: enq.request_id, status: "done", content: "# forged" }))
+        .toEqual({ ok: true, ignored: "unknown_or_foreign_request" });
+      expect(await u.call("get_rules_file_result", { request_id: enq.request_id })).toMatchObject({ status: "pending" });
+    } finally { await u.close(); await stale.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("the live token does not pull a request queued for the stale row", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    const n = await connect(asLive);
+    try {
+      await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { node_id: STALE_ID });
+      expect(await n.call("get_rules_file_request", {})).toEqual({ ok: true, request: null });
+    } finally { await u.close(); await n.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("client targeting by alias queues under the row the alias's session points at", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { alias: ALIAS });
+      expect(enq).toMatchObject({ ok: true, op: "read" });
+      expect(queuedNodeId(enq.request_id)).toBe(LIVE_ID);
+      const sk = await u.call("list_node_skills", { alias: ALIAS });
+      expect(sk).toMatchObject({ ok: true });
+      expect(queuedNodeId(sk.request_id)).toBe(LIVE_ID);
+    } finally { await u.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("without a session row, alias targeting falls back to the newest row", async () => {
+    seedWorld({ liveSession: false });
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { alias: ALIAS });
+      expect(queuedNodeId(enq.request_id)).toBe(LIVE_ID);
+    } finally { await u.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("the session mapping wins over recency: alias targeting picks the older row when the session points at it", async () => {
+    seedWorld({ liveSession: false });
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO sessions (resume_id, alias, network_id, node_id, status, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, 'idle', datetime('now'))`,
+      [`sdk-${STALE_ID}`, ALIAS, NET, STALE_ID],
+    );
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { alias: ALIAS });
+      expect(queuedNodeId(enq.request_id)).toBe(STALE_ID);
+    } finally { await u.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("a token bound to a node whose row is gone does not fall back to another row with its alias", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    db.run("UPDATE api_tokens SET bound_node_id = 'node_rules_dup_deleted' WHERE token_id = ?1", [STALE_TOKEN]);
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    const stale = await connect(asStale);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { node_id: LIVE_ID });
+      expect(await stale.call("get_rules_file_request", {})).toEqual({ ok: true, request: null });
+      expect(await u.call("get_rules_file_result", { request_id: enq.request_id })).toMatchObject({ status: "pending" });
+    } finally { await u.close(); await stale.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("an unbound legacy token resolves its alias to the session-mapped row", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    const u = await connect(asUser);
+    const n = await connect(asUnbound);
+    try {
+      const enq = await u.call("read_node_rules_file", { node_id: LIVE_ID });
+      expect(await n.call("get_rules_file_request", {})).toEqual({ ok: true, request: { request_id: enq.request_id, op: "read" } });
+    } finally { await u.close(); await n.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+});
+
+describe("duplicate alias — config update pull/ack", () => {
+  function queueUpdate(nodeId: string, updateId: string) {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO node_config_updates (update_id, node_id, network_id, patch_json, apply_mode, base_revision, status, created_at, created_by_token) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, '{"model":"m"}', 'hot', 0, 'pending', ?4, 'tok_rules_dup_user')`,
+      [updateId, nodeId, NET, Date.now()],
+    );
+  }
+
+  test("the live node's bound token pulls and acks its own pending update", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    queueUpdate(LIVE_ID, "cu_rules_dup_live");
+    const n = await connect(asLive);
+    try {
+      const pulled = await n.call("get_config_update", {});
+      expect(pulled.update?.update_id).toBe("cu_rules_dup_live");
+      const ack = await n.call("ack_config_update", { update_id: "cu_rules_dup_live", status: "applied", new_revision: 1 });
+      expect(ack.ok).toBe(true);
+      expect(ack.ignored).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(db.get<{ status: string }>("SELECT status FROM node_config_updates WHERE update_id = 'cu_rules_dup_live'")?.status).toBe("applied");
+    } finally { await n.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+
+  test("a token bound to the stale row cannot pull or ack the live node's update", async () => {
+    seedWorld();
+    queueUpdate(LIVE_ID, "cu_rules_dup_live2");
+    const stale = await connect(asStale);
+    try {
+      expect((await stale.call("get_config_update", {})).update).toBeNull();
+      await stale.call("ack_config_update", { update_id: "cu_rules_dup_live2", status: "applied", new_revision: 1 });
+      expect(db.get<{ status: string }>("SELECT status FROM node_config_updates WHERE update_id = 'cu_rules_dup_live2'")?.status).toBe("pending");
+    } finally { await stale.close(); }
+  }, 20_000);
+});