@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.5 → 0.9.0-preview.51

package/src/server.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3780 @@
+import { buildServeErrorResponse } from "./serve-error.js";
+import { redactMessageRow } from "./redact-tokens.js";
+import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
+import { parseDbTimestampMs } from "./db-timestamp.js";
+import { buildControllableMap, isLifecycleControllable } from "./node-lifecycle-controllable.js";
+import { resolvePort } from "./resolve-port.js";
+import { normalizeSessionRuntime } from "./runtime-label.js";
+import { WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/webStandardStreamableHttp.js";
+import { z } from "zod/v4";
+import { registerTools } from "./tools.js";
+import { db, logTaskEvent, logAudit, syncScheduledRunForTask } from "./db.js";
+import { createSSEStream, createNetworkObserverStream, createUserEventStream, pushEvent, pushNetworkObserverEvent, getSSEStats, PRINTABLE_OBSERVER_KEY_PREFIX } from "./push.js";
+import { assertNodeActive } from "./lifecycle-guard.js";
+import { pendingInboxCount } from "./inbox-count.js";
+import { addNetworkScope, canRestWriteNetwork, getUserNetworkIds, resolveRestNetworkScope, resolveRestWriteNetworkId, singleNetworkId, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
+import { validateAvatarUrl } from "./avatar-validate.js";
+import { narrowTags, parseStoredTags, validateScalarAttr } from "./node-attrs-validate.js";
+import { register, login, resolveToken, getUserNetworks, getUserAllNetworks, createNetwork, deleteNetwork, renameNetwork, changePassword, issueUserToken, listTokens, createToken, revokeToken, getNetworkMembers, getUserNetworkRole, addNetworkMember, updateMemberRole, removeNetworkMember, createInvite, joinByInvite, createNetworkTokenForNode, type AuthUser } from "./auth.js";
+import { abortRename, cleanupCommittedRenameSessions, commitRename, prepareRename, resolveCanonicalAlias } from "./rename.js";
+import { sharedSendDedup, buildDuplicateSendPayload } from "./send_dedup.js";
+import { getLoginClientIp, sharedLoginFailureLockout, sharedLoginIpRateLimiter } from "./auth_login_guard.js";
+import {
+  FILE_ID_REGEX,
+  MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH,
+  MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES,
+  buildStoragePath,
+  pathForExistingBlob,
+  isValidCalendarBucket,
+  generateFileId,
+  getUploadsRoot,
+  indexEntryPath,
+  isPathInsideUploadsRoot,
+  sanitizeExt,
+  sharedUploadRateLimiter,
+  stripHostLocalPathsForCrossHostSafe,
+  validateAttachments,
+  validateIndexEntry,
+} from "./uploads.js";
+import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, unlinkSync, renameSync } from "fs";
+import { dirname as pathDirname } from "path";
+import { startRetentionSweeper } from "./retention.js";
+import { startStaleSessionSweeper } from "./stale-sweeper.js";
+import {
+  AUDIT_LOG_REST_SELECT,
+  COMPLETION_REST_SELECT,
+  NETWORK_REST_SELECT,
+  SESSION_REST_SELECT,
+  TASK_EVENT_REST_SELECT,
+  TASK_REST_SELECT,
+} from "./rest-projections.js";
+import { resolveRestFromSession } from "./rest-identity.js";
+import { stampTaskAuthOrigin, type TaskAuthOrigin } from "./task-auth-origin.js";
+import { diagnoseTask } from "./task-diagnostic.js";
+import { assertScheduledTaskBackendSupported, handleScheduledTaskRequest, startScheduledTaskScheduler } from "./scheduled-tasks.js";
+import { handleExternalScheduleEditRequest } from "./external-schedule-edits.js";
+import { recordDeliveredStaleEvents } from "./task-lifecycle-watcher.js";
+import { SIDE_THREAD_FEATURE_FLAG, SideThreadCoordinator, SideThreadPortRegistry, SideThreadStore, type SideThreadActor, type SideThreadAttachmentRef, type SideThreadExecutionPort } from "./side-thread.js";
+import { handleSideThreadHttpRequest } from "./side-thread-http.js";
+import { createProductionSideThreadTransport } from "./side-thread-production.js";
+import { parseHubTimestamp } from "./hub-timestamp";
+
+const PORT = resolvePort(process.env.PORT);
+const HOST = process.env.HOST || "127.0.0.1";
+const AUTH_TOKEN = process.env.COMMHUB_AUTH_TOKEN;
+const DEV_OPEN = process.argv.includes("--dev-open") || process.env.COMMHUB_DEV_OPEN === "1";
+const TMUX_ENABLED = process.env.COMMHUB_ENABLE_TMUX === "1";
+const SECURITY_LABEL = DEV_OPEN ? "⚠️ DEV OPEN MODE" : "🔒 secured";
+const TMUX_ALLOWLIST = new Set(
+  (process.env.COMMHUB_TMUX_ALLOWLIST || "")
+    .split(",")
+    .map((s) => s.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean)
+);
+let masterTokenDeprecationLogged = false;
+
+// #175 PR2 starts fail-closed. Only a verified native adapter can be installed;
+// the execution port deliberately has no ordinary task/FIFO delivery method.
+export const sideThreadPortRegistry = new SideThreadPortRegistry();
+export function installSideThreadExecutionPort(port: SideThreadExecutionPort): () => void {
+  return sideThreadPortRegistry.install(port);
+}
+const sideThreadCoordinator = new SideThreadCoordinator(new SideThreadStore(db), sideThreadPortRegistry, {
+  enabled: process.env[SIDE_THREAD_FEATURE_FLAG] === "1",
+  authorizeNode: (actor, networkId, nodeId) => authorizeSideThreadNode(actor, networkId, nodeId),
+  authorizeAttachment: (actor, networkId, ref) => authorizeSideThreadAttachment(actor, networkId, ref),
+});
+const productionSideThreadTransport = process.env[SIDE_THREAD_FEATURE_FLAG] === "1"
+  ? createProductionSideThreadTransport(db)
+  : null;
+if (productionSideThreadTransport) installSideThreadExecutionPort(productionSideThreadTransport.port);
+
+if (AUTH_TOKEN) {
+  console.warn("[commhub] COMMHUB_AUTH_TOKEN is deprecated and will be removed in v1.0. See RFC-001.");
+}
+
+// Read version from package.json so banners and /health stay in sync.
+const SERVER_VERSION = (() => {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL("../package.json", import.meta.url);
+    return JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(url, "utf8")).version || "?";
+  } catch { return "?"; }
+})();
+
+// In-memory log ring buffer — last N lines streamed via /api/server-logs.
+// Wraps console.log/info/warn/error so EVERY existing log call lands here
+// without source changes. Dashboard tails this buffer for "hub server log
+// view" feature.
+const LOG_RING_CAP = Number(process.env.COMMHUB_LOG_RING || 500);
+type LogEntry = { ts: string; level: "log" | "info" | "warn" | "error"; line: string };
+const logRing: LogEntry[] = [];
+const _origConsole = { log: console.log.bind(console), info: console.info.bind(console), warn: console.warn.bind(console), error: console.error.bind(console) };
+function pushLog(level: LogEntry["level"], args: any[]) {
+  const line = args.map(a => typeof a === "string" ? a : (() => { try { return JSON.stringify(a); } catch { return String(a); } })()).join(" ");
+  logRing.push({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), level, line: line.slice(0, 4000) });
+  if (logRing.length > LOG_RING_CAP) logRing.splice(0, logRing.length - LOG_RING_CAP);
+}
+console.log = (...args: any[]) => { pushLog("log", args); _origConsole.log(...args); };
+console.info = (...args: any[]) => { pushLog("info", args); _origConsole.info(...args); };
+console.warn = (...args: any[]) => { pushLog("warn", args); _origConsole.warn(...args); };
+console.error = (...args: any[]) => { pushLog("error", args); _origConsole.error(...args); };
+
+function normalizeMetaJson(meta: unknown): string | null {
+  if (!meta || typeof meta !== "object") return null;
+  // #222 cross-host safety — same sanitization as tools.ts so REST
+  // /api/task and MCP send_task produce identical meta_json shapes.
+  // Conditional: only strips `path` when `file_id` is also present
+  // (preserves single-host feishu fallback per team rule — assume-unit-before-threshold: cap is in bytes
+  // discipline of not breaking other call sites).
+  try { return JSON.stringify(stripHostLocalPathsForCrossHostSafe(meta)); } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+// ── Rate limiter (in-memory, per IP) ──
+const rateLimits = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
+function checkRateLimit(ip: string, maxPerMinute = 60): boolean {
+  // Skip rate limiting for localhost/internal/unknown (dev/test)
+  if (!ip || ip === "unknown" || ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1") return true;
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const entry = rateLimits.get(ip);
+  if (!entry || now > entry.resetAt) {
+    rateLimits.set(ip, { count: 1, resetAt: now + 60000 });
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (entry.count >= maxPerMinute) return false;
+  entry.count++;
+  return true;
+}
+// Cleanup stale entries every 5 minutes. Interval is registered in
+// startHub() (#476) — module scope must stay timer-free so importing
+// this module neither holds the event loop open nor does periodic work.
+function sweepStaleRateLimits(): void {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  for (const [ip, entry] of rateLimits) {
+    if (now > entry.resetAt) rateLimits.delete(ip);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── Factory: 每个请求创建新的 McpServer（stateless 模式）──
+function createServer(clientIP?: string, enforceNetworkId?: string | null, enforceUserId?: string | null, callerAlias?: string | null, callerTokenIsNetwork = false, callerTokenId?: string | null): McpServer {
+  const server = new McpServer({
+    name: "commhub",
+    version: "0.5.0",
+  });
+  registerTools(server, clientIP, enforceNetworkId, enforceUserId, callerAlias, callerTokenIsNetwork, callerTokenId);
+  return server;
+}
+
+// ── Auth helper ─────────────────────────────────────
+type RequestTokenOptions = { allowQueryToken?: boolean };
+
+function requestToken(req: Request, options: RequestTokenOptions = {}): string {
+  const header = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+  if (options.allowQueryToken === false) return header || "";
+  const url = new URL(req.url);
+  return header || url.searchParams.get("token") || "";
+}
+
+function isLegacyAuthToken(req: Request, options: RequestTokenOptions = {}): boolean {
+  const token = requestToken(req, options);
+  return !!AUTH_TOKEN && token === AUTH_TOKEN;
+}
+
+function requireAuth(req: Request, options: RequestTokenOptions = {}): Response | null {
+  const token = requestToken(req, options);
+
+  // V3: check api_tokens first
+  if (token) {
+    const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+    if (resolved) return null; // valid user token
+  }
+
+  // Legacy: check global COMMHUB_AUTH_TOKEN
+  if (!AUTH_TOKEN && DEV_OPEN) return null; // explicit local/dev open mode
+  if (token === AUTH_TOKEN) {
+    const u = new URL(req.url);
+    const readOnlyApi = u.pathname.startsWith("/api/") && (req.method === "GET" || req.method === "HEAD" || req.method === "OPTIONS");
+    if (!readOnlyApi) return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "master-token auth is deprecated; use admin utok_" }, { status: 401 });
+    if (!masterTokenDeprecationLogged) {
+      console.warn("[commhub] master-token auth is deprecated and will be removed in v1.0. See RFC-001.");
+      masterTokenDeprecationLogged = true;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return Response.json({ error: "unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
+}
+
+function getClientIP(req: Request, server?: any): string {
+  const direct = server?.requestIP?.(req)?.address;
+  if (direct) return direct;
+  const fwd = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
+  return fwd ? fwd.split(",")[0].trim() : (req.headers.get("x-real-ip") ?? "unknown");
+}
+
+function isLocalhostIP(ip: string): boolean {
+  return ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1" || ip === "::ffff:127.0.0.1" || ip === "localhost";
+}
+
+// Normalize the raw `agent` field into a canonical runtime identifier for the
+// dashboard's Runtime badge. Returns null for unknown/absent agents so the
+// frontend can fall back to a placeholder.
+const normalizeRuntime = normalizeSessionRuntime;
+
+function isTmuxAllowedIP(ip: string): boolean {
+  return isLocalhostIP(ip) || TMUX_ALLOWLIST.has(ip);
+}
+
+function requireAdminAuth(req: Request): Response | null {
+  const token = requestToken(req);
+  if (!token) return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 });
+  const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+  if (!resolved) return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 });
+  if (resolved.user.role !== "admin") return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "admin required" }, { status: 403 });
+  return null;
+}
+
+function requireTmuxAccess(req: Request, server?: any): Response | null {
+  if (!TMUX_ENABLED) return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "tmux disabled" }, { status: 404 });
+  const ip = getClientIP(req, server);
+  if (!isTmuxAllowedIP(ip)) return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "tmux access denied from this ip" }, { status: 403 });
+  return requireAdminAuth(req);
+}
+
+// Extract user + network + token-binding identity from request token.
+function resolveRequestAuth(req: Request, options: RequestTokenOptions = {}): { userId: string; networkId: string | null; username: string; tokenName: string | null; tokenId: string | null } | null {
+  const token = requestToken(req, options);
+  if (!token) return null;
+  const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+  if (!resolved) return null;
+  return { userId: resolved.user.user_id, networkId: resolved.networkId, username: resolved.user.username, tokenName: resolved.tokenName, tokenId: resolved.tokenId };
+}
+
+function resolveSideThreadActor(req: Request, auth: ReturnType<typeof resolveRequestAuth>, isAdmin: boolean): SideThreadActor | null {
+  // Legacy master and DEV_OPEN cannot own durable records because neither
+  // supplies a stable per-user identity for later window hydration.
+  if (!auth?.userId || !auth.tokenId) return null;
+  const nodeCredential = requestToken(req).startsWith("ntok_");
+  const tokenRow = nodeCredential
+    ? db.get<{ bound_node_id: string | null }>("SELECT bound_node_id FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1", auth.tokenId)
+    : null;
+  return {
+    userId: auth.userId,
+    username: auth.username,
+    tokenId: auth.tokenId,
+    kind: nodeCredential ? "node" : "user",
+    ...(auth.networkId ? { boundNetworkId: auth.networkId } : {}),
+    ...(tokenRow?.bound_node_id ? { boundNodeId: tokenRow.bound_node_id } : {}),
+    isAdmin,
+  };
+}
+
+// #503 — the credential kinds that authorization decisions branch on.
+// Resolved once per request at the handler, so the authz helpers stay
+// pure functions of (principal, entry) and every credential kind is a
+// directly constructible test input instead of a hand-assembled Request.
+export type Principal =
+  | { kind: "anonymous" }
+  | { kind: "dev-open-anon" }
+  | { kind: "legacy-master" }
+  | { kind: "utok"; userId: string; username: string; isAdmin: false }
+  | { kind: "ntok"; userId: string; boundNetworkId: string }
+  | { kind: "admin-utok"; userId: string; username: string };
+
+export function resolvePrincipal(req: Request, options: RequestTokenOptions = {}): Principal {
+  const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req, options);
+  if (!authCtx) {
+    if (isLegacyAuthToken(req, options)) return { kind: "legacy-master" };
+    if (DEV_OPEN) return { kind: "dev-open-anon" };
+    return { kind: "anonymous" };
+  }
+  const token = requestToken(req, options);
+  const resolved = token ? resolveToken(token) : null;
+  const isAdmin = !!resolved && resolved.user.role === "admin";
+  // Bound network wins over admin classification: a ntok_ issued BY an
+  // admin is still a ntok_, and its bound scope defines its identity.
+  // Inverting this order would silently re-grant every production agent
+  // node cross-network read, since production node tokens resolve to an
+  // admin user (see the 生产影响 note on authorizeFileDownload).
+  if (authCtx.networkId) return { kind: "ntok", userId: authCtx.userId, boundNetworkId: authCtx.networkId };
+  if (isAdmin) return { kind: "admin-utok", userId: authCtx.userId, username: authCtx.username };
+  return { kind: "utok", userId: authCtx.userId, username: authCtx.username, isAdmin: false };
+}
+
+// #503 — coerce the on-disk (untrusted, hand-editable) index entry into
+// the shape the authz helper reasons about. Every `typeof` narrowing for
+// these two fields lives here and nowhere else, so the authz rules can be
+// read as rules rather than as string-checks.
+export function normalizeEntry(
+  entry: { owner_id?: unknown; network_id?: unknown },
+): { ownerId: string | null; networkId: string | null } {
+  const ownerId = typeof entry.owner_id === "string" && entry.owner_id.length > 0
+    ? entry.owner_id
+    : null;
+  const networkId = typeof entry.network_id === "string" && entry.network_id.length > 0
+    ? entry.network_id
+    : null;
+  return { ownerId, networkId };
+}
+
+// #495/#503 — shared authorization gate for /api/files/:file_id downloads.
+// Called from the GET handler and any future HEAD/Range/dashboard-proxy
+// entry so the allow-list can't drift between methods (通信龙 clause 2:
+// "授权若只在 GET 分支实现, HEAD 或 Range 走别路径 = 等于没修").
+//
+// Returns true if the caller may read this entry; false otherwise. The
+// caller emits 404 on false — never 403; 403 would leak that the
+// file_id exists and enables enumeration.
+//
+// Allow-list — network scope enforced by #503:
+//   - Legacy master AUTH_TOKEN (RFC-001 read-only) → allow.
+//   - admin utok_ → allow (mirrors requireAdminAuth).
+//   - entry.network_id present → caller must belong to THAT network:
+//     ntok_ must be bound to it; utok_ must hold any role in it
+//     (viewer included — viewer is read-only, and a viewer who can see
+//     a task but not open its attachment is a broken product).
+//   - entry.network_id absent (legacy / unattributed) → the pre-#503
+//     rules stand unchanged: owner match, or null owner_id + DEV_OPEN.
+//   - Everything else → deny (404). New uploads in production always
+//     carry a truthy owner_id (requireAuth blocks the null-owner-
+//     producing path when DEV_OPEN=off and no legacy master token is
+//     configured), so denying null-owner in production closes the
+//     enumeration vector for legacy blobs without breaking new uploads.
+//
+// 生产影响: 新的 ntok 归属文件走 network gate, admin 签发的 ntok 也走 gate
+// (kind='ntok' 分类优先绑定). 98 历史文件无 network_id 走老文件兼容分支
+// (owner/admin 可读, 存量行为不变).
+//
+// 行为变更: admin 的节点令牌 (ntok_) 失去它今天拥有的跨网络读权. 生产今天
+// 所有文件在同一 network → 无实际影响, 但语义变更须明写, 不能悄悄发生.
+export function authorizeFileDownload(
+  principal: Principal,
+  entry: { ownerId: string | null; networkId: string | null },
+): boolean {
+  if (principal.kind === "legacy-master") return true;
+  if (principal.kind === "admin-utok") return true;
+
+  if (entry.networkId !== null) {
+    if (principal.kind === "anonymous" || principal.kind === "dev-open-anon") return false;
+    if (principal.kind === "ntok") return principal.boundNetworkId === entry.networkId;
+    return !!getUserNetworkRole(principal.userId, entry.networkId);
+  }
+
+  if (principal.kind === "ntok" || principal.kind === "utok") {
+    if (entry.ownerId !== null && principal.userId === entry.ownerId) return true;
+  }
+  // Kept env-gated rather than narrowed to kind==='dev-open-anon': the
+  // pre-#503 rule allowed ANY caller to read a null-owner entry while
+  // DEV_OPEN is on, and #503 is scoped to adding network scope, not to
+  // tightening the local-dev carve-out.
+  if (entry.ownerId === null && DEV_OPEN) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+function authorizeSideThreadNode(actor: SideThreadActor, networkId: string, nodeId: string): boolean {
+  const node = db.get<{ network_id: string | null; owner_user_id: string | null }>(
+    "SELECT network_id, owner_user_id FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", nodeId,
+  );
+  if (!node || node.network_id !== networkId) return false;
+  if (!getUserNetworkRole(actor.userId, networkId)) return false;
+  if (!node.owner_user_id || node.owner_user_id !== actor.userId) return false;
+  if (actor.boundNetworkId && actor.boundNetworkId !== networkId) return false;
+  if (actor.kind === "node" && actor.boundNodeId !== nodeId) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function resolveSideThreadCapabilityTarget(input: { actor: SideThreadActor; alias?: string; nodeId?: string; networkId?: string }): { nodeId: string; networkId: string } | undefined {
+  if ((!input.alias && !input.nodeId) || (input.alias && input.nodeId)) return undefined;
+  const networkId = input.actor.boundNetworkId ?? input.networkId;
+  const params: unknown[] = [input.nodeId ?? input.alias];
+  let sql = input.nodeId
+    ? "SELECT node_id,network_id FROM nodes WHERE node_id=?1"
+    : "SELECT node_id,network_id FROM nodes WHERE alias=?1";
+  if (networkId) { params.push(networkId); sql += " AND network_id=?2"; }
+  const authorized = db.all<{ node_id: string; network_id: string | null }>(sql, ...params)
+    .filter(row => !!row.network_id && authorizeSideThreadNode(input.actor, row.network_id, row.node_id));
+  if (authorized.length !== 1) return undefined;
+  return { nodeId: authorized[0].node_id, networkId: authorized[0].network_id! };
+}
+
+function authorizeSideThreadAttachment(actor: SideThreadActor, networkId: string, ref: SideThreadAttachmentRef): boolean {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(ref.fileId)) return false;
+  const path = indexEntryPath(ref.fileId);
+  if (!path || !existsSync(path)) return false;
+  try {
+    const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
+    if (!validateIndexEntry(entry) || entry.file_id !== ref.fileId) return false;
+    if (entry.network_id !== networkId || entry.owner_id !== actor.userId) return false;
+    if (!isValidCalendarBucket(entry.date_bucket)) return false;
+    const storage = pathForExistingBlob(entry.date_bucket, entry.file_id, entry.ext);
+    return isPathInsideUploadsRoot(storage.absolutePath) && existsSync(storage.absolutePath);
+  } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+type ByteRange =
+  | { ok: true; start: number; end: number; length: number }
+  | { ok: false };
+
+function parseSingleByteRange(rangeHeader: string | null, size: number): ByteRange | null {
+  if (rangeHeader === null) return null;
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(size) || size < 0) return { ok: false };
+  const match = /^bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)$/.exec(rangeHeader.trim());
+  if (!match) return { ok: false };
+  const [, rawStart, rawEnd] = match;
+  if (rawStart === "" && rawEnd === "") return { ok: false };
+
+  let start: number;
+  let end: number;
+  if (rawStart === "") {
+    const suffixLength = Number(rawEnd);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(suffixLength) || suffixLength <= 0) return { ok: false };
+    if (size === 0) return { ok: false };
+    start = Math.max(0, size - suffixLength);
+    end = size - 1;
+  } else {
+    start = Number(rawStart);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(start) || start < 0) return { ok: false };
+    if (start >= size) return { ok: false };
+    if (rawEnd === "") {
+      end = size - 1;
+    } else {
+      end = Number(rawEnd);
+      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(end) || end < start) return { ok: false };
+      end = Math.min(end, size - 1);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { ok: true, start, end, length: end - start + 1 };
+}
+
+function sqliteTime(date: Date): string {
+  return date.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19);
+}
+
+function parseSqliteTime(value: string | null | undefined): number {
+  if (!value) return 0;
+  const normalized = value.includes("T") ? value : `${value.replace(" ", "T")}Z`;
+  const ts = Date.parse(normalized);
+  return Number.isFinite(ts) ? ts : 0;
+}
+
+function normalizeTaskBeforeCursor(value: string): string | null {
+  const cursor = value.trim();
+  if (!cursor) return null;
+  const sqliteShape = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}$/;
+  if (sqliteShape.test(cursor)) {
+    const parsed = new Date(`${cursor.replace(" ", "T")}Z`);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(parsed.getTime()) || sqliteTime(parsed) !== cursor) return null;
+    return cursor;
+  }
+  const timestamp = Date.parse(cursor);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(timestamp)) return null;
+  return sqliteTime(new Date(timestamp));
+}
+
+function normalizeTaskBeforeTaskId(value: string): string | null {
+  const taskId = value.trim();
+  if (!taskId || taskId.length > 256 || /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(taskId)) return null;
+  return taskId;
+}
+
+function cpuPct(load: number | null | undefined, cores: number | null | undefined): number | null {
+  if (typeof load !== "number" || typeof cores !== "number" || cores <= 0) return null;
+  return Math.round((load / cores) * 1000) / 10;
+}
+
+function serverAlertLevel(row: any): { level: "green" | "yellow" | "red"; alerts: string[] } {
+  const alerts: string[] = [];
+  const pct = cpuPct(row?.cpu_load_1min, row?.cpu_cores);
+  if (pct !== null && pct >= 80) alerts.push(`cpu ${pct}%`);
+  if (typeof row?.mem_avail_gb === "number" && row.mem_avail_gb < 0.5) alerts.push(`memory ${row.mem_avail_gb}GB available`);
+  if (typeof row?.disk_avail_gb === "number" && row.disk_avail_gb < 1) alerts.push(`disk ${row.disk_avail_gb}GB available`);
+  if (alerts.length > 0) return { level: "red", alerts };
+
+  if (pct !== null && pct >= 60) alerts.push(`cpu ${pct}%`);
+  if (typeof row?.mem_avail_gb === "number" && row.mem_avail_gb < 1) alerts.push(`memory ${row.mem_avail_gb}GB available`);
+  if (typeof row?.disk_avail_gb === "number" && row.disk_avail_gb < 5) alerts.push(`disk ${row.disk_avail_gb}GB available`);
+  return { level: alerts.length > 0 ? "yellow" : "green", alerts };
+}
+
+function agentHealthChip(status: unknown, lastSeen: string | null | undefined): "online" | "offline" | "stale" {
+  if (String(status || "").toLowerCase() === "offline") return "offline";
+  const ts = parseSqliteTime(lastSeen);
+  if (!ts || Date.now() - ts > 5 * 60 * 1000) return "stale";
+  return "online";
+}
+
+function bucketTelemetry(rows: any[], fromMs: number, bucketMs: number) {
+  const buckets = new Map<number, {
+    ts: number;
+    count: number;
+    cpu_pct_sum: number;
+    cpu_pct_count: number;
+    cpu_load_sum: number;
+    cpu_load_count: number;
+    mem_avail_min: number | null;
+    mem_used_max: number | null;
+    disk_avail_min: number | null;
+    disk_used_max: number | null;
+  }>();
+
+  for (const row of rows) {
+    const ts = parseSqliteTime(row.created_at);
+    if (!ts || ts < fromMs) continue;
+    const bucketTs = Math.floor(ts / bucketMs) * bucketMs;
+    const bucket = buckets.get(bucketTs) ?? {
+      ts: bucketTs,
+      count: 0,
+      cpu_pct_sum: 0,
+      cpu_pct_count: 0,
+      cpu_load_sum: 0,
+      cpu_load_count: 0,
+      mem_avail_min: null,
+      mem_used_max: null,
+      disk_avail_min: null,
+      disk_used_max: null,
+    };
+    bucket.count += 1;
+    const pct = cpuPct(row.cpu_load_1min, row.cpu_cores);
+    if (pct !== null) {
+      bucket.cpu_pct_sum += pct;
+      bucket.cpu_pct_count += 1;
+    }
+    if (typeof row.cpu_load_1min === "number") {
+      bucket.cpu_load_sum += row.cpu_load_1min;
+      bucket.cpu_load_count += 1;
+    }
+    if (typeof row.mem_avail_gb === "number") bucket.mem_avail_min = bucket.mem_avail_min === null ? row.mem_avail_gb : Math.min(bucket.mem_avail_min, row.mem_avail_gb);
+    if (typeof row.mem_used_gb === "number") bucket.mem_used_max = bucket.mem_used_max === null ? row.mem_used_gb : Math.max(bucket.mem_used_max, row.mem_used_gb);
+    if (typeof row.disk_avail_gb === "number") bucket.disk_avail_min = bucket.disk_avail_min === null ? row.disk_avail_gb : Math.min(bucket.disk_avail_min, row.disk_avail_gb);
+    if (typeof row.disk_used_gb === "number") bucket.disk_used_max = bucket.disk_used_max === null ? row.disk_used_gb : Math.max(bucket.disk_used_max, row.disk_used_gb);
+    buckets.set(bucketTs, bucket);
+  }
+
+  return Array.from(buckets.values())
+    .sort((a, b) => a.ts - b.ts)
+    .map((b) => ({
+      ts: new Date(b.ts).toISOString(),
+      count: b.count,
+      cpu_pct: b.cpu_pct_count ? Math.round((b.cpu_pct_sum / b.cpu_pct_count) * 10) / 10 : null,
+      cpu_load_1min: b.cpu_load_count ? Math.round((b.cpu_load_sum / b.cpu_load_count) * 100) / 100 : null,
+      mem_avail_gb: b.mem_avail_min,
+      mem_used_gb: b.mem_used_max,
+      disk_avail_gb: b.disk_avail_min,
+      disk_used_gb: b.disk_used_max,
+    }));
+}
+
+
+type RestDeliveryTarget =
+  | { state: "online"; alias: string; session: any }
+  | { state: "offline"; alias: string; session: any; message: string }
+  | { state: "not_found"; alias: string; message: string };
+
+// Build this only after authorization and a network-scoped lookup succeeded.
+// In particular, not-found and permission-denied responses must not become a
+// cross-network alias/node enumeration oracle.
+function restActualTo(target: Exclude<RestDeliveryTarget, { state: "not_found" }>, networkId: string | null) {
+  return {
+    alias: target.alias,
+    to_node_id: target.session?.node_id ?? null,
+    network_id: networkId,
+  };
+}
+
+function resolveRestDeliveryTarget(alias: string, networkId: string | null): RestDeliveryTarget {
+  const params: any[] = [alias];
+  let sql = "SELECT status, updated_at, last_seen_at, node_id FROM sessions WHERE alias = ?1";
+  if (networkId) {
+    sql += " AND network_id = ?2";
+    params.push(networkId);
+  }
+  const session = db.get<any>(sql, ...params);
+  if (!session) {
+    return { state: "not_found", alias, message: `alias not found: ${alias}` };
+  }
+  const lastSeen = session.last_seen_at || session.updated_at;
+  const lastSeenAt = lastSeen ? new Date(String(lastSeen).replace(" ", "T") + "Z").getTime() : 0;
+  const stale = !lastSeenAt || Date.now() - lastSeenAt > 5 * 60 * 1000;
+  if (String(session.status || "").toLowerCase() === "offline" || stale) {
+    return {
+      state: "offline",
+      alias,
+      session,
+      message: `alias is offline; task queued in inbox: ${alias}`,
+    };
+  }
+  return { state: "online", alias, session };
+}
+
+function resolveRestNodeIdForAlias(alias: string, networkId: string | null): string | null {
+  if (!alias || alias === "hub" || alias === "api") return null;
+  const canonical = resolveCanonicalAlias(networkId, alias);
+  const target = resolveRestDeliveryTarget(canonical.alias, networkId);
+  return target.state === "not_found" ? null : (target.session?.node_id ?? null);
+}
+
+function withNetworkNameAlias<T extends { network_name?: unknown }>(row: T): T & { name: string | null } {
+  return {
+    ...row,
+    // `network_name` is the canonical V3 storage/API field and remains for
+    // existing CLI/Dashboard clients. `name` is the documented REST-friendly
+    // compatibility alias; never let it drift or serialize as null when the
+    // canonical NOT NULL field is present.
+    name: typeof row.network_name === "string" ? row.network_name : null,
+  };
+}
+
+// ── REST input schema ───────────────────────────────
+const TaskSchema = z.object({
+  alias: z.string().min(1).max(200),
+  task: z.string().min(1).max(10000),
+  priority: z.enum(["high", "normal", "low"]).default("normal"),
+  from: z.string().max(200).optional(),
+  network_id: z.string().max(200).optional(),
+  parent_task_id: z.string().max(200).optional(),
+  ttl_seconds: z.number().min(1).max(86400).optional(),
+  // #221 — top-level attachments mirror the MCP send_task tool. They are
+  // merged into `meta.attachments` for persistence so the on-disk shape
+  // stays unified regardless of transport (REST or MCP).
+  attachments: z.any().optional(),
+  meta: z.any().optional(),
+});
+
+const BroadcastSchema = z.object({
+  message: z.string().min(1).max(10000),
+  filter_server: z.string().max(200).optional(),
+  filter_status: z.string().max(50).optional(),
+});
+
+// ── HTTP Server (Bun native) ────────────────────────
+const CORS_ORIGINS = process.env.COMMHUB_CORS_ORIGINS
+  ? process.env.COMMHUB_CORS_ORIGINS.split(",").map((s) => s.trim())
+  : ["http://localhost:3000", "http://localhost:3001"];
+
+function corsHeaders(req: Request): Record<string, string> {
+  const origin = req.headers.get("Origin") || "";
+  // CORS allowlist is driven entirely by COMMHUB_CORS_ORIGINS env (comma-separated).
+  // Default (env unset) allows localhost dev origins only — see CORS_ORIGINS above.
+  // No author-specific domains are hardcoded; production deployments must set
+  // COMMHUB_CORS_ORIGINS explicitly. See docs/concepts/security.md "CORS 配置".
+  const allowed = CORS_ORIGINS.includes(origin) ? origin : "";
+  return {
+    "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": allowed,
+    "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS",
+    "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "Content-Type, Authorization",
+    "Access-Control-Max-Age": "86400",
+  };
+}
+
+function withCors(req: Request, res: Response): Response {
+  const headers = corsHeaders(req);
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    res.headers.set(k, v);
+  }
+  return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ * #426 — append `charset=utf-8` to text-y Content-Type headers that
+ * omit it. Legacy Windows clients (PowerShell 5.1 Invoke-RestMethod /
+ * Invoke-WebRequest) default to ISO-8859-1 when the charset is
+ * unspecified, which double-encodes our clean UTF-8 payloads on the
+ * way in.
+ *
+ * Applied to Responses whose Content-Type header we can't influence at
+ * construction time — notably the MCP SDK transport, which builds its
+ * own `text/event-stream` / `application/json` reply. Response headers
+ * from `fetch` are mutable, so this rewrites in place rather than
+ * reconstructing the Response (which would break streamed bodies).
+ *
+ * No-ops when: charset is already set, the type is binary
+ * (application/octet-stream, image/*, video/*, application/pdf, etc.),
+ * or the header is missing entirely.
+ */
+function withUtf8CharsetContentType(res: Response): Response {
+  const ct = res.headers.get("content-type");
+  if (!ct) return res;
+  if (/;\s*charset=/i.test(ct)) return res;
+  const trimmed = ct.trim();
+  // Text-y types that legacy clients decode via charset. Everything
+  // else (binary, opaque) is left alone.
+  if (
+    trimmed === "application/json" ||
+    trimmed.startsWith("text/") ||
+    trimmed.startsWith("application/json;") ||
+    trimmed === "application/ld+json" ||
+    trimmed === "application/xml"
+  ) {
+    res.headers.set("content-type", `${trimmed}; charset=utf-8`);
+  }
+  return res;
+}
+
+// ── WebSocket tmux sessions ────────────────────────
+const wsTmuxIntervals = new Map<object, ReturnType<typeof setInterval>>();
+
+
+// ── Task expiration patrol (every 5 minutes) ──
+// Registered in startHub() (#476): this WRITES the DB, so it must never
+// run as an import side effect — a tool/test importing this module with
+// COMMHUB_DB unset would patrol the production database.
+export function patrolExpiredTasks(): void {
+  try {
+    const expired = db.transaction(() => {
+      const due = db.all<{ task_id: string; network_id: string | null }>(
+        `SELECT task_id, network_id FROM tasks
+          WHERE expires_at IS NOT NULL AND expires_at < datetime('now')
+            AND status IN ('created', 'delivered')`,
+      );
+      const changed: Array<{ task_id: string; network_id: string | null }> = [];
+      for (const task of due) {
+        const result = db.run(
+          `UPDATE tasks SET status = 'expired', completed_at = datetime('now')
+            WHERE task_id = ?1 AND status IN ('created', 'delivered')`,
+          [task.task_id],
+        );
+        // SQLite may include the AFTER UPDATE terminal-journal trigger write
+        // in this count. The WHERE clause still targets one exact guarded
+        // task, so any positive count proves the task transition happened.
+        if (result.changes < 1) continue;
+        syncScheduledRunForTask(task.task_id, task.network_id);
+        changed.push(task);
+      }
+      return changed;
+    });
+    if (expired.length > 0) {
+      console.log(`[patrol] expired ${expired.length} stale task(s)`);
+      for (const task of expired) logTaskEvent(task.task_id, null, "expired", "patrol");
+    }
+  } catch {}
+}
+
+function patrolDeliveredStaleTasks(): void {
+  try {
+    const result = recordDeliveredStaleEvents();
+    if (result.inserted > 0) {
+      console.warn(`[patrol] recorded ${result.inserted} delivered-stale task warning(s)`);
+    }
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    console.error(`[patrol] delivered-stale watcher failed: ${error?.message || error}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// #434 — test-safety seam, same signature as PR #438 so the two branches
+// merge cleanly. Wraps the sole Bun.serve config in a factory so
+// integration tests can request an OS-assigned ephemeral port
+// (`bootServer({ port: 0 })`) and read the actual bound port back from
+// the returned server. In an aggregate `bun test` run only the FIRST test
+// file's import boots the default server (module cache) — later files'
+// PORT env is ignored, so a suite that hard-codes its own port gets
+// ConnectionRefused on every fetch while still "running" (审查修复 per
+// 通信龙 #461 review, finding 2). Suites boot a private instance via this
+// seam instead. #438 additionally moves the default boot below under
+// `import.meta.main`; until that lands, import keeps booting (pre-#434
+// behavior) so the not-yet-migrated suites stay green.
+//
+// Note: `opts.port ?? PORT` uses nullish-coalescing on purpose — `||`
+// would swallow a legitimate `0`. Same for hostname.
+export function bootServer(opts?: { port?: number; hostname?: string }): ReturnType<typeof Bun.serve> {
+return Bun.serve({
+  port: opts?.port ?? PORT,
+  hostname: opts?.hostname ?? HOST,
+  idleTimeout: 255, // max value: keep SSE connections alive (seconds)
+  // #221 — defense-in-depth cap on the raw request body. The /api/upload
+  // handler also pre-checks Content-Length and post-checks parsed size
+  // against the documented 12 MiB cap (MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES); this knob
+  // simply guarantees Bun's own buffer won't grow past 13 MiB on any
+  // route. Default Bun ceiling is 128 MiB which is too permissive for
+  // a hub now exposed to the public internet.
+  maxRequestBodySize: MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH,
+  // #695 —— fetch 处理器抛出时不要让 Bun 回默认的非 JSON 500;带上异常 message,
+  //   /mcp 客户端按 JSON-RPC 读 error.message,REST 客户端按 { ok:false, message } 读。
+  error: (err) => buildServeErrorResponse(err),
+
+  async fetch(req, server) {
+    const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`);
+
+    // ── CORS preflight ──
+    if (req.method === "OPTIONS") {
+      return new Response(null, { status: 204, headers: corsHeaders(req) });
+    }
+
+    // ── WebSocket: tmux terminal ──
+    const wsMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/ws\/tmux\/([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)$/);
+    if (wsMatch) {
+      const tmuxErr = requireTmuxAccess(req, server);
+      if (tmuxErr) return withCors(req, tmuxErr);
+      if (server.upgrade(req, { data: { tmuxName: wsMatch[1] } } as any)) return;
+    }
+
+    // ── MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/mcp") {
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+      if (authErr) return withCors(req, authErr);
+      const clientIP = getClientIP(req, server);
+      // V3: resolve token → enforce network_id in all MCP tools.
+      // utok_ (user token, not network-bound) is allowed — the tool layer
+      // scopes to the user's accessible networks. Without this Dashboard
+      // (which logs in as a user) cannot call send_task.
+      const token = requestToken(req);
+      const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      const enforceNetId = authCtx?.networkId || null;
+      // Derive the calling alias from the token name (e.g., 'node:视频审查')
+      // so peer agents see the real sender instead of 'hub' on send_task.
+      const callerAlias = authCtx?.tokenName?.startsWith("node:")
+        ? authCtx.tokenName.slice("node:".length)
+        : (authCtx?.username || null);
+      const transport = new WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport({
+        sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
+      });
+      const mcpServer = createServer(clientIP, enforceNetId, authCtx?.userId || null, callerAlias, !!token?.startsWith("ntok_"), authCtx?.tokenId || null);
+      await mcpServer.connect(transport);
+      const response = await transport.handleRequest(req);
+      // Disconnect after response to prevent McpServer leak
+      setImmediate(() => mcpServer.close().catch(() => {}));
+      // #426: the MCP SDK's WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport builds
+      // its own Response with `Content-Type: text/event-stream` (or
+      // `application/json` for JSON-mode) but WITHOUT charset. Legacy
+      // Windows clients (PowerShell 5.1 Invoke-WebRequest / RestMethod)
+      // default to ISO-8859-1 when the charset is unspecified and 双重-
+      // 编码 our clean UTF-8 payload on the way in — the reported
+      // mojibake is client-side, but the header is what tells them to
+      // guess. We can't tell the SDK to add it, so wrap the response and
+      // rewrite the header. Streamed bodies (SSE) pass through untouched
+      // because Response takes the original ReadableStream verbatim.
+      return withUtf8CharsetContentType(response);
+    }
+
+    // ── #461 SSE network observer stream ──
+    // GET /events/network/:network_id → 网络级摘要事件（new_task / new_reply
+    // routing metadata only, no content）。Dashboard 用它实时感知第三方流量,
+    // 退役 15s 软轮询。MUST be matched before the generic /events/(.+) route
+    // below, which would otherwise swallow the path as a session name.
+    //
+    // Auth mirrors /events/:session's three paths:
+    //   1. legacy AUTH_TOKEN (master) → any network
+    //   2/3. ntok_ / utok_ → must CURRENTLY be a member of the requested
+    //        network. Membership is checked unconditionally — there is NO
+    //        token-bound-network shortcut. removeNetworkMember deletes the
+    //        membership row but does NOT revoke the user's ntok, so the
+    //        network_members lookup IS the revocation mechanism: an ntok
+    //        bound to this network whose owner was removed must lose the
+    //        stream (审查修复 per 通信龙 #461 review, finding 1).
+    const netEventsMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/events\/network\/(.+)$/);
+    if (netEventsMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+      if (authErr) return authErr;
+      const observedNetId = decodeURIComponent(netEventsMatch[1]);
+      const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      if (!authCtx && isLegacyAuthToken(req)) {
+        return createNetworkObserverStream(observedNetId);
+      }
+      if (!authCtx) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const observerRole = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, observedNetId);
+      if (!observerRole) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not a member of this network" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      return createNetworkObserverStream(observedNetId);
+    }
+
+    // GET /events/users/me?network_id=... → Desktop/user-client stream.
+    // This is intentionally keyed by authenticated user_id, not alias.
+    // Desktop must use its utok_; ntok_ is a node credential and cannot
+    // subscribe to user channels.
+    if (url.pathname === "/events/users/me" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+      if (authErr) return authErr;
+      const token = requestToken(req);
+      if (!token?.startsWith("utok_")) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "user_token_required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      if (!authCtx) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const networkId = url.searchParams.get("network_id");
+      if (!networkId) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network_id required" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const role = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, networkId);
+      if (!role) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not a member of this network" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      return createUserEventStream(networkId, authCtx.userId);
+    }
+
+    // ── SSE push: Agent 实时接收任务推送 ──
+    // GET /events/知识哥 → 保持长连接，send_task 时秒推
+    const eventsMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/events\/(.+)$/);
+    if (eventsMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+      if (authErr) return authErr;
+      const sessionName = decodeURIComponent(eventsMatch[1]);
+      const token = requestToken(req);
+      const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      const scopedNetId = authCtx?.networkId || url.searchParams.get("network_id");
+
+      // ── Path 1: legacy AUTH_TOKEN (master token) — unchanged ──
+      if (!authCtx && isLegacyAuthToken(req)) {
+        if (scopedNetId) {
+          const session = db.get<any>(
+            "SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE alias = ?1 AND network_id = ?2",
+            sessionName, scopedNetId
+          );
+          if (!session) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "session not in requested network" }, { status: 403 }));
+        }
+        return createSSEStream(sessionName, scopedNetId);
+      }
+
+      // ── Path 2: ntok_ (network-bound agent token) — pre-#247 behavior preserved ──
+      if (token?.startsWith("ntok_")) {
+        if (!authCtx || !scopedNetId) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network-scoped token required for SSE" }, { status: 403 }));
+        }
+        const role = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, scopedNetId);
+        if (!role) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not a member of this network" }, { status: 403 }));
+        const session = db.get<any>(
+          "SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE alias = ?1 AND network_id = ?2",
+          sessionName, scopedNetId
+        );
+        if (!session && authCtx.networkId !== scopedNetId) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "session not in requested network" }, { status: 403 }));
+        }
+        return createSSEStream(sessionName, scopedNetId);
+      }
+
+      // ── Path 3 (#247): utok_ (user token, dashboard SSE path) — 4 gates ──
+      //
+      // Pre-#247 the only V3 path required `ntok_` and rejected `utok_` outright,
+      // which locked the dashboard out of SSE (the dashboard proxy authenticates
+      // with the user's `utok_`). That broke real-time chat updates — replies
+      // were persisted but never live-pushed to the UI.
+      //
+      // Auth-scoping rules (all four must pass — see #247 design):
+      //   gate 1: token resolves to a valid user context (authCtx non-null)
+      //   gate 2: network scope is explicit — `utok_` has no implicit network,
+      //           so the caller must pass `?network_id=<id>`
+      //   gate 3: user is a member of that network (any role: owner / admin / member)
+      //   gate 4: channel-ownership — one of:
+      //           (a) sessionName === own username (the dashboard's default channel —
+      //               `send_reply` pushes to the original sender's alias which equals
+      //               the dashboard user's username; NO `sessions` row required for
+      //               this branch since the dashboard user is not a registered agent)
+      //           (b) sessionName is an existing agent alias in `scopedNetId`
+      //               (lets members monitor agents within their network)
+      //
+      // Security: rule 4(a) uses strict equality, so a `utok_` user cannot subscribe
+      // to another user's username channel (no cross-user eavesdrop). Rule 4(b) is
+      // scoped to `scopedNetId` + gate 3 membership, so cross-network eavesdrop is
+      // blocked too. There is intentionally NO org-admin bypass — even users with
+      // global `admin` role must be a member of the network they want to listen on.
+      if (!authCtx) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      if (!scopedNetId) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "network_id required (utok has no implicit network; pass ?network_id=<id>)"
+        }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const utokRole = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, scopedNetId);
+      if (!utokRole) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not a member of this network" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      if (sessionName === authCtx.username) {
+        return createSSEStream(sessionName, scopedNetId);
+      }
+      const utokSession = db.get<any>(
+        "SELECT 1 FROM sessions WHERE alias = ?1 AND network_id = ?2",
+        sessionName, scopedNetId
+      );
+      if (!utokSession) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "channel not allowed: must be your username or an existing agent in your network"
+        }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      return createSSEStream(sessionName, scopedNetId);
+    }
+
+    // ── V3: License endpoints ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/license" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const license = db.get<any>(
+        "SELECT type, expires_at, max_agents, max_networks, max_tasks_day FROM licenses ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
+      );
+      if (!license) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, status: "no_license" }));
+      const now = new Date().toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19);
+      const expired = license.expires_at && license.expires_at < now;
+      // #1650 — licenses.expires_at 是 TEXT(datetime('now') 家族),UTC 但不带时区
+      //   标记;`new Date()` 会按本机时区解析,边界上差一天。parse 失败时返回 null
+      //   而不是 NaN —— JSON.stringify(NaN) 本来也序列化成 null,线上字节不变。
+      const expiresMs = parseHubTimestamp(license.expires_at);
+      const daysLeft = expiresMs === null
+        ? null
+        : Math.max(0, Math.ceil((expiresMs - Date.now()) / 86400000));
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        license: { type: license.type, expires_at: license.expires_at, days_left: daysLeft, expired },
+        limits: { max_agents: license.max_agents, max_networks: license.max_networks, max_tasks_day: license.max_tasks_day },
+      }));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/license/activate" && req.method === "POST") {
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const key = body.key;
+        if (!key) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "key required" }, { status: 400 }));
+        // For now: accept any key starting with "anet-" as valid pro license
+        if (!key.startsWith("anet-") || key.length < 16) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid license key" }, { status: 400 }));
+        }
+        // Upgrade existing license or create new
+        db.run("DELETE FROM licenses");
+        const licId = `lic_${crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "").slice(0, 12)}`;
+        db.run(
+          "INSERT INTO licenses (id, license_key, type, max_agents, max_networks, max_tasks_day, activated_at, expires_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, 'pro', 50, 10, 10000, datetime('now'), datetime('now', '+365 days'))",
+          [licId, key]
+        );
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, type: "pro", expires_in_days: 365 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── V3: Auth endpoints (public) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/register" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const clientIP = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() || "unknown";
+      if (!checkRateLimit(clientIP, 30)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "too many requests, try again later" }, { status: 429 }));
+      }
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = register(body.username, body.password, body.email, body.display_name);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(result.user!.user_id, body.username, "register", "user", result.user!.user_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/login" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const clientIP = getLoginClientIp(req);
+      const ipRate = sharedLoginIpRateLimiter.check(clientIP || "unknown");
+      if (!ipRate.allowed) {
+        logAudit(null, null, "login_rate_limited", "auth", undefined, clientIP);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "rate_limited", message: "Too many login attempts. Try again later.", retry_after_ms: ipRate.retryAfterMs },
+          { status: 429, headers: { "Retry-After": String(Math.ceil((ipRate.retryAfterMs ?? 1000) / 1000)) } }
+        ));
+      }
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const lock = sharedLoginFailureLockout.check(body.username);
+        if (lock.locked) {
+          logAudit(null, body.username, "login_locked", "auth", undefined, `retry_after_ms=${lock.retryAfterMs ?? 0}`);
+          return withCors(req, Response.json(
+            { ok: false, error: "login_locked", message: "Too many failed login attempts. Try again later.", retry_after_ms: lock.retryAfterMs },
+            { status: 429, headers: { "Retry-After": String(Math.ceil((lock.retryAfterMs ?? 1000) / 1000)) } }
+          ));
+        }
+        const result = login(body.username, body.password);
+        if (result.ok) {
+          sharedLoginFailureLockout.recordSuccess(body.username);
+          logAudit(result.user!.user_id, body.username, "login", "user", result.user!.user_id);
+        } else {
+          const failure = sharedLoginFailureLockout.recordFailure(body.username);
+          if (failure.locked) {
+            const safeUsername = String(body.username ?? "").replace(/[\r\n\t]/g, " ").slice(0, 80);
+            console.warn(`[auth] login locked for username=${safeUsername} failures=${failure.failures} retry_after_ms=${failure.lockMs}`);
+          }
+          logAudit(null, body.username, "login_failed", "user", undefined, "invalid credentials");
+        }
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 401 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/me" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "token required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const networks = getUserAllNetworks(resolved.user.user_id);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, user: resolved.user, networks, current_network: resolved.networkId }));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/me" && req.method === "PUT") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "token required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const updates: string[] = [];
+        const params: any[] = [];
+        if (body.display_name) { updates.push(`display_name = ?${params.length + 1}`); params.push(body.display_name); }
+        if (body.email) { updates.push(`email = ?${params.length + 1}`); params.push(body.email); }
+        if (updates.length > 0) {
+          updates.push(`updated_at = datetime('now')`);
+          params.push(resolved.user.user_id);
+          db.run(`UPDATE users SET ${updates.join(", ")} WHERE user_id = ?${params.length}`, params);
+        }
+        // Re-fetch
+        const user = db.get<any>("SELECT user_id, username, display_name, email, role FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", resolved.user.user_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, user }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/password" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "token required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = changePassword(resolved.user.user_id, body.old_password, body.new_password, resolved.tokenId);
+        if (result.ok) {
+          const issued = issueUserToken(resolved.user.user_id, "password-change");
+          if (resolved.tokenId) revokeToken(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.tokenId);
+          logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "password_changed", "user", resolved.user.user_id);
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ...result, token: issued.token, token_id: issued.token_id }));
+        }
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── V3.13: Create network token for a node ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/node-token" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        if (!body.network_id || !body.node_name) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network_id and node_name required" }, { status: 400 }));
+        const result = createNetworkTokenForNode(resolved.user.user_id, body.network_id, body.node_name, body.node_id);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "node_token_created", "network", body.network_id, body.node_name);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── #84: node rename 2PC — Server surface (RFC-010 §4) ──
+    // The CLI orchestrates the 2PC; these endpoints are the Server steps:
+    // prepare = PHASE 1 P3, commit = PHASE 2 C1, abort = PHASE 1 rollback.
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/node-rename/prepare" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        if (!body.network_id || !body.old_alias || !body.new_alias) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network_id, old_alias, new_alias required" }, { status: 400 }));
+        }
+        const result = prepareRename(resolved.user.user_id, body.network_id, body.old_alias, body.new_alias);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "node_rename_prepared", "node", body.old_alias, body.new_alias);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok || result.code === "node_local_only" ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/node-rename/commit" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        if (!body.txn_id) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "txn_id required" }, { status: 400 }));
+        const result = commitRename(resolved.user.user_id, body.txn_id);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "node_rename_committed", "node", body.txn_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/node-rename/abort" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        if (!body.txn_id) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "txn_id required" }, { status: 400 }));
+        const result = abortRename(resolved.user.user_id, body.txn_id);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "node_rename_aborted", "node", body.txn_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── V3: Token management ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/tokens" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const tokens = listTokens(resolved.user.user_id);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, tokens }));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/auth/tokens" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = createToken(resolved.user.user_id, body.name || "api-token", body.network_id);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "token_created", "token", result.token_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    const tokenDeleteMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/auth\/tokens\/([^/]+)$/);
+    if (tokenDeleteMatch && req.method === "DELETE") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const result = revokeToken(resolved.user.user_id, tokenDeleteMatch[1]);
+      if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "token_revoked", "token", tokenDeleteMatch[1]);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 404 }));
+    }
+
+    // ── V3: Network management ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/networks" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "token required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      // V3.13: ntok_ can only see its bound network; utok_ sees all member networks
+      if (resolved.networkId) {
+        // ntok_ — only return the bound network
+        const net = db.get<any>(`SELECT ${NETWORK_REST_SELECT} FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1`, resolved.networkId);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, networks: net ? [withNetworkNameAlias(net)] : [] }));
+      }
+      // Global Hub admins have cross-network authority throughout the REST
+      // surface, so limiting this discovery endpoint to their membership rows
+      // made otherwise-authorized networks impossible to select (#94). Keep
+      // ordinary utok_ callers membership-scoped; ntok_ returned above stays
+      // bound to exactly one network.
+      const networks = resolved.user.role === "admin"
+        ? db.all<any>(
+            `SELECT ${NETWORK_REST_SELECT},
+                    COALESCE((SELECT nm.role FROM network_members nm
+                              WHERE nm.network_id = networks.network_id
+                                AND nm.user_id = ?1), 'admin') AS member_role
+             FROM networks ORDER BY created_at`,
+            resolved.user.user_id,
+          )
+        : getUserAllNetworks(resolved.user.user_id);
+      const visibleNetworks = networks.map(withNetworkNameAlias);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, networks: visibleNetworks }));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/networks" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "token required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = createNetwork(resolved.user.user_id, body.name, body.description);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── V3.13: Network members + invites ──
+    const membersMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/networks\/([^/]+)\/members(?:\/([^/]+))?$/);
+    if (membersMatch) {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const netId = membersMatch[1];
+      const targetUid = membersMatch[2];
+      const callerRole = getUserNetworkRole(resolved.user.user_id, netId);
+      if (!callerRole) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not a member of this network" }, { status: 403 }));
+
+      if (req.method === "GET") {
+        if (!["owner", "admin"].includes(callerRole)) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "owner/admin required" }, { status: 403 }));
+        const members = getNetworkMembers(netId);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, members }));
+      }
+      if (req.method === "POST") {
+        if (!["owner", "admin"].includes(callerRole)) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "owner/admin required" }, { status: 403 }));
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = addNetworkMember(netId, body.user_id, body.role || "member", resolved.user.user_id);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "member_added", "network", netId, `${body.user_id} as ${body.role || "member"}`);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      }
+      if (req.method === "PUT" && targetUid) {
+        if (callerRole !== "owner") return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "owner required" }, { status: 403 }));
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        const result = updateMemberRole(netId, targetUid, body.role);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "member_role_changed", "network", netId, `${targetUid} → ${body.role}`);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      }
+      if (req.method === "DELETE" && targetUid) {
+        if (!["owner", "admin"].includes(callerRole)) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "owner/admin required" }, { status: 403 }));
+        const result = removeNetworkMember(netId, targetUid);
+        if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "member_removed", "network", netId, targetUid);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/networks\/([^/]+)\/invite$/) && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const netId = url.pathname.split("/")[3];
+      const callerRole = getUserNetworkRole(resolved.user.user_id, netId);
+      if (!callerRole || !["owner", "admin"].includes(callerRole)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "owner/admin required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const body = await req.json() as any;
+      const result = createInvite(netId, resolved.user.user_id, body.role || "member", body.max_uses || 1, body.expires_days);
+      if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "invite_created", "network", netId, result.invite_code);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(result));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/networks/join" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const body = await req.json() as any;
+      const result = joinByInvite(body.invite_code, resolved.user.user_id);
+      if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "network_joined", "network", result.network_id, `via invite, role=${result.role}`);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+    }
+
+    // ── V3: Admin APIs (require auth) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/users" && req.method === "GET") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved || resolved.user.role !== "admin") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "admin required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const users = db.all("SELECT user_id, username, display_name, email, role, created_at FROM users ORDER BY created_at");
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, users }));
+    }
+
+    const netDetailMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/networks\/([^/]+)$/);
+    if (netDetailMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const networkId = netDetailMatch[1];
+      const network = db.get<any>(`SELECT ${NETWORK_REST_SELECT} FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1`, networkId);
+      if (!network) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      // Membership check: must be a member or system admin
+      const viewerRole = getUserNetworkRole(resolved.user.user_id, networkId);
+      if (!viewerRole && resolved.user.role !== "admin") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "access denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      // Get network stats
+      const nodeCount = db.get<{ cnt: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM nodes WHERE network_id = ?1", networkId);
+      const sessionCount = db.get<{ cnt: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM sessions WHERE network_id = ?1", networkId);
+      const taskStats = db.all<any>("SELECT status, COUNT(*) as count FROM tasks WHERE network_id = ?1 GROUP BY status", networkId);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true, network,
+        stats: { nodes: nodeCount?.cnt || 0, sessions: sessionCount?.cnt || 0, tasks: taskStats },
+      }));
+    }
+
+    if (netDetailMatch && req.method === "DELETE") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const result = deleteNetwork(resolved.user.user_id, netDetailMatch[1]);
+      if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "network_deleted", "network", netDetailMatch[1]);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+    }
+
+    if (netDetailMatch && req.method === "PUT") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      try {
+        const body = await req.json() as any;
+        if (body.name) {
+          const result = renameNetwork(resolved.user.user_id, netDetailMatch[1], body.name);
+          if (result.ok) logAudit(resolved.user.user_id, resolved.user.username, "network_renamed", "network", netDetailMatch[1], body.name);
+          return withCors(req, Response.json(result, { status: result.ok ? 200 : 400 }));
+        }
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "name required" }, { status: 400 }));
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: e.message }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: health (public, no auth) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/health") {
+      // #473 — /health is ANONYMOUS BY CONTRACT (the central watchdog
+      // cron curls it every minute to decide dead-or-alive; adding auth
+      // here would blind it — do NOT add requireAuth, do NOT change the
+      // 200-with-JSON shape without telling the watchdog owner first).
+      // Anonymous callers get AGGREGATES ONLY. The per-key SSE detail
+      // (`{networkId}:{alias}` + observer keys) used to be inlined here,
+      // which handed any internet stranger the full network id + all
+      // agent aliases (95 on the public hub when audited) — that detail
+      // now lives behind auth at GET /api/stats/sse.
+      // `version` stays: it does help fingerprinting, but ops needs it
+      // to verify deploys land, and the tradeoff was accepted in review.
+      //
+      // #495-followup / f28a6c1b — auth-gated `sse_sessions` restored so
+      // the dashboard's own "online" widget can compute per-agent status
+      // in one round-trip. Rules:
+      //   - anonymous (no valid token): NO sse_sessions field → watchdog
+      //     contract untouched, no topology leak (mutation removing this
+      //     gate turns the anonymous test RED — see health-redaction.test)
+      //   - admin utok_ / legacy master / DEV_OPEN: full sessions map
+      //     (parity with /api/stats/sse ops path)
+      //   - regular utok_ member: sessions map FILTERED to network_ids
+      //     the caller is a member of — safe against the "any account
+      //     sees all-network topology" regression the #473 fix closed;
+      //     dashboard user proxies with the logged-in user's utok_ so
+      //     their own network's aliases surface; strangers' networks do
+      //     not
+      const count = db.get<{ cnt: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM sessions");
+      const sse = getSSEStats();
+      const license = db.get<any>("SELECT type, expires_at FROM licenses LIMIT 1");
+
+      // Non-fatal auth probe (no 401 — /health must stay 200 anonymous).
+      const healthAuth = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      const healthIsMaster = !healthAuth && isLegacyAuthToken(req);
+      const healthIsDevOpen = !healthAuth && !AUTH_TOKEN && DEV_OPEN;
+      const healthIsAdmin = !!(healthAuth?.username && db.get<any>(
+        "SELECT role FROM users WHERE username = ?1", healthAuth.username,
+      )?.role === "admin");
+
+      let scopedSessions: Record<string, number> | undefined;
+      if (healthIsMaster || healthIsDevOpen || healthIsAdmin) {
+        // Ops parity with /api/stats/sse — full map.
+        scopedSessions = sse.sessions;
+      } else if (healthAuth?.userId) {
+        // Regular authenticated member — filter to networks they belong
+        // to. Keys are `{networkId}:{alias}` (or observer keys shaped
+        // `\0netobs:{networkId}`); parse the network prefix and keep
+        // only entries whose network is in the member's set.
+        //
+        // 🔴 ntok_ (network-scoped token) MUST be forced to its single
+        // bound network (parity with resolveRestNetworkScope L277:
+        // `if (authCtx.networkId) return { networkId: authCtx.networkId }`).
+        // Falling through to the utok_ union query would return
+        // sessions from every network the underlying user belongs to,
+        // silently escalating a network-scoped token to a user-scoped
+        // token — the exact "认证 ≠ 已授权" mistake this whole change
+        // is meant to prevent. Same shape as f28a6c1b root cause; see
+        // CR3 audit 4703b0e7.
+        const memberNets = new Set<string>(
+          healthAuth.networkId
+            ? [healthAuth.networkId]  // ntok_ single-network enforce
+            : db.all<{ network_id: string }>(
+                "SELECT network_id FROM network_members WHERE user_id = ?1",
+                healthAuth.userId,
+              ).map((r) => r.network_id),
+        );
+        // If member has no networks at all, keep field present but empty
+        // so the dashboard can distinguish "authenticated + none active"
+        // from "not authenticated at all".
+        const filtered: Record<string, number> = {};
+        for (const [key, n] of Object.entries(sse.sessions)) {
+          // Observer keys are shape `\0netobs:<networkId>` raw; keyed
+          // through `printableKey()` in push.ts, they surface here as
+          // the literal string `\\0netobs:<networkId>` (backslash-zero,
+          // not NUL byte). Use the shared `PRINTABLE_OBSERVER_KEY_PREFIX`
+          // export so this side and the emitter side stay locked to the
+          // same literal — CR3 audit 4703b0e7 caught prior check
+          // `startsWith("netobs:")` was always false → observer keys
+          // silently over-filtered out of member views.
+          const isObserver = key.startsWith(PRINTABLE_OBSERVER_KEY_PREFIX);
+          const netId = isObserver
+            ? key.slice(PRINTABLE_OBSERVER_KEY_PREFIX.length)
+            : key.split(":")[0];
+          if (memberNets.has(netId)) filtered[key] = n;
+        }
+        scopedSessions = filtered;
+      }
+      // healthAuth == null AND no legacy master AND no DEV_OPEN → leave
+      // scopedSessions undefined → sse_sessions field omitted entirely
+      // (watchdog + arbitrary internet strangers see aggregates only).
+
+      const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
+        ok: true,
+        version: SERVER_VERSION,
+        api_version: "v3",
+        transport: "streamable-http",
+        sessions_count: count?.cnt ?? 0,
+        sse_connections: sse.total,
+        auth: DEV_OPEN ? "dev-open" : "user-token",
+        security: DEV_OPEN ? "dev-open" : "secured",
+        tmux: TMUX_ENABLED ? "enabled" : "disabled",
+        v3_auth: true,
+        multi_network: true,
+        license: license?.type || "none",
+        uptime: Math.floor(process.uptime()),
+        // #496 — public, stable capability data. Dashboard upload proxies
+        // need the Hub's real limits before opening a streaming request;
+        // duplicating these constants client-side creates a silent
+        // lower-limit drift that the Hub can never observe.
+        limits: {
+          max_upload_bytes: MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES,
+          max_request_content_length: MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH,
+        },
+      };
+      if (scopedSessions !== undefined) body.sse_sessions = scopedSessions;
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(body));
+    }
+
+    // ── All REST /api endpoints require auth (if token configured) ──
+    const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+    if (authErr) return withCors(req, authErr);
+
+    // Resolve network scope for REST queries — enforce isolation
+    // Token-bound networkId takes precedence (ntok_ → forced), then query param
+    const restAuth = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+    const isAdmin = !!(restAuth?.username && db.get<any>("SELECT role FROM users WHERE username = ?1", restAuth.username)?.role === "admin");
+    const restScope = resolveRestNetworkScope(url.searchParams.get("network_id"), restAuth, isAdmin);
+    if (restScope.denied) {
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: restScope.denied }, { status: 403 }));
+    }
+
+    const sideActor = resolveSideThreadActor(req, resolveRequestAuth(req, { allowQueryToken: false }), isAdmin);
+    const nodeCommandActor = sideActor?.kind === "node" && sideActor.boundNodeId && sideActor.boundNetworkId
+      ? { tokenId: sideActor.tokenId, networkId: sideActor.boundNetworkId, nodeId: sideActor.boundNodeId }
+      : null;
+    if (productionSideThreadTransport) {
+      const attachmentResponse = await productionSideThreadTransport.attachment(req, url, nodeCommandActor);
+      if (attachmentResponse) return withCors(req, attachmentResponse);
+      const commandResponse = await productionSideThreadTransport.handle({ req, url, actor: nodeCommandActor });
+      if (commandResponse) return withCors(req, commandResponse);
+    }
+
+    const sideThreadResponse = await handleSideThreadHttpRequest({
+      req,
+      url,
+      // Durable prompts/results never accept query-string credentials.
+      actor: sideActor,
+      coordinator: sideThreadCoordinator,
+      resolveCapabilityTarget: resolveSideThreadCapabilityTarget,
+    });
+    if (sideThreadResponse) return withCors(req, sideThreadResponse);
+
+    // RFC-036 owner-gated host schedule edits. This handler independently
+    // verifies exact node ownership and node-token binding; network admin is
+    // deliberately not an override.
+    const requestCredential = requestToken(req);
+    const externalScheduleEditResponse = await handleExternalScheduleEditRequest({
+      req,
+      url,
+      auth: restAuth,
+      isUserToken: requestCredential.startsWith("utok_"),
+      isNodeToken: requestCredential.startsWith("ntok_"),
+    });
+    if (externalScheduleEditResponse) return withCors(req, externalScheduleEditResponse);
+
+    // Hub-owned scheduled tasks. Dashboard and mobile are management
+    // clients only; each occurrence is dispatched as an ordinary task by the
+    // scheduler started in startHub(). Node tokens are rejected in the
+    // handler so an agent cannot grant itself a persistent execution loop.
+    const scheduledResponse = await handleScheduledTaskRequest({
+      req,
+      url,
+      auth: restAuth,
+      isAdmin,
+      isNodeToken: requestToken(req).startsWith("ntok_"),
+      scope: restScope,
+    });
+    if (scheduledResponse) return withCors(req, scheduledResponse);
+
+    // ── #473 REST: SSE connection detail (ops-only) ──
+    // The per-key breakdown /health used to expose anonymously: keys are
+    // `{networkId}:{alias}` (+ `\0netobs:{networkId}` observer keys via
+    // printableKey), i.e. the full network/agent topology. Ops-scoped:
+    // legacy master token (restAuth null once requireAuth passed) or an
+    // admin user. Regular members get 403 — the detail spans EVERY
+    // network, so per-network filtering would be required to open it
+    // wider; no consumer needs that today.
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/stats/sse") {
+      // restAuth === null here means the caller passed the legacy master
+      // token (requireAuth already accepted it above) OR the hub runs in
+      // DEV_OPEN mode. Both are treated as ops: master token is root, and
+      // under DEV_OPEN this endpoint is anonymously readable BY DESIGN
+      // (dev convenience — production never sets COMMHUB_DEV_OPEN, so the
+      // topology detail stays gated in every real deployment).
+      if (restAuth && !isAdmin) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "admin or master token required" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const sse = getSSEStats();
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, total: sse.total, sessions: sse.sessions }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: all sessions status ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/status") {
+      // Round-2/4 review ③: stale-marking moved to startStaleSessionSweeper()
+      // (background timer, ~60s cadence). Read paths no longer fire UPDATE.
+      // Per-request UPDATE was a write-amp vector — see stale-sweeper.ts.
+      cleanupCommittedRenameSessions(restScope.networkId ? [restScope.networkId] : restScope.networkIds ?? null);
+      // `?light=1` returns a narrow projection (alias / status / agent / task /
+      // server / updated_at + runtime + network_id) — used by the mobile APP
+      // list view, where pulling 30+ fields × 150 agents was making cold open
+      // take 12s+ on flaky cellular (Vincent tg, #220 PWA). Default response
+      // is unchanged so the dashboard / scripts that read full telemetry are
+      // unaffected.
+      const isLight = url.searchParams.get("light") === "1";
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      let sql = isLight
+        ? "SELECT alias, status, agent, task, server, updated_at, network_id FROM sessions WHERE 1=1"
+        : `SELECT ${SESSION_REST_SELECT} FROM sessions WHERE 1=1`;
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC";
+      // `model` comes straight from the explicit sessions projection; `runtime` is
+      // derived from the raw `agent` field. Both default to null for old nodes
+      // that never reported a model — the dashboard falls back to a placeholder.
+      const sessions = db.all(sql, ...params).map((s: any) => {
+        if (isLight) {
+          return {
+            alias: s.alias,
+            status: s.status,
+            agent: s.agent ?? null,
+            task: s.task ?? null,
+            server: s.server ?? null,
+            updated_at: s.updated_at ?? null,
+            runtime: normalizeRuntime(s.agent),
+            network_id: s.network_id ?? null,
+          };
+        }
+        const externalSchedules = (() => {
+          if (typeof s.external_schedules !== "string") return null;
+          try { return JSON.parse(s.external_schedules); } catch { return null; }
+        })();
+        const { external_schedules: _externalSchedulesJson, ...publicSession } = s;
+        return {
+          ...publicSession,
+          external_schedules: externalSchedules,
+          model: s.model ?? null,
+          runtime: normalizeRuntime(s.agent),
+          host: {
+            hostname: s.hostname ?? null,
+            ip: s.ip ?? null,
+            cpu_load_1min: s.cpu_load_1min ?? null,
+            cpu_cores: s.cpu_cores ?? null,
+            mem_total_gb: s.mem_total_gb ?? null,
+            mem_used_gb: s.mem_used_gb ?? null,
+            mem_avail_gb: s.mem_avail_gb ?? null,
+            disk_total_gb: s.disk_total_gb ?? null,
+            disk_used_gb: s.disk_used_gb ?? null,
+            disk_avail_gb: s.disk_avail_gb ?? null,
+          },
+          process_telemetry: {
+            rss_bytes: s.process_rss_bytes ?? null,
+            rss_mb: s.process_rss_mb ?? null,
+            cpu_pct: s.process_cpu_pct ?? null,
+            uptime_seconds: s.process_uptime_seconds ?? null,
+            in_flight_count: s.process_in_flight_count ?? null,
+          },
+        };
+      });
+      const summary = sessions.reduce((acc: any, session: any) => {
+        const raw = String(session.status || "").toLowerCase();
+        if (raw === "offline") acc.offline++;
+        else if (["working", "blocked", "error", "waiting_input", "running", "busy"].includes(raw)) acc.working++;
+        else acc.idle++;
+        return acc;
+      }, { idle: 0, working: 0, offline: 0, total: sessions.length });
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, sessions, summary }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: aggregate agents by physical server ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/servers") {
+      // Round-2/4 review ③: stale-marking moved to background sweeper.
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      let sql = `
+        SELECT hostname, ip, cpu_load_1min, cpu_cores, mem_avail_gb, mem_used_gb,
+               COALESCE(last_seen_at, updated_at) AS last_seen
+        FROM sessions
+        WHERE 1=1
+      `;
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY COALESCE(last_seen_at, updated_at) DESC";
+
+      const grouped = new Map<string, {
+        hostname: string;
+        ip: string;
+        agent_count: number;
+        cpu_load_1min: number | null;
+        cpu_cores: number | null;
+        mem_avail_gb: number | null;
+        mem_used_gb: number | null;
+        last_seen: string | null;
+      }>();
+
+      const preferDisplayIp = (current: string, next: string) => {
+        const isWeak = (ip: string) => !ip || ip === "unknown" || ip === "127.0.0.1" || ip === "::1";
+        if (isWeak(current) && !isWeak(next)) return next;
+        return current;
+      };
+      const hasHostTelemetry = (row: any) =>
+        row.cpu_load_1min != null || row.cpu_cores != null || row.mem_avail_gb != null || row.mem_used_gb != null;
+
+      for (const row of db.all<any>(sql, ...params)) {
+        const hostname = row.hostname || "unknown";
+        const ip = row.ip || "unknown";
+        // Group primarily by hostname. A single host can report both a
+        // routable/container IP and loopback (127.0.0.1); splitting those
+        // into separate cards makes the dashboard show one useful load row
+        // plus one "n/a" duplicate. Unknown hostnames still fall back to IP.
+        const key = hostname !== "unknown" ? `host:${hostname}` : `ip:${ip}`;
+        const existing = grouped.get(key);
+        if (existing) {
+          existing.agent_count += 1;
+          existing.ip = preferDisplayIp(existing.ip, ip);
+          if (parseSqliteTime(row.last_seen) > parseSqliteTime(existing.last_seen)) existing.last_seen = row.last_seen ?? existing.last_seen;
+          if (hasHostTelemetry(row) && (
+            existing.cpu_load_1min == null ||
+            existing.cpu_cores == null ||
+            existing.mem_avail_gb == null ||
+            existing.mem_used_gb == null
+          )) {
+            existing.cpu_load_1min = row.cpu_load_1min ?? existing.cpu_load_1min;
+            existing.cpu_cores = row.cpu_cores ?? existing.cpu_cores;
+            existing.mem_avail_gb = row.mem_avail_gb ?? existing.mem_avail_gb;
+            existing.mem_used_gb = row.mem_used_gb ?? existing.mem_used_gb;
+          }
+          continue;
+        }
+        grouped.set(key, {
+          hostname,
+          ip,
+          agent_count: 1,
+          cpu_load_1min: row.cpu_load_1min ?? null,
+          cpu_cores: row.cpu_cores ?? null,
+          mem_avail_gb: row.mem_avail_gb ?? null,
+          mem_used_gb: row.mem_used_gb ?? null,
+          last_seen: row.last_seen ?? null,
+        });
+      }
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json(Array.from(grouped.values())));
+    }
+
+    const serverDetailMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/server\/([^/]+)\/(health|agents)$/);
+    if (serverDetailMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const host = decodeURIComponent(serverDetailMatch[1]);
+      const detailKind = serverDetailMatch[2];
+      if (!host) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "host required" }, { status: 400 }));
+
+      // Round-2/4 review ③: stale-marking moved to background sweeper.
+      if (detailKind === "agents") {
+        const params: any[] = [host, host];
+        let sql = `
+          SELECT alias, agent, status, task, progress, model, hostname, ip, external_schedules,
+                 cpu_load_1min, cpu_cores, mem_avail_gb, mem_used_gb, mem_total_gb,
+                 disk_avail_gb, disk_used_gb, disk_total_gb,
+                 process_rss_bytes, process_rss_mb, process_cpu_pct, process_uptime_seconds, process_in_flight_count,
+                 COALESCE(last_seen_at, updated_at) AS last_seen
+          FROM sessions
+          WHERE (hostname = ?1 OR ip = ?2)
+        `;
+        sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+        sql += " ORDER BY alias";
+        const agents = db.all<any>(sql, ...params).map((s) => ({
+          alias: s.alias,
+          runtime: normalizeRuntime(s.agent),
+          raw_agent: s.agent ?? null,
+          model: s.model ?? null,
+          status: s.status ?? "offline",
+          task: s.task ?? null,
+          progress: s.progress ?? 0,
+          external_schedules: (() => {
+            if (typeof s.external_schedules !== "string") return null;
+            try { return JSON.parse(s.external_schedules); } catch { return null; }
+          })(),
+          last_seen: s.last_seen ?? null,
+          health: agentHealthChip(s.status, s.last_seen),
+          hostname: s.hostname ?? null,
+          ip: s.ip ?? null,
+          telemetry: {
+            cpu_load_1min: s.cpu_load_1min ?? null,
+            cpu_cores: s.cpu_cores ?? null,
+            cpu_pct: cpuPct(s.cpu_load_1min, s.cpu_cores),
+            mem_total_gb: s.mem_total_gb ?? null,
+            mem_used_gb: s.mem_used_gb ?? null,
+            mem_avail_gb: s.mem_avail_gb ?? null,
+            disk_total_gb: s.disk_total_gb ?? null,
+            disk_used_gb: s.disk_used_gb ?? null,
+            disk_avail_gb: s.disk_avail_gb ?? null,
+            process_rss_bytes: s.process_rss_bytes ?? null,
+            process_rss_mb: s.process_rss_mb ?? null,
+            process_cpu_pct: s.process_cpu_pct ?? null,
+            process_uptime_seconds: s.process_uptime_seconds ?? null,
+            process_in_flight_count: s.process_in_flight_count ?? null,
+          },
+          process_telemetry: {
+            rss_bytes: s.process_rss_bytes ?? null,
+            rss_mb: s.process_rss_mb ?? null,
+            cpu_pct: s.process_cpu_pct ?? null,
+            uptime_seconds: s.process_uptime_seconds ?? null,
+            in_flight_count: s.process_in_flight_count ?? null,
+          },
+        }));
+        if (agents.length === 0) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "server not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, host, agent_count: agents.length, agents }));
+      }
+
+      const latestParams: any[] = [host, host];
+      let latestSql = `
+        SELECT hostname, ip, COUNT(*) OVER () AS agent_count,
+               cpu_load_1min, cpu_cores, mem_total_gb, mem_used_gb, mem_avail_gb,
+               disk_total_gb, disk_used_gb, disk_avail_gb,
+               COALESCE(last_seen_at, updated_at) AS last_seen
+        FROM sessions
+        WHERE (hostname = ?1 OR ip = ?2)
+      `;
+      latestSql = addNetworkScope(latestSql, latestParams, restScope);
+      latestSql += " ORDER BY COALESCE(last_seen_at, updated_at) DESC LIMIT 1";
+      const latest = db.get<any>(latestSql, ...latestParams);
+      if (!latest) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "server not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+
+      const since24h = sqliteTime(new Date(Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000));
+      const histParams: any[] = [host, host, since24h];
+      let histSql = `
+        SELECT created_at, cpu_load_1min, cpu_cores, mem_total_gb, mem_used_gb, mem_avail_gb,
+               disk_total_gb, disk_used_gb, disk_avail_gb
+        FROM agent_telemetry
+        WHERE (hostname = ?1 OR ip = ?2) AND created_at >= ?3
+      `;
+      histSql = addNetworkScope(histSql, histParams, restScope);
+      histSql += " ORDER BY created_at ASC";
+      const historyRows = db.all<any>(histSql, ...histParams);
+      const now = Date.now();
+      const alert = serverAlertLevel(latest);
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        host,
+        hostname: latest.hostname ?? null,
+        ip: latest.ip ?? null,
+        agent_count: latest.agent_count ?? 0,
+        alert_level: alert.level,
+        alerts: alert.alerts,
+        latest: {
+          cpu_load_1min: latest.cpu_load_1min ?? null,
+          cpu_cores: latest.cpu_cores ?? null,
+          cpu_pct: cpuPct(latest.cpu_load_1min, latest.cpu_cores),
+          mem_total_gb: latest.mem_total_gb ?? null,
+          mem_used_gb: latest.mem_used_gb ?? null,
+          mem_avail_gb: latest.mem_avail_gb ?? null,
+          disk_total_gb: latest.disk_total_gb ?? null,
+          disk_used_gb: latest.disk_used_gb ?? null,
+          disk_avail_gb: latest.disk_avail_gb ?? null,
+          last_seen: latest.last_seen ?? null,
+        },
+        history: {
+          "5m": bucketTelemetry(historyRows, now - 5 * 60 * 1000, 60 * 1000),
+          "1h": bucketTelemetry(historyRows, now - 60 * 60 * 1000, 5 * 60 * 1000),
+          "24h": bucketTelemetry(historyRows, now - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, 60 * 60 * 1000),
+        },
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: file upload (#221) ──
+    // POST multipart/form-data with a single `file` field. Bearer auth.
+    // 12 MiB cap (two-stage: Content-Length pre-check + post-parse size
+    // verify). Returns { ok, file_id, path, url, size, mime }. The
+    // file_id is server-generated (crypto.randomUUID with hyphens
+    // stripped) so a client-supplied filename never enters the storage
+    // path. The download URL `/api/files/<file_id>` requires the same
+    // Bearer auth and forces Content-Disposition: attachment +
+    // X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so uploaded files can never be
+    // executed or served as HTML.
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/upload" && req.method === "POST") {
+      // #503 Finding 3 = Option A (lead 40be9845): every 4xx returned
+      // BEFORE `req.formData()` drains the request body MUST include
+      // `Connection: close`. Otherwise the client's still-inbound bytes
+      // land on a keepalive connection the server already answered on,
+      // poisoning the next pooled request. Bug is pre-existing (411/
+      // 413/415/429/401 all have this shape) — the #503 authz block
+      // just made it visible under aggregate `bun test` with a 12MiB
+      // upload immediately followed by another request. Per-file green
+      // hides this class of bug.
+      const earlyReject = (res: Response): Response => {
+        const wrapped = withCors(req, res);
+        wrapped.headers.set("Connection", "close");
+        return wrapped;
+      };
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req);
+      if (authErr) return earlyReject(authErr);
+
+      // Rate-limit key prefers the token id (so 60/h is per-token, not
+      // per-IP); falls back to IP for legacy or anonymous-but-dev-open.
+      const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+      const rateKey = authCtx?.tokenId ?? `ip:${getClientIP(req, server)}`;
+      const rate = sharedUploadRateLimiter.check(rateKey);
+      if (!rate.allowed) {
+        const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+          "X-RateLimit-Limit": String(60),
+          "X-RateLimit-Remaining": "0",
+          "X-RateLimit-Reset": String(Math.floor(rate.resetAt / 1000)),
+        };
+        if (rate.retryAfterMs) headers["Retry-After"] = String(Math.ceil(rate.retryAfterMs / 1000));
+        return earlyReject(new Response(
+          JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "rate_limited", message: "Upload rate limit exceeded (60/hour). Try again later.", retry_after_ms: rate.retryAfterMs }),
+          { status: 429, headers: { ...headers, "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8" } },   // #426 — legacy clients default to ISO-8859-1 without charset
+        ));
+      }
+
+      // Two-stage size cap per 通信龙 dispatch c38de7a9:
+      //   stage 1 — reject before reading body when Content-Length
+      //             exceeds the cap (saves bandwidth, fails fast)
+      //   stage 2 — re-verify the parsed File.size after Bun has parsed
+      //             the multipart envelope (defends against a missing
+      //             or lied Content-Length header)
+      const contentLength = req.headers.get("Content-Length");
+      if (!contentLength) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "length_required", message: "Content-Length header is required for /api/upload" },
+          { status: 411 },
+        ));
+      }
+      const declaredBytes = Number(contentLength);
+      if (!Number.isFinite(declaredBytes) || declaredBytes < 0) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "bad_content_length" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (declaredBytes > MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "payload_too_large", message: `Upload exceeds the ${MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} byte limit`, limit_bytes: MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES },
+          { status: 413 },
+        ));
+      }
+
+      // #503 — decide which network this upload is attributed to, then
+      // check the caller may write there. Attribution and authorization
+      // are two questions; neither substitutes for the other. Placed
+      // after the in-memory rate limiter (above) and before the body is
+      // read, so an unauthorized caller never gets a DB query per byte
+      // uploaded and never gets their multipart envelope parsed.
+      const principal = resolvePrincipal(req);
+      const requestedNetId = url.searchParams.get("network_id");
+      let uploadNetId: string | null = null;
+
+      switch (principal.kind) {
+        case "anonymous":
+          // Unreachable: requireAuth above already 401s. Kept so the
+          // switch stays exhaustive and a future auth change fails loud.
+          return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth_required" }, { status: 401 }));
+        case "dev-open-anon":
+          // Local dev only. Deliberately does NOT claim a real network,
+          // even if one was requested — an unauthenticated caller must
+          // not be able to file blobs into a tenant's network.
+          uploadNetId = null;
+          break;
+        case "legacy-master":
+          // Unreachable today: requireAuth 401s master tokens on every
+          // non-GET /api/ request (RFC-001 made them read-only). Kept
+          // fail-closed so relaxing that rule cannot silently start
+          // producing unattributed blobs.
+          if (!requestedNetId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "legacy master uploads must specify a network_id query param",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+          break;
+        case "ntok":
+          if (requestedNetId && requestedNetId !== principal.boundNetworkId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_conflict",
+              message: "network_id query param conflicts with the token-bound network",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          uploadNetId = principal.boundNetworkId;
+          break;
+        case "admin-utok": {
+          // #503 Finding 2 = Option F (lead 40be9845): admin follows the same
+          // "auto-derive when unambiguous / require param when ambiguous" rule
+          // as utok_. Rule 4's REASON (no unowned files) is preserved — the
+          // derived network is a real membership. Strict on genuine ambiguity:
+          // 0 or ≥2 memberships → 400. Preserves prod upload contract (in
+          // prod admin is in exactly 1 network; auto-derive succeeds).
+          if (requestedNetId) {
+            // Admin bypasses membership; network existence validated below.
+            uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+            break;
+          }
+          const adminNetworks = getUserNetworkIds(principal.userId);
+          if (adminNetworks.length === 1) {
+            uploadNetId = adminNetworks[0];
+          } else {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "admin has 0 or ≥2 network memberships; network_id query param required",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          break;
+        }
+        case "utok": {
+          if (requestedNetId) {
+            // A non-member asking for someone else's network never gets
+            // here: the REST scope guard (`restScope.denied`) already
+            // 403'd, with the same body whether the network exists or
+            // not. Re-checking membership here would be a second, drifting
+            // copy of a decision this codebase makes in one place.
+            uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+            break;
+          }
+          uploadNetId = singleNetworkId(resolveRestNetworkScope(url.searchParams.get("network_id"), authCtx, false));
+          if (!uploadNetId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "network_id query param required for a multi-network user token; 'first network' is not assumed",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (uploadNetId !== null) {
+        const networkRow = db.get<any>("SELECT network_id FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1", uploadNetId);
+        if (!networkRow) {
+          if (principal.kind === "admin-utok" || principal.kind === "legacy-master") {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "unknown_network",
+              message: "network_id does not exist",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          // Byte-identical to the non-member 404 above: distinguishing
+          // the two would hand an unprivileged caller a network-existence
+          // oracle.
+          return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(authCtx, uploadNetId, principal.kind === "admin-utok")) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+
+      const contentType = req.headers.get("Content-Type") ?? "";
+      if (!/^multipart\/form-data/i.test(contentType)) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "unsupported_media_type", message: "Use multipart/form-data with a 'file' field" },
+          { status: 415 },
+        ));
+      }
+
+      let form: FormData;
+      try {
+        form = await req.formData();
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "multipart_parse_failed", message: e?.message?.slice(0, 200) ?? "multipart parse failed" },
+          { status: 400 },
+        ));
+      }
+      const file = form.get("file");
+      if (!file || typeof file === "string") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "missing_file", message: "Expected a 'file' field with binary content" },
+          { status: 400 },
+        ));
+      }
+
+      // Stage 2 — re-verify parsed size against the documented cap.
+      if (file.size > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+          { ok: false, error: "payload_too_large", message: `Upload exceeds the ${MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} byte limit`, limit_bytes: MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES, observed_bytes: file.size },
+          { status: 413 },
+        ));
+      }
+
+      const fileId = generateFileId();
+      const ext = sanitizeExt(file.name);
+      let storage;
+      try {
+        storage = buildStoragePath(fileId, ext);
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        // Should be unreachable — we generated the id ourselves — but
+        // surface as 500 if our own primitives reject our own input.
+        console.error("[/api/upload] buildStoragePath rejected:", e?.message);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "internal_path_error" }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+
+      try {
+        mkdirSync(pathDirname(storage.absolutePath), { recursive: true });
+        const buf = Buffer.from(await file.arrayBuffer());
+        // #693 — write blob to .tmp then rename for crash-safe durability.
+        const tmpPath = storage.absolutePath + ".tmp";
+        writeFileSync(tmpPath, buf);
+        // Defense-in-depth: after writing, confirm the path still sits
+        // inside the uploads root (catches a symlink swap or root env
+        // poisoning across processes).
+        if (!isPathInsideUploadsRoot(tmpPath) || !isPathInsideUploadsRoot(storage.absolutePath)) {
+          try { unlinkSync(tmpPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+          console.error("[/api/upload] write escaped uploads root:", storage.absolutePath);
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "internal_path_escape" }, { status: 500 }));
+        }
+
+        // Persist the index entry so /api/files/<file_id> can do an
+        // O(1) lookup without scanning every date bucket.
+        const idxPath = indexEntryPath(fileId);
+        if (idxPath) {
+          mkdirSync(pathDirname(idxPath), { recursive: true });
+          writeFileSync(idxPath, JSON.stringify({
+            file_id: fileId,
+            date_bucket: storage.dateBucket,
+            ext: storage.ext,
+            name: typeof file.name === "string" ? file.name.slice(0, 255) : "",
+            mime: typeof file.type === "string" ? file.type.slice(0, 100) : "application/octet-stream",
+            size: file.size,
+            owner: authCtx?.username ?? null,
+            owner_id: authCtx?.userId ?? null,
+            // Key omitted (not null) when unattributed — see UploadIndexEntry.
+            ...(uploadNetId ? { network_id: uploadNetId } : {}),
+            uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+          }, null, 2));
+        } else {
+          // No index path → refuse to leave an unindexed blob.
+          try { unlinkSync(tmpPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "index_path_error" }, { status: 500 }));
+        }
+        // Index first, then publish blob via rename — if rename fails, drop index.
+        try {
+          renameSync(tmpPath, storage.absolutePath);
+        } catch (renameErr: any) {
+          try { unlinkSync(tmpPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+          try { if (idxPath) unlinkSync(idxPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+          throw renameErr;
+        }
+      } catch (e: any) {
+        console.error("[/api/upload] write failed:", e?.message);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "write_failed", message: e?.message?.slice(0, 200) ?? "write failed" }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        file_id: fileId,
+        path: storage.absolutePath,
+        url: `/api/files/${fileId}`,
+        size: file.size,
+        mime: typeof file.type === "string" ? file.type : "application/octet-stream",
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: file download (#221 + #495 + #500 CR2 HEAD) ──
+    // GET or HEAD /api/files/:file_id with Bearer auth + ownership
+    // check. Always forces Content-Disposition: attachment +
+    // X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so the served file can never be
+    // executed or rendered as HTML. The file_id is validated against
+    // the same strict regex used at generation time before any
+    // filesystem access.
+    //
+    // Ownership gate is factored into `authorizeFileDownload` (see
+    // src/server.ts near resolveRequestAuth). HEAD MUST route through
+    // the same helper — pre-#500-CR2, HEAD fell through to a fallback
+    // 200 page whose body happened to be byte-identical to the
+    // "unknown file" case, so no enumeration oracle formed in practice.
+    // That was coincidence, not a gate. A change to the fallback (e.g.
+    // adding "Requested resource: <hint>") would materialize the oracle
+    // with zero failing tests. Any future Range, conditional-request,
+    // or dashboard-proxy path for /api/files MUST route through this
+    // handler (via authorizeFileDownload) — do not duplicate the
+    // allow-list inline, or the branches will drift.
+    const fileMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/files\/(.+)$/);
+    if (fileMatch && (req.method === "GET" || req.method === "HEAD")) {
+      // #501: file credentials must never travel in the URL. Query tokens
+      // leak through browser history, access/proxy logs, copied links, and
+      // Referer. SSE/EventSource compatibility keeps the global query-token
+      // fallback for now; file GET/HEAD deliberately opt out here.
+      const authErr = requireAuth(req, { allowQueryToken: false });
+      if (authErr) return withCors(req, authErr);
+
+      const fileId = decodeURIComponent(fileMatch[1]);
+      if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "bad_file_id" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+
+      const idxPath = indexEntryPath(fileId);
+      if (!idxPath || !existsSync(idxPath)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      let entry: any;
+      try { entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(idxPath, "utf-8")); } catch {
+        // #509 副指挥 66983a19: corrupted index must not leak "server
+        // failed" signal — 404 with same shape as unknown file_id
+        // (input refused at boundary, no enumeration).
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+      if (!validateIndexEntry(entry)) {
+        // #509 副指挥 66983a19: schema-invalid index (bucket "../etc",
+        // missing fields, wrong types) is also 404 — same discipline.
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      // #495 ownership gate — placed AFTER file-exists so denied
+      // callers cannot distinguish "you don't own this" from
+      // "no such file". Both branches return the same 404 shape
+      // for BOTH GET and HEAD (HEAD honours body-omission but the
+      // status code and headers are the authoritative signal).
+      if (!authorizeFileDownload(resolvePrincipal(req, { allowQueryToken: false }), normalizeEntry(entry))) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      // #509 defence-in-depth: pre-check date_bucket against BOTH
+      // shape regex AND real-calendar semantics. A poisoned index (e.g.
+      // "../etc", "2026-02-30", "2026-13-01") must return 404 not 500
+      // — 500 says "server failed"; 404 says "input refused at boundary".
+      // 副指挥 b1082017 / 66983a19 hard doors:
+      //   • 稳定 404 非 500 for invalid/missing/poisoned date_bucket
+      //   • 真日历语义校验, 不仅 regex 形状
+      if (!isValidCalendarBucket(entry.date_bucket)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      let storage;
+      try {
+        // #509 fix: use the date_bucket recorded in the index at upload
+        // time, NOT today's date. buildStoragePath computes today; that is
+        // correct for new uploads only. Yesterday's file lives in
+        // yesterday's bucket forever — read path must respect that.
+        storage = pathForExistingBlob(entry.date_bucket, entry.file_id, entry.ext);
+      } catch {
+        // Defence-in-depth: unreachable given the pre-check above, but
+        // keep as fallback. Return 404 not 500 to match the pre-check
+        // shape — caller sees the same code for all invalid-bucket cases.
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+      if (!isPathInsideUploadsRoot(storage.absolutePath)) {
+        // Defence: should be unreachable since buildStoragePath rejected
+        // malformed inputs, but a poisoned index could try to fool us.
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "path_escape" }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+      if (!existsSync(storage.absolutePath)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "blob_missing" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      // Defence: verify the on-disk size matches what the index claims
+      // before serving — a tampered index could otherwise mislead the
+      // caller about file integrity.
+      const st = statSync(storage.absolutePath);
+      if (st.size !== entry.size) {
+        console.error("[/api/files] size mismatch:", { fileId, indexed: entry.size, onDisk: st.size });
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "size_mismatch" }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+
+      const safeFilename = (entry.name && /^[\x20-\x7e]+$/.test(entry.name))
+        ? entry.name
+        : `${fileId}${entry.ext}`;
+      const responseHeaders: Record<string, string> = {
+        ...corsHeaders(req),
+        "Content-Type": "application/octet-stream", // always opaque; nosniff prevents the client from re-deciding
+        "Content-Length": String(entry.size),
+        "Content-Disposition": `attachment; filename="${safeFilename.replace(/"/g, "")}"`,
+        "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+        "Cache-Control": "private, no-store",
+        "Accept-Ranges": "bytes",
+      };
+      const range = parseSingleByteRange(req.headers.get("Range"), entry.size);
+      if (range && !range.ok) {
+        return new Response(null, {
+          status: 416,
+          headers: {
+            ...responseHeaders,
+            "Content-Length": "0",
+            "Content-Range": `bytes */${entry.size}`,
+          },
+        });
+      }
+      if (range?.ok) {
+        const headers = {
+          ...responseHeaders,
+          "Content-Length": String(range.length),
+          "Content-Range": `bytes ${range.start}-${range.end}/${entry.size}`,
+        };
+        if (req.method === "HEAD") {
+          return new Response(null, { status: 206, headers });
+        }
+        const blob = Bun.file(storage.absolutePath).slice(range.start, range.end + 1);
+        return new Response(blob, { status: 206, headers });
+      }
+      // HEAD: return the same status and headers as GET, but no body,
+      // per RFC 9110 §9.3.2. This ensures HEAD passes through the same
+      // authorization helper — a cross-owner HEAD is 404 (same as GET),
+      // not a fallback 200. Status/headers are the authoritative
+      // signal; body omission is HTTP-standard for HEAD.
+      if (req.method === "HEAD") {
+        return new Response(null, { status: 200, headers: responseHeaders });
+      }
+      const blob = Bun.file(storage.absolutePath);
+      return new Response(blob, { status: 200, headers: responseHeaders });
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: send task ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/task" && req.method === "POST") {
+      let raw: unknown;
+      try {
+        raw = await req.json();
+      } catch {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const parsed = TaskSchema.safeParse(raw);
+      if (!parsed.success) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "invalid input", details: parsed.error.format() }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const body = parsed.data;
+      let taskNetId: string | null = null;
+      if (restAuth?.networkId) {
+        taskNetId = restAuth.networkId;
+      } else if (body.network_id) {
+        if (restAuth && !isAdmin && !getUserNetworkRole(restAuth.userId, body.network_id)) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "access denied to requested network" }, { status: 403 }));
+        }
+        taskNetId = body.network_id;
+      } else {
+        taskNetId = restAuth
+          ? resolveRestWriteNetworkId(restScope, restAuth, isAdmin)
+          : null;
+      }
+      if (restAuth && !taskNetId) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "network_id_required",
+          message: "network_id is required when the user token has zero or multiple network memberships",
+        }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(restAuth, taskNetId, isAdmin)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const canonical = resolveCanonicalAlias(taskNetId, body.alias);
+      const targetAlias = canonical.alias;
+      const target = resolveRestDeliveryTarget(targetAlias, taskNetId);
+      if (target.state === "not_found") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "alias_not_found",
+          message: target.message,
+          alias: targetAlias,
+          queued: false,
+          ...(canonical.renamed ? { renamed_from: body.alias, renamed_to: targetAlias } : {}),
+        }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+      const id = crypto.randomUUID();
+      // Identity binding, mirroring the MCP transport (tools.ts defaultFrom /
+      // fromIdentityMismatchReply). Both transports resolve the same
+      // api_tokens row through resolveToken, and auth.ts already documents the
+      // invariant: "Network-bound node tokens are an identity boundary: they
+      // must not spoof another node via from_session."
+      //
+      // MCP enforced it; this REST handler did not — it took `body.from`
+      // verbatim, so any node could POST /api/task with another node's alias
+      // and be recorded (and, once sender labels ship, *rendered in a human's
+      // TUI*) as that node. Same table, same token, one transport hardened and
+      // its sibling not.
+      //
+      // User tokens keep the previous behaviour: the Dashboard legitimately
+      // posts as its logged-in user, and tightening that is a separate change
+      // with its own compatibility surface.
+      // The decision itself lives in rest-identity.ts as a pure function so the
+      // shipped path and the tested path are the same code.
+      const identity = resolveRestFromSession({
+        token: requestToken(req),
+        tokenName: restAuth?.tokenName,
+        authenticatedUsername: restAuth?.username,
+        requestedFrom: body.from,
+      });
+      if (!identity.ok) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: identity.error,
+          message: identity.message,
+          token_alias: identity.tokenAlias,
+          requested_from_session: identity.requestedFromSession,
+        }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      const fromSession = identity.fromSession;
+      const ttlSeconds = (body as any).ttl_seconds || 3600;
+      const fromNodeId = resolveRestNodeIdForAlias(fromSession, taskNetId);
+      const targetNodeId = target.session?.node_id ?? null;
+      const actualTo = restActualTo(target, taskNetId);
+      // #221 — fold top-level `attachments` into `meta.attachments` so
+      // the REST and MCP send_task transports produce identical
+      // tasks.meta_json shape downstream. Top-level wins over any
+      // duplicate `meta.attachments` the client supplied. Validation
+      // matches the MCP-side schema (max 20 entries, file_id regex,
+      // size cap, etc.).
+      const attachmentsResult = validateAttachments((body as any).attachments ?? (body as any).meta?.attachments);
+      if (!attachmentsResult.ok) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "bad_attachments", message: attachmentsResult.error }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const mergedMeta = attachmentsResult.attachments.length
+        ? { ...((body as any).meta && typeof (body as any).meta === "object" ? (body as any).meta : {}), attachments: attachmentsResult.attachments }
+        : (body as any).meta;
+      const rawToken = requestToken(req);
+      const authOrigin: TaskAuthOrigin = rawToken.startsWith("ntok_")
+        ? "node"
+        : restAuth
+          ? "user"
+          : "legacy";
+      const metaJson = normalizeMetaJson(stampTaskAuthOrigin(mergedMeta, authOrigin));
+
+      // #212 dedup guardrail. Mirrors the MCP `send_task` tool: same
+      // (from_session, target_alias, task) within COMMHUB_SEND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MS
+      // is rejected with a structured `duplicate_send` error so dashboard
+      // dispatch buttons and scripted REST callers get the same guarantee
+      // as agent-driven MCP traffic.
+      const dedup = sharedSendDedup.check(fromSession, targetAlias, body.task);
+      if (dedup.duplicate) {
+        const payload = buildDuplicateSendPayload({
+          from: fromSession,
+          to: targetAlias,
+          ageMs: dedup.ageMs,
+          windowMs: sharedSendDedup.windowMs,
+        });
+        console.log(`[/api/task] ${fromSession} → ${targetAlias}: DROPPED duplicate (age=${dedup.ageMs}ms, window=${sharedSendDedup.windowMs}ms)`);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json(payload, { status: 429 }));
+      }
+
+      // RFC-027 §2.3 inbox-enqueue lifecycle guard (PR1.2a REST site
+      // 1/2 — paired with the 6 MCP sites guarded in tools.ts at PR1.1).
+      // Dashboard's "Dispatch" button hits this endpoint, so without
+      // the guard a stopping/stopped/deleting node still got tasks
+      // routed through REST. Returns 409 with the same structured
+      // payload the MCP handlers use.
+      {
+        const lc = assertNodeActive(targetAlias, taskNetId ?? null);
+        if (!lc.ok) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json(lc, { status: 409 }));
+        }
+      }
+      // Mirror send_task MCP: write inbox + tasks rows in a single
+      // transaction so the dispatch is visible to dashboard's Tasks page
+      // and the parent_task_id lineage chain. Previously this endpoint
+      // only wrote inbox, leaving GET /api/tasks empty for any task
+      // dispatched via REST (anet demo, dashboard Dispatch button, etc.).
+      db.transaction(() => {
+        db.run(
+          `INSERT INTO inbox (id, task_id, session_name, node_id, type, priority, content, from_session, requires_response, network_id, meta_json)
+           VALUES (?1, ?1, ?2, ?3, 'task', ?4, ?5, ?6, 'reply', ?7, ?8)`,
+          [id, targetAlias, targetNodeId, body.priority, body.task, fromSession, taskNetId, metaJson]
+        );
+        db.run(
+          `INSERT INTO tasks (task_id, from_node_id, from_name, to_node_id, to_name, priority, status, content, requires_response, created_at, delivered_at, expires_at, network_id, parent_task_id, meta_json)
+           VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, 'delivered', ?7, 'reply', datetime('now'), datetime('now'), datetime('now', ?8), ?9, ?10, ?11)`,
+          [id, fromNodeId, fromSession, targetNodeId, targetAlias, body.priority, body.task, `+${ttlSeconds} seconds`, taskNetId, body.parent_task_id ?? null, metaJson]
+        );
+        // Touch session row so the dashboard reflects "task in flight"
+        // immediately, without waiting for the agent's report_status to
+        // arrive. Updating both `task` and `updated_at` is enough — we
+        // leave `status` to the agent (idle → working → idle).
+        const touchParams: any[] = [body.task.slice(0, 200), targetAlias];
+        let touchSql = "UPDATE sessions SET task = ?1, updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE alias = ?2";
+        if (taskNetId) { touchSql += " AND network_id = ?3"; touchParams.push(taskNetId); }
+        db.run(touchSql, touchParams);
+      });
+      // SSE push: 秒达
+      const pendingParams: any[] = [targetAlias];
+      let pendingSql = "SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM inbox WHERE session_name = ?1 AND acked = 0";
+      if (taskNetId) { pendingSql += " AND network_id = ?2"; pendingParams.push(taskNetId); }
+      const pending = db.get<{ cnt: number }>(pendingSql, ...pendingParams);
+      if (target.state === "online") {
+        pushEvent(targetAlias, { type: "new_task", inbox_count: pending?.cnt ?? 1, priority: body.priority, from: fromSession, ...(canonical.renamed ? { renamed_from: body.alias } : {}) }, taskNetId);
+      }
+      // #461 network observer summary — unconditional (the task row
+      // exists even when the target is offline/queued), metadata only.
+      pushNetworkObserverEvent(taskNetId, { type: "new_task", task_id: id, from: fromSession, to: targetAlias, status: target.state === "online" ? "delivered" : "queued", priority: body.priority });
+      // #212 — stamp the dedup index only after the inbox/tasks insert
+      // succeeds. Mirrors the MCP `send_task` path so a failed write
+      // never shadows a legitimate retry.
+      sharedSendDedup.record(fromSession, targetAlias, body.task);
+      if (target.state === "offline") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "alias_offline",
+          message: target.message,
+          alias: targetAlias,
+          queued: true,
+          task_id: id,
+          message_id: id,
+          session_status: target.session.status ?? "offline",
+          actual_to: actualTo,
+          ...(canonical.renamed ? { renamed_from: body.alias, renamed_to: targetAlias } : {}),
+        }, { status: 202 }));
+      }
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        task_id: id,
+        message_id: id,
+        actual_to: actualTo,
+        ...(canonical.renamed ? { renamed_from: body.alias, renamed_to: targetAlias } : {}),
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: broadcast ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/broadcast" && req.method === "POST") {
+      let raw: unknown;
+      try {
+        raw = await req.json();
+      } catch {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const parsed = BroadcastSchema.safeParse(raw);
+      if (!parsed.success) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "invalid input", details: parsed.error.format() }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const body = parsed.data;
+      if (restAuth && !restScope.networkId && !isAdmin) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "network_id required for user token when broadcasting" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(restAuth, restScope.networkId, isAdmin)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+      let sql = "SELECT alias, node_id, network_id FROM sessions WHERE alias IS NOT NULL";
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      if (body.filter_server) { sql += " AND server = ?"; params.push(body.filter_server); }
+      if (body.filter_status) { sql += " AND status = ?"; params.push(body.filter_status); }
+      const targets = db.all<{ alias: string; node_id: string | null; network_id: string | null }>(sql, ...params);
+      const ids: string[] = [];
+      // #1440 ① — mirrors the MCP handler: push to the recipients that
+      // actually got an inbox row, not to every candidate target.
+      const delivered: Array<{ alias: string; netId: string | null }> = [];
+      for (const t of targets) {
+        // RFC-027 §2.3 inbox-enqueue lifecycle guard (PR1.2a REST site
+        // 2/2). Broadcast skips non-active recipients silently per its
+        // best-effort semantics — mirrors the MCP broadcast handler
+        // in tools.ts (PR1.1 site 6/6).
+        const lc = assertNodeActive(t.alias, t.network_id ?? null);
+        if (!lc.ok) continue;
+        const id = crypto.randomUUID();
+        db.run(
+          `INSERT INTO inbox (id, session_name, node_id, type, priority, content, from_session, network_id)
+           VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'broadcast', 'normal', ?4, 'api', ?5)`,
+          [id, t.alias, t.node_id ?? null, body.message, t.network_id]
+        );
+        ids.push(id);
+        delivered.push({ alias: t.alias, netId: t.network_id });
+      }
+      for (const d of delivered) {
+        pushEvent(d.alias, { type: "broadcast", inbox_count: pendingInboxCount(d.alias, d.netId) }, d.netId);
+      }
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, recipients: ids.length, message_ids: ids }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: tmux capture-pane ──
+    const tmuxCapture = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/tmux\/([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)$/);
+    if (tmuxCapture && req.method === "GET") {
+      const tmuxErr = requireTmuxAccess(req, server);
+      if (tmuxErr) return withCors(req, tmuxErr);
+      const name = tmuxCapture[1];
+      const lines = Number(url.searchParams.get("lines")) || 30;
+      try {
+        const proc = Bun.spawn(["tmux", "capture-pane", "-t", name, "-p"], {
+          stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+        });
+        const text = await new Response(proc.stdout).text();
+        const err = await new Response(proc.stderr).text();
+        const code = await proc.exited;
+        if (code !== 0) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: err.trim() || `exit ${code}` }, { status: 400 }));
+        }
+        const trimmed = text.split("\n").slice(-lines).join("\n");
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, tmux_name: name, lines: lines, output: trimmed }));
+      } catch (e) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: (e as Error).message }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: tmux send-keys ──
+    const tmuxSend = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/tmux\/([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\/send$/);
+    if (tmuxSend && req.method === "POST") {
+      const tmuxErr = requireTmuxAccess(req, server);
+      if (tmuxErr) return withCors(req, tmuxErr);
+      const name = tmuxSend[1];
+      let body: { text?: string; enter?: boolean };
+      try { body = await req.json(); } catch {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (!body.text || typeof body.text !== "string") {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ error: "text is required" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const args = ["tmux", "send-keys", "-t", name, body.text];
+      if (body.enter !== false) args.push("Enter");
+      try {
+        const proc = Bun.spawn(args, { stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" });
+        const err = await new Response(proc.stderr).text();
+        const code = await proc.exited;
+        if (code !== 0) {
+          return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: err.trim() || `exit ${code}` }, { status: 400 }));
+        }
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, sent: body.text }));
+      } catch (e) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: (e as Error).message }, { status: 500 }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // #1828 —— 用户名与某个节点 alias 撞名时,inbox 里 session_name=用户名 的行属于那个节点,
+    //    不能当成用户的未读、也不能替它 ack。只看当前 REST scope 内的节点。
+    const userInboxAliasCollides = (username: string, scope: RestNetworkScope): boolean => {
+      const p: any[] = [username];
+      let q = "SELECT 1 AS hit FROM nodes WHERE alias = ?1";
+      q = addNetworkScope(q, p, scope);
+      return !!db.get<{ hit: number }>(q + " LIMIT 1", ...p);
+    };
+
+    // ── REST: per-user desktop inbox (#1459 ① P3) ──
+    // 🔴 只在 ?scope=user 时走这条；下面按 alias 寻址的既有分支一行未动
+    //    （dashboard 依赖那条 inbox 查询）。
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/messages" && url.searchParams.get("scope") === "user") {
+      // 🔴 收件人取自**鉴权上下文**，不接受 query 指定 —— 否则任何人都能
+      //    ?user_id=<别人> 读走别人的私信。
+      const callerUserId = restAuth?.userId ?? null;
+      if (!callerUserId) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth_required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      }
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 100, 500);
+      const unackedOnly = url.searchParams.get("unacked") === "1";
+
+      const params: any[] = [callerUserId];
+      let sql = `SELECT message_id, network_id, user_id, from_session, kind, title, content, severity,
+                        meta_json, acked, created_at, acked_at
+                 FROM user_inbox WHERE user_id = ?1`;
+      if (unackedOnly) sql += " AND acked = 0";
+      // 复用 alias 分支同一个 scope 助手：新读路径漏 scope 是已被审计证实的真风险。
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?${params.length + 1}`;
+      params.push(limit);
+      const rows = db.all<any>(sql, ...params);
+
+      // 未读数与列表用同一个 user_id + 同一个 scope 助手算，避免两处口径漂开。
+      const countParams: any[] = [callerUserId];
+      let countSql = "SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt FROM user_inbox WHERE user_id = ?1 AND acked = 0";
+      countSql = addNetworkScope(countSql, countParams, restScope);
+      const unread = db.get<{ cnt: number }>(countSql, ...countParams)?.cnt ?? 0;
+
+      // #1828 —— 按 agent 分的未读:user_inbox(agent 主动发给用户)+ inbox 里发给**这个用户名**的
+      //    reply/task/message 行(agent 对用户任务的回复;acked 从来没人置 1,见 app#260)。
+      //    `unread`/`pending_count` 口径不动(只算 user_inbox,qa-hub-14 钉着);两表之和另给 `unread_total`。
+      //    🔴 用户名恰好也是某个节点 alias 时,inbox 里那些行是节点的待办,不是用户的 —— 跳过 inbox 半边。
+      const byAgent: Record<string, number> = {};
+      const addByAgent = (agentRows: Array<{ agent: string | null; n: number }>) => {
+        for (const r of agentRows) byAgent[r.agent || "hub"] = (byAgent[r.agent || "hub"] ?? 0) + Number(r.n ?? 0);
+      };
+      const uiAgentParams: any[] = [callerUserId];
+      let uiAgentSql = "SELECT from_session AS agent, COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_inbox WHERE user_id = ?1 AND acked = 0";
+      uiAgentSql = addNetworkScope(uiAgentSql, uiAgentParams, restScope);
+      addByAgent(db.all<{ agent: string | null; n: number }>(uiAgentSql + " GROUP BY from_session", ...uiAgentParams));
+      const callerUsername = restAuth?.username ?? "";
+      if (callerUsername && !userInboxAliasCollides(callerUsername, restScope)) {
+        const ibParams: any[] = [callerUsername];
+        let ibSql = "SELECT from_session AS agent, COUNT(*) AS n FROM inbox WHERE session_name = ?1 AND acked = 0 AND type IN ('reply', 'task', 'message')";
+        ibSql = addNetworkScope(ibSql, ibParams, restScope);
+        addByAgent(db.all<{ agent: string | null; n: number }>(ibSql + " GROUP BY from_session", ...ibParams));
+      }
+      const unreadTotal = Object.values(byAgent).reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0);
+
+      // 🔴 redact-at-read：写入方是 agent，不受信任。存储侧已做跨主机路径脱敏，
+      //    这一层单独防"有人把凭据塞进正文/标题/meta"。
+      const messages = rows.map(redactMessageRow);
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        messages,
+        unread,
+        // 同一个数的两个名字：`unread` 给角标读，`pending_count` 与 alias 分支
+        // 的字段名保持一致。**一处计算**，不是两处实现。
+        pending_count: unread,
+        unread_by_agent: byAgent,
+        unread_total: unreadTotal,
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: recent messages (for Dashboard communication graph) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/messages") {
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 100, 500);
+      const since = url.searchParams.get("since") ?? new Date(Date.now() - 3600000).toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19);
+      const alias = url.searchParams.get("alias")?.trim() || null;
+      const params: any[] = [since];
+      let sql = "SELECT id, session_name as to_alias, from_session as from_alias, type, priority, content, acked, created_at, network_id FROM inbox WHERE created_at >= ?1";
+      if (alias) {
+        params.push(alias);
+        sql += ` AND session_name = ?${params.length}`;
+      }
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?${params.length + 1}`;
+      params.push(limit);
+      const rows = db.all(sql, ...params);
+
+      let pendingCount: number | undefined;
+      if (alias) {
+        const countParams: any[] = [alias];
+        let countSql = "SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt FROM inbox WHERE session_name = ?1 AND acked = 0";
+        countSql = addNetworkScope(countSql, countParams, restScope);
+        pendingCount = db.get<{ cnt: number }>(countSql, ...countParams)?.cnt ?? 0;
+      }
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, messages: rows, ...(alias ? { pending_count: pendingCount ?? 0 } : {}) }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: ack per-user desktop messages (#1459 ① P3) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/messages/ack" && req.method === "POST") {
+      const callerUserId = restAuth?.userId ?? null;
+      if (!callerUserId) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth_required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      }
+      let body: any = null;
+      try { body = await req.json(); } catch { /* 下面按缺参处理 */ }
+      const ids: string[] = Array.isArray(body?.message_ids)
+        ? body.message_ids.filter((x: unknown) => typeof x === "string" && x.length > 0)
+        : (typeof body?.message_id === "string" && body.message_id ? [body.message_id] : []);
+      if (ids.length === 0) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "message_id_required" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (ids.length > 500) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "too_many_ids", limit: 500 }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      // 🔴 `AND user_id = <ctx>`：只能 ack 自己的。别人的 message_id 传进来
+      //    也匹配不到行，所以既不会改到别人的状态，也不会因此泄漏它是否存在。
+      const params: any[] = [callerUserId, ...ids];
+      const placeholders = ids.map((_, i) => `?${i + 2}`).join(", ");
+      let sql = `UPDATE user_inbox SET acked = 1, acked_at = datetime('now')
+                 WHERE user_id = ?1 AND message_id IN (${placeholders}) AND acked = 0`;
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      const res = db.run(sql, params);
+      // #1828 —— 同一批 id 也可能是 inbox 里发给这个用户名的 reply/task/message 行(agent 回复);
+      //    用户看过就 ack 掉。只动 session_name = 调用者用户名 的行,别人的 id 匹配不到;
+      //    用户名与节点 alias 撞名时跳过(那是节点的待办)。
+      let inboxAcked = 0;
+      const callerUsername = restAuth?.username ?? "";
+      if (callerUsername && !userInboxAliasCollides(callerUsername, restScope)) {
+        const ibParams: any[] = [callerUsername, ...ids];
+        let ibSql = `UPDATE inbox SET acked = 1
+                     WHERE session_name = ?1 AND id IN (${placeholders}) AND acked = 0 AND type IN ('reply', 'task', 'message')`;
+        ibSql = addNetworkScope(ibSql, ibParams, restScope);
+        inboxAcked = db.run(ibSql, ibParams).changes ?? 0;
+      }
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, acked: (res.changes ?? 0) + inboxAcked, acked_user_inbox: res.changes ?? 0, acked_inbox: inboxAcked }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: stats summary ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/stats") {
+      const taskStatsParams: any[] = [];
+      let taskStatsSql = "SELECT status, COUNT(*) as count FROM tasks WHERE 1=1";
+      taskStatsSql = addNetworkScope(taskStatsSql, taskStatsParams, restScope);
+      taskStatsSql += " GROUP BY status";
+      const taskStats = db.all<any>(taskStatsSql, ...taskStatsParams);
+
+      const sessionStatsParams: any[] = [];
+      let sessionStatsSql = "SELECT status, COUNT(*) as count FROM sessions WHERE 1=1";
+      sessionStatsSql = addNetworkScope(sessionStatsSql, sessionStatsParams, restScope);
+      sessionStatsSql += " GROUP BY status";
+      const sessionStats = db.all<any>(sessionStatsSql, ...sessionStatsParams);
+
+      const totalTasksParams: any[] = [];
+      let totalTasksSql = "SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM tasks WHERE 1=1";
+      totalTasksSql = addNetworkScope(totalTasksSql, totalTasksParams, restScope);
+      const totalTasks = db.get<{ cnt: number }>(totalTasksSql, ...totalTasksParams);
+
+      const totalNodesParams: any[] = [];
+      let totalNodesSql = "SELECT COUNT(*) as cnt FROM nodes WHERE 1=1";
+      totalNodesSql = addNetworkScope(totalNodesSql, totalNodesParams, restScope);
+      const totalNodes = db.get<{ cnt: number }>(totalNodesSql, ...totalNodesParams);
+
+      const recentTasksParams: any[] = [];
+      let recentTasksSql = "SELECT task_id, from_name, to_name, status, created_at FROM tasks WHERE 1=1";
+      recentTasksSql = addNetworkScope(recentTasksSql, recentTasksParams, restScope);
+      recentTasksSql += " ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 5";
+      const recentTasks = db.all<any>(recentTasksSql, ...recentTasksParams);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        network_id: restScope.networkId || null,
+        tasks: { total: totalTasks?.cnt || 0, by_status: taskStats },
+        sessions: { by_status: sessionStats },
+        nodes: { total: totalNodes?.cnt || 0 },
+        recent_tasks: recentTasks,
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: server log tail (in-memory ring buffer, last LOG_RING_CAP lines) ──
+    // Admin-only because logs may include user names + task content.
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/server-logs") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      if (resolved.user.role !== "admin") return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "admin only" }, { status: 403 }));
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 200, LOG_RING_CAP);
+      const since = url.searchParams.get("since"); // ISO timestamp; only return logs newer
+      let entries = logRing.slice(-limit);
+      if (since) entries = entries.filter(e => e.ts > since);
+      // Newest first
+      entries = entries.slice().reverse();
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, logs: entries, capacity: LOG_RING_CAP }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: audit log (V3) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/audit-log") {
+      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization")?.replace("Bearer ", "") || url.searchParams.get("token");
+      if (!token) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const resolved = resolveToken(token);
+      if (!resolved) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid token" }, { status: 401 }));
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 50, 200);
+      const action = url.searchParams.get("action");
+      const userId = url.searchParams.get("user_id");
+      let sql = `SELECT ${AUDIT_LOG_REST_SELECT} FROM audit_log WHERE 1=1`;
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      // Non-admin can only see own logs
+      if (resolved.user.role !== "admin") { sql += ` AND user_id = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(resolved.user.user_id); }
+      if (action) { sql += ` AND action = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(action); }
+      if (userId && resolved.user.role === "admin") { sql += ` AND user_id = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(userId); }
+      sql += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?${params.length + 1}`;
+      params.push(limit);
+      const logs = db.all(sql, ...params);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, logs, count: logs.length }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: task events (V2 Sprint 2) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/task_events") {
+      const taskId = url.searchParams.get("task_id");
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 50, 500);
+      let sql = `SELECT ${TASK_EVENT_REST_SELECT} FROM task_events WHERE 1=1`;
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      if (taskId) { sql += ` AND task_id = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(taskId); }
+      sql += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?${params.length + 1}`;
+      params.push(limit);
+      const rows = db.all(sql, ...params);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, events: rows, count: rows.length }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: delete node (Dashboard/CLI remote cleanup) ──
+    const nodeDeleteMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/nodes\/([^/]+)$/);
+    if (nodeDeleteMatch && req.method === "DELETE") {
+      const ref = decodeURIComponent(nodeDeleteMatch[1]);
+      const params: any[] = [ref, ref, ref];
+      let sql = "SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, network_id FROM nodes WHERE (node_id = ?1 OR node_name = ?2 OR alias = ?3)";
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1";
+      const node = db.get<any>(sql, ...params);
+      if (!node) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "node not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+
+      const nodeNetId = node.network_id ?? singleNetworkId(restScope);
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(restAuth, nodeNetId, isAdmin)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+
+      db.transaction(() => {
+        db.run("DELETE FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", [node.node_id]);
+        if (node.alias) {
+          db.run(
+            "DELETE FROM sessions WHERE alias = ?1 AND (network_id = ?2 OR (?2 IS NULL AND network_id IS NULL))",
+            [node.alias, node.network_id ?? null]
+          );
+        }
+      });
+
+      if (node.alias) {
+        pushEvent(node.alias, {
+          type: "node_deleted",
+          node_id: node.node_id,
+          node_name: node.node_name,
+          alias: node.alias,
+          network_id: node.network_id ?? null,
+        }, node.network_id ?? null);
+      }
+
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        deleted: true,
+        node_id: node.node_id,
+        node_name: node.node_name,
+        alias: node.alias,
+        network_id: node.network_id ?? null,
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: single node config snapshot (RFC-024 B5) ──
+    // Dashboard calls this for the snapshot path. Returns the masked
+    // {model, flags, config_revision} the node last posted via
+    // report_status (B6). NEVER reads per-node files. Network-scoped
+    // via addNetworkScope so a netA viewer can't read a netB node.
+    const nodeConfigMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/nodes\/([^/]+)\/config$/);
+    if (nodeConfigMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const nodeId = decodeURIComponent(nodeConfigMatch[1] ?? "");
+      const params: any[] = [nodeId];
+      let sql = "SELECT node_id, alias, network_id, config_revision, config_snapshot FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1";
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " LIMIT 1";
+      const node = db.get<any>(sql, ...params);
+      if (!node) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "node_not_found", node_id: nodeId }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+      let snapshot: any = {};
+      if (node.config_snapshot) {
+        try { snapshot = JSON.parse(node.config_snapshot); } catch { snapshot = {}; }
+      }
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        node_id: node.node_id,
+        alias: node.alias,
+        network_id: node.network_id,
+        config_revision: node.config_revision || 0,
+        model: snapshot.model ?? null,
+        flags: snapshot.flags ?? {},
+        config_update_capable: snapshot.config_update_capable ?? false,
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── #462 REST: set / clear a node's custom avatar ──
+    // PUT /api/nodes/:ref/avatar  body: { "avatar_url": "https://…" | null }
+    //
+    // Deliberately NOT part of the RFC-024 config-apply pipeline: avatar
+    // is a pure display attribute — nothing for agent-node to consume, no
+    // config_revision / ack round-trip, no restart tier. Persisted on the
+    // nodes row and served back via GET /api/nodes (cross-device).
+    //
+    // Auth: same write gate as node delete above — network-scoped lookup
+    // + canRestWriteNetwork (member with role above viewer, or admin, or
+    // legacy master token). Value passes validateAvatarUrl (http/https
+    // only, ≤ 2048 chars, no control chars — XSS boundary, see
+    // avatar-validate.ts).
+    // ── REST: node DISPLAY attributes (display_name / team / tags) ──
+    // Companion to the avatar route below: hub-side presentation fields that
+    // agent-node does not consume, so they deliberately bypass the RFC-024
+    // config-apply pipeline (no doorbell, no ack, no config_revision bump).
+    //
+    // Unlike avatar, these are multi-field and multi-editor, so they carry
+    // their OWN optimistic lock (`attrs_revision`). A stale base revision is
+    // a 409 with the current value, mirroring update_node_config's contract
+    // so the dashboard can reuse its conflict-resolution UX.
+    //
+    // NOT editable here: `alias` (message-routing key) and `node_name`
+    // (addressing key). Renaming those must go through the rename 2PC at
+    // /api/node-rename/* which cascades sessions + api_tokens + SSE cleanup;
+    // a single-table UPDATE would strand the node (see #146).
+    const nodeAttrsMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/nodes\/([^/]+)\/attrs$/);
+    if (nodeAttrsMatch && req.method === "PUT") {
+      let attrsBody: any;
+      try {
+        attrsBody = await req.json();
+      } catch {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const ref = decodeURIComponent(nodeAttrsMatch[1]);
+      const params: any[] = [ref, ref, ref];
+      let sql = "SELECT node_id, alias, network_id, display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision FROM nodes WHERE (node_id = ?1 OR node_name = ?2 OR alias = ?3)";
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1";
+      const node = db.get<any>(sql, ...params);
+      if (!node) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "node not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+
+      const nodeNetId = node.network_id ?? singleNetworkId(restScope);
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(restAuth, nodeNetId, isAdmin)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+
+      // Optimistic lock BEFORE any narrowing work, so a losing writer never
+      // has side effects.
+      const currentRev = Number(node.attrs_revision ?? 0);
+      const baseRev = attrsBody?.base_attrs_revision;
+      if (typeof baseRev !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(baseRev) || baseRev < 0) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false, error: "base_attrs_revision required (integer >= 0)",
+        }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      if (baseRev !== currentRev) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "attrs_revision_conflict",
+          current_attrs_revision: currentRev,
+          message: "another editor changed this node's attributes; re-read and retry",
+        }, { status: 409 }));
+      }
+
+      // Scalars reject on wrong type (never coerce); tags drop junk per item.
+      const nextDisplay = "display_name" in attrsBody
+        ? validateScalarAttr(attrsBody.display_name, "display_name")
+        : null;
+      if (nextDisplay && !nextDisplay.ok) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_display_name", reason: nextDisplay.reason }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const nextTeam = "team" in attrsBody ? validateScalarAttr(attrsBody.team, "team") : null;
+      if (nextTeam && !nextTeam.ok) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_team", reason: nextTeam.reason }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const nextTags = "tags" in attrsBody ? narrowTags(attrsBody.tags) : null;
+
+      // Only the supplied fields move; the rest keep their stored value.
+      const sets: string[] = [];
+      const vals: any[] = [];
+      if (nextDisplay) { sets.push(`display_name = ?${vals.length + 1}`); vals.push(nextDisplay.value); }
+      if (nextTeam) { sets.push(`team = ?${vals.length + 1}`); vals.push(nextTeam.value); }
+      if (nextTags) { sets.push(`tags = ?${vals.length + 1}`); vals.push(JSON.stringify(nextTags)); }
+      // A no-op patch still bumps the revision: the caller observed a state
+      // and asserted it, so honouring the CAS keeps client counters in step.
+      sets.push(`attrs_revision = ?${vals.length + 1}`); vals.push(currentRev + 1);
+      sets.push(`updated_at = datetime('now')`);
+      vals.push(node.node_id);
+      // Guard the UPDATE with the same revision so two concurrent writers
+      // that both passed the read above cannot both land.
+      vals.push(currentRev);
+      const res = db.run(
+        `UPDATE nodes SET ${sets.join(", ")} WHERE node_id = ?${vals.length - 1} AND attrs_revision = ?${vals.length}`,
+        vals,
+      );
+      if (!res.changes) {
+        const fresh = db.get<any>("SELECT attrs_revision FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", node.node_id);
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({
+          ok: false,
+          error: "attrs_revision_conflict",
+          current_attrs_revision: Number(fresh?.attrs_revision ?? currentRev),
+          message: "another editor changed this node's attributes; re-read and retry",
+        }, { status: 409 }));
+      }
+      logAudit(restAuth?.userId ?? null, restAuth?.username ?? null, "node_attrs_updated", "node", node.node_id,
+        JSON.stringify({ display_name: nextDisplay?.value ?? undefined, team: nextTeam?.value ?? undefined, tags: nextTags ?? undefined }),
+        undefined, nodeNetId ?? undefined);
+      const after = db.get<any>(
+        "SELECT display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", node.node_id);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({
+        ok: true,
+        node_id: node.node_id,
+        alias: node.alias,
+        display_name: after?.display_name ?? null,
+        team: after?.team ?? null,
+        tags: parseStoredTags(after?.tags),
+        attrs_revision: Number(after?.attrs_revision ?? currentRev + 1),
+      }));
+    }
+
+    const nodeAvatarMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/nodes\/([^/]+)\/avatar$/);
+    if (nodeAvatarMatch && req.method === "PUT") {
+      let avatarBody: any;
+      try {
+        avatarBody = await req.json();
+      } catch {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const validated = validateAvatarUrl(avatarBody?.avatar_url);
+      if (!validated.ok) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_avatar_url", reason: validated.reason }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const ref = decodeURIComponent(nodeAvatarMatch[1]);
+      const params: any[] = [ref, ref, ref];
+      let sql = "SELECT node_id, alias, network_id FROM nodes WHERE (node_id = ?1 OR node_name = ?2 OR alias = ?3)";
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1";
+      const node = db.get<any>(sql, ...params);
+      if (!node) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "node not found" }, { status: 404 }));
+
+      const nodeNetId = node.network_id ?? singleNetworkId(restScope);
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(restAuth, nodeNetId, isAdmin)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+
+      db.run(
+        "UPDATE nodes SET avatar_url = ?1, updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE node_id = ?2",
+        [validated.value, node.node_id]
+      );
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, node_id: node.node_id, alias: node.alias, avatar_url: validated.value }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: nodes table (V2 Sprint 2) ──
+    // Explicit column list — NOT `SELECT *`. Two reasons:
+    //   1. `SELECT *` silently broadcasts any column added later to the
+    //      response (RFC-024 added config_revision/config_snapshot which
+    //      the dashboard's GET /api/nodes/:id/config endpoint owns;
+    //      RFC-028 will add more vault-flavored columns). Tests asserting
+    //      response shape break on every ALTER; integrations that key
+    //      off Object.keys() can pick up internals.
+    //   2. The list endpoint and the per-node config snapshot endpoint
+    //      have different consumer contracts; this list should be the
+    //      stable, dashboard-facing fields only.
+    // Add a new column to this list explicitly when a real client needs
+    // it; do NOT switch back to SELECT *.
+    // ── REST: list host_supervisor daemons (RFC-026 §9.2.2 / #338 PR2) ──
+    // Mirror of the `list_host_supervisors` MCP tool for non-MCP callers.
+    // Same SQL + role-extract + member-脱敏 logic; SEC-1 scoped via REST
+    // auth pipeline (restScope). Returns {ok, daemons:[...], count}.
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/host-supervisors") {
+      // #380 — utok callers with exactly one accessible network get a
+      // safe fallback so the create-node wizard doesn't have to bake
+      // network_id into every request (it was hard-4xxing when the
+      // dashboard omitted the query param — that's what "hub 400" was).
+      // `singleNetworkId` returns:
+      //   - scope.networkId when it's set (ntok binding, or an
+      //     explicitly-requested network the user has verified access to)
+      //   - the sole member of scope.networkIds when the utok user
+      //     belongs to exactly one network (safe unambiguous fallback)
+      //   - null when the user belongs to 0 or 2+ networks (authz
+      //     boundary — refuse to guess which one, mirrors 通信龙 spec
+      //     "别 fallback 到错 network")
+      // The 400 branch is retained for the ambiguous / no-access cases
+      // and distinguishes them in the error message so the client can
+      // recover (send network_id explicitly).
+      const effectiveNetId = singleNetworkId(restScope);
+      if (!effectiveNetId) {
+        const memberships = restScope.networkIds?.length ?? 0;
+        const error = memberships > 1
+          ? "network_id_required_multi"
+          : "missing_network_id";
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error, memberships }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      // Role for member-脱敏 (admin/owner = full host_telemetry, others = masked)
+      let isPrivileged = false;
+      if (restAuth?.userId) {
+        const role = getUserNetworkRole(restAuth.userId, effectiveNetId);
+        isPrivileged = role === "admin" || role === "owner";
+      } else {
+        // Network-token caller (no user) — treat as privileged within its network
+        isPrivileged = true;
+      }
+
+      // EXISTS subquery handles BOTH revoked_at SET and DELETEd token
+      // rows (revokeToken DELETEs the row in production — PR2 v1
+      // SHOULD-FIX per 通信龙 audit). EXISTS naturally dedupes daemons
+      // with rotated tokens.
+      const sqlRows = db.all<Record<string, any>>(`
+        SELECT
+          n.node_id, n.alias, n.hostname, n.network_id,
+          n.runtimes_supported, n.allowed_secret_keys,
+          n.created_at, n.updated_at,
+          s.last_seen_at AS session_last_seen,
+          s.cpu_cores AS session_cpu_cores,
+          s.mem_total_gb AS session_mem_total_gb,
+          s.ip AS session_ip,
+          n.config_snapshot
+        FROM nodes n
+        LEFT JOIN sessions s ON s.alias = n.alias AND (s.network_id = n.network_id OR s.network_id IS NULL)
+        WHERE n.network_id = ?1
+          AND EXISTS (
+            SELECT 1 FROM api_tokens t
+            WHERE t.network_id = n.network_id
+              AND t.name = 'node:' || n.alias
+              AND t.revoked_at IS NULL
+          )
+        ORDER BY n.updated_at DESC
+      `, effectiveNetId);
+
+      const nowMs = Date.now();
+      // 心跳周期是 3 分钟（agent-node/src/cli.ts 的 report_status 定时器），
+      // 窗口必须大于它，否则每次心跳后的 60s~180s 之间必然抖成 offline
+      // （通信评审牛 #1279 独审④）。取 5min，与仓内既有 stale 口径一致。
+      const ONLINE_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+      const daemons = sqlRows
+        .map(r => {
+          let snapRole: string | null = null;
+          // #1353 Fix ② — surface daemon self-reported create-node
+          // capability so dashboard's "选服务器" picker can filter or
+          // dim broken daemons instead of listing them as online.
+          // Fix ① (hub-side dispatch gate, PR #1510) refuses the
+          // request but the picker still lists the daemon and the user
+          // finds out only after clicking. Exposing the fact one layer
+          // earlier lets the picker never surface the daemon in the
+          // first place.
+          //
+          // 🔴 Pre-#1371 daemons don't report either field. Leave the
+          // response keys UNDEFINED in that case (not `false`, not
+          // `null`) — mirrors the Fix ① rule "known-blocked, NOT
+          // unknown-treated-as-blocked". Emitting a fabricated `false`
+          // would silently start dimming every daemon that hasn't
+          // upgraded past preview.55.
+          let snapCanCreate: boolean | undefined;
+          let snapBlockedReason: string | undefined;
+          // #1545 —— 见 report_status schema 里 create_capability_observed_ms_ago 的注释:
+          // 上报侧**故意收得宽**(无 int/min/max,免得一个诊断字段能让整份 report 被拒),
+          // 消毒放在这里。非有限数、负数、超过 1 年的一律当作「没报」——
+          // 🔴 不是 clamp 成边界值:clamp 会把一个坏值变成一个**看起来正常的年龄**,
+          //    而这一格存在的全部意义就是让人分辨新鲜和陈旧。
+          let snapObservedMsAgo: number | undefined;
+          if (r.config_snapshot) {
+            try {
+              const parsed = typeof r.config_snapshot === "string" ? JSON.parse(r.config_snapshot) : r.config_snapshot;
+              snapRole = typeof parsed?.role === "string" ? parsed.role : null;
+              const caps = parsed?.daemon_capabilities;
+              if (caps && typeof caps.can_create_nodes === "boolean") {
+                snapCanCreate = caps.can_create_nodes;
+              }
+              if (caps && typeof caps.create_nodes_blocked_reason === "string"
+                  && caps.create_nodes_blocked_reason.length > 0) {
+                snapBlockedReason = caps.create_nodes_blocked_reason;
+              }
+              const rawAge = caps?.create_capability_observed_ms_ago;
+              if (typeof rawAge === "number" && Number.isFinite(rawAge)
+                  && rawAge >= 0 && rawAge <= 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) {
+                snapObservedMsAgo = rawAge;
+              }
+            } catch { /* malformed */ }
+          }
+          return { row: r, role: snapRole, canCreate: snapCanCreate, blockedReason: snapBlockedReason,
+            observedMsAgo: snapObservedMsAgo };
+        })
+        .filter(({ role }) => role === "host_supervisor")
+        .map(({ row: r, canCreate, blockedReason, observedMsAgo }) => {
+          let online = false;
+          let lastSeenAt: string | null = null;
+          if (r.session_last_seen) {
+            lastSeenAt = r.session_last_seen;
+            const t = parseDbTimestampMs(r.session_last_seen);
+            if (!isNaN(t)) online = (nowMs - t) <= ONLINE_MS;
+          }
+          let runtimes: string[] = [];
+          let secrets: string[] = [];
+          try {
+            if (r.runtimes_supported) {
+              const parsed = JSON.parse(r.runtimes_supported);
+              runtimes = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((s: unknown) => typeof s === "string") : [];
+            }
+          } catch {}
+          try {
+            if (r.allowed_secret_keys) {
+              const parsed = JSON.parse(r.allowed_secret_keys);
+              secrets = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((s: unknown) => typeof s === "string") : [];
+            }
+          } catch {}
+          const telemetry: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            alert_level: online ? "green" : "gray",
+          };
+          if (isPrivileged) {
+            telemetry.cpu_cores = r.session_cpu_cores ?? null;
+            telemetry.mem_gb = r.session_mem_total_gb ?? null;
+            telemetry.ip_internal = r.session_ip ?? null;
+          }
+          const out: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            daemon_node_id: r.node_id,
+            alias: r.alias,
+            hostname: r.hostname,
+            online,
+            last_seen_at: lastSeenAt,
+            runtimes_supported: runtimes,
+            allowed_secret_keys: secrets,
+            host_telemetry: telemetry,
+          };
+          // #1353 Fix ② — only emit the two capability keys when the
+          // daemon actually reported them. Undefined vs. false is a
+          // real distinction here (see Fix ② comment above).
+          if (typeof canCreate === "boolean") {
+            out.can_create_nodes = canCreate;
+            // Blocked reason only meaningful when blocked. Some legacy
+            // shapes could carry a reason without can_create_nodes=false
+            // (defensive fallback in Fix ①); mirror the same choice —
+            // don't confuse consumers with a reason on a healthy daemon.
+            if (canCreate === false && blockedReason) {
+              out.create_nodes_blocked_reason = blockedReason;
+            }
+            // #1545 —— 只在 daemon 真的报了这一格时才出现。
+            // 🔴 缺席**不能**当成 0:那等于替一个从不重算的旧 daemon 宣称
+            //    「这是刚测的」,正好朝「没问题」方向说谎。缺席就让它缺席,
+            //    读的人据此说「年龄未知」(与 can_create_nodes 本身
+            //    undefined-vs-false 的处理同一条规矩,见上面 #1353 Fix ②)。
+            //
+            // 语义:该能力值是在**这份 report 发出前 N 毫秒**测得的。
+            // 绝对年龄 = (now - last_seen_at) + create_capability_observed_ms_ago。
+            // 用节点自己的钟只量了「多久以前」,绝对时间全部由 hub 的钟出。
+            if (typeof observedMsAgo === "number") {
+              out.create_capability_observed_ms_ago = observedMsAgo;
+            }
+          }
+          return out;
+        });
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, daemons, count: daemons.length }));
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/nodes") {
+      const nodeId = url.searchParams.get("node_id");
+      const alias = url.searchParams.get("alias");
+      // `config_snapshot` SELECTed ONLY to extract the daemon `role` field
+      // for dashboard discovery — full snapshot is NOT broadcast (would
+      // re-introduce the #312 SELECT * fragility). Mapping step pulls
+      // `role` out then drops `config_snapshot` from the response row.
+      // RFC-027 PR2 dashboard prereq: lifecycle_state is needed
+      // client-side to drive the ⋮ menu (active → "停止/删除";
+      // stopped → "重启/删除"). Hub schema gained the column at PR1
+      // (#345) but /api/nodes never SELECTed it. Following #312
+      // "explicit SELECT" discipline — extend the projection here,
+      // do NOT switch to SELECT *.
+      // #462: avatar_url added to the projection so custom avatars are
+      // cross-device (dashboard hydrates from here; localStorage was the
+      // only store before). Nullable — null means "use default set".
+      let sql = `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model,
+                        config_path, channels, server, hostname,
+                        network_id, created_at, updated_at,
+                        config_snapshot, lifecycle_state, avatar_url,
+                        display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+                 FROM nodes WHERE 1=1`;
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      if (nodeId) { sql += ` AND node_id = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(nodeId); }
+      if (alias) { sql += ` AND alias = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(alias); }
+      sql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC";
+      const rawRows = db.all<Record<string, any>>(sql, ...params);
+      // Add a single new field `role: string | null` per row, extracted from
+      // config_snapshot JSON. Daemon nodes that posted role='host_supervisor'
+      // via report_status surface here; dashboard uses this for daemon
+      // discovery (replacing the prior `node_daemon_` prefix heuristic).
+      // RFC-026 P1 P2 §9 will supersede this REST proxy with the
+      // `list_host_supervisors` MCP tool.
+      // app#196 —— 哪些节点能走 stop_node / restart_node / delete_node。
+      //
+      // 背景:那三个工具的 schema 是 `regex(/^node_[a-z0-9_-]+$/)`,而节点 id 有两种:
+      //   node_xxxx  daemon 建出来的子节点(+ daemon 自己)
+      //   n_xxxx     人手工 `anet node start` 起的
+      // 2026-08-28 对生产 hub 实测:218 个节点里 **207 个是 n_**,
+      // 在桌面端点「停止」只会看到一段 zod 正则原文。
+      //
+      // 🔴 这不是「正则写窄了」——那三个工具的做法是**让那台机器上的 daemon 去停它
+      //    自己建的子进程**。手工起的节点没有 daemon 可问,放宽正则只会把失败推到更深处。
+      //
+      // 所以这里给出一个显式标志,**让前端不必靠 id 前缀去猜**。判据不是前缀,
+      // 是 node_create_requests 里真的有对应的创建记录 ——
+      // 子节点 id 由 request_id 确定性推导:`node_${request_id.replace(/^cr_/,"")}`
+      // (2026-08-28 用真实一对验过:cr_59723b24-… → node_59723b24-…)。
+      const controllable = (() => {
+        try {
+          const crParams: any[] = [];
+          let crSql = "SELECT request_id, daemon_node_id FROM node_create_requests WHERE 1=1";
+          crSql = addNetworkScope(crSql, crParams, restScope);
+          return buildControllableMap(db.all<Record<string, any>>(crSql, ...crParams));
+        } catch {
+          // 表不存在/查询失败 ⇒ 全部按不可控处理,不让这一格拖垮整个列表
+          return new Map<string, string>();
+        }
+      })();
+
+      const rows = rawRows.map(r => {
+        let role: string | null = null;
+        const snap = r.config_snapshot;
+        if (snap) {
+          try { role = (typeof snap === "string" ? JSON.parse(snap) : snap)?.role ?? null; }
+          catch { /* malformed snapshot — leave role null */ }
+        }
+        const { config_snapshot, ...rest } = r;
+        // `tags` is stored as JSON text; hand the dashboard a real array so
+        // it can map() without a guard, and normalise legacy/absent values
+        // to [] rather than null. attrs_revision is normalised to a number
+        // so pre-migration rows (NULL) read as 0.
+        // app#196 —— 显式告诉前端这个节点能不能走生命周期操作,以及该找哪个 daemon。
+        // daemon 自己(role=host_supervisor)也能被 restart/stop,它的 id 同样是 node_ 前缀
+        // 且在 node_create_requests 里没有记录,所以单独放行。
+        const lifecycle_controllable = isLifecycleControllable(r.node_id, role, controllable);
+        return {
+          ...rest,
+          tags: parseStoredTags(r.tags),
+          attrs_revision: Number(r.attrs_revision ?? 0),
+          role,
+          lifecycle_controllable,
+          lifecycle_daemon_node_id: controllable.get(r.node_id) ?? null,
+        };
+      });
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, nodes: rows, count: rows.length }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: single task lookup (V2) ──
+    const taskPathMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/tasks?\/([^/]+)$/);
+    if (taskPathMatch && req.method === "GET") {
+      const taskId = decodeURIComponent(taskPathMatch[1] ?? "");
+      const params: any[] = [taskId];
+      let sql = `SELECT ${TASK_REST_SELECT} FROM tasks WHERE task_id = ?1`;
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " LIMIT 1";
+      const task = db.get(sql, ...params);
+      if (!task) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "task_not_found", task_id: taskId }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+      const taskNetworkId = typeof task.network_id === "string" ? task.network_id : null;
+      const canonicalTarget = task.to_node_id
+        ? null
+        : resolveCanonicalAlias(taskNetworkId, String(task.to_name ?? "")).alias;
+      const targetParams: unknown[] = [];
+      let targetSql = "SELECT alias, status FROM sessions WHERE ";
+      if (task.to_node_id) {
+        targetSql += "node_id = ?1";
+        targetParams.push(task.to_node_id);
+      } else {
+        targetSql += "alias = ?1";
+        targetParams.push(canonicalTarget);
+      }
+      if (taskNetworkId) {
+        targetSql += " AND network_id = ?2";
+        targetParams.push(taskNetworkId);
+      } else {
+        targetSql += " AND network_id IS NULL";
+      }
+      targetSql += " ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1";
+      const targetSession = db.get<{ alias: string; status: string }>(targetSql, ...targetParams);
+      const targetAlias = targetSession?.alias ?? canonicalTarget ?? String(task.to_name ?? "");
+      const liveSseConnections = getSSEStats().sessions[`${taskNetworkId || "global"}:${targetAlias}`] ?? 0;
+      // 🔴 #1083：这个目标【历史上有没有报过任何一次】运行时证据。
+      //   只用 Hub 自己已有的数据算，不需要 agent 侧任何改动。
+      //   为空时 runtime_submitted_at/consumed_at 是「不会走到」而不是「还没走到」，
+      //   两者处置相反（别等去接线 vs 等）。参数编号沿用上面 targetSql 的写法。
+      const evidenceParams: unknown[] = [];
+      let evidenceSql = "SELECT 1 AS seen FROM tasks WHERE runtime_submitted_at IS NOT NULL AND ";
+      if (task.to_node_id) {
+        evidenceSql += "to_node_id = ?1";
+        evidenceParams.push(task.to_node_id);
+      } else {
+        evidenceSql += "to_node_id IS NULL AND to_name = ?1";
+        evidenceParams.push(canonicalTarget ?? String(task.to_name ?? ""));
+      }
+      if (taskNetworkId) {
+        evidenceSql += " AND network_id = ?2";
+        evidenceParams.push(taskNetworkId);
+      } else {
+        evidenceSql += " AND network_id IS NULL";
+      }
+      evidenceSql += " LIMIT 1";
+      const targetEverReportedRuntimeEvidence =
+        Boolean(db.get<{ seen: number }>(evidenceSql, ...evidenceParams));
+      const diagnostic = diagnoseTask({
+        status: String(task.status ?? "unknown"),
+        runtimeSubmittedAt: typeof task.runtime_submitted_at === "string" ? task.runtime_submitted_at : null,
+        consumedAt: typeof task.consumed_at === "string" ? task.consumed_at : null,
+        targetSessionStatus: targetSession?.status ?? null,
+        targetSessionExists: Boolean(targetSession),
+        liveSseConnections,
+        targetEverReportedRuntimeEvidence,
+      });
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, task, diagnostic }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: tasks table (V2) ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/tasks") {
+      const taskId = url.searchParams.get("task_id");
+      const status = url.searchParams.get("status");
+      const toName = url.searchParams.get("to_name");
+      const fromName = url.searchParams.get("from_name");
+      const rawBefore = url.searchParams.get("before");
+      const before = rawBefore === null ? null : normalizeTaskBeforeCursor(rawBefore);
+      if (rawBefore !== null && before === null) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_before" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const rawBeforeTaskId = url.searchParams.get("before_task_id");
+      const beforeTaskId = rawBeforeTaskId === null ? null : normalizeTaskBeforeTaskId(rawBeforeTaskId);
+      if (rawBeforeTaskId !== null && (before === null || beforeTaskId === null)) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_before_task_id" }, { status: 400 }));
+      }
+      const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get("limit")) || 50, 200);
+      // #248 — opt-out of the stats GROUP-BY scan. The dashboard chat panel
+      // never consumes `stats`; it's a global per-status table scan that
+      // dominates the request time on a large DB (270 MB / many tasks).
+      // Existing callers that don't pass `skip_stats=1` get the same
+      // {ok, tasks, count, stats} shape — backwards-compatible.
+      const skipStats = url.searchParams.get("skip_stats") === "1";
+
+      let sql = `SELECT ${TASK_REST_SELECT} FROM tasks WHERE 1=1`;
+      const params: any[] = [];
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      if (taskId) { sql += ` AND task_id = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(taskId); }
+      if (status) { sql += ` AND status = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(status); }
+      if (toName) { sql += ` AND to_name = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(toName); }
+      if (fromName) { sql += ` AND from_name = ?${params.length + 1}`; params.push(fromName); }
+      if (before && beforeTaskId) {
+        const createdAtParam = params.length + 1;
+        const taskIdParam = params.length + 2;
+        sql += ` AND (created_at < ?${createdAtParam} OR (created_at = ?${createdAtParam} AND task_id < ?${taskIdParam}))`;
+        params.push(before, beforeTaskId);
+      } else if (before) {
+        sql += ` AND created_at < ?${params.length + 1}`;
+        params.push(before);
+      }
+      sql += ` ORDER BY created_at DESC, task_id DESC LIMIT ?${params.length + 1}`;
+      params.push(limit);
+
+      const rows = db.all(sql, ...params);
+      if (skipStats) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, tasks: rows, count: rows.length }));
+      }
+      const statsParams: any[] = [];
+      let statsSql = "SELECT status, COUNT(*) as count FROM tasks WHERE 1=1";
+      statsSql = addNetworkScope(statsSql, statsParams, restScope);
+      statsSql += " GROUP BY status";
+      const stats = db.all<any>(statsSql, ...statsParams);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, tasks: rows, count: rows.length, stats }));
+    }
+
+    // ── REST: recent completions ──
+    if (url.pathname === "/api/completions") {
+      const since = url.searchParams.get("since") ?? new Date(Date.now() - 86400000).toISOString();
+      const params: any[] = [since];
+      let sql = `SELECT ${COMPLETION_REST_SELECT} FROM completions WHERE completed_at >= ?1`;
+      sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
+      sql += " ORDER BY completed_at DESC LIMIT 100";
+      const rows = db.all(sql, ...params);
+      return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, completions: rows }));
+    }
+
+    return withCors(req, new Response(
+      `CommHub MCP Server v${SERVER_VERSION} (Streamable HTTP + SSE Push)
+
+Endpoints:
+  POST /mcp               - MCP Streamable HTTP (for Claude Code / Codex)
+  GET  /events/:session   - SSE realtime push (Agent subscribes here)
+  GET  /health            - Health check
+  GET  /api/status        - All sessions (auth required)
+  POST /api/task          - Send task via REST (auth required)
+  GET  /api/tasks         - Tasks table (V2) (auth required)
+  GET  /api/completions   - Recent completions (auth required)
+  GET  /api/tmux/:name    - Capture tmux pane output (${TMUX_ENABLED ? "admin + localhost/allowlist required" : "disabled"})
+  POST /api/tmux/:name/send - Send keys to tmux (${TMUX_ENABLED ? "admin + localhost/allowlist required" : "disabled"})
+
+Security: ${SECURITY_LABEL}
+`,
+      { status: 200, headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" } }   // #426
+    ));
+  },
+
+  // ── WebSocket handler for tmux terminal streaming ──
+  websocket: {
+    open(ws) {
+      const { tmuxName } = ws.data as unknown as { tmuxName: string };
+      console.log(`[ws] tmux terminal opened: ${tmuxName}`);
+      let lastOutput = "";
+
+      // Poll capture-pane every 200ms and send diffs
+      const interval = setInterval(async () => {
+        try {
+          const proc = Bun.spawn(["tmux", "capture-pane", "-t", tmuxName, "-p", "-e"], {
+            stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+          });
+          const output = await new Response(proc.stdout).text();
+          const code = await proc.exited;
+          if (code !== 0) return;
+
+          if (output !== lastOutput) {
+            lastOutput = output;
+            ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "output", data: output }));
+          }
+        } catch { /* session gone */ }
+      }, 200);
+
+      wsTmuxIntervals.set(ws, interval);
+
+      // Send initial capture immediately
+      (async () => {
+        try {
+          const proc = Bun.spawn(["tmux", "capture-pane", "-t", tmuxName, "-p", "-e"], {
+            stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+          });
+          const output = await new Response(proc.stdout).text();
+          const code = await proc.exited;
+          if (code === 0) {
+            lastOutput = output;
+            ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "output", data: output }));
+          } else {
+            const err = await new Response(proc.stderr).text();
+            ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "error", data: err.trim() || "tmux session not found" }));
+          }
+        } catch (e) {
+          ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "error", data: (e as Error).message }));
+        }
+      })();
+    },
+
+    async message(ws, message) {
+      const { tmuxName } = ws.data as unknown as { tmuxName: string };
+      try {
+        const msg = JSON.parse(typeof message === "string" ? message : new TextDecoder().decode(message));
+
+        if (msg.type === "input" && typeof msg.data === "string") {
+          // Send individual characters/sequences via send-keys
+          const proc = Bun.spawn(["tmux", "send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, "-l", msg.data], {
+            stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+          });
+          await proc.exited;
+        } else if (msg.type === "key" && typeof msg.data === "string") {
+          // Send special key names (Enter, C-c, etc.)
+          const proc = Bun.spawn(["tmux", "send-keys", "-t", tmuxName, msg.data], {
+            stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+          });
+          await proc.exited;
+        } else if (msg.type === "resize" && msg.cols && msg.rows) {
+          // Resize tmux pane
+          Bun.spawn(["tmux", "resize-window", "-t", tmuxName, "-x", String(msg.cols), "-y", String(msg.rows)], {
+            stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe",
+          });
+        }
+      } catch { /* ignore malformed messages */ }
+    },
+
+    close(ws) {
+      const { tmuxName } = ws.data as unknown as { tmuxName: string };
+      console.log(`[ws] tmux terminal closed: ${tmuxName}`);
+      const interval = wsTmuxIntervals.get(ws);
+      if (interval) { clearInterval(interval); wsTmuxIntervals.delete(ws); }
+    },
+  },
+});
+} // end bootServer
+
+// ── Explicit startup (#438 corrective / 通信龙派单) ──────────────────
+//
+// Importing this module NO LONGER binds a port. The two failure modes
+// this design dodges, both field-verified:
+//
+//   1. `if (import.meta.main)` guard — the published package's process
+//      entry is bin/commhub.ts which DYNAMICALLY imports this module, so
+//      import.meta.main is always false there: the process comes up but
+//      listens on nothing (#438 review finding; would have shipped dead).
+//   2. Module-level `export const server = bootServer()` side effect —
+//      fixes (1) but makes EVERY import bind a port: tooling scripts,
+//      typechecks, and unrelated tests all grab the port by accident.
+//
+// The contract instead: bin/commhub.ts (and anything else that wants a
+// running hub) calls `startHub()` explicitly. Tests that need a private
+// throwaway instance keep using `bootServer({ port: 0 })`, which stays
+// side-effect-free (no sweepers / signal handlers / banner).
+//
+// startHub is SINGLE-SHOT and observable: a second call throws with the
+// first boot's coordinates rather than silently no-op'ing — "I thought I
+// started it but nothing happened" is the same failure family as (1)
+// (承 通信测试马 verification design requirement).
+
+let startedHub: { server: ReturnType<typeof Bun.serve>; startedAt: string } | null = null;
+
+/** The hub instance startHub() booted, or null before startHub() runs.
+ *  Read-only introspection for diagnostics; do not boot through this. */
+export function getStartedHub(): { server: ReturnType<typeof Bun.serve>; startedAt: string } | null {
+  return startedHub;
+}
+
+export function startHub(opts?: { port?: number; hostname?: string }): ReturnType<typeof Bun.serve> {
+  if (startedHub) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `startHub() already ran at ${startedHub.startedAt} (listening on ` +
+      `${startedHub.server.hostname}:${startedHub.server.port}) — it is single-shot ` +
+      `by design (sweepers + signal handlers must register exactly once). ` +
+      `For an additional throwaway instance use bootServer({ port: 0 }).`
+    );
+  }
+  // The current PostgreSQL adapter opens a fresh process/connection for each
+  // statement, so its transaction() cannot provide the occurrence claim +
+  // task creation atomicity this scheduler requires. Refuse before opening a
+  // listening socket instead of silently running an unsafe scheduler.
+  assertScheduledTaskBackendSupported();
+  const server = bootServer(opts);
+
+  // Round-2/4 review ② — periodic retention sweep + incremental VACUUM.
+  // Sweeps every hour by default. Operators can disable any single table
+  // by setting COMMHUB_RETENTION_*_DAYS to a negative value, or shorten
+  // the sweep window via COMMHUB_RETENTION_SWEEP_MINUTES.
+  const sweepIntervalMinutes = Number(process.env.COMMHUB_RETENTION_SWEEP_MINUTES);
+  const sweepIntervalMs = Number.isFinite(sweepIntervalMinutes) && sweepIntervalMinutes > 0
+    ? sweepIntervalMinutes * 60 * 1000
+    : 60 * 60 * 1000;
+  const retentionSweeperTimer = startRetentionSweeper(sweepIntervalMs);
+
+  // Round-2/4 review ③ — stale session sweeper (coexists with the
+  // retention sweeper above; different concerns + different cadences).
+  // Replaces the per-request UPDATE in GET /api/status (+ /api/servers,
+  // /api/server-detail/*, MCP get_all_status). Each of those endpoints
+  // used to run UPDATE on the sessions table just to maintain the
+  // derived `offline` status; with the dashboard polling fast that was
+  // 99% no-op write-amp under hot read paths. Now done globally once
+  // every COMMHUB_STALE_SWEEP_SECONDS (default 60s).
+  const staleSweeperTimer = startStaleSessionSweeper();
+
+  // #476 — the two legacy module-level intervals, now owned by startHub
+  // like every other periodic job: rate-limit map cleanup (memory only)
+  // and task expiration patrol (writes DB — must never run on import).
+  // Periods env-overridable so tests can observe a real firing without
+  // waiting minutes (mirrors COMMHUB_RETENTION_SWEEP_MINUTES above).
+  const rateLimitSweepMs = Number(process.env.COMMHUB_RATELIMIT_SWEEP_MS) > 0
+    ? Number(process.env.COMMHUB_RATELIMIT_SWEEP_MS) : 300000;
+  const taskPatrolMs = Number(process.env.COMMHUB_TASK_PATROL_MS) > 0
+    ? Number(process.env.COMMHUB_TASK_PATROL_MS) : 5 * 60 * 1000;
+  const deliveredStalePatrolMs = Number(process.env.COMMHUB_DELIVERED_STALE_PATROL_MS) > 0
+    ? Number(process.env.COMMHUB_DELIVERED_STALE_PATROL_MS) : 5 * 1000;
+  const rateLimitSweepTimer = setInterval(sweepStaleRateLimits, rateLimitSweepMs);
+  const taskPatrolTimer = setInterval(patrolExpiredTasks, taskPatrolMs);
+  patrolDeliveredStaleTasks();
+  const deliveredStalePatrolTimer = setInterval(patrolDeliveredStaleTasks, deliveredStalePatrolMs);
+  const scheduledTaskTimer = startScheduledTaskScheduler();
+
+  // The Bun.serve socket is what keeps the process alive; the periodic
+  // jobs must not — otherwise a test (or a future caller) that stops the
+  // server would still hang on live intervals it cannot reach.
+  (retentionSweeperTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+  (staleSweeperTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+  (rateLimitSweepTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+  (taskPatrolTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+  (deliveredStalePatrolTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+  (scheduledTaskTimer as any)?.unref?.();
+
+  // ── Graceful shutdown ───────────────────────────────
+  function shutdown() {
+    console.log("[commhub] shutting down...");
+    clearInterval(retentionSweeperTimer);
+    clearInterval(staleSweeperTimer);
+    clearInterval(rateLimitSweepTimer);
+    clearInterval(taskPatrolTimer);
+    clearInterval(deliveredStalePatrolTimer);
+    clearInterval(scheduledTaskTimer);
+    db.close();
+    process.exit(0);
+  }
+  process.on("SIGTERM", shutdown);
+  process.on("SIGINT", shutdown);
+
+  // Banner reports the ACTUAL bound address (matters for port 0).
+  const bHost = server.hostname ?? HOST;
+  const bPort = server.port ?? PORT;
+  console.log(`
+╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+║   CommHub MCP Server v${SERVER_VERSION}                     ║
+║   Transport: Streamable HTTP (Bun native)         ║
+║   Security: ${SECURITY_LABEL}${" ".repeat(Math.max(0, 33 - SECURITY_LABEL.length))}║
+║   Tmux: ${TMUX_ENABLED ? "ENABLED (admin + localhost/allowlist)" : "DISABLED (set COMMHUB_ENABLE_TMUX=1)"}${" ".repeat(Math.max(0, TMUX_ENABLED ? 0 : 2))}║
+║                                                   ║
+║   MCP:    http://${bHost}:${bPort}/mcp                 ║
+║   REST:   http://${bHost}:${bPort}/api                 ║
+║   Health: http://${bHost}:${bPort}/health               ║
+╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
+`);
+
+  // RFC-028 P1 boot banner — vault key configuration status.
+  // F2 invariant: hub MUST boot regardless of vault state. Banner-only
+  // (informational), fire-and-forget so startHub stays synchronous;
+  // errors are raised lazily at vault op time. needsKeyToOp=true means
+  // the operator should set ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY before
+  // vault/provider features will work.
+  import("./vault.js").then(({ vaultStatusForBoot }) => {
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    if (s.needsKeyToOp) {
+      console.warn("[rfc-028 vault] ⚠️  network_secrets/providers have data BUT ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY is unset — vault ops will throw vault_master_key_missing until you set the env. Generate one: `openssl rand -hex 32` (must match the key used at write time).");
+    } else if (s.configured) {
+      console.log(`[rfc-028 vault] master key configured (tables_have_data=${s.tablesHaveData})`);
+    } else {
+      console.log("[rfc-028 vault] master key not set + no vault rows — vault gating is lazy; boot OK. Set ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY when enabling provider/secret features.");
+    }
+  }).catch((e: any) => {
+    console.warn(`[rfc-028 vault] boot banner skipped (${e?.message || e})`);
+  });
+
+  startedHub = { server, startedAt: new Date().toISOString() };
+  return server;
+}