@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.3 → 0.9.0-preview.31

package/src/uploads.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,17 @@ export const UPLOAD_RATE_MAX_ENTRIES = 50_000;
 // traversal.
 export const FILE_ID_REGEX = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,64}$/;
 
+// Stored extension tokens have one invariant at every path boundary:
+// either no extension, or a leading dot followed by 1-16 ASCII
+// alphanumeric characters. Keep this separate from sanitizeExt(), which
+// parses a client filename and therefore deliberately has different
+// capture/anchoring semantics.
+const EXT_TOKEN_REGEX = /^\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,16}$/;
+
+function isValidExtToken(ext: unknown): ext is string {
+  return typeof ext === "string" && (ext === "" || EXT_TOKEN_REGEX.test(ext));
+}
+
 export type GeneratedFile = {
   fileId: string;
   ext: string;
@@ -94,14 +105,51 @@ export function sanitizeExt(filename: string | undefined | null): string {
   return match ? "." + match[1].toLowerCase() : "";
 }
 
+// YYYY-MM-DD bucket string regex — matches what getDateBucket produces
+// and what an index entry's `date_bucket` field is validated against.
+const DATE_BUCKET_REGEX = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/;
+
 /**
- * Build the per-upload storage path. The file_id and ext are validated
- * against strict regexes; any path-separator or `..` segment from a
- * malicious client gets rejected at the regex layer before any I/O.
+ * Validate a date_bucket string against BOTH shape (YYYY-MM-DD regex)
+ * AND real-calendar semantics: rejects "2026-02-30", "2026-13-01",
+ * "2026-00-15", leap-day-on-non-leap-year, etc. Shape-only check is not
+ * enough because the regex accepts any digit combination in each
+ * position.
+ *
+ * Used as a pre-check by the download handler before it calls into
+ * pathForExistingBlob — a non-calendar bucket is a 404 (invalid input
+ * rejected at the boundary), NOT a 500 (uncaught throw from deep in
+ * the read path). Distinguishing these matters: 500 says "server
+ * failed"; 404 says "we know your request is bad, refused early".
+ */
+export function isValidCalendarBucket(bucket: unknown): bucket is string {
+  if (typeof bucket !== "string") return false;
+  if (!DATE_BUCKET_REGEX.test(bucket)) return false;
+  // Round-trip via Date to reject non-calendar shapes like "2026-02-30"
+  // or "2026-13-01". `Date.UTC` coerces overflow ("2026-02-30" becomes
+  // "2026-03-02") — if the ISO round-trip doesn't equal the input, the
+  // caller supplied a non-calendar bucket.
+  const [yStr, mStr, dStr] = bucket.split("-");
+  const y = Number(yStr), m = Number(mStr), d = Number(dStr);
+  if (m < 1 || m > 12) return false;
+  if (d < 1 || d > 31) return false;
+  const roundtrip = new Date(Date.UTC(y, m - 1, d)).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
+  return roundtrip === bucket;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the storage path for a NEW upload. Computes today's date bucket
+ * from the runtime clock (or `opts.now` for tests). Use ONLY for creating
+ * a fresh blob; for reading an existing blob whose bucket is already
+ * recorded in the index, use pathForExistingBlob() instead.
+ *
+ * The file_id and ext are validated against strict regexes; any
+ * path-separator or `..` segment from a malicious client gets rejected
+ * at the regex layer before any I/O.
  */
 export function buildStoragePath(fileId: string, ext: string, opts: { uploadsRoot?: string; now?: Date } = {}): GeneratedFile {
   if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) throw new Error(`file_id "${fileId}" is invalid`);
-  if (ext && !/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,16}$/.test(ext)) throw new Error(`ext "${ext}" is invalid`);
+  if (!isValidExtToken(ext)) throw new Error(`ext "${ext}" is invalid`);
   const dateBucket = getDateBucket(opts.now);
   const root = opts.uploadsRoot ?? getUploadsRoot();
   const relativePath = join(dateBucket, fileId + ext);
@@ -109,6 +157,32 @@ export function buildStoragePath(fileId: string, ext: string, opts: { uploadsRoo
   return { fileId, ext, dateBucket, relativePath, absolutePath };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Build the storage path for an EXISTING blob, using the caller-supplied
+ * `dateBucket` (typically read from the index entry). Does NOT compute
+ * a date from the runtime clock — that is the write-side concern.
+ *
+ * This split exists because sharing one date-computing function between
+ * write and read semantics caused #509: yesterday's file downloaded
+ * today would look under today's bucket → blob_missing → 404, even
+ * though the blob was still sitting in yesterday's directory.
+ *
+ * The file_id, ext and dateBucket are validated against strict regexes
+ * before any I/O; a poisoned index bucket (e.g. `../etc`) is rejected
+ * here just as file_id path-escape attempts are.
+ */
+export function pathForExistingBlob(dateBucket: string, fileId: string, ext: string, opts: { uploadsRoot?: string } = {}): GeneratedFile {
+  if (!FILE_ID_REGEX.test(fileId)) throw new Error(`file_id "${fileId}" is invalid`);
+  if (!isValidExtToken(ext)) throw new Error(`ext "${ext}" is invalid`);
+  if (typeof dateBucket !== "string" || !DATE_BUCKET_REGEX.test(dateBucket)) {
+    throw new Error(`date_bucket "${dateBucket}" is invalid`);
+  }
+  const root = opts.uploadsRoot ?? getUploadsRoot();
+  const relativePath = join(dateBucket, fileId + ext);
+  const absolutePath = join(root, relativePath);
+  return { fileId, ext, dateBucket, relativePath, absolutePath };
+}
+
 export type UploadIndexEntry = {
   file_id: string;
   date_bucket: string; // YYYY-MM-DD
@@ -117,6 +191,15 @@ export type UploadIndexEntry = {
   mime: string;        // best-effort mime from the multipart Content-Type
   size: number;        // byte length of the binary
   owner?: string;      // upload token id / username, for traceability
+  // Written by the upload handler as `authCtx?.userId ?? null`, so `null`
+  // is a real on-disk value — the type must say so rather than pretend
+  // the field is `string | undefined`.
+  owner_id?: string | null;
+  // #503 — network the upload is attributed to. The key is OMITTED (not
+  // written as null) when there is no attribution, so "absent" and
+  // "unattributed" are the same on-disk shape and legacy entries written
+  // before #503 are indistinguishable from new unattributed ones.
+  network_id?: string;
   uploaded_at: string; // ISO 8601
 };
 
@@ -135,10 +218,16 @@ export function indexEntryPath(fileId: string, opts: { uploadsRoot?: string } =
 export function validateIndexEntry(entry: unknown): entry is UploadIndexEntry {
   if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") return false;
   const e: any = entry;
+  // #503 — if the network_id key is present it must be a non-empty string.
+  // An absent key is valid (legacy entries + unattributed uploads); that
+  // keeps this in sync with the writer, which omits the key entirely
+  // rather than writing null. owner_id is deliberately NOT constrained
+  // here — existing entries legitimately carry owner_id=null.
+  if ("network_id" in e && !(typeof e.network_id === "string" && e.network_id.length > 0)) return false;
   return (
     typeof e.file_id === "string" && FILE_ID_REGEX.test(e.file_id) &&
     typeof e.date_bucket === "string" && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(e.date_bucket) &&
-    typeof e.ext === "string" && (e.ext === "" || /^\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,16}$/.test(e.ext)) &&
+    isValidExtToken(e.ext) &&
     typeof e.size === "number" && e.size >= 0 && e.size <= MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES
   );
 }
@@ -241,6 +330,42 @@ export type TaskAttachment = {
   size?: number;
 };
 
+/**
+ * #222 cross-host attachment safety — strip `path` from meta.attachments
+ * entries that ALSO carry a `file_id`. Reason: the hub's /api/upload
+ * returns `{file_id, path}` where `path` is a hub-machine-local
+ * absolute path. Senders sometimes echo `path` back into meta.attachments.
+ * When the receiving agent runs on a different host (Vincent 2026-06-30
+ * toodadev2 case), that path string is meaningless. agent-node's
+ * fetch-attachment.ts will fetch via `file_id` regardless, but leaving
+ * the stale `path` in the JSON misleads any tooling that reads it.
+ *
+ * CRITICAL — conditional, not unconditional (通信龙 PR #222 pre-review
+ * nit): feishu-bridge currently writes `/work/feishu-attachments/<conn>/
+ * <chat>/` directly and ships path-only attachments (NO file_id). If we
+ * strip path unconditionally those break too. Only strip when file_id
+ * is present (the "safe to drop" signal). Single-host feishu fallback
+ * preserved.
+ *
+ * Shared by tools.ts (MCP send_task) and index.ts (REST /api/task) so
+ * both transports apply the same sanitization to meta.
+ */
+export function stripHostLocalPathsForCrossHostSafe(meta: any): any {
+  if (!meta || typeof meta !== "object") return meta;
+  if (!Array.isArray((meta as any).attachments)) return meta;
+  let mutated = false;
+  const sanitized = (meta as any).attachments.map((a: any) => {
+    if (a && typeof a === "object" && typeof a.file_id === "string" && a.file_id && typeof a.path === "string") {
+      mutated = true;
+      const { path: _stripped, ...rest } = a;
+      return rest;
+    }
+    return a;
+  });
+  if (!mutated) return meta;
+  return { ...meta, attachments: sanitized };
+}
+
 /** Light validator usable from the REST handler. Returns null on success or an error message string. */
 export function validateAttachments(input: unknown): { ok: true; attachments: TaskAttachment[] } | { ok: false; error: string } {
   if (input === undefined || input === null) return { ok: true, attachments: [] };

package/src/vault.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// RFC-028 P1 §4.1 vault layer tests. F2 lazy gate is the critical
+// invariant — existing prod hub升级 without ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY
+// must NOT boot-fail. Every test runs with deterministic key isolation.
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterAll } from "bun:test";
+import {
+  encryptSecret, decryptSecret,
+  vaultUpsert, vaultGet, vaultListKeys, vaultDelete,
+  vaultStatusForBoot, vaultMasterKeyFingerprint,
+  _resetVaultKeyForTest, VaultError,
+} from "./vault.js";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+const TEST_KEY_HEX = "0123456789abcdef".repeat(4);   // 32 bytes hex = 64 chars
+
+function setKey(hex: string | undefined): void {
+  if (hex === undefined) delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY;
+  else process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY = hex;
+  _resetVaultKeyForTest();
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  db.run("DELETE FROM network_secrets");
+  db.run("DELETE FROM provider_models");
+  db.run("DELETE FROM providers");
+});
+afterAll(() => { _resetVaultKeyForTest(); delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY; });
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 F2 — LAZY GATE (critical: don't brick prod hub)", () => {
+  test("hub boot WITHOUT env + WITHOUT vault data → vaultStatusForBoot says configured=false, needsKeyToOp=false (boots OK)", () => {
+    setKey(undefined);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(false);
+    // Crucially: no throw, no crash, hub keeps running.
+  });
+
+  test("hub boot WITH env + WITHOUT vault data → configured=true, tablesEmpty (no fingerprint needed)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(true);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("hub WITHOUT env + WITH vault data → needsKeyToOp=true (banner warning, NO throw)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_test", "TEST_KEY", "plaintext-value");
+    setKey(undefined);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(true);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(true);
+    // Still no throw — banner is informational; throw only happens on
+    // actual vault op (test below).
+  });
+
+  test("vault op WITHOUT env throws vault_master_key_missing (lazy throw, not boot throw)", () => {
+    setKey(undefined);
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(VaultError);
+    try { vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v"); }
+    catch (e: any) { expect(e.code).toBe("vault_master_key_missing"); }
+  });
+
+  test("vault op WITH invalid env (not 32 bytes hex) throws vault_master_key_invalid", () => {
+    setKey("not-hex");
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(/vault_master_key_invalid/);
+    setKey("aabbcc");  // too short
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(/vault_master_key_invalid/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — AES-GCM encrypt/decrypt round-trip", () => {
+  test("encrypt+decrypt roundtrip preserves plaintext", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const pt = "sk-ant-api03-abc123xyz";
+    const enc = encryptSecret(pt);
+    expect(enc.ciphertext.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(enc.iv.length).toBe(12);
+    expect(enc.tag.length).toBe(16);
+    expect(decryptSecret(enc)).toBe(pt);
+  });
+
+  test("ciphertext is unique per call (random IV)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const a = encryptSecret("same-secret");
+    const b = encryptSecret("same-secret");
+    expect(a.iv.equals(b.iv)).toBe(false);
+    expect(a.ciphertext.equals(b.ciphertext)).toBe(false);
+    // Both decrypt back to same plaintext
+    expect(decryptSecret(a)).toBe("same-secret");
+    expect(decryptSecret(b)).toBe("same-secret");
+  });
+
+  test("tamper detection — flipping ciphertext bit throws vault_decrypt_failed", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    enc.ciphertext[0] ^= 0x01;
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+
+  test("tamper detection — flipping tag bit throws vault_decrypt_failed", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    enc.tag[0] ^= 0x01;
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+
+  test("wrong key cannot decrypt", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    setKey("ff".repeat(32));  // different key
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — DB ops + key listing (永不返 value)", () => {
+  test("vaultUpsert + vaultGet roundtrip via DB", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_A", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "sk-ant-prod-1");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_A", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")).toBe("sk-ant-prod-1");
+  });
+
+  test("vaultUpsert replaces existing key (same network_id + key)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "K1", "v1");
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "K1", "v2");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_B", "K1")).toBe("v2");
+  });
+
+  test("vaultGet returns null for missing key (does NOT throw)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    expect(vaultGet("net_X", "MISSING")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("vaultListKeys returns key NAMES only (no values, ever)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_L", "KEY_A", "value-a");
+    vaultUpsert("net_L", "KEY_B", "value-b");
+    const keys = vaultListKeys("net_L");
+    expect(keys).toEqual(["KEY_A", "KEY_B"]);  // sorted; no values
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).not.toContain("value-a");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).not.toContain("value-b");
+  });
+
+  test("network isolation — netA's secret不 visible to netB", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_A", "SHARED_NAME", "value-from-A");
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "SHARED_NAME", "value-from-B");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_A", "SHARED_NAME")).toBe("value-from-A");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_B", "SHARED_NAME")).toBe("value-from-B");
+    expect(vaultListKeys("net_A")).toEqual(["SHARED_NAME"]);
+    expect(vaultListKeys("net_B")).toEqual(["SHARED_NAME"]);
+  });
+
+  test("vaultDelete removes key + returns true; second delete returns false", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_D", "K", "v");
+    expect(vaultDelete("net_D", "K")).toBe(true);
+    expect(vaultGet("net_D", "K")).toBeNull();
+    expect(vaultDelete("net_D", "K")).toBe(false);  // no-op
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — master key fingerprint", () => {
+  test("fingerprint same for same key, different for different key", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const fp1 = vaultMasterKeyFingerprint();
+    expect(fp1.length).toBe(16);
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);  // re-set same key
+    expect(vaultMasterKeyFingerprint()).toBe(fp1);
+    setKey("ff".repeat(32));
+    expect(vaultMasterKeyFingerprint()).not.toBe(fp1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — DB ciphertext storage (PRAGMA-style: NO plaintext in DB)", () => {
+  test("BLOB stored is ciphertext, not plaintext (raw SELECT verifies)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const plaintext = "sk-very-secret-key-do-not-leak";
+    vaultUpsert("net_P", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", plaintext);
+    const raw = db.get<{ ciphertext: Buffer | Uint8Array; iv: Buffer | Uint8Array; tag: Buffer | Uint8Array }>(
+      "SELECT ciphertext, iv, tag FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2",
+      "net_P", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+    );
+    expect(raw).not.toBeNull();
+    const ctBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(raw!.ciphertext) ? raw!.ciphertext : Buffer.from(raw!.ciphertext as any);
+    // Plaintext substring MUST NOT appear in ciphertext bytes
+    expect(ctBuf.toString("binary")).not.toContain(plaintext);
+    expect(ctBuf.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(plaintext);
+    // Even as hex / base64 / partial — bytes must not match plaintext bytes
+    const plainBytes = Buffer.from(plaintext, "utf8");
+    let found = false;
+    for (let i = 0; i <= ctBuf.length - plainBytes.length; i++) {
+      if (ctBuf.subarray(i, i + plainBytes.length).equals(plainBytes)) { found = true; break; }
+    }
+    expect(found).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

package/src/vault.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — vault layer (AES-GCM at-rest + lazy master key gate).
+//
+// F2 CRITICAL: master key from ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY env is
+// resolved LAZILY — hub boot does NOT require it. Existing prod hubs
+// without the env should boot + run normally. The env is only required
+// when:
+//   (a) vault write hits (upsert_network_secret)
+//   (b) vault read hits (probe / create-node env_refs)
+//   (c) network_secrets / providers tables are non-empty at boot
+//       (banner status only — doesn't throw)
+//
+// If the env is missing AND a vault op runs → throw `vault_master_key_missing`
+// with explicit migration message. Existing hub stays up.
+
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+let _masterKey: Buffer | null = null;
+let _bootBannerShown = false;
+
+/** Lazy getter — throws on first vault op if env missing. */
+export function getVaultMasterKey(): Buffer {
+  if (_masterKey) return _masterKey;
+  const hex = process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY;
+  if (!hex) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_master_key_missing",
+      "ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY env var not set. Generate one: openssl rand -hex 32. " +
+      "Required only when using vault/provider features; this op tried to access vault."
+    );
+  }
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(hex)) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_master_key_invalid",
+      "ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY must be 32 bytes hex (64 chars). Generate: openssl rand -hex 32"
+    );
+  }
+  _masterKey = Buffer.from(hex, "hex");
+  return _masterKey;
+}
+
+/** Banner-only check (does not throw). Call on boot for operator visibility. */
+export function vaultStatusForBoot(): { configured: boolean; tablesHaveData: boolean; needsKeyToOp: boolean } {
+  const configured = !!process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY
+    && /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY);
+  let tablesHaveData = false;
+  try {
+    const r1 = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM network_secrets");
+    const r2 = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM providers");
+    tablesHaveData = (r1?.n || 0) > 0 || (r2?.n || 0) > 0;
+  } catch { /* tables may not exist yet */ }
+  return {
+    configured,
+    tablesHaveData,
+    needsKeyToOp: tablesHaveData && !configured,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Reset for unit tests (must be combined with delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY). */
+export function _resetVaultKeyForTest(): void { _masterKey = null; _bootBannerShown = false; }
+
+export class VaultError extends Error {
+  constructor(public code: string, msg: string) {
+    super(`${code}: ${msg}`);
+    this.name = "VaultError";
+  }
+}
+
+// ── AES-GCM encrypt/decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// AES-256-GCM. 12-byte IV per RFC 5116. Auth tag is 16 bytes. We
+// store iv + ciphertext + tag separately (DB schema mirrors NIST SP
+// 800-38D structure for forward-compatibility).
+
+const ALGO = "aes-256-gcm";
+const IV_BYTES = 12;
+const TAG_BYTES = 16;
+
+export interface EncryptedSecret {
+  ciphertext: Buffer;
+  iv: Buffer;
+  tag: Buffer;
+}
+
+export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): EncryptedSecret {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  const iv = randomBytes(IV_BYTES);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGO, key, iv);
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return { ciphertext: ct, iv, tag };
+}
+
+export function decryptSecret(enc: EncryptedSecret): string {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  if (enc.tag.length !== TAG_BYTES) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_tag_invalid", `auth tag must be ${TAG_BYTES} bytes, got ${enc.tag.length}`);
+  }
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGO, key, enc.iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(enc.tag);
+  try {
+    const pt = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(enc.ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
+    return pt.toString("utf8");
+  } catch (e: any) {
+    // GCM auth fail = either wrong key, tampered ciphertext, or
+    // tampered iv/tag. All collapse to one error.
+    throw new VaultError("vault_decrypt_failed", `AES-GCM auth fail (key/iv/tag/ciphertext mismatch): ${e?.message || e}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── DB ops ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export function vaultUpsert(networkId: string, key: string, plaintext: string): void {
+  const enc = encryptSecret(plaintext);
+  const now = Date.now();
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO network_secrets (network_id, key, ciphertext, iv, tag, created_at, updated_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?6)
+     ON CONFLICT(network_id, key) DO UPDATE SET
+       ciphertext = ?3, iv = ?4, tag = ?5, updated_at = ?6`,
+    [networkId, key, enc.ciphertext, enc.iv, enc.tag, now],
+  );
+}
+
+/** Returns the decrypted plaintext, or null if no row.
+ *  Throws VaultError on missing key / decrypt failure. */
+export function vaultGet(networkId: string, key: string): string | null {
+  const row = db.get<{ ciphertext: Buffer; iv: Buffer; tag: Buffer }>(
+    "SELECT ciphertext, iv, tag FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2",
+    networkId, key,
+  );
+  if (!row) return null;
+  return decryptSecret({
+    ciphertext: Buffer.isBuffer(row.ciphertext) ? row.ciphertext : Buffer.from(row.ciphertext as any),
+    iv:         Buffer.isBuffer(row.iv)         ? row.iv         : Buffer.from(row.iv as any),
+    tag:        Buffer.isBuffer(row.tag)        ? row.tag        : Buffer.from(row.tag as any),
+  });
+}
+
+/** List vault key names for a network (NEVER returns values). */
+export function vaultListKeys(networkId: string): string[] {
+  const rows = db.all<{ key: string }>(
+    "SELECT key FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 ORDER BY key",
+    networkId,
+  );
+  return rows.map(r => r.key);
+}
+
+export function vaultDelete(networkId: string, key: string): boolean {
+  const r: any = db.run("DELETE FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2", [networkId, key]);
+  return (r?.changes ?? 0) > 0;
+}
+
+/** Test/diagnostic: fingerprint of master key (sha256 hex first 8) so
+ *  ops can verify two hubs share the same vault key without leaking it. */
+export function vaultMasterKeyFingerprint(): string {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  return createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+}