@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.280 → 0.9.0-preview.281
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/build-info.json +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/anet-variant-real-daemon-http.test.ts +3 -2
- package/src/build-commit-report-http.test.ts +3 -2
- package/src/health-redaction.test.ts +8 -4
- package/src/launched-by-cli-report-http.test.ts +155 -0
- package/src/node-inbox-allowlist-http.test.ts +320 -0
- package/src/node-lifecycle-read.ts +1 -1
- package/src/node-permissions.ts +133 -2
- package/src/requirements-comment-http.test.ts +1 -1
- package/src/requirements-status-participants-http.test.ts +3 -3
- package/src/scheduled-tasks.ts +19 -3
- package/src/server.ts +76 -6
- package/src/session-project-attach-migration.test.ts +2 -1
- package/src/session-project-attach-native.test.ts +3 -1
- package/src/session-project-create-http.test.ts +3 -2
- package/src/session-project-create-native.test.ts +3 -1
- package/src/session-source-delivery.ts +5 -0
- package/src/session-source-directory-http.test.ts +5 -1
- package/src/session-source-evidence.test.ts +11 -4
- package/src/session-source-transport.ts +7 -1
- package/src/test-work-root.ts +18 -0
- package/src/tools.ts +43 -17
package/src/node-permissions.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -36,17 +36,23 @@ export type NodePermissionReason =
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* 这类令牌**没有 nodes 行**,两张白名单都管不到它;先按「记录」模式跑,看有多少。 */
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| "unbound_token"
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/** #2969 续 —— 主人在这个节点的 REST 白名单里没有列这条写路由。 */
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-
| "rest_not_allowed"
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| "rest_not_allowed"
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/** 收件白名单 —— **目标**节点的主人设了收件白名单,发件人不在名单上。判的是收件方,不是调用方。 */
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| "sender_not_allowed";
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/** 显式模式的原因:不看开关,永远拒。 */
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// 白名单和 readonly/restricted 同类:**主人主动设的,设了就立刻生效**,不看开关。
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-
const MODE_REASONS: ReadonlySet<NodePermissionReason> = new Set(["mode_readonly", "mode_restricted_not_assigned", "peer_not_allowed", "tool_not_allowed", "rest_not_allowed"]);
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const MODE_REASONS: ReadonlySet<NodePermissionReason> = new Set(["mode_readonly", "mode_restricted_not_assigned", "peer_not_allowed", "tool_not_allowed", "rest_not_allowed", "sender_not_allowed"]);
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// #2969 —— 节点级对端白名单:JSON 数组(alias 或 node_id);NULL = 不限制。
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// 只增不改:旧代码不读这一列;设为 NULL 时行为与现在完全一致。
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// #2969 后半 —— 接口白名单:JSON 数组(MCP 工具名);NULL = 不限制。
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// #2969 续 —— REST 写接口白名单:JSON 数组(形如 "POST /api/task");NULL = 不限制。
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// 只对**节点令牌的写方法**生效(GET / SSE 永不经过它,否则节点会变聋)。
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// 收件白名单:JSON 数组(alias / node_id / user:<username|user_id> / user:* / !strict);NULL = 谁都能发。
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try { db.exec("ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN inbox_allowlist TEXT"); } catch (e: any) {
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if (!/duplicate column|already exists/i.test(e?.message || "")) throw e;
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}
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try { db.exec("ALTER TABLE nodes ADD COLUMN rest_allowlist TEXT"); } catch (e: any) {
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if (!/duplicate column|already exists/i.test(e?.message || "")) throw e;
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}
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@@ -304,6 +310,7 @@ const HINTS: Record<NodePermissionReason, string> = {
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tool_not_allowed: "this node is limited to an explicit tool allowlist; this tool is not on it — ask the node's owner to add it, or clear the allowlist",
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unbound_token: "this token does not resolve to a node (usually the node was renamed and the token was not); rename or bind the token, or issue a node-bound token",
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rest_not_allowed: "this node is limited to an explicit REST write allowlist; this route is not on it — ask the node's owner to add it, or clear the allowlist",
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sender_not_allowed: "the target node only accepts tasks and messages from an explicit inbox allowlist and you are not on it — ask the target node's owner to add you (alias, node_id, or user:<username>), or clear its inbox allowlist",
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};
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export function nodePermissionDeniedBody(reason: NodePermissionReason, route: string): { ok: false; error: "node_permission_denied"; reason: NodePermissionReason; route: string; hint: string } {
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@@ -400,6 +407,130 @@ export function broadcastVerdict(id: NodeIdentity): Verdict {
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return null;
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}
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// ── 收件白名单(接收侧) ──
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//
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// 上面几条判的都是**调用方**能不能发;这里判**收件方**愿不愿意收。两边独立、都要过。
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// 名单条目:
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// alias / node_id → 匹配 Agent 发件人(节点令牌)
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// user:<username|user_id> → 匹配人(Dashboard / 桌面端的用户令牌);user:* = 任何人
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// !strict → 关掉下面的隐式放行
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// 隐式放行(没有 !strict 时):节点主人、网络 owner/admin、Hub 管理员、旧的无身份调用(open/legacy 模式,
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// 本来就「谁都是谁」,名单在那里无从判起)。目的:主人设名单时不会把自己锁在门外。
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// 节点发给自己永远放行(含 !strict)。
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export const INBOX_STRICT_ENTRY = "!strict";
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export type InboxSender =
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| { kind: "node"; nodeId: string | null; aliases: string[] }
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| { kind: "user"; userId: string; username: string | null; isHubAdmin?: boolean }
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| { kind: "legacy" };
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/** 从调用方的令牌上下文得出发件人(REST 与 MCP 共用,免得两边口径漂)。 */
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export function inboxSenderFromAuth(auth: { isNodeToken: boolean; tokenId: string | null; boundNetworkId: string | null; userId: string | null; username: string | null }): InboxSender {
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if (auth.isNodeToken) {
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const id = auth.boundNetworkId ? nodeIdentity(auth.tokenId, auth.boundNetworkId) : null;
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return { kind: "node", nodeId: id?.nodeId ?? null, aliases: id?.aliases ?? [] };
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}
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if (auth.userId) {
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const isHubAdmin = db.get<{ role: string | null }>("SELECT role FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", auth.userId)?.role === "admin";
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return { kind: "user", userId: auth.userId, username: auth.username, isHubAdmin };
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}
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return { kind: "legacy" };
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}
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export function inboxSenderLabel(sender: InboxSender): string {
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if (sender.kind === "node") return sender.aliases[0] ?? (sender.nodeId ? `node:${sender.nodeId}` : "node:?");
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if (sender.kind === "user") return `user:${sender.username ?? sender.userId}`;
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return "legacy";
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}
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type InboxTargetRow = { node_id: string; alias: string | null; owner_user_id: string | null; inbox_allowlist: string | null };
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function inboxTargetRow(networkId: string | null, target: AgentRef): InboxTargetRow | null {
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if (target.nodeId) {
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const row = db.get<InboxTargetRow>(
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"SELECT node_id, alias, owner_user_id, inbox_allowlist FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", target.nodeId);
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if (row) return row;
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}
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if (target.alias && networkId) {
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return db.get<InboxTargetRow>(
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"SELECT node_id, alias, owner_user_id, inbox_allowlist FROM nodes WHERE alias = ?1 AND network_id = ?2 LIMIT 1", target.alias, networkId);
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}
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return null;
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}
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/** 纯判定(不记账):名单 + 发件人 → 放不放行。 */
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export function inboxAllows(
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list: string[] | null,
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sender: InboxSender,
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ctx: { targetNodeId: string; targetAlias: string | null; ownerUserId: string | null; networkId: string | null },
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): boolean {
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if (!list) return true;
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if (sender.kind === "node") {
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if ((sender.nodeId && sender.nodeId === ctx.targetNodeId) || (ctx.targetAlias && sender.aliases.includes(ctx.targetAlias))) return true;
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return (!!sender.nodeId && list.includes(sender.nodeId)) || sender.aliases.some(a => list.includes(a));
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}
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const strict = list.includes(INBOX_STRICT_ENTRY);
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if (sender.kind === "legacy") return !strict;
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if (!strict) {
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if (sender.isHubAdmin) return true;
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if (ctx.ownerUserId && sender.userId === ctx.ownerUserId) return true;
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if (ctx.networkId) {
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const role = db.get<{ role: string }>("SELECT role FROM network_members WHERE network_id = ?1 AND user_id = ?2", ctx.networkId, sender.userId)?.role;
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if (role === "owner" || role === "admin") return true;
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}
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}
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return list.includes("user:*")
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|| list.includes(`user:${sender.userId}`)
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|| (!!sender.username && list.includes(`user:${sender.username}`));
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}
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export type InboxDenial = ReturnType<typeof nodePermissionDeniedBody> & { target: string; sender: string };
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/**
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* 发往 target 之前判一次收件白名单。放行 → null;拒绝 → 拒绝体(REST 403 / MCP 文本同形),
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* 并按**目标节点**记一行 node_permission_log(主人在报表里能看到谁被挡在门外)。
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*/
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export function inboxDenied(networkId: string | null, target: AgentRef, sender: InboxSender, route: string): InboxDenial | null {
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const row = inboxTargetRow(networkId, target);
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if (!row) return null;
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const list = normalizePeerAllowlist(row.inbox_allowlist);
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if (!list) return null;
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if (inboxAllows(list, sender, { targetNodeId: row.node_id, targetAlias: row.alias ?? target.alias, ownerUserId: row.owner_user_id, networkId })) return null;
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const senderLabel = inboxSenderLabel(sender);
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const targetLabel = row.alias ?? target.alias ?? row.node_id;
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if (networkId) {
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recordNodePermission({
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networkId, nodeId: row.node_id, logKey: row.node_id, aliases: row.alias ? [row.alias] : [], ownerUserId: row.owner_user_id,
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mode: "normal", peerAllowlist: null, toolAllowlist: null, restAllowlist: null,
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}, route, "sender_not_allowed", senderLabel);
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}
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return { ...nodePermissionDeniedBody("sender_not_allowed", route), target: targetLabel, sender: senderLabel };
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}
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export type InboxSkipped = { alias: string; node_id: string | null; reason: "sender_not_allowed" };
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/**
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* 广播:收件白名单不收这个发件人的收件人**跳过**(不让整条广播失败),并报告给调用方。
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* 快路径:全库没有任何节点设收件白名单时一次查询就返回,不逐个判。
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*/
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export function filterBroadcastByInbox<T extends { alias: string; node_id: string | null; network_id: string | null }>(
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targets: readonly T[], effectiveNetId: string | null, sender: InboxSender, route: string,
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): { allowed: T[]; skipped: InboxSkipped[] } {
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if (!targets.length || !db.get("SELECT 1 AS ok FROM nodes WHERE inbox_allowlist IS NOT NULL LIMIT 1")) {
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return { allowed: [...targets], skipped: [] };
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}
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const allowed: T[] = [];
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const skipped: InboxSkipped[] = [];
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for (const t of targets) {
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if (inboxDenied(effectiveNetId ?? t.network_id ?? null, { alias: t.alias, nodeId: t.node_id }, sender, route)) {
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skipped.push({ alias: t.alias, node_id: t.node_id ?? null, reason: "sender_not_allowed" });
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} else {
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allowed.push(t);
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}
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}
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return { allowed, skipped };
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}
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/** 一般的写(管节点、提交技能、探测模型…):只读 / 受限拒;正常放行(由各自的既有规则管)。 */
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export function writeVerdict(id: NodeIdentity, sample?: string): Verdict {
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if (id.mode === "readonly") return { reason: "mode_readonly", sample };
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@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ describe("requirements_comment", () => {
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const lines = raw.split("\n").filter(x => x.startsWith("data:"));
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const tools = (lines.length ? JSON.parse(lines.at(-1)!.slice(5).trim()) : JSON.parse(raw)).result.tools as any[];
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const byName = new Map(tools.map(t => [t.name, t]));
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expect(String(byName.get("requirements_comment")?.description)).
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expect(String(byName.get("requirements_comment")?.description)).toMatch(/append-only/i);
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expect(String(byName.get("requirements_events")?.description)).toContain("kind=comment");
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});
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});
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@@ -207,14 +207,14 @@ describe("tool descriptions", () => {
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const tools = (await rpc(U.nodeA.token, "tools/list", {})).result.tools as any[];
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const byName = new Map(tools.map(t => [t.name, t]));
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const update = byName.get("requirements_update");
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expect(update.description).
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expect(update.description).toMatch(/participants REPLACES the (whole )?list/);
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expect(update.inputSchema.properties.participants.description).toContain("REPLACES");
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expect(Object.keys(update.inputSchema.properties)).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(["status", "participants_add", "participants_remove"]));
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// #478:节点令牌的 tools/list 里本来就没有 projects_create / projects_update(调了也是 403),那两条的说明从人的列表里读。
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expect(byName.has("projects_create")).toBe(false);
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const human = new Map(((await rpc(U.member.token, "tools/list", {})).result.tools as any[]).map(t => [t.name, t]));
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expect(byName.get("projects_list").description).toMatch(/node (?:\(Agent\) )?tokens can only read projects/i);
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for (const name of ["projects_create", "projects_update"]) expect(human.get(name).description).toMatch(/node (?:\(Agent\) )?tokens can only read projects/i);
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expect(byName.get("projects_list").description).toMatch(/node (?:\(Agent\) )?tokens (?:can only read projects|read only)/i);
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for (const name of ["projects_create", "projects_update"]) expect(human.get(name).description).toMatch(/node (?:\(Agent\) )?tokens (?:can only read projects|read only)/i);
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const denied = await mcp(U.nodeA.token, "projects_create", { name: "示例项目" });
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expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
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expect(denied.error).toBe("user_token_required");
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package/src/scheduled-tasks.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { assertNodeHealthy } from "./node-health-guard.js";
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import { nodeCanAcceptDispatch } from "./node-serviceability.js";
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import { addNetworkScope, canRestWriteNetwork, singleNetworkId, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
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import { canMessageAgent, type AgentRef } from "./agent-access.js";
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import { dispatchVerdict } from "./node-permissions.js";
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import { dispatchVerdict, inboxDenied, type InboxSender } from "./node-permissions.js";
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import { hasSubscribers, pushEvent, pushNetworkObserverEvent } from "./push.js";
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import { SCHEDULED_TASK_STORAGE_SELECT } from "./rest-projections.js";
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import { blockerTimedOut, blockerTimeoutClock, expireStuckBlocker, sendStuckNotice, skipsBlockedBy, stuckNoticeSkips, stuckTimeoutMs, type StuckNotice } from "./scheduled-stuck.js";
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@@ -403,6 +403,22 @@ function agentCreatorDenial(row: ScheduledRow, target: AgentRef): { code: string
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return null;
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}
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/** 目标节点的收件白名单每次触发都按「建排程的人 / 节点」现判一次(名单可能在排程建好之后才设)。 */
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function creatorInboxDenial(row: ScheduledRow, target: AgentRef): { code: string; message: string } | null {
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let sender: InboxSender;
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|
409
|
+
if (row.created_by_node_id) {
|
|
410
|
+
const alias = db.get<{ alias: string | null }>("SELECT alias FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1 AND network_id = ?2", row.created_by_node_id, row.network_id)?.alias;
|
|
411
|
+
sender = { kind: "node", nodeId: row.created_by_node_id, aliases: alias ? [alias] : [] };
|
|
412
|
+
} else if (row.created_by) {
|
|
413
|
+
const user = db.get<{ username: string | null; role: string | null }>("SELECT username, role FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", row.created_by);
|
|
414
|
+
sender = { kind: "user", userId: row.created_by, username: user?.username ?? null, isHubAdmin: user?.role === "admin" };
|
|
415
|
+
} else {
|
|
416
|
+
sender = { kind: "legacy" };
|
|
417
|
+
}
|
|
418
|
+
const denial = inboxDenied(row.network_id, target, sender, "schedule:dispatch");
|
|
419
|
+
return denial ? { code: "sender_not_allowed", message: `The target agent's inbox allowlist does not accept the schedule creator (${denial.sender})` } : null;
|
|
420
|
+
}
|
|
421
|
+
|
|
406
422
|
type DispatchEvent = { alias: string; networkId: string; taskId: string; priority: string; state: "delivered" | "queued" };
|
|
407
423
|
|
|
408
424
|
export function dispatchScheduledOccurrence(row: ScheduledRow, scheduledFor: string, advanceSchedule: boolean, advanceAfter = new Date()): { runId: string; taskId?: string; status: string; event?: DispatchEvent } {
|
|
@@ -574,11 +590,11 @@ export function dispatchScheduledOccurrence(row: ScheduledRow, scheduledFor: str
|
|
|
574
590
|
// 给目标 Agent 发任务时,不再代他派发(否则受限前建的排程会永远绕过授权)。
|
|
575
591
|
// Board #733 — an Agent-created schedule is that node's standing send_task: every run re-evaluates the
|
|
576
592
|
// creating node as it is NOW (exists, not read-only, current owner) with send_task's own dispatchVerdict.
|
|
577
|
-
const creatorDenial = row.created_by_node_id
|
|
593
|
+
const creatorDenial = (row.created_by_node_id
|
|
578
594
|
? agentCreatorDenial(row, { alias: node.alias, nodeId: node.node_id })
|
|
579
595
|
: row.created_by && !canMessageAgent(row.created_by, row.network_id, { alias: node.alias, nodeId: node.node_id })
|
|
580
596
|
? { code: "creator_access_revoked", message: "The schedule creator is no longer allowed to message this agent" }
|
|
581
|
-
: null;
|
|
597
|
+
: null) ?? creatorInboxDenial(row, { alias: node.alias, nodeId: node.node_id });
|
|
582
598
|
if (creatorDenial) {
|
|
583
599
|
finalStatus = "failed";
|
|
584
600
|
db.run(
|
package/src/server.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import { dmParticipantSeesFile, listDmThread, listDmThreads, sendHumanDm } from
|
|
|
54
54
|
import { groupMemberSeesFile, groupUnreadFor, listGroupMessages, listGroupThreads, markGroupRead, memberGroup, sendGroupMessage } from "./group-messages.js";
|
|
55
55
|
import { getTaskAccessMode, isTaskScoped, listProjectGrants, replaceTaskGrants, newMemberTaskAccess } from "./task-access.js";
|
|
56
56
|
import { canMessageAgent, isAgentRestricted, visibleAgents, listAgentGrants, listGroupGrants, getAgentAccessMode, replaceAgentGrants, restrictedNetworkIds, usernameIsAgentAlias, listAgentGroups, createAgentGroup, updateAgentGroup, replaceAgentGroupMembers, deleteAgentGroup, usersGrantedGroup, listDepartmentGrants, departmentCoverage } from "./agent-access.js";
|
|
57
|
-
import { broadcastVerdict, dispatchVerdict, humanOnlyVerdict, NODE_PERMISSION_MODES, nodeDecide, nodeIdentity, nodePermissionDeniedBody, nodePermissionsFlag, streamVerdict, writeVerdict, type NodeIdentity, type NodePermissionMode, type Verdict } from "./node-permissions.js";
|
|
57
|
+
import { broadcastVerdict, dispatchVerdict, filterBroadcastByInbox, humanOnlyVerdict, inboxDenied, inboxSenderFromAuth, NODE_PERMISSION_MODES, nodeDecide, nodeIdentity, nodePermissionDeniedBody, nodePermissionsFlag, streamVerdict, writeVerdict, type InboxSender, type NodeIdentity, type NodePermissionMode, type Verdict } from "./node-permissions.js";
|
|
58
58
|
import { validateAvatarUrl } from "./avatar-validate.js";
|
|
59
59
|
import { narrowTags, parseStoredTags, validateScalarAttr } from "./node-attrs-validate.js";
|
|
60
60
|
import { daemonDefaultWorkdirRoot } from "./create-node-validate.js";
|
|
@@ -216,7 +216,9 @@ const SERVER_VERSION_SOURCE = RESOLVED_VERSION.source;
|
|
|
216
216
|
// PUT /api/nodes/:id/permission-mode 与 GET /api/networks/:id/node-permission-report 可用(RFC-041 第一阶段)。
|
|
217
217
|
// chat_groups(RFC-042,#457):部门群可用 —— …/departments/:dept/group、…/chat-groups(资料 / 成员 / 消息 / 已读)、
|
|
218
218
|
// GET /api/dm/threads 的 group_threads;群对象带 viewer_can {manage, post},会话行带 last_message 预览,成员带 username / display_name。
|
|
219
|
-
|
|
219
|
+
// node_inbox_allowlist:收件白名单可用 —— PUT /api/nodes/:id/inbox-allowlist { senders },GET /api/nodes 每行带 inbox_allowlist,
|
|
220
|
+
// 被挡的派活回 reason=sender_not_allowed,广播回 inbox_skipped(有人被跳过时才出现,没人被跳过时回执与以前逐字节相同)。
|
|
221
|
+
export const HUB_HEALTH_CAPABILITIES = ["status_node_id", "node_permission_mode", "chat_groups", "node_inbox_allowlist"] as const;
|
|
220
222
|
|
|
221
223
|
// In-memory log ring buffer — last N lines streamed via /api/server-logs.
|
|
222
224
|
// Wraps console.log/info/warn/error so EVERY existing log call lands here
|
|
@@ -478,6 +480,13 @@ function restNodeDenied(req: Request, restAuth: { networkId: string | null; toke
|
|
|
478
480
|
const verdict = verdictOf(id);
|
|
479
481
|
return nodeDecide(id, route, verdict) ? withCors(req, Response.json(nodePermissionDeniedBody(verdict!.reason, route), { status: 403 })) : null;
|
|
480
482
|
}
|
|
483
|
+
/** 收件白名单的发件人:网络绑定令牌 = 节点;用户令牌 = 人;没有身份 = legacy。 */
|
|
484
|
+
function restInboxSender(_req: Request, restAuth: { networkId: string | null; tokenId: string | null; userId?: string | null; username?: string | null } | null): InboxSender {
|
|
485
|
+
return inboxSenderFromAuth({
|
|
486
|
+
isNodeToken: !!restAuth?.networkId, tokenId: restAuth?.tokenId ?? null, boundNetworkId: restAuth?.networkId ?? null,
|
|
487
|
+
userId: restAuth?.userId ?? null, username: restAuth?.username ?? null,
|
|
488
|
+
});
|
|
489
|
+
}
|
|
481
490
|
/** 写别的节点 = 只有人能做;写自己 = 只看模式。 */
|
|
482
491
|
const nodeTargetVerdict = (targetNodeId: string) => (id: NodeIdentity): Verdict =>
|
|
483
492
|
id.nodeId && id.nodeId === targetNodeId ? writeVerdict(id, targetNodeId) : humanOnlyVerdict(id, targetNodeId);
|
|
@@ -4352,6 +4361,45 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
4352
4361
|
logAudit(restAuth.userId, restAuth.username, "node_peer_allowlist_changed", "node", node2.node_id, JSON.stringify({ from: node2.peer_allowlist, to: nextValue }), getClientIP(req), node2.network_id);
|
|
4353
4362
|
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, node_id: node2.node_id, peers: peers.length ? peers : null }));
|
|
4354
4363
|
}
|
|
4364
|
+
// 收件白名单:PUT /api/nodes/:id/inbox-allowlist { senders: string[] | null }
|
|
4365
|
+
// 与 peer-allowlist 同一套授权、审计与空数组语义(拒收 [],清空请传 null)。
|
|
4366
|
+
// 条目语法与发件人匹配规则见 node-permissions.ts「收件白名单」。
|
|
4367
|
+
const inboxAllowMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/nodes\/([^/]+)\/inbox-allowlist$/);
|
|
4368
|
+
if (inboxAllowMatch && req.method === "PUT") {
|
|
4369
|
+
if (!restAuth) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
|
|
4370
|
+
if (restAuth.networkId) return userTokenRequired(req);
|
|
4371
|
+
let body: any;
|
|
4372
|
+
try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_json" }, { status: 400 })); }
|
|
4373
|
+
const rawSenders = body?.senders;
|
|
4374
|
+
if (rawSenders !== null && rawSenders !== undefined && !Array.isArray(rawSenders)) {
|
|
4375
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_senders", message: "senders must be an array of alias / node_id / user:<username> strings, or null" }, { status: 400 }));
|
|
4376
|
+
}
|
|
4377
|
+
const senders = Array.isArray(rawSenders)
|
|
4378
|
+
? rawSenders.filter((x: unknown): x is string => typeof x === "string" && x.trim().length > 0).map((x: string) => x.trim())
|
|
4379
|
+
: [];
|
|
4380
|
+
if (Array.isArray(rawSenders) && senders.length === 0) {
|
|
4381
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({
|
|
4382
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
4383
|
+
error: "empty_allowlist_ambiguous",
|
|
4384
|
+
message: "send null to clear the allowlist (no restriction); an empty array is ambiguous and is rejected",
|
|
4385
|
+
}, { status: 400 }));
|
|
4386
|
+
}
|
|
4387
|
+
if (senders.length > 200) {
|
|
4388
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "too_many_senders", message: "at most 200 entries" }, { status: 400 }));
|
|
4389
|
+
}
|
|
4390
|
+
const nodeRef5 = decodeURIComponent(inboxAllowMatch[1]);
|
|
4391
|
+
const node5 = db.get<{ node_id: string; network_id: string | null; owner_user_id: string | null; inbox_allowlist: string | null }>(
|
|
4392
|
+
"SELECT node_id, network_id, owner_user_id, inbox_allowlist FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", nodeRef5);
|
|
4393
|
+
const role5 = node5?.network_id ? getUserNetworkRole(restAuth.userId, node5.network_id) : null;
|
|
4394
|
+
if (!node5 || !node5.network_id || (!role5 && !isAdmin)) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "node_not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
|
|
4395
|
+
if (!canRestWriteNodeSecurity(restAuth, node5.owner_user_id, role5, isAdmin)) {
|
|
4396
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied", message: "only the node's owner or a network owner/admin can change its inbox allowlist" }, { status: 403 }));
|
|
4397
|
+
}
|
|
4398
|
+
const nextSenders = senders.length ? JSON.stringify(senders) : null;
|
|
4399
|
+
db.run("UPDATE nodes SET inbox_allowlist = ?1 WHERE node_id = ?2", [nextSenders, node5.node_id]);
|
|
4400
|
+
logAudit(restAuth.userId, restAuth.username, "node_inbox_allowlist_changed", "node", node5.node_id, JSON.stringify({ from: node5.inbox_allowlist, to: nextSenders }), getClientIP(req), node5.network_id);
|
|
4401
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, node_id: node5.node_id, senders: senders.length ? senders : null }));
|
|
4402
|
+
}
|
|
4355
4403
|
const permReportMatch = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/networks\/([^/]+)\/node-permission-report$/);
|
|
4356
4404
|
if (permReportMatch && req.method === "GET") {
|
|
4357
4405
|
if (!restAuth) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth required" }, { status: 401 }));
|
|
@@ -5766,6 +5814,8 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
5766
5814
|
...(canonical.renamed ? { renamed_from: body.alias, renamed_to: targetAlias } : {}),
|
|
5767
5815
|
}, { status: 404 })));
|
|
5768
5816
|
}
|
|
5817
|
+
const inboxRefused = inboxDenied(taskNetId ?? null, { alias: targetAlias, nodeId: target.session?.node_id ?? null }, restInboxSender(req, restAuth), "POST /api/task");
|
|
5818
|
+
if (inboxRefused) return reject(withCors(req, Response.json(inboxRefused, { status: 403 })));
|
|
5769
5819
|
// Identity binding, mirroring the MCP transport (tools.ts defaultFrom /
|
|
5770
5820
|
// fromIdentityMismatchReply). Both transports resolve the same
|
|
5771
5821
|
// api_tokens row through resolveToken, and auth.ts already documents the
|
|
@@ -6025,14 +6075,15 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
6025
6075
|
sql = addNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope);
|
|
6026
6076
|
if (body.filter_server) { sql += " AND server = ?"; params.push(body.filter_server); }
|
|
6027
6077
|
if (body.filter_status) { sql += " AND status = ?"; params.push(body.filter_status); }
|
|
6028
|
-
const
|
|
6078
|
+
const allTargets = db.all<{ alias: string; node_id: string | null; network_id: string | null }>(sql, ...params);
|
|
6079
|
+
const { allowed: targets, skipped: inboxSkipped } = filterBroadcastByInbox(allTargets, restScope.networkId ?? null, restInboxSender(req, restAuth), "POST /api/broadcast");
|
|
6029
6080
|
// #2721 —— 与 MCP broadcast 同一条分批路径(reason 见 broadcast-fanout.ts 顶部)。
|
|
6030
6081
|
const { ids } = await enqueueBroadcast(targets, body.message, "api", null, {
|
|
6031
6082
|
// RFC-027 §2.3 inbox-enqueue lifecycle guard (PR1.2a REST site 2/2).
|
|
6032
6083
|
isActive: (alias, netId) => assertNodeActive(alias, netId).ok,
|
|
6033
6084
|
notify: (alias, netId) => pushEvent(alias, { type: "broadcast", inbox_count: pendingInboxCount(alias, netId) }, netId),
|
|
6034
6085
|
});
|
|
6035
|
-
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, recipients: ids.length, message_ids: ids }));
|
|
6086
|
+
return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: true, recipients: ids.length, message_ids: ids, ...(inboxSkipped.length ? { inbox_skipped: inboxSkipped } : {}) }));
|
|
6036
6087
|
}
|
|
6037
6088
|
|
|
6038
6089
|
// ── REST: tmux capture-pane ──
|
|
@@ -6944,7 +6995,7 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
6944
6995
|
network_id, created_at, updated_at,
|
|
6945
6996
|
config_snapshot, lifecycle_state, avatar_url,
|
|
6946
6997
|
display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision, permission_mode, owner_user_id,
|
|
6947
|
-
department_id, peer_allowlist, tool_allowlist, rest_allowlist
|
|
6998
|
+
department_id, peer_allowlist, tool_allowlist, rest_allowlist, inbox_allowlist
|
|
6948
6999
|
FROM nodes WHERE 1=1`;
|
|
6949
7000
|
const params: any[] = [];
|
|
6950
7001
|
sql = addAgentNetworkScope(sql, params, restScope, { alias: "alias", nodeId: "node_id" });
|
|
@@ -7101,6 +7152,11 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
7101
7152
|
let opencodeGeneration: "v1" | "v2" | null = null;
|
|
7102
7153
|
let opencodeMode: string | null = null;
|
|
7103
7154
|
let opencodeServer: string | null = null;
|
|
7155
|
+
// 2026-11-10 —— 起这台节点的 anet CLI 版本。**声明在 `if (snap)` 外面**:
|
|
7156
|
+
// 下面的投影对每一行都会求值,块内 `let` 会让部署后的 /api/nodes 直接抛
|
|
7157
|
+
// "launchedByCliVersion is not defined"(#4150-Build 的 opencodeAgents 踩过同一次)。
|
|
7158
|
+
// null = 节点没报(老节点 / 不是 CLI 起的,如 daemon adopt 出来的子节点)。
|
|
7159
|
+
let launchedByCliVersion: string | null = null;
|
|
7104
7160
|
const snap = r.config_snapshot;
|
|
7105
7161
|
// #4150-Build — declared outside the `if (snap)` block: the projection below is
|
|
7106
7162
|
// evaluated for every row, and a block-scoped `let` here made /api/nodes throw
|
|
@@ -7108,6 +7164,9 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
7108
7164
|
let opencodeAgents: string[] | null = null;
|
|
7109
7165
|
let opencodeAgentsSeenAt: string | null = null;
|
|
7110
7166
|
let opencodeAgentCurrent: string | null = null;
|
|
7167
|
+
// 与 GET /api/nodes/:id/config 保持同一口径:列表里也要能读到「能不能切 agent」,
|
|
7168
|
+
// 否则两个端点对同一台节点会给出不一致的能力结论。
|
|
7169
|
+
let opencodeAgentConfigCapable = false;
|
|
7111
7170
|
if (snap) {
|
|
7112
7171
|
let parsed: any = null;
|
|
7113
7172
|
try { parsed = typeof snap === "string" ? JSON.parse(snap) : snap; }
|
|
@@ -7139,14 +7198,21 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
7139
7198
|
if (typeof rawAgentCurrent === "string" && rawAgentCurrent.length > 0 && rawAgentCurrent.length <= 200) {
|
|
7140
7199
|
opencodeAgentCurrent = rawAgentCurrent;
|
|
7141
7200
|
}
|
|
7201
|
+
opencodeAgentConfigCapable = parsed?.opencode_agent_config_capable === true;
|
|
7142
7202
|
const flags = parsed?.flags;
|
|
7143
7203
|
if (flags?.opencodeGeneration === "v1" || flags?.opencodeGeneration === "v2") opencodeGeneration = flags.opencodeGeneration;
|
|
7144
7204
|
if (typeof flags?.opencodeMode === "string" && flags.opencodeMode.length <= 32) opencodeMode = flags.opencodeMode;
|
|
7145
7205
|
if (typeof parsed?.opencode_server === "string" && parsed.opencode_server.length <= 200) opencodeServer = parsed.opencode_server;
|
|
7206
|
+
// 2026-11-10 —— 只做投影:节点报了就给出来,没报就是 null(两种成因见上面的注释)。
|
|
7207
|
+
// 形状再校验一遍:schema 那层已经限了 64 字符,但库里的历史行不受 schema 管。
|
|
7208
|
+
const rawLaunchedBy = parsed?.launched_by_cli_version;
|
|
7209
|
+
if (typeof rawLaunchedBy === "string" && rawLaunchedBy.length > 0 && rawLaunchedBy.length <= 64) {
|
|
7210
|
+
launchedByCliVersion = rawLaunchedBy;
|
|
7211
|
+
}
|
|
7146
7212
|
}
|
|
7147
7213
|
// #2969 —— 两张白名单原来**只能写不能读**(PUT 有了,GET 里没有),
|
|
7148
7214
|
// 客户端因此做不出「当前设置」这一屏。这里把原始列解构出来,下面换成解析后的数组。
|
|
7149
|
-
const { config_snapshot, owner_user_id, peer_allowlist, tool_allowlist, rest_allowlist, ...rest } = r;
|
|
7215
|
+
const { config_snapshot, owner_user_id, peer_allowlist, tool_allowlist, rest_allowlist, inbox_allowlist, ...rest } = r;
|
|
7150
7216
|
// `tags` is stored as JSON text; hand the dashboard a real array so
|
|
7151
7217
|
// it can map() without a guard, and normalise legacy/absent values
|
|
7152
7218
|
// to [] rather than null. attrs_revision is normalised to a number
|
|
@@ -7163,12 +7229,14 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
7163
7229
|
opencode_catalog: opencodeCatalog,
|
|
7164
7230
|
opencode_agents: opencodeAgents,
|
|
7165
7231
|
opencode_agent_current: opencodeAgentCurrent,
|
|
7232
|
+
opencode_agent_config_capable: opencodeAgentConfigCapable,
|
|
7166
7233
|
opencode_agents_seen_at: opencodeAgentsSeenAt,
|
|
7167
7234
|
// 见上:null 表示 daemon 未上报;非 null 是它自己给的采集时刻
|
|
7168
7235
|
opencode_catalog_seen_at: opencodeCatalogSeenAt,
|
|
7169
7236
|
opencode_generation: opencodeGeneration,
|
|
7170
7237
|
opencode_mode: opencodeMode,
|
|
7171
7238
|
opencode_server: opencodeServer,
|
|
7239
|
+
launched_by_cli_version: launchedByCliVersion,
|
|
7172
7240
|
lifecycle_controllable,
|
|
7173
7241
|
lifecycle_daemon_node_id: controllable.get(r.node_id) ?? null,
|
|
7174
7242
|
...(management ? (management.get(r.node_id) ?? { managed: "none", adoption: null }) : {}),
|
|
@@ -7178,6 +7246,8 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
7178
7246
|
tool_allowlist: normalizeToolAllowlist(tool_allowlist),
|
|
7179
7247
|
// #2969 续 —— REST 写接口白名单(形如 "POST /api/task")。null = 不限制。
|
|
7180
7248
|
rest_allowlist: normalizePeerAllowlist(rest_allowlist),
|
|
7249
|
+
// 收件白名单(谁能给这个节点派活 / 发消息)。null = 谁都能发。
|
|
7250
|
+
inbox_allowlist: normalizePeerAllowlist(inbox_allowlist),
|
|
7181
7251
|
// #1510 —— 管理员要能看出「谁的 transport 未知」才敢打开 strict。
|
|
7182
7252
|
// 这一格**只读**,不参与任何判定(判定在 env-transport-policy.ts)。
|
|
7183
7253
|
env_transport: envTransportOf(r.node_id, r.alias, r.network_id),
|
|
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
|
|
|
2
2
|
import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";
|
|
3
3
|
import { mkdtempSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
4
4
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
5
|
+
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
5
6
|
import { sessionProjectCreateSchema, migrateProjectOperationJournal } from "./session-source-admission-store";
|
|
6
7
|
|
|
7
8
|
test("actual old on-disk journal migrates twice and keeps new-session rows and intent tombstones", () => {
|
|
8
|
-
const path = join(mkdtempSync("
|
|
9
|
+
const path = join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "attach-migration-")), "old.db");
|
|
9
10
|
let sql = new Database(path);
|
|
10
11
|
sql.exec(sessionProjectCreateSchema);
|
|
11
12
|
sql.run(`INSERT INTO session_project_creates
|
|
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
1
2
|
// Opt-in, exact SHA verified patched ELF. No new/fork acceptance rerun.
|
|
2
3
|
import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
|
|
4
|
+
import { testWorkRoot } from "./test-work-root";
|
|
3
5
|
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, symlinkSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
4
6
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
5
7
|
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
|
|
@@ -12,7 +14,7 @@ import { PROJECT_CREATE_ROOT as P, SESSION_ATTACH_CAPABILITY as CAP } from "../.
|
|
|
12
14
|
|
|
13
15
|
const delegated = process.env.TEST4150_NATIVE_ATTACH_DERIVED === "1";
|
|
14
16
|
test.skipIf(!process.env.TEST4150_NATIVE_BINARY)(delegated ? "real patched Linux delegated policy -> one empty existing Session attach, exact CLI registration, zero native mutation" : "real patched Linux existing empty/materialized Session attach, occupied refusal, exact child register and zero attach native writes", async () => {
|
|
15
|
-
const root = mkdtempSync("
|
|
17
|
+
const root = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "native-attach-")), home = join(root, "home"), project = join(root, "project"), daemonDir = join(root, "daemon");
|
|
16
18
|
for (const d of [home, project, daemonDir, join(home, ".anet"), join(project, ".anet"), join(project, ".anet", "nodes"), join(daemonDir, ".anet")]) mkdirSync(d, { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
17
19
|
process.env.COMMHUB_DB = join(root, "hub.db"); process.env.COMMHUB_SOURCE_DIRECTORY_PREVIEW = "1"; process.env.COMMHUB_SESSION_ATTACH_PREVIEW = "1";
|
|
18
20
|
delete process.env.COMMHUB_PROJECT_NEW_SESSION_PREVIEW; delete process.env.COMMHUB_SOURCE_FORK_PREVIEW;
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, expect, setSystemTime, test } from "bun:test";
|
|
2
|
+
import { testWorkRoot } from "./test-work-root";
|
|
2
3
|
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
3
4
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
4
5
|
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ import { createSourceDirectoryReader } from "../../agent-node/src/runtime/sessio
|
|
|
10
11
|
import { createSessionControlPin } from "../../agent-node/src/runtime/session-control-bridge";
|
|
11
12
|
import { createSessionSourceTransportWorker } from "../../agent-node/src/runtime/session-source-transport";
|
|
12
13
|
|
|
13
|
-
const root = mkdtempSync(join(
|
|
14
|
+
const root = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "project-create-http-")); process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(root, "hub.db");
|
|
14
15
|
const gates = ["COMMHUB_SOURCE_DIRECTORY_PREVIEW", "COMMHUB_PROJECT_NEW_SESSION_PREVIEW", "COMMHUB_SESSION_ATTACH_PREVIEW"];
|
|
15
16
|
const previous = gates.map(g => process.env[g]);
|
|
16
17
|
const D = "/api/node-session-control/source/directory", serverId = `osrv_${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ test("actual HTTP directory -> project intent -> one native empty create -> exac
|
|
|
268
269
|
}, 15000);
|
|
269
270
|
for (const operation of ["new", "manual", "delegated"]) test(`${operation} HTTP chain uses actual anet CLI -> paired agent-node CLI -> exact shared resume -> actual Hub registration with synthetic native package`, async () => {
|
|
270
271
|
const attach = operation !== "new";
|
|
271
|
-
await worker.stop(); const prefix = mkdtempSync("
|
|
272
|
+
await worker.stop(); const prefix = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "project-cli-fixture-")); cliFixtureRoot = prefix;
|
|
272
273
|
const pkg = join(prefix, "node_modules", "@opencode", "cli"); mkdirSync(join(pkg, "bin"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
|
273
274
|
mkdirSync(join(prefix, "bin"), { mode: 0o700 }); mkdirSync(join(prefix, "safe"), { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
274
275
|
writeFileSync(join(pkg, "package.json"), JSON.stringify({ name: "@opencode/cli", version: "2.0.22", bin: { opencode: "bin/opencode.exe" } }));
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
1
2
|
// Opt-in Docker-only acceptance against the SHA-verified real TEST-ONLY ELF.
|
|
2
3
|
// No native protocol mock/fake executable or external provider/npm. Fork fixture
|
|
3
4
|
// may use a deterministic loopback OpenAI-compatible provider via REAL prompt.
|
|
4
5
|
import { test, expect } from "bun:test";
|
|
6
|
+
import { testWorkRoot } from "./test-work-root";
|
|
5
7
|
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, symlinkSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
6
8
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
7
9
|
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
|
|
@@ -15,7 +17,7 @@ import { SOURCE_DELIVERY_CAPABILITY } from "../../contracts/session-source-deliv
|
|
|
15
17
|
|
|
16
18
|
const forkMode = process.env.TEST4150_NATIVE_FORK === "1";
|
|
17
19
|
test.skipIf(!process.env.TEST4150_NATIVE_BINARY)(forkMode ? "real patched ELF managed live-source fork, attach refusal and negative-only cleanup" : "real patched 2.0.22 ELF: directory -> project-new -> actual CLI exact child -> native SSE and real Hub registration", async () => {
|
|
18
|
-
const root = mkdtempSync("
|
|
20
|
+
const root = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "native-project-")), home = join(root, "home"), project = join(root, "project"), daemonDir = join(root, "daemon");
|
|
19
21
|
for (const d of [home, project, daemonDir, join(home, ".anet"), join(daemonDir, ".anet"), join(project, ".anet"), join(project, ".anet", "nodes")]) mkdirSync(d, { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
20
22
|
process.env.COMMHUB_DB = join(root, "hub.db"); process.env.COMMHUB_SOURCE_DIRECTORY_PREVIEW = "1"; process.env.COMMHUB_PROJECT_NEW_SESSION_PREVIEW = "1";
|
|
21
23
|
if (forkMode) process.env.COMMHUB_SOURCE_FORK_PREVIEW = "1";
|
|
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ export function createSessionSourceDeliveryQueue(executions: ReturnType<typeof c
|
|
|
94
94
|
return db.transaction(() => {
|
|
95
95
|
if (db.run("UPDATE session_source_node_deliveries SET state='registered' WHERE delivery_id=?1 AND state='delivered'", [id]).changes !== 1) return false;
|
|
96
96
|
db.run("UPDATE api_tokens SET expires_at=NULL WHERE token_id=?1 AND revoked_at IS NULL", [r.token_id]);
|
|
97
|
+
// admin 2026-11-10「fork 开来的节点就是要继承之前的部门的」: the child takes the
|
|
98
|
+
// source node's department, unless someone already placed it explicitly.
|
|
99
|
+
db.run(`UPDATE nodes SET department_id = (SELECT s.department_id FROM nodes s WHERE s.node_id = ?2 AND s.network_id = ?3)
|
|
100
|
+
WHERE node_id = ?1 AND network_id = ?3 AND (department_id IS NULL OR department_id = '')`,
|
|
101
|
+
[r.child_node_id, t.evidence.request.source_node_id, caller.networkId]);
|
|
97
102
|
return true;
|
|
98
103
|
});
|
|
99
104
|
},
|
|
@@ -104,7 +104,11 @@ test("actual Hub HTTP -> frozen daemon worker -> native 2.0.22-shaped GET pages
|
|
|
104
104
|
});
|
|
105
105
|
test("HTTP requires human create/source visibility, exact network, explicit daemon capability and secure channel; rejects raw inputs", async () => {
|
|
106
106
|
await worker.tick();
|
|
107
|
-
|
|
107
|
+
// 节点凭据不是 human 凭据 → 403(权限),不是 400(请求)。见 #4467。
|
|
108
|
+
for (const token of [daemon.token, source.token]) expect((await api(token, "", selection())).status).toBe(403);
|
|
109
|
+
expect((await api(outsider.token, "", selection())).status).not.toBe(200);
|
|
110
|
+
// 请求体不合法 → 400,与上面的 403 区分开。
|
|
111
|
+
expect((await api(human.token, "", { ...selection(), extra: 1 })).status).toBe(400);
|
|
108
112
|
for (const extra of [{ url: "http://127.0.0.1:1" }, { path: project }, { token: "forged" }, { server_id: serverId }, { network_id: "other" }, { daemon_node_id: "dir_source" }]) {
|
|
109
113
|
expect((await api(human.token, "", { ...selection(), ...extra })).status).not.toBe(200);
|
|
110
114
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, expect, test } from "bun:test";
|
|
2
|
+
import { testWorkRoot } from "./test-work-root";
|
|
2
3
|
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, chmodSync, chownSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
3
4
|
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
4
5
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ import { SOURCE_FORK_ROOT, SOURCE_FORK_CAPABILITY } from "../../contracts/sessio
|
|
|
25
26
|
let human: ReturnType<typeof register>, daemon: ReturnType<typeof createNetworkTokenForNode>;
|
|
26
27
|
let source: ReturnType<typeof createNetworkTokenForNode>, selection: SourceSelection;
|
|
27
28
|
const req = (token?: string) => new Request("http://isolated.invalid", { headers: token ? { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {} });
|
|
28
|
-
const root = mkdtempSync(join(
|
|
29
|
+
const root = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "source-read-")), project = join(root, "project"), daemonDir = join(root, "daemon");
|
|
29
30
|
const nodeDir = join(project, ".anet", "nodes", "source");
|
|
30
31
|
let version = "2.0.22", sessionDirectory = project, sessionId = "ses_Selected", authGate = true, redirect = false, large = false;
|
|
31
32
|
let forkPosts = 0, loseForkResponse = false, busy = false, busyDelivery = "";
|
|
@@ -228,8 +229,10 @@ test("private registry and actual directory uid are required before network read
|
|
|
228
229
|
chmodSync(registry, 0o644);
|
|
229
230
|
expect((await reader.read(c)).ok).toBe(false);
|
|
230
231
|
chmodSync(registry, 0o600);
|
|
231
|
-
// Docker --user 0 permits a real foreign-owner fixture, never touches host.
|
|
232
|
-
|
|
232
|
+
// Docker --user 0 permits a real foreign-owner fixture, never touches host. The unit image runs
|
|
233
|
+
// as a non-root user; there the foreign-owner half cannot be built, so it ends here (the
|
|
234
|
+
// permission checks above still ran).
|
|
235
|
+
if (process.getuid!() !== 0) { console.warn("[session-source-evidence] foreign-owner fixture needs uid 0; skipped that half"); return; }
|
|
233
236
|
chownSync(project, 65534, 65534);
|
|
234
237
|
try { expect((await reader.read(c)).ok).toBe(false); }
|
|
235
238
|
finally { chownSync(project, 0, 0); }
|
|
@@ -579,8 +582,12 @@ test("real child token metadata -> one-shot source payload -> private profile ->
|
|
|
579
582
|
expect(statSync(input.configPath).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
|
|
580
583
|
await registerFromPrivateProfile(cfg);
|
|
581
584
|
}, confirmRegistration: async (id, token) => p.delivery.confirmRegistration(req(token), id) });
|
|
585
|
+
const srcReq = payload.execution.evidence.request;
|
|
586
|
+
db.run("UPDATE nodes SET department_id='dep_fork_parent' WHERE node_id=?1 AND network_id=?2", [srcReq.source_node_id, srcReq.network_id]);
|
|
582
587
|
expect((await worker.run(payload)).status).toBe("registration_confirmed"); expect(launches).toBe(1);
|
|
583
588
|
expect(forkPosts).toBe(beforePosts);
|
|
589
|
+
// admin 2026-11-10: a forked child inherits the source node's department.
|
|
590
|
+
expect(db.get<{ department_id: string | null }>("SELECT department_id FROM nodes WHERE node_id=?1", payload.child_node_id)?.department_id).toBe("dep_fork_parent");
|
|
584
591
|
const token = db.get<{ token_hash: string; bound_node_id: string; expires_at: string | null }>("SELECT token_hash,bound_node_id,expires_at FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id=?1", resolveToken(payload.child_token)!.tokenId!);
|
|
585
592
|
expect(token!.bound_node_id).toBe(payload.child_node_id); expect(token!.token_hash !== payload.child_token).toBe(true);
|
|
586
593
|
expect(token!.expires_at).toBeNull();
|
|
@@ -681,7 +688,7 @@ test("actual anet CLI -> exact paired agent-node CLI -> shared V2 resume -> real
|
|
|
681
688
|
const id = p.delivery.queue(req(human.token), p.id)!;
|
|
682
689
|
const payload = p.delivery.take(req(daemon.token), id, SOURCE_DELIVERY_CAPABILITY)!;
|
|
683
690
|
// Container-only safe prefix. NOT a downloaded/real OpenCode binary.
|
|
684
|
-
const prefix = mkdtempSync("
|
|
691
|
+
const prefix = mkdtempSync(join(testWorkRoot(), "source-cli-fixture-"));
|
|
685
692
|
const pkg = join(prefix, "node_modules", "@opencode", "cli");
|
|
686
693
|
mkdirSync(join(pkg, "bin"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); mkdirSync(join(prefix, "bin"), { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
687
694
|
mkdirSync(join(prefix, "safe"), { mode: 0o700 }); mkdirSync(join(prefix, "home"), { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
@@ -176,7 +176,13 @@ export function createSessionSourceTransport(options: { enabled?: boolean; direc
|
|
|
176
176
|
if (req.method !== "POST" || url.search) return fail(400);
|
|
177
177
|
const b = await readSessionControlBody(req, 65536); if (!b) return fail(400);
|
|
178
178
|
if (!suffix) {
|
|
179
|
-
|
|
179
|
+
// 凭据类型与请求体是**两种不同性质**的问题,不能共用一个 400(#4467):
|
|
180
|
+
// · 凭据不是 human 凭据 → 权限问题,403
|
|
181
|
+
// · 请求体键/ID 不合法 → 请求问题,400
|
|
182
|
+
// 混在一起的实际代价:2026-11-10 我用节点 token 验这条链路,
|
|
183
|
+
// 拿到 400 后第一反应是「body 拼错了」,查了半小时才想到是凭据类型。
|
|
184
|
+
if (!isHumanCredential(credential)) return fail(403);
|
|
185
|
+
if (!keys(b, ["network_id", "source_node_id", "daemon_node_id", "server_id", "selection_scope"])
|
|
180
186
|
|| !id(b.network_id) || !id(b.source_node_id) || !id(b.daemon_node_id)
|
|
181
187
|
|| (b.server_id !== undefined && (!isDirectoryServerId(b.server_id) || !isDirectoryRequestId(b.selection_scope)))
|
|
182
188
|
|| (b.server_id === undefined && b.selection_scope !== undefined)) return fail(400);
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// A private work root for tests that build fixture packages the runtime will execute.
|
|
2
|
+
// The OpenCode/agent-node binary checks refuse anything under a world-writable directory
|
|
3
|
+
// such as /tmp (that is the point of those checks), so these fixtures cannot live in
|
|
4
|
+
// tmpdir(). They used to live under /work, which no current image provides.
|
|
5
|
+
// It must also sit outside the project tree (project-local packages are not trusted either).
|
|
6
|
+
// ANET_TEST_WORK_ROOT overrides; default is $HOME/.anet-test-work, mode 0700.
|
|
7
|
+
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
|
|
8
|
+
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
9
|
+
import { homedir } from "node:os";
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
export function testWorkRoot(): string {
|
|
12
|
+
const root = process.env.ANET_TEST_WORK_ROOT ?? join(homedir(), ".anet-test-work");
|
|
13
|
+
mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
|
14
|
+
chmodSync(root, 0o700);
|
|
15
|
+
return root;
|
|
16
|
+
}
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
export const testWorkPath = (prefix: string) => join(testWorkRoot(), prefix);
|