@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.263 → 0.9.0-preview.265
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/build-info.json +2 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/admin-delete-network-http.test.ts +3 -2
- package/src/agent-acl-http.test.ts +13 -2
- package/src/auth-layer-shape.test.ts +105 -0
- package/src/auth.ts +32 -12
- package/src/dm-file-scope-http.test.ts +50 -1
- package/src/health-identity-root.test.ts +98 -0
- package/src/health-status-reasons.test.ts +26 -2
- package/src/hub-catalog-read-http.test.ts +23 -0
- package/src/license-state.test.ts +49 -0
- package/src/network-quota-config.test.ts +100 -0
- package/src/node-config-last-update.test.ts +126 -0
- package/src/node-config-last-update.ts +107 -0
- package/src/node-health-guard-origin.test.ts +98 -0
- package/src/node-permissions-http.test.ts +173 -0
- package/src/node-secret-vault-inject.test.ts +132 -0
- package/src/node-token-privilege-http.test.ts +68 -2
- package/src/scoped-secrets.ts +28 -2
- package/src/server.ts +11 -0
- package/src/task-access-http.test.ts +5 -0
- package/src/tools.ts +2 -2
- package/src/user-avatar-upload-http.test.ts +5 -0
- package/src/user-inbox-by-agent-http.test.ts +24 -0
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// #3148 —— 保险库的值要能**流向**真正要用的那个进程,但任何人仍然**读不出来**。
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//
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// admin 2026-11-01 在客户端里撞到的死结:
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// 密钥已经在保险库里了,可没有任何路径把它送到目标节点;
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// 于是人只能把明文再复制一遍,或者写进工作区文件 —— 两条都比保险库更差。
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//
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// 本文件的判据分两半,缺一半就只是「加了个功能」:
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// ① 流向成立:owner/admin 只给键名,节点真的收到值(用节点侧 pull 来验,不靠内部字段)
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// ② 读权不成立:任何读接口都不回值(getScopedSecrets / ack 回来的 snapshot / 响应体本身)
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import './require-explicit-test-db';
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import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
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import { db } from './db';
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import { getScopedSecrets, pullNodeSecrets, ackNodeSecrets, requestNodeSecrets } from './scoped-secrets';
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import { vaultUpsert, vaultListKeys, vaultDelete } from './vault';
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const net = 'net_vaultinject';
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const baseNode = 'n_vaultinject';
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let node = baseNode;
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const owner = 'u_vaultinject_owner';
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const member = 'u_vaultinject_member';
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const KEY = 'TMPAT';
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const VALUE = 'pat-value-that-must-never-be-readable-0123456789';
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function cleanup() {
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db.run('DELETE FROM nodes WHERE network_id=?1', [net]);
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db.run('DELETE FROM network_members WHERE network_id=?1', [net]);
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db.run('DELETE FROM networks WHERE network_id=?1', [net]);
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db.run('DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id IN (?1, ?2)', [owner, member]);
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for (const k of vaultListKeys(net)) vaultDelete(net, k);
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}
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function makeNode(name: string) {
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node = name;
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db.run('INSERT INTO nodes(node_id,node_name,alias,network_id,config_snapshot) VALUES(?1,?1,?1,?2,?3)',
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[node, net, JSON.stringify({ node_secrets_capable: true })]);
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return node;
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}
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beforeEach(() => {
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cleanup();
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node = baseNode;
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process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY = '43'.repeat(32);
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db.run("INSERT INTO users(user_id,username,password_hash,role) VALUES(?1,?1,'x','user')", [owner]);
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db.run("INSERT INTO users(user_id,username,password_hash,role) VALUES(?1,?1,'x','user')", [member]);
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db.run('INSERT INTO networks(network_id,network_name,owner_id) VALUES(?1,?1,?2)', [net, owner]);
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db.run("INSERT INTO network_members(user_id,network_id,role) VALUES(?1,?2,'owner')", [owner, net]);
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db.run("INSERT INTO network_members(user_id,network_id,role) VALUES(?1,?2,'member')", [member, net]);
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vaultUpsert(net, KEY, VALUE);
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});
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afterAll(cleanup);
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const human = (userId: string) => ({ userId, isNode: false, networkId: net });
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// 必须是函数:node 每个用例都不同,写成常量会把第一个用例的节点名焊死。
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const asDaemon = () => ({ ok: true as const, networkId: net, daemonNodeId: node, daemonAlias: node });
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/** 节点侧真正会收到的那个请求(不是内部字段:走 pullNodeSecrets 这条公开路径)。 */
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function pulledFor(requestId: string) {
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const pulled = pullNodeSecrets(asDaemon()) as any;
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expect(pulled.ok).toBe(true);
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return (pulled.requests as any[]).find((r) => r.request_id === requestId);
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}
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describe("#3148 保险库 → 节点:值能流过去,但读不回来", () => {
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test("① 流向:owner 只给键名(from_vault),节点 pull 到的那条请求里带着保险库的值", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_flow");
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const created = requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any;
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expect(created.ok).toBe(true);
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const pulled = pulledFor(created.request_id);
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expect(pulled).toBeDefined();
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expect(pulled.action).toBe('put');
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expect(pulled.key).toBe(KEY);
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// 这一条是「值真的到了目标进程手上」——流向成立。
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expect(pulled.value).toBe(VALUE);
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});
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test("② 读权:ack 回来的回执里只有键名与来源,没有任何值", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_ack");
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const created = requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any;
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pulledFor(created.request_id);
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const ack = ackNodeSecrets(asDaemon(), created.request_id, {
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network_id: net, daemon_node_id: null, node_id: node, revision: 1, activation: 'next_start',
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keys: [{ key: KEY, source: 'node' }],
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}) as any;
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expect(ack.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(JSON.stringify(ack)).not.toContain(VALUE);
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});
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test("② 镜像否定:getScopedSecrets 的回执里没有值,也没有请求体里的明文", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_noread");
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const created = requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any;
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const got = getScopedSecrets(human(owner), created.request_id) as any;
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expect(got.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(JSON.stringify(got)).not.toContain(VALUE);
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expect(JSON.stringify(got)).not.toContain('"value"');
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});
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test("保险库里没有这个键 ⇒ vault_key_missing(不许回一个看起来成功的请求)", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_missing");
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expect(requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', 'NOT_THERE', undefined, 0, true)).toEqual({
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ok: false, error: 'vault_key_missing',
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});
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});
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test("from_vault 只对 put 有意义:list / delete 用它是无效输入", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_list");
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expect((requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'list', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any).error).toBe('invalid_secret_input');
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expect((requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'delete', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any).error).toBe('invalid_secret_input');
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});
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test("同时给 value 与 from_vault ⇒ 无效输入(两种来源不许混用,否则说不清写进去的是哪一个)", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_mix");
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expect((requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', KEY, 'another-value', 0, true) as any).error).toBe('invalid_secret_input');
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});
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test("普通成员用 from_vault ⇒ secret_admin_required(这是权限边界,不是能力边界)", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_member");
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expect((requestNodeSecrets(human(member), node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any).error).toBe('secret_admin_required');
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});
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test("节点令牌(isNode)自己调 ⇒ user_token_required(机器不能给自己发密钥)", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_nodetoken");
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expect((requestNodeSecrets({ userId: null, isNode: true, networkId: net }, node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any)
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.error).toBe('user_token_required');
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});
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test("不支持的节点 ⇒ node_secrets_upgrade_required(先升级,不是先提权)", () => {
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makeNode("n_vi_oldnode");
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db.run('UPDATE nodes SET config_snapshot=?1 WHERE node_id=?2', [JSON.stringify({}), node]);
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expect((requestNodeSecrets(human(owner), node, 'put', KEY, undefined, 0, true) as any).error)
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.toBe('node_secrets_upgrade_required');
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});
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});
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "anet-ntok-priv-"));
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let BASE = "";
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let hub: any = null;
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const PW = "NtokPrivPassw0rd!";
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let adminToken = "", adminId = "", NET = "", OTHER_NET = "", ntok = "";
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let adminToken = "", adminId = "", NET = "", OTHER_NET = "", ntok = "", adminUsername = "";
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const auth = (t: string) => ({ Authorization: `Bearer ${t}` });
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async function call(token: string, method: string, path: string, body?: unknown) {
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process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(DIR, "hub.db");
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process.env.COMMHUB_UPLOADS_DIR = join(DIR, "uploads");
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process.env.HOST = "127.0.0.1";
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adminUsername = `ntok_admin_${Date.now()}`;
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const admin = register(adminUsername, PW);
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adminToken = admin.token!; adminId = admin.user!.user_id; NET = admin.network_id!;
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db.run("UPDATE users SET role = 'admin' WHERE user_id = ?1", [adminId]);
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const other = createNetwork(adminId, "ntok-other");
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@@ -80,28 +81,71 @@ describe("hub-admin powers need a user token", () => {
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void sub;
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});
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test("POST /api/admin/users and agent-grants", async () => {
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// #3354 —— 拒绝之外钉「没有建出用户」:建用户的副作用是**多一行 users**。
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const userRows = () => db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users")!.n;
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const beforeUsers = userRows();
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expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/admin/users", { username: "ntok_made", password: PW })).status).toBe(403);
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expect(userRows()).toBe(beforeUsers);
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expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE username = 'ntok_made'")).toBeFalsy();
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// #3354 —— 写 side:节点令牌不能改 agent-grants(读的 403 上面已有)。
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// 副作用是**多一条授权**(那意味着一个 Agent 对这个人可见)。
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const grants = () => db.get<{ n: number }>(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM network_member_agent_grants WHERE network_id = ?1", NET)!.n;
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const beforeGrants = grants();
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expect((await call(ntok, "GET", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${adminId}/agent-grants`)).status).toBe(403);
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expect((await call(ntok, "PUT", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${adminId}/agent-grants`, { node_ids: ["n_x"] })).status).toBe(403);
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expect(grants()).toBe(beforeGrants);
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});
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});
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describe("account and network management need a user token", () => {
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test("token management: cannot list, mint user tokens, mint node tokens or revoke", async () => {
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// #3354 —— 拒绝之外还要钉「没有新令牌」:发令牌的副作用是**多一行 api_tokens**。
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// 只断 403 时,「拒了但令牌已经发出来了」也会绿 —— 而那一枚令牌是能真的用的。
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const tokenRows = () => db.get<{ n: number }>(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM api_tokens WHERE user_id = ?1", adminId)!.n;
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const beforeTokens = tokenRows();
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expect((await call(ntok, "GET", "/api/auth/tokens")).status).toBe(403);
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const minted = await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/auth/tokens", { name: "escalate" });
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expect(minted.status).toBe(403);
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expect(minted.body.token).toBeUndefined();
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expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/auth/node-token", { network_id: OTHER_NET, node_name: "x" })).status).toBe(403);
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// 两条被拒的发放都不许留下任何一行
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expect(tokenRows()).toBe(beforeTokens);
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expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM api_tokens WHERE name = 'escalate'")).toBeFalsy();
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expect((await call(ntok, "DELETE", "/api/auth/tokens/tok_whatever")).status).toBe(403);
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expect((await call(adminToken, "GET", "/api/auth/tokens")).status).toBe(200);
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});
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// #3354 —— DELETE /api/auth/tokens/:id:拒绝之后**那一行必须还在**。
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// 吊销是不可逆的副作用(令牌一旦删掉,用户的脚本当场断掉),所以拒绝时更不能碰它。
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test("节点令牌不能吊销用户令牌:403 且目标行仍在", async () => {
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const mint = await call(adminToken, "POST", "/api/auth/tokens", { name: "revoke-target" });
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expect(mint.status).toBe(200);
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const targetId = mint.body.token_id as string;
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expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1", targetId)).toBeTruthy();
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const denied = await call(ntok, "DELETE", `/api/auth/tokens/${targetId}`);
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expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
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// 拒绝的第二半:那一行还在(只断 403 时,「拒了但已经吊销了」也会绿)
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expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1", targetId)).toBeTruthy();
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});
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test("cannot edit the owner's profile or password", async () => {
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expect((await call(ntok, "PUT", "/api/auth/me", { display_name: "pwned" })).status).toBe(403);
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expect(db.get<{ display_name: string }>("SELECT display_name FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", adminId)?.display_name).not.toBe("pwned");
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expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/auth/password", { old_password: PW, new_password: "AnotherPassw0rd!" })).status).toBe(403);
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// #3354 —— 拒绝的第二半:**旧密码仍然可用**(改密的副作用是旧密码立刻失效)。
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// 只断 403 时,「拒了但密码已经被改掉」也会绿 —— 那会让主人当场登不进来。
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const relogin = await call("", "POST", "/api/auth/login", { username: adminUsername, password: PW });
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expect(relogin.status).toBe(200);
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});
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test("cannot create, rename or delete networks", async () => {
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+
// #3354 —— 拒绝之外还要钉「没有副作用」:建网络的副作用是**多一行 networks**。
|
|
143
|
+
// 只断 403 时,「拒了但已经建出来了」也会绿 —— 而那是一个节点令牌自己开了租户。
|
|
144
|
+
const netCount = () => db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM networks")!.n;
|
|
145
|
+
const beforeNets = netCount();
|
|
104
146
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/networks", { name: "ntok-made" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
147
|
+
expect(netCount()).toBe(beforeNets);
|
|
148
|
+
expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM networks WHERE network_name = 'ntok-made'")).toBeFalsy();
|
|
105
149
|
expect((await call(ntok, "PUT", `/api/networks/${OTHER_NET}`, { name: "renamed" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
106
150
|
expect((await call(ntok, "DELETE", `/api/networks/${OTHER_NET}`)).status).toBe(403);
|
|
107
151
|
expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1", OTHER_NET)).toBeTruthy();
|
|
@@ -109,19 +153,41 @@ describe("account and network management need a user token", () => {
|
|
|
109
153
|
test("cannot manage members, invites or join", async () => {
|
|
110
154
|
expect((await call(ntok, "GET", `/api/networks/${NET}/members`)).status).toBe(403);
|
|
111
155
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", `/api/networks/${NET}/members`, { user_id: "u_x" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
156
|
+
// #3354 —— 邀请的副作用是**多一行 invite**(那行能换出一个新成员)。
|
|
157
|
+
const invites = () => db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM network_invites")!.n;
|
|
158
|
+
const beforeInvites = invites();
|
|
112
159
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", `/api/networks/${NET}/invite`, { role: "admin" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
160
|
+
expect(invites()).toBe(beforeInvites);
|
|
161
|
+
// #3354 —— 拒绝之外还要钉「没加入任何网络」:join 的副作用是**多一行 network_members**。
|
|
162
|
+
// 只断 403 时,「拒了但已经加进去了」也会绿 —— 而那意味着节点令牌借邀请码混进了别人的租户。
|
|
163
|
+
const memberships = () => db.get<{ n: number }>(
|
|
164
|
+
"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM network_members WHERE user_id = ?1", adminId)!.n;
|
|
165
|
+
const beforeJoin = memberships();
|
|
113
166
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/networks/join", { invite_code: "inv_x" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
167
|
+
expect(memberships()).toBe(beforeJoin);
|
|
114
168
|
expect((await call(adminToken, "GET", `/api/networks/${NET}/members`)).status).toBe(200);
|
|
115
169
|
});
|
|
116
170
|
test("renames: a node token may only rename ITSELF in its bound network", async () => {
|
|
117
171
|
// 别的网络 / 别的节点 → user_token_required
|
|
172
|
+
// #3354 —— 拒绝之外钉「没有开出事务」:prepare 的副作用是多一行 rename_txn。
|
|
173
|
+
const txns = () => db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM rename_txn")!.n;
|
|
174
|
+
const beforeTxns = txns();
|
|
118
175
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/node-rename/prepare", { network_id: OTHER_NET, old_alias: "ntok-node", new_alias: "b" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
176
|
+
expect(txns()).toBe(beforeTxns);
|
|
119
177
|
db.run(`INSERT INTO sessions (resume_id, alias, status, network_id) VALUES ('r_other_node', 'other-node', 'idle', ?1)`, [NET]);
|
|
120
178
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/node-rename/prepare", { network_id: NET, old_alias: "other-node", new_alias: "b" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
121
179
|
// 另一个节点(管理员用户令牌)开的事务,本节点不能提交
|
|
122
180
|
const foreign = await call(adminToken, "POST", "/api/node-rename/prepare", { network_id: NET, old_alias: "other-node", new_alias: "other-node-2" });
|
|
123
181
|
expect(foreign.body.ok).toBe(true);
|
|
124
182
|
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/node-rename/commit", { txn_id: foreign.body.txn_id })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
183
|
+
// #3354 —— 同理,abort 别人的事务也要被拒,且**拒绝之后那行事务还在**(状态仍是 prepared)。
|
|
184
|
+
// 只断 403 时,「拒了但已经把事务作废」也会绿 —— 而那会让真正的事务主人 abort 时拿到「已结束」。
|
|
185
|
+
const txnStatus = () => db.get<{ status: string }>(
|
|
186
|
+
"SELECT status FROM rename_txn WHERE txn_id = ?1", foreign.body.txn_id)?.status;
|
|
187
|
+
const statusBefore = txnStatus();
|
|
188
|
+
expect((await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/node-rename/abort", { txn_id: foreign.body.txn_id })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
189
|
+
expect(txnStatus()).toBe(statusBefore);
|
|
190
|
+
// 事务仍可被它的主人 abort(拒绝不许消耗掉它)
|
|
125
191
|
expect((await call(adminToken, "POST", "/api/node-rename/abort", { txn_id: foreign.body.txn_id })).body.ok).toBe(true);
|
|
126
192
|
// 自己:照常(anet node rename 就是这么用的)
|
|
127
193
|
db.run(`INSERT INTO sessions (resume_id, alias, status, network_id) VALUES ('r_self_node', 'ntok-node', 'idle', ?1)`, [NET]);
|
package/src/scoped-secrets.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { providerScanTargets } from './daemon-provider-snapshots';
|
|
|
6
6
|
import { validScopedSecretKey } from './shared/scoped-secret-contract';
|
|
7
7
|
import { observeSecretWrite, transportOf } from './env-transport-gate.js';
|
|
8
8
|
import { secretTransportVerdict } from './env-transport-policy.js';
|
|
9
|
+
import { vaultGet } from './vault';
|
|
9
10
|
type Human = { userId?: string | null; isNode: boolean; networkId: string | null };
|
|
10
11
|
type Daemon = { ok: false; error: string } | { ok: true; networkId: string; daemonNodeId: string; daemonAlias: string };
|
|
11
12
|
type Request = { request_id: string; network_id: string; daemon_node_id: string | null; node_id: string | null;
|
|
@@ -33,9 +34,33 @@ function nodeSupported(network: string, node: string) {
|
|
|
33
34
|
try { return JSON.parse(row?.config_snapshot ?? '{}').node_secrets_capable === true; } catch { return false; }
|
|
34
35
|
}
|
|
35
36
|
// Independent node lane: no supervisor lookup, binding, or Daemon credential.
|
|
36
|
-
|
|
37
|
+
//
|
|
38
|
+
// `fromVault`(2026-11-01,#3148)—— **把保险库里的值直接推给这个节点**,调用方不必再持有明文。
|
|
39
|
+
//
|
|
40
|
+
// 背景:RFC-028 的保险库是「只进不出」——`list_network_secrets` 只回键名,没有任何取值接口。
|
|
41
|
+
// 这是对的:给 agent 一个读口,等于把整个网络的密钥变成任何一次 prompt 注入都能 dump 的东西。
|
|
42
|
+
// 但它带来一个真实的死结(admin 2026-11-01 在客户端里撞到):
|
|
43
|
+
//
|
|
44
|
+
// 密钥已经在保险库里了,可**没有任何路径**把它送到真正要用的那个进程;
|
|
45
|
+
// 于是人只能把明文再复制一遍,或者干脆写进工作区文件 —— 两条都比保险库更差。
|
|
46
|
+
//
|
|
47
|
+
// 所以这里补的是**流向**而不是**读权**:值从保险库直接写进目标节点的那次请求,
|
|
48
|
+
// 调用方(必须是 owner/admin)只提供键名。读侧仍然拿不到任何明文:
|
|
49
|
+
// · getScopedSecrets 只回 status/snapshot/error
|
|
50
|
+
// · 节点 ack 回来的 snapshot 里只有 {key, source},没有值
|
|
51
|
+
export function requestNodeSecrets(h: Human, node: string, action: Request['action'], key?: string, value?: string, revision?: number, fromVault?: boolean) {
|
|
37
52
|
const refusal = authorize(h); if (refusal) return refusal;
|
|
38
53
|
if (!nodeSupported(h.networkId!, node)) return denied('node_secrets_upgrade_required');
|
|
54
|
+
// from_vault 只在 put 上有意义:list/delete 没有值可推。
|
|
55
|
+
if (fromVault && action !== 'put') return denied('invalid_secret_input');
|
|
56
|
+
if (fromVault && value !== undefined) return denied('invalid_secret_input');
|
|
57
|
+
if (fromVault) {
|
|
58
|
+
if (!validScopedSecretKey(key)) return denied('invalid_secret_input');
|
|
59
|
+
// 保险库里没有这个名字 ⇒ 明确说「没有」,不要回一个看起来成功的请求。
|
|
60
|
+
const fromVaultValue = vaultGet(h.networkId!, key!);
|
|
61
|
+
if (typeof fromVaultValue !== 'string' || !fromVaultValue) return denied('vault_key_missing');
|
|
62
|
+
value = fromVaultValue;
|
|
63
|
+
}
|
|
39
64
|
if (action !== 'list' && (!validScopedSecretKey(key) || !Number.isSafeInteger(revision) || revision! < 0
|
|
40
65
|
|| (action === 'put' && (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || Buffer.byteLength(value) > 8192 || value.includes('\0'))))) return denied('invalid_secret_input');
|
|
41
66
|
expire();
|
|
@@ -45,7 +70,8 @@ export function requestNodeSecrets(h: Human, node: string, action: Request['acti
|
|
|
45
70
|
const transport = transportOf(h.networkId!, node);
|
|
46
71
|
const verdict = secretTransportVerdict(transport);
|
|
47
72
|
if (verdict) return denied(verdict);
|
|
48
|
-
|
|
73
|
+
// 记录的是**来源**,不是值:from_vault 的注入要能从审计里区分出来。
|
|
74
|
+
observeSecretWrite(h.networkId!, node, `node_secret_${action}${fromVault ? '_from_vault' : ''}`);
|
|
49
75
|
}
|
|
50
76
|
if ([...requests.values()].some(r => r.network_id === h.networkId && r.daemon_node_id === null && r.node_id === node && r.status === 'pending')) return denied('secret_store_busy');
|
|
51
77
|
if (requests.size >= 1000) return denied('secret_queue_busy');
|
package/src/server.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ import { assertScheduledTaskBackendSupported, handleScheduledTaskRequest, startS
|
|
|
107
107
|
import { startDueReminderTimer } from "./requirement-due-reminders.js";
|
|
108
108
|
import { clearNodeFromRequirements, handleRequirementsRequest } from "./requirements.js";
|
|
109
109
|
import { readHubProviders, putHubProvider, providerWriteStatus } from "./hub-provider-config.js";
|
|
110
|
+
import { readLastConfigUpdate } from "./node-config-last-update.js";
|
|
110
111
|
import { readBuildInfo } from "./build-info.js";
|
|
111
112
|
import { requestProviderApplication } from "./daemon-provider-snapshots.js";
|
|
112
113
|
import { requestNodeSecrets, getScopedSecrets } from "./scoped-secrets.js";
|
|
@@ -6400,6 +6401,14 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
6400
6401
|
if (node.config_snapshot) {
|
|
6401
6402
|
try { snapshot = JSON.parse(node.config_snapshot); } catch { snapshot = {}; }
|
|
6402
6403
|
}
|
|
6404
|
+
// #3146 —— 上一次下发的**结局**。没有这一格时,客户端只能靠
|
|
6405
|
+
// 「config_revision 有没有涨」推断,涨不了就一律显示成 timeout(「90s 内没回来,去看日志」),
|
|
6406
|
+
// 而生产上真实结局是 rejected,原因(OpenCode V2 session is not running)就写在本库里。
|
|
6407
|
+
// ⇒ 读者拿不到答案,于是被指去机器上看日志 —— 一句话把人送错了层。
|
|
6408
|
+
const lastUpdate = readLastConfigUpdate(
|
|
6409
|
+
(sql: string, ...params: any[]) => (db.get as any)(sql, ...params),
|
|
6410
|
+
node.node_id,
|
|
6411
|
+
);
|
|
6403
6412
|
return withCors(req, Response.json({
|
|
6404
6413
|
ok: true,
|
|
6405
6414
|
node_id: node.node_id,
|
|
@@ -6409,6 +6418,8 @@ return Bun.serve({
|
|
|
6409
6418
|
model: snapshot.model ?? null,
|
|
6410
6419
|
flags: snapshot.flags ?? {},
|
|
6411
6420
|
config_update_capable: snapshot.config_update_capable ?? false,
|
|
6421
|
+
// null = 这个节点从来没有被下发过配置(与「下发过但还没终局」是两件事)
|
|
6422
|
+
last_update: lastUpdate,
|
|
6412
6423
|
}));
|
|
6413
6424
|
}
|
|
6414
6425
|
|
|
@@ -200,7 +200,12 @@ describe("默认值与授权接口", () => {
|
|
|
200
200
|
const keep = await send(admin.token, "PUT", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${alice.id}/task-grants`, { task_access: "scoped" });
|
|
201
201
|
expect(keep.body.project_grants.length).toBe(2);
|
|
202
202
|
expect((await send(alice.token, "GET", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${alice.id}/task-grants`)).status).toBe(403);
|
|
203
|
+
// #3354 —— 拒绝之外钉「授权没变」:读回来的 project_grants 必须仍是原来那两条。
|
|
204
|
+
// 只断 403 时,「拒了但已经把 task_access 改成 all」也会绿 —— 那是一次越权的权限提升。
|
|
203
205
|
expect((await send(carol.token, "PUT", `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${alice.id}/task-grants`, { task_access: "all" })).status).toBe(403);
|
|
206
|
+
const afterDenied = await get(admin.token, `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${alice.id}/task-grants`);
|
|
207
|
+
expect(afterDenied.body.task_access).toBe("scoped");
|
|
208
|
+
expect(afterDenied.body.project_grants.length).toBe(2);
|
|
204
209
|
const nt = await send(admin.token, "POST", "/api/auth/node-token", { network_id: NET, node_name: "ta-node", node_id: "node_ta_1" });
|
|
205
210
|
expect((await get(nt.body.token, `/api/networks/${NET}/members/${alice.id}/task-grants`)).status).toBe(403);
|
|
206
211
|
expect(db.get("SELECT 1 FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'member_task_grants_changed' AND network_id = ?1", NET)).toBeTruthy();
|
package/src/tools.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -4607,8 +4607,8 @@ export function registerTools(server: McpServer, clientIP?: string, enforceNetwo
|
|
|
4607
4607
|
// No additional tools in model context; ordinary Provider actions unchanged.
|
|
4608
4608
|
if (action === 'secret_read') return providerReply(getScopedSecrets(human, id));
|
|
4609
4609
|
if (action === 'node_secret_list' || action === 'node_secret_put' || action === 'node_secret_delete') {
|
|
4610
|
-
const input = provider as { key?: string; value?: string } | undefined;
|
|
4611
|
-
const result = requestNodeSecrets(human, id, action === 'node_secret_list' ? 'list' : action === 'node_secret_put' ? 'put' : 'delete', input?.key, input?.value, revision);
|
|
4610
|
+
const input = provider as { key?: string; value?: string; from_vault?: boolean } | undefined;
|
|
4611
|
+
const result = requestNodeSecrets(human, id, action === 'node_secret_list' ? 'list' : action === 'node_secret_put' ? 'put' : 'delete', input?.key, input?.value, revision, input?.from_vault === true);
|
|
4612
4612
|
if (result.ok) {
|
|
4613
4613
|
const target = db.get<{ alias: string }>('SELECT alias FROM nodes WHERE node_id=?1 AND network_id=?2', id, human.networkId!);
|
|
4614
4614
|
if (target) pushEvent(target.alias, { type: 'node_secrets', request_id: result.request_id }, human.networkId!);
|
|
@@ -100,8 +100,13 @@ test("account avatar upload: user token only, PNG limits, visibility by shared n
|
|
|
100
100
|
expect(db.get("SELECT 1 AS ok FROM network_members m WHERE m.user_id=?1 AND m.network_id=?2", outsider.user!.user_id, a.network_id!)).toBeNull();
|
|
101
101
|
|
|
102
102
|
// 匿名/节点令牌都不是「本人」。
|
|
103
|
+
// #3354 —— 拒绝之外钉「没有留下一行上传记录」:一次被拒的上传若仍写进 user_avatar_uploads,
|
|
104
|
+
// 它会占配额、也说明「拒绝」发生在落盘之后。
|
|
105
|
+
const uploadRows = () => db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_avatar_uploads")!.n;
|
|
106
|
+
const beforeNeg = uploadRows();
|
|
103
107
|
expect((await upload(null, PNG_1X1)).status).toBe(401);
|
|
104
108
|
expect((await upload(node.token!, PNG_1X1)).status).toBe(403);
|
|
109
|
+
expect(uploadRows()).toBe(beforeNeg);
|
|
105
110
|
|
|
106
111
|
// 畸形输入:非 PNG、超边长、空、多字段、非 multipart。
|
|
107
112
|
expect((await upload(a.token!, Buffer.from("not a png"))).body.error).toBe("invalid_image");
|
|
@@ -151,6 +151,30 @@ describe("#1828 POST /api/messages/ack covers inbox reply rows", () => {
|
|
|
151
151
|
expect(again.body.acked).toBe(0);
|
|
152
152
|
});
|
|
153
153
|
|
|
154
|
+
// #3354 —— 拒绝路径:未认证必须 401,且**一条都不许 ack**。
|
|
155
|
+
// 这条路由的门是 `restAuth?.userId`(没有它就没有"我的消息"这个概念)。
|
|
156
|
+
test("🔴 未认证 ⇒ 401,且 A 的未读数一条都不减(拒绝不许有副作用)", async () => {
|
|
157
|
+
const before = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
|
|
158
|
+
const res = await fetch(`${base}/api/messages/ack`, {
|
|
159
|
+
method: "POST",
|
|
160
|
+
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
|
|
161
|
+
body: JSON.stringify({ message_ids: ["ib_a1"] }),
|
|
162
|
+
});
|
|
163
|
+
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
|
|
164
|
+
const after = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
|
|
165
|
+
expect(after.body.unread_total).toBe(before.body.unread_total);
|
|
166
|
+
});
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
// 同时给 agent 与 message_ids 是歧义的:拒收,且不 ack 任何一边
|
|
169
|
+
test("🔴 {agent} 与 {message_ids} 同给 ⇒ 400 ambiguous_ack,且两边都不动", async () => {
|
|
170
|
+
const before = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
|
|
171
|
+
const { status, body } = await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, { agent: "peer-1", message_ids: ["ib_a1"] }) as any;
|
|
172
|
+
expect(status).toBe(400);
|
|
173
|
+
expect(body.error).toBe("ambiguous_ack");
|
|
174
|
+
const after = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
|
|
175
|
+
expect(after.body.unread_total).toBe(before.body.unread_total);
|
|
176
|
+
});
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
154
178
|
test("status 类 inbox 行不会被用户 ack 掉(不是发给用户的消息)", async () => {
|
|
155
179
|
const { body } = await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, { message_ids: ["ib_a_status"] });
|
|
156
180
|
expect(body.acked_inbox).toBe(0);
|