@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.24 → 0.9.0-preview.26

package/src/server.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { registerTools } from "./tools.js";
 import { db, logTaskEvent, logAudit } from "./db.js";
 import { createSSEStream, createNetworkObserverStream, pushEvent, pushNetworkObserverEvent, getSSEStats, PRINTABLE_OBSERVER_KEY_PREFIX } from "./push.js";
 import { assertNodeActive } from "./lifecycle-guard.js";
+import { addNetworkScope, canRestWriteNetwork, getUserNetworkIds, resolveRestNetworkScope, singleNetworkId, type RestNetworkScope } from "./network-scope.js";
 import { validateAvatarUrl } from "./avatar-validate.js";
 import { narrowTags, parseStoredTags, validateScalarAttr } from "./node-attrs-validate.js";
 import { register, login, resolveToken, getUserNetworks, getUserAllNetworks, createNetwork, deleteNetwork, renameNetwork, changePassword, issueUserToken, listTokens, createToken, revokeToken, getNetworkMembers, getUserNetworkRole, addNetworkMember, updateMemberRole, removeNetworkMember, createInvite, joinByInvite, createNetworkTokenForNode, type AuthUser } from "./auth.js";
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ import {
   MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH,
   MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES,
   buildStoragePath,
+  pathForExistingBlob,
+  isValidCalendarBucket,
   generateFileId,
   getUploadsRoot,
   indexEntryPath,
@@ -214,7 +217,55 @@ function resolveRequestAuth(req: Request): { userId: string; networkId: string |
   return { userId: resolved.user.user_id, networkId: resolved.networkId, username: resolved.user.username, tokenName: resolved.tokenName, tokenId: resolved.tokenId };
 }
 
-// #495 — shared authorization gate for /api/files/:file_id downloads.
+// #503 — the credential kinds that authorization decisions branch on.
+// Resolved once per request at the handler, so the authz helpers stay
+// pure functions of (principal, entry) and every credential kind is a
+// directly constructible test input instead of a hand-assembled Request.
+export type Principal =
+  | { kind: "anonymous" }
+  | { kind: "dev-open-anon" }
+  | { kind: "legacy-master" }
+  | { kind: "utok"; userId: string; username: string; isAdmin: false }
+  | { kind: "ntok"; userId: string; boundNetworkId: string }
+  | { kind: "admin-utok"; userId: string; username: string };
+
+export function resolvePrincipal(req: Request): Principal {
+  const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
+  if (!authCtx) {
+    if (isLegacyAuthToken(req)) return { kind: "legacy-master" };
+    if (DEV_OPEN) return { kind: "dev-open-anon" };
+    return { kind: "anonymous" };
+  }
+  const token = requestToken(req);
+  const resolved = token ? resolveToken(token) : null;
+  const isAdmin = !!resolved && resolved.user.role === "admin";
+  // Bound network wins over admin classification: a ntok_ issued BY an
+  // admin is still a ntok_, and its bound scope defines its identity.
+  // Inverting this order would silently re-grant every production agent
+  // node cross-network read, since production node tokens resolve to an
+  // admin user (see the 生产影响 note on authorizeFileDownload).
+  if (authCtx.networkId) return { kind: "ntok", userId: authCtx.userId, boundNetworkId: authCtx.networkId };
+  if (isAdmin) return { kind: "admin-utok", userId: authCtx.userId, username: authCtx.username };
+  return { kind: "utok", userId: authCtx.userId, username: authCtx.username, isAdmin: false };
+}
+
+// #503 — coerce the on-disk (untrusted, hand-editable) index entry into
+// the shape the authz helper reasons about. Every `typeof` narrowing for
+// these two fields lives here and nowhere else, so the authz rules can be
+// read as rules rather than as string-checks.
+export function normalizeEntry(
+  entry: { owner_id?: unknown; network_id?: unknown },
+): { ownerId: string | null; networkId: string | null } {
+  const ownerId = typeof entry.owner_id === "string" && entry.owner_id.length > 0
+    ? entry.owner_id
+    : null;
+  const networkId = typeof entry.network_id === "string" && entry.network_id.length > 0
+    ? entry.network_id
+    : null;
+  return { ownerId, networkId };
+}
+
+// #495/#503 — shared authorization gate for /api/files/:file_id downloads.
 // Called from the GET handler and any future HEAD/Range/dashboard-proxy
 // entry so the allow-list can't drift between methods (通信龙 clause 2:
 // "授权若只在 GET 分支实现, HEAD 或 Range 走别路径 = 等于没修").
@@ -223,90 +274,85 @@ function resolveRequestAuth(req: Request): { userId: string; networkId: string |
 // caller emits 404 on false — never 403; 403 would leak that the
 // file_id exists and enables enumeration.
 //
-// Allow-list (staged P0 hotfix; same-network non-owner is NOT included
-// here — see follow-up #503):
+// Allow-list — network scope enforced by #503:
 //   - Legacy master AUTH_TOKEN (RFC-001 read-only) → allow.
 //   - admin utok_ → allow (mirrors requireAdminAuth).
-//   - Owner match: caller's resolved user_id === entry.owner_id.
-//   - null owner_id + DEV_OPEN → allow. DEV_OPEN uploads carry
-//     owner_id=null (authCtx=null in DEV_OPEN mode); rejecting them
-//     would break the intended local-dev anonymous flow. Encoded as
-//     an explicit env-gated branch so if DEV_OPEN semantics change,
-//     the code fails loudly instead of trusting a stale note.
+//   - entry.network_id present → caller must belong to THAT network:
+//     ntok_ must be bound to it; utok_ must hold any role in it
+//     (viewer included — viewer is read-only, and a viewer who can see
+//     a task but not open its attachment is a broken product).
+//   - entry.network_id absent (legacy / unattributed) → the pre-#503
+//     rules stand unchanged: owner match, or null owner_id + DEV_OPEN.
 //   - Everything else → deny (404). New uploads in production always
 //     carry a truthy owner_id (requireAuth blocks the null-owner-
 //     producing path when DEV_OPEN=off and no legacy master token is
 //     configured), so denying null-owner in production closes the
 //     enumeration vector for legacy blobs without breaking new uploads.
-export function authorizeFileDownload(req: Request, entry: { owner_id?: unknown }): boolean {
-  const token = requestToken(req);
-  const authCtx = resolveRequestAuth(req);
-  const resolved = token ? resolveToken(token) : null;
-  const isLegacyMasterCaller = !authCtx && isLegacyAuthToken(req);
-  const isAdminCaller = !!resolved && resolved.user.role === "admin";
-  const ownerId = typeof entry.owner_id === "string" && entry.owner_id.length > 0
-    ? entry.owner_id
-    : null;
-  const isOwnerCaller = !!authCtx && !!ownerId && authCtx.userId === ownerId;
-  if (isLegacyMasterCaller || isAdminCaller || isOwnerCaller) return true;
-  if (ownerId === null && DEV_OPEN) return true;
-  return false;
-}
-
-type RestNetworkScope = {
-  networkId: string | null;
-  networkIds: string[] | null;
-  denied?: string;
-};
-
-function getUserNetworkIds(userId: string): string[] {
-  return db.all<{ network_id: string }>(
-    "SELECT network_id FROM network_members WHERE user_id = ?1",
-    userId
-  ).map((row) => row.network_id);
-}
-
-function resolveRestNetworkScope(url: URL, authCtx: { userId: string; networkId: string | null } | null, isAdmin: boolean): RestNetworkScope {
-  const requested = url.searchParams.get("network_id");
-
-  // Legacy global token or open dev mode keeps the old global behavior.
-  if (!authCtx) return { networkId: requested || null, networkIds: null };
-
-  // Network tokens are forcibly scoped to their bound network.
-  if (authCtx.networkId) return { networkId: authCtx.networkId, networkIds: null };
-
-  // System admins may intentionally inspect all networks.
-  if (isAdmin) return { networkId: requested || null, networkIds: null };
-
-  if (requested) {
-    const role = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, requested);
-    if (!role) return { networkId: null, networkIds: [], denied: "access denied to requested network" };
-    return { networkId: requested, networkIds: null };
+//
+// 生产影响: 新的 ntok 归属文件走 network gate, admin 签发的 ntok 也走 gate
+// (kind='ntok' 分类优先绑定). 98 历史文件无 network_id 走老文件兼容分支
+// (owner/admin 可读, 存量行为不变).
+//
+// 行为变更: admin 的节点令牌 (ntok_) 失去它今天拥有的跨网络读权. 生产今天
+// 所有文件在同一 network → 无实际影响, 但语义变更须明写, 不能悄悄发生.
+export function authorizeFileDownload(
+  principal: Principal,
+  entry: { ownerId: string | null; networkId: string | null },
+): boolean {
+  if (principal.kind === "legacy-master") return true;
+  if (principal.kind === "admin-utok") return true;
+
+  if (entry.networkId !== null) {
+    if (principal.kind === "anonymous" || principal.kind === "dev-open-anon") return false;
+    if (principal.kind === "ntok") return principal.boundNetworkId === entry.networkId;
+    return !!getUserNetworkRole(principal.userId, entry.networkId);
   }
 
-  return { networkId: null, networkIds: getUserNetworkIds(authCtx.userId) };
+  if (principal.kind === "ntok" || principal.kind === "utok") {
+    if (entry.ownerId !== null && principal.userId === entry.ownerId) return true;
+  }
+  // Kept env-gated rather than narrowed to kind==='dev-open-anon': the
+  // pre-#503 rule allowed ANY caller to read a null-owner entry while
+  // DEV_OPEN is on, and #503 is scoped to adding network scope, not to
+  // tightening the local-dev carve-out.
+  if (entry.ownerId === null && DEV_OPEN) return true;
+  return false;
 }
 
-function addNetworkScope(sql: string, params: any[], scope: RestNetworkScope, column = "network_id"): string {
-  if (scope.networkId) {
-    sql += ` AND ${column} = ?${params.length + 1}`;
-    params.push(scope.networkId);
-  } else if (scope.networkIds) {
-    if (scope.networkIds.length === 0) {
-      sql += " AND 1=0";
+type ByteRange =
+  | { ok: true; start: number; end: number; length: number }
+  | { ok: false };
+
+function parseSingleByteRange(rangeHeader: string | null, size: number): ByteRange | null {
+  if (rangeHeader === null) return null;
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(size) || size < 0) return { ok: false };
+  const match = /^bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)$/.exec(rangeHeader.trim());
+  if (!match) return { ok: false };
+  const [, rawStart, rawEnd] = match;
+  if (rawStart === "" && rawEnd === "") return { ok: false };
+
+  let start: number;
+  let end: number;
+  if (rawStart === "") {
+    const suffixLength = Number(rawEnd);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(suffixLength) || suffixLength <= 0) return { ok: false };
+    if (size === 0) return { ok: false };
+    start = Math.max(0, size - suffixLength);
+    end = size - 1;
+  } else {
+    start = Number(rawStart);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(start) || start < 0) return { ok: false };
+    if (start >= size) return { ok: false };
+    if (rawEnd === "") {
+      end = size - 1;
     } else {
-      const placeholders = scope.networkIds.map((_, i) => `?${params.length + i + 1}`).join(", ");
-      sql += ` AND ${column} IN (${placeholders})`;
-      params.push(...scope.networkIds);
+      end = Number(rawEnd);
+      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(end) || end < start) return { ok: false };
+      end = Math.min(end, size - 1);
     }
   }
-  return sql;
-}
 
-function singleNetworkId(scope: RestNetworkScope): string | null {
-  if (scope.networkId) return scope.networkId;
-  if (scope.networkIds?.length === 1) return scope.networkIds[0];
-  return null;
+  return { ok: true, start, end, length: end - start + 1 };
 }
 
 function sqliteTime(date: Date): string {
@@ -407,13 +453,6 @@ function bucketTelemetry(rows: any[], fromMs: number, bucketMs: number) {
     }));
 }
 
-function canRestWriteNetwork(authCtx: { userId: string; networkId: string | null } | null, networkId: string | null, isAdmin: boolean): boolean {
-  if (!authCtx) return true; // legacy global token or open dev mode
-  if (isAdmin) return true;
-  if (!networkId) return false;
-  const role = getUserNetworkRole(authCtx.userId, networkId);
-  return !!role && role !== "viewer";
-}
 
 type RestDeliveryTarget =
   | { state: "online"; alias: string; session: any }
@@ -1303,7 +1342,7 @@ return Bun.serve({
     // Token-bound networkId takes precedence (ntok_ → forced), then query param
     const restAuth = resolveRequestAuth(req);
     const isAdmin = !!(restAuth?.username && db.get<any>("SELECT role FROM users WHERE username = ?1", restAuth.username)?.role === "admin");
-    const restScope = resolveRestNetworkScope(url, restAuth, isAdmin);
+    const restScope = resolveRestNetworkScope(url.searchParams.get("network_id"), restAuth, isAdmin);
     if (restScope.denied) {
       return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: restScope.denied }, { status: 403 }));
     }
@@ -1600,8 +1639,22 @@ return Bun.serve({
     // X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so uploaded files can never be
     // executed or served as HTML.
     if (url.pathname === "/api/upload" && req.method === "POST") {
+      // #503 Finding 3 = Option A (lead 40be9845): every 4xx returned
+      // BEFORE `req.formData()` drains the request body MUST include
+      // `Connection: close`. Otherwise the client's still-inbound bytes
+      // land on a keepalive connection the server already answered on,
+      // poisoning the next pooled request. Bug is pre-existing (411/
+      // 413/415/429/401 all have this shape) — the #503 authz block
+      // just made it visible under aggregate `bun test` with a 12MiB
+      // upload immediately followed by another request. Per-file green
+      // hides this class of bug.
+      const earlyReject = (res: Response): Response => {
+        const wrapped = withCors(req, res);
+        wrapped.headers.set("Connection", "close");
+        return wrapped;
+      };
       const authErr = requireAuth(req);
-      if (authErr) return withCors(req, authErr);
+      if (authErr) return earlyReject(authErr);
 
       // Rate-limit key prefers the token id (so 60/h is per-token, not
       // per-IP); falls back to IP for legacy or anonymous-but-dev-open.
@@ -1615,7 +1668,7 @@ return Bun.serve({
           "X-RateLimit-Reset": String(Math.floor(rate.resetAt / 1000)),
         };
         if (rate.retryAfterMs) headers["Retry-After"] = String(Math.ceil(rate.retryAfterMs / 1000));
-        return withCors(req, new Response(
+        return earlyReject(new Response(
           JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "rate_limited", message: "Upload rate limit exceeded (60/hour). Try again later.", retry_after_ms: rate.retryAfterMs }),
           { status: 429, headers: { ...headers, "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8" } },   // #426 — legacy clients default to ISO-8859-1 without charset
         ));
@@ -1629,25 +1682,132 @@ return Bun.serve({
       //             or lied Content-Length header)
       const contentLength = req.headers.get("Content-Length");
       if (!contentLength) {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
           { ok: false, error: "length_required", message: "Content-Length header is required for /api/upload" },
           { status: 411 },
         ));
       }
       const declaredBytes = Number(contentLength);
       if (!Number.isFinite(declaredBytes) || declaredBytes < 0) {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "bad_content_length" }, { status: 400 }));
+        return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "bad_content_length" }, { status: 400 }));
       }
       if (declaredBytes > MAX_REQUEST_CONTENT_LENGTH) {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
           { ok: false, error: "payload_too_large", message: `Upload exceeds the ${MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} byte limit`, limit_bytes: MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES },
           { status: 413 },
         ));
       }
 
+      // #503 — decide which network this upload is attributed to, then
+      // check the caller may write there. Attribution and authorization
+      // are two questions; neither substitutes for the other. Placed
+      // after the in-memory rate limiter (above) and before the body is
+      // read, so an unauthorized caller never gets a DB query per byte
+      // uploaded and never gets their multipart envelope parsed.
+      const principal = resolvePrincipal(req);
+      const requestedNetId = url.searchParams.get("network_id");
+      let uploadNetId: string | null = null;
+
+      switch (principal.kind) {
+        case "anonymous":
+          // Unreachable: requireAuth above already 401s. Kept so the
+          // switch stays exhaustive and a future auth change fails loud.
+          return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "auth_required" }, { status: 401 }));
+        case "dev-open-anon":
+          // Local dev only. Deliberately does NOT claim a real network,
+          // even if one was requested — an unauthenticated caller must
+          // not be able to file blobs into a tenant's network.
+          uploadNetId = null;
+          break;
+        case "legacy-master":
+          // Unreachable today: requireAuth 401s master tokens on every
+          // non-GET /api/ request (RFC-001 made them read-only). Kept
+          // fail-closed so relaxing that rule cannot silently start
+          // producing unattributed blobs.
+          if (!requestedNetId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "legacy master uploads must specify a network_id query param",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+          break;
+        case "ntok":
+          if (requestedNetId && requestedNetId !== principal.boundNetworkId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_conflict",
+              message: "network_id query param conflicts with the token-bound network",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          uploadNetId = principal.boundNetworkId;
+          break;
+        case "admin-utok": {
+          // #503 Finding 2 = Option F (lead 40be9845): admin follows the same
+          // "auto-derive when unambiguous / require param when ambiguous" rule
+          // as utok_. Rule 4's REASON (no unowned files) is preserved — the
+          // derived network is a real membership. Strict on genuine ambiguity:
+          // 0 or ≥2 memberships → 400. Preserves prod upload contract (in
+          // prod admin is in exactly 1 network; auto-derive succeeds).
+          if (requestedNetId) {
+            // Admin bypasses membership; network existence validated below.
+            uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+            break;
+          }
+          const adminNetworks = getUserNetworkIds(principal.userId);
+          if (adminNetworks.length === 1) {
+            uploadNetId = adminNetworks[0];
+          } else {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "admin has 0 or ≥2 network memberships; network_id query param required",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          break;
+        }
+        case "utok": {
+          if (requestedNetId) {
+            // A non-member asking for someone else's network never gets
+            // here: the REST scope guard (`restScope.denied`) already
+            // 403'd, with the same body whether the network exists or
+            // not. Re-checking membership here would be a second, drifting
+            // copy of a decision this codebase makes in one place.
+            uploadNetId = requestedNetId;
+            break;
+          }
+          uploadNetId = singleNetworkId(resolveRestNetworkScope(url.searchParams.get("network_id"), authCtx, false));
+          if (!uploadNetId) {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "network_id_required",
+              message: "network_id query param required for a multi-network user token; 'first network' is not assumed",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (uploadNetId !== null) {
+        const networkRow = db.get<any>("SELECT * FROM networks WHERE network_id = ?1", uploadNetId);
+        if (!networkRow) {
+          if (principal.kind === "admin-utok" || principal.kind === "legacy-master") {
+            return earlyReject(Response.json({
+              ok: false, error: "unknown_network",
+              message: "network_id does not exist",
+            }, { status: 400 }));
+          }
+          // Byte-identical to the non-member 404 above: distinguishing
+          // the two would hand an unprivileged caller a network-existence
+          // oracle.
+          return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (!canRestWriteNetwork(authCtx, uploadNetId, principal.kind === "admin-utok")) {
+        return earlyReject(Response.json({ ok: false, error: "permission_denied" }, { status: 403 }));
+      }
+
       const contentType = req.headers.get("Content-Type") ?? "";
       if (!/^multipart\/form-data/i.test(contentType)) {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json(
+        return earlyReject(Response.json(
           { ok: false, error: "unsupported_media_type", message: "Use multipart/form-data with a 'file' field" },
           { status: 415 },
         ));
@@ -1719,6 +1879,8 @@ return Bun.serve({
             size: file.size,
             owner: authCtx?.username ?? null,
             owner_id: authCtx?.userId ?? null,
+            // Key omitted (not null) when unattributed — see UploadIndexEntry.
+            ...(uploadNetId ? { network_id: uploadNetId } : {}),
             uploaded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
           }, null, 2));
         }
@@ -1773,10 +1935,15 @@ return Bun.serve({
 
       let entry: any;
       try { entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(idxPath, "utf-8")); } catch {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "index_corrupt" }, { status: 500 }));
+        // #509 副指挥 66983a19: corrupted index must not leak "server
+        // failed" signal — 404 with same shape as unknown file_id
+        // (input refused at boundary, no enumeration).
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
       }
       if (!validateIndexEntry(entry)) {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "index_invalid" }, { status: 500 }));
+        // #509 副指挥 66983a19: schema-invalid index (bucket "../etc",
+        // missing fields, wrong types) is also 404 — same discipline.
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
       }
 
       // #495 ownership gate — placed AFTER file-exists so denied
@@ -1784,15 +1951,33 @@ return Bun.serve({
       // "no such file". Both branches return the same 404 shape
       // for BOTH GET and HEAD (HEAD honours body-omission but the
       // status code and headers are the authoritative signal).
-      if (!authorizeFileDownload(req, entry)) {
+      if (!authorizeFileDownload(resolvePrincipal(req), normalizeEntry(entry))) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
+      }
+
+      // #509 defence-in-depth: pre-check date_bucket against BOTH
+      // shape regex AND real-calendar semantics. A poisoned index (e.g.
+      // "../etc", "2026-02-30", "2026-13-01") must return 404 not 500
+      // — 500 says "server failed"; 404 says "input refused at boundary".
+      // 副指挥 b1082017 / 66983a19 hard doors:
+      //   • 稳定 404 非 500 for invalid/missing/poisoned date_bucket
+      //   • 真日历语义校验, 不仅 regex 形状
+      if (!isValidCalendarBucket(entry.date_bucket)) {
         return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
       }
 
       let storage;
       try {
-        storage = buildStoragePath(entry.file_id, entry.ext);
+        // #509 fix: use the date_bucket recorded in the index at upload
+        // time, NOT today's date. buildStoragePath computes today; that is
+        // correct for new uploads only. Yesterday's file lives in
+        // yesterday's bucket forever — read path must respect that.
+        storage = pathForExistingBlob(entry.date_bucket, entry.file_id, entry.ext);
       } catch {
-        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "index_invalid" }, { status: 500 }));
+        // Defence-in-depth: unreachable given the pre-check above, but
+        // keep as fallback. Return 404 not 500 to match the pre-check
+        // shape — caller sees the same code for all invalid-bucket cases.
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "not_found" }, { status: 404 }));
       }
       if (!isPathInsideUploadsRoot(storage.absolutePath)) {
         // Defence: should be unreachable since buildStoragePath rejected
@@ -1822,7 +2007,31 @@ return Bun.serve({
         "Content-Disposition": `attachment; filename="${safeFilename.replace(/"/g, "")}"`,
         "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
         "Cache-Control": "private, no-store",
+        "Accept-Ranges": "bytes",
       };
+      const range = parseSingleByteRange(req.headers.get("Range"), entry.size);
+      if (range && !range.ok) {
+        return new Response(null, {
+          status: 416,
+          headers: {
+            ...responseHeaders,
+            "Content-Length": "0",
+            "Content-Range": `bytes */${entry.size}`,
+          },
+        });
+      }
+      if (range?.ok) {
+        const headers = {
+          ...responseHeaders,
+          "Content-Length": String(range.length),
+          "Content-Range": `bytes ${range.start}-${range.end}/${entry.size}`,
+        };
+        if (req.method === "HEAD") {
+          return new Response(null, { status: 206, headers });
+        }
+        const blob = Bun.file(storage.absolutePath).slice(range.start, range.end + 1);
+        return new Response(blob, { status: 206, headers });
+      }
       // HEAD: return the same status and headers as GET, but no body,
       // per RFC 9110 §9.3.2. This ensures HEAD passes through the same
       // authorization helper — a cross-owner HEAD is 404 (same as GET),