@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.146 → 0.9.0-preview.147

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sleep2agi/commhub-server",
-  "version": "0.9.0-preview.146",
+  "version": "0.9.0-preview.147",
   "description": "CommHub Server — AI Agent communication hub with MCP protocol, multi-network isolation, user auth, and MCP tools (17 collaboration-core + node/provider ops tools; authoritative list: docs-site/docs/api/mcp-tools.md).",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.ts",

package/src/health-redaction.test.ts

@@ -640,3 +640,46 @@ describe("#506 cross-network isolation of /health sse_sessions (same alias, two
     expect(keys.some((k) => k.startsWith(`${aNet}:`))).toBe(false);
   });
 });
+
+// #2149 —— 错误路径**不能回显凭据**。
+//
+// 背景：2026-10-23 TMA云鲸 对 CommHub MCP 做只读扫描时收到 502，代理生成的
+// 非 JSON 错误页把本次请求的鉴权相关头回显在正文里。那个 502 页很可能来自
+// 调用链上的代理（本仓没有 502 生成逻辑），但**这条防线必须在本仓也有**：
+// 任何 4xx/5xx 的响应体都不该把调用方递上来的 `Authorization` / `Cookie` /
+// query 里的 token 原样吐回去 —— 一旦有人写出这种错误文案，它就会进日志、
+// 进回执、进诊断归档。
+//
+// 做法是**注入一个形状像真凭据的 canary**，然后打一圈错误路径，断言响应正文
+// 里一次都不出现它。canary 用 `ntok_` 前缀，正是本仓 `redactTokens` 认得的形状。
+describe("#2149 error paths never echo credentials", () => {
+  const CANARY = "ntok_LEAKCANARY_0123456789abcdef";
+  const COOKIE = "session=COOKIELEAKCANARY0123456789";
+
+  const paths: Array<{ method: string; path: string; body?: string }> = [
+    { method: "GET", path: "/api/nope-not-a-route" },
+    { method: "GET", path: "/api/requirements" },
+    { method: "GET", path: "/api/nodes" },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/mcp", body: "{not json" },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/api/auth/login", body: JSON.stringify({ username: "nobody", password: "wrong-password-Aa1!" }) },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/api/auth/me/avatar/upload" },
+  ];
+
+  test("no 4xx/5xx body contains the presented token, cookie or query secret", async () => {
+    for (const c of paths) {
+      const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${c.path}${c.path.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}access_token=${CANARY}`, {
+        method: c.method,
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${CANARY}`,
+          cookie: COOKIE,
+          "content-type": "application/json",
+        },
+        body: c.body,
+      });
+      const text = await res.text();
+      expect(text.includes(CANARY)).toBe(false);
+      expect(text.includes("LEAKCANARY")).toBe(false);
+      expect(text.includes("COOKIELEAKCANARY")).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+});

package/src/schedule-agent-mcp-http.test.ts

@@ -312,13 +312,23 @@ describe("old clients unaffected", () => {
 });
 
 describe("scheduler re-checks the creating node as it is now", () => {
+  // #2115 —— `at` 原来是 `now - 5s - random(0..1000ms)`：两次调用只要「晚的毫秒差」正好等于两个
+  // 随机值之差，算出的 `at` 就完全相同，于是第二次按 `scheduled_for = at` 读到的是**上一轮那行**
+  // （于是 test638 L2 并发聚合偶发「期望 creator_node_gone、得到 creator_node_readonly」）。
+  // 注释里说「随机」的人以为碰撞概率是 1/1000，其实是「随机差 == 时间差」，慢机器上时间差几十毫秒
+  // 就落在这个窗口里。改成单调递推：每次减 1s，任何两次调用都不可能相等。
+  let dueSeq = 0;
   const dueAndRun = async (id: string) => {
-    const at = new Date(Date.now() - 5_000 - Math.floor(Math.random() * 1000)).toISOString();
+    dueSeq += 1;
+    const at = new Date(Date.now() - 5_000 - dueSeq * 1_000).toISOString();
     db.run("UPDATE scheduled_tasks SET next_run_at = ?1 WHERE schedule_id = ?2", [at, id]);
     const { runDueScheduledTasks } = await import("./scheduled-tasks.js");
     runDueScheduledTasks();
-    return db.get<{ status: string; error_code: string | null; task_id: string | null }>(
-      "SELECT status, error_code, task_id FROM scheduled_task_runs WHERE schedule_id = ?1 AND scheduled_for = ?2", id, at)!;
+    const row = db.get<{ status: string; error_code: string | null; task_id: string | null }>(
+      "SELECT status, error_code, task_id FROM scheduled_task_runs WHERE schedule_id = ?1 AND scheduled_for = ?2", id, at);
+    // 把「这一轮根本没跑出 run 行」和「跑出了但结论不对」分开报 —— 前者是夹具问题，后者才是行为问题。
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    return row!;
   };
   test("owner changes to a user not granted the target: send_task denied, and so is every scheduled run", async () => {
     const id = (await create("a", { target_node_id: node.b.id })).schedule.schedule_id;

package/src/server.ts

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ import { handleSideThreadHttpRequest } from "./side-thread-http.js";
 import { createProductionSideThreadTransport } from "./side-thread-production.js";
 import { parseHubTimestamp } from "./hub-timestamp";
 import { logTaskRejection } from "./task-rejection-log.js";
-import { AVATAR_FIELD, avatarUrl, inspectAvatarImage, isMultipart, isValidAvatarVersion, MAX_AVATAR_BYTES } from "./user-avatar-image.js";
+import { AVATAR_FIELD, avatarUrl, inspectAvatarImage, isMultipart, isValidAvatarVersion, MAX_AVATAR_BYTES, MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES } from "./user-avatar-image.js";
 
 const PORT = resolvePort(process.env.PORT);
 const HOST = process.env.HOST || "127.0.0.1";
@@ -1553,6 +1553,14 @@ return Bun.serve({
         return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_avatar_body", reason: "expected exactly one `file` part" }, { status: 400 }));
       }
       if (file.size > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "too_large" }, { status: 413 }));
+      // #2054 —— Hub-wide 总容量上界：公开注册可无限建账号，per-user 单条上限挡不住
+      // 「轮换账号把主库撑大」。这里在**写入前**用当前总量 + 本次大小判一次；
+      // 已存在的其他用户头像绝不删除（不回收别人的数据），只拒绝本次上传。
+      const storedBytes = db.get<{ total: number }>("SELECT COALESCE(SUM(bytes), 0) AS total FROM user_avatar_uploads")?.total ?? 0;
+      const ownBytes = db.get<{ bytes: number }>("SELECT bytes FROM user_avatar_uploads WHERE user_id = ?1", [resolved.user.user_id])?.bytes ?? 0;
+      if (storedBytes - ownBytes + file.size > MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES) {
+        return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "avatar_storage_full" }, { status: 503 }));
+      }
       const bytes = new Uint8Array(await file.arrayBuffer());
       const check = inspectAvatarImage(bytes);
       if (!check.ok) return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_image", reason: check.reason }, { status: 400 }));

package/src/user-avatar-image.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@ import { inflateSync } from "node:zlib";
 // 校验强度：结构（签名/chunk/CRC）+ 真实解码（IDAT 解压且扫描行长度与 IHDR 相符）。
 
 export const MAX_AVATAR_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * #2054 —— 单个 Hub 的头像总存储上界。公开注册可以持续创建账号，per-user 单条
+ * 上限（每人 1 条 × 8 MiB）挡不住轮换账号把主库撑大，所以再加一道总量边界。
+ * 超限时上传返回 503 `avatar_storage_full`；不回收/删除任何既有用户的头像。
+ */
+export const MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
 /** 客户端会把图重编码到最长边 512；服务端独立复核这条上限。 */
 export const MAX_AVATAR_EDGE = 512;
 /** version 只允许 URL 安全字符，长度有界（避免拼路径时引入 `.`、`/`）。 */

package/src/user-avatar-upload-http.test.ts

@@ -292,3 +292,57 @@ test("image inspector: signature, shape and size limits", () => {
   expect(inspectAvatarImage(jpeg)).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: "not_png" });
   expect(inspectAvatarImage(Buffer.alloc(MAX_AVATAR_BYTES + 1))).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: "too_large" });
 });
+
+// #2054 —— Hub-wide 头像总容量上界：公开注册可无限建账号，per-user 单条上限挡不住
+// 轮换账号把主库撑大。这里在库里塞一条接近上界的行，断言上传被 503 拒绝，
+// 且**不删除**任何既有用户的头像（别人的数据不动），随后清掉该行恢复。
+test("account avatar upload: a hub-wide storage cap rejects the write and keeps existing rows", async () => {
+  const { MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES } = await import("./user-avatar-image.js");
+  const victim = register("avcap_alice", "AvatarCap1!");
+  const uploader = register("avcap_bob", "AvatarCap1!");
+  expect(victim.ok && uploader.ok).toBe(true);
+
+  const { bootServer } = await import("./server.js");
+  const hub = bootServer({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1" });
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${hub.port}`;
+  const upload = async (token: string, bytes: Buffer) => {
+    const form = new FormData();
+    form.append("file", new Blob([bytes], { type: "image/png" }), "a.png");
+    const res = await fetch(`${base}/api/auth/me/avatar/upload`, {
+      method: "POST", headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, body: form,
+    });
+    return { status: res.status, body: (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as any };
+  };
+
+  const filler = Buffer.from("filler-avatar-bytes");
+  try {
+    // 先让 bob 正常上传一次，证明上界不是「谁都不能传」。
+    const ok = await upload(uploader.token!, PNG_1X1);
+    expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // 塞一条「别人已经占满」的行：总量逼到上界之上。
+    db.run(
+      "INSERT INTO user_avatar_uploads (user_id, version, png, bytes, width, height, updated_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, 1, 1, datetime('now'))",
+      [victim.user!.user_id, "capver", filler, MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES],
+    );
+    const before = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_avatar_uploads")!.n;
+
+    const blocked = await upload(uploader.token!, PNG_1X1);
+    expect(blocked.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(blocked.body.error).toBe("avatar_storage_full");
+
+    // 不回收别人的数据：行数与那条 filler 都还在。
+    const after = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_avatar_uploads")!.n;
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+    expect(db.get<any>("SELECT bytes FROM user_avatar_uploads WHERE user_id = ?1", [victim.user!.user_id])?.bytes)
+      .toBe(MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES);
+    // 自己的额度要扣掉：上限全算在自己头上时，替换**自己**的头像不应被拒。
+    db.run("DELETE FROM user_avatar_uploads WHERE user_id = ?1", [victim.user!.user_id]);
+    db.run("UPDATE user_avatar_uploads SET bytes = ?1 WHERE user_id = ?2", [MAX_AVATAR_STORAGE_BYTES, uploader.user!.user_id]);
+    const replaced = await upload(uploader.token!, PNG_1X1);
+    expect(replaced.status).toBe(200);
+  } finally {
+    db.run("DELETE FROM user_avatar_uploads WHERE user_id = ?1", [victim.user!.user_id]);
+    hub.stop?.();
+  }
+});