@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.1 → 0.9.0-preview.101

package/src/api-nodes-shape.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+import { parseStoredTags } from "./node-attrs-validate.js";
+
+// Regression test for SELECT * fragility on GET /api/nodes.
+//
+// Prior behavior: `SELECT * FROM nodes` returned whatever columns the
+// table happened to have. When RFC-024 added config_revision +
+// config_snapshot columns (read by the per-node GET /api/nodes/:id/config
+// endpoint, NOT meant for the list endpoint), they silently leaked into
+// the list response and broke V3 Networks tests that asserted on the
+// nodes-list row shape.
+//
+// Current behavior: explicit column list — the response contract is:
+//   node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path, channels,
+//   server, hostname, network_id, created_at, updated_at
+// This test runs the same SQL the handler uses, on a row that DOES have
+// config_revision + config_snapshot populated, and asserts those fields
+// do NOT appear in the returned row. If anyone reverts the handler to
+// SELECT *, or adds an internal column to the SELECT, this test breaks.
+
+const TEST_NETWORK = "net_test_shape";
+const TEST_NODE = "node_test_shape_abc";
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  // Best-effort cleanup (test runs in shared test DB; rows are isolated by id)
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", [TEST_NODE]); } catch {}
+});
+afterAll(() => {
+  try { db.run("DELETE FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1", [TEST_NODE]); } catch {}
+});
+
+// Helper: mirror handler's role-extraction pass to mimic the production
+// response shape exactly. Keeps the test the source of truth for the
+// contract; if the handler changes, the assertions still lock what
+// the dashboard / external clients see.
+function mapRow(r: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  let role: string | null = null;
+  const snap = r.config_snapshot;
+  if (snap) {
+    try { role = (typeof snap === "string" ? JSON.parse(snap) : snap)?.role ?? null; }
+    catch { /* malformed */ }
+  }
+  const { config_snapshot, ...rest } = r;
+  return {
+    ...rest,
+    tags: parseStoredTags(r.tags),
+    attrs_revision: Number(r.attrs_revision ?? 0),
+    role,
+  };
+}
+
+describe("RFC-024 regression — GET /api/nodes response shape (no SELECT *)", () => {
+  test("explicit columns + role extracted: config_snapshot NOT in response, role IS", () => {
+    // Insert a row with the leak-prone columns populated. Use INSERT OR
+    // REPLACE so concurrent test runs don't trip on PRIMARY KEY.
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO nodes (
+         node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path,
+         channels, server, hostname, network_id,
+         config_revision, config_snapshot
+       ) VALUES (
+         ?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8, ?9, ?10, ?11, ?12
+       )`,
+      [TEST_NODE, "test-shape", "test-shape", "claude-agent-sdk", "claude-opus",
+       "/tmp/cfg.json", "[]", "localhost", "test-host", TEST_NETWORK,
+       7, JSON.stringify({ model: "claude-opus", flags: { x: true }, role: "host_supervisor" })],
+    );
+
+    // Mirror handler SQL + mapping
+    const raw = db.all<Record<string, unknown>>(
+      `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model,
+              config_path, channels, server, hostname,
+              network_id, created_at, updated_at,
+              config_snapshot, display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+       FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1`,
+      TEST_NODE,
+    );
+    const rows = raw.map(mapRow);
+
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    const row = rows[0]!;
+    // Expected fields present (13 = 12 contract + new role)
+    for (const k of ["node_id", "node_name", "alias", "runtime", "model",
+                     "config_path", "channels", "server", "hostname",
+                     "network_id", "created_at", "updated_at", "role"]) {
+      expect(row).toHaveProperty(k);
+    }
+    // Internal fields NOT present
+    expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("config_revision");
+    expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("config_snapshot");
+    // role is EXTRACTED from config_snapshot JSON, not the raw blob
+    expect(row.role).toBe("host_supervisor");
+    // Belt: the key set is exactly the dashboard-facing contract.
+    // NOTE: this file MIRRORS the handler's SQL rather than calling it, so
+    // it can drift — it already lagged behind `lifecycle_state` /
+    // `avatar_url`, which the handler selects but this mirror does not.
+    // Treat a diff here as "re-read the handler", not as proof of the wire
+    // shape; node-attrs.test.ts asserts the real HTTP response.
+    expect(Object.keys(row).sort()).toEqual([
+      "alias", "attrs_revision", "channels", "config_path", "created_at",
+      "display_name", "hostname", "model", "network_id", "node_id",
+      "node_name", "role", "runtime", "server", "tags", "team",
+      "updated_at",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  test("role is null when config_snapshot is empty / missing / malformed", () => {
+    // Empty snapshot → null
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id, config_snapshot)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, NULL)`,
+      [TEST_NODE, "test-shape", "test-shape", TEST_NETWORK],
+    );
+    let row = mapRow(db.get<Record<string, unknown>>(
+      `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path, channels,
+              server, hostname, network_id, created_at, updated_at, config_snapshot,
+              display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+       FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1`,
+      TEST_NODE,
+    )!);
+    expect(row.role).toBeNull();
+    expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("config_snapshot");
+
+    // Malformed JSON → null (handler doesn't throw, just leaves role null)
+    db.run(`UPDATE nodes SET config_snapshot = ?1 WHERE node_id = ?2`, ["not-json{", TEST_NODE]);
+    row = mapRow(db.get<Record<string, unknown>>(
+      `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path, channels,
+              server, hostname, network_id, created_at, updated_at, config_snapshot,
+              display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+       FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1`,
+      TEST_NODE,
+    )!);
+    expect(row.role).toBeNull();
+
+    // Snapshot without role key → null
+    db.run(`UPDATE nodes SET config_snapshot = ?1 WHERE node_id = ?2`,
+           [JSON.stringify({ model: "x", flags: {} }), TEST_NODE]);
+    row = mapRow(db.get<Record<string, unknown>>(
+      `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path, channels,
+              server, hostname, network_id, created_at, updated_at, config_snapshot,
+              display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+       FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1`,
+      TEST_NODE,
+    )!);
+    expect(row.role).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("daemon discovery use-case: dashboard finds role=host_supervisor without prefix heuristic", () => {
+    // Daemon registered with arbitrary node_id (NO `node_daemon_` prefix)
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id, config_snapshot)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5)`,
+      [TEST_NODE, "my-daemon", "my-daemon", TEST_NETWORK,
+       JSON.stringify({ role: "host_supervisor", runtime: "claude-agent-sdk" })],
+    );
+    const rows = db.all<Record<string, unknown>>(
+      `SELECT node_id, node_name, alias, runtime, model, config_path, channels,
+              server, hostname, network_id, created_at, updated_at, config_snapshot,
+              display_name, team, tags, attrs_revision
+       FROM nodes WHERE network_id = ?1`,
+      TEST_NETWORK,
+    ).map(mapRow);
+    // Dashboard's lookup: find first node with role==='host_supervisor'
+    const daemon = rows.find(r => r.role === "host_supervisor");
+    expect(daemon).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(daemon!.node_id).toBe(TEST_NODE);
+    // Even though node_id does NOT start with `node_daemon_` (the prior heuristic)
+    expect(String(daemon!.node_id).startsWith("node_daemon_")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("internal columns are still readable via dedicated query (config snapshot endpoint path)", () => {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO nodes (node_id, node_name, alias, network_id,
+                                     config_revision, config_snapshot)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6)`,
+      [TEST_NODE, "test-shape", "test-shape", TEST_NETWORK,
+       42, JSON.stringify({ model: "claude-opus" })],
+    );
+    // Mirrors the SELECT in GET /api/nodes/:id/config (server/src/index.ts):
+    const cfgRow = db.get<{ config_revision: number; config_snapshot: string }>(
+      "SELECT config_revision, config_snapshot FROM nodes WHERE node_id = ?1",
+      TEST_NODE,
+    );
+    expect(cfgRow?.config_revision).toBe(42);
+    expect(cfgRow?.config_snapshot).toContain("claude-opus");
+  });
+});

package/src/auth-sessions-http.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+// 登录会话:闲置过期 + 「登录设备」列表 + 退出其他设备。
+//
+// 生产上 user-login 令牌一次登录一条、从不过期也不回收,泄漏任何一条就等于那个账号(多为管理员)。
+// 这里的每一条在 main 上都是红的:main 没有闲置过期(旧令牌永远有效)、登录响应不带 token_id、
+// /api/auth/sessions* 端点不存在。正控:在用的会话、显式 API 令牌、节点令牌照常可用。
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeAll, afterAll } from "bun:test";
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "fs";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { tmpdir } from "os";
+import { register, createNetworkTokenForNode, createToken } from "./auth.js";
+import { db, hashToken } from "./db.js";
+
+const DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "anet-sessions-"));
+let BASE = "";
+let hub: any = null;
+const PW = "SessionsPassw0rd!";
+let USER = "", userId = "", NET = "", ntok = "", apiToken = "";
+
+const auth = (t: string) => ({ Authorization: `Bearer ${t}` });
+async function call(token: string, method: string, path: string, body?: unknown, extra: Record<string, string> = {}) {
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, {
+    method,
+    headers: { ...(token ? auth(token) : {}), ...(body === undefined ? {} : { "Content-Type": "application/json" }), ...extra },
+    body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
+  });
+  return { status: res.status, body: await res.json().catch(() => null) as any };
+}
+async function loginAs(label?: string, ua = "anet-test-agent/1.0") {
+  const r = await call("", "POST", "/api/auth/login", { username: USER, password: PW, ...(label ? { client_label: label } : {}) }, { "User-Agent": ua });
+  expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+  return r.body as { token: string; token_id: string };
+}
+// 把某条令牌的「最近使用」拨回 days 天前(created_at 一起拨,模拟一条很早签发、之后没再用过的令牌)。
+function ageToken(token: string, days: number) {
+  db.run(
+    "UPDATE api_tokens SET last_used_at = datetime('now', ?1), created_at = datetime('now', ?1) WHERE token_hash = ?2",
+    [`-${days} days`, hashToken(token)],
+  );
+}
+function neverUsed(token: string, days: number) {
+  db.run("UPDATE api_tokens SET last_used_at = NULL, created_at = datetime('now', ?1) WHERE token_hash = ?2", [`-${days} days`, hashToken(token)]);
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(DIR, "hub.db");
+  process.env.COMMHUB_UPLOADS_DIR = join(DIR, "uploads");
+  process.env.HOST = "127.0.0.1";
+  // 这里每个用例都真走 POST /api/auth/login 签发会话;默认的每 IP 登录限流会在第 ~20 次开始 429。
+  process.env.COMMHUB_LOGIN_IP_MAX = "1000";
+  delete process.env.COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS;
+  USER = `sess_user_${Date.now()}`;
+  const reg = register(USER, PW);
+  userId = reg.user!.user_id; NET = reg.network_id!;
+  const minted = createNetworkTokenForNode(userId, NET, "sess-node", "node_sess_1");
+  expect(minted.ok).toBe(true);
+  ntok = minted.token!;
+  const api = createToken(userId, "ci-script");
+  expect(api.ok).toBe(true);
+  apiToken = api.token!;
+  const mod: any = await import("./server.js");
+  hub = mod.bootServer({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1" });
+  BASE = `http://127.0.0.1:${hub.port}`;
+}, 30_000);
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  try { hub?.stop?.(true); } catch {}
+  try { rmSync(DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+});
+
+describe("login / register identify the issued token", () => {
+  test("login returns token_id of the token it returned (and stays backward-compatible)", async () => {
+    const r = await call("", "POST", "/api/auth/login", { username: USER, password: PW });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(typeof r.body.token).toBe("string");
+    expect(r.body.token_id).toMatch(/^tok_/);
+    const row = db.get<any>("SELECT token_id FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(r.body.token));
+    expect(row.token_id).toBe(r.body.token_id);
+  });
+  test("register returns token_id", async () => {
+    const r = await call("", "POST", "/api/auth/register", { username: `sess_reg_${Date.now()}`, password: PW });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.token_id).toMatch(/^tok_/);
+    const row = db.get<any>("SELECT token_id, name FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(r.body.token));
+    expect(row.token_id).toBe(r.body.token_id);
+    expect(row.name).toBe("user-login");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("sliding idle expiry (default 30 days)", () => {
+  test("a login token idle past the window is rejected with token_expired", async () => {
+    const s = await loginAs();
+    ageToken(s.token, 31);
+    const r = await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("token_expired");
+    // 同一条 401 改写也覆盖走统一 requireAuth 的 REST 端点
+    const r2 = await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/sessions");
+    expect(r2.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(r2.body.error).toBe("token_expired");
+  });
+  test("a login token that was never used counts idle time from created_at", async () => {
+    const s = await loginAs();
+    neverUsed(s.token, 45);
+    const r = await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("token_expired");
+  });
+  test("an old but recently used login token stays valid (the window slides)", async () => {
+    const s = await loginAs();
+    // 90 天前签发,2 天前还在用
+    db.run("UPDATE api_tokens SET created_at = datetime('now', '-90 days'), last_used_at = datetime('now', '-2 days') WHERE token_hash = ?1", [hashToken(s.token)]);
+    const r = await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    // 使用把 last_used_at 推到现在(超过节流间隔,必须写)
+    const row = db.get<any>("SELECT last_used_at >= datetime('now', '-60 seconds') AS fresh FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(s.token));
+    expect(row.fresh).toBe(1);
+  });
+  test("last_used_at is written at most once per hour per token", async () => {
+    const s = await loginAs();
+    db.run("UPDATE api_tokens SET last_used_at = datetime('now', '-10 minutes') WHERE token_hash = ?1", [hashToken(s.token)]);
+    const before = db.get<any>("SELECT last_used_at FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(s.token)).last_used_at;
+    expect((await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    const after = db.get<any>("SELECT last_used_at FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(s.token)).last_used_at;
+    expect(after).toBe(before);
+  });
+  test("a truly invalid token still says invalid, not expired", async () => {
+    const r = await call("utok_00000000000000000000000000000000", "GET", "/api/auth/me");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(r.body.error).not.toBe("token_expired");
+  });
+  test("node tokens and explicit API tokens never idle-expire", async () => {
+    neverUsed(ntok, 400);
+    neverUsed(apiToken, 400);
+    const n = await call(ntok, "GET", "/api/auth/me");
+    expect(n.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(n.body.credential.kind).toBe("node");
+    expect((await call(apiToken, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+  test("COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS configures the window; 0 disables it", async () => {
+    const s = await loginAs();
+    ageToken(s.token, 10);
+    process.env.COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS = "7";
+    try {
+      expect((await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).body.error).toBe("token_expired");
+      process.env.COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS = "0";
+      expect((await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    } finally {
+      delete process.env.COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS;
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /api/auth/sessions", () => {
+  test("lists my live login sessions with label, user agent and is_current", async () => {
+    const a = await loginAs("Android · 0.2.150", "okhttp/4");
+    const b = await loginAs("macOS · 0.2.150", "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh)");
+    const dead = await loginAs("stale");
+    ageToken(dead.token, 40);
+    const r = await call(b.token, "GET", "/api/auth/sessions");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.idle_timeout_days).toBe(30);
+    expect(r.body.current_token_id).toBe(b.token_id);
+    const ids = r.body.sessions.map((x: any) => x.token_id);
+    expect(ids).toContain(a.token_id);
+    expect(ids).toContain(b.token_id);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain(dead.token_id);
+    const me = r.body.sessions.find((x: any) => x.token_id === b.token_id);
+    expect(me.is_current).toBe(true);
+    expect(me.client_label).toBe("macOS · 0.2.150");
+    expect(me.user_agent).toBe("Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh)");
+    expect(typeof me.created_at).toBe("string");
+    const other = r.body.sessions.find((x: any) => x.token_id === a.token_id);
+    expect(other.is_current).toBe(false);
+    expect(other.client_label).toBe("Android · 0.2.150");
+    // 不泄漏令牌本身或哈希;API 令牌和节点令牌不在列表里
+    expect(JSON.stringify(r.body)).not.toContain("token_hash");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(r.body)).not.toContain(b.token);
+    expect(r.body.sessions.every((x: any) => x.name !== "ci-script" && !String(x.name).startsWith("node:"))).toBe(true);
+  });
+  test("node tokens get 403 user_token_required", async () => {
+    const r = await call(ntok, "GET", "/api/auth/sessions");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("user_token_required");
+  });
+  test("no token → 401", async () => {
+    expect((await call("", "GET", "/api/auth/sessions")).status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("revoking sessions", () => {
+  test("revoke-others keeps the current token and leaves API and node tokens alone", async () => {
+    const keep = await loginAs("keep");
+    const other1 = await loginAs("other1");
+    const other2 = await loginAs("other2");
+    const r = await call(keep.token, "POST", "/api/auth/sessions/revoke-others");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.kept_token_id).toBe(keep.token_id);
+    expect(r.body.revoked).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
+    expect((await call(keep.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await call(other1.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(401);
+    expect((await call(other2.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(401);
+    expect((await call(ntok, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await call(apiToken, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    const list = await call(keep.token, "GET", "/api/auth/sessions");
+    expect(list.body.sessions.map((x: any) => x.token_id)).toEqual([keep.token_id]);
+    const audit = db.get<any>("SELECT detail FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'sessions_revoked_others' AND target_id = ?1", keep.token_id);
+    expect(audit?.detail).toMatch(/^revoked=\d+$/);
+  });
+  test("revoke-others refuses node tokens and non-session tokens", async () => {
+    const r = await call(ntok, "POST", "/api/auth/sessions/revoke-others");
+    expect(r.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(r.body.error).toBe("user_token_required");
+    const s = await loginAs("survivor");
+    const viaApi = await call(apiToken, "POST", "/api/auth/sessions/revoke-others");
+    expect(viaApi.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(viaApi.body.error).toBe("session_token_required");
+    expect((await call(s.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+  test("DELETE /api/auth/sessions/:id revokes one other session", async () => {
+    const me = await loginAs("me");
+    const victim = await loginAs("victim");
+    const r = await call(me.token, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${victim.token_id}`);
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.was_current).toBe(false);
+    expect((await call(victim.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(401);
+    expect((await call(me.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(db.get<any>("SELECT 1 AS x FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'session_revoked' AND target_id = ?1", victim.token_id)?.x).toBe(1);
+  });
+  test("DELETE of my own session is a logout", async () => {
+    const me = await loginAs("logout");
+    const r = await call(me.token, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${me.token_id}`);
+    expect(r.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(r.body.was_current).toBe(true);
+    expect((await call(me.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(401);
+  });
+  test("DELETE cannot reach API tokens, node tokens, or another user's session", async () => {
+    const me = await loginAs("guard");
+    const apiRow = db.get<any>("SELECT token_id FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(apiToken));
+    const ntokRow = db.get<any>("SELECT token_id FROM api_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1", hashToken(ntok));
+    expect((await call(me.token, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${apiRow.token_id}`)).status).toBe(404);
+    expect((await call(me.token, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${ntokRow.token_id}`)).status).toBe(404);
+    const stranger = register(`sess_stranger_${Date.now()}`, PW);
+    expect((await call(me.token, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${stranger.token_id}`)).status).toBe(404);
+    expect((await call(stranger.token!, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await call(ntok, "DELETE", `/api/auth/sessions/${me.token_id}`)).status).toBe(403);
+    expect((await call(me.token, "GET", "/api/auth/me")).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});

package/src/auth-validate.test.ts

@@ -10,13 +10,17 @@ import { register } from "./auth.js";
 
 // First user gets RELAXED rules (admin bootstrap allows 4-char "anethub" etc.)
 // To test full-strength rules, seed a dummy admin first.
+// 30s 而不是 bun 默认的 5s:这个 hook 跑 register()(KDF)+bootServer(),
+// 本机空载基线 ~620ms,而 2026-08-17 与 2026-08-31 两次 CI 上它被 5s 上限打死
+// (0 pass / 1 fail / Ran 1 test —— 见 #928、#1627)。5247ms 是**被截断的下界**,
+// 不是测量值,所以余量按基线的 ~48x 取,而不是按那个数取。
 beforeAll(() => {
   // Idempotent: if DB file already has users (from a previous run on the
   // same temp path), this errors with "username already taken" → that's
   // fine, the goal is just "ensure at least one user exists so subsequent
   // registers hit the strict path".
   register("_seed_admin", "BootstrapPw1", undefined, "seed");
-});
+}, 30_000);
 
 describe("register — username rules", () => {
   it("rejects empty username", () => {