@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.1 → 0.9.0-preview.100

package/src/user-inbox-read-http.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// #1459 ① P3 —— per-user 收件回读 + ack + 未读数 + redact-at-read。
+//
+// 承重的是**隔离**：A 只能读到 A 的。所以下面每条隔离断言都额外钉住探针身份 ——
+// 首个注册用户会自动成为全局 admin，而 admin 在别处走的是不过滤的分支；
+// 若探针恰好是 admin，隔离断言会"通过但什么都没证明"（#500/#506 同款）。
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+const PRIVATE_DB_DIR = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "anet-user-inbox-read-"));
+process.env.COMMHUB_DB ||= join(PRIVATE_DB_DIR, "hub.db");
+
+let server: ReturnType<typeof Bun.serve>;
+let base = "";
+let adminToken = "", aToken = "", bToken = "";
+const MASTER_TOKEN = "legacy-master-token-for-test";
+let aUserId = "", bUserId = "", aNet = "", bNet = "";
+let adminUserId = "", adminNet = "";
+
+const get = async (path: string, token: string) => {
+  const r = await fetch(`${base}${path}`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+  return { status: r.status, body: await r.json() as any };
+};
+const post = async (path: string, token: string, body: unknown) => {
+  const r = await fetch(`${base}${path}`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    body: JSON.stringify(body),
+  });
+  return { status: r.status, body: await r.json() as any };
+};
+
+function seedMessage(mid: string, userId: string, netId: string, content: string, meta?: string, acked = 0) {
+  const { db } = require("./db.js");
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO user_inbox (message_id, network_id, user_id, from_session, kind, title, content, severity, meta_json, acked, acked_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'node-x', 'agent_message', NULL, ?4, 'info', ?5, ?6, ?7)`,
+    [mid, netId, userId, content, meta ?? null, acked, acked ? "2026-01-01 00:00:00" : null],
+  );
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  // 传统全局 master token：requireAuth 对 GET /api/* 放行，但 resolveRequestAuth
+  // 返回 null（没有 user）。这条路径是分支内 `if (!callerUserId)` 唯一能被触发的
+  // 场景 —— 必须在 import server.js 之前设，AUTH_TOKEN 是模块加载期读的常量。
+  process.env.COMMHUB_AUTH_TOKEN ||= MASTER_TOKEN;
+
+  const { db } = await import("./db.js");
+  const { register, addNetworkMember } = await import("./auth.js");
+  const stamp = Date.now();
+
+  // 首个注册用户 = 全局 admin。**故意先注册一个用不到的 admin**，这样下面
+  // 两个探针 A/B 都不是 admin —— 隔离断言才有分辨力。
+  const admin = register(`ui_admin_${stamp}`, "UiAdmin-Strong-1!");
+  expect(admin.ok).toBe(true);
+  adminToken = admin.token!;
+  adminUserId = db.get<{ user_id: string }>("SELECT user_id FROM users WHERE username = ?1", `ui_admin_${stamp}`)!.user_id;
+  adminNet = admin.network_id!;
+
+  const a = register(`ui_a_${stamp}`, "UiA-Strong-1!");
+  const b = register(`ui_b_${stamp}`, "UiB-Strong-1!");
+  expect(a.ok && b.ok).toBe(true);
+  aToken = a.token!; bToken = b.token!;
+  aNet = a.network_id!; bNet = b.network_id!;
+  aUserId = db.get<{ user_id: string }>("SELECT user_id FROM users WHERE username = ?1", `ui_a_${stamp}`)!.user_id;
+  bUserId = db.get<{ user_id: string }>("SELECT user_id FROM users WHERE username = ?1", `ui_b_${stamp}`)!.user_id;
+
+  // 前提断言：探针不是 admin。靠"注册顺序"是隐式前提，会随夹具变化悄悄失效，
+  // 所以显式断言。
+  // 承重的是 role ≠ "admin"；这里钉死具体值（auth.ts:88 非首用户写 "user"），
+  // 因为 `not.toBe("admin")` 在 role 为 undefined（查不到行）时也会通过 —— 松判据
+  // 会朝"没问题"那边失败。
+  for (const [name, id] of [["A", aUserId], ["B", bUserId]] as const) {
+    const role = db.get<{ role: string }>("SELECT role FROM users WHERE user_id = ?1", id)?.role;
+    expect([name, role]).toEqual([name, "user"]);
+  }
+
+  // 🔴 B 必须在**同一个 network** 里也有一条私信。
+  //    第一版夹具让 A/B 各处一网，于是 addNetworkScope 顺手挡住了 B 的行 ——
+  //    变异掉 `WHERE user_id = ?1` 后隔离断言照样通过（M1/M2/M4 全部存活）。
+  //    同网同事之间，user_id 过滤是**唯一**的隔离手段，夹具必须落在那一格。
+  expect(addNetworkMember(aNet, bUserId, "member").ok).toBe(true);
+
+  seedMessage("dm_a1", aUserId, aNet, "A 的第一条");
+  seedMessage("dm_a2", aUserId, aNet, "A 的第二条");
+  seedMessage("dm_b_same_net", bUserId, aNet, "B 在 A 同网里的私信");
+  seedMessage("dm_b1", bUserId, bNet, "B 的私信");
+  // A 自己的、但落在 A 不是成员的 network 上的行（例如 A 被移出该网后的遗留）。
+  // 它是 addNetworkScope 这次调用的唯一 witnessed-red 对象：user_id 过滤对它无效。
+  seedMessage("dm_a_foreign_net", aUserId, bNet, "A 在外网的遗留私信");
+  // #1493 —— network_id 升到 schema 级 NOT NULL 后,「network_id 为 NULL 的行」已
+  // **schema 级不可能**(写路径原本三闸挡、现在 DB 直接拒)。原先手播的 dm_a_nonet /
+  // dm_admin_nonet 两条 NULL 夹具随之删除:
+  //   · dm_a_nonet(证"受网络限制成员读不到 NULL 行")—— 网络 scope 隔离已由下面
+  //     dm_a_foreign_net(A 自己的行、落在 A 非成员的网)覆盖,不丢覆盖。
+  //   · dm_admin_nonet 重锚到 admin **自己网络**的非 NULL 行 dm_admin_own,保住
+  //     "admin(scope 助手 no-op)仍只读自己的、不绕过 user_id 过滤"这条覆盖。
+  seedMessage("dm_admin_own", adminUserId, adminNet, "admin 自己网络里的私信");
+  // #1493 SDK马 建议:用**非 NULL** 行补回"admin(scope 助手 no-op)能读到别网的自己的行"
+  // 这维覆盖(原先靠 NULL 行,现 NULL 不可能)。对照 dm_a_foreign_net(受限成员读不到),
+  // 两边都不依赖 NULL。
+  seedMessage("dm_admin_foreign_net", adminUserId, bNet, "admin 在别网的自己的私信");
+  seedMessage("dm_a_read", aUserId, aNet, "A 已读的一条", undefined, 1);
+  seedMessage("dm_a_secret", aUserId, aNet,
+    "凭据在正文里 ntok_abcdef123456", JSON.stringify({ k: "ghp_" + "A".repeat(24) }));
+
+  const mod = await import("./server.js");
+  server = mod.bootServer({ port: 0, hostname: "127.0.0.1" });
+  base = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.port}`;
+});
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  try { server?.stop(true); } catch {}
+  try { rmSync(PRIVATE_DB_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
+});
+
+describe("#1459 ① P3 GET /api/messages?scope=user", () => {
+  test("🔴 只返回调用者自己的消息 —— A 读不到 B 的", async () => {
+    const { status, body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
+    expect(status).toBe(200);
+    expect(body.ok).toBe(true);
+    const ids = body.messages.map((m: any) => m.message_id);
+    expect(ids).toContain("dm_a1");
+    expect(ids).toContain("dm_a_read");          // 不加 unacked 时已读也要回来
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_b_same_net");  // 承重：同网，只有 user_id 过滤挡得住
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_b1");          // 跨网，scope 助手挡
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_a_foreign_net"); // 承重：A 自己的行，只有 scope 助手挡得住
+    expect(body.messages.every((m: any) => m.user_id === aUserId)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 收件人取自 auth ctx —— query 里指定别人的 user_id 无效", async () => {
+    const { body } = await get(`/api/messages?scope=user&user_id=${bUserId}`, aToken);
+    const ids = body.messages.map((m: any) => m.message_id);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_b_same_net");
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_b1");
+    expect(body.messages.every((m: any) => m.user_id === aUserId)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 redact-at-read：正文与 meta 里的凭据形状被遮住", async () => {
+    const { body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
+    const row = body.messages.find((m: any) => m.message_id === "dm_a_secret");
+    expect(row).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(row.content).toContain("ntok_***redacted***");
+    expect(row.content).not.toContain("ntok_abcdef123456");
+    expect(row.meta_json).toContain("ghp_***redacted***");
+  });
+
+  // #1493 后 NULL 网络行不可能,原"受网络限制成员读不到 NULL 行"一测删除——
+  // 网络 scope 隔离已由上面 dm_a_foreign_net(承重断言,test 112 line 121)覆盖。
+  // admin 一测重锚到非 NULL:验 admin(scope 助手 no-op)**仍只读自己的、不绕过 user_id 过滤**。
+  test("admin(scope 助手 no-op)仍受 user_id 限制：只读自己的、不读别人的", async () => {
+    const { body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", adminToken);
+    const ids = body.messages.map((m: any) => m.message_id);
+    expect(ids).toContain("dm_admin_own");            // 读得到自己的
+    expect(ids).toContain("dm_admin_foreign_net");     // scope 助手 no-op → 跨网也读得到自己的
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_a1");                // 承重:admin 不绕过 user_id 过滤读别人的
+    expect(body.messages.every((m: any) => m.user_id === adminUserId)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("unread 是未读数而非总数（A：4 条里 3 条未读）", async () => {
+    const { body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken);
+    expect(body.messages.length).toBe(4);
+    expect(body.unread).toBe(3);
+    expect(body.pending_count).toBe(body.unread);
+  });
+
+  test("unacked=1 排掉已读那条", async () => {
+    const { body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user&unacked=1", aToken);
+    const ids = body.messages.map((m: any) => m.message_id);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain("dm_a_read");      // 承重：集合里确实有已读行才有分辨力
+    expect(ids.sort()).toEqual(["dm_a1", "dm_a2", "dm_a_secret"]);
+  });
+
+  test("未鉴权 ⇒ 401（/api 全局闸）", async () => {
+    const r = await fetch(`${base}/api/messages?scope=user`);
+    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 legacy master token 过得了全局闸但没有 user ⇒ 401，不能回一个空列表", async () => {
+    // 这条才是分支内 `if (!callerUserId)` 的 witnessed-red：把它换成
+    // `?? ""` 后本条从 401 变成 200 + 空列表 —— "看起来正常"的错误答案。
+    const { status, body } = await get("/api/messages?scope=user", MASTER_TOKEN);
+    expect([status, body.error]).toEqual([401, "auth_required"]);
+  });
+
+  test("alias 分支未受影响（dashboard 依赖它）", async () => {
+    const { status, body } = await get("/api/messages", adminToken);
+    expect(status).toBe(200);
+    expect(body.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(Array.isArray(body.messages)).toBe(true);
+    expect(body.unread).toBeUndefined();          // 老分支不该多出新字段
+  });
+});
+
+describe("#1459 ① P3 POST /api/messages/ack", () => {
+  test("ack 自己的消息 ⇒ acked 置位、未读数下降", async () => {
+    const before = (await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken)).body.unread;
+    const { status, body } = await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, { message_id: "dm_a1" });
+    expect(status).toBe(200);
+    expect(body.acked).toBe(1);
+    const after = (await get("/api/messages?scope=user", aToken)).body.unread;
+    expect(after).toBe(before - 1);
+  });
+
+  test("🔴 ack 不了同网同事的消息 —— 改动行数为 0，且对方仍是未读", async () => {
+    const { body } = await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, { message_id: "dm_b_same_net" });
+    expect(body.acked).toBe(0);
+    const bView = (await get("/api/messages?scope=user", bToken)).body;
+    expect(bView.messages.find((m: any) => m.message_id === "dm_b_same_net").acked).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  test("ack 跨网的消息同样为 0", async () => {
+    const { body } = await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, { message_id: "dm_b1" });
+    expect(body.acked).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  test("缺参 ⇒ 400；未鉴权 ⇒ 401", async () => {
+    expect((await post("/api/messages/ack", aToken, {})).status).toBe(400);
+    const r = await fetch(`${base}/api/messages/ack`, { method: "POST", body: "{}" });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});

package/src/user-inbox-schema.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// #1459 ① — user_inbox 建表 + 幂等打底(P1)。零行为变化,只落 schema。
+//
+// 承重属性(SDK马 review 要点):message_id 即主键 → send_desktop_message 因 HTTP
+// 响应丢失被重试时,同一 dm_<uuid> 用 INSERT OR IGNORE 不会插出重复行(前端免去重)。
+
+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+describe("#1459 user_inbox schema (P1)", () => {
+  test("table exists with the expected columns", () => {
+    const cols = db.all<{ name: string }>("PRAGMA table_info(user_inbox)").map(c => c.name);
+    for (const c of ["message_id", "network_id", "user_id", "from_session", "kind", "title", "content", "severity", "meta_json", "acked", "created_at", "acked_at"]) {
+      expect(cols).toContain(c);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // 注:这条钉的是「主键在我们以为的那一列」(SQLite 行为),**不是**「写入路径幂等」——
+  // 后者要 P2 驱动真实 send_desktop_message 两次来证(SDK马 review)。这里只保证主键选对。
+  test("message_id is PRIMARY KEY → INSERT OR IGNORE dedups on the same id", () => {
+    const mid = `dm_test_${Date.now()}`;
+    try {
+      const ins = () => db.run(
+        `INSERT OR IGNORE INTO user_inbox (message_id, network_id, user_id, from_session, content)
+         VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5)`,
+        [mid, "net_test_1459", "u_test_1459", "sender-a", "hello"],
+      );
+      ins();
+      ins();   // 同 message_id 第二次插入应被 IGNORE
+      const n = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_inbox WHERE message_id = ?1", mid)?.n ?? 0;
+      expect(n).toBe(1);
+    } finally {
+      db.run("DELETE FROM user_inbox WHERE message_id = ?1", mid);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("defaults: acked=0, kind/severity='info'", () => {
+    const mid = `dm_def_${Date.now()}`;
+    try {
+      db.run(
+        // #1493 后 network_id 是 NOT NULL,补上(本测试只验其它列的默认值)
+        `INSERT INTO user_inbox (message_id, network_id, user_id, content) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4)`,
+        [mid, "net_def_1459", "u_def_1459", "body"],
+      );
+      const row = db.get<{ acked: number; kind: string; severity: string }>(
+        "SELECT acked, kind, severity FROM user_inbox WHERE message_id = ?1", mid,
+      );
+      expect(row?.acked).toBe(0);
+      expect(row?.kind).toBe("info");
+      expect(row?.severity).toBe("info");
+    } finally {
+      db.run("DELETE FROM user_inbox WHERE message_id = ?1", mid);
+    }
+  });
+});

package/src/vault.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// RFC-028 P1 §4.1 vault layer tests. F2 lazy gate is the critical
+// invariant — existing prod hub升级 without ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY
+// must NOT boot-fail. Every test runs with deterministic key isolation.
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterAll } from "bun:test";
+import {
+  encryptSecret, decryptSecret,
+  vaultUpsert, vaultGet, vaultListKeys, vaultDelete,
+  vaultStatusForBoot, vaultMasterKeyFingerprint,
+  _resetVaultKeyForTest, VaultError,
+} from "./vault.js";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+const TEST_KEY_HEX = "0123456789abcdef".repeat(4);   // 32 bytes hex = 64 chars
+
+function setKey(hex: string | undefined): void {
+  if (hex === undefined) delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY;
+  else process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY = hex;
+  _resetVaultKeyForTest();
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  db.run("DELETE FROM network_secrets");
+  db.run("DELETE FROM provider_models");
+  db.run("DELETE FROM providers");
+});
+afterAll(() => { _resetVaultKeyForTest(); delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY; });
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 F2 — LAZY GATE (critical: don't brick prod hub)", () => {
+  test("hub boot WITHOUT env + WITHOUT vault data → vaultStatusForBoot says configured=false, needsKeyToOp=false (boots OK)", () => {
+    setKey(undefined);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(false);
+    // Crucially: no throw, no crash, hub keeps running.
+  });
+
+  test("hub boot WITH env + WITHOUT vault data → configured=true, tablesEmpty (no fingerprint needed)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(true);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("hub WITHOUT env + WITH vault data → needsKeyToOp=true (banner warning, NO throw)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_test", "TEST_KEY", "plaintext-value");
+    setKey(undefined);
+    const s = vaultStatusForBoot();
+    expect(s.configured).toBe(false);
+    expect(s.tablesHaveData).toBe(true);
+    expect(s.needsKeyToOp).toBe(true);
+    // Still no throw — banner is informational; throw only happens on
+    // actual vault op (test below).
+  });
+
+  test("vault op WITHOUT env throws vault_master_key_missing (lazy throw, not boot throw)", () => {
+    setKey(undefined);
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(VaultError);
+    try { vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v"); }
+    catch (e: any) { expect(e.code).toBe("vault_master_key_missing"); }
+  });
+
+  test("vault op WITH invalid env (not 32 bytes hex) throws vault_master_key_invalid", () => {
+    setKey("not-hex");
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(/vault_master_key_invalid/);
+    setKey("aabbcc");  // too short
+    expect(() => vaultUpsert("net_test", "K", "v")).toThrow(/vault_master_key_invalid/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — AES-GCM encrypt/decrypt round-trip", () => {
+  test("encrypt+decrypt roundtrip preserves plaintext", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const pt = "sk-ant-api03-abc123xyz";
+    const enc = encryptSecret(pt);
+    expect(enc.ciphertext.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(enc.iv.length).toBe(12);
+    expect(enc.tag.length).toBe(16);
+    expect(decryptSecret(enc)).toBe(pt);
+  });
+
+  test("ciphertext is unique per call (random IV)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const a = encryptSecret("same-secret");
+    const b = encryptSecret("same-secret");
+    expect(a.iv.equals(b.iv)).toBe(false);
+    expect(a.ciphertext.equals(b.ciphertext)).toBe(false);
+    // Both decrypt back to same plaintext
+    expect(decryptSecret(a)).toBe("same-secret");
+    expect(decryptSecret(b)).toBe("same-secret");
+  });
+
+  test("tamper detection — flipping ciphertext bit throws vault_decrypt_failed", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    enc.ciphertext[0] ^= 0x01;
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+
+  test("tamper detection — flipping tag bit throws vault_decrypt_failed", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    enc.tag[0] ^= 0x01;
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+
+  test("wrong key cannot decrypt", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const enc = encryptSecret("important");
+    setKey("ff".repeat(32));  // different key
+    expect(() => decryptSecret(enc)).toThrow(/vault_decrypt_failed/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — DB ops + key listing (永不返 value)", () => {
+  test("vaultUpsert + vaultGet roundtrip via DB", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_A", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "sk-ant-prod-1");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_A", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")).toBe("sk-ant-prod-1");
+  });
+
+  test("vaultUpsert replaces existing key (same network_id + key)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "K1", "v1");
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "K1", "v2");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_B", "K1")).toBe("v2");
+  });
+
+  test("vaultGet returns null for missing key (does NOT throw)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    expect(vaultGet("net_X", "MISSING")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("vaultListKeys returns key NAMES only (no values, ever)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_L", "KEY_A", "value-a");
+    vaultUpsert("net_L", "KEY_B", "value-b");
+    const keys = vaultListKeys("net_L");
+    expect(keys).toEqual(["KEY_A", "KEY_B"]);  // sorted; no values
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).not.toContain("value-a");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(keys)).not.toContain("value-b");
+  });
+
+  test("network isolation — netA's secret不 visible to netB", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_A", "SHARED_NAME", "value-from-A");
+    vaultUpsert("net_B", "SHARED_NAME", "value-from-B");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_A", "SHARED_NAME")).toBe("value-from-A");
+    expect(vaultGet("net_B", "SHARED_NAME")).toBe("value-from-B");
+    expect(vaultListKeys("net_A")).toEqual(["SHARED_NAME"]);
+    expect(vaultListKeys("net_B")).toEqual(["SHARED_NAME"]);
+  });
+
+  test("vaultDelete removes key + returns true; second delete returns false", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    vaultUpsert("net_D", "K", "v");
+    expect(vaultDelete("net_D", "K")).toBe(true);
+    expect(vaultGet("net_D", "K")).toBeNull();
+    expect(vaultDelete("net_D", "K")).toBe(false);  // no-op
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — master key fingerprint", () => {
+  test("fingerprint same for same key, different for different key", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const fp1 = vaultMasterKeyFingerprint();
+    expect(fp1.length).toBe(16);
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);  // re-set same key
+    expect(vaultMasterKeyFingerprint()).toBe(fp1);
+    setKey("ff".repeat(32));
+    expect(vaultMasterKeyFingerprint()).not.toBe(fp1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — DB ciphertext storage (PRAGMA-style: NO plaintext in DB)", () => {
+  test("BLOB stored is ciphertext, not plaintext (raw SELECT verifies)", () => {
+    setKey(TEST_KEY_HEX);
+    const plaintext = "sk-very-secret-key-do-not-leak";
+    vaultUpsert("net_P", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", plaintext);
+    const raw = db.get<{ ciphertext: Buffer | Uint8Array; iv: Buffer | Uint8Array; tag: Buffer | Uint8Array }>(
+      "SELECT ciphertext, iv, tag FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2",
+      "net_P", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+    );
+    expect(raw).not.toBeNull();
+    const ctBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(raw!.ciphertext) ? raw!.ciphertext : Buffer.from(raw!.ciphertext as any);
+    // Plaintext substring MUST NOT appear in ciphertext bytes
+    expect(ctBuf.toString("binary")).not.toContain(plaintext);
+    expect(ctBuf.toString("utf8")).not.toContain(plaintext);
+    // Even as hex / base64 / partial — bytes must not match plaintext bytes
+    const plainBytes = Buffer.from(plaintext, "utf8");
+    let found = false;
+    for (let i = 0; i <= ctBuf.length - plainBytes.length; i++) {
+      if (ctBuf.subarray(i, i + plainBytes.length).equals(plainBytes)) { found = true; break; }
+    }
+    expect(found).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

package/src/vault.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// RFC-028 P1 §4.1 — vault layer (AES-GCM at-rest + lazy master key gate).
+//
+// F2 CRITICAL: master key from ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY env is
+// resolved LAZILY — hub boot does NOT require it. Existing prod hubs
+// without the env should boot + run normally. The env is only required
+// when:
+//   (a) vault write hits (upsert_network_secret)
+//   (b) vault read hits (probe / create-node env_refs)
+//   (c) network_secrets / providers tables are non-empty at boot
+//       (banner status only — doesn't throw)
+//
+// If the env is missing AND a vault op runs → throw `vault_master_key_missing`
+// with explicit migration message. Existing hub stays up.
+
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { db } from "./db.js";
+
+let _masterKey: Buffer | null = null;
+let _bootBannerShown = false;
+
+/** Lazy getter — throws on first vault op if env missing. */
+export function getVaultMasterKey(): Buffer {
+  if (_masterKey) return _masterKey;
+  const hex = process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY;
+  if (!hex) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_master_key_missing",
+      "ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY env var not set. Generate one: openssl rand -hex 32. " +
+      "Required only when using vault/provider features; this op tried to access vault."
+    );
+  }
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(hex)) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_master_key_invalid",
+      "ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY must be 32 bytes hex (64 chars). Generate: openssl rand -hex 32"
+    );
+  }
+  _masterKey = Buffer.from(hex, "hex");
+  return _masterKey;
+}
+
+/** Banner-only check (does not throw). Call on boot for operator visibility. */
+export function vaultStatusForBoot(): { configured: boolean; tablesHaveData: boolean; needsKeyToOp: boolean } {
+  const configured = !!process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY
+    && /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY);
+  let tablesHaveData = false;
+  try {
+    const r1 = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM network_secrets");
+    const r2 = db.get<{ n: number }>("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM providers");
+    tablesHaveData = (r1?.n || 0) > 0 || (r2?.n || 0) > 0;
+  } catch { /* tables may not exist yet */ }
+  return {
+    configured,
+    tablesHaveData,
+    needsKeyToOp: tablesHaveData && !configured,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Reset for unit tests (must be combined with delete process.env.ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY). */
+export function _resetVaultKeyForTest(): void { _masterKey = null; _bootBannerShown = false; }
+
+export class VaultError extends Error {
+  constructor(public code: string, msg: string) {
+    super(`${code}: ${msg}`);
+    this.name = "VaultError";
+  }
+}
+
+// ── AES-GCM encrypt/decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// AES-256-GCM. 12-byte IV per RFC 5116. Auth tag is 16 bytes. We
+// store iv + ciphertext + tag separately (DB schema mirrors NIST SP
+// 800-38D structure for forward-compatibility).
+
+const ALGO = "aes-256-gcm";
+const IV_BYTES = 12;
+const TAG_BYTES = 16;
+
+export interface EncryptedSecret {
+  ciphertext: Buffer;
+  iv: Buffer;
+  tag: Buffer;
+}
+
+export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): EncryptedSecret {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  const iv = randomBytes(IV_BYTES);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGO, key, iv);
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return { ciphertext: ct, iv, tag };
+}
+
+export function decryptSecret(enc: EncryptedSecret): string {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  if (enc.tag.length !== TAG_BYTES) {
+    throw new VaultError("vault_tag_invalid", `auth tag must be ${TAG_BYTES} bytes, got ${enc.tag.length}`);
+  }
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGO, key, enc.iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(enc.tag);
+  try {
+    const pt = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(enc.ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
+    return pt.toString("utf8");
+  } catch (e: any) {
+    // GCM auth fail = either wrong key, tampered ciphertext, or
+    // tampered iv/tag. All collapse to one error.
+    throw new VaultError("vault_decrypt_failed", `AES-GCM auth fail (key/iv/tag/ciphertext mismatch): ${e?.message || e}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── DB ops ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export function vaultUpsert(networkId: string, key: string, plaintext: string): void {
+  const enc = encryptSecret(plaintext);
+  const now = Date.now();
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO network_secrets (network_id, key, ciphertext, iv, tag, created_at, updated_at)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?6)
+     ON CONFLICT(network_id, key) DO UPDATE SET
+       ciphertext = ?3, iv = ?4, tag = ?5, updated_at = ?6`,
+    [networkId, key, enc.ciphertext, enc.iv, enc.tag, now],
+  );
+}
+
+/** Returns the decrypted plaintext, or null if no row.
+ *  Throws VaultError on missing key / decrypt failure. */
+export function vaultGet(networkId: string, key: string): string | null {
+  const row = db.get<{ ciphertext: Buffer; iv: Buffer; tag: Buffer }>(
+    "SELECT ciphertext, iv, tag FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2",
+    networkId, key,
+  );
+  if (!row) return null;
+  return decryptSecret({
+    ciphertext: Buffer.isBuffer(row.ciphertext) ? row.ciphertext : Buffer.from(row.ciphertext as any),
+    iv:         Buffer.isBuffer(row.iv)         ? row.iv         : Buffer.from(row.iv as any),
+    tag:        Buffer.isBuffer(row.tag)        ? row.tag        : Buffer.from(row.tag as any),
+  });
+}
+
+/** List vault key names for a network (NEVER returns values). */
+export function vaultListKeys(networkId: string): string[] {
+  const rows = db.all<{ key: string }>(
+    "SELECT key FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 ORDER BY key",
+    networkId,
+  );
+  return rows.map(r => r.key);
+}
+
+export function vaultDelete(networkId: string, key: string): boolean {
+  const r: any = db.run("DELETE FROM network_secrets WHERE network_id = ?1 AND key = ?2", [networkId, key]);
+  return (r?.changes ?? 0) > 0;
+}
+
+/** Test/diagnostic: fingerprint of master key (sha256 hex first 8) so
+ *  ops can verify two hubs share the same vault key without leaking it. */
+export function vaultMasterKeyFingerprint(): string {
+  const key = getVaultMasterKey();
+  return createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+}