@sleep2agi/commhub-server 0.9.0-preview.0 → 0.9.0-preview.12

package/src/create-node.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+// RFC-026 v4 hub-side runtime — pendingEnvBlobs Map (F1 mint-stream-
+// evict) + sweeper (C4 orphan ntok revoke) + content-match finalize
+// helper (called from report_status when a child first registers).
+//
+// The actual MCP tools (create_node / get_create_request /
+// ack_create_request) are registered in tools.ts and call into this
+// module. Keeping the heavy state + sweeper here makes the tool layer
+// thin + this module independently testable.
+
+import { db, uuidv4 } from "./db.js";
+
+// ── §4.4 F1 — pendingEnvBlobs Map ─────────────────────────────────
+// In-memory ONLY. Never touches disk / never enters the SQL store.
+// Daemon `get_create_request(request_id)` consumes + evicts. Untaken
+// blobs are GC'd at TTL expiry.
+
+export interface PendingEnvBlob {
+  request_id: string;
+  daemon_node_id: string;          // hub uses this for C2 cross-daemon check
+  env_blob: Record<string, string>; // KEY → secret value (plaintext, never logged)
+  child_token: string;              // freshly minted ntok_ for the child
+  child_token_id: string;           // tokens.token_id for sweeper revoke
+  expires_at: number;               // ms epoch
+}
+
+const TTL_MS = 60_000;                      // 60s per RFC-026 v4 §4.4
+const SWEEPER_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;         // 30s per RFC-026 v4 §4.4.8
+const REAPER_TTL_MS = 60_000;               // 60s timeout for pending/delivered rows
+
+const pendingEnvBlobs = new Map<string, PendingEnvBlob>();
+let gcTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
+let sweeperTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
+
+export function putPendingEnvBlob(b: Omit<PendingEnvBlob, "expires_at">): void {
+  pendingEnvBlobs.set(b.request_id, { ...b, expires_at: Date.now() + TTL_MS });
+}
+
+/** Get the pending env_blob for daemon. Returns null if not found OR
+ *  if caller's daemon_node_id doesn't match (C2 cross-daemon guard).
+ *  Atomically deletes the entry from the Map (one-shot consume). */
+export function takePendingEnvBlob(
+  request_id: string,
+  callerDaemonNodeId: string,
+): PendingEnvBlob | null {
+  const b = pendingEnvBlobs.get(request_id);
+  if (!b) return null;
+  if (b.daemon_node_id !== callerDaemonNodeId) return null;
+  if (Date.now() > b.expires_at) {
+    pendingEnvBlobs.delete(request_id);
+    return null;
+  }
+  pendingEnvBlobs.delete(request_id);  // §4.4 evict immediately
+  return b;
+}
+
+/** Test/diagnostic helper — does NOT consume. */
+export function peekPendingEnvBlob(request_id: string): PendingEnvBlob | null {
+  return pendingEnvBlobs.get(request_id) || null;
+}
+
+export function evictExpired(now = Date.now()): number {
+  let evicted = 0;
+  for (const [k, v] of pendingEnvBlobs) {
+    if (now > v.expires_at) {
+      pendingEnvBlobs.delete(k);
+      evicted++;
+    }
+  }
+  return evicted;
+}
+
+export function startPendingEnvGcTimer(): void {
+  if (gcTimer) return;
+  gcTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    const n = evictExpired();
+    if (n > 0) console.log(`[create-node] GC: evicted ${n} expired env_blob(s)`);
+  }, 5_000);
+  (gcTimer as any).unref?.();
+}
+
+// ── §4.4.8 C4 — orphan ntok revoke sweeper ────────────────────────
+// Scans `node_create_requests` for non-terminal rows older than
+// REAPER_TTL_MS. Atomically marks request as failed/expired AND
+// revokes the matching api_tokens.row (via request_id link) so the
+// orphan child-ntok cannot be used by anyone who scraped it.
+
+export function runOrphanSweepOnce(now = Date.now()): { swept: number; revoked: number } {
+  const cutoffAge = REAPER_TTL_MS;
+  const cutoffMs = now - cutoffAge;
+  // Two cohorts (per RFC §4.4.8 case table):
+  //  F-1 status='pending'   age > TTL → hub crashed before daemon get
+  //  F-2 status='delivered' age > TTL → daemon got blob but never ack'd
+  const stale = db.all<{ request_id: string; status: string; child_token_id: string | null }>(
+    `SELECT request_id, status, child_token_id
+       FROM node_create_requests
+      WHERE status IN ('pending', 'delivered')
+        AND created_at < ?1`,
+    cutoffMs,
+  );
+  if (stale.length === 0) return { swept: 0, revoked: 0 };
+
+  let swept = 0; let revoked = 0;
+  // SQLite Bun driver doesn't expose BEGIN/COMMIT cleanly across the
+  // wrapper here; fold per-row into a transaction.
+  try {
+    db.exec("BEGIN");
+    for (const row of stale) {
+      // Revoke the child-ntok first (sweeper is server-side ground
+      // truth per §4.4.8). If child_token_id null somehow, skip
+      // revoke (request never made it that far) but still mark
+      // failed.
+      if (row.child_token_id) {
+        // db.run returns the SQLite adapter's RunResult (changes counter
+        // if driver-supported). Only count a revoke when the UPDATE
+        // actually touched a row — under the bun:sqlite adapter the
+        // changes prop is reliable; on adapters returning undefined we
+        // fall back to a post-UPDATE SELECT to confirm revoked_at IS
+        // NOT NULL (DB is ground truth). Avoids over-counting when
+        // child_token_id is stale or already revoked. (通信龙 nit 2)
+        const r = db.run(
+          `UPDATE api_tokens SET revoked_at = datetime('now') WHERE token_id = ?1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
+          [row.child_token_id],
+        );
+        const changes = (r as any)?.changes;
+        if (typeof changes === "number") {
+          if (changes > 0) revoked++;
+        } else {
+          // Adapter didn't report; verify via SELECT
+          const after = db.get<{ revoked_at: string | null }>(
+            `SELECT revoked_at FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1`, row.child_token_id,
+          );
+          if (after?.revoked_at) revoked++;
+        }
+      }
+      const newStatus = row.status === "pending" ? "failed" : "expired";
+      const err = row.status === "pending" ? "sweeper_revoked_before_delivery" : "sweeper_revoked_after_delivery_no_ack";
+      db.run(
+        `UPDATE node_create_requests SET status = ?1, error = ?2, acked_at = ?3 WHERE request_id = ?4 AND status IN ('pending', 'delivered')`,
+        [newStatus, err, now, row.request_id],
+      );
+      // Also drop any lingering env_blob (defense; should already be
+      // gone for delivered, but pending could leak if GC hasn't run).
+      pendingEnvBlobs.delete(row.request_id);
+      swept++;
+    }
+    db.exec("COMMIT");
+  } catch (e: any) {
+    try { db.exec("ROLLBACK"); } catch { /* swallow */ }
+    console.warn(`[create-node] sweeper transaction failed: ${e?.message || e}`);
+    return { swept: 0, revoked: 0 };
+  }
+  if (swept > 0) {
+    console.log(`[commhub] ✓ create-node sweeper: swept ${swept} stale request(s), revoked ${revoked} child-ntok(s)`);
+    auditCreateNode({
+      action: "create_node_sweeper_revoked",
+      detail: { swept, revoked, sweeper_run_at_ms: now },
+    });
+  }
+  return { swept, revoked };
+}
+
+export function startSweeperTimer(): void {
+  if (sweeperTimer) return;
+  // Boot-time sweep: catch any rows left over from a prior process
+  // crash (case F-1: hub crashed after mint, before daemon get).
+  try { runOrphanSweepOnce(); } catch (e: any) {
+    console.warn(`[create-node] boot sweeper failed: ${e?.message || e}`);
+  }
+  sweeperTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    try { runOrphanSweepOnce(); }
+    catch (e: any) { console.warn(`[create-node] periodic sweeper failed: ${e?.message || e}`); }
+  }, SWEEPER_INTERVAL_MS);
+  (sweeperTimer as any).unref?.();
+}
+
+export function stopBackgroundTimersForTest(): void {
+  if (gcTimer) { clearInterval(gcTimer); gcTimer = null; }
+  if (sweeperTimer) { clearInterval(sweeperTimer); sweeperTimer = null; }
+  pendingEnvBlobs.clear();
+}
+
+// ── content-match finalize on child first register ────────────────
+// Called from tools.ts report_status handler when a node registers (or
+// re-registers). If there's a pending node_create_requests row whose
+// `child_name` matches the incoming alias AND the daemon_node_id is
+// in caller's network, mark it succeeded and stamp the real
+// child_node_id. Mirrors RFC-024 finalizePendingMatchingUpdates.
+
+export function finalizeCreateOnFirstRegister(
+  incoming: { node_id: string; alias: string; network_id: string | null },
+): { finalized: number; matchedIds: string[] } {
+  if (!incoming.node_id || !incoming.alias) return { finalized: 0, matchedIds: [] };
+  const net = incoming.network_id ?? "default";
+  const pending = db.all<{ request_id: string; daemon_node_id: string }>(
+    `SELECT request_id, daemon_node_id FROM node_create_requests
+      WHERE child_name = ?1 AND network_id = ?2 AND status IN ('delivered', 'pending')
+      ORDER BY created_at ASC`,
+    incoming.alias, net,
+  );
+  if (pending.length === 0) return { finalized: 0, matchedIds: [] };
+
+  const matchedIds: string[] = [];
+  for (const row of pending) {
+    const r = db.run(
+      `UPDATE node_create_requests
+          SET status = 'succeeded', child_node_id = ?1, acked_at = ?2
+        WHERE request_id = ?3 AND status IN ('delivered', 'pending')`,
+      [incoming.node_id, Date.now(), row.request_id],
+    );
+    matchedIds.push(row.request_id);
+    console.log(`[commhub] ✓ create-node finalize: request=${row.request_id} child=${incoming.alias} (${incoming.node_id}) daemon=${row.daemon_node_id}`);
+    auditCreateNode({
+      action: "create_node_succeeded",
+      network_id: net,
+      target_id: row.request_id,
+      detail: { child_node_id: incoming.node_id, child_alias: incoming.alias, daemon_node_id: row.daemon_node_id },
+    });
+  }
+  return { finalized: matchedIds.length, matchedIds };
+}
+
+export function newRequestId(): string {
+  return `cr_${uuidv4()}`;
+}
+
+// §4.1.4 C2 — resolve the caller daemon's node row by **token-bound
+// identity** (PR #299 BLOCKER #1). Module-level so unit tests can
+// import + call directly (per 通信龙 nit 1 — don't inline-mirror SQL
+// in tests; that's exactly the helper-drift anti-pattern the tools.ts
+// comment warns against).
+export type DaemonResolveResult =
+  | { ok: true; daemonNodeId: string; daemonAlias: string; networkId: string }
+  | { ok: false; error: string };
+
+export function resolveCallerDaemonTokenBound(opts: {
+  callerTokenIsNetwork: boolean;
+  callerTokenId: string | null | undefined;
+  enforceNetworkId: string | null | undefined;
+}): DaemonResolveResult {
+  if (!opts.callerTokenIsNetwork || !opts.callerTokenId) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "caller_not_a_daemon" };
+  }
+  if (!opts.enforceNetworkId) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "caller_not_a_daemon" };
+  }
+  const tokRow = db.get<{ name: string; network_id: string | null }>(
+    `SELECT name, network_id FROM api_tokens WHERE token_id = ?1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
+    opts.callerTokenId,
+  );
+  if (!tokRow || !tokRow.name || !tokRow.name.startsWith("node:")) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "caller_not_a_daemon" };
+  }
+  if (tokRow.network_id !== opts.enforceNetworkId) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "caller_not_a_daemon" };
+  }
+  const tokenAlias = tokRow.name.slice(5);
+  const nodeRow = db.get<{ node_id: string; alias: string; network_id: string }>(
+    `SELECT node_id, alias, network_id FROM nodes WHERE alias = ?1 AND network_id = ?2 LIMIT 1`,
+    tokenAlias, tokRow.network_id,
+  );
+  if (!nodeRow) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "caller_not_a_daemon" };
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    daemonNodeId: nodeRow.node_id,
+    daemonAlias: nodeRow.alias,
+    networkId: nodeRow.network_id,
+  };
+}
+
+// RFC-026 §4.5 — append a row to audit_log for every create_node
+// lifecycle event. Best-effort: never throw out (calling tool should
+// continue even if audit insert fails for any reason).
+/** RFC-027 §4.5 D8 — tx-aware variant. Identical SQL to auditCreateNode
+ *  but RE-THROWS on failure so a BEGIN..COMMIT around lifecycle UPDATE +
+ *  audit INSERT can ROLLBACK if the audit row would have been lost.
+ *  Required for the "no audit-but state changed" window that §4.5 / D8
+ *  explicitly closes (PR1 SF-2 review catch — auditCreateNode's
+ *  swallow-and-warn defeats atomicity).
+ *
+ *  Callers in a non-transaction context should keep using auditCreateNode
+ *  (best-effort, never throws). */
+export function auditCreateNodeStrict(input: {
+  action: Parameters<typeof auditCreateNode>[0]["action"];
+  user_id?: string | null;
+  username?: string | null;
+  network_id?: string | null;
+  target_id?: string | null;
+  detail: Record<string, unknown>;
+}): void {
+  db.run(
+    `INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, username, action, target_type, target_id, detail, network_id)
+     VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'node_create_request', ?4, ?5, ?6)`,
+    [
+      input.user_id || null,
+      input.username || null,
+      input.action,
+      input.target_id || null,
+      JSON.stringify(input.detail),
+      input.network_id || null,
+    ],
+  );
+}
+
+export function auditCreateNode(input: {
+  action:
+    | "create_node_dispatched"
+    | "create_node_rejected"
+    | "create_node_succeeded"
+    | "create_node_sweeper_revoked"
+    | "daemon_capability_lied"                  // RFC-026 §9.3 D2 — daemon declared runtime support, child died before serving
+    // RFC-027 §4.5 — stop/delete lifecycle audit action enum extension.
+    // Re-using auditCreateNode is fine: the action column carries the
+    // discriminator; target_type stays 'node_create_request' which is a
+    // misnomer for stop/delete rows but updating the schema would force a
+    // wider migration (see P1.1 issue).
+    | "stop_node_dispatched"
+    | "stop_node_completed"
+    | "delete_node_dispatched"
+    | "delete_node_completed"
+    | "forced_stop_with_in_flight"
+    | "backup_purged";
+  user_id?: string | null;
+  username?: string | null;
+  network_id?: string | null;
+  target_id?: string | null;   // request_id
+  detail: Record<string, unknown>;
+}): void {
+  try {
+    db.run(
+      `INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, username, action, target_type, target_id, detail, network_id)
+       VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, 'node_create_request', ?4, ?5, ?6)`,
+      [
+        input.user_id || null,
+        input.username || null,
+        input.action,
+        input.target_id || null,
+        JSON.stringify(input.detail),
+        input.network_id || null,
+      ],
+    );
+  } catch (e: any) {
+    console.warn(`[commhub] audit_log insert (create_node) failed: ${e?.message || e}`);
+  }
+}

package/src/cross-tenant-injection.test.ts

@@ -64,6 +64,116 @@ beforeEach(() => {
 // fix, the function refuses to traverse and writes nothing.
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Round-5 follow-up — chainReplyToParent return value gates SSE push
+//
+// 通信牛 catch on #275: the DB write is refused on cross-network, but
+// the post-call code in tools.ts was still running:
+//
+//   SELECT parent_task_id, from_name FROM tasks WHERE task_id = ?
+//   SELECT from_name, task_id ... WHERE task_id = ?
+//   pushEvent(parent.from_name, { parent_task_id: <netA-id>, ... },
+//             effectiveNetId)
+//
+// That pushEvent leaks the foreign parent's task_id into the caller's
+// network via SSE payload. The fix: chainReplyToParent now returns
+// `{ chained, stoppedReason? }` so callers can skip the follow-up
+// push when the chain didn't actually write. These tests pin the
+// return contract directly. The SSE-gate is exercised at the call
+// sites in tools.ts; pinning the contract here ensures the call-site
+// behaviour can't drift back if someone refactors db.ts.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe("chainReplyToParent — return value gates SSE push (round5 follow-up)", () => {
+  test("cross-network refusal returns { chained: false, stoppedReason: 'cross_network' }", () => {
+    const parentA = insertTask({
+      from_name: "admin-a",
+      to_name: "worker-a",
+      network_id: "net-A",
+      status: "delivered",
+    });
+    const childB = insertTask({
+      from_name: "attacker-b",
+      to_name: "victim-b",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "replied",
+      parent_task_id: parentA,
+    });
+
+    const result = chainReplyToParent(childB, "payload", "replied", 5, "net-B");
+
+    expect(result.chained).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.stoppedReason).toBe("cross_network");
+  });
+
+  test("legitimate same-network chain returns { chained: true } (no stoppedReason)", () => {
+    const parentB = insertTask({
+      from_name: "admin-b",
+      to_name: "worker-b",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "delivered",
+    });
+    const childB = insertTask({
+      from_name: "child-b",
+      to_name: "leaf-b",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "replied",
+      parent_task_id: parentB,
+    });
+
+    const result = chainReplyToParent(childB, "ok", "replied", 5, "net-B");
+
+    expect(result.chained).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.stoppedReason).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  test("child with no parent returns { chained: false } (no stoppedReason)", () => {
+    const orphan = insertTask({
+      from_name: "x",
+      to_name: "y",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "replied",
+    });
+
+    const result = chainReplyToParent(orphan, "ok", "replied", 5, "net-B");
+
+    expect(result.chained).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.stoppedReason).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  test("3-level chain: same-net parent writes, foreign grandparent halts → chained=true, stoppedReason='cross_network'", () => {
+    const grandparent = insertTask({
+      from_name: "gp-admin",
+      to_name: "gp-worker",
+      network_id: "net-A",
+      status: "delivered",
+    });
+    const parent = insertTask({
+      from_name: "p-admin",
+      to_name: "p-worker",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "delivered",
+      parent_task_id: grandparent,
+    });
+    const child = insertTask({
+      from_name: "c",
+      to_name: "leaf",
+      network_id: "net-B",
+      status: "replied",
+      parent_task_id: parent,
+    });
+
+    const result = chainReplyToParent(child, "ok", "replied", 5, "net-B");
+
+    // We DID write into the same-net parent before the chain halted
+    // at the foreign grandparent. `chained: true` lets callers push
+    // SSE for the legitimate parent; `stoppedReason` makes it visible
+    // in logs/metrics that the chain didn't run to completion.
+    expect(result.chained).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.stoppedReason).toBe("cross_network");
+  });
+});
+
 describe("chainReplyToParent — cross-network rejection (round5 F2 #3)", () => {
   test("blocks chain when parent.network_id != callerNetId", () => {
     // Network A: a task that should NEVER receive a foreign reply.