@sleep2agi/agent-network 2.3.0-preview.4 → 2.3.0-preview.40

package/dist/bin/goal-wake-log-render.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+export interface WakeLogEntryShape {
+    ts?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    summary?: string;
+    task_id?: string;
+}
+export interface WakeLogGoalShape {
+    goal_id: string;
+    progress_log?: WakeLogEntryShape[];
+}
+export interface WakeLogRenderOpts {
+    /** Trim to the last N entries. undefined = all. */
+    tail?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Format progress_log as a JSON object suitable for `--json` output.
+ * Pure. Never reads/writes filesystem. Legacy goals without
+ * progress_log render as empty array (not error).
+ */
+export declare function renderWakeLogJson(goal: WakeLogGoalShape, opts?: WakeLogRenderOpts): {
+    goal_id: string;
+    total: number;
+    returned: number;
+    entries: WakeLogEntryShape[];
+};
+/**
+ * Format progress_log as a table for human console output.
+ * Column layout mirrors printGoalShow so the two commands read
+ * consistently. Empty log renders a single "(none)" line, not an error.
+ */
+export declare function renderWakeLogText(goal: WakeLogGoalShape, opts?: WakeLogRenderOpts): string;

package/dist/src/batch-workdir.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/**
+ * Resolve one batch workdir before any mkdir/chdir loop starts.
+ *
+ * Node does not expand shell tildes. Leaving `~/team` relative means every
+ * iteration can resolve it from the previous node's cwd and create paths such
+ * as `/work/~/team/~/team`. Only the current user's `~` form is supported;
+ * `~other` is rejected instead of being written as a literal directory.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeBatchWorkdir(input: string, cwd?: string, home?: string): string;

package/dist/src/bootstrap-password-db.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+export interface BootstrapPasswordUpdateInvocation {
+    argv: string[];
+    env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    script: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the database selected for the local Hub into an explicit absolute
+ * path before launching the bootstrap helper. The helper must never infer a
+ * database from its own HOME/cwd: those can differ from the parent process.
+ */
+export declare function resolveBootstrapDatabasePath(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, home: string, cwd: string): string;
+export declare const BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_UPDATE_SCRIPT: string;
+export declare function buildBootstrapPasswordUpdateInvocation(userId: string, dbPath: string, baseEnv?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): BootstrapPasswordUpdateInvocation;

package/dist/src/channel-attachments.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+interface AttachmentDescriptor {
+    type?: unknown;
+    file_id?: unknown;
+    path?: unknown;
+    mime?: unknown;
+    name?: unknown;
+    size?: unknown;
+}
+export interface ChannelAttachmentDeps {
+    hubUrl: string;
+    authToken: string;
+    cacheDir: string;
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    maxBytes?: number;
+}
+export interface ChannelAttachmentResult {
+    paths: string[];
+    failures: Array<{
+        fileId: string;
+        code: string;
+        message: string;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function readableAttachmentsFromInbox(message: any): AttachmentDescriptor[];
+export declare function channelAttachmentCacheDir(home: string, alias: string): string;
+export declare function downloadChannelAttachments(message: any, deps: ChannelAttachmentDeps): Promise<ChannelAttachmentResult>;
+export declare const downloadChannelImageAttachments: typeof downloadChannelAttachments;
+export declare function appendChannelAttachmentPaths(content: string, paths: readonly string[]): string;
+export {};

package/dist/src/channel-task-trace.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+export declare function sendChannelTaskWithTrace(input: {
+    alias: string;
+    task: string;
+    priority?: string;
+    fromAlias: string;
+    networkId?: string | null;
+}, deps: {
+    send: (args: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<any>;
+    log: (line: string) => void;
+}): Promise<any>;

package/dist/src/claude-vendor-env.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+export declare const CLAUDE_VENDOR_ENV_KEYS: readonly ["ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"];
+export type PlainSecretEnvRewrite = {
+    key: string;
+    refName: string;
+    value: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Plan the values that the node-create writer will move into its line-oriented
+ * `.env` file. This is deliberately side-effect free: callers can run it as a
+ * preflight before creating a node directory, changing process.env, or writing
+ * config.json. Keeping the line-break rejection here makes it cover every
+ * caller of the dotenv writer, including the no-name interactive wizard.
+ */
+export declare function planPlainSecretEnvRewrites(input: {
+    env: unknown;
+    nodeId: string;
+}): PlainSecretEnvRewrite[];
+/**
+ * Persist the exact Anthropic-compatible vendor environment used by an
+ * explicit claude-agent-sdk create. Explicit --env values retain precedence;
+ * ambient shell values only fill missing known keys. Other environment values
+ * are intentionally ignored so node create never snapshots the whole shell.
+ */
+export declare function collectClaudeVendorEnvForCreate(input: {
+    runtime: string;
+    explicitEnv: readonly string[];
+    shellEnv: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
+}): string[];

package/dist/src/cli-args.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+export type ParsedCliOptions = {
+    [key: string]: string | string[];
+    _channels: string[];
+    _envs: string[];
+};
+export declare const BOOLEAN_FLAGS: Set<string>;
+export declare function parseCliOptions(argv: string[]): ParsedCliOptions;
+export declare function positionalArgs(argv: string[]): string[];

package/dist/src/client-task-trace.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+export declare function sendClientTaskWithTrace(input: {
+    alias: string;
+    fromAlias: string;
+    parentTaskId?: string | null;
+    networkId?: string | null;
+}, dependencies: {
+    send: () => Promise<any>;
+    log: (line: string) => void;
+}): Promise<any>;

package/dist/src/client.js

@@ -1 +1 @@
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this[_0x497fbb(0x217)]();}catch{}}}}catch(_0x234b32){if(_0x234b32[_0x497fbb(0x24c)]==='AbortError')break;this[_0x497fbb(0x238)](_0x497fbb(0x268),_0x234b32),this['log']('SSE\x20error:\x20'+_0x234b32[_0x497fbb(0x248)]);}if(this[_0x497fbb(0x1f6)])this[_0x497fbb(0x238)](_0x497fbb(0x221)),this[_0x497fbb(0x1f8)]('SSE\x20reconnecting\x20in\x20'+_0x3e2421/0x3e8+'s...'),await this[_0x497fbb(0x23d)](_0x3e2421),_0x3e2421=Math['min'](_0x3e2421*1.5,0xea60);}}async['processInbox'](){const _0x5473b0=a0_0x48272b;try{let _0x49d8ca=(await this[_0x5473b0(0x265)](_0x5473b0(0x231),{'alias':this[_0x5473b0(0x207)],'limit':0xa}))?.['messages']||[];for(let _0x5554a2 of _0x49d8ca)await this['call'](_0x5473b0(0x1fd),{'alias':this[_0x5473b0(0x207)],'message_id':_0x5554a2['id']}),this['log']('←\x20'+_0x5554a2['from_session']+':\x20'+_0x5554a2[_0x5473b0(0x215)][_0x5473b0(0x260)](0x0,0x3c)),this['emit'](_0x5473b0(0x200),_0x5554a2),this[_0x5473b0(0x238)](_0x5473b0(0x248),_0x5554a2);}catch(_0x2729c7){this['log'](_0x5473b0(0x23e)+_0x2729c7[_0x5473b0(0x248)]);}}['sleep'](_0x235230){return new Promise(_0x47d8e1=>setTimeout(_0x47d8e1,_0x235230));}}function a0_0x4270(_0x32b12a,_0x15415d){_0x32b12a=_0x32b12a-0x1ed;const _0x4f750b=a0_0x4f75();let _0x427085=_0x4f750b[_0x32b12a];return _0x427085;}var F=$;export{F as default,$ as CommHub};

package/dist/src/codex-model-default.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+export declare const DEFAULT_CODEX_MODEL = "gpt-5.6-sol";
+export declare const CODEX_MODEL_CHOICES: ReadonlyArray<{
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly default?: boolean;
+}>;
+export declare function defaultCodexModelForRuntime(runtime: string): string | undefined;

package/dist/src/controlled-upload.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * #693 — token-bound node controlled local file → Hub /api/upload bridge.
+ *
+ * Security boundary (hard gates):
+ *  1. Cross-host: bytes travel over HTTP multipart; Hub never reads agent FS.
+ *  2. Identity: caller supplies the node's bearer token; ntok binds network.
+ *  3. Path safety: realpath + allowlisted roots; reject NUL, symlink, traversal.
+ *  4. Size ≤ 12 MiB enforced with same-fd fstat + bounded read (no full slurp).
+ *  5. Hub /api/upload is the sole write surface (atomic on hub side).
+ *
+ * Adversarial add-only (#694 DO-NOT-MERGE fixes):
+ *  - TOCTOU: open O_NOFOLLOW → fstat(fd) → read(fd) only; no re-open by path.
+ *  - Bounded read: never allocate/read past CONTROLLED_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES.
+ *  - NUL guard is live and reachable before any fs call.
+ */
+/** Mirrors server/src/uploads.ts MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES. */
+export declare const CONTROLLED_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES: number;
+/** Chunk size for bounded streaming read from a single fd. */
+export declare const CONTROLLED_UPLOAD_READ_CHUNK: number;
+export type ControlledUploadErrorCode = "path_required" | "path_nul" | "path_not_found" | "path_untrusted" | "path_symlink" | "path_not_regular" | "path_empty" | "payload_too_large" | "read_failed" | "auth_required" | "hub_url_required" | "upload_failed" | "bad_response" | "missing_file_id";
+export type ControlledUploadFail = {
+    ok: false;
+    error: ControlledUploadErrorCode;
+    message: string;
+};
+export type ControlledUploadOk = {
+    ok: true;
+    file_id: string;
+    name: string;
+    mime: string;
+    size: number;
+    url?: string;
+};
+export type ControlledUploadResult = ControlledUploadOk | ControlledUploadFail;
+export interface ControlledUploadDeps {
+    hubUrl: string;
+    authToken: string;
+    allowedRoots?: string[];
+    alias?: string;
+    nodeDir?: string;
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    home?: string;
+}
+/** Normalize a client filename: basename only, strip controls, cap 255. */
+export declare function normalizeUploadName(input: string | undefined | null, fallback?: string): string;
+export declare function defaultControlledUploadRoots(opts?: {
+    home?: string;
+    alias?: string;
+    nodeDir?: string;
+    cwd?: string;
+    env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+}): string[];
+/** True iff canonicalPath is strictly inside one of the allowlisted roots. */
+export declare function isPathInsideAllowedRoots(canonicalPath: string, allowedRoots: string[]): boolean;
+/**
+ * Resolve a user-supplied path to a canonical path under an allowlisted root.
+ * Does not open the file for reading — open+fstat+read is a separate same-fd step.
+ */
+export declare function resolveControlledUploadPath(rawPath: string, allowedRoots: string[]): {
+    ok: true;
+    canonicalPath: string;
+} | ControlledUploadFail;
+export type ControlledFileBytes = {
+    ok: true;
+    bytes: Buffer;
+    size: number;
+    canonicalPath: string;
+} | ControlledUploadFail;
+/**
+ * Open → fstat(fd) → bounded read(fd) on the **same fd** (TOCTOU hard gate).
+ * Uses O_NOFOLLOW when available so a symlink swap at open is rejected.
+ * Never uses path-based readFileSync after the initial open.
+ */
+export declare function openFstatBoundedReadControlledFile(canonicalPath: string, allowedRoots: string[], maxBytes?: number): ControlledFileBytes;
+/**
+ * Upload a controlled local file to Hub POST /api/upload.
+ * Returns file_id + metadata for send_reply attachments.
+ * Never falls back to sending a raw path to the Hub.
+ */
+export declare function uploadControlledLocalFile(rawPath: string, deps: ControlledUploadDeps, opts?: {
+    name?: string;
+    mime?: string;
+}): Promise<ControlledUploadResult>;

package/dist/src/copresence-identity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+export interface SessionInfo {
+    tmux: string;
+    pid: number;
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+}
+export interface CopresenceMarker {
+    marker: string;
+    boot_id: string;
+    started_at_epoch_ms: number;
+    owner_uid: number;
+    sessions: {
+        appsrv?: SessionInfo;
+        bridge?: SessionInfo;
+        tui?: SessionInfo;
+    };
+}
+export type RefuseCause = "MISSING" | "SYMLINK" | "NOT_REGULAR" | "WRONG_MODE" | "OWNER_MISMATCH" | "PARSE_ERROR" | "SCHEMA_INVALID" | "STALE_BOOT_ID" | "PLATFORM_UNSUPPORTED";
+export type ReadMarkerResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    marker: CopresenceMarker;
+} | {
+    kind: "refuse";
+    cause: RefuseCause;
+    detail: string;
+};
+export interface ProcStat {
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+    ppid: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for /proc access. Real impl reads the filesystem;
+ * unit tests inject a mock so /proc-based logic is deterministically testable.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *   - listAllPids: read /proc directory and return numeric-name entries.
+ *     Throws on unrecoverable errors (permission denied on /proc itself).
+ *   - readEnviron: read /proc/<pid>/environ as a raw string. Returns null
+ *     if the pid has vanished (ENOENT) — that's a normal race, not a failure.
+ *     Throws for permission errors etc.
+ *   - readStat: read /proc/<pid>/stat and extract (pgid, starttime, ppid).
+ *     Returns null on ENOENT (pid gone). Throws on other errors.
+ */
+export interface ProcessEnumerator {
+    listAllPids(): number[];
+    readEnviron(pid: number): string | null;
+    readStat(pid: number): ProcStat | null;
+    /**
+     * REAL uid of the process itself (`Uid:` line of /proc/<pid>/status,
+     * field 0). Used by the environ-EACCES discriminator to tell
+     * "other-user process (expected EACCES)" from "our own process we could
+     * not inspect (must be accounted for)".
+     *
+     * MUST NOT be implemented as `statSync('/proc/<pid>/environ').uid`.
+     * A process that called prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) keeps its real uid but
+     * its /proc/<pid>/{environ,mem,...} nodes flip to root:root 0400 (see
+     * proc(5) / kernel `task_dump_owner`). Deriving ownership from the
+     * environ inode therefore reports uid 0 for our OWN non-dumpable
+     * children, which made them invisible to the scan: not in `hits`, not in
+     * the unreadable list, so teardown reported success and deleted the
+     * marker while the orphan lived on (Defect A).
+     *
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT) or if even /proc/<pid>/status
+     * is blocked (hidepid / LSM) — in that case the process cannot be ours
+     * to reason about and is skipped.
+     */
+    readOwnerUid(pid: number): number | null;
+    /**
+     * Single-character process state from /proc/<pid>/status (R/S/D/Z/T/...).
+     * `Z` means zombie — mm freed, environ returns EACCES even to owner, but
+     * the pid is going away shortly. Skip zombies during environ scan.
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT).
+     */
+    readState(pid: number): string | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for sending signals. Real impl uses process.kill;
+ * tests inject a mock.
+ */
+export interface KillPrimitive {
+    killPgroup(pgid: number, signal: "TERM" | "KILL"): void;
+    /** Returns true if ANY process in the pgroup is still alive. */
+    pgroupAlive(pgid: number): boolean;
+}
+export declare function markerFilePath(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): string;
+export declare function readBootId(): string;
+/**
+ * Write the marker file atomically.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT (Blocker 1 fix): the uuid parameter is the SINGLE SOURCE OF
+ * TRUTH. Caller is expected to inject this same uuid into every tmux
+ * session's ANET_NODE_MARKER env var. writeMarker does NOT generate its
+ * own uuid — that was the exact bug in 9f2ec282.
+ */
+export declare function writeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string, uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): CopresenceMarker;
+/**
+ * Read the marker file with structured fail-closed refuses.
+ *
+ * Never throws for expected refuse causes. Only throws if the OS itself
+ * is broken (e.g. EIO). Malformed JSON, wrong types, null bodies etc.
+ * all return { kind: "refuse", cause, detail }.
+ */
+export declare function readMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): ReadMarkerResult;
+export declare function removeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): void;
+export declare function realEnumerator(): ProcessEnumerator;
+export declare function realKiller(): KillPrimitive;
+/**
+ * Scan /proc for all pids whose environ contains ANET_NODE_MARKER=<uuid>.
+ * This is the authoritative identity source — NOT the marker file's stored
+ * pids, which may be stale (main died, workers survived under new pgids).
+ *
+ * Bytes format of /proc/PID/environ: NUL-separated key=value pairs.
+ *
+ * Blocker 1 fix (independent audit 92d53c8f, 2026-07-29): /proc/<pid>/environ
+ * is 0400 owner-only. Blindly reading it will hit EACCES on every other-user
+ * process (pid 1 is systemd/root → guaranteed EACCES). The naive fix — wrap
+ * in try/catch and continue — would silently miss marker-carrying processes
+ * whose environ we can't read for some other reason, recreating Defect A
+ * ("nothing killed but report success"). Right fix:
+ *
+ *   1. Try readEnviron.
+ *   2. On EACCES, discriminate via readOwnerUid + readState:
+ *      - Owner uid != ours     → EXPECTED skip (can't be one of our procs).
+ *      - Own uid, state = Z    → EXPECTED skip (zombie, mm freed).
+ *      - Own uid, not zombie   → FAIL-CLOSED (unexplained EACCES on our own
+ *                                live process is a real problem, must throw).
+ */
+export interface ScanResult {
+    /** Pids whose environ we successfully read and matched the marker uuid. */
+    hits: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that are PLAUSIBLY PART OF THE
+     * COPRESENCE TREE (invariant 11 scope test). These might be marker-
+     * carrying without us being able to prove it, so the reap flow REFUSES
+     * marker removal while this list is non-empty — defense against Defect A
+     * (silently missing a marker-carrying process, then deleting the marker
+     * as if teardown had succeeded).
+     */
+    unreadableOwnUid: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that failed the scope test:
+     * their pgid belongs to no marker-carrying group and their ppid chain
+     * reaches no marker carrier / validated marker-file session pid.
+     *
+     * INFORMATIONAL ONLY — never fail-closed. A machine routinely has such
+     * processes (a same-uid process whose primary GID differs from ours fails
+     * the kernel's __ptrace_may_access gid check and EACCESes on environ even
+     * though its real uid matches). v2 lumped these into unreadableOwnUid,
+     * which made reapMarkerGroups structurally unable to return success on
+     * any such host.
+     *
+     * KNOWN RESIDUAL GAP (stated rather than papered over): a marker-carrying
+     * process that is BOTH non-dumpable (environ unreadable) AND fully
+     * detached (setsid'd into its own pgroup with ppid=1, no live recorded
+     * session pid above it) lands here and is therefore not reaped and does
+     * not block marker removal. Nothing in /proc exposes the environment of a
+     * non-dumpable task to a non-root reader, so no scope widening can
+     * recover it — only running teardown as root could. Widening scope to
+     * "every same-uid unreadable process" is NOT an acceptable trade: that is
+     * exactly the v2 behaviour that made teardown never succeed. The
+     * realistic copresence shape (child of a recorded pane pid, or sharing a
+     * marker carrier's pgroup) IS covered — see the real-/proc test.
+     */
+    unreadableOutOfScope: number[];
+}
+/**
+ * Marker-file session records used to anchor the invariant-11 scope test.
+ * Each entry must be re-validated (pid alive AND same starttime) before it
+ * is trusted — see validateAnchors.
+ */
+export interface ScanAnchors {
+    sessions?: Array<{
+        pid: number;
+        starttime_jiffies: number;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function anchorsFromMarker(marker: CopresenceMarker): ScanAnchors;
+/**
+ * Invariant 11 scope test: is `pid` plausibly part of the copresence tree?
+ *
+ * True when the pid IS an anchor, when its pgid belongs to a marker-carrying
+ * group (or a validated anchor's group), or when walking its ppid chain
+ * reaches an anchor / marker carrier / a pid inside a relevant pgroup.
+ *
+ * Everything else is out of scope and must not participate in a fail-closed
+ * decision, no matter how unreadable it is.
+ */
+export declare function isInCopresenceScope(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pid: number, relevantPids: Set<number>, relevantPgids: Set<number>): boolean;
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): number[];
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarkerFull(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string, anchors?: ScanAnchors): ScanResult;
+export declare function groupPidsByPgid(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pids: number[]): Map<number, number[]>;
+export type HomogeneityResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    members: number[];
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    cause: "FOREIGN_MEMBER" | "ENUM_ERROR" | "EMPTY_GROUP";
+    foreignPids: number[];
+    unreadablePids: number[];
+    detail: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Verify that EVERY live member of `pgid` carries the marker.
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 fix: enumeration errors surface as ENUM_ERROR (fail-closed),
+ * never as an empty-list judged "safe". Any unreadable member also
+ * fails-closed. Empty group (no live members at all) also refuses — killing
+ * an empty pgroup can't be right and empty-list judged "ok" recreates the
+ * exact defect shape (independent audit 92d53c8f finding #6).
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 second half (zombie): a zombie same-uid process's environ
+ * returns EACCES even to owner (mm freed), but stat still exists with
+ * original pgid. Without discrimination, the zombie would be treated as
+ * "unreadable member" → ENUM_ERROR → entire group SKIPPED. Since re-verify
+ * happens post-SIGTERM (when zombies are most numerous), teardown would
+ * never escalate. Fix: apply the same owner-uid + state=Z discriminator as
+ * scanEnvironForMarker.
+ *
+ * Algorithm:
+ *   1. Enumerate all pids on the system.
+ *   2. Filter to pids whose /proc/PID/stat pgid == target pgid.
+ *   3. For each such pid, check its environ with EACCES discrimination:
+ *      - Other-user EACCES  → skip (can't be ours anyway).
+ *      - Own-uid zombie     → skip (expected, dying).
+ *      - Own-uid live EACCES → truly unreadable → fail-closed.
+ *      - Missing marker     → foreign member → fail-closed.
+ */
+export declare function verifyGroupHomogeneity(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pgid: number, markerUuid: string): HomogeneityResult;
+/**
+ * Walk the caller's ancestry (self → PPID → grandparent → ...) and check
+ * whether any ancestor carries the target marker. If yes → caller is
+ * running inside the copresence tree we're about to kill, and would take
+ * itself down.
+ */
+export declare function callerCarriesMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): {
+    self: boolean;
+    ancestorPid?: number;
+};
+export type ReapResult = {
+    kind: "success";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+} | {
+    kind: "failed";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    skippedGroups: Array<{
+        pgid: number;
+        reason: string;
+    }>;
+    detail: string;
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+};
+export interface ReapOptions {
+    graceMs: number;
+    logger: (msg: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Sleep primitive (grace period). Real code uses setTimeout; tests inject
+     * a fast/deterministic sleep so grace paths are actually covered. Prior
+     * impl was a busy-wait `while (Date.now() < end) {}` — audit 92d53c8f
+     * finding #3 flagged that as pinning one CPU core for graceMs and blocking
+     * the event loop; test coverage missed it because tests passed graceMs=0.
+     */
+    sleep?: (ms: number) => Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Invariant-11 scope anchors, normally `anchorsFromMarker(marker)`.
+     *
+     * Without them the only anchors are the marker carriers the scan itself
+     * found, so a marker-carrying process we cannot READ (non-dumpable) but
+     * whose parent IS a recorded session pid would be judged out of scope and
+     * silently dropped. Passing the marker's recorded session pids closes that
+     * hole; each one is re-validated (alive + same starttime) before it can
+     * widen scope, so a stale/recycled pid cannot.
+     */
+    anchors?: ScanAnchors;
+}
+/**
+ * Full reap flow with TOCTOU re-verification.
+ *
+ * Sequence:
+ *   1. Environ scan for marker → get all live pids carrying it.
+ *   2. Group by current PGID.
+ *   3. For each group: verify homogeneity. Skip on foreign/unreadable.
+ *   4. For each verified group: send SIGTERM to pgroup.
+ *   5. Wait grace.
+ *   6. Re-verify each group (marker still there, no new foreign) before SIGKILL.
+ *   7. Send SIGKILL to any group still alive.
+ *   8. Post-rescan: if any marker-carrying pid alive → preserve marker.
+ */
+export declare function reapMarkerGroups(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, killer: KillPrimitive, markerUuid: string, opts: ReapOptions): Promise<ReapResult>;
+export interface PrepareStartDeps {
+    /** Usually () => readMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    readMarker(): ReadMarkerResult;
+    /** Usually (uuid, anchors) => reapMarkerGroups(realEnumerator(), realKiller(), uuid, {...anchors}). */
+    reap(uuid: string, anchors: ScanAnchors): Promise<ReapResult>;
+    /** Usually () => removeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    removeMarker(): void;
+    /** Usually (uuid, sessions) => writeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId, uuid, sessions). */
+    writeMarker(uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): void;
+    logger(msg: string): void;
+}
+export type PrepareStartResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    reclaimedUuid?: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "blocked";
+    cause: "STALE_TREE_ALIVE" | "UNUSABLE_MARKER";
+    detail: string;
+    remedy: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Everything that must happen BEFORE the first `tmux new-session` of a
+ * copresence start. Extracted out of cli.ts so both blockers below are
+ * actually reachable by tests — the audit's point that the two fatal
+ * defects of the previous rounds both lived in an untested cli.ts seam.
+ *
+ * Blocker 5 — marker-before-tmux ordering.
+ *   v2 wrote the marker only after the app-server had bound its port, i.e.
+ *   after a 25s wait and after several `process.exit(1)` paths. A start that
+ *   died in that window left a live, marker-carrying tmux session behind
+ *   with NO marker file on disk: the exact unreclaimable-ghost this feature
+ *   exists to prevent. The marker is now written here, before any session is
+ *   created, with an empty `sessions` object — reap identity has always been
+ *   the environ uuid, never the recorded pids, so an empty sessions object
+ *   loses nothing but observability hints (which the start path fills in
+ *   later, best-effort).
+ *
+ * Blocker 6 — never overwrite a preserved marker.
+ *   A failed stop deliberately PRESERVES the marker so the next stop can
+ *   retry idempotently. v2's start then overwrote it with a fresh uuid while
+ *   only killing tmux sessions BY NAME, so the still-running subprocesses of
+ *   the previous instance became permanently unreclaimable: their uuid was
+ *   gone from disk forever. Now the old identity is reaped FIRST; if that
+ *   reap does not fully succeed we refuse to start rather than destroy the
+ *   only handle on those processes.
+ */
+export declare function prepareIdentityForStart(newUuid: string, deps: PrepareStartDeps): Promise<PrepareStartResult>;