@sleep2agi/agent-network 2.3.0-preview.35 → 2.3.0-preview.37

package/dist/src/client.js

@@ -1 +1 @@
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a0_0x50f097{[a0_0x4813e6(0x1ac)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x199)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x1aa)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x168)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x16f)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x179)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x1a1)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x16e)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x1b9)];[a0_0x4813e6(0x196)]=!0x1;constructor(_0x3dd536){const _0x593924=a0_0x4813e6;super();if(this[_0x593924(0x1ac)]=_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x1ac)][_0x593924(0x186)](/\/$/,''),this[_0x593924(0x199)]=_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x199)],this[_0x593924(0x1aa)]=_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x1aa)],this[_0x593924(0x168)]=_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x168)]||_0x593924(0x16a),this['resumeId']=_0x593924(0x16b)+_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x199)]+'-'+Date[_0x593924(0x18a)]()['toString'](0x24),this[_0x593924(0x179)]=_0x3dd536['heartbeatInterval']??0x2bf20,this[_0x593924(0x1a1)]=_0x3dd536['reconnectDelay']??0xbb8,_0x3dd536[_0x593924(0x1bd)]!==!0x1)this[_0x593924(0x1be)]();}[a0_0x4813e6(0x19e)](_0x5bd9c3){const _0x16cb50=a0_0x4813e6;console[_0x16cb50(0x19e)]('['+new Date()[_0x16cb50(0x1a7)]()[_0x16cb50(0x171)](0x0,0x8)+_0x16cb50(0x17c)+this[_0x16cb50(0x199)]+']\x20'+_0x5bd9c3);}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x18b)](_0x344c4a,_0x139960){const _0x300917=a0_0x4813e6;let _0x22a8b9={'Content-Type':_0x300917(0x17a),'Accept':_0x300917(0x175)};if(this['token'])_0x22a8b9[_0x300917(0x1a5)]='Bearer\x20'+this[_0x300917(0x1aa)];let _0x269648=await(await fetch(this[_0x300917(0x1ac)]+'/mcp',{'method':_0x300917(0x19b),'headers':_0x22a8b9,'body':JSON['stringify']({'jsonrpc':_0x300917(0x195),'id':Date[_0x300917(0x18a)](),'method':_0x300917(0x1ba),'params':{'name':_0x344c4a,'arguments':_0x139960}})}))[_0x300917(0x1a0)](),_0x51ac78=_0x269648['match'](/data: (.+)/),_0x4e8d70=_0x51ac78?JSON[_0x300917(0x16c)](_0x51ac78[0x1]):JSON[_0x300917(0x16c)](_0x269648),_0x32c39f=_0x4e8d70?.[_0x300917(0x183)]?.[_0x300917(0x1b7)]?.[0x0]?.['text'];return _0x32c39f?JSON[_0x300917(0x16c)](_0x32c39f):_0x4e8d70;}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x1be)](){const _0x107f4e=a0_0x4813e6;if(this[_0x107f4e(0x196)])return;this[_0x107f4e(0x196)]=!0x0,await this[_0x107f4e(0x17d)](_0x107f4e(0x193)),this['log'](_0x107f4e(0x19d)),this[_0x107f4e(0x16e)]=setInterval(()=>{const _0x9dd776=_0x107f4e;this[_0x9dd776(0x17d)]('idle')[_0x9dd776(0x1ae)](_0x33ff0d=>this[_0x9dd776(0x19e)](_0x9dd776(0x19a)+_0x33ff0d['message']));},this[_0x107f4e(0x179)]),this['connectSSE']();}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x1af)](){const _0x2ba720=a0_0x4813e6;if(this['running']=!0x1,this[_0x2ba720(0x1b9)]?.[_0x2ba720(0x17f)](),this[_0x2ba720(0x16e)])clearInterval(this[_0x2ba720(0x16e)]);await this[_0x2ba720(0x17d)](_0x2ba720(0x174))[_0x2ba720(0x1ae)](()=>{}),this['log'](_0x2ba720(0x1ab));}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x181)](_0x4512e0,_0x3eeabb,_0x59cc4e=a0_0x4813e6(0x167)){const _0x3139c2=a0_0x4813e6;return this[_0x3139c2(0x18b)](_0x3139c2(0x1b1),{'alias':_0x4512e0,'task':_0x3eeabb,'priority':_0x59cc4e,'from_session':this[_0x3139c2(0x199)]});}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x1b0)](_0x5bbb29,_0x3c9638){const _0x2ae2c9=a0_0x4813e6;return this[_0x2ae2c9(0x18b)]('send_message',{'alias':_0x5bbb29,'message':_0x3c9638,'from_session':this['alias']});}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x177)](_0x1ad994,_0x1c68e2,_0x254e6e=a0_0x4813e6(0x188)){const _0xef0205=a0_0x4813e6;return this[_0xef0205(0x18b)]('send_reply',{'in_reply_to':_0x1ad994,'text':_0x1c68e2,'status':_0x254e6e});}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x17d)](_0x362cb6,_0x58be86){const _0x271517=a0_0x4813e6;return this[_0x271517(0x18b)](_0x271517(0x1bc),{'resume_id':this[_0x271517(0x16f)],'alias':this[_0x271517(0x199)],'status':_0x362cb6,'server':a0_0x42e141(),'hostname':a0_0x42e141(),'agent':this[_0x271517(0x168)],'project_dir':process[_0x271517(0x176)](),..._0x58be86});}async['getAllStatus'](){return this['call']('get_all_status',{});}async['broadcast'](_0x24e194,_0x10d463){const _0x55c825=a0_0x4813e6;return this[_0x55c825(0x18b)](_0x55c825(0x187),{'message':_0x24e194,'filter_server':_0x10d463?.[_0x55c825(0x1b2)],'filter_status':_0x10d463?.['status']});}async[a0_0x4813e6(0x1a2)](){const _0x339a47=a0_0x4813e6;let _0x426cc3=encodeURIComponent(this['alias']),_0x191432=this[_0x339a47(0x1ac)]+_0x339a47(0x18c)+_0x426cc3,_0x4142e6=this[_0x339a47(0x1a1)];while(this[_0x339a47(0x196)]){try{this[_0x339a47(0x1b9)]=new AbortController();let _0x28e6f8={'Accept':_0x339a47(0x1b3)};if(this[_0x339a47(0x1aa)])_0x28e6f8[_0x339a47(0x1a5)]=_0x339a47(0x173)+this['token'];let _0x191d7f=await fetch(_0x191432,{'headers':_0x28e6f8,'signal':this[_0x339a47(0x1b9)][_0x339a47(0x169)]});if(!_0x191d7f['ok']||!_0x191d7f[_0x339a47(0x18d)]){this[_0x339a47(0x19e)](_0x339a47(0x192)+_0x191d7f[_0x339a47(0x17d)]),await this[_0x339a47(0x190)](_0x4142e6),_0x4142e6=Math[_0x339a47(0x184)](_0x4142e6*1.5,0xea60);continue;}_0x4142e6=this[_0x339a47(0x1a1)];let _0x2326ee=_0x191d7f[_0x339a47(0x18d)]['getReader'](),_0x3706ab=new TextDecoder(),_0xbf2c31='';while(this[_0x339a47(0x196)]){let {done:_0x21b668,value:_0xabe6bb}=await _0x2326ee[_0x339a47(0x16d)]();if(_0x21b668)break;_0xbf2c31+=_0x3706ab[_0x339a47(0x191)](_0xabe6bb,{'stream':!0x0});let _0x3bd60f=_0xbf2c31[_0x339a47(0x17e)]('\x0a');_0xbf2c31=_0x3bd60f[_0x339a47(0x178)]()||'';for(let _0x75ebc7 of _0x3bd60f){if(!_0x75ebc7[_0x339a47(0x182)](_0x339a47(0x18f)))continue;try{let _0x55fbd6=JSON[_0x339a47(0x16c)](_0x75ebc7[_0x339a47(0x171)](0x6));if(_0x55fbd6[_0x339a47(0x1b6)]===_0x339a47(0x17b)){this[_0x339a47(0x19e)](_0x339a47(0x194)),this[_0x339a47(0x1a9)](_0x339a47(0x17b));continue;}if(_0x55fbd6[_0x339a47(0x1b6)]===_0x339a47(0x19c)||_0x55fbd6[_0x339a47(0x1b6)]===_0x339a47(0x1b8)||_0x55fbd6[_0x339a47(0x1b6)]===_0x339a47(0x187))await this['processInbox']();}catch{}}}}catch(_0x111afa){if(_0x111afa[_0x339a47(0x19f)]===_0x339a47(0x1a4))break;this[_0x339a47(0x1a9)]('error',_0x111afa),this['log']('SSE\x20error:\x20'+_0x111afa[_0x339a47(0x1b0)]);}if(this['running'])this[_0x339a47(0x1a9)](_0x339a47(0x1ab)),this[_0x339a47(0x19e)]('SSE\x20reconnecting\x20in\x20'+_0x4142e6/0x3e8+_0x339a47(0x1ad)),await this[_0x339a47(0x190)](_0x4142e6),_0x4142e6=Math[_0x339a47(0x184)](_0x4142e6*1.5,0xea60);}}async['processInbox'](){const _0x477445=a0_0x4813e6;try{let _0x51a4a6=(await this[_0x477445(0x18b)]('get_inbox',{'alias':this[_0x477445(0x199)],'limit':0xa}))?.['messages']||[];for(let _0x2edada of _0x51a4a6)await this[_0x477445(0x18b)](_0x477445(0x170),{'alias':this['alias'],'message_id':_0x2edada['id']}),this['log']('←\x20'+_0x2edada[_0x477445(0x1a3)]+':\x20'+_0x2edada['content'][_0x477445(0x171)](0x0,0x3c)),this[_0x477445(0x1a9)]('task',_0x2edada),this[_0x477445(0x1a9)](_0x477445(0x1b0),_0x2edada);}catch(_0x3058eb){this['log'](_0x477445(0x189)+_0x3058eb[_0x477445(0x1b0)]);}}[a0_0x4813e6(0x190)](_0x495293){return new Promise(_0x3eb579=>setTimeout(_0x3eb579,_0x495293));}}var $=T;export{$ as default,T as CommHub};function a0_0x38dc(){const _0xac7f80=['113572CPYRxj','replace','broadcast','completed','inbox\x20error:\x20','now','call','/events/','body','252DMEZxA','data:\x20','sleep','decode','SSE\x20failed:\x20','idle','SSE\x20connected','2.0','running','464dQkQIJ','2ohjRwe','alias','heartbeat\x20failed:\x20','POST','new_task','registered','log','name','text','reconnectDelay','connectSSE','from_session','AbortError','Authorization','1752kxYMdU','toTimeString','94409zzGhAi','emit','token','disconnected','url','s...','catch','disconnect','message','send_task','server','text/event-stream','125411hvfIEJ','4239231SvWDsO','type','content','new_message','sseAbort','tools/call','55qUCFYS','report_status','autoConnect','connect','158683LarlfJ','normal','agent','signal','sdk','sdk-','parse','read','heartbeatTimer','resumeId','ack_inbox','slice','195795gJUKpE','Bearer\x20','offline','application/json,\x20text/event-stream','cwd','reply','pop','heartbeatInterval','application/json','connected',']\x20[commhub:','status','split','abort','4648480qtZBQV','send','startsWith','result','min'];a0_0x38dc=function(){return _0xac7f80;};return a0_0x38dc();}
+function a0_0x6de1(_0x4e3e59,_0x1b9c4f){_0x4e3e59=_0x4e3e59-0xea;const _0x40fe82=a0_0x40fe();let _0x6de1e1=_0x40fe82[_0x4e3e59];return _0x6de1e1;}const a0_0x230d08=a0_0x6de1;function a0_0x40fe(){const _0x14968a=['url','slice','parse','new_task','sseAbort','text/event-stream','report_status','replace','emit','type','4091458iZWsQm','toTimeString','144765bkuQHm','/events/','catch','heartbeatInterval','getAllStatus','24726GPhIpb','token','connectSSE','520RwIKTP','running','10BPzsZx','signal','reconnectDelay','15568289UrBTPk','SSE\x20failed:\x20','new_message','disconnect','startsWith','text','5490CuQXkh','error','decode','Bearer\x20','get_inbox','s...','695eQhJwC','stringify','content','log','connected',']\x20[commhub:','now','task','sdk','normal','processInbox','sdk-','cwd','Authorization','min','agent','heartbeat\x20failed:\x20','message','get_all_status','status','pop','inbox\x20error:\x20','autoConnect','2.0','application/json,\x20text/event-stream','SSE\x20connected','connect','514lHxAnX','send_message','resumeId','call','disconnected','3430986Elwrzi','5313740UULazF','/mcp','send','getReader','reply','tools/call','alias','body','messages','ack_inbox','name','data:\x20','heartbeatTimer','read','broadcast','server','sleep','send_reply'];a0_0x40fe=function(){return _0x14968a;};return a0_0x40fe();}(function(_0x6bcbe2,_0x394dd0){const _0x28270e=a0_0x6de1,_0x11eb5c=_0x6bcbe2();while(!![]){try{const _0x3862fd=parseInt(_0x28270e(0x131))/0x1*(-parseInt(_0x28270e(0xfa))/0x2)+parseInt(_0x28270e(0xff))/0x3+-parseInt(_0x28270e(0x100))/0x4+parseInt(_0x28270e(0x137))/0x5*(-parseInt(_0x28270e(0x123))/0x6)+parseInt(_0x28270e(0x11c))/0x7+-parseInt(_0x28270e(0x126))/0x8*(-parseInt(_0x28270e(0x11e))/0x9)+parseInt(_0x28270e(0x128))/0xa*(parseInt(_0x28270e(0x12b))/0xb);if(_0x3862fd===_0x394dd0)break;else _0x11eb5c['push'](_0x11eb5c['shift']());}catch(_0x2fac3a){_0x11eb5c['push'](_0x11eb5c['shift']());}}}(a0_0x40fe,0xd60fc));import{EventEmitter as a0_0x5ce8b4}from'events';import{hostname as a0_0x37fdd8}from'os';class T extends a0_0x5ce8b4{[a0_0x230d08(0x112)];[a0_0x230d08(0x106)];[a0_0x230d08(0x124)];[a0_0x230d08(0xee)];['resumeId'];[a0_0x230d08(0x121)];[a0_0x230d08(0x12a)];[a0_0x230d08(0x10c)];['sseAbort'];[a0_0x230d08(0x127)]=!0x1;constructor(_0x5bc09d){const _0x5c0a7b=a0_0x230d08;super();if(this[_0x5c0a7b(0x112)]=_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0x112)][_0x5c0a7b(0x119)](/\/$/,''),this[_0x5c0a7b(0x106)]=_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0x106)],this[_0x5c0a7b(0x124)]=_0x5bc09d['token'],this[_0x5c0a7b(0xee)]=_0x5bc09d['agent']||_0x5c0a7b(0x13f),this[_0x5c0a7b(0xfc)]=_0x5c0a7b(0xea)+_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0x106)]+'-'+Date[_0x5c0a7b(0x13d)]()['toString'](0x24),this[_0x5c0a7b(0x121)]=_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0x121)]??0x2bf20,this[_0x5c0a7b(0x12a)]=_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0x12a)]??0xbb8,_0x5bc09d[_0x5c0a7b(0xf5)]!==!0x1)this[_0x5c0a7b(0xf9)]();}[a0_0x230d08(0x13a)](_0x1f9b0e){const _0x275549=a0_0x230d08;console[_0x275549(0x13a)]('['+new Date()[_0x275549(0x11d)]()[_0x275549(0x113)](0x0,0x8)+_0x275549(0x13c)+this['alias']+']\x20'+_0x1f9b0e);}async['call'](_0x29f9c4,_0x201e70){const _0x411ac6=a0_0x230d08;let _0x220afa={'Content-Type':'application/json','Accept':_0x411ac6(0xf7)};if(this['token'])_0x220afa[_0x411ac6(0xec)]='Bearer\x20'+this['token'];let _0x4b27f6=await(await fetch(this[_0x411ac6(0x112)]+_0x411ac6(0x101),{'method':'POST','headers':_0x220afa,'body':JSON[_0x411ac6(0x138)]({'jsonrpc':_0x411ac6(0xf6),'id':Date[_0x411ac6(0x13d)](),'method':_0x411ac6(0x105),'params':{'name':_0x29f9c4,'arguments':_0x201e70}})}))[_0x411ac6(0x130)](),_0x5acd89=_0x4b27f6['match'](/data: (.+)/),_0x372246=_0x5acd89?JSON[_0x411ac6(0x114)](_0x5acd89[0x1]):JSON[_0x411ac6(0x114)](_0x4b27f6),_0x92053b=_0x372246?.['result']?.[_0x411ac6(0x139)]?.[0x0]?.['text'];return _0x92053b?JSON[_0x411ac6(0x114)](_0x92053b):_0x372246;}async[a0_0x230d08(0xf9)](){const _0x2ebdc6=a0_0x230d08;if(this[_0x2ebdc6(0x127)])return;this[_0x2ebdc6(0x127)]=!0x0,await this['status']('idle'),this[_0x2ebdc6(0x13a)]('registered'),this['heartbeatTimer']=setInterval(()=>{const 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package/dist/src/copresence-identity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+export interface SessionInfo {
+    tmux: string;
+    pid: number;
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+}
+export interface CopresenceMarker {
+    marker: string;
+    boot_id: string;
+    started_at_epoch_ms: number;
+    owner_uid: number;
+    sessions: {
+        appsrv?: SessionInfo;
+        bridge?: SessionInfo;
+        tui?: SessionInfo;
+    };
+}
+export type RefuseCause = "MISSING" | "SYMLINK" | "NOT_REGULAR" | "WRONG_MODE" | "OWNER_MISMATCH" | "PARSE_ERROR" | "SCHEMA_INVALID" | "STALE_BOOT_ID" | "PLATFORM_UNSUPPORTED";
+export type ReadMarkerResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    marker: CopresenceMarker;
+} | {
+    kind: "refuse";
+    cause: RefuseCause;
+    detail: string;
+};
+export interface ProcStat {
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+    ppid: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for /proc access. Real impl reads the filesystem;
+ * unit tests inject a mock so /proc-based logic is deterministically testable.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *   - listAllPids: read /proc directory and return numeric-name entries.
+ *     Throws on unrecoverable errors (permission denied on /proc itself).
+ *   - readEnviron: read /proc/<pid>/environ as a raw string. Returns null
+ *     if the pid has vanished (ENOENT) — that's a normal race, not a failure.
+ *     Throws for permission errors etc.
+ *   - readStat: read /proc/<pid>/stat and extract (pgid, starttime, ppid).
+ *     Returns null on ENOENT (pid gone). Throws on other errors.
+ */
+export interface ProcessEnumerator {
+    listAllPids(): number[];
+    readEnviron(pid: number): string | null;
+    readStat(pid: number): ProcStat | null;
+    /**
+     * REAL uid of the process itself (`Uid:` line of /proc/<pid>/status,
+     * field 0). Used by the environ-EACCES discriminator to tell
+     * "other-user process (expected EACCES)" from "our own process we could
+     * not inspect (must be accounted for)".
+     *
+     * MUST NOT be implemented as `statSync('/proc/<pid>/environ').uid`.
+     * A process that called prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) keeps its real uid but
+     * its /proc/<pid>/{environ,mem,...} nodes flip to root:root 0400 (see
+     * proc(5) / kernel `task_dump_owner`). Deriving ownership from the
+     * environ inode therefore reports uid 0 for our OWN non-dumpable
+     * children, which made them invisible to the scan: not in `hits`, not in
+     * the unreadable list, so teardown reported success and deleted the
+     * marker while the orphan lived on (Defect A).
+     *
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT) or if even /proc/<pid>/status
+     * is blocked (hidepid / LSM) — in that case the process cannot be ours
+     * to reason about and is skipped.
+     */
+    readOwnerUid(pid: number): number | null;
+    /**
+     * Single-character process state from /proc/<pid>/status (R/S/D/Z/T/...).
+     * `Z` means zombie — mm freed, environ returns EACCES even to owner, but
+     * the pid is going away shortly. Skip zombies during environ scan.
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT).
+     */
+    readState(pid: number): string | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for sending signals. Real impl uses process.kill;
+ * tests inject a mock.
+ */
+export interface KillPrimitive {
+    killPgroup(pgid: number, signal: "TERM" | "KILL"): void;
+    /** Returns true if ANY process in the pgroup is still alive. */
+    pgroupAlive(pgid: number): boolean;
+}
+export declare function markerFilePath(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): string;
+export declare function readBootId(): string;
+/**
+ * Write the marker file atomically.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT (Blocker 1 fix): the uuid parameter is the SINGLE SOURCE OF
+ * TRUTH. Caller is expected to inject this same uuid into every tmux
+ * session's ANET_NODE_MARKER env var. writeMarker does NOT generate its
+ * own uuid — that was the exact bug in 9f2ec282.
+ */
+export declare function writeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string, uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): CopresenceMarker;
+/**
+ * Read the marker file with structured fail-closed refuses.
+ *
+ * Never throws for expected refuse causes. Only throws if the OS itself
+ * is broken (e.g. EIO). Malformed JSON, wrong types, null bodies etc.
+ * all return { kind: "refuse", cause, detail }.
+ */
+export declare function readMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): ReadMarkerResult;
+export declare function removeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): void;
+export declare function realEnumerator(): ProcessEnumerator;
+export declare function realKiller(): KillPrimitive;
+/**
+ * Scan /proc for all pids whose environ contains ANET_NODE_MARKER=<uuid>.
+ * This is the authoritative identity source — NOT the marker file's stored
+ * pids, which may be stale (main died, workers survived under new pgids).
+ *
+ * Bytes format of /proc/PID/environ: NUL-separated key=value pairs.
+ *
+ * Blocker 1 fix (independent audit 92d53c8f, 2026-07-29): /proc/<pid>/environ
+ * is 0400 owner-only. Blindly reading it will hit EACCES on every other-user
+ * process (pid 1 is systemd/root → guaranteed EACCES). The naive fix — wrap
+ * in try/catch and continue — would silently miss marker-carrying processes
+ * whose environ we can't read for some other reason, recreating Defect A
+ * ("nothing killed but report success"). Right fix:
+ *
+ *   1. Try readEnviron.
+ *   2. On EACCES, discriminate via readOwnerUid + readState:
+ *      - Owner uid != ours     → EXPECTED skip (can't be one of our procs).
+ *      - Own uid, state = Z    → EXPECTED skip (zombie, mm freed).
+ *      - Own uid, not zombie   → FAIL-CLOSED (unexplained EACCES on our own
+ *                                live process is a real problem, must throw).
+ */
+export interface ScanResult {
+    /** Pids whose environ we successfully read and matched the marker uuid. */
+    hits: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that are PLAUSIBLY PART OF THE
+     * COPRESENCE TREE (invariant 11 scope test). These might be marker-
+     * carrying without us being able to prove it, so the reap flow REFUSES
+     * marker removal while this list is non-empty — defense against Defect A
+     * (silently missing a marker-carrying process, then deleting the marker
+     * as if teardown had succeeded).
+     */
+    unreadableOwnUid: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that failed the scope test:
+     * their pgid belongs to no marker-carrying group and their ppid chain
+     * reaches no marker carrier / validated marker-file session pid.
+     *
+     * INFORMATIONAL ONLY — never fail-closed. A machine routinely has such
+     * processes (a same-uid process whose primary GID differs from ours fails
+     * the kernel's __ptrace_may_access gid check and EACCESes on environ even
+     * though its real uid matches). v2 lumped these into unreadableOwnUid,
+     * which made reapMarkerGroups structurally unable to return success on
+     * any such host.
+     *
+     * KNOWN RESIDUAL GAP (stated rather than papered over): a marker-carrying
+     * process that is BOTH non-dumpable (environ unreadable) AND fully
+     * detached (setsid'd into its own pgroup with ppid=1, no live recorded
+     * session pid above it) lands here and is therefore not reaped and does
+     * not block marker removal. Nothing in /proc exposes the environment of a
+     * non-dumpable task to a non-root reader, so no scope widening can
+     * recover it — only running teardown as root could. Widening scope to
+     * "every same-uid unreadable process" is NOT an acceptable trade: that is
+     * exactly the v2 behaviour that made teardown never succeed. The
+     * realistic copresence shape (child of a recorded pane pid, or sharing a
+     * marker carrier's pgroup) IS covered — see the real-/proc test.
+     */
+    unreadableOutOfScope: number[];
+}
+/**
+ * Marker-file session records used to anchor the invariant-11 scope test.
+ * Each entry must be re-validated (pid alive AND same starttime) before it
+ * is trusted — see validateAnchors.
+ */
+export interface ScanAnchors {
+    sessions?: Array<{
+        pid: number;
+        starttime_jiffies: number;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function anchorsFromMarker(marker: CopresenceMarker): ScanAnchors;
+/**
+ * Invariant 11 scope test: is `pid` plausibly part of the copresence tree?
+ *
+ * True when the pid IS an anchor, when its pgid belongs to a marker-carrying
+ * group (or a validated anchor's group), or when walking its ppid chain
+ * reaches an anchor / marker carrier / a pid inside a relevant pgroup.
+ *
+ * Everything else is out of scope and must not participate in a fail-closed
+ * decision, no matter how unreadable it is.
+ */
+export declare function isInCopresenceScope(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pid: number, relevantPids: Set<number>, relevantPgids: Set<number>): boolean;
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): number[];
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarkerFull(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string, anchors?: ScanAnchors): ScanResult;
+export declare function groupPidsByPgid(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pids: number[]): Map<number, number[]>;
+export type HomogeneityResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    members: number[];
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    cause: "FOREIGN_MEMBER" | "ENUM_ERROR" | "EMPTY_GROUP";
+    foreignPids: number[];
+    unreadablePids: number[];
+    detail: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Verify that EVERY live member of `pgid` carries the marker.
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 fix: enumeration errors surface as ENUM_ERROR (fail-closed),
+ * never as an empty-list judged "safe". Any unreadable member also
+ * fails-closed. Empty group (no live members at all) also refuses — killing
+ * an empty pgroup can't be right and empty-list judged "ok" recreates the
+ * exact defect shape (independent audit 92d53c8f finding #6).
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 second half (zombie): a zombie same-uid process's environ
+ * returns EACCES even to owner (mm freed), but stat still exists with
+ * original pgid. Without discrimination, the zombie would be treated as
+ * "unreadable member" → ENUM_ERROR → entire group SKIPPED. Since re-verify
+ * happens post-SIGTERM (when zombies are most numerous), teardown would
+ * never escalate. Fix: apply the same owner-uid + state=Z discriminator as
+ * scanEnvironForMarker.
+ *
+ * Algorithm:
+ *   1. Enumerate all pids on the system.
+ *   2. Filter to pids whose /proc/PID/stat pgid == target pgid.
+ *   3. For each such pid, check its environ with EACCES discrimination:
+ *      - Other-user EACCES  → skip (can't be ours anyway).
+ *      - Own-uid zombie     → skip (expected, dying).
+ *      - Own-uid live EACCES → truly unreadable → fail-closed.
+ *      - Missing marker     → foreign member → fail-closed.
+ */
+export declare function verifyGroupHomogeneity(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pgid: number, markerUuid: string): HomogeneityResult;
+/**
+ * Walk the caller's ancestry (self → PPID → grandparent → ...) and check
+ * whether any ancestor carries the target marker. If yes → caller is
+ * running inside the copresence tree we're about to kill, and would take
+ * itself down.
+ */
+export declare function callerCarriesMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): {
+    self: boolean;
+    ancestorPid?: number;
+};
+export type ReapResult = {
+    kind: "success";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+} | {
+    kind: "failed";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    skippedGroups: Array<{
+        pgid: number;
+        reason: string;
+    }>;
+    detail: string;
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+};
+export interface ReapOptions {
+    graceMs: number;
+    logger: (msg: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Sleep primitive (grace period). Real code uses setTimeout; tests inject
+     * a fast/deterministic sleep so grace paths are actually covered. Prior
+     * impl was a busy-wait `while (Date.now() < end) {}` — audit 92d53c8f
+     * finding #3 flagged that as pinning one CPU core for graceMs and blocking
+     * the event loop; test coverage missed it because tests passed graceMs=0.
+     */
+    sleep?: (ms: number) => Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Invariant-11 scope anchors, normally `anchorsFromMarker(marker)`.
+     *
+     * Without them the only anchors are the marker carriers the scan itself
+     * found, so a marker-carrying process we cannot READ (non-dumpable) but
+     * whose parent IS a recorded session pid would be judged out of scope and
+     * silently dropped. Passing the marker's recorded session pids closes that
+     * hole; each one is re-validated (alive + same starttime) before it can
+     * widen scope, so a stale/recycled pid cannot.
+     */
+    anchors?: ScanAnchors;
+}
+/**
+ * Full reap flow with TOCTOU re-verification.
+ *
+ * Sequence:
+ *   1. Environ scan for marker → get all live pids carrying it.
+ *   2. Group by current PGID.
+ *   3. For each group: verify homogeneity. Skip on foreign/unreadable.
+ *   4. For each verified group: send SIGTERM to pgroup.
+ *   5. Wait grace.
+ *   6. Re-verify each group (marker still there, no new foreign) before SIGKILL.
+ *   7. Send SIGKILL to any group still alive.
+ *   8. Post-rescan: if any marker-carrying pid alive → preserve marker.
+ */
+export declare function reapMarkerGroups(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, killer: KillPrimitive, markerUuid: string, opts: ReapOptions): Promise<ReapResult>;
+export interface PrepareStartDeps {
+    /** Usually () => readMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    readMarker(): ReadMarkerResult;
+    /** Usually (uuid, anchors) => reapMarkerGroups(realEnumerator(), realKiller(), uuid, {...anchors}). */
+    reap(uuid: string, anchors: ScanAnchors): Promise<ReapResult>;
+    /** Usually () => removeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    removeMarker(): void;
+    /** Usually (uuid, sessions) => writeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId, uuid, sessions). */
+    writeMarker(uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): void;
+    logger(msg: string): void;
+}
+export type PrepareStartResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    reclaimedUuid?: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "blocked";
+    cause: "STALE_TREE_ALIVE" | "UNUSABLE_MARKER";
+    detail: string;
+    remedy: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Everything that must happen BEFORE the first `tmux new-session` of a
+ * copresence start. Extracted out of cli.ts so both blockers below are
+ * actually reachable by tests — the audit's point that the two fatal
+ * defects of the previous rounds both lived in an untested cli.ts seam.
+ *
+ * Blocker 5 — marker-before-tmux ordering.
+ *   v2 wrote the marker only after the app-server had bound its port, i.e.
+ *   after a 25s wait and after several `process.exit(1)` paths. A start that
+ *   died in that window left a live, marker-carrying tmux session behind
+ *   with NO marker file on disk: the exact unreclaimable-ghost this feature
+ *   exists to prevent. The marker is now written here, before any session is
+ *   created, with an empty `sessions` object — reap identity has always been
+ *   the environ uuid, never the recorded pids, so an empty sessions object
+ *   loses nothing but observability hints (which the start path fills in
+ *   later, best-effort).
+ *
+ * Blocker 6 — never overwrite a preserved marker.
+ *   A failed stop deliberately PRESERVES the marker so the next stop can
+ *   retry idempotently. v2's start then overwrote it with a fresh uuid while
+ *   only killing tmux sessions BY NAME, so the still-running subprocesses of
+ *   the previous instance became permanently unreclaimable: their uuid was
+ *   gone from disk forever. Now the old identity is reaped FIRST; if that
+ *   reap does not fully succeed we refuse to start rather than destroy the
+ *   only handle on those processes.
+ */
+export declare function prepareIdentityForStart(newUuid: string, deps: PrepareStartDeps): Promise<PrepareStartResult>;