@sleep2agi/agent-network 2.3.0-preview.34 → 2.3.0-preview.36

package/dist/src/client.js

@@ -1 +1 @@
-function a0_0x9418(){const _0x454798=['sdk-','completed','ack_inbox','processInbox','connect','heartbeatInterval','reconnectDelay','split','token','1102851pkALrK','/mcp','log','send_task','offline','agent','startsWith','call','Bearer\x20','sleep','heartbeat\x20failed:\x20','18GUttkd','POST','send_reply','sseAbort','parse','catch','send','messages','reply','url','tools/call','application/json,\x20text/event-stream','abort','slice','type','task','connected','error','read','getReader','Authorization','resumeId','SSE\x20connected','disconnected','809568YMGlFg','send_message','disconnect','1366000cyTevn','status','emit','2.0',']\x20[commhub:','getAllStatus','content','message','connectSSE','heartbeatTimer','now','5KuWHWF','184404Gpvqqb','body','5157060mOPyCN','application/json','/events/','inbox\x20error:\x20','849175IXKUxY','get_all_status','server','5056992FStvGn','broadcast','running','s...','SSE\x20failed:\x20','text/event-stream','name','SSE\x20error:\x20','alias','idle','35fvCLtW'];a0_0x9418=function(){return _0x454798;};return a0_0x9418();}const a0_0x5a1909=a0_0x4e34;(function(_0x2865f9,_0x3761fc){const _0x5ebf3d=a0_0x4e34,_0x15d8d9=_0x2865f9();while(!![]){try{const _0x3d8dfe=parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0x106))/0x1*(-parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0x107))/0x2)+parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xd5))/0x3+parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xfb))/0x4+-parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xbe))/0x5*(parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xe0))/0x6)+-parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xcb))/0x7*(-parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xf8))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0xc1))/0x9+-parseInt(_0x5ebf3d(0x109))/0xa;if(_0x3d8dfe===_0x3761fc)break;else _0x15d8d9['push'](_0x15d8d9['shift']());}catch(_0x3b4465){_0x15d8d9['push'](_0x15d8d9['shift']());}}}(a0_0x9418,0x46fcc));function a0_0x4e34(_0x3b0a03,_0x34118d){_0x3b0a03=_0x3b0a03-0xbb;const _0x94180e=a0_0x9418();let _0x4e3437=_0x94180e[_0x3b0a03];return _0x4e3437;}import{EventEmitter as a0_0x536da2}from'events';import{hostname as a0_0x1ffcb0}from'os';class T extends a0_0x536da2{['url'];[a0_0x5a1909(0xc9)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xd4)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xda)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xf5)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xd1)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xd2)];['heartbeatTimer'];[a0_0x5a1909(0xe3)];[a0_0x5a1909(0xc3)]=!0x1;constructor(_0x36c4fe){const _0x1bfaff=a0_0x5a1909;super();if(this['url']=_0x36c4fe[_0x1bfaff(0xe9)]['replace'](/\/$/,''),this[_0x1bfaff(0xc9)]=_0x36c4fe[_0x1bfaff(0xc9)],this[_0x1bfaff(0xd4)]=_0x36c4fe['token'],this[_0x1bfaff(0xda)]=_0x36c4fe[_0x1bfaff(0xda)]||'sdk',this[_0x1bfaff(0xf5)]=_0x1bfaff(0xcc)+_0x36c4fe[_0x1bfaff(0xc9)]+'-'+Date[_0x1bfaff(0x105)]()['toString'](0x24),this[_0x1bfaff(0xd1)]=_0x36c4fe['heartbeatInterval']??0x2bf20,this[_0x1bfaff(0xd2)]=_0x36c4fe[_0x1bfaff(0xd2)]??0xbb8,_0x36c4fe['autoConnect']!==!0x1)this[_0x1bfaff(0xd0)]();}[a0_0x5a1909(0xd7)](_0xac0e7e){const _0x1e7171=a0_0x5a1909;console['log']('['+new Date()['toTimeString']()[_0x1e7171(0xed)](0x0,0x8)+_0x1e7171(0xff)+this[_0x1e7171(0xc9)]+']\x20'+_0xac0e7e);}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xdc)](_0x94ed95,_0x215f21){const _0x5dfb3f=a0_0x5a1909;let _0x3d96f9={'Content-Type':_0x5dfb3f(0xbb),'Accept':_0x5dfb3f(0xeb)};if(this[_0x5dfb3f(0xd4)])_0x3d96f9[_0x5dfb3f(0xf4)]=_0x5dfb3f(0xdd)+this[_0x5dfb3f(0xd4)];let _0x4f4ade=await(await fetch(this[_0x5dfb3f(0xe9)]+_0x5dfb3f(0xd6),{'method':_0x5dfb3f(0xe1),'headers':_0x3d96f9,'body':JSON['stringify']({'jsonrpc':_0x5dfb3f(0xfe),'id':Date['now'](),'method':_0x5dfb3f(0xea),'params':{'name':_0x94ed95,'arguments':_0x215f21}})}))['text'](),_0x57a7a1=_0x4f4ade['match'](/data: (.+)/),_0x284fcf=_0x57a7a1?JSON[_0x5dfb3f(0xe4)](_0x57a7a1[0x1]):JSON[_0x5dfb3f(0xe4)](_0x4f4ade),_0x5b6cc3=_0x284fcf?.['result']?.[_0x5dfb3f(0x101)]?.[0x0]?.['text'];return _0x5b6cc3?JSON[_0x5dfb3f(0xe4)](_0x5b6cc3):_0x284fcf;}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xd0)](){const _0x5d92e4=a0_0x5a1909;if(this['running'])return;this['running']=!0x0,await this[_0x5d92e4(0xfc)](_0x5d92e4(0xca)),this['log']('registered'),this[_0x5d92e4(0x104)]=setInterval(()=>{const _0x13bb35=_0x5d92e4;this[_0x13bb35(0xfc)]('idle')['catch'](_0x43940e=>this[_0x13bb35(0xd7)](_0x13bb35(0xdf)+_0x43940e[_0x13bb35(0x102)]));},this[_0x5d92e4(0xd1)]),this['connectSSE']();}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xfa)](){const _0x5e789a=a0_0x5a1909;if(this[_0x5e789a(0xc3)]=!0x1,this[_0x5e789a(0xe3)]?.[_0x5e789a(0xec)](),this['heartbeatTimer'])clearInterval(this[_0x5e789a(0x104)]);await this[_0x5e789a(0xfc)](_0x5e789a(0xd9))[_0x5e789a(0xe5)](()=>{}),this[_0x5e789a(0xd7)](_0x5e789a(0xf7));}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xe6)](_0x11c606,_0x2ba2d3,_0x2b6299='normal'){const _0x573381=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0x573381(0xdc)](_0x573381(0xd8),{'alias':_0x11c606,'task':_0x2ba2d3,'priority':_0x2b6299,'from_session':this[_0x573381(0xc9)]});}async['message'](_0x4d2249,_0x5c2fc4){const _0xfaf92f=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0xfaf92f(0xdc)](_0xfaf92f(0xf9),{'alias':_0x4d2249,'message':_0x5c2fc4,'from_session':this[_0xfaf92f(0xc9)]});}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xe8)](_0x1e4478,_0x3c89bf,_0x403566=a0_0x5a1909(0xcd)){const _0x361e4f=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0x361e4f(0xdc)](_0x361e4f(0xe2),{'in_reply_to':_0x1e4478,'text':_0x3c89bf,'status':_0x403566});}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xfc)](_0x3bcca2,_0xd343fa){const _0x59c013=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0x59c013(0xdc)]('report_status',{'resume_id':this[_0x59c013(0xf5)],'alias':this[_0x59c013(0xc9)],'status':_0x3bcca2,'server':a0_0x1ffcb0(),'hostname':a0_0x1ffcb0(),'agent':this[_0x59c013(0xda)],'project_dir':process['cwd'](),..._0xd343fa});}async[a0_0x5a1909(0x100)](){const _0x1ea804=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0x1ea804(0xdc)](_0x1ea804(0xbf),{});}async['broadcast'](_0x1b15e3,_0x13f9e1){const _0x376bad=a0_0x5a1909;return this[_0x376bad(0xdc)](_0x376bad(0xc2),{'message':_0x1b15e3,'filter_server':_0x13f9e1?.[_0x376bad(0xc0)],'filter_status':_0x13f9e1?.[_0x376bad(0xfc)]});}async[a0_0x5a1909(0x103)](){const _0x30be42=a0_0x5a1909;let _0xd3dc6d=encodeURIComponent(this['alias']),_0x1634ca=this[_0x30be42(0xe9)]+_0x30be42(0xbc)+_0xd3dc6d,_0x10ce93=this['reconnectDelay'];while(this[_0x30be42(0xc3)]){try{this[_0x30be42(0xe3)]=new AbortController();let _0x27184b={'Accept':_0x30be42(0xc6)};if(this[_0x30be42(0xd4)])_0x27184b[_0x30be42(0xf4)]='Bearer\x20'+this[_0x30be42(0xd4)];let _0x66c85b=await fetch(_0x1634ca,{'headers':_0x27184b,'signal':this[_0x30be42(0xe3)]['signal']});if(!_0x66c85b['ok']||!_0x66c85b[_0x30be42(0x108)]){this[_0x30be42(0xd7)](_0x30be42(0xc5)+_0x66c85b[_0x30be42(0xfc)]),await this[_0x30be42(0xde)](_0x10ce93),_0x10ce93=Math['min'](_0x10ce93*1.5,0xea60);continue;}_0x10ce93=this['reconnectDelay'];let _0x2a9a54=_0x66c85b['body'][_0x30be42(0xf3)](),_0x362655=new TextDecoder(),_0xb7259e='';while(this['running']){let {done:_0x589725,value:_0x4dc8ba}=await _0x2a9a54[_0x30be42(0xf2)]();if(_0x589725)break;_0xb7259e+=_0x362655['decode'](_0x4dc8ba,{'stream':!0x0});let _0x2105a0=_0xb7259e[_0x30be42(0xd3)]('\x0a');_0xb7259e=_0x2105a0['pop']()||'';for(let _0x30924a of _0x2105a0){if(!_0x30924a[_0x30be42(0xdb)]('data:\x20'))continue;try{let _0x5ef844=JSON[_0x30be42(0xe4)](_0x30924a[_0x30be42(0xed)](0x6));if(_0x5ef844[_0x30be42(0xee)]===_0x30be42(0xf0)){this['log'](_0x30be42(0xf6)),this['emit'](_0x30be42(0xf0));continue;}if(_0x5ef844['type']==='new_task'||_0x5ef844[_0x30be42(0xee)]==='new_message'||_0x5ef844[_0x30be42(0xee)]===_0x30be42(0xc2))await this[_0x30be42(0xcf)]();}catch{}}}}catch(_0x574727){if(_0x574727[_0x30be42(0xc7)]==='AbortError')break;this[_0x30be42(0xfd)](_0x30be42(0xf1),_0x574727),this['log'](_0x30be42(0xc8)+_0x574727[_0x30be42(0x102)]);}if(this['running'])this[_0x30be42(0xfd)]('disconnected'),this[_0x30be42(0xd7)]('SSE\x20reconnecting\x20in\x20'+_0x10ce93/0x3e8+_0x30be42(0xc4)),await this['sleep'](_0x10ce93),_0x10ce93=Math['min'](_0x10ce93*1.5,0xea60);}}async[a0_0x5a1909(0xcf)](){const _0x8c91ed=a0_0x5a1909;try{let _0x46203c=(await this['call']('get_inbox',{'alias':this[_0x8c91ed(0xc9)],'limit':0xa}))?.[_0x8c91ed(0xe7)]||[];for(let _0x3c15ce of _0x46203c)await this[_0x8c91ed(0xdc)](_0x8c91ed(0xce),{'alias':this['alias'],'message_id':_0x3c15ce['id']}),this[_0x8c91ed(0xd7)]('←\x20'+_0x3c15ce['from_session']+':\x20'+_0x3c15ce[_0x8c91ed(0x101)]['slice'](0x0,0x3c)),this[_0x8c91ed(0xfd)](_0x8c91ed(0xef),_0x3c15ce),this[_0x8c91ed(0xfd)](_0x8c91ed(0x102),_0x3c15ce);}catch(_0x167d4f){this[_0x8c91ed(0xd7)](_0x8c91ed(0xbd)+_0x167d4f[_0x8c91ed(0x102)]);}}[a0_0x5a1909(0xde)](_0x28f9a4){return new Promise(_0x1df5c7=>setTimeout(_0x1df5c7,_0x28f9a4));}}var $=T;export{$ as default,T as CommHub};
+function a0_0x855f(_0x39248a,_0x4f8b92){_0x39248a=_0x39248a-0x17e;const _0x1fdedc=a0_0x1fde();let _0x855f3a=_0x1fdedc[_0x39248a];return _0x855f3a;}const a0_0x4d231b=a0_0x855f;function a0_0x1fde(){const _0x6156d4=['1284230tDpjGQ','send','4054gZjmun','new_message','token','12sHOfGT','replace','application/json,\x20text/event-stream','name','content','510fdmlNL','completed','signal','startsWith','send_task','sdk-','url','decode','connected','alias','cwd','idle','SSE\x20failed:\x20','SSE\x20error:\x20','reconnectDelay','tools/call','report_status','203291GZjLqV','1420065tZtERR','body','POST','s...','292812gmjImy','sseAbort','emit','connect',']\x20[commhub:','Bearer\x20','180AKOQIx','Authorization','parse','normal','error','327072wpmrft','reply','sleep','status','text','toString','text/event-stream','heartbeatTimer','min','ack_inbox','/events/','387qyGICo','autoConnect','log','message','read','send_message','disconnect','pop','broadcast','agent','catch','abort','running','18GuMYSJ','type','connectSSE','getReader','data:\x20','server','get_inbox','registered','offline','slice','new_task','455xtKROn','call','disconnected','heartbeatInterval','split','messages','sdk','task','match','resumeId','processInbox','1860873HDbrtt','/mcp'];a0_0x1fde=function(){return _0x6156d4;};return a0_0x1fde();}(function(_0x69f157,_0x34d6a8){const _0x16a939=a0_0x855f,_0x43f872=_0x69f157();while(!![]){try{const _0x163c93=parseInt(_0x16a939(0x18e))/0x1*(parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1b5))/0x2)+parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1cf))/0x3+parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1b8))/0x4*(parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1b3))/0x5)+-parseInt(_0x16a939(0x19b))/0x6*(parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1b1))/0x7)+parseInt(_0x16a939(0x183))/0x8*(-parseInt(_0x16a939(0x17e))/0x9)+parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1bd))/0xa*(parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1ce))/0xb)+-parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1d3))/0xc*(parseInt(_0x16a939(0x1a6))/0xd);if(_0x163c93===_0x34d6a8)break;else _0x43f872['push'](_0x43f872['shift']());}catch(_0xff4c24){_0x43f872['push'](_0x43f872['shift']());}}}(a0_0x1fde,0x7a789));import{EventEmitter as a0_0x124210}from'events';import{hostname as a0_0x4fa072}from'os';class T extends a0_0x124210{[a0_0x4d231b(0x1c3)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1c6)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1b7)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x197)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1af)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1a9)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1cb)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x18a)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x1d4)];[a0_0x4d231b(0x19a)]=!0x1;constructor(_0x378de7){const _0x3e0180=a0_0x4d231b;super();if(this[_0x3e0180(0x1c3)]=_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x1c3)][_0x3e0180(0x1b9)](/\/$/,''),this[_0x3e0180(0x1c6)]=_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x1c6)],this[_0x3e0180(0x1b7)]=_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x1b7)],this['agent']=_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x197)]||_0x3e0180(0x1ac),this[_0x3e0180(0x1af)]=_0x3e0180(0x1c2)+_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x1c6)]+'-'+Date['now']()[_0x3e0180(0x188)](0x24),this[_0x3e0180(0x1a9)]=_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x1a9)]??0x2bf20,this[_0x3e0180(0x1cb)]=_0x378de7['reconnectDelay']??0xbb8,_0x378de7[_0x3e0180(0x18f)]!==!0x1)this[_0x3e0180(0x1d6)]();}[a0_0x4d231b(0x190)](_0x1bcd5e){const _0x1c84f5=a0_0x4d231b;console['log']('['+new Date()['toTimeString']()[_0x1c84f5(0x1a4)](0x0,0x8)+_0x1c84f5(0x1d7)+this['alias']+']\x20'+_0x1bcd5e);}async['call'](_0x2c471f,_0x1d8c39){const _0x3f9e56=a0_0x4d231b;let _0x11ef76={'Content-Type':'application/json','Accept':_0x3f9e56(0x1ba)};if(this['token'])_0x11ef76[_0x3f9e56(0x17f)]=_0x3f9e56(0x1d8)+this[_0x3f9e56(0x1b7)];let _0x32392e=await(await fetch(this[_0x3f9e56(0x1c3)]+_0x3f9e56(0x1b2),{'method':_0x3f9e56(0x1d1),'headers':_0x11ef76,'body':JSON['stringify']({'jsonrpc':'2.0','id':Date['now'](),'method':_0x3f9e56(0x1cc),'params':{'name':_0x2c471f,'arguments':_0x1d8c39}})}))['text'](),_0x4a9b2d=_0x32392e[_0x3f9e56(0x1ae)](/data: (.+)/),_0x29381a=_0x4a9b2d?JSON['parse'](_0x4a9b2d[0x1]):JSON[_0x3f9e56(0x180)](_0x32392e),_0x40fe30=_0x29381a?.['result']?.['content']?.[0x0]?.[_0x3f9e56(0x187)];return _0x40fe30?JSON[_0x3f9e56(0x180)](_0x40fe30):_0x29381a;}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x1d6)](){const _0x490e88=a0_0x4d231b;if(this[_0x490e88(0x19a)])return;this[_0x490e88(0x19a)]=!0x0,await this[_0x490e88(0x186)](_0x490e88(0x1c8)),this[_0x490e88(0x190)](_0x490e88(0x1a2)),this['heartbeatTimer']=setInterval(()=>{const _0x323a3d=_0x490e88;this[_0x323a3d(0x186)](_0x323a3d(0x1c8))[_0x323a3d(0x198)](_0x2688bf=>this['log']('heartbeat\x20failed:\x20'+_0x2688bf[_0x323a3d(0x191)]));},this[_0x490e88(0x1a9)]),this[_0x490e88(0x19d)]();}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x194)](){const _0x48dfe2=a0_0x4d231b;if(this[_0x48dfe2(0x19a)]=!0x1,this['sseAbort']?.[_0x48dfe2(0x199)](),this['heartbeatTimer'])clearInterval(this[_0x48dfe2(0x18a)]);await this['status'](_0x48dfe2(0x1a3))['catch'](()=>{}),this[_0x48dfe2(0x190)](_0x48dfe2(0x1a8));}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x1b4)](_0x3e0fac,_0x58ed5e,_0x2a11e7=a0_0x4d231b(0x181)){const _0x32dbcc=a0_0x4d231b;return this[_0x32dbcc(0x1a7)](_0x32dbcc(0x1c1),{'alias':_0x3e0fac,'task':_0x58ed5e,'priority':_0x2a11e7,'from_session':this['alias']});}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x191)](_0x78ee4d,_0x4cd5f2){const _0x42f76f=a0_0x4d231b;return this[_0x42f76f(0x1a7)](_0x42f76f(0x193),{'alias':_0x78ee4d,'message':_0x4cd5f2,'from_session':this[_0x42f76f(0x1c6)]});}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x184)](_0x4ac7fd,_0x4eaf65,_0x4d2158=a0_0x4d231b(0x1be)){const _0x9807bc=a0_0x4d231b;return this[_0x9807bc(0x1a7)]('send_reply',{'in_reply_to':_0x4ac7fd,'text':_0x4eaf65,'status':_0x4d2158});}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x186)](_0x2a2d4a,_0x33278e){const _0x9d60a7=a0_0x4d231b;return this[_0x9d60a7(0x1a7)](_0x9d60a7(0x1cd),{'resume_id':this[_0x9d60a7(0x1af)],'alias':this[_0x9d60a7(0x1c6)],'status':_0x2a2d4a,'server':a0_0x4fa072(),'hostname':a0_0x4fa072(),'agent':this[_0x9d60a7(0x197)],'project_dir':process[_0x9d60a7(0x1c7)](),..._0x33278e});}async['getAllStatus'](){const _0x4a2eae=a0_0x4d231b;return this[_0x4a2eae(0x1a7)]('get_all_status',{});}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x196)](_0x2c4132,_0x1b73f1){const _0x1d63a4=a0_0x4d231b;return 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this['processInbox']();}catch{}}}}catch(_0x511634){if(_0x511634[_0x1cc7a5(0x1bb)]==='AbortError')break;this[_0x1cc7a5(0x1d5)](_0x1cc7a5(0x182),_0x511634),this['log'](_0x1cc7a5(0x1ca)+_0x511634['message']);}if(this[_0x1cc7a5(0x19a)])this[_0x1cc7a5(0x1d5)]('disconnected'),this['log']('SSE\x20reconnecting\x20in\x20'+_0xcdf218/0x3e8+_0x1cc7a5(0x1d2)),await this[_0x1cc7a5(0x185)](_0xcdf218),_0xcdf218=Math[_0x1cc7a5(0x18b)](_0xcdf218*1.5,0xea60);}}async[a0_0x4d231b(0x1b0)](){const _0x3f29f2=a0_0x4d231b;try{let _0x203ada=(await this[_0x3f29f2(0x1a7)](_0x3f29f2(0x1a1),{'alias':this[_0x3f29f2(0x1c6)],'limit':0xa}))?.[_0x3f29f2(0x1ab)]||[];for(let _0x12737f of _0x203ada)await 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package/dist/src/copresence-identity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+export interface SessionInfo {
+    tmux: string;
+    pid: number;
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+}
+export interface CopresenceMarker {
+    marker: string;
+    boot_id: string;
+    started_at_epoch_ms: number;
+    owner_uid: number;
+    sessions: {
+        appsrv?: SessionInfo;
+        bridge?: SessionInfo;
+        tui?: SessionInfo;
+    };
+}
+export type RefuseCause = "MISSING" | "SYMLINK" | "NOT_REGULAR" | "WRONG_MODE" | "OWNER_MISMATCH" | "PARSE_ERROR" | "SCHEMA_INVALID" | "STALE_BOOT_ID" | "PLATFORM_UNSUPPORTED";
+export type ReadMarkerResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    marker: CopresenceMarker;
+} | {
+    kind: "refuse";
+    cause: RefuseCause;
+    detail: string;
+};
+export interface ProcStat {
+    pgid: number;
+    starttime_jiffies: number;
+    ppid: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for /proc access. Real impl reads the filesystem;
+ * unit tests inject a mock so /proc-based logic is deterministically testable.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *   - listAllPids: read /proc directory and return numeric-name entries.
+ *     Throws on unrecoverable errors (permission denied on /proc itself).
+ *   - readEnviron: read /proc/<pid>/environ as a raw string. Returns null
+ *     if the pid has vanished (ENOENT) — that's a normal race, not a failure.
+ *     Throws for permission errors etc.
+ *   - readStat: read /proc/<pid>/stat and extract (pgid, starttime, ppid).
+ *     Returns null on ENOENT (pid gone). Throws on other errors.
+ */
+export interface ProcessEnumerator {
+    listAllPids(): number[];
+    readEnviron(pid: number): string | null;
+    readStat(pid: number): ProcStat | null;
+    /**
+     * REAL uid of the process itself (`Uid:` line of /proc/<pid>/status,
+     * field 0). Used by the environ-EACCES discriminator to tell
+     * "other-user process (expected EACCES)" from "our own process we could
+     * not inspect (must be accounted for)".
+     *
+     * MUST NOT be implemented as `statSync('/proc/<pid>/environ').uid`.
+     * A process that called prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) keeps its real uid but
+     * its /proc/<pid>/{environ,mem,...} nodes flip to root:root 0400 (see
+     * proc(5) / kernel `task_dump_owner`). Deriving ownership from the
+     * environ inode therefore reports uid 0 for our OWN non-dumpable
+     * children, which made them invisible to the scan: not in `hits`, not in
+     * the unreadable list, so teardown reported success and deleted the
+     * marker while the orphan lived on (Defect A).
+     *
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT) or if even /proc/<pid>/status
+     * is blocked (hidepid / LSM) — in that case the process cannot be ours
+     * to reason about and is skipped.
+     */
+    readOwnerUid(pid: number): number | null;
+    /**
+     * Single-character process state from /proc/<pid>/status (R/S/D/Z/T/...).
+     * `Z` means zombie — mm freed, environ returns EACCES even to owner, but
+     * the pid is going away shortly. Skip zombies during environ scan.
+     * Returns null if the pid is gone (ENOENT).
+     */
+    readState(pid: number): string | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Injectable primitive for sending signals. Real impl uses process.kill;
+ * tests inject a mock.
+ */
+export interface KillPrimitive {
+    killPgroup(pgid: number, signal: "TERM" | "KILL"): void;
+    /** Returns true if ANY process in the pgroup is still alive. */
+    pgroupAlive(pgid: number): boolean;
+}
+export declare function markerFilePath(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): string;
+export declare function readBootId(): string;
+/**
+ * Write the marker file atomically.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT (Blocker 1 fix): the uuid parameter is the SINGLE SOURCE OF
+ * TRUTH. Caller is expected to inject this same uuid into every tmux
+ * session's ANET_NODE_MARKER env var. writeMarker does NOT generate its
+ * own uuid — that was the exact bug in 9f2ec282.
+ */
+export declare function writeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string, uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): CopresenceMarker;
+/**
+ * Read the marker file with structured fail-closed refuses.
+ *
+ * Never throws for expected refuse causes. Only throws if the OS itself
+ * is broken (e.g. EIO). Malformed JSON, wrong types, null bodies etc.
+ * all return { kind: "refuse", cause, detail }.
+ */
+export declare function readMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): ReadMarkerResult;
+export declare function removeMarker(nodesDir: string, nodeId: string): void;
+export declare function realEnumerator(): ProcessEnumerator;
+export declare function realKiller(): KillPrimitive;
+/**
+ * Scan /proc for all pids whose environ contains ANET_NODE_MARKER=<uuid>.
+ * This is the authoritative identity source — NOT the marker file's stored
+ * pids, which may be stale (main died, workers survived under new pgids).
+ *
+ * Bytes format of /proc/PID/environ: NUL-separated key=value pairs.
+ *
+ * Blocker 1 fix (independent audit 92d53c8f, 2026-07-29): /proc/<pid>/environ
+ * is 0400 owner-only. Blindly reading it will hit EACCES on every other-user
+ * process (pid 1 is systemd/root → guaranteed EACCES). The naive fix — wrap
+ * in try/catch and continue — would silently miss marker-carrying processes
+ * whose environ we can't read for some other reason, recreating Defect A
+ * ("nothing killed but report success"). Right fix:
+ *
+ *   1. Try readEnviron.
+ *   2. On EACCES, discriminate via readOwnerUid + readState:
+ *      - Owner uid != ours     → EXPECTED skip (can't be one of our procs).
+ *      - Own uid, state = Z    → EXPECTED skip (zombie, mm freed).
+ *      - Own uid, not zombie   → FAIL-CLOSED (unexplained EACCES on our own
+ *                                live process is a real problem, must throw).
+ */
+export interface ScanResult {
+    /** Pids whose environ we successfully read and matched the marker uuid. */
+    hits: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that are PLAUSIBLY PART OF THE
+     * COPRESENCE TREE (invariant 11 scope test). These might be marker-
+     * carrying without us being able to prove it, so the reap flow REFUSES
+     * marker removal while this list is non-empty — defense against Defect A
+     * (silently missing a marker-carrying process, then deleting the marker
+     * as if teardown had succeeded).
+     */
+    unreadableOwnUid: number[];
+    /**
+     * Own-uid, live, environ-unreadable pids that failed the scope test:
+     * their pgid belongs to no marker-carrying group and their ppid chain
+     * reaches no marker carrier / validated marker-file session pid.
+     *
+     * INFORMATIONAL ONLY — never fail-closed. A machine routinely has such
+     * processes (a same-uid process whose primary GID differs from ours fails
+     * the kernel's __ptrace_may_access gid check and EACCESes on environ even
+     * though its real uid matches). v2 lumped these into unreadableOwnUid,
+     * which made reapMarkerGroups structurally unable to return success on
+     * any such host.
+     *
+     * KNOWN RESIDUAL GAP (stated rather than papered over): a marker-carrying
+     * process that is BOTH non-dumpable (environ unreadable) AND fully
+     * detached (setsid'd into its own pgroup with ppid=1, no live recorded
+     * session pid above it) lands here and is therefore not reaped and does
+     * not block marker removal. Nothing in /proc exposes the environment of a
+     * non-dumpable task to a non-root reader, so no scope widening can
+     * recover it — only running teardown as root could. Widening scope to
+     * "every same-uid unreadable process" is NOT an acceptable trade: that is
+     * exactly the v2 behaviour that made teardown never succeed. The
+     * realistic copresence shape (child of a recorded pane pid, or sharing a
+     * marker carrier's pgroup) IS covered — see the real-/proc test.
+     */
+    unreadableOutOfScope: number[];
+}
+/**
+ * Marker-file session records used to anchor the invariant-11 scope test.
+ * Each entry must be re-validated (pid alive AND same starttime) before it
+ * is trusted — see validateAnchors.
+ */
+export interface ScanAnchors {
+    sessions?: Array<{
+        pid: number;
+        starttime_jiffies: number;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function anchorsFromMarker(marker: CopresenceMarker): ScanAnchors;
+/**
+ * Invariant 11 scope test: is `pid` plausibly part of the copresence tree?
+ *
+ * True when the pid IS an anchor, when its pgid belongs to a marker-carrying
+ * group (or a validated anchor's group), or when walking its ppid chain
+ * reaches an anchor / marker carrier / a pid inside a relevant pgroup.
+ *
+ * Everything else is out of scope and must not participate in a fail-closed
+ * decision, no matter how unreadable it is.
+ */
+export declare function isInCopresenceScope(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pid: number, relevantPids: Set<number>, relevantPgids: Set<number>): boolean;
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): number[];
+export declare function scanEnvironForMarkerFull(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string, anchors?: ScanAnchors): ScanResult;
+export declare function groupPidsByPgid(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pids: number[]): Map<number, number[]>;
+export type HomogeneityResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    members: number[];
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    cause: "FOREIGN_MEMBER" | "ENUM_ERROR" | "EMPTY_GROUP";
+    foreignPids: number[];
+    unreadablePids: number[];
+    detail: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Verify that EVERY live member of `pgid` carries the marker.
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 fix: enumeration errors surface as ENUM_ERROR (fail-closed),
+ * never as an empty-list judged "safe". Any unreadable member also
+ * fails-closed. Empty group (no live members at all) also refuses — killing
+ * an empty pgroup can't be right and empty-list judged "ok" recreates the
+ * exact defect shape (independent audit 92d53c8f finding #6).
+ *
+ * Blocker 2 second half (zombie): a zombie same-uid process's environ
+ * returns EACCES even to owner (mm freed), but stat still exists with
+ * original pgid. Without discrimination, the zombie would be treated as
+ * "unreadable member" → ENUM_ERROR → entire group SKIPPED. Since re-verify
+ * happens post-SIGTERM (when zombies are most numerous), teardown would
+ * never escalate. Fix: apply the same owner-uid + state=Z discriminator as
+ * scanEnvironForMarker.
+ *
+ * Algorithm:
+ *   1. Enumerate all pids on the system.
+ *   2. Filter to pids whose /proc/PID/stat pgid == target pgid.
+ *   3. For each such pid, check its environ with EACCES discrimination:
+ *      - Other-user EACCES  → skip (can't be ours anyway).
+ *      - Own-uid zombie     → skip (expected, dying).
+ *      - Own-uid live EACCES → truly unreadable → fail-closed.
+ *      - Missing marker     → foreign member → fail-closed.
+ */
+export declare function verifyGroupHomogeneity(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, pgid: number, markerUuid: string): HomogeneityResult;
+/**
+ * Walk the caller's ancestry (self → PPID → grandparent → ...) and check
+ * whether any ancestor carries the target marker. If yes → caller is
+ * running inside the copresence tree we're about to kill, and would take
+ * itself down.
+ */
+export declare function callerCarriesMarker(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, markerUuid: string): {
+    self: boolean;
+    ancestorPid?: number;
+};
+export type ReapResult = {
+    kind: "success";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+} | {
+    kind: "failed";
+    killedPgids: number[];
+    residualPids: number[];
+    skippedGroups: Array<{
+        pgid: number;
+        reason: string;
+    }>;
+    detail: string;
+    unreadableOwnUid?: number[];
+};
+export interface ReapOptions {
+    graceMs: number;
+    logger: (msg: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Sleep primitive (grace period). Real code uses setTimeout; tests inject
+     * a fast/deterministic sleep so grace paths are actually covered. Prior
+     * impl was a busy-wait `while (Date.now() < end) {}` — audit 92d53c8f
+     * finding #3 flagged that as pinning one CPU core for graceMs and blocking
+     * the event loop; test coverage missed it because tests passed graceMs=0.
+     */
+    sleep?: (ms: number) => Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Invariant-11 scope anchors, normally `anchorsFromMarker(marker)`.
+     *
+     * Without them the only anchors are the marker carriers the scan itself
+     * found, so a marker-carrying process we cannot READ (non-dumpable) but
+     * whose parent IS a recorded session pid would be judged out of scope and
+     * silently dropped. Passing the marker's recorded session pids closes that
+     * hole; each one is re-validated (alive + same starttime) before it can
+     * widen scope, so a stale/recycled pid cannot.
+     */
+    anchors?: ScanAnchors;
+}
+/**
+ * Full reap flow with TOCTOU re-verification.
+ *
+ * Sequence:
+ *   1. Environ scan for marker → get all live pids carrying it.
+ *   2. Group by current PGID.
+ *   3. For each group: verify homogeneity. Skip on foreign/unreadable.
+ *   4. For each verified group: send SIGTERM to pgroup.
+ *   5. Wait grace.
+ *   6. Re-verify each group (marker still there, no new foreign) before SIGKILL.
+ *   7. Send SIGKILL to any group still alive.
+ *   8. Post-rescan: if any marker-carrying pid alive → preserve marker.
+ */
+export declare function reapMarkerGroups(enumer: ProcessEnumerator, killer: KillPrimitive, markerUuid: string, opts: ReapOptions): Promise<ReapResult>;
+export interface PrepareStartDeps {
+    /** Usually () => readMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    readMarker(): ReadMarkerResult;
+    /** Usually (uuid, anchors) => reapMarkerGroups(realEnumerator(), realKiller(), uuid, {...anchors}). */
+    reap(uuid: string, anchors: ScanAnchors): Promise<ReapResult>;
+    /** Usually () => removeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId). */
+    removeMarker(): void;
+    /** Usually (uuid, sessions) => writeMarker(nodesDir, nodeId, uuid, sessions). */
+    writeMarker(uuid: string, sessions: CopresenceMarker["sessions"]): void;
+    logger(msg: string): void;
+}
+export type PrepareStartResult = {
+    kind: "ok";
+    reclaimedUuid?: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "blocked";
+    cause: "STALE_TREE_ALIVE" | "UNUSABLE_MARKER";
+    detail: string;
+    remedy: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Everything that must happen BEFORE the first `tmux new-session` of a
+ * copresence start. Extracted out of cli.ts so both blockers below are
+ * actually reachable by tests — the audit's point that the two fatal
+ * defects of the previous rounds both lived in an untested cli.ts seam.
+ *
+ * Blocker 5 — marker-before-tmux ordering.
+ *   v2 wrote the marker only after the app-server had bound its port, i.e.
+ *   after a 25s wait and after several `process.exit(1)` paths. A start that
+ *   died in that window left a live, marker-carrying tmux session behind
+ *   with NO marker file on disk: the exact unreclaimable-ghost this feature
+ *   exists to prevent. The marker is now written here, before any session is
+ *   created, with an empty `sessions` object — reap identity has always been
+ *   the environ uuid, never the recorded pids, so an empty sessions object
+ *   loses nothing but observability hints (which the start path fills in
+ *   later, best-effort).
+ *
+ * Blocker 6 — never overwrite a preserved marker.
+ *   A failed stop deliberately PRESERVES the marker so the next stop can
+ *   retry idempotently. v2's start then overwrote it with a fresh uuid while
+ *   only killing tmux sessions BY NAME, so the still-running subprocesses of
+ *   the previous instance became permanently unreclaimable: their uuid was
+ *   gone from disk forever. Now the old identity is reaped FIRST; if that
+ *   reap does not fully succeed we refuse to start rather than destroy the
+ *   only handle on those processes.
+ */
+export declare function prepareIdentityForStart(newUuid: string, deps: PrepareStartDeps): Promise<PrepareStartResult>;