@slack/radar-mcp 1.18.1 → 1.20.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +40 -4
- package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/mcp/tools.js +7 -2
- package/dist/mcp/web-child-env.js +10 -7
- package/dist/shared/android.d.ts +10 -21
- package/dist/shared/android.js +30 -9
- package/dist/shared/constants.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/shared/constants.js +4 -3
- package/dist/shared/ios.d.ts +5 -10
- package/dist/shared/ios.js +23 -5
- package/dist/shared/transport.d.ts +31 -19
- package/dist/shared/wire.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/shared/wire.js +6 -0
- package/dist/web/install-app.d.ts +64 -1
- package/dist/web/install-app.js +174 -24
- package/dist/web/macapp/RadarApp.swift +1311 -75
- package/dist/web/public/index.html +72 -5
- package/dist/web/public/next/app.js +173 -24
- package/dist/web/public/next/db.js +177 -18
- package/dist/web/public/next/feed.js +129 -20
- package/dist/web/public/next/filter.js +24 -11
- package/dist/web/public/next/filters.js +8 -0
- package/dist/web/public/next/registry.js +12 -1
- package/dist/web/public/next/store.js +666 -45
- package/dist/web/server.d.ts +115 -8
- package/dist/web/server.js +734 -58
- package/dist/web/spec.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/web/spec.js +28 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/web/server.js
CHANGED
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@@ -296,6 +296,15 @@ export function registerScreenCleanupOnBind() {
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// harmlessly), it does not misfire an auto-close. Exported so tests pin the real constant
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// instead of a duplicated copy.
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export const TAB_LIVENESS_MS = 75_000;
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/**
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* How recently a tab must have polled to count as SOMEONE USING the dashboard, which is a different
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* question from whether it is stale enough to auto-close, and takes a much tighter answer.
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*
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* Three of the dashboard's own five second profile polls. Generous enough that a live tab never
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* flickers out of it, tight enough that closing a window releases the port in seconds rather than in
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* the minute and a quarter TAB_LIVENESS_MS would impose.
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*/
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export const TAB_IN_USE_MS = 15_000;
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// How long the dashboard must have ZERO live tabs before auto-close fires. Sized at ~3x the
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// worst-case legitimate gap between presence pings (~60-90s under intensive throttling), so a
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// backgrounded tab is never mistaken for a closed one. Not 90s — that is barely one throttled
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@@ -303,10 +312,16 @@ export const TAB_LIVENESS_MS = 75_000;
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// backgrounded tab outright, permanently stopping its polling; auto-close eventually firing in
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// that case is correct behavior ("nobody is looking"), not a bug to work around.
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export const AUTO_CLOSE_GRACE_MS = 5 * 60_000;
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// How long an authored write keeps a dashboard counted as in use by an agent session, when no tab is
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// open. Its own constant rather than borrowing AUTO_CLOSE_GRACE_MS, which starts at the same value
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// and answers a different question: that one decides when a process should end ITSELF, this one
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// decides how long a quiet session may hold a port against another process taking it. Retuning
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// either for its own reason must not silently retune the other.
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export const MCP_IN_USE_MS = 5 * 60_000;
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// Sweep cadence: cheap (a map prune + a subtraction), frequent enough that auto-close fires
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// promptly once the grace window elapses.
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const AUTO_CLOSE_SWEEP_MS = 15_000;
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-
const presence = { tabs: new Map(), emptySince: null, everSeen: false };
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const presence = { tabs: new Map(), emptySince: null, everSeen: false, keepAliveAt: null };
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/**
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* Pure auto-close decision, mirroring screen.ts's nextViewerAction/shouldRelaunch precedent:
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* the sweep owns the timestamp bookkeeping, this owns only the yes/no. Close only when there
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@@ -323,6 +338,96 @@ export function shouldAutoClose(liveTabs, everSeen, msSinceEmpty) {
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return false;
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return msSinceEmpty >= AUTO_CLOSE_GRACE_MS;
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}
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/**
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* Whether anyone is using this dashboard RIGHT NOW, which is a different question from
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* shouldAutoClose() above and deliberately not the same answer.
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*
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* shouldAutoClose adds the grace window, because a process deciding to end itself should be slow
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* about it. This is read by a DIFFERENT process deciding whether it may take the port, and there the
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* grace window is exactly wrong: the five minutes after a dock app quits and its tab closes is the
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* window an upgrade lands in, and a leftover nobody is looking at is the thing that most needs
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* replacing.
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*
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* So: a live tab counts, and an MCP session with no tab open counts (markKeepAlive clears the empty
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* marker without setting everSeen, which is what keeps an hour-long debugging session alive), but a
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* dashboard whose last tab has gone does not.
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*
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* Exported for unit testing without a clock or a socket, same as shouldAutoClose.
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*/
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export function isInUse(now = Date.now()) {
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return inUseReason(now) !== "no";
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}
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/**
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* WHY this dashboard is in use, not merely whether, because the two claims are worth different
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* decisions to the process asking.
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*
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* A "tab" claim is a window someone has open. A "mcp" claim is an agent session driving this
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* dashboard with no window of its own, and stopping that costs the session's pulled databases, its
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* device pin and its logcat ring, none of which it can get back. A single yes/no cannot tell those
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* apart, so a launcher had to treat them the same, and the only safe reading of "the same" is the
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* cautious one, which then blocks the upgrade this whole path exists to perform.
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*
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* Priority is deliberate: an mcp claim outranks a tab claim, because the app's OWN window is a tab
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* and a decision about whether to disturb someone else must not be answered by our own presence.
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*
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* `ignoreTab` is how a caller asks the narrower question it actually has: is anyone OTHER than my own
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* window using this. The dock app generates the presence id, hands it to the page it loads, and sends
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* it back here, so its own window stops answering for everybody else. Without it the app could not
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* tell its own tab from a real second browser tab, and had to guess; guessing either way is wrong,
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* because one reading kills a page someone is reading and the other never stops anything.
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*/
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export function inUseReason(now = Date.now(), ignoreTab, decision = "take") {
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// A dashboard NO tab has ever opened, which is what an MCP-spawned one looks like. The server
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// refuses to auto-close those for a reason that applies here word for word: nobody can have closed
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// a window that never existed, so its quietness says nothing about whether the session driving it
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// is finished. Without this the in-use answer was more permissive than the server's own protection,
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// and a twenty-minute debugging session with no tab open read as a leftover.
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//
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// Only for a caller deciding whether to TAKE the port. To a caller deciding whether to STOP a server it
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// started itself, this reading is a false positive with teeth: the app spawns a server, its window fails
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// to load (a proxy with no loopback bypass is the documented case), no tab ever polls, and the quit path
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// is told an agent session is driving it. It then leaves the server running, logs a session that does not
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// exist, and the server cannot auto-close either, because shouldAutoClose reads the same everSeen flag.
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// The port is held for good by a process with nothing on screen, which is exactly the orphan the quit
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// path exists to prevent. The caller that spawned the process does not need this guess: it knows the
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// process is its own, and "no window ever opened it" is then an answer rather than a gap.
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if (!presence.everSeen && decision === "take")
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return "mcp";
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// An authored write that named no tab, which is what an agent session's looks like. The dashboard
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// page makes authored writes too (a page load that finds a blank spec, every mode switch and filter
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// Apply), and those name their tab and are credited as presence instead (creditAuthoredWrite), so a
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// window changing a filter does not read as a session here. Checked BEFORE the tab loop so a
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// session driving a dashboard that also has a window open still reads as mcp.
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if (presence.keepAliveAt !== null && now - presence.keepAliveAt <= MCP_IN_USE_MS)
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return "mcp";
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// A tab that is still polling, and how recently it must have polled depends on what the caller is about
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// to do.
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//
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// TAKING the port uses 15s, deliberately not the 75s auto-close uses. That 75s exists so a THROTTLED
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// background tab is not mistaken for a closed one, and borrowing it here made a window someone closed a
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// minute ago still report "in use", which blocked the upgrade for 75 seconds after a window closed,
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// exactly the quit-and-reopen the installer instructs. Being tight costs a relaunch a few seconds later,
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// which is what the user was asking for anyway.
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//
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// STOPPING uses the 75s, because that justification does not survive the change of caller: nothing
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// relaunches a server after it is stopped. A hidden tab throttled to one poll a minute reads as absent at
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// 15s, and stopping its server leaves it reloading onto a dead port with no way to recover from that tab.
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// Being loose here costs one orphaned server, which the launch path already reclaims.
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//
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// Neither window helps a tab Chrome has DISCARDED, which stops polling forever. That is the same
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// limitation auto-close names and accepts: a discarded tab reads as nobody looking.
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const tabWindow = decision === "stop" ? TAB_LIVENESS_MS : TAB_IN_USE_MS;
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for (const [id, ts] of presence.tabs) {
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// Skipped BEFORE the freshness check, not after: the caller's own window is the freshest tab in the
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// map, so an ordering that tests liveness first returns "tab" on it every time and the parameter
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// does nothing.
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if (ignoreTab !== undefined && id === ignoreTab)
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continue;
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if (now - ts <= tabWindow)
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return "tab";
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}
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return "no";
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}
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// A tab pinged /health with its id: record it live and remember a tab was seen. A fresh id
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// after zero live tabs is the 0->1 transition, so clear the empty marker immediately. `now` is
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// injectable so the sweep's staleness math is unit-testable with a fake clock.
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@@ -341,8 +446,9 @@ export function touchTab(id, now = Date.now()) {
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* pin, and the pulled-DB cache. Deliberately does NOT set everSeen: an MCP-only dashboard that
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* nobody ever opened stays protected by the everSeen guard even after the MCP goes quiet.
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*/
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export function markKeepAlive() {
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export function markKeepAlive(now = Date.now()) {
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presence.emptySince = null;
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presence.keepAliveAt = now;
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}
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/**
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* Whether a request may buy the process more life. True for our own client and the MCP, false
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@@ -371,6 +477,78 @@ export function isAuthoredRequest(headers) {
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const essence = value.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
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return essence === "application/json";
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}
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/**
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* The shared strictness for both presence-id headers below.
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*
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* Strict for a duller reason than the security gates elsewhere in this file: a wrong read here is
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* SILENT. An id that does not arrive intact matches no tab, and the only symptom is a dashboard that
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* never gets replaced or a window that reports itself as somebody else.
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*
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* A REPEATED header is the case worth spelling out, because the obvious guess about it is wrong. Node does
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* not hand a duplicated request header over as an array (only set-cookie arrives that way): it JOINS the
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* values, so `X-Radar-Tab: A` sent twice arrives as the single string `"A, A"`. Measured. Taken at face
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* value that becomes a presence key no tab will ever refresh, and for the next fifteen seconds a probe
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* excluding `A` is told a tab holds the port. So a value carrying a comma is refused, and the array shape
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* is still handled because the type admits it.
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*
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* The ids this accepts are generated by the app (a UUID) and by the page (a UUID, or a random decimal
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* string in a browser without crypto.randomUUID), so refusing a comma costs nothing real.
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*/
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function presenceIdHeader(value) {
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if (typeof value !== "string")
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return undefined;
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if (value.length === 0 || value.includes(","))
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return undefined;
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return value;
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}
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/**
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* "This request comes FROM the tab with this id." Sent by the dashboard page on its own authored
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* writes, so a write can be credited to the window that made it.
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*/
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export function readTabIdentity(headers) {
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return presenceIdHeader(headers["x-radar-tab"]);
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}
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/**
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* "Leave this id out of the answer." Sent by a launcher asking whether anyone OTHER than the window it
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* owns is using this dashboard.
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*
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* A separate header from the identity one above, carrying the same value, and deliberately so: the app
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* that sends this is NOT the tab. Its window may have failed to load, or may be showing the failure
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* page. One header would invite a future route to treat the app's own probe as proof that its tab is
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* live, which would record presence for a window that does not exist. Two names make that impossible
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* rather than merely discouraged.
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*/
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export function readIgnoredTab(headers) {
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return presenceIdHeader(headers["x-radar-ignore-tab"]);
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}
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/**
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* Which decision the caller says it is about to make. Anything other than the one recognised value reads as
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* `take`, which is both the back-compatible answer (no installed launcher sends this) and the conservative
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* one: it is the reading that protects a port rather than the one that permits a stop.
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*/
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export function readInUseDecision(headers) {
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return headers["x-radar-in-use-for"] === "stop" ? "stop" : "take";
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}
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/**
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* Credit an authored write to whoever made it: a tab that named itself, or an agent session.
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*
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* The distinction is load-bearing, and getting it wrong was a real bug. `markKeepAlive` is what makes
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* inUseReason answer "mcp", and the dashboard PAGE makes authored writes too: `bootDefault` posts
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* /setspec on any page load that finds a blank spec, and every mode switch and filter Apply posts
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* another. So a person opening the dock app and clicking one tab made the server report an agent
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* session for the next MCP_IN_USE_MS, and "mcp" is the one claim nothing overrides — the launcher
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* refuses to replace it and the quit path refuses to stop it. The app then left its own server running
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* on quit, which is the exact leak the quit path exists to close, reachable by ordinary use.
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*
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* A tab's write is credited as presence instead, which is both true and stronger: it is the same thing
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* the tab's own /health poll records. Only a write from something with no tab at all is a session.
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*/
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export function creditAuthoredWrite(tab, now = Date.now()) {
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if (tab !== undefined)
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touchTab(tab, now);
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else
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markKeepAlive(now);
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}
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/**
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* One sweep tick: prune stale tab ids, maintain the emptySince marker across the 1->0 / 0->1
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* transitions, and return whether the dashboard should auto-close now. Owns all timestamp
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@@ -406,6 +584,7 @@ export function resetPresenceForTest() {
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presence.tabs.clear();
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presence.emptySince = null;
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presence.everSeen = false;
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presence.keepAliveAt = null;
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}
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// Servers already tearing down. Keyed on the server rather than a module flag so the latch
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// scopes to the thing being closed: a second call for the SAME server is suppressed, while a
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@@ -538,11 +717,14 @@ function pingDevice(timeoutMs = PING_PROBE_MS) {
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*/
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export function armOnBoot() {
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// An agent-spawned dashboard must not reach the device on its own. open_radar_dashboard is exempt
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// from the MCP session gate precisely BECAUSE opening a dashboard could not arm anything
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//
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//
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//
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//
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// from the MCP session gate precisely BECAUSE opening a dashboard could not arm anything by itself,
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// and arming here would quietly remove the premise that exemption rests on: an agent call would arm
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// a device and begin logcat capture to disk with no human action, and its child is detached with
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// stdio ignored so even a failure line would reach nobody. The client's automatic re-enable is
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|
+
// gated on the same flag (surfaced as /health's self_arm_blocked, and enforced server-side by
|
|
725
|
+
// handleEnable's own ?auto=1 refusal), so neither the boot nor an open tab
|
|
726
|
+
// arms an agent-spawned dashboard. A human launch, whether a terminal `slack-radar web` or the dock
|
|
727
|
+
// app, sets no marker: it arms here, and its tab may recover a dead session unattended.
|
|
546
728
|
if (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH)
|
|
547
729
|
return;
|
|
548
730
|
// Escape hatch, matching this file's other automatic-on-boot behaviours (SLACK_RADAR_NO_OPEN,
|
|
@@ -630,7 +812,7 @@ async function armDevice() {
|
|
|
630
812
|
// devices/emulators found"), and that is the deliberately quiet case. An attached but
|
|
631
813
|
// unauthorized device also selects nothing, so the gate is the raw listing, which keeps
|
|
632
814
|
// exactly that case loud.
|
|
633
|
-
if (reason && selection.devices
|
|
815
|
+
if (reason && (selection.devices?.length ?? 0) > 0) {
|
|
634
816
|
console.log(`Radar could not be armed at startup: ${reason}`);
|
|
635
817
|
}
|
|
636
818
|
return;
|
|
@@ -703,6 +885,12 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
|
|
|
703
885
|
});
|
|
704
886
|
return;
|
|
705
887
|
}
|
|
888
|
+
// Contract §7 (docs/wire-contract.md): every response the Host gate accepts names the host
|
|
889
|
+
// version, so a machine consumer can detect skew (@latest auto-upgrade, stale npx cache, the
|
|
890
|
+
// adopt trap) from any request instead of depending on /spec. Deliberately AFTER the Host
|
|
891
|
+
// check: a DNS-rebound page reads response headers as same-origin, and before this feature
|
|
892
|
+
// the version was never visible past that gate — refusals it issues stay version-silent.
|
|
893
|
+
res.setHeader("X-Radar-Version", RADAR_VERSION);
|
|
706
894
|
const url = req.url ?? "";
|
|
707
895
|
const urlPath = url.split("?")[0];
|
|
708
896
|
// Second chokepoint, DEFAULT DENY. A request must prove it came from our own client unless its
|
|
@@ -734,12 +922,54 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
|
|
|
734
922
|
if ((req.method === "GET" || req.method === "HEAD") && serveStatic(urlPath, res, req.method === "HEAD", Array.isArray(inm) ? inm[0] : inm)) {
|
|
735
923
|
return;
|
|
736
924
|
}
|
|
737
|
-
if (url === "/spec" && req.method === "GET") {
|
|
738
|
-
//
|
|
739
|
-
//
|
|
740
|
-
//
|
|
741
|
-
//
|
|
742
|
-
|
|
925
|
+
if (url === "/spec" && (req.method === "GET" || req.method === "HEAD")) {
|
|
926
|
+
// The version marker a second launcher's adopt path compares against its own RADAR_VERSION is
|
|
927
|
+
// the X-Radar-Version HEADER, set for every response at the top of this handler. A header, not
|
|
928
|
+
// a body field, so the /spec fingerprint and the client's change-detection key
|
|
929
|
+
// (JSON.stringify of the body) stay byte-identical.
|
|
930
|
+
//
|
|
931
|
+
// HEAD is here because that header is the only way to ask a running dashboard what version it
|
|
932
|
+
// is, and `curl -sI` is what someone reaches for to do that. Without HEAD the request fell past
|
|
933
|
+
// every handler to the terminal 404, so the answer read as "no dashboard here" while a dashboard
|
|
934
|
+
// was serving the port.
|
|
935
|
+
//
|
|
936
|
+
// The in-use answer rides the SAME response, deliberately: the app already makes this one
|
|
937
|
+
// request, and a second round trip on the launch path would be latency the user waits through
|
|
938
|
+
// before any window appears. Answered here rather than on /health because /spec is the
|
|
939
|
+
// fingerprint every launcher already probes, and because a launcher asking this must not have to
|
|
940
|
+
// send the X-Radar-Dashboard header that /health's presence side door requires.
|
|
941
|
+
//
|
|
942
|
+
// Two headers rather than one richer value, and NOT because anything already reads the first
|
|
943
|
+
// one: both ship together here, so no installed dock app reads the bit without the reason.
|
|
944
|
+
// The split is for the next change. A reader that only needs "is anyone there" keeps a stable
|
|
945
|
+
// answer while the vocabulary of reasons grows, and the wire contract's rule is that a new
|
|
946
|
+
// field may appear at any time and an older reader must ignore it. Widening the 1/0 value
|
|
947
|
+
// instead would make every future reason a breaking change to the same field.
|
|
948
|
+
//
|
|
949
|
+
// X-Radar-Ignore-Tab is the asking app's own presence id, and the answer excludes it. Echoed back
|
|
950
|
+
// in X-Radar-In-Use-Excludes, which is the part that earns its keep: a server too old to know the
|
|
951
|
+
// request header answers "a tab is using it" about the asker's OWN window, and it answers that
|
|
952
|
+
// with exactly the same two headers a current server uses to mean somebody else. The echo is the
|
|
953
|
+
// only thing that tells those apart, so it is what lets the app protect a real second browser tab
|
|
954
|
+
// without refusing to ever replace a dashboard its own window is looking at.
|
|
955
|
+
//
|
|
956
|
+
// Not gated on X-Radar-Dashboard, unlike /health's presence side door. That gate exists because
|
|
957
|
+
// touchTab WRITES: a foreign page could keep a dashboard alive or fake a tab on one. This only
|
|
958
|
+
// narrows the answer this one response carries, changes no state, and cannot be aimed: excluding
|
|
959
|
+
// an id means guessing a uuid, and the result of guessing it is being told nobody is using a
|
|
960
|
+
// dashboard the guesser could already have asked about without the header.
|
|
961
|
+
//
|
|
962
|
+
// X-Radar-In-Use-For names which decision the answer will inform, because the two callers of this
|
|
963
|
+
// route are asking different questions and one answer cannot serve both. See InUseDecision.
|
|
964
|
+
const ignoreTab = readIgnoredTab(req.headers);
|
|
965
|
+
const use = inUseReason(Date.now(), ignoreTab, readInUseDecision(req.headers));
|
|
966
|
+
res.setHeader("X-Radar-In-Use", use === "no" ? "0" : "1");
|
|
967
|
+
if (use !== "no")
|
|
968
|
+
res.setHeader("X-Radar-In-Use-By", use);
|
|
969
|
+
if (ignoreTab !== undefined)
|
|
970
|
+
res.setHeader("X-Radar-In-Use-Excludes", ignoreTab);
|
|
971
|
+
// The framing a HEAD needs to mirror a GET (RFC 9110 9.3.2) is stated by sendJson for every
|
|
972
|
+
// JSON route, so this one is an ordinary send.
|
|
743
973
|
sendJson(res, 200, loadSpec());
|
|
744
974
|
return;
|
|
745
975
|
}
|
|
@@ -785,9 +1015,12 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
|
|
|
785
1015
|
return;
|
|
786
1016
|
}
|
|
787
1017
|
if (urlPath === "/enable" && req.method === "POST") {
|
|
788
|
-
const
|
|
1018
|
+
const params = new URL(url, `http://localhost:${WEB_PORT}`).searchParams;
|
|
1019
|
+
const serial = params.get("device_serial");
|
|
789
1020
|
// Deliberately not awaited; handleEnable answers res itself and never rejects.
|
|
790
|
-
|
|
1021
|
+
// ?auto=1 marks the dashboard's own unattended recovery; see handleEnable's `auto`.
|
|
1022
|
+
const auto = params.get("auto") === "1";
|
|
1023
|
+
void handleEnable(res, serial, isAuthoredRequest(req.headers), readTabIdentity(req.headers), auto);
|
|
791
1024
|
return;
|
|
792
1025
|
}
|
|
793
1026
|
if (url === "/stream" && req.method === "GET") {
|
|
@@ -968,8 +1201,20 @@ function sendJson(res, status, payload) {
|
|
|
968
1201
|
// ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT and crash the whole process. Swallow the duplicate.
|
|
969
1202
|
if (res.headersSent || res.writableEnded)
|
|
970
1203
|
return;
|
|
971
|
-
|
|
972
|
-
|
|
1204
|
+
// No special case for HEAD. Node drops the body itself when the request method was HEAD, so the
|
|
1205
|
+
// same call answers both, and measuring it was the only way to know: a flag here that skipped the
|
|
1206
|
+
// body produced a byte-identical response, which is a parameter earning nothing.
|
|
1207
|
+
//
|
|
1208
|
+
// Content-Length is stated rather than left to chunked encoding, so a HEAD reports the same
|
|
1209
|
+
// framing a GET would. Node drops the body but keeps the header, which is the whole point: a
|
|
1210
|
+
// caller sizing a response can ask without fetching it. Every JSON route gets that for free here,
|
|
1211
|
+
// which is why it belongs in this helper rather than in one route that happened to need it.
|
|
1212
|
+
const body = JSON.stringify(payload);
|
|
1213
|
+
res.writeHead(status, {
|
|
1214
|
+
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
|
|
1215
|
+
"Content-Length": Buffer.byteLength(body),
|
|
1216
|
+
});
|
|
1217
|
+
res.end(body);
|
|
973
1218
|
}
|
|
974
1219
|
function readBody(req) {
|
|
975
1220
|
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
|
@@ -1012,8 +1257,10 @@ async function handleSetSpec(req, res, authored) {
|
|
|
1012
1257
|
// request, so without the gate any page in the user's browser could postpone auto-close
|
|
1013
1258
|
// forever by pinging this every few minutes. The spec still gets written either way, which
|
|
1014
1259
|
// keeps a bare curl working; it just does not buy the process more life.
|
|
1260
|
+
//
|
|
1261
|
+
// Credited to the writer rather than assumed to be a session: see creditAuthoredWrite.
|
|
1015
1262
|
if (authored)
|
|
1016
|
-
|
|
1263
|
+
creditAuthoredWrite(readTabIdentity(req.headers));
|
|
1017
1264
|
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
1018
1265
|
ok: true,
|
|
1019
1266
|
url: `http://localhost:${WEB_PORT}`,
|
|
@@ -1083,6 +1330,19 @@ async function handleHealth(res) {
|
|
|
1083
1330
|
boundProfile: profile,
|
|
1084
1331
|
device_serial: selected?.serial ?? null,
|
|
1085
1332
|
device_label: selected?.label ?? null,
|
|
1333
|
+
// Whether THIS PROCESS is forbidden from touching the device on its own. Two reasons
|
|
1334
|
+
// today: an agent spawned it (open_radar_dashboard is exempt from the MCP session gate
|
|
1335
|
+
// precisely because opening a dashboard cannot itself reach the device, and an
|
|
1336
|
+
// agent-spawned tab that re-armed on its own would remove the premise that exemption
|
|
1337
|
+
// rests on), or SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM, which suppresses the boot arm and is documented as
|
|
1338
|
+
// the opt-out that "most deserves" one because it is the first behaviour to touch
|
|
1339
|
+
// physical hardware. Automatic recovery is the second such behaviour, so it honours the
|
|
1340
|
+
// same flags: otherwise setting NO_ARM stopped the boot arm and a visible tab armed the
|
|
1341
|
+
// device ten seconds later anyway. The client's automatic re-enable reads this and
|
|
1342
|
+
// refuses to arm (handleEnable refuses an ?auto=1 server-side too). Sent as one derived
|
|
1343
|
+
// boolean so a future third reason to refuse has one place to join, and the client needs
|
|
1344
|
+
// no env knowledge.
|
|
1345
|
+
self_arm_blocked: !!process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH || !!process.env.SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM,
|
|
1086
1346
|
// Capture sources the build declares on ping (seam builds only); null on older builds.
|
|
1087
1347
|
sources,
|
|
1088
1348
|
});
|
|
@@ -1092,10 +1352,10 @@ async function handleHealth(res) {
|
|
|
1092
1352
|
* successful re-arm keeps the dashboard alive (an MCP-driven session can re-enable with no tab
|
|
1093
1353
|
* open, and that must not let the idle timer fire out from under it).
|
|
1094
1354
|
*
|
|
1095
|
-
* `onEnabled` fires only on a successful probe. The route passes
|
|
1096
|
-
* request was authored (see isAuthoredRequest) and OMITS it otherwise, so
|
|
1097
|
-
* gets the same body but buys no extra process life. Injected rather than called
|
|
1098
|
-
* the keep-alive wiring is testable without a real device probe (handleEnable's ping goes over
|
|
1355
|
+
* `onEnabled` fires only on a successful probe. The route passes a hook that credits the WRITER
|
|
1356
|
+
* (creditAuthoredWrite) when the request was authored (see isAuthoredRequest) and OMITS it otherwise, so
|
|
1357
|
+
* an unauthored caller gets the same body but buys no extra process life. Injected rather than called
|
|
1358
|
+
* directly so the keep-alive wiring is testable without a real device probe (handleEnable's ping goes over
|
|
1099
1359
|
* a real socket to RADAR_HOST:RADAR_PORT, which this function does not touch at all).
|
|
1100
1360
|
*
|
|
1101
1361
|
* A failed probe gets guidance, not a bare false: the broadcast landed (or exited 0 with no
|
|
@@ -1108,9 +1368,12 @@ async function handleHealth(res) {
|
|
|
1108
1368
|
* through the route cannot cover this — handleEnable's device probe fails with no hardware, which
|
|
1109
1369
|
* short-circuits before the hook is ever consulted, so a route-level test passes either way (a
|
|
1110
1370
|
* mutation deleting the gate survived the whole suite before this existed).
|
|
1371
|
+
*
|
|
1372
|
+
* `tab` is the writer, and it decides WHICH credit the hook applies: a re-arm pressed in the dashboard
|
|
1373
|
+
* is a window's, not an agent session's. See creditAuthoredWrite.
|
|
1111
1374
|
*/
|
|
1112
|
-
export function keepAliveHookFor(authored) {
|
|
1113
|
-
return authored ?
|
|
1375
|
+
export function keepAliveHookFor(authored, tab) {
|
|
1376
|
+
return authored ? () => creditAuthoredWrite(tab) : undefined;
|
|
1114
1377
|
}
|
|
1115
1378
|
// Reads the dashboard serves to any local caller. Everything NOT matching is treated as
|
|
1116
1379
|
// state-changing and needs proof it came from our own client (see isOpenToAnyCaller).
|
|
@@ -1256,15 +1519,175 @@ processState = "unknown") {
|
|
|
1256
1519
|
onEnabled?.();
|
|
1257
1520
|
return { enabled };
|
|
1258
1521
|
}
|
|
1259
|
-
|
|
1522
|
+
// `instructs` travels with every failed reply: whether the wording tells the user what to do
|
|
1523
|
+
// next, decided where the wording is written rather than guessed from its prose by the client
|
|
1524
|
+
// (some reasons pass adb's own stderr straight through, which no verb list can classify). Here
|
|
1525
|
+
// only the "stopped" wording gives an instruction (launch a debug build and retry).
|
|
1526
|
+
return { enabled, error: deviceServerSilentError(processState), instructs: processState === "stopped" };
|
|
1527
|
+
}
|
|
1528
|
+
// One /enable at a time, full stop. Every visible tab diagnoses the same dead session off one
|
|
1529
|
+
// shared memo (diagnoseStreamOutage), so each fires its own immediate ?auto=1 in the same window,
|
|
1530
|
+
// and two concurrent runEnable calls race on the shared transport: the second's resetState()
|
|
1531
|
+
// clears lastActivateError under the first's in-flight activateAsync, and the first then reports
|
|
1532
|
+
// the generic "did not respond" wording instead of the adb error this route exists to show (and
|
|
1533
|
+
// both spend a budget slot on it). A pick for another device mid-flight races the same way and
|
|
1534
|
+
// moves the pin under the first flight's forward, so different targets never overlap either;
|
|
1535
|
+
// they queue. Same shape as outageDiagnosisInflight for the join: a request identical to the
|
|
1536
|
+
// flight in progress receives the winner's reply rather than a refusal, since a refusal is
|
|
1537
|
+
// terminal for the joiner's automation and would spend its whole budget on an attempt that may
|
|
1538
|
+
// have succeeded.
|
|
1539
|
+
//
|
|
1540
|
+
// Joins are for the SAME target only (a pick for device B must not adopt A's answer), and a
|
|
1541
|
+
// human press never joins an unattended flight: the press earns things the timer may not (the
|
|
1542
|
+
// screen teardown, adopting swapped hardware), so it waits for the flight to settle and then
|
|
1543
|
+
// runs on its own. An unattended attempt arriving during a press does join it; the press's reply
|
|
1544
|
+
// is a superset of what the attempt could have earned. A joiner's own `authored` IS consulted, and so is
|
|
1545
|
+
// the tab it named: the flight's own hook credits only the writer that started it, and after a join those
|
|
1546
|
+
// are two different writers, so the joiner credits itself at the end of handleEnable. That mattered only
|
|
1547
|
+
// once the credit gained a writer; while it was one global keep-alive the winner's call did cover it.
|
|
1548
|
+
let enableInFlight = null;
|
|
1549
|
+
// Test seam: the next runEnable rejects with this error after `delayMs` (long enough for a second
|
|
1550
|
+
// request to join the flight), to prove a rejection still answers every request riding the flight
|
|
1551
|
+
// instead of leaving them (and the client's Reconnect button) hanging.
|
|
1552
|
+
let enableFaultForTest = null;
|
|
1553
|
+
export function _setEnableFaultForTest(err, delayMs = 300) {
|
|
1554
|
+
enableFaultForTest = err ? { err, delayMs } : null;
|
|
1555
|
+
}
|
|
1556
|
+
async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored,
|
|
1557
|
+
// The tab that made this request, when one named itself. Travels next to `authored` because the two
|
|
1558
|
+
// are read together: authored decides WHETHER the re-arm buys the process more life, this decides
|
|
1559
|
+
// whose claim that life is recorded under.
|
|
1560
|
+
tab,
|
|
1561
|
+
// An UNATTENDED re-arm (the dashboard's own automatic recovery of a diagnosed-dead session,
|
|
1562
|
+
// marked with ?auto=1). See runEnable for what it may and may not do.
|
|
1563
|
+
auto = false) {
|
|
1564
|
+
// `||`, not `??`: an empty ?device_serial= means "no serial" to selectDevice too, so the two
|
|
1565
|
+
// requests must share one slot key.
|
|
1566
|
+
const target = deviceSerial || null;
|
|
1567
|
+
// The server-side half of the self-arm consent boundary. The client refuses off /health's
|
|
1568
|
+
// self_arm_blocked, but that field only reaches it on the first /health reply, and the
|
|
1569
|
+
// no_session diagnosis can beat that reply on a fresh tab, so the promise that an
|
|
1570
|
+
// agent-spawned (or SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM) process never arms on its own is enforced here, where
|
|
1571
|
+
// the ?auto=1 marker already arrives. Answered before any side effect and before any join: a
|
|
1572
|
+
// forbidden process must not even pin a device for an attempt it is refusing, and this
|
|
1573
|
+
// per-request refusal must never be replaced by the reply of a human press it overlaps.
|
|
1574
|
+
if (auto && (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH || process.env.SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM)) {
|
|
1575
|
+
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
1576
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1577
|
+
error: "This dashboard may not arm the device on its own. Press Reconnect to arm it.",
|
|
1578
|
+
instructs: true,
|
|
1579
|
+
// A machine-readable marker for a refusal no later automatic attempt can change: the client
|
|
1580
|
+
// reads it to stop retrying and tell the user the next press is theirs, instead of burning
|
|
1581
|
+
// its budget on attempts this route will refuse the same way every time.
|
|
1582
|
+
refusal: "self_arm_blocked",
|
|
1583
|
+
});
|
|
1584
|
+
return;
|
|
1585
|
+
}
|
|
1586
|
+
// The rules above are held as invariants, not checked once: after any wait the slot may hold a
|
|
1587
|
+
// NEW flight (another tab's attempt, a pick for another device), so re-evaluate until nothing
|
|
1588
|
+
// stands in the way. The loop hands out its decision: the flight this request may join, or
|
|
1589
|
+
// null for "run your own". Acting on that binding rather than re-reading the slot keeps the
|
|
1590
|
+
// rule in one place; a re-read would need the same predicate again and would rot the first
|
|
1591
|
+
// time an await lands between the two.
|
|
1592
|
+
let joinable = null;
|
|
1593
|
+
for (;;) {
|
|
1594
|
+
const flight = enableInFlight;
|
|
1595
|
+
if (!flight)
|
|
1596
|
+
break;
|
|
1597
|
+
if (flight.serial === target && (auto || !flight.auto)) {
|
|
1598
|
+
joinable = flight;
|
|
1599
|
+
break;
|
|
1600
|
+
}
|
|
1601
|
+
await flight.p.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
1602
|
+
}
|
|
1603
|
+
let p;
|
|
1604
|
+
if (joinable) {
|
|
1605
|
+
p = joinable.p;
|
|
1606
|
+
}
|
|
1607
|
+
else {
|
|
1608
|
+
// .finally with an identity check, so a flight that settles after a successor took the slot
|
|
1609
|
+
// never clears the successor.
|
|
1610
|
+
p = runEnable(target, authored, auto, tab).finally(() => {
|
|
1611
|
+
if (enableInFlight?.p === p)
|
|
1612
|
+
enableInFlight = null;
|
|
1613
|
+
});
|
|
1614
|
+
enableInFlight = { serial: target, auto, p };
|
|
1615
|
+
}
|
|
1616
|
+
let reply;
|
|
1617
|
+
try {
|
|
1618
|
+
reply = await p;
|
|
1619
|
+
}
|
|
1620
|
+
catch (e) {
|
|
1621
|
+
// Nothing in runEnable is meant to reject, but a rejection that escaped here left every
|
|
1622
|
+
// request on the flight unanswered: the client's fetch never resolved, `enabling` stayed
|
|
1623
|
+
// latched, the Reconnect button stayed disabled and the automation never ran again.
|
|
1624
|
+
reply = {
|
|
1625
|
+
status: 500,
|
|
1626
|
+
body: { enabled: false, error: `Enable failed: ${e.message}. Try again.`, instructs: true },
|
|
1627
|
+
};
|
|
1628
|
+
}
|
|
1629
|
+
// A JOINED request credits itself, because the flight's own hook only credits whoever started it and
|
|
1630
|
+
// after coalescing those are two different writers. The lossy direction is the one that matters: an
|
|
1631
|
+
// agent session joining a window's attempt would have its re-arm recorded as the window's, leave no
|
|
1632
|
+
// session claim on the port, and get taken by the next launcher. While the credit was writer-agnostic
|
|
1633
|
+
// this could not happen, so it arrives with the attribution and is fixed with it.
|
|
1634
|
+
if (joinable && authored && reply.body.enabled)
|
|
1635
|
+
creditAuthoredWrite(tab);
|
|
1636
|
+
sendJson(res, reply.status, reply.body);
|
|
1260
1637
|
}
|
|
1261
1638
|
/**
|
|
1262
|
-
*
|
|
1639
|
+
* The /enable body: one attempt against the device, run by handleEnable at most once at a time
|
|
1640
|
+
* per target. Re-arm Radar from the dashboard. Mirrors the recovery sequence: reset cached
|
|
1263
1641
|
* forward state, rebuild a clean adb forward, and re-broadcast activation, so the
|
|
1264
1642
|
* user never has to drop to a terminal. Delegates entirely to AndroidTransport;
|
|
1265
1643
|
* no adb shelling here.
|
|
1266
1644
|
*/
|
|
1267
|
-
async function
|
|
1645
|
+
async function runEnable(deviceSerial, authored,
|
|
1646
|
+
// An UNATTENDED re-arm (the dashboard's own automatic recovery of a diagnosed-dead session,
|
|
1647
|
+
// marked with ?auto=1). It never takes the destructive screen teardown below — that reap
|
|
1648
|
+
// kills a live cast and deletes saved recordings, so a human press or an MCP enable earns
|
|
1649
|
+
// it and a timer does not. Two refusals in this handler enforce that: an auto attempt from
|
|
1650
|
+
// a process whose env forbids self-arming is refused before any device work, and an auto
|
|
1651
|
+
// attempt onto DIFFERENT hardware than this process last armed is refused before the
|
|
1652
|
+
// teardown decision; the same-device auto path takes the detection-only reset.
|
|
1653
|
+
auto,
|
|
1654
|
+
// The tab that started this flight, when one named itself. Only reaches keepAliveHookFor below.
|
|
1655
|
+
tab) {
|
|
1656
|
+
if (enableFaultForTest) {
|
|
1657
|
+
const fault = enableFaultForTest;
|
|
1658
|
+
enableFaultForTest = null;
|
|
1659
|
+
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, fault.delayMs));
|
|
1660
|
+
throw fault.err;
|
|
1661
|
+
}
|
|
1662
|
+
// The unattended path decides "different hardware?" BEFORE anything is touched. selectDevice
|
|
1663
|
+
// below pins as it answers, and the reset/select/DB-drop/logcat-restart that used to run ahead
|
|
1664
|
+
// of this check had already re-pointed the process at the new device by the time the refusal
|
|
1665
|
+
// went out, under wording that said nothing had moved. resolveDevice is the same pick with no
|
|
1666
|
+
// pin, so a refused attempt leaves the process exactly as it found it (the transport keeps
|
|
1667
|
+
// its old selection, the pulled-DB scratch and the retained logcat ring stay). A transport
|
|
1668
|
+
// without resolveDevice falls back to the post-pin check further down. The listing runs again
|
|
1669
|
+
// inside selectDevice below; that second listing is the price of a refusal that changes
|
|
1670
|
+
// nothing, so do not reuse this one to save it.
|
|
1671
|
+
if (auto && transport.resolveDevice) {
|
|
1672
|
+
const would = transport.resolveDevice(deviceSerial ?? null);
|
|
1673
|
+
const target = would.ok ? (would.serial ?? null) : null;
|
|
1674
|
+
if (target !== null && lastArmedSerial !== null && target !== lastArmedSerial) {
|
|
1675
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1676
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1677
|
+
// "A different device" rather than "the device changed": the pin has not moved, and the
|
|
1678
|
+
// header's device chip may already be naming the newcomer as the one attached.
|
|
1679
|
+
error: "A different device is attached. Press Reconnect to use it.",
|
|
1680
|
+
instructs: true,
|
|
1681
|
+
// Terminal for the automation (see the marker on the env refusal above): lastArmedSerial is
|
|
1682
|
+
// kept, so every later unattended attempt onto this device is refused identically.
|
|
1683
|
+
refusal: "device_changed",
|
|
1684
|
+
// The pin did not move to the new device: this is still the old one, or null once the
|
|
1685
|
+
// listing noticed the old one is gone (every listing reconciles a vanished pin). Never the
|
|
1686
|
+
// new serial, so the client's baseline cannot advance off a refusal that armed nothing.
|
|
1687
|
+
device_serial: transport.getSelectedDevice?.()?.serial ?? null,
|
|
1688
|
+
} };
|
|
1689
|
+
}
|
|
1690
|
+
}
|
|
1268
1691
|
transport.resetState();
|
|
1269
1692
|
// A reconnect may be a different device / re-armed profile, so drop the cached DB user
|
|
1270
1693
|
// set + sqlite path; the next /dbs re-detects the profiles fresh.
|
|
@@ -1277,12 +1700,12 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1277
1700
|
// here with the list, before forwarding OR the screen reset.
|
|
1278
1701
|
const selection = transport.selectDevice?.(deviceSerial ?? null);
|
|
1279
1702
|
if (selection && !selection.ok) {
|
|
1280
|
-
|
|
1281
|
-
|
|
1282
|
-
|
|
1283
|
-
|
|
1284
|
-
|
|
1285
|
-
|
|
1703
|
+
return { status: 409, body: {
|
|
1704
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1705
|
+
error: selection.error,
|
|
1706
|
+
instructs: selection.instructs,
|
|
1707
|
+
devices: selection.devices,
|
|
1708
|
+
} };
|
|
1286
1709
|
}
|
|
1287
1710
|
// The serial pinned at REPLY time, which under an overlapping /enable can differ from the pin
|
|
1288
1711
|
// this press made -- and reply time is the correct read: the verify probe rode the forward as
|
|
@@ -1305,7 +1728,9 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1305
1728
|
// The second is not the old per-process one-shot back: that spent a teardown on the first enable
|
|
1306
1729
|
// even when boot had already reaped. reapScreenOnce fires only when boot did not, and without it
|
|
1307
1730
|
// such a process never reaps for its whole lifetime, because the switch gate needs a prior armed
|
|
1308
|
-
// serial and only an arm can set one.
|
|
1731
|
+
// serial and only an arm can set one. Neither is ever earned by an unattended attempt (see the
|
|
1732
|
+
// `auto` parameter): a switched auto attempt is refused outright below, and a same-device one
|
|
1733
|
+
// takes the detection-only reset.
|
|
1309
1734
|
//
|
|
1310
1735
|
// Live work IS in reach on that path, and iOS is where it matters. armDevice returns before the
|
|
1311
1736
|
// reap unless the transport implements selectDeviceAsync, and only AndroidTransport does
|
|
@@ -1321,6 +1746,34 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1321
1746
|
const pinned = selection && selection.ok ? (selection.serial ?? null) : null;
|
|
1322
1747
|
// A null pin means "nothing attached", not "the hardware changed".
|
|
1323
1748
|
const switched = pinned !== null && lastArmedSerial !== null && pinned !== lastArmedSerial;
|
|
1749
|
+
// An unattended attempt must not adopt DIFFERENT hardware than this process last armed: a
|
|
1750
|
+
// hardware swap is a human-scale event, and the swap teardown below (kill the live cast,
|
|
1751
|
+
// delete saved clips, pkill screenrecord device-wide) is exactly the destructive step a
|
|
1752
|
+
// timer never earns. Refusing — rather than arming without the teardown — also keeps
|
|
1753
|
+
// lastArmedSerial intact, so the press that follows still reads the swap and spends the
|
|
1754
|
+
// teardown it is owed; arming here and advancing the serial would hide the swap from that
|
|
1755
|
+
// press.
|
|
1756
|
+
if (switched && auto) {
|
|
1757
|
+
// The pin has already moved to the new hardware (selectDevice above), and the stream proxy
|
|
1758
|
+
// reasserts its forward onto the current pin on every connect, so from here the tab reads the
|
|
1759
|
+
// NEW device. The per-device state that belongs to the OLD one must not follow it: the
|
|
1760
|
+
// retained logcat ring would replay device A's lines into a stream now serving device B, and
|
|
1761
|
+
// the pulled-DB scratch is A's. Same two drops the switched path below performs; only the
|
|
1762
|
+
// screen teardown is withheld, and lastArmedSerial stays put so the press earns it.
|
|
1763
|
+
cleanupPulledDatabases();
|
|
1764
|
+
logSession?.restart();
|
|
1765
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1766
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1767
|
+
// Reachable only on a transport without resolveDevice (or a listing that changed between
|
|
1768
|
+
// the resolve above and this pick), so the pin HAS moved here; say so.
|
|
1769
|
+
error: "The attached device changed and the dashboard now points at it. Press Reconnect to arm it.",
|
|
1770
|
+
instructs: true,
|
|
1771
|
+
// Terminal for the automation (see the marker on the env refusal above): lastArmedSerial is
|
|
1772
|
+
// kept, so every later unattended attempt onto this device is refused identically.
|
|
1773
|
+
refusal: "device_changed",
|
|
1774
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1775
|
+
} };
|
|
1776
|
+
}
|
|
1324
1777
|
if (switched) {
|
|
1325
1778
|
// A real hardware change earns the teardown every time, not once per process, so this is the
|
|
1326
1779
|
// one reap that does not go through reapScreenOnce. Setting the flag here still tells a later
|
|
@@ -1328,10 +1781,13 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1328
1781
|
reapedThisProcess = true;
|
|
1329
1782
|
dashboardScreen.reset();
|
|
1330
1783
|
}
|
|
1331
|
-
else if (!reapScreenOnce(pinned, false)) {
|
|
1332
|
-
// No teardown was owed
|
|
1333
|
-
//
|
|
1334
|
-
//
|
|
1784
|
+
else if (auto || !reapScreenOnce(pinned, false)) {
|
|
1785
|
+
// No teardown was owed — or this is the unattended auto re-arm, which may never spend one
|
|
1786
|
+
// (see the `auto` parameter): the one-shot stays unspent for the next human press, which is
|
|
1787
|
+
// where the responsibility for killing a live cast and deleting clips belongs. false covers
|
|
1788
|
+
// the empty-cable enable for the same reason the seed below needs a real pin: there is no
|
|
1789
|
+
// device to reap on, so spending the one-shot there would leave a later real pin with
|
|
1790
|
+
// nothing left to earn a teardown with.
|
|
1335
1791
|
dashboardScreen.resetDetection();
|
|
1336
1792
|
}
|
|
1337
1793
|
// Only remember a serial we actually ARMED. selectDevice returns { ok: true, serial: null } when
|
|
@@ -1365,12 +1821,13 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1365
1821
|
const forwarded = forwardForRead();
|
|
1366
1822
|
if (!forwarded) {
|
|
1367
1823
|
const reason = transport.getLastForwardError?.() ?? null;
|
|
1368
|
-
|
|
1369
|
-
|
|
1370
|
-
|
|
1371
|
-
|
|
1372
|
-
|
|
1373
|
-
|
|
1824
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1825
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1826
|
+
error: reason ?? "ADB forward failed. Is a device connected?",
|
|
1827
|
+
// adb's own text, or a question: neither tells the user what to do.
|
|
1828
|
+
instructs: false,
|
|
1829
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1830
|
+
} };
|
|
1374
1831
|
}
|
|
1375
1832
|
// activateAsync() never throws; a failed broadcast is recorded on the transport.
|
|
1376
1833
|
// Surfacing it here gives the dashboard user the actual adb error instead of a bare
|
|
@@ -1385,27 +1842,33 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1385
1842
|
}
|
|
1386
1843
|
const activateError = transport.getLastActivateError?.() ?? null;
|
|
1387
1844
|
if (activateError) {
|
|
1388
|
-
|
|
1389
|
-
|
|
1390
|
-
|
|
1391
|
-
|
|
1392
|
-
|
|
1393
|
-
|
|
1845
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1846
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1847
|
+
error: `Broadcast failed: ${activateError}. Is the device connected?`,
|
|
1848
|
+
instructs: false,
|
|
1849
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1850
|
+
} };
|
|
1394
1851
|
}
|
|
1395
1852
|
// Verify by pinging the device the same way /health does (the shared pingDevice, so the
|
|
1396
1853
|
// ceiling and the three-state rules cannot drift from the other probe sites).
|
|
1397
1854
|
const ping = await pingDevice();
|
|
1398
1855
|
const enabled = ping.state === "armed" && ping.status === 200;
|
|
1856
|
+
// A verified arm refutes any cached "no_session" the same way a stream connect does (the
|
|
1857
|
+
// memo is evidence about a session this route just restored): without this, another stream
|
|
1858
|
+
// client's mid-retry memo read could announce the pre-arm diagnosis for up to its TTL and
|
|
1859
|
+
// drive that tab to fire a spurious /enable against the live session.
|
|
1860
|
+
if (enabled)
|
|
1861
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
1399
1862
|
// Probe the process state only on the failure path: a successful enable needs no diagnosis,
|
|
1400
1863
|
// and the probe is a real adb round trip. Capped short, because by this point the failure is
|
|
1401
1864
|
// already established and the user is watching a request that has stalled their SSE tabs; an
|
|
1402
1865
|
// explanation must not cost more than the operation it explains. The MCP path keeps the
|
|
1403
1866
|
// patient default, where seconds of ping retries have already elapsed and a real answer
|
|
1404
1867
|
// beats a fast "unknown".
|
|
1405
|
-
|
|
1406
|
-
|
|
1407
|
-
|
|
1408
|
-
|
|
1868
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1869
|
+
...enableResultBody(enabled, keepAliveHookFor(authored, tab), enabled ? "unknown" : readProcessState(transport, DIAGNOSTIC_PS_TIMEOUT_MS)),
|
|
1870
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1871
|
+
} };
|
|
1409
1872
|
}
|
|
1410
1873
|
// The device-buffered source kinds, in one table so a new source is one row here: the
|
|
1411
1874
|
// device API route segment (clog and trace pluralize; the rest match the kind name) and
|
|
@@ -2116,12 +2579,138 @@ export function parseLogcat(line, resolvePkg = packageForPid) {
|
|
|
2116
2579
|
package: resolvePkg(pidN),
|
|
2117
2580
|
};
|
|
2118
2581
|
}
|
|
2582
|
+
// How long a freshly opened device stream may go without response HEADERS before the attempt is
|
|
2583
|
+
// declared dead. A healthy device answers /api/stream immediately; the pathological case this
|
|
2584
|
+
// bounds is a dead device-side socket behind a LIVE adb forward, where the host adb server
|
|
2585
|
+
// accepts the TCP connection unconditionally and then nothing ever answers — no error event, no
|
|
2586
|
+
// end event, just silence (observed live 2026-09-03: a stream that emitted no _status frame at
|
|
2587
|
+
// all). Generous enough to sit above pingDevice's observed 2.2s worst case.
|
|
2588
|
+
const STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 6000;
|
|
2589
|
+
// Test seam: the real deadline is deliberately generous, which would make every hang-mode test
|
|
2590
|
+
// wait it out in real time. Never read anywhere else.
|
|
2591
|
+
let streamResponseTimeoutMs = STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
2592
|
+
export function _setStreamResponseTimeoutForTest(ms) {
|
|
2593
|
+
streamResponseTimeoutMs = ms ?? STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
2594
|
+
}
|
|
2595
|
+
// Why the device stream keeps dying, answered from the device's own socket table — the one read
|
|
2596
|
+
// the adb forward cannot distort (see pingDevice's classification rules: through a forward, an
|
|
2597
|
+
// absent socket and a live-but-hiccuping session both present as resets). ABSENT means no radar
|
|
2598
|
+
// server is bound anywhere on the device: the session ENDED (idle watchdog, app restart), and
|
|
2599
|
+
// only a re-enable brings it back — which the retry loop deliberately never performs (enabling
|
|
2600
|
+
// binds an identity and mutates device state; a read loop must not, and a wire-contract machine
|
|
2601
|
+
// consumer holding /stream must never arm a device by holding it). The dashboard CLIENT acts on
|
|
2602
|
+
// this instead: its auto-re-arm is the human's own tab pressing its own Reconnect.
|
|
2603
|
+
//
|
|
2604
|
+
// One probe at a time, memoized briefly: every open stream connection retries on its own clock,
|
|
2605
|
+
// so several tabs against a dead session would otherwise each run their own adb read (a call
|
|
2606
|
+
// with a 5s ceiling) every few seconds.
|
|
2607
|
+
const OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS = 8000;
|
|
2608
|
+
let outageDiagnosisTtlMs = OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2609
|
+
// Test seam for the memo TTL: the collapse-slot invariants below are only observable once the
|
|
2610
|
+
// memo has expired, and 8 seconds of wall clock per assertion is the flake this seam avoids.
|
|
2611
|
+
export function _setOutageDiagnosisTtlForTest(ms) {
|
|
2612
|
+
outageDiagnosisTtlMs = ms ?? OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2613
|
+
}
|
|
2614
|
+
let lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2615
|
+
let outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2616
|
+
// Bumped wherever a live connect invalidates the diagnosis. A probe is an adb round trip
|
|
2617
|
+
// with a 5s ceiling racing a 1-2s reconnect cadence, so probe-resolves-after-recovery is the
|
|
2618
|
+
// COMMON ordering: without the generation check, that late resolution would re-poison the
|
|
2619
|
+
// just-cleared memo with a fresh timestamp, and any other stream (a second tab) or a quick
|
|
2620
|
+
// re-drop of this one would inherit "no_session" for the full TTL and re-arm against the
|
|
2621
|
+
// live session.
|
|
2622
|
+
let outageDiagnosisGeneration = 0;
|
|
2623
|
+
// Test seam: the real probe reaches a physical device over adb, which a test host may or may
|
|
2624
|
+
// not have, so tests pin the answer instead of inheriting whatever hardware is attached.
|
|
2625
|
+
let outageProbe = () => transport.radarSocketPresentAsync?.() ?? Promise.resolve("unknown");
|
|
2626
|
+
export function _setOutageProbeForTest(probe) {
|
|
2627
|
+
outageProbe = probe ?? (() => transport.radarSocketPresentAsync?.() ?? Promise.resolve("unknown"));
|
|
2628
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2629
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2630
|
+
outageDiagnosisGeneration++;
|
|
2631
|
+
// This is the "restore the diagnosis machinery" seam, so the TTL goes back with the rest: a
|
|
2632
|
+
// test that shortened it and forgot its own restore must not leak a 50ms memo into the next.
|
|
2633
|
+
outageDiagnosisTtlMs = OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2634
|
+
}
|
|
2635
|
+
// Test seams for the diagnosis cache itself. The generation rule is a pure invariant about
|
|
2636
|
+
// ordering (a probe that resolves after an invalidation must not cache), and driving it
|
|
2637
|
+
// through the real stream would mean racing an adb-shaped probe against a live reconnect
|
|
2638
|
+
// cadence on the wall clock — the flake this pair exists to avoid.
|
|
2639
|
+
export function _diagnoseOutageForTest() {
|
|
2640
|
+
return diagnoseStreamOutage();
|
|
2641
|
+
}
|
|
2642
|
+
export function _invalidateOutageDiagnosisForTest() {
|
|
2643
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
2644
|
+
}
|
|
2645
|
+
// A live connect refutes any "no_session" — cached, in flight, or both. Exported to the
|
|
2646
|
+
// connect callback only through this helper so the memo and the pending write cannot be
|
|
2647
|
+
// invalidated separately (clearing just the memo was cycle-2's reopened race).
|
|
2648
|
+
function invalidateOutageDiagnosis() {
|
|
2649
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2650
|
+
// Drop the in-flight slot too: its eventual result is pre-invalidation evidence, and a
|
|
2651
|
+
// post-recovery consult must start a FRESH probe rather than await (or worse, adopt) the
|
|
2652
|
+
// orphan. The orphan's own cleanup is identity-checked, so it cannot null a successor.
|
|
2653
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2654
|
+
outageDiagnosisGeneration++;
|
|
2655
|
+
}
|
|
2656
|
+
async function diagnoseStreamOutage() {
|
|
2657
|
+
const now = Date.now();
|
|
2658
|
+
if (lastOutageDiagnosis && now - lastOutageDiagnosis.ts < outageDiagnosisTtlMs) {
|
|
2659
|
+
return lastOutageDiagnosis.reason;
|
|
2660
|
+
}
|
|
2661
|
+
if (outageDiagnosisInflight)
|
|
2662
|
+
return outageDiagnosisInflight;
|
|
2663
|
+
const generation = outageDiagnosisGeneration;
|
|
2664
|
+
// A holder rather than a bare binding: the async body needs its own promise's identity for
|
|
2665
|
+
// the slot-release check below, and it can run synchronously up to its first await —
|
|
2666
|
+
// before any direct `const probe = …` binding would initialize.
|
|
2667
|
+
const holder = { p: null };
|
|
2668
|
+
holder.p = (async () => {
|
|
2669
|
+
let reason = null;
|
|
2670
|
+
try {
|
|
2671
|
+
// The probe is CALLED synchronously (concurrent consults rely on it starting inside this
|
|
2672
|
+
// tick), but a synchronous throw is turned into a rejection so the body still suspends at
|
|
2673
|
+
// the await. Without that, a sync throw would let this whole body finish BEFORE the caller
|
|
2674
|
+
// stores holder.p into the collapse slot; the slot would then hold an already-settled
|
|
2675
|
+
// promise that the identity-checked release below never clears, wedging every later
|
|
2676
|
+
// consult on a stale null until the next live connect.
|
|
2677
|
+
let probe;
|
|
2678
|
+
try {
|
|
2679
|
+
probe = Promise.resolve(outageProbe());
|
|
2680
|
+
}
|
|
2681
|
+
catch (e) {
|
|
2682
|
+
probe = Promise.reject(e);
|
|
2683
|
+
}
|
|
2684
|
+
reason = (await probe) === "absent" ? "no_session" : null;
|
|
2685
|
+
}
|
|
2686
|
+
catch {
|
|
2687
|
+
// An unreadable socket table is "unknown", and unknown never classifies an outage.
|
|
2688
|
+
}
|
|
2689
|
+
// Release the collapse slot only if it is still OURS: a probe orphaned by an
|
|
2690
|
+
// invalidation (a live connect, the test seam) must not null a successor's in-flight
|
|
2691
|
+
// promise and briefly break the one-probe-at-a-time collapse.
|
|
2692
|
+
if (outageDiagnosisInflight === holder.p)
|
|
2693
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2694
|
+
// A stale probe reports nothing and caches nothing: evidence gathered before the
|
|
2695
|
+
// invalidation describes an outage that already ended.
|
|
2696
|
+
if (generation !== outageDiagnosisGeneration)
|
|
2697
|
+
return null;
|
|
2698
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = { ts: Date.now(), reason };
|
|
2699
|
+
return reason;
|
|
2700
|
+
})();
|
|
2701
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = holder.p;
|
|
2702
|
+
return holder.p;
|
|
2703
|
+
}
|
|
2119
2704
|
/**
|
|
2120
2705
|
* Self-healing SSE proxy. Keeps ONE long-lived response open to the browser and
|
|
2121
2706
|
* internally (re)connects to the device `/api/stream` every couple seconds while
|
|
2122
2707
|
* it is down, so the browser's EventSource never sees a close and never gives up.
|
|
2123
2708
|
* Every other retry it rebuilds the adb forward (the real cause of recurring
|
|
2124
2709
|
* "unreachable"), reusing AndroidTransport rather than shelling adb directly.
|
|
2710
|
+
* When retries keep failing it additionally asks WHY (see diagnoseStreamOutage)
|
|
2711
|
+
* and stamps the answer as `reason` on the `_status` frame, so a client can tell
|
|
2712
|
+
* "transport blip, the proxy will heal this" from "no radar session exists and
|
|
2713
|
+
* someone has to re-enable".
|
|
2125
2714
|
*
|
|
2126
2715
|
* When the active spec wants logs (source "log" or "all"), the handler subscribes
|
|
2127
2716
|
* to the shared session-long logSession: it is first replayed the entire retained
|
|
@@ -2140,11 +2729,26 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2140
2729
|
let upstream = null;
|
|
2141
2730
|
let closed = false;
|
|
2142
2731
|
let lastState = "";
|
|
2143
|
-
|
|
2144
|
-
|
|
2732
|
+
let lastReason = "";
|
|
2733
|
+
let headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2734
|
+
const announce = (state, msg, reason) => {
|
|
2735
|
+
// Dedup on state AND reason, with one asymmetry: a diagnosed outage keeps its diagnosis.
|
|
2736
|
+
// The retry loop re-announces generic "waiting" wording on every failed attempt, and once
|
|
2737
|
+
// this outage has been classified (reason set), that generic repeat is the SAME outage
|
|
2738
|
+
// described worse — letting it through would strip the reason the client is acting on
|
|
2739
|
+
// (see the dashboard's auto-re-arm) a second or two after it arrived. A reason CHANGE does
|
|
2740
|
+
// pass: the re-diagnosis retires a stale no_session with reason "undiagnosed" (a frame the
|
|
2741
|
+
// client reads as "drop the latch", not as a diagnosis of its own).
|
|
2742
|
+
if (state === lastState && !reason && lastReason)
|
|
2743
|
+
return;
|
|
2744
|
+
if (state === lastState && (reason ?? "") === lastReason)
|
|
2145
2745
|
return;
|
|
2146
2746
|
lastState = state;
|
|
2147
|
-
|
|
2747
|
+
lastReason = reason ?? "";
|
|
2748
|
+
const event = { state, msg };
|
|
2749
|
+
if (reason)
|
|
2750
|
+
event.reason = reason;
|
|
2751
|
+
res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "_status", event })}\n\n`);
|
|
2148
2752
|
};
|
|
2149
2753
|
// Keep the persistent logcat capture armed for the life of this connection.
|
|
2150
2754
|
// start() is idempotent, so it is safe to call both on initial setup and from
|
|
@@ -2178,6 +2782,41 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2178
2782
|
return;
|
|
2179
2783
|
settled = true;
|
|
2180
2784
|
retries++;
|
|
2785
|
+
// A failure that keeps repeating deserves a WHY. The second attempt (the first repeat —
|
|
2786
|
+
// one failure is routine) and a coarse cadence after that, so a fresh classification can
|
|
2787
|
+
// still ARRIVE mid-outage without running an adb probe on every 2s retry. announce never
|
|
2788
|
+
// downgrades a reasoned waiting to a generic one on its own (see its dedup asymmetry), but
|
|
2789
|
+
// a later probe that no longer finds the session absent (the socket is present, or the
|
|
2790
|
+
// table cannot be read because the device is gone) RETIRES a diagnosis this outage
|
|
2791
|
+
// announced: the outage changed nature under the latched reason, and without this the
|
|
2792
|
+
// client's headline kept asserting "no radar session" over a reason span saying the device
|
|
2793
|
+
// is unreachable, while its automation spent attempts on hardware that was not there.
|
|
2794
|
+
// Fire-and-forget: the probe must never delay the reconnect cadence it is describing.
|
|
2795
|
+
if (retries === 2 || retries % 6 === 0) {
|
|
2796
|
+
// A probe orphaned by an invalidation (this tab's own arm landing, an MCP activate, a live
|
|
2797
|
+
// connect) reports null exactly like a fresh "not absent" answer would. The generation tells
|
|
2798
|
+
// them apart: a stale null must not retire a diagnosis against a session that just armed.
|
|
2799
|
+
const generation = outageDiagnosisGeneration;
|
|
2800
|
+
void diagnoseStreamOutage().then((reason) => {
|
|
2801
|
+
// The connected check closes a REPRODUCED race: the probe is an adb round trip (5s
|
|
2802
|
+
// ceiling) racing a 1-2s reconnect cadence, so a session restored during its flight
|
|
2803
|
+
// (an auto-re-arm landing, an MCP activate, a manual press) can reconnect this stream
|
|
2804
|
+
// before the probe resolves — and announcing the stale diagnosis then would drive the
|
|
2805
|
+
// client to fire /enable AGAINST THE LIVE SESSION it just got back, the exact clobber
|
|
2806
|
+
// the socket-table diagnosis exists to prevent.
|
|
2807
|
+
if (closed || lastState === "connected" || generation !== outageDiagnosisGeneration)
|
|
2808
|
+
return;
|
|
2809
|
+
if (reason === null) {
|
|
2810
|
+
// "Not absent" covers both a socket that is present and a table that could not be read
|
|
2811
|
+
// (device gone, adb busy), so the wording asserts no cause; the generic per-retry
|
|
2812
|
+
// message is what the loop would say anyway.
|
|
2813
|
+
if (lastReason === "no_session")
|
|
2814
|
+
announce("waiting", "device not answering, retrying…", "undiagnosed");
|
|
2815
|
+
return;
|
|
2816
|
+
}
|
|
2817
|
+
announce("waiting", "no radar session on the device", reason);
|
|
2818
|
+
});
|
|
2819
|
+
}
|
|
2181
2820
|
// planReconnect (shared/stream.ts) owns the cadence: every other retry it
|
|
2182
2821
|
// rebuilds a clean forward before reconnecting and returns the delay. One
|
|
2183
2822
|
// implementation for this proxy and the MCP stream, so a tuning change
|
|
@@ -2193,12 +2832,44 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2193
2832
|
// (tuned for "device end died"), which would only catch a foreign repoint by luck on
|
|
2194
2833
|
// half of attempts; this cheap check-first call covers every attempt instead.
|
|
2195
2834
|
forwardForRead();
|
|
2835
|
+
// Bound the wait for response headers: see STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS. Without this, the
|
|
2836
|
+
// accepted-but-never-answered connect mode fires none of the callbacks below and the
|
|
2837
|
+
// stream sits silent forever — no _status, no retry, nothing for a client to act on.
|
|
2838
|
+
// Per-ATTEMPT const, mirrored into the connection-scoped slot only for the close
|
|
2839
|
+
// teardown: each attempt's handlers clear their OWN deadline, so a stale attempt's late
|
|
2840
|
+
// error event can never clear the live attempt's timer out from under it.
|
|
2841
|
+
const myDeadline = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
2842
|
+
if (closed)
|
|
2843
|
+
return;
|
|
2844
|
+
announce("waiting", "device not answering, retrying…");
|
|
2845
|
+
try {
|
|
2846
|
+
upstream?.destroy();
|
|
2847
|
+
}
|
|
2848
|
+
catch {
|
|
2849
|
+
// already torn down
|
|
2850
|
+
}
|
|
2851
|
+
retry();
|
|
2852
|
+
}, streamResponseTimeoutMs);
|
|
2853
|
+
headersDeadline = myDeadline;
|
|
2196
2854
|
upstream = http.request({
|
|
2197
2855
|
host: RADAR_HOST,
|
|
2198
2856
|
port: RADAR_PORT,
|
|
2199
2857
|
path: "/api/stream",
|
|
2200
2858
|
method: "GET",
|
|
2201
2859
|
}, (up) => {
|
|
2860
|
+
clearTimeout(myDeadline);
|
|
2861
|
+
if (headersDeadline === myDeadline)
|
|
2862
|
+
headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2863
|
+
// A fresh outage on a long-lived connection must diagnose as early as the first one:
|
|
2864
|
+
// the "second failure" trigger and planReconnect's every-other-attempt forward
|
|
2865
|
+
// rebuild both key off this counter, and neither should inherit the count from an
|
|
2866
|
+
// outage that already recovered.
|
|
2867
|
+
retries = 0;
|
|
2868
|
+
// A live connect refutes any "no_session" — the cached memo AND a probe still in
|
|
2869
|
+
// flight (see invalidateOutageDiagnosis): without this, other stream clients would
|
|
2870
|
+
// re-read the pre-recovery diagnosis for up to its TTL and re-arm against the
|
|
2871
|
+
// healthy session.
|
|
2872
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
2202
2873
|
announce("connected", "device stream connected");
|
|
2203
2874
|
// Re-arm logs on the same path the device proxy heals on: if the device
|
|
2204
2875
|
// dropped and came back, `adb logcat` had exited; restart it (idempotent)
|
|
@@ -2215,6 +2886,9 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2215
2886
|
});
|
|
2216
2887
|
});
|
|
2217
2888
|
upstream.on("error", () => {
|
|
2889
|
+
clearTimeout(myDeadline);
|
|
2890
|
+
if (headersDeadline === myDeadline)
|
|
2891
|
+
headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2218
2892
|
announce("waiting", "device unreachable, retrying…");
|
|
2219
2893
|
retry();
|
|
2220
2894
|
});
|
|
@@ -2271,6 +2945,8 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2271
2945
|
req.on("close", () => {
|
|
2272
2946
|
closed = true;
|
|
2273
2947
|
clearInterval(heartbeat);
|
|
2948
|
+
if (headersDeadline)
|
|
2949
|
+
clearTimeout(headersDeadline);
|
|
2274
2950
|
if (unsubscribeLogs)
|
|
2275
2951
|
unsubscribeLogs(); // detach listener; capture stays up
|
|
2276
2952
|
try {
|