@slack/radar-mcp 1.18.1 → 1.19.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -1
- package/dist/mcp/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/mcp/web-child-env.js +10 -7
- package/dist/shared/android.d.ts +10 -21
- package/dist/shared/android.js +30 -9
- package/dist/shared/ios.d.ts +5 -10
- package/dist/shared/ios.js +23 -5
- package/dist/shared/transport.d.ts +31 -19
- package/dist/shared/wire.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/shared/wire.js +6 -0
- package/dist/web/macapp/RadarApp.swift +24 -4
- package/dist/web/public/index.html +27 -3
- package/dist/web/public/next/app.js +163 -18
- package/dist/web/public/next/feed.js +60 -11
- package/dist/web/public/next/filter.js +24 -11
- package/dist/web/public/next/store.js +577 -28
- package/dist/web/server.d.ts +12 -2
- package/dist/web/server.js +459 -41
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/web/server.js
CHANGED
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@@ -538,11 +538,14 @@ function pingDevice(timeoutMs = PING_PROBE_MS) {
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*/
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export function armOnBoot() {
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// An agent-spawned dashboard must not reach the device on its own. open_radar_dashboard is exempt
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// from the MCP session gate precisely BECAUSE opening a dashboard could not arm anything
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//
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//
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//
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//
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// from the MCP session gate precisely BECAUSE opening a dashboard could not arm anything by itself,
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// and arming here would quietly remove the premise that exemption rests on: an agent call would arm
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// a device and begin logcat capture to disk with no human action, and its child is detached with
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// stdio ignored so even a failure line would reach nobody. The client's automatic re-enable is
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// gated on the same flag (surfaced as /health's self_arm_blocked, and enforced server-side by
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// handleEnable's own ?auto=1 refusal), so neither the boot nor an open tab
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// arms an agent-spawned dashboard. A human launch, whether a terminal `slack-radar web` or the dock
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// app, sets no marker: it arms here, and its tab may recover a dead session unattended.
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if (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH)
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return;
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// Escape hatch, matching this file's other automatic-on-boot behaviours (SLACK_RADAR_NO_OPEN,
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@@ -630,7 +633,7 @@ async function armDevice() {
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// devices/emulators found"), and that is the deliberately quiet case. An attached but
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// unauthorized device also selects nothing, so the gate is the raw listing, which keeps
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// exactly that case loud.
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-
if (reason && selection.devices
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if (reason && (selection.devices?.length ?? 0) > 0) {
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console.log(`Radar could not be armed at startup: ${reason}`);
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}
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return;
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@@ -785,9 +788,12 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
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return;
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}
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if (urlPath === "/enable" && req.method === "POST") {
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-
const
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const params = new URL(url, `http://localhost:${WEB_PORT}`).searchParams;
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const serial = params.get("device_serial");
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// Deliberately not awaited; handleEnable answers res itself and never rejects.
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-
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// ?auto=1 marks the dashboard's own unattended recovery; see handleEnable's `auto`.
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const auto = params.get("auto") === "1";
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void handleEnable(res, serial, isAuthoredRequest(req.headers), auto);
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return;
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}
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if (url === "/stream" && req.method === "GET") {
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@@ -1083,6 +1089,19 @@ async function handleHealth(res) {
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boundProfile: profile,
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device_serial: selected?.serial ?? null,
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device_label: selected?.label ?? null,
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// Whether THIS PROCESS is forbidden from touching the device on its own. Two reasons
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// today: an agent spawned it (open_radar_dashboard is exempt from the MCP session gate
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// precisely because opening a dashboard cannot itself reach the device, and an
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// agent-spawned tab that re-armed on its own would remove the premise that exemption
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// rests on), or SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM, which suppresses the boot arm and is documented as
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// the opt-out that "most deserves" one because it is the first behaviour to touch
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// physical hardware. Automatic recovery is the second such behaviour, so it honours the
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// same flags: otherwise setting NO_ARM stopped the boot arm and a visible tab armed the
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// device ten seconds later anyway. The client's automatic re-enable reads this and
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// refuses to arm (handleEnable refuses an ?auto=1 server-side too). Sent as one derived
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// boolean so a future third reason to refuse has one place to join, and the client needs
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// no env knowledge.
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self_arm_blocked: !!process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH || !!process.env.SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM,
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// Capture sources the build declares on ping (seam builds only); null on older builds.
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sources,
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});
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@@ -1256,15 +1275,161 @@ processState = "unknown") {
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onEnabled?.();
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return { enabled };
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}
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-
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// `instructs` travels with every failed reply: whether the wording tells the user what to do
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// next, decided where the wording is written rather than guessed from its prose by the client
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// (some reasons pass adb's own stderr straight through, which no verb list can classify). Here
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// only the "stopped" wording gives an instruction (launch a debug build and retry).
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return { enabled, error: deviceServerSilentError(processState), instructs: processState === "stopped" };
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}
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// One /enable at a time, full stop. Every visible tab diagnoses the same dead session off one
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// shared memo (diagnoseStreamOutage), so each fires its own immediate ?auto=1 in the same window,
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// and two concurrent runEnable calls race on the shared transport: the second's resetState()
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// clears lastActivateError under the first's in-flight activateAsync, and the first then reports
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// the generic "did not respond" wording instead of the adb error this route exists to show (and
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// both spend a budget slot on it). A pick for another device mid-flight races the same way and
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// moves the pin under the first flight's forward, so different targets never overlap either;
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// they queue. Same shape as outageDiagnosisInflight for the join: a request identical to the
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// flight in progress receives the winner's reply rather than a refusal, since a refusal is
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// terminal for the joiner's automation and would spend its whole budget on an attempt that may
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// have succeeded.
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//
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// Joins are for the SAME target only (a pick for device B must not adopt A's answer), and a
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// human press never joins an unattended flight: the press earns things the timer may not (the
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// screen teardown, adopting swapped hardware), so it waits for the flight to settle and then
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// runs on its own. An unattended attempt arriving during a press does join it; the press's reply
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// is a superset of what the attempt could have earned. A joiner's own `authored` is never
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// consulted: its only effect would be markKeepAlive, which is global and idempotent, so the
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// winner's call covers it.
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let enableInFlight = null;
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// Test seam: the next runEnable rejects with this error after `delayMs` (long enough for a second
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// request to join the flight), to prove a rejection still answers every request riding the flight
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// instead of leaving them (and the client's Reconnect button) hanging.
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let enableFaultForTest = null;
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export function _setEnableFaultForTest(err, delayMs = 300) {
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enableFaultForTest = err ? { err, delayMs } : null;
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}
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async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored,
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// An UNATTENDED re-arm (the dashboard's own automatic recovery of a diagnosed-dead session,
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// marked with ?auto=1). See runEnable for what it may and may not do.
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auto = false) {
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// `||`, not `??`: an empty ?device_serial= means "no serial" to selectDevice too, so the two
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// requests must share one slot key.
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const target = deviceSerial || null;
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// The server-side half of the self-arm consent boundary. The client refuses off /health's
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// self_arm_blocked, but that field only reaches it on the first /health reply, and the
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// no_session diagnosis can beat that reply on a fresh tab, so the promise that an
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// agent-spawned (or SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM) process never arms on its own is enforced here, where
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// the ?auto=1 marker already arrives. Answered before any side effect and before any join: a
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// forbidden process must not even pin a device for an attempt it is refusing, and this
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// per-request refusal must never be replaced by the reply of a human press it overlaps.
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if (auto && (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH || process.env.SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM)) {
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sendJson(res, 200, {
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enabled: false,
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error: "This dashboard may not arm the device on its own. Press Reconnect to arm it.",
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instructs: true,
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// A machine-readable marker for a refusal no later automatic attempt can change: the client
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// reads it to stop retrying and tell the user the next press is theirs, instead of burning
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// its budget on attempts this route will refuse the same way every time.
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refusal: "self_arm_blocked",
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});
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return;
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}
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// The rules above are held as invariants, not checked once: after any wait the slot may hold a
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// NEW flight (another tab's attempt, a pick for another device), so re-evaluate until nothing
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// stands in the way. The loop hands out its decision: the flight this request may join, or
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// null for "run your own". Acting on that binding rather than re-reading the slot keeps the
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// rule in one place; a re-read would need the same predicate again and would rot the first
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// time an await lands between the two.
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let joinable = null;
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for (;;) {
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const flight = enableInFlight;
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if (!flight)
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break;
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if (flight.serial === target && (auto || !flight.auto)) {
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joinable = flight;
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break;
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}
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1352
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await flight.p.catch(() => undefined);
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}
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let p;
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1355
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if (joinable) {
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1356
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p = joinable.p;
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}
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else {
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// .finally with an identity check, so a flight that settles after a successor took the slot
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1360
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// never clears the successor.
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1361
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p = runEnable(target, authored, auto).finally(() => {
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1362
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if (enableInFlight?.p === p)
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1363
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enableInFlight = null;
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1364
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});
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1365
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enableInFlight = { serial: target, auto, p };
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1366
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}
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1367
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let reply;
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1368
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try {
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1369
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reply = await p;
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1370
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}
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1371
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catch (e) {
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1372
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// Nothing in runEnable is meant to reject, but a rejection that escaped here left every
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1373
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// request on the flight unanswered: the client's fetch never resolved, `enabling` stayed
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1374
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// latched, the Reconnect button stayed disabled and the automation never ran again.
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1375
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reply = {
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1376
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status: 500,
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1377
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body: { enabled: false, error: `Enable failed: ${e.message}. Try again.`, instructs: true },
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1378
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};
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1379
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}
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1380
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sendJson(res, reply.status, reply.body);
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1260
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}
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1261
1382
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/**
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1262
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-
*
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1383
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* The /enable body: one attempt against the device, run by handleEnable at most once at a time
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1384
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* per target. Re-arm Radar from the dashboard. Mirrors the recovery sequence: reset cached
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1263
1385
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* forward state, rebuild a clean adb forward, and re-broadcast activation, so the
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* user never has to drop to a terminal. Delegates entirely to AndroidTransport;
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* no adb shelling here.
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*/
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1267
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async function
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1389
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+
async function runEnable(deviceSerial, authored,
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1390
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// An UNATTENDED re-arm (the dashboard's own automatic recovery of a diagnosed-dead session,
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1391
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// marked with ?auto=1). It never takes the destructive screen teardown below — that reap
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1392
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// kills a live cast and deletes saved recordings, so a human press or an MCP enable earns
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1393
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// it and a timer does not. Two refusals in this handler enforce that: an auto attempt from
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1394
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// a process whose env forbids self-arming is refused before any device work, and an auto
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1395
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// attempt onto DIFFERENT hardware than this process last armed is refused before the
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1396
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// teardown decision; the same-device auto path takes the detection-only reset.
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1397
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auto) {
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1398
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if (enableFaultForTest) {
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1399
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const fault = enableFaultForTest;
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1400
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enableFaultForTest = null;
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1401
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, fault.delayMs));
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1402
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throw fault.err;
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1403
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+
}
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1404
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// The unattended path decides "different hardware?" BEFORE anything is touched. selectDevice
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1405
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// below pins as it answers, and the reset/select/DB-drop/logcat-restart that used to run ahead
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1406
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// of this check had already re-pointed the process at the new device by the time the refusal
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1407
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// went out, under wording that said nothing had moved. resolveDevice is the same pick with no
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1408
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// pin, so a refused attempt leaves the process exactly as it found it (the transport keeps
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1409
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// its old selection, the pulled-DB scratch and the retained logcat ring stay). A transport
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1410
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+
// without resolveDevice falls back to the post-pin check further down. The listing runs again
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1411
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// inside selectDevice below; that second listing is the price of a refusal that changes
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1412
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// nothing, so do not reuse this one to save it.
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1413
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+
if (auto && transport.resolveDevice) {
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1414
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+
const would = transport.resolveDevice(deviceSerial ?? null);
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1415
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const target = would.ok ? (would.serial ?? null) : null;
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1416
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if (target !== null && lastArmedSerial !== null && target !== lastArmedSerial) {
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1417
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return { status: 200, body: {
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1418
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enabled: false,
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1419
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// "A different device" rather than "the device changed": the pin has not moved, and the
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1420
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// header's device chip may already be naming the newcomer as the one attached.
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1421
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error: "A different device is attached. Press Reconnect to use it.",
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1422
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instructs: true,
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1423
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// Terminal for the automation (see the marker on the env refusal above): lastArmedSerial is
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1424
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// kept, so every later unattended attempt onto this device is refused identically.
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1425
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refusal: "device_changed",
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1426
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+
// The pin did not move to the new device: this is still the old one, or null once the
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1427
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+
// listing noticed the old one is gone (every listing reconciles a vanished pin). Never the
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1428
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+
// new serial, so the client's baseline cannot advance off a refusal that armed nothing.
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1429
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+
device_serial: transport.getSelectedDevice?.()?.serial ?? null,
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1430
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+
} };
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1431
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+
}
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1432
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+
}
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1268
1433
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transport.resetState();
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1269
1434
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// A reconnect may be a different device / re-armed profile, so drop the cached DB user
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1270
1435
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// set + sqlite path; the next /dbs re-detects the profiles fresh.
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@@ -1277,12 +1442,12 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
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1277
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// here with the list, before forwarding OR the screen reset.
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const selection = transport.selectDevice?.(deviceSerial ?? null);
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1279
1444
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if (selection && !selection.ok) {
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1280
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-
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1281
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-
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-
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1283
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-
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1284
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-
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1285
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-
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1445
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+
return { status: 409, body: {
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1446
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+
enabled: false,
|
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1447
|
+
error: selection.error,
|
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1448
|
+
instructs: selection.instructs,
|
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1449
|
+
devices: selection.devices,
|
|
1450
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+
} };
|
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1286
1451
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}
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1287
1452
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// The serial pinned at REPLY time, which under an overlapping /enable can differ from the pin
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1288
1453
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// this press made -- and reply time is the correct read: the verify probe rode the forward as
|
|
@@ -1305,7 +1470,9 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
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|
1305
1470
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// The second is not the old per-process one-shot back: that spent a teardown on the first enable
|
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1306
1471
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// even when boot had already reaped. reapScreenOnce fires only when boot did not, and without it
|
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1307
1472
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// such a process never reaps for its whole lifetime, because the switch gate needs a prior armed
|
|
1308
|
-
// serial and only an arm can set one.
|
|
1473
|
+
// serial and only an arm can set one. Neither is ever earned by an unattended attempt (see the
|
|
1474
|
+
// `auto` parameter): a switched auto attempt is refused outright below, and a same-device one
|
|
1475
|
+
// takes the detection-only reset.
|
|
1309
1476
|
//
|
|
1310
1477
|
// Live work IS in reach on that path, and iOS is where it matters. armDevice returns before the
|
|
1311
1478
|
// reap unless the transport implements selectDeviceAsync, and only AndroidTransport does
|
|
@@ -1321,6 +1488,34 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1321
1488
|
const pinned = selection && selection.ok ? (selection.serial ?? null) : null;
|
|
1322
1489
|
// A null pin means "nothing attached", not "the hardware changed".
|
|
1323
1490
|
const switched = pinned !== null && lastArmedSerial !== null && pinned !== lastArmedSerial;
|
|
1491
|
+
// An unattended attempt must not adopt DIFFERENT hardware than this process last armed: a
|
|
1492
|
+
// hardware swap is a human-scale event, and the swap teardown below (kill the live cast,
|
|
1493
|
+
// delete saved clips, pkill screenrecord device-wide) is exactly the destructive step a
|
|
1494
|
+
// timer never earns. Refusing — rather than arming without the teardown — also keeps
|
|
1495
|
+
// lastArmedSerial intact, so the press that follows still reads the swap and spends the
|
|
1496
|
+
// teardown it is owed; arming here and advancing the serial would hide the swap from that
|
|
1497
|
+
// press.
|
|
1498
|
+
if (switched && auto) {
|
|
1499
|
+
// The pin has already moved to the new hardware (selectDevice above), and the stream proxy
|
|
1500
|
+
// reasserts its forward onto the current pin on every connect, so from here the tab reads the
|
|
1501
|
+
// NEW device. The per-device state that belongs to the OLD one must not follow it: the
|
|
1502
|
+
// retained logcat ring would replay device A's lines into a stream now serving device B, and
|
|
1503
|
+
// the pulled-DB scratch is A's. Same two drops the switched path below performs; only the
|
|
1504
|
+
// screen teardown is withheld, and lastArmedSerial stays put so the press earns it.
|
|
1505
|
+
cleanupPulledDatabases();
|
|
1506
|
+
logSession?.restart();
|
|
1507
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1508
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1509
|
+
// Reachable only on a transport without resolveDevice (or a listing that changed between
|
|
1510
|
+
// the resolve above and this pick), so the pin HAS moved here; say so.
|
|
1511
|
+
error: "The attached device changed and the dashboard now points at it. Press Reconnect to arm it.",
|
|
1512
|
+
instructs: true,
|
|
1513
|
+
// Terminal for the automation (see the marker on the env refusal above): lastArmedSerial is
|
|
1514
|
+
// kept, so every later unattended attempt onto this device is refused identically.
|
|
1515
|
+
refusal: "device_changed",
|
|
1516
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1517
|
+
} };
|
|
1518
|
+
}
|
|
1324
1519
|
if (switched) {
|
|
1325
1520
|
// A real hardware change earns the teardown every time, not once per process, so this is the
|
|
1326
1521
|
// one reap that does not go through reapScreenOnce. Setting the flag here still tells a later
|
|
@@ -1328,10 +1523,13 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1328
1523
|
reapedThisProcess = true;
|
|
1329
1524
|
dashboardScreen.reset();
|
|
1330
1525
|
}
|
|
1331
|
-
else if (!reapScreenOnce(pinned, false)) {
|
|
1332
|
-
// No teardown was owed
|
|
1333
|
-
//
|
|
1334
|
-
//
|
|
1526
|
+
else if (auto || !reapScreenOnce(pinned, false)) {
|
|
1527
|
+
// No teardown was owed — or this is the unattended auto re-arm, which may never spend one
|
|
1528
|
+
// (see the `auto` parameter): the one-shot stays unspent for the next human press, which is
|
|
1529
|
+
// where the responsibility for killing a live cast and deleting clips belongs. false covers
|
|
1530
|
+
// the empty-cable enable for the same reason the seed below needs a real pin: there is no
|
|
1531
|
+
// device to reap on, so spending the one-shot there would leave a later real pin with
|
|
1532
|
+
// nothing left to earn a teardown with.
|
|
1335
1533
|
dashboardScreen.resetDetection();
|
|
1336
1534
|
}
|
|
1337
1535
|
// Only remember a serial we actually ARMED. selectDevice returns { ok: true, serial: null } when
|
|
@@ -1365,12 +1563,13 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1365
1563
|
const forwarded = forwardForRead();
|
|
1366
1564
|
if (!forwarded) {
|
|
1367
1565
|
const reason = transport.getLastForwardError?.() ?? null;
|
|
1368
|
-
|
|
1369
|
-
|
|
1370
|
-
|
|
1371
|
-
|
|
1372
|
-
|
|
1373
|
-
|
|
1566
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1567
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1568
|
+
error: reason ?? "ADB forward failed. Is a device connected?",
|
|
1569
|
+
// adb's own text, or a question: neither tells the user what to do.
|
|
1570
|
+
instructs: false,
|
|
1571
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1572
|
+
} };
|
|
1374
1573
|
}
|
|
1375
1574
|
// activateAsync() never throws; a failed broadcast is recorded on the transport.
|
|
1376
1575
|
// Surfacing it here gives the dashboard user the actual adb error instead of a bare
|
|
@@ -1385,27 +1584,33 @@ async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1385
1584
|
}
|
|
1386
1585
|
const activateError = transport.getLastActivateError?.() ?? null;
|
|
1387
1586
|
if (activateError) {
|
|
1388
|
-
|
|
1389
|
-
|
|
1390
|
-
|
|
1391
|
-
|
|
1392
|
-
|
|
1393
|
-
|
|
1587
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1588
|
+
enabled: false,
|
|
1589
|
+
error: `Broadcast failed: ${activateError}. Is the device connected?`,
|
|
1590
|
+
instructs: false,
|
|
1591
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1592
|
+
} };
|
|
1394
1593
|
}
|
|
1395
1594
|
// Verify by pinging the device the same way /health does (the shared pingDevice, so the
|
|
1396
1595
|
// ceiling and the three-state rules cannot drift from the other probe sites).
|
|
1397
1596
|
const ping = await pingDevice();
|
|
1398
1597
|
const enabled = ping.state === "armed" && ping.status === 200;
|
|
1598
|
+
// A verified arm refutes any cached "no_session" the same way a stream connect does (the
|
|
1599
|
+
// memo is evidence about a session this route just restored): without this, another stream
|
|
1600
|
+
// client's mid-retry memo read could announce the pre-arm diagnosis for up to its TTL and
|
|
1601
|
+
// drive that tab to fire a spurious /enable against the live session.
|
|
1602
|
+
if (enabled)
|
|
1603
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
1399
1604
|
// Probe the process state only on the failure path: a successful enable needs no diagnosis,
|
|
1400
1605
|
// and the probe is a real adb round trip. Capped short, because by this point the failure is
|
|
1401
1606
|
// already established and the user is watching a request that has stalled their SSE tabs; an
|
|
1402
1607
|
// explanation must not cost more than the operation it explains. The MCP path keeps the
|
|
1403
1608
|
// patient default, where seconds of ping retries have already elapsed and a real answer
|
|
1404
1609
|
// beats a fast "unknown".
|
|
1405
|
-
|
|
1406
|
-
|
|
1407
|
-
|
|
1408
|
-
|
|
1610
|
+
return { status: 200, body: {
|
|
1611
|
+
...enableResultBody(enabled, keepAliveHookFor(authored), enabled ? "unknown" : readProcessState(transport, DIAGNOSTIC_PS_TIMEOUT_MS)),
|
|
1612
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1613
|
+
} };
|
|
1409
1614
|
}
|
|
1410
1615
|
// The device-buffered source kinds, in one table so a new source is one row here: the
|
|
1411
1616
|
// device API route segment (clog and trace pluralize; the rest match the kind name) and
|
|
@@ -2116,12 +2321,138 @@ export function parseLogcat(line, resolvePkg = packageForPid) {
|
|
|
2116
2321
|
package: resolvePkg(pidN),
|
|
2117
2322
|
};
|
|
2118
2323
|
}
|
|
2324
|
+
// How long a freshly opened device stream may go without response HEADERS before the attempt is
|
|
2325
|
+
// declared dead. A healthy device answers /api/stream immediately; the pathological case this
|
|
2326
|
+
// bounds is a dead device-side socket behind a LIVE adb forward, where the host adb server
|
|
2327
|
+
// accepts the TCP connection unconditionally and then nothing ever answers — no error event, no
|
|
2328
|
+
// end event, just silence (observed live 2026-09-03: a stream that emitted no _status frame at
|
|
2329
|
+
// all). Generous enough to sit above pingDevice's observed 2.2s worst case.
|
|
2330
|
+
const STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 6000;
|
|
2331
|
+
// Test seam: the real deadline is deliberately generous, which would make every hang-mode test
|
|
2332
|
+
// wait it out in real time. Never read anywhere else.
|
|
2333
|
+
let streamResponseTimeoutMs = STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
2334
|
+
export function _setStreamResponseTimeoutForTest(ms) {
|
|
2335
|
+
streamResponseTimeoutMs = ms ?? STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
2336
|
+
}
|
|
2337
|
+
// Why the device stream keeps dying, answered from the device's own socket table — the one read
|
|
2338
|
+
// the adb forward cannot distort (see pingDevice's classification rules: through a forward, an
|
|
2339
|
+
// absent socket and a live-but-hiccuping session both present as resets). ABSENT means no radar
|
|
2340
|
+
// server is bound anywhere on the device: the session ENDED (idle watchdog, app restart), and
|
|
2341
|
+
// only a re-enable brings it back — which the retry loop deliberately never performs (enabling
|
|
2342
|
+
// binds an identity and mutates device state; a read loop must not, and a wire-contract machine
|
|
2343
|
+
// consumer holding /stream must never arm a device by holding it). The dashboard CLIENT acts on
|
|
2344
|
+
// this instead: its auto-re-arm is the human's own tab pressing its own Reconnect.
|
|
2345
|
+
//
|
|
2346
|
+
// One probe at a time, memoized briefly: every open stream connection retries on its own clock,
|
|
2347
|
+
// so several tabs against a dead session would otherwise each run their own adb read (a call
|
|
2348
|
+
// with a 5s ceiling) every few seconds.
|
|
2349
|
+
const OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS = 8000;
|
|
2350
|
+
let outageDiagnosisTtlMs = OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2351
|
+
// Test seam for the memo TTL: the collapse-slot invariants below are only observable once the
|
|
2352
|
+
// memo has expired, and 8 seconds of wall clock per assertion is the flake this seam avoids.
|
|
2353
|
+
export function _setOutageDiagnosisTtlForTest(ms) {
|
|
2354
|
+
outageDiagnosisTtlMs = ms ?? OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2355
|
+
}
|
|
2356
|
+
let lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2357
|
+
let outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2358
|
+
// Bumped wherever a live connect invalidates the diagnosis. A probe is an adb round trip
|
|
2359
|
+
// with a 5s ceiling racing a 1-2s reconnect cadence, so probe-resolves-after-recovery is the
|
|
2360
|
+
// COMMON ordering: without the generation check, that late resolution would re-poison the
|
|
2361
|
+
// just-cleared memo with a fresh timestamp, and any other stream (a second tab) or a quick
|
|
2362
|
+
// re-drop of this one would inherit "no_session" for the full TTL and re-arm against the
|
|
2363
|
+
// live session.
|
|
2364
|
+
let outageDiagnosisGeneration = 0;
|
|
2365
|
+
// Test seam: the real probe reaches a physical device over adb, which a test host may or may
|
|
2366
|
+
// not have, so tests pin the answer instead of inheriting whatever hardware is attached.
|
|
2367
|
+
let outageProbe = () => transport.radarSocketPresentAsync?.() ?? Promise.resolve("unknown");
|
|
2368
|
+
export function _setOutageProbeForTest(probe) {
|
|
2369
|
+
outageProbe = probe ?? (() => transport.radarSocketPresentAsync?.() ?? Promise.resolve("unknown"));
|
|
2370
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2371
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2372
|
+
outageDiagnosisGeneration++;
|
|
2373
|
+
// This is the "restore the diagnosis machinery" seam, so the TTL goes back with the rest: a
|
|
2374
|
+
// test that shortened it and forgot its own restore must not leak a 50ms memo into the next.
|
|
2375
|
+
outageDiagnosisTtlMs = OUTAGE_DIAGNOSIS_TTL_MS;
|
|
2376
|
+
}
|
|
2377
|
+
// Test seams for the diagnosis cache itself. The generation rule is a pure invariant about
|
|
2378
|
+
// ordering (a probe that resolves after an invalidation must not cache), and driving it
|
|
2379
|
+
// through the real stream would mean racing an adb-shaped probe against a live reconnect
|
|
2380
|
+
// cadence on the wall clock — the flake this pair exists to avoid.
|
|
2381
|
+
export function _diagnoseOutageForTest() {
|
|
2382
|
+
return diagnoseStreamOutage();
|
|
2383
|
+
}
|
|
2384
|
+
export function _invalidateOutageDiagnosisForTest() {
|
|
2385
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
2386
|
+
}
|
|
2387
|
+
// A live connect refutes any "no_session" — cached, in flight, or both. Exported to the
|
|
2388
|
+
// connect callback only through this helper so the memo and the pending write cannot be
|
|
2389
|
+
// invalidated separately (clearing just the memo was cycle-2's reopened race).
|
|
2390
|
+
function invalidateOutageDiagnosis() {
|
|
2391
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = null;
|
|
2392
|
+
// Drop the in-flight slot too: its eventual result is pre-invalidation evidence, and a
|
|
2393
|
+
// post-recovery consult must start a FRESH probe rather than await (or worse, adopt) the
|
|
2394
|
+
// orphan. The orphan's own cleanup is identity-checked, so it cannot null a successor.
|
|
2395
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2396
|
+
outageDiagnosisGeneration++;
|
|
2397
|
+
}
|
|
2398
|
+
async function diagnoseStreamOutage() {
|
|
2399
|
+
const now = Date.now();
|
|
2400
|
+
if (lastOutageDiagnosis && now - lastOutageDiagnosis.ts < outageDiagnosisTtlMs) {
|
|
2401
|
+
return lastOutageDiagnosis.reason;
|
|
2402
|
+
}
|
|
2403
|
+
if (outageDiagnosisInflight)
|
|
2404
|
+
return outageDiagnosisInflight;
|
|
2405
|
+
const generation = outageDiagnosisGeneration;
|
|
2406
|
+
// A holder rather than a bare binding: the async body needs its own promise's identity for
|
|
2407
|
+
// the slot-release check below, and it can run synchronously up to its first await —
|
|
2408
|
+
// before any direct `const probe = …` binding would initialize.
|
|
2409
|
+
const holder = { p: null };
|
|
2410
|
+
holder.p = (async () => {
|
|
2411
|
+
let reason = null;
|
|
2412
|
+
try {
|
|
2413
|
+
// The probe is CALLED synchronously (concurrent consults rely on it starting inside this
|
|
2414
|
+
// tick), but a synchronous throw is turned into a rejection so the body still suspends at
|
|
2415
|
+
// the await. Without that, a sync throw would let this whole body finish BEFORE the caller
|
|
2416
|
+
// stores holder.p into the collapse slot; the slot would then hold an already-settled
|
|
2417
|
+
// promise that the identity-checked release below never clears, wedging every later
|
|
2418
|
+
// consult on a stale null until the next live connect.
|
|
2419
|
+
let probe;
|
|
2420
|
+
try {
|
|
2421
|
+
probe = Promise.resolve(outageProbe());
|
|
2422
|
+
}
|
|
2423
|
+
catch (e) {
|
|
2424
|
+
probe = Promise.reject(e);
|
|
2425
|
+
}
|
|
2426
|
+
reason = (await probe) === "absent" ? "no_session" : null;
|
|
2427
|
+
}
|
|
2428
|
+
catch {
|
|
2429
|
+
// An unreadable socket table is "unknown", and unknown never classifies an outage.
|
|
2430
|
+
}
|
|
2431
|
+
// Release the collapse slot only if it is still OURS: a probe orphaned by an
|
|
2432
|
+
// invalidation (a live connect, the test seam) must not null a successor's in-flight
|
|
2433
|
+
// promise and briefly break the one-probe-at-a-time collapse.
|
|
2434
|
+
if (outageDiagnosisInflight === holder.p)
|
|
2435
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = null;
|
|
2436
|
+
// A stale probe reports nothing and caches nothing: evidence gathered before the
|
|
2437
|
+
// invalidation describes an outage that already ended.
|
|
2438
|
+
if (generation !== outageDiagnosisGeneration)
|
|
2439
|
+
return null;
|
|
2440
|
+
lastOutageDiagnosis = { ts: Date.now(), reason };
|
|
2441
|
+
return reason;
|
|
2442
|
+
})();
|
|
2443
|
+
outageDiagnosisInflight = holder.p;
|
|
2444
|
+
return holder.p;
|
|
2445
|
+
}
|
|
2119
2446
|
/**
|
|
2120
2447
|
* Self-healing SSE proxy. Keeps ONE long-lived response open to the browser and
|
|
2121
2448
|
* internally (re)connects to the device `/api/stream` every couple seconds while
|
|
2122
2449
|
* it is down, so the browser's EventSource never sees a close and never gives up.
|
|
2123
2450
|
* Every other retry it rebuilds the adb forward (the real cause of recurring
|
|
2124
2451
|
* "unreachable"), reusing AndroidTransport rather than shelling adb directly.
|
|
2452
|
+
* When retries keep failing it additionally asks WHY (see diagnoseStreamOutage)
|
|
2453
|
+
* and stamps the answer as `reason` on the `_status` frame, so a client can tell
|
|
2454
|
+
* "transport blip, the proxy will heal this" from "no radar session exists and
|
|
2455
|
+
* someone has to re-enable".
|
|
2125
2456
|
*
|
|
2126
2457
|
* When the active spec wants logs (source "log" or "all"), the handler subscribes
|
|
2127
2458
|
* to the shared session-long logSession: it is first replayed the entire retained
|
|
@@ -2140,11 +2471,26 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2140
2471
|
let upstream = null;
|
|
2141
2472
|
let closed = false;
|
|
2142
2473
|
let lastState = "";
|
|
2143
|
-
|
|
2144
|
-
|
|
2474
|
+
let lastReason = "";
|
|
2475
|
+
let headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2476
|
+
const announce = (state, msg, reason) => {
|
|
2477
|
+
// Dedup on state AND reason, with one asymmetry: a diagnosed outage keeps its diagnosis.
|
|
2478
|
+
// The retry loop re-announces generic "waiting" wording on every failed attempt, and once
|
|
2479
|
+
// this outage has been classified (reason set), that generic repeat is the SAME outage
|
|
2480
|
+
// described worse — letting it through would strip the reason the client is acting on
|
|
2481
|
+
// (see the dashboard's auto-re-arm) a second or two after it arrived. A reason CHANGE does
|
|
2482
|
+
// pass: the re-diagnosis retires a stale no_session with reason "undiagnosed" (a frame the
|
|
2483
|
+
// client reads as "drop the latch", not as a diagnosis of its own).
|
|
2484
|
+
if (state === lastState && !reason && lastReason)
|
|
2485
|
+
return;
|
|
2486
|
+
if (state === lastState && (reason ?? "") === lastReason)
|
|
2145
2487
|
return;
|
|
2146
2488
|
lastState = state;
|
|
2147
|
-
|
|
2489
|
+
lastReason = reason ?? "";
|
|
2490
|
+
const event = { state, msg };
|
|
2491
|
+
if (reason)
|
|
2492
|
+
event.reason = reason;
|
|
2493
|
+
res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "_status", event })}\n\n`);
|
|
2148
2494
|
};
|
|
2149
2495
|
// Keep the persistent logcat capture armed for the life of this connection.
|
|
2150
2496
|
// start() is idempotent, so it is safe to call both on initial setup and from
|
|
@@ -2178,6 +2524,41 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2178
2524
|
return;
|
|
2179
2525
|
settled = true;
|
|
2180
2526
|
retries++;
|
|
2527
|
+
// A failure that keeps repeating deserves a WHY. The second attempt (the first repeat —
|
|
2528
|
+
// one failure is routine) and a coarse cadence after that, so a fresh classification can
|
|
2529
|
+
// still ARRIVE mid-outage without running an adb probe on every 2s retry. announce never
|
|
2530
|
+
// downgrades a reasoned waiting to a generic one on its own (see its dedup asymmetry), but
|
|
2531
|
+
// a later probe that no longer finds the session absent (the socket is present, or the
|
|
2532
|
+
// table cannot be read because the device is gone) RETIRES a diagnosis this outage
|
|
2533
|
+
// announced: the outage changed nature under the latched reason, and without this the
|
|
2534
|
+
// client's headline kept asserting "no radar session" over a reason span saying the device
|
|
2535
|
+
// is unreachable, while its automation spent attempts on hardware that was not there.
|
|
2536
|
+
// Fire-and-forget: the probe must never delay the reconnect cadence it is describing.
|
|
2537
|
+
if (retries === 2 || retries % 6 === 0) {
|
|
2538
|
+
// A probe orphaned by an invalidation (this tab's own arm landing, an MCP activate, a live
|
|
2539
|
+
// connect) reports null exactly like a fresh "not absent" answer would. The generation tells
|
|
2540
|
+
// them apart: a stale null must not retire a diagnosis against a session that just armed.
|
|
2541
|
+
const generation = outageDiagnosisGeneration;
|
|
2542
|
+
void diagnoseStreamOutage().then((reason) => {
|
|
2543
|
+
// The connected check closes a REPRODUCED race: the probe is an adb round trip (5s
|
|
2544
|
+
// ceiling) racing a 1-2s reconnect cadence, so a session restored during its flight
|
|
2545
|
+
// (an auto-re-arm landing, an MCP activate, a manual press) can reconnect this stream
|
|
2546
|
+
// before the probe resolves — and announcing the stale diagnosis then would drive the
|
|
2547
|
+
// client to fire /enable AGAINST THE LIVE SESSION it just got back, the exact clobber
|
|
2548
|
+
// the socket-table diagnosis exists to prevent.
|
|
2549
|
+
if (closed || lastState === "connected" || generation !== outageDiagnosisGeneration)
|
|
2550
|
+
return;
|
|
2551
|
+
if (reason === null) {
|
|
2552
|
+
// "Not absent" covers both a socket that is present and a table that could not be read
|
|
2553
|
+
// (device gone, adb busy), so the wording asserts no cause; the generic per-retry
|
|
2554
|
+
// message is what the loop would say anyway.
|
|
2555
|
+
if (lastReason === "no_session")
|
|
2556
|
+
announce("waiting", "device not answering, retrying…", "undiagnosed");
|
|
2557
|
+
return;
|
|
2558
|
+
}
|
|
2559
|
+
announce("waiting", "no radar session on the device", reason);
|
|
2560
|
+
});
|
|
2561
|
+
}
|
|
2181
2562
|
// planReconnect (shared/stream.ts) owns the cadence: every other retry it
|
|
2182
2563
|
// rebuilds a clean forward before reconnecting and returns the delay. One
|
|
2183
2564
|
// implementation for this proxy and the MCP stream, so a tuning change
|
|
@@ -2193,12 +2574,44 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2193
2574
|
// (tuned for "device end died"), which would only catch a foreign repoint by luck on
|
|
2194
2575
|
// half of attempts; this cheap check-first call covers every attempt instead.
|
|
2195
2576
|
forwardForRead();
|
|
2577
|
+
// Bound the wait for response headers: see STREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS. Without this, the
|
|
2578
|
+
// accepted-but-never-answered connect mode fires none of the callbacks below and the
|
|
2579
|
+
// stream sits silent forever — no _status, no retry, nothing for a client to act on.
|
|
2580
|
+
// Per-ATTEMPT const, mirrored into the connection-scoped slot only for the close
|
|
2581
|
+
// teardown: each attempt's handlers clear their OWN deadline, so a stale attempt's late
|
|
2582
|
+
// error event can never clear the live attempt's timer out from under it.
|
|
2583
|
+
const myDeadline = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
2584
|
+
if (closed)
|
|
2585
|
+
return;
|
|
2586
|
+
announce("waiting", "device not answering, retrying…");
|
|
2587
|
+
try {
|
|
2588
|
+
upstream?.destroy();
|
|
2589
|
+
}
|
|
2590
|
+
catch {
|
|
2591
|
+
// already torn down
|
|
2592
|
+
}
|
|
2593
|
+
retry();
|
|
2594
|
+
}, streamResponseTimeoutMs);
|
|
2595
|
+
headersDeadline = myDeadline;
|
|
2196
2596
|
upstream = http.request({
|
|
2197
2597
|
host: RADAR_HOST,
|
|
2198
2598
|
port: RADAR_PORT,
|
|
2199
2599
|
path: "/api/stream",
|
|
2200
2600
|
method: "GET",
|
|
2201
2601
|
}, (up) => {
|
|
2602
|
+
clearTimeout(myDeadline);
|
|
2603
|
+
if (headersDeadline === myDeadline)
|
|
2604
|
+
headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2605
|
+
// A fresh outage on a long-lived connection must diagnose as early as the first one:
|
|
2606
|
+
// the "second failure" trigger and planReconnect's every-other-attempt forward
|
|
2607
|
+
// rebuild both key off this counter, and neither should inherit the count from an
|
|
2608
|
+
// outage that already recovered.
|
|
2609
|
+
retries = 0;
|
|
2610
|
+
// A live connect refutes any "no_session" — the cached memo AND a probe still in
|
|
2611
|
+
// flight (see invalidateOutageDiagnosis): without this, other stream clients would
|
|
2612
|
+
// re-read the pre-recovery diagnosis for up to its TTL and re-arm against the
|
|
2613
|
+
// healthy session.
|
|
2614
|
+
invalidateOutageDiagnosis();
|
|
2202
2615
|
announce("connected", "device stream connected");
|
|
2203
2616
|
// Re-arm logs on the same path the device proxy heals on: if the device
|
|
2204
2617
|
// dropped and came back, `adb logcat` had exited; restart it (idempotent)
|
|
@@ -2215,6 +2628,9 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2215
2628
|
});
|
|
2216
2629
|
});
|
|
2217
2630
|
upstream.on("error", () => {
|
|
2631
|
+
clearTimeout(myDeadline);
|
|
2632
|
+
if (headersDeadline === myDeadline)
|
|
2633
|
+
headersDeadline = null;
|
|
2218
2634
|
announce("waiting", "device unreachable, retrying…");
|
|
2219
2635
|
retry();
|
|
2220
2636
|
});
|
|
@@ -2271,6 +2687,8 @@ function handleStream(req, res) {
|
|
|
2271
2687
|
req.on("close", () => {
|
|
2272
2688
|
closed = true;
|
|
2273
2689
|
clearInterval(heartbeat);
|
|
2690
|
+
if (headersDeadline)
|
|
2691
|
+
clearTimeout(headersDeadline);
|
|
2274
2692
|
if (unsubscribeLogs)
|
|
2275
2693
|
unsubscribeLogs(); // detach listener; capture stays up
|
|
2276
2694
|
try {
|