@slack/radar-mcp 1.17.0 → 1.17.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/mcp/index.js +3 -7
- package/dist/mcp/web-child-env.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/web-child-env.js +32 -0
- package/dist/shared/android.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/shared/android.js +246 -35
- package/dist/web/bin.js +5 -1
- package/dist/web/public/next/app.js +16 -4
- package/dist/web/public/next/registry.js +18 -10
- package/dist/web/public/next/store.js +279 -35
- package/dist/web/server.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/web/server.js +231 -108
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/web/server.js
CHANGED
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@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ const SPEC_PATH = path.join(SPEC_DIR, `web-spec-${WEB_PORT}.json`);
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// fingerprint every launch for a reason unrelated to the actual spec.
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const SELF_HEAL_PATH = path.join(SPEC_DIR, "self-heal.json");
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const transport = new AndroidTransport();
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// The ONE ceiling for every device ping this file makes (boot-arm, /health, /enable all go
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// through pingDevice). A shorter one turns ordinary latency into a false negative: boot would
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// read a live-but-slow session as absent, and /health would flap the connection dot. Observed
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// latency reaches past 2.2 seconds against an unauthorized device, so this must stay above that.
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const PING_PROBE_MS = 2500;
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// Reassert the shared adb forward before every HTTP-based device read. Mirrors
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// mcp/index.ts's forwardForRead(): this process's own portForwarded cache cannot see a
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// repoint made by a SEPARATE process (the MCP server) sharing the same host-global
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@@ -354,6 +359,165 @@ export async function shutdownDashboard(server, deps = {}) {
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fallback = setTimeout(finish, 2000);
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fallback.unref();
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}
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/**
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* The ONE device ping every probe site uses: boot-arm's armed check, /health, and /enable's
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* verify step. One function rather than three inline copies so the three-state rules below hold
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* everywhere at once, and so the ceiling cannot be lowered at one site while the others keep the
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* old value. The default ceiling sits inside observed latency: a health read against an
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* unauthorized device has been measured at over 2.2 seconds.
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*
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* The classification rules, each load-bearing:
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* - Anything that ANSWERS is "armed": something we must not clobber. A 200 is Radar; another
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* status still means a live server on the socket, which is not ours to re-arm out from under.
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* - Only a clean REFUSAL is "unarmed": ECONNREFUSED means nothing is listening on the local
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* port at all. Through a built adb forward that hardly ever happens: the HOST adb server
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* accepts every connection first and only then discovers whether the device side exists, so
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* an absent device-side socket presents as a RESET, not a refusal.
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* - A timeout, a reset, or a mid-response error is "unknown": not an answer. A reset in
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* particular is ambiguous by construction here (an absent socket and a misbehaving live
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* session read identically through the forward), so the boot chain resolves it against the
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* device's own socket table instead of guessing at this layer.
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*/
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function pingDevice(timeoutMs = PING_PROBE_MS) {
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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let settled = false;
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const done = (state, status = null, body = "") => {
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if (settled)
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return;
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settled = true;
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resolve({ state, status, body });
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};
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const req = http.request({ host: RADAR_HOST, port: RADAR_PORT, path: "/api/ping", method: "GET", timeout: timeoutMs }, (up) => {
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// The ping body is the device's own small JSON status. Bound the accumulation anyway so a
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// misbehaving local endpoint cannot grow it without limit; a truncated body simply fails
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// the caller's JSON.parse, which every caller treats as "no extra detail".
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const MAX_PING_BODY = 64 * 1024;
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let body = "";
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up.on("data", (c) => {
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if (body.length < MAX_PING_BODY)
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body += c;
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});
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up.on("end", () => done("armed", up.statusCode ?? null, body));
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up.on("error", () => done("unknown"));
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});
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req.on("error", (e) => done(e.code === "ECONNREFUSED" ? "unarmed" : "unknown"));
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req.on("timeout", () => {
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req.destroy();
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done("unknown");
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});
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req.end();
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});
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}
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/**
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* Arm Radar once, at dashboard boot, so a launch against a freshly restarted app does not land on
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* "waiting for device" until the human finds the Reconnect button. Called by bin.ts from the listen
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* callback, for the same reason startAutoCloseSweep is: only the process that actually WON the port
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* may touch the device, so a second launcher that adopts a running dashboard never re-arms someone
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* else's session.
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*
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* The work itself runs OFF the event loop entirely (see armDevice), because an
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* attached-but-unauthorised or locked device can hold a single adb call at its 5 second ceiling,
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* and a chain of them can run 15 seconds or more. A server that cannot answer meanwhile breaks
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* the adopt path this file otherwise protects carefully: a second launcher hits EADDRINUSE,
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* probes the loopback /spec with a 2 second timeout to recognise this dashboard, and declares
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* the port foreign and exits if that probe does not answer.
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*
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* NOT routed through handleEnable, which is written around an HTTP response. Two of the steps it
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* additionally performs really are no-ops in a fresh process (resetState and resetDbState only clear
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* in-process fields that are already at their defaults), but two are NOT, and this is deliberately
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* left as a known gap rather than claimed away: resetScreenState() kills orphaned device-side
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* screenrecord processes left by a crashed prior dashboard, and the switched-device branch
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* (cleanupPulledDatabases + logSession.restart) is gated on a serial inherited from the environment,
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* so a boot carrying a stale ANDROID_SERIAL can legitimately be a switch. Pressing Reconnect still
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* performs both. If a third step is ever needed here, extract the shared core instead of copying it.
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*/
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export function armOnBoot() {
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// An agent-spawned dashboard must not reach the device on its own. open_radar_dashboard is exempt
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// from the MCP session gate precisely BECAUSE opening a dashboard could not arm anything without a
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// human pressing Reconnect, and arming here would quietly remove the premise that exemption rests
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// on: an agent call would arm a device and begin logcat capture to disk with no human action, and
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// its child is detached with stdio ignored so even a failure line would reach nobody. A human
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// launch, whether a terminal `slack-radar web` or the dock app, sets no marker and does arm.
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if (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_AGENT_LAUNCH)
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return;
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// Escape hatch, matching this file's other automatic-on-boot behaviours (SLACK_RADAR_NO_OPEN,
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// SLACK_RADAR_NO_AUTO_CLOSE, SLACK_RADAR_NO_FFMPEG). This is the first one that touches the
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// physical device, so it is the one that most deserves an opt-out.
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if (process.env.SLACK_RADAR_NO_ARM)
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return;
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void armDevice();
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}
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/**
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* The deferred body of armOnBoot. Never throws: every call below reports through the transport.
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*
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* Every adb step runs through the transport's *Async methods (promisified execFile), so each adb
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* call lives in its own child process and the event loop stays free WHILE a call is in flight,
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* not merely between calls. The bound this buys: the server can accept and answer at any point
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* in the chain, including the middle of a single wedged 5 second adb call, so a second
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* launcher's 2 second /spec probe is answered no matter how slow the device is. An earlier
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* version ran synchronous transport calls with yields between them, which still left each
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* individual call as an unanswerable window at its own ceiling.
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*
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* A detached child was also considered and rejected, but not for the reason once claimed here
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* (that a child's logcat capture would die with it: the dashboard's Logs tab actually reads
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* logSession, spawned per /stream, and startCapture's file is only read by the MCP side's
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* getRecentLogs and snapshot). The real problem is state: selectDevice pins ANDROID_SERIAL and
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* activate records radarEnabled and the timeout, and a child would set all three in its own
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* process and exit, leaving THIS server unpinned and unaware of what it just armed.
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*/
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async function armDevice() {
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469
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// One macrotask before any adb child spawns, so armOnBoot's caller provably returns with zero
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470
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// device work started in its own tick (execFile spawns its child synchronously even though the
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// result is awaited).
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await new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
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// Two DIFFERENT situations return not-ok here and both are deliberately silent: a genuinely
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// ambiguous host (two or more devices, which the header's picker must ask about rather than have
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// answered for the user), and a device list that could not be read at all. The second is a real
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// condition, and it is not left unreported: /_control/devices polls separately and distinguishes
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// adb_error from zero devices, which the header's device chip renders as "device: adb error".
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const selection = await transport.selectDeviceAsync(null);
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if (!selection.ok)
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return;
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// The forward could not be built. Nothing to arm, and the dashboard is still usable for a
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// device plugged in later, but the REASON is printed rather than swallowed: an attached device
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// that is unauthorized or offline fails exactly here, and silence on that path is what left
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// people staring at "waiting for device" with no idea a launch had already tried and why it
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// stopped.
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if (!(await transport.reassertForwardAsync())) {
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const reason = transport.getLastForwardError?.() ?? null;
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// Only when something is on the cable: an empty desk fails the forward too ("no
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// devices/emulators found"), and that is the deliberately quiet case. An attached but
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// unauthorized device also selects nothing, so the gate is the raw listing, which keeps
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// exactly that case loud.
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if (reason && selection.devices.length > 0) {
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console.log(`Radar could not be armed at startup: ${reason}`);
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}
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return;
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}
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// ALREADY ARMED, so leave it alone. This is not just an optimisation. activate()'s own skip guard
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498
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// is per-instance state and this process is brand new, so without this check boot would
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499
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// re-broadcast on every launch -- and the timeout it would send is this fresh instance's own
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// default, which can be SHORTER than one another process explicitly asked for. An MCP session that
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// armed for 30 minutes would have its idle window silently cut to the default by someone merely
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// opening a dashboard to look, with no error surfaced to either side.
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if ((await pingDevice()).state === "armed")
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return;
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505
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// Anything else the ping says is inconclusive HERE, including a reset: the probe travels the
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// adb forward, and the host adb server accepts every connection before discovering whether the
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507
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// device side exists, so an absent socket and a misbehaving live session read identically. The
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508
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// device's own socket table is the authority the forward cannot distort: ABSENT means no server
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509
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// is bound anywhere, so a broadcast cannot take another session's window. Anything else skips,
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510
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// because the cost of guessing wrong is another process's window while the cost of not arming
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// is one press of a button that is already on screen.
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if ((await transport.radarSocketPresentAsync()) !== "absent")
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return;
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await transport.activateAsync(transport.getTimeoutMinutes());
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// A device WAS reachable and the broadcast still failed, which is worth printing. Silence here is
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// what left people staring at "waiting for device" with no idea a launch had already tried.
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const error = transport.getLastActivateError?.() ?? null;
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if (error)
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console.log(`Radar could not be armed at startup: ${error}`);
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}
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/**
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* Start the periodic auto-close sweep. Called once by bin.ts AFTER a successful listen bind, not
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* from createServer, so importing this module (or spinning a throwaway server in a test) never
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@@ -461,7 +625,8 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
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if (tab)
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touchTab(tab);
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}
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-
handleHealth
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// Deliberately not awaited; handleHealth answers res itself and never rejects.
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void handleHealth(res);
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return;
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}
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if (urlPath === "/shutdown" && req.method === "POST") {
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@@ -470,7 +635,8 @@ export function createServer(onShutdown) {
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}
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if (urlPath === "/enable" && req.method === "POST") {
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const serial = new URL(url, `http://localhost:${WEB_PORT}`).searchParams.get("device_serial");
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473
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-
handleEnable
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// Deliberately not awaited; handleEnable answers res itself and never rejects.
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void handleEnable(res, serial, isAuthoredRequest(req.headers));
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return;
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}
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if (url === "/stream" && req.method === "GET") {
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@@ -714,7 +880,7 @@ function handleShutdown(req, res, fire) {
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* is built. Drives the connection dot even on a blank dashboard. Reuses the same
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* forward/proxy base as the rest of the server.
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*/
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-
function handleHealth(res) {
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async function handleHealth(res) {
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// Reassert before reading: see forwardForRead's doc comment. Without this, a foreign
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// repoint of the shared port (the MCP process switching devices) makes /health probe
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// the WRONG device while still labeling the reply with THIS process's own (correct)
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@@ -723,80 +889,43 @@ function handleHealth(res) {
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// the cost low on the 2s poll cadence; it only pays for a real rebuild when the shared
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// port is actually pointed somewhere else.
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forwardForRead();
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-
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// does a second writeHead -> ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT -> uncaught -> the whole server dies.
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-
let replied = false;
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const ping = await pingDevice();
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const ok = ping.state === "armed" && ping.status === 200;
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// The bound profile, read from the device ping body. This is the TRUTH about which
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// profile owns the socket (the app that bound first), unlike the host-side activate
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// guess in getActiveUserId() which can drift. The dashboard shows this so it never
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// claims a profile you are not actually seeing.
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up.on("data", (c) => {
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if (body.length < MAX_PING_BODY)
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body += c;
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});
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up.on("end", () => {
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const ok = up.statusCode === 200;
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let uid = null;
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let profile = null;
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let sources = null;
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// Only trust the body on a 200. A device 5xx-ing with a stale ping body must NOT
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// surface a bound profile while device:false — that would let the dashboard show a
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// confident profile label for an unhealthy device.
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if (ok) {
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try {
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const p = JSON.parse(body);
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if (p.android_user_id != null)
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uid = String(p.android_user_id);
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if (typeof p.profile === "string")
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profile = p.profile;
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if (Array.isArray(p.sources))
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784
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sources = p.sources;
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-
}
|
|
786
|
-
catch {
|
|
787
|
-
// non-JSON / partial body: device is up but we cannot name the profile
|
|
788
|
-
}
|
|
789
|
-
}
|
|
790
|
-
reply(ok, uid, profile, sources);
|
|
791
|
-
});
|
|
792
|
-
up.on("error", () => reply(false));
|
|
793
|
-
});
|
|
794
|
-
probe.on("error", () => reply(false));
|
|
795
|
-
probe.on("timeout", () => {
|
|
796
|
-
probe.destroy();
|
|
797
|
-
reply(false);
|
|
898
|
+
let uid = null;
|
|
899
|
+
let profile = null;
|
|
900
|
+
let sources = null;
|
|
901
|
+
// Only trust the body on a healthy 200. A device 5xx-ing with a stale ping body must NOT
|
|
902
|
+
// surface a bound profile while device:false -- that would let the dashboard show a
|
|
903
|
+
// confident profile label for an unhealthy device.
|
|
904
|
+
if (ok) {
|
|
905
|
+
try {
|
|
906
|
+
const p = JSON.parse(ping.body);
|
|
907
|
+
if (p.android_user_id != null)
|
|
908
|
+
uid = String(p.android_user_id);
|
|
909
|
+
if (typeof p.profile === "string")
|
|
910
|
+
profile = p.profile;
|
|
911
|
+
if (Array.isArray(p.sources))
|
|
912
|
+
sources = p.sources;
|
|
913
|
+
}
|
|
914
|
+
catch {
|
|
915
|
+
// non-JSON / partial body: device is up but we cannot name the profile
|
|
916
|
+
}
|
|
917
|
+
}
|
|
918
|
+
const selected = transport.getSelectedDevice?.() ?? null;
|
|
919
|
+
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
920
|
+
device: ok,
|
|
921
|
+
screen: screenCapabilities(),
|
|
922
|
+
boundUserId: uid,
|
|
923
|
+
boundProfile: profile,
|
|
924
|
+
device_serial: selected?.serial ?? null,
|
|
925
|
+
device_label: selected?.label ?? null,
|
|
926
|
+
// Capture sources the build declares on ping (seam builds only); null on older builds.
|
|
927
|
+
sources,
|
|
798
928
|
});
|
|
799
|
-
probe.end();
|
|
800
929
|
}
|
|
801
930
|
/**
|
|
802
931
|
* The /enable response body for a completed device probe, plus its one side effect: a
|
|
@@ -974,7 +1103,7 @@ processState = "unknown") {
|
|
|
974
1103
|
* user never has to drop to a terminal. Delegates entirely to AndroidTransport;
|
|
975
1104
|
* no adb shelling here.
|
|
976
1105
|
*/
|
|
977
|
-
function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
1106
|
+
async function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
978
1107
|
transport.resetState();
|
|
979
1108
|
// A reconnect may be a different device / re-armed profile, so drop the cached DB user
|
|
980
1109
|
// set + sqlite path; the next /dbs re-detects the profiles fresh.
|
|
@@ -994,6 +1123,14 @@ function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
994
1123
|
});
|
|
995
1124
|
return;
|
|
996
1125
|
}
|
|
1126
|
+
// The serial pinned at REPLY time, which under an overlapping /enable can differ from the pin
|
|
1127
|
+
// this press made -- and reply time is the correct read: the verify probe rode the forward as
|
|
1128
|
+
// it is NOW, readProcessState reads the same current pin, and the next /health poll reports
|
|
1129
|
+
// this serial, so the reply stays consistent with its own diagnosis and with the poll that
|
|
1130
|
+
// follows. Echoed on every reply past this point so the store can advance its serial baseline
|
|
1131
|
+
// from the reply itself, instead of discovering the pin from a later health poll whose serial
|
|
1132
|
+
// edge would retire the very reason the reply carries.
|
|
1133
|
+
const pinnedSerial = () => transport.getSelectedDevice?.()?.serial ?? null;
|
|
997
1134
|
resetScreenState(); // re-detect the active display + clear any stale cast on re-arm
|
|
998
1135
|
// On a switch to a different device, drop this device's pulled DB scratch AND the
|
|
999
1136
|
// retained logcat capture -- both are per-device state resetDbState()/resetScreenState()
|
|
@@ -1024,53 +1161,39 @@ function handleEnable(res, deviceSerial, authored) {
|
|
|
1024
1161
|
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
1025
1162
|
enabled: false,
|
|
1026
1163
|
error: reason ?? "ADB forward failed. Is a device connected?",
|
|
1164
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1027
1165
|
});
|
|
1028
1166
|
return;
|
|
1029
1167
|
}
|
|
1030
|
-
//
|
|
1031
|
-
// Surfacing it here gives the dashboard user the actual adb error instead of
|
|
1032
|
-
//
|
|
1033
|
-
|
|
1168
|
+
// activateAsync() never throws; a failed broadcast is recorded on the transport.
|
|
1169
|
+
// Surfacing it here gives the dashboard user the actual adb error instead of a bare
|
|
1170
|
+
// enabled:false after the ping probe times out. Async for the same reason as the boot chain:
|
|
1171
|
+
// the broadcast waits for ordered delivery under a 15 second ceiling, and a Reconnect press
|
|
1172
|
+
// must not hold the event loop for it.
|
|
1173
|
+
await transport.activateAsync(transport.getTimeoutMinutes());
|
|
1034
1174
|
const activateError = transport.getLastActivateError?.() ?? null;
|
|
1035
1175
|
if (activateError) {
|
|
1036
1176
|
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
1037
1177
|
enabled: false,
|
|
1038
1178
|
error: `Broadcast failed: ${activateError}. Is the device connected?`,
|
|
1179
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1039
1180
|
});
|
|
1040
1181
|
return;
|
|
1041
1182
|
}
|
|
1042
|
-
// Verify by pinging the device the same way /health does
|
|
1043
|
-
// and
|
|
1044
|
-
|
|
1045
|
-
const
|
|
1046
|
-
|
|
1047
|
-
|
|
1048
|
-
|
|
1049
|
-
|
|
1050
|
-
|
|
1051
|
-
|
|
1052
|
-
|
|
1053
|
-
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
|
-
sendJson(res, 200, enableResultBody(enabled, keepAliveHookFor(authored), enabled ? "unknown" : readProcessState(transport, DIAGNOSTIC_PS_TIMEOUT_MS)));
|
|
1056
|
-
};
|
|
1057
|
-
const probe = http.request({
|
|
1058
|
-
host: RADAR_HOST,
|
|
1059
|
-
port: RADAR_PORT,
|
|
1060
|
-
path: "/api/ping",
|
|
1061
|
-
method: "GET",
|
|
1062
|
-
timeout: 2500,
|
|
1063
|
-
}, (up) => {
|
|
1064
|
-
up.resume();
|
|
1065
|
-
up.on("end", () => reply(up.statusCode === 200));
|
|
1066
|
-
up.on("error", () => reply(false));
|
|
1067
|
-
});
|
|
1068
|
-
probe.on("error", () => reply(false));
|
|
1069
|
-
probe.on("timeout", () => {
|
|
1070
|
-
probe.destroy();
|
|
1071
|
-
reply(false);
|
|
1183
|
+
// Verify by pinging the device the same way /health does (the shared pingDevice, so the
|
|
1184
|
+
// ceiling and the three-state rules cannot drift from the other probe sites).
|
|
1185
|
+
const ping = await pingDevice();
|
|
1186
|
+
const enabled = ping.state === "armed" && ping.status === 200;
|
|
1187
|
+
// Probe the process state only on the failure path: a successful enable needs no diagnosis,
|
|
1188
|
+
// and the probe is a real adb round trip. Capped short, because by this point the failure is
|
|
1189
|
+
// already established and the user is watching a request that has stalled their SSE tabs; an
|
|
1190
|
+
// explanation must not cost more than the operation it explains. The MCP path keeps the
|
|
1191
|
+
// patient default, where seconds of ping retries have already elapsed and a real answer
|
|
1192
|
+
// beats a fast "unknown".
|
|
1193
|
+
sendJson(res, 200, {
|
|
1194
|
+
...enableResultBody(enabled, keepAliveHookFor(authored), enabled ? "unknown" : readProcessState(transport, DIAGNOSTIC_PS_TIMEOUT_MS)),
|
|
1195
|
+
device_serial: pinnedSerial(),
|
|
1072
1196
|
});
|
|
1073
|
-
probe.end();
|
|
1074
1197
|
}
|
|
1075
1198
|
// The device-buffered source kinds, in one table so a new source is one row here: the
|
|
1076
1199
|
// device API route segment (clog and trace pluralize; the rest match the kind name) and
|