@skyramp/mcp 0.4.1 → 0.4.2-rc.2

package/node_modules/playwright/node_modules/playwright-core/bundles/mcp/node_modules/fast-uri/test/reserved-path-normalization.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const test = require('tape')
+const fastURI = require('..')
+
+const PATH_RESERVED = "!$&'()*+,;=:@/"
+
+function percentEncode (character, lowerCase) {
+  const hex = character.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(2, '0')
+  return '%' + (lowerCase ? hex : hex.toUpperCase())
+}
+
+test('normalize preserves literal and escaped reserved path characters', (t) => {
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://example.com/a;b'),
+    'http://example.com/a;b',
+    'literal semicolon remains literal'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://example.com/a%3ab'),
+    'http://example.com/a%3Ab',
+    'escaped colon remains escaped and its hex is uppercased'
+  )
+
+  for (const character of PATH_RESERVED) {
+    const literal = `http://example.com/a${character}b`
+    const escaped = `http://example.com/a${percentEncode(character, true)}b`
+    const normalizedEscape = `http://example.com/a${percentEncode(character, false)}b`
+
+    t.equal(fastURI.normalize(literal), literal, `preserves literal ${character}`)
+    t.equal(fastURI.normalize(escaped), normalizedEscape, `preserves escaped ${character}`)
+  }
+
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://example.com/a/./café'),
+    'http://example.com/a/caf%C3%A9',
+    'removes real dot segments and UTF-8 encodes raw non-ASCII'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://example.com/a/%2e%2e/b'),
+    'http://example.com/a/%2E%2E/b',
+    'preserves escaped dots as path data'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://example.com/Kſ'),
+    'http://example.com/%E2%84%AA%C5%BF',
+    'UTF-8 encodes Unicode characters that case-fold to ASCII'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('serialize uses the RFC 3986 path character set without opening escapes', (t) => {
+  const rawPath = `/a${PATH_RESERVED}b`
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ scheme: 'http', host: 'example.com', path: rawPath }),
+    `http://example.com${rawPath}`,
+    'keeps all legal raw path characters'
+  )
+
+  const escapedPath = Array.from(PATH_RESERVED, (character) => percentEncode(character, true)).join('')
+  const normalizedEscapedPath = Array.from(PATH_RESERVED, (character) => percentEncode(character, false)).join('')
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ scheme: 'http', host: 'example.com', path: '/' + escapedPath }),
+    'http://example.com/' + normalizedEscapedPath,
+    'uppercases valid escapes without decoding reserved characters'
+  )
+
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ scheme: 'http', host: 'example.com', path: '/a?b#c[d]' }),
+    'http://example.com/a%3Fb%23c%5Bd%5D',
+    'encodes characters that would leave the path component'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ path: 'a:b/c:d' }),
+    'a%3Ab/c:d',
+    'only escapes a colon where path-noscheme requires it'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ path: './a:b/c:d' }),
+    'a%3Ab/c:d',
+    'escapes a first-segment colon exposed by dot-segment removal'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('./a:b'),
+    'a%3Ab',
+    'normalization keeps a relative path from becoming a scheme'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ path: '/Kſ' }),
+    '/%E2%84%AA%C5%BF',
+    'UTF-8 encodes Unicode characters that case-fold to ASCII'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('equal distinguishes escaped reserved path data from literal syntax', (t) => {
+  for (const character of PATH_RESERVED) {
+    const literal = `http://example.com/a${character}b`
+    const escaped = `http://example.com/a${percentEncode(character, false)}b`
+    t.equal(fastURI.equal(literal, escaped, {}), false, `distinguishes literal and escaped ${character}`)
+  }
+
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.equal('./a:b', 'a:b', {}),
+    false,
+    'does not equate a relative path with an absolute URI after removing dot segments'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})

package/node_modules/playwright/node_modules/playwright-core/bundles/mcp/node_modules/fast-uri/test/scheme-validation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const test = require('tape')
+const fastURI = require('..')
+
+const MALFORMED_SCHEME_ERROR = 'URI scheme is malformed.'
+
+const malformedSchemes = [
+  '%2f%2fevil.example:/pwn',
+  '%u002f%u002fevil.example:/pwn',
+  '%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20sid=attacker:/p',
+  'foo%3Abar:value',
+  'foo%2Fbar:value',
+  '1http://example.com/',
+  'foo_bar:value',
+  'éxample:value',
+  'Kttp://example.com/',
+  'ſcheme:value'
+]
+
+test('parse validates the decoded scheme against RFC 3986', (t) => {
+  const validSchemes = [
+    ['a:value', 'a'],
+    ['HTTP://example.com/', 'http'],
+    ['a1+.-:value', 'a1+.-'],
+    ['%4Aavascript:alert(1)', 'javascript'],
+    ['foo%2Bbar:value', 'foo+bar'],
+    ['%u006Aavascript:1', 'javascript'],
+    ['ht%74ps://example.com/', 'https']
+  ]
+
+  for (const [uri, scheme] of validSchemes) {
+    const parsed = fastURI.parse(uri)
+    t.equal(parsed.error, undefined, uri)
+    t.equal(parsed.scheme, scheme, uri + ' scheme')
+  }
+
+  for (const uri of malformedSchemes) {
+    const parsed = fastURI.parse(uri)
+    t.equal(parsed.error, MALFORMED_SCHEME_ERROR, uri)
+  }
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('decoded schemes select their scheme handlers', (t) => {
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('ht%74ps://example.com:443'),
+    'https://example.com/',
+    'HTTP normalization runs after decoding the scheme'
+  )
+
+  // 3.x has no mailto scheme handler (added in v4); use the ws handler to
+  // verify that a percent-encoded scheme still selects its scheme handler
+  const ws = fastURI.parse('we%62socket://example.com/')
+  t.equal(ws.scheme, 'websocket', 'ws parsing runs after decoding the scheme')
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('normalize preserves schemes that decode to invalid identifiers', (t) => {
+  for (const uri of malformedSchemes) {
+    t.equal(fastURI.normalize(uri), uri, uri)
+  }
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('scheme normalization cannot introduce authority or control delimiters', (t) => {
+  const authority = '%2f%2fevil.example:/pwn'
+  const crlf = '%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20sid=attacker:/p'
+
+  t.equal(fastURI.parse(authority).host, undefined, 'original input has no authority')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(authority), authority, 'normalization does not create an authority')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(crlf), crlf, 'normalization does not emit raw CRLF')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(crlf).includes('\r\n'), false, 'normalized output contains no raw CRLF')
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('equal returns false for malformed decoded schemes', (t) => {
+  for (const uri of malformedSchemes) {
+    t.equal(fastURI.equal(uri, uri, {}), false, uri)
+  }
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('resolve rejects malformed decoded schemes in either input', (t) => {
+  t.throws(
+    () => fastURI.resolve('%2f%2fevil.example:/base', 'child'),
+    /URI scheme is malformed\./,
+    'malformed base'
+  )
+  t.throws(
+    () => fastURI.resolve('https://allowed.example/app/', '%2f%2fevil.example:/pwn'),
+    /URI scheme is malformed\./,
+    'malformed relative reference'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('serialize validates decoded component schemes', (t) => {
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ scheme: 'foo%2Bbar', path: 'value' }),
+    'foo+bar:value',
+    'valid decoded scheme is serialized'
+  )
+  t.throws(
+    () => fastURI.serialize({ scheme: '//evil.example', path: '/pwn' }),
+    /URI scheme is malformed\./,
+    'raw invalid scheme'
+  )
+  t.throws(
+    () => fastURI.serialize({ scheme: '%2f%2fevil.example', path: '/pwn' }),
+    /URI scheme is malformed\./,
+    'encoded invalid scheme'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.equal(
+      { scheme: '%2f%2fevil.example', path: '/pwn' },
+      { scheme: '%2f%2fevil.example', path: '/pwn' },
+      {}
+    ),
+    false,
+    'equality fails closed for malformed component objects'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})

package/node_modules/playwright/node_modules/playwright-core/bundles/mcp/node_modules/fast-uri/test/security-normalization.test.js

@@ -37,3 +37,104 @@ test('equal does not treat reserved path escapes as live path syntax', (t) => {
 
   t.end()
 })
+
+test('serialize preserves literal RFC 3986 reserved path characters', (t) => {
+  // GHSA-7mh8-fcmq-x23c: literal reserved path chars must not be rewritten to
+  // percent escapes by the escape()-style safe set.
+  const cases = [
+    'http://example.com/a;b',
+    'http://example.com/a=b',
+    'http://example.com/a&b',
+    'http://example.com/a$b',
+    'http://example.com/a:b',
+    'http://example.com/a@b'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((uri) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.serialize(fastURI.parse(uri)), uri, uri)
+  })
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('serialize preserves existing reserved path escapes as data', (t) => {
+  // GHSA-7mh8-fcmq-x23c: an existing %3A escape must stay %3A instead of being
+  // rewritten into a live colon.
+  const cases = [
+    'http://example.com/a%3Ab',
+    'http://example.com/a%3Bb',
+    'http://example.com/a%3D%3D'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((uri) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.serialize(fastURI.parse(uri)), uri, uri)
+  })
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('serialize keeps path-noscheme colon escaping', (t) => {
+  // Without a scheme a literal colon would be reparsed as a scheme separator,
+  // so it must stay percent-escaped while an existing %3A is preserved.
+  t.equal(fastURI.serialize({ path: 'foo:bar' }), 'foo%3Abar')
+  t.equal(fastURI.serialize({ path: 'a%3Ab' }), 'a%3Ab')
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('hostname normalization never decodes an escape more than once', (t) => {
+  const encodedLocalhost = 'http://%256c%256f%2563%2561%256c%2568%256f%2573%2574/'
+  const encodedLoopback = '//127%252e0%252e0%252e1/private'
+  const encodedMetadataAddress = '//169%252E254%252E169%252E254/latest/meta-data/'
+
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(encodedLocalhost), encodedLocalhost, 'nested hostname letters remain encoded')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(encodedLoopback), encodedLoopback, 'nested IPv4 dots remain encoded')
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.resolve('https://safe.example/', encodedLoopback),
+    'https://127%252e0%252e0%252e1/private',
+    'resolve does not turn nested dots into a loopback address'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.resolve('https://allowed.com/api/v1/', encodedMetadataAddress),
+    'https://169%252e254%252e169%252e254/latest/meta-data/',
+    'resolve does not turn nested dots into a metadata address'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.normalize('http://allowed.com%255Cevil.com/'),
+    'http://allowed.com%255Cevil.com/',
+    'normalize does not activate a nested backslash'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.serialize({ scheme: 'http', host: '%256cocalhost', path: '/' }),
+    'http://%256cocalhost/',
+    'component serialization preserves an encoded percent sign'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.equal(encodedLocalhost, 'http://localhost/', {}),
+    false,
+    'nested escapes do not compare equal to their twice-decoded target'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('hostname normalization decodes only current unreserved escapes', (t) => {
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize('x://%6cocalhost/'), 'x://localhost/', 'a current unreserved escape is decoded')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize('x://%256cocalhost/'), 'x://%256cocalhost/', 'an encoded percent is preserved')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize('x://host%2540evil/'), 'x://host%2540evil/', 'a nested authority delimiter stays inert')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize('x://%2525/'), 'x://%2525/', 'nested encoded percent signs stay encoded')
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('host conversion failures are not treated as comparable URLs', (t) => {
+  const malformedHost = 'http://trusted.test%2540evil.test/'
+
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize(malformedHost), malformedHost, 'normalization preserves the failing input')
+  t.equal(fastURI.equal(malformedHost, malformedHost, {}), false, 'equal rejects a failed host conversion')
+  t.throws(
+    () => fastURI.resolve(malformedHost, 'child', { domainHost: true }),
+    /Host's domain name can not be converted to ASCII/,
+    'resolve propagates a host conversion failure'
+  )
+  t.end()
+})

package/node_modules/playwright/node_modules/playwright-core/bundles/mcp/node_modules/fast-uri/test/security.test.js

@@ -125,9 +125,307 @@ test('serialize escapes authority delimiters in host field', (t) => {
 })
 
 test('normalize does not double-decode %2540 into a live @', (t) => {
-  const result = fastURI.normalize('http://trusted.com%2540evil.com/')
+  const input = 'http://trusted.com%2540evil.com/'
+  const result = fastURI.normalize(input)
   const parsed = fastURI.parse(result)
 
-  t.plan(1)
-  t.notEqual(parsed.host, 'trusted.com@evil.com', 'http://trusted.com%2540evil.com/')
+  t.plan(2)
+  t.equal(result, input, 'the encoded percent sign is preserved')
+  t.notEqual(parsed.host, 'trusted.com@evil.com', input)
+})
+
+test('parse canonicalises IDN / Unicode hosts to their ASCII form', (t) => {
+  const cases = [
+    {
+      input: 'http://127。0。0。1/',
+      expectedHost: '127.0.0.1',
+      description: 'full-width ideographic stops as octet separators'
+    },
+    {
+      input: 'http://ｅxample.com/',
+      expectedHost: 'example.com',
+      description: 'fullwidth e as first letter'
+    },
+    {
+      input: 'http://納豆.example.org/',
+      expectedHost: 'xn--99zt52a.example.org',
+      description: 'CJK label requiring punycode'
+    }
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length * 2)
+
+  cases.forEach(({ input, expectedHost, description }) => {
+    const parsed = fastURI.parse(input)
+    t.notOk(parsed.error, `parse should not set error: ${description}`)
+    t.equal(parsed.host, expectedHost, `host canonicalised to ASCII: ${description}`)
+  })
+})
+
+test('resolve canonicalises the host using the final resolved scheme', (t) => {
+  const cases = [
+    {
+      base: 'http://trusted.example/base',
+      relative: '//127\u30020\u30020\u30021/private',
+      expected: 'http://127.0.0.1/private',
+      expectedHost: '127.0.0.1',
+      description: 'scheme-relative loopback host'
+    },
+    {
+      base: 'https://ex\u00ADample.com/base',
+      relative: 'child',
+      expected: 'https://example.com/child',
+      expectedHost: 'example.com',
+      description: 'host inherited from the base'
+    },
+    {
+      base: 'http://trusted.example/base',
+      relative: 'http://ex\u200Bample.com/',
+      expected: 'http://example.com/',
+      expectedHost: 'example.com',
+      description: 'absolute relative reference'
+    }
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length * 2)
+
+  cases.forEach(({ base, relative, expected, expectedHost, description }) => {
+    const resolved = fastURI.resolve(base, relative)
+    t.equal(resolved, expected, description)
+    t.equal(fastURI.parse(resolved).host, expectedHost, `${description} reparses consistently`)
+  })
+})
+
+test('resolve applies domain canonicalisation only when the effective scheme opts in', (t) => {
+  const host = 'ex\u00ADample.com'
+
+  t.plan(2)
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.resolve('uri://trusted.example/', `//${host}/`),
+    `uri://${host}/`,
+    'an unsupported scheme preserves the host'
+  )
+  t.equal(
+    fastURI.resolve('http://trusted.example/', `//${host}/`, { unicodeSupport: true }),
+    `http://${host}/`,
+    'unicodeSupport preserves the Unicode host'
+  )
+})
+
+test('resolve throws when the final scheme cannot canonicalise the host', (t) => {
+  const invalidHost = '\u200D.example'
+  const cases = [
+    ['http://trusted.example/', `//${invalidHost}/`],
+    [`https://${invalidHost}/base`, 'child'],
+    ['http://trusted.example/', `http://${invalidHost}/`],
+    ['http://trusted.example/', `//${invalidHost}%2Etest/`]
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach(([base, relative]) => {
+    t.throws(
+      () => fastURI.resolve(base, relative),
+      /Host's domain name can not be converted to ASCII/,
+      `${base} + ${relative}`
+    )
+  })
+})
+
+test('parse rejects a literal backslash in the authority as malformed (RFC 3986)', (t) => {
+  // Regression for the host-confusion bypass: a literal "\" is invalid RFC 3986
+  // syntax and must be flagged malformed, not silently rewritten. Otherwise "\"
+  // acts as a host delimiter here while Node's native URL parses a different
+  // host, defeating a host-based SSRF/redirect/origin allowlist.
+  const cases = [
+    'http://evil.com\\@allowed.com',
+    'https://169.254.169.254\\@trusted.example.com',
+    'http://127.0.0.1\\@public.example.com',
+    'https://attacker.com\\@api.internal',
+    'http://a\\@b',
+    'ws://evil.com\\@allowed.com/chat',
+    'wss://evil.com\\@allowed.com/chat',
+    'http://evil.com\\%40allowed.com',
+    '//evil.com\\@allowed.com'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((input) => {
+    t.equal(
+      fastURI.parse(input).error,
+      'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.',
+      input
+    )
+  })
+})
+
+test('normalize does not canonicalize a literal-backslash URI into a different valid URL', (t) => {
+  const cases = [
+    'http://evil.com\\@allowed.com',
+    'https://attacker.com\\@api.internal'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((input) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.normalize(input), input, input)
+  })
+})
+
+test('parse leaves percent-encoded %5C untouched as encoded data (not rejected)', (t) => {
+  // Only the literal "\" byte is rejected; %5C stays valid encoded data and
+  // does not diverge from the native URL parser, so it must not be flagged.
+  const input = 'http://evil.com%5C@allowed.com'
+  const parsed = fastURI.parse(input)
+
+  t.plan(2)
+  t.notOk(parsed.error, '%5C is valid encoded data, not malformed')
+  t.equal(parsed.host, new URL(input).hostname, '%5C host matches native URL (no divergence)')
+})
+
+test('parse does not reject a literal backslash in the query or fragment', (t) => {
+  // The rejection is scoped to the authority/path (the host-confusion surface);
+  // a backslash after "?"/"#" is normalized as encoded data as before.
+  const parsed = fastURI.parse('http://host.example.com/?x=\\y#z\\w')
+
+  t.plan(2)
+  t.notOk(parsed.error, 'backslash in query/fragment does not mark the URI malformed')
+  t.equal(parsed.host, 'host.example.com', 'host parsed normally')
+})
+
+test('parse rejects a malformed authority introducer (\\\\, /\\, \\/) in place of //', (t) => {
+  // Regression: "\\", "/\\", "\\/" after the scheme colon are not valid authority
+  // introducers. Node's URL treats "\\" as interchangeable with "/" on special
+  // schemes, so "http:\\\\evil.com/path" would be parsed as host "evil.com" by
+  // Node, but fast-uri must reject it as malformed to prevent SSRF/redirect bypass.
+  const cases = [
+    'http:\\\\evil.com/path',
+    'http:/\\evil.com/path',
+    'http:\\/evil.com/path',
+    'ws:\\\\evil.com/chat',
+    'wss:\\\\evil.com/chat',
+    'ftp:\\\\evil.com/',
+    '\\\\evil.com/path'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((input) => {
+    t.equal(
+      fastURI.parse(input).error,
+      'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.',
+      input
+    )
+  })
+})
+
+test('normalize does not canonicalize a malformed-authority-introducer URI', (t) => {
+  const cases = [
+    'http:\\\\evil.com/path',
+    'http:/\\evil.com/path'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((input) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.normalize(input), input, input)
+  })
+})
+
+test('equal returns false for malformed-authority-introducer URIs', (t) => {
+  const pairs = [
+    ['http:\\\\evil.com/path', 'http://evil.com/path'],
+    ['http:/\\evil.com/path', 'http://evil.com/path']
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(pairs.length)
+
+  pairs.forEach(([left, right]) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.equal(left, right), false, `${left} != ${right}`)
+  })
+})
+
+test('resolve throws on malformed authority introducer', (t) => {
+  // resolve() returns a plain string with no error field, so the only safe
+  // behavior is to throw when either component has a malformed authority.
+  const pairs = [
+    ['https://allowed.com/', '\\\\evil.com/path'],
+    ['\\\\evil.com/path', 'https://allowed.com/'],
+    ['https://allowed.com/', 'http:/\\evil.com/path'],
+    ['https://allowed.com/', 'http:\\/evil.com/path']
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(pairs.length)
+
+  pairs.forEach(([base, rel]) => {
+    t.throws(
+      () => fastURI.resolve(base, rel),
+      /URI authority must not contain a literal backslash/,
+      `${base} + ${rel}`
+    )
+  })
+})
+
+test('parse rejects a whitespace-split authority introducer (TAB, LF, CR)', (t) => {
+  // The WHATWG URL parser removes TAB (U+0009), LF (U+000A) and CR (U+000D) from
+  // the input before parsing, so a stripped character wedged into the introducer
+  // ("/<TAB>\\", "/<TAB>/", or a leading "<TAB>//") reaches an authority in Node
+  // while fast-uri would otherwise fold it into the path. These must be rejected
+  // like the adjacent "\\", "/\\", "\\/" forms.
+  const cases = [
+    { input: '/\t\\evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.' },
+    { input: '/\t/evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority introducer must not contain whitespace.' },
+    { input: '/\n\\evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.' },
+    { input: '/\r\\evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.' },
+    { input: '\t//evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority introducer must not contain whitespace.' },
+    { input: '\t/\\evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority must not contain a literal backslash.' },
+    { input: 'https:/\t/evil.com/path', expectedError: 'URI authority introducer must not contain whitespace.' }
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach(({ input, expectedError }) => {
+    t.equal(fastURI.parse(input).error, expectedError, JSON.stringify(input))
+  })
+})
+
+test('resolve throws on a whitespace-split authority introducer', (t) => {
+  const pairs = [
+    ['https://allowed.com/', '/\t\\evil.com/path'],
+    ['https://allowed.com/', '/\t/evil.com/path'],
+    ['https://allowed.com/', '/\n\\evil.com/path'],
+    ['/\t/evil.com/path', 'https://allowed.com/']
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(pairs.length)
+
+  pairs.forEach(([base, rel]) => {
+    t.throws(
+      () => fastURI.resolve(base, rel),
+      /URI authority (must not contain a literal backslash|introducer must not contain whitespace)/,
+      `${JSON.stringify(base)} + ${JSON.stringify(rel)}`
+    )
+  })
+})
+
+test('parse does not reject valid authority introducer patterns', (t) => {
+  // No false positives: "//" introducer and scheme-less "//" must be valid.
+  const cases = [
+    'http://good.com/',
+    'https://good.com/',
+    'ws://good.com/chat',
+    'wss://good.com/chat',
+    'ftp://good.com/',
+    '//good.com/path',
+    '/absolute/path',
+    'relative/path'
+  ]
+
+  t.plan(cases.length)
+
+  cases.forEach((input) => {
+    const parsed = fastURI.parse(input)
+    t.notOk(parsed.error, input)
+  })
 })

package/node_modules/playwright/node_modules/playwright-core/bundles/mcp/node_modules/fast-uri/test/urn-full-input.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const test = require('tape')
+const fastURI = require('..')
+
+test('URN parsing validates the complete scheme-specific input', (t) => {
+  const embedded = fastURI.parse('urn:x|foo:bar')
+  t.equal(embedded.error, 'URN can not be parsed.', 'does not search for a later nid:nss substring')
+  t.equal(embedded.nid, undefined, 'does not adopt the later nid')
+  t.equal(embedded.nss, undefined, 'does not adopt the later nss')
+
+  const trailing = fastURI.parse('urn:foo:bar|ignored')
+  t.equal(trailing.error, 'URN can not be parsed.', 'rejects trailing input outside the RFC 2141 NSS grammar')
+  t.equal(trailing.nid, undefined, 'does not return an nid from a partial match')
+  t.equal(trailing.nss, undefined, 'does not return a truncated nss')
+
+  t.end()
+})
+
+test('URN parsing preserves the complete RFC 2141 NSS', (t) => {
+  const parsed = fastURI.parse('urn:foo:allowed/evil')
+  t.equal(parsed.error, undefined, 'accepts slash in an RFC 2141 NSS')
+  t.equal(parsed.nid, 'foo', 'parses the nid')
+  t.equal(parsed.nss, 'allowed/evil', 'preserves the complete NSS')
+  t.equal(fastURI.normalize('urn:foo:allowed/evil'), 'urn:foo:allowed/evil', 'normalization retains slash data')
+  t.equal(fastURI.equal('urn:foo:allowed/evil', 'urn:foo:allowed'), false, 'distinct NSS values do not compare equal')
+
+  t.end()
+})