@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.83 → 0.1.84

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@skrr-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.1.83",
+  "version": "0.1.84",
   "description": "Command-line interface for skrr",
   "license": "ISC",
   "author": "skrr",
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@
     "@oclif/plugin-warn-if-update-available": "^3.1.0",
     "@skrr-ai/auth-core": "^0.4.12",
     "proper-lockfile": "^4.1.2",
-    "qrcode-terminal": "^0.12.0",
     "socket.io-client": "^4.8.3",
     "tweetnacl": "^1.0.3"
   },
@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@
     "@oclif/plugin-legacy": "^2.0.37",
     "@types/node": "^20.11.0",
     "@types/proper-lockfile": "^4.1.4",
-    "@types/qrcode-terminal": "^0.12.2",
     "esbuild": "^0.25.12",
     "oclif": "^4.23.29",
     "rimraf": "^5.0.5",
@@ -157,6 +155,9 @@
       "agents:goals": {
         "description": "List the goals an agent is on the hook for (agent-scoped facade over `goals`)"
       },
+      "agents:endpoint": {
+        "description": "Your agent as a hosted MCP endpoint: show its URL and payer, switch it on for a Store copy, and mint an agents:invoke key"
+      },
       "agents:tone": {
         "description": "Read and set how an agent WRITES (its tone; audio timbre is `voiceId`)"
       },

package/dist/commands/pair.d.ts

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-import { BaseCommand } from '../base-command';
-interface DecryptedPlaintext {
-    token: string;
-    refreshToken: string;
-    daemonId: string | null;
-    dataEncryptionKey: string | null;
-}
-/**
- * Canonical AAD bytes for the pair-response (C4). Mobile builds the
- * same string, ASCII-encodes, prepends a 2-byte big-endian length, and
- * appends to the ciphertext bundle. The CLI rebuilds locally and
- * compares before decrypting — so a tampered or misdirected ciphertext
- * fails AAD before tweetnacl ever sees it.
- *
- * Format: `oversky:pair:v1:daemonId=<daemonId>:responseUserId=<responseUserId>`
- *
- * The version tag (`v1`) lets us evolve the AAD shape later without
- * silently accepting old payloads.
- */
-export declare function buildPairAad(daemonId: string, responseUserId: string): Uint8Array;
-export default class Pair extends BaseCommand {
-    static description: string;
-    static hidden: boolean;
-    static examples: string[];
-    static flags: {
-        'no-qr': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").BooleanFlag<boolean>;
-        'poll-timeout': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<number, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
-    };
-    run(): Promise<void>;
-}
-export interface DecryptOptions {
-    expectedDaemonId: string;
-    expectedResponseUserId: string;
-}
-/**
- * Decrypt the pairing response. Returns null on any failure (bad format,
- * decryption mismatch, malformed JSON, AAD mismatch) — the caller surfaces
- * a uniform "decrypt failed" error to the user. See
- * `docs/daemon-pair-protocol.md` for the byte layout.
- *
- * Bundle layout (mobile-encoded):
- *   nonce (24 bytes) || mobilePublicKey (32 bytes) || ciphertext
- *     || lenAad (2 bytes, big-endian) || aad
- *
- * The trailing `lenAad || aad` is XSalsa20-Poly1305's "no native AAD slot"
- * workaround (C4): the canonical AAD is sealed alongside the ciphertext so
- * any tampered/misdirected payload fails verification BEFORE tweetnacl
- * sees a single byte of plaintext. The CLI rebuilds the AAD locally from
- * `expectedDaemonId` + `expectedResponseUserId` and constant-time compares
- * — a leaked QR + race attack that swapped the daemonId at the server gets
- * rejected here.
- */
-export declare function decryptResponse(responseB64: string, cliSecretKey: Uint8Array, opts?: DecryptOptions): DecryptedPlaintext | null;
-/**
- * Persist the pairing credentials. Token + refreshToken go to the
- * canonical auth backend (keychain or file); the optional
- * dataEncryptionKey is preserved alongside (C4) — until Tier 1 #1's
- * mobile half ships, this field will typically be null and the daemon
- * derives its machine-DEK locally instead.
- *
- * Exported for tests so the persistence path can be exercised without
- * spinning the full oclif runtime.
- */
-export declare function persistPairCredentials(plaintext: DecryptedPlaintext, serverOrigin: string): void;
-/** base64url encode (no padding) — what the protocol uses for publicKey. */
-export declare function base64urlEncode(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
-export {};

package/dist/commands/pair.js

@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
-    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
-};
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.buildPairAad = buildPairAad;
-exports.decryptResponse = decryptResponse;
-exports.persistPairCredentials = persistPairCredentials;
-exports.base64urlEncode = base64urlEncode;
-const core_1 = require("@oclif/core");
-const tweetnacl_1 = __importDefault(require("tweetnacl"));
-const qrcode_terminal_1 = __importDefault(require("qrcode-terminal"));
-const auth_storage_1 = require("../lib/auth-storage");
-const base_command_1 = require("../base-command");
-const api_fetch_1 = require("../lib/api-fetch");
-const PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = tweetnacl_1.default.box.publicKeyLength; // 32
-const SECRET_KEY_BYTES = tweetnacl_1.default.box.secretKeyLength; // 32
-const NONCE_BYTES = tweetnacl_1.default.box.nonceLength; // 24
-// H16 — feature-flag check evaluated AT MODULE LOAD so oclif sees a
-// stable `hidden` value when it builds the manifest. Toggling at
-// runtime would require a manifest rebuild anyway; capturing once
-// matches oclif's static-class-field model.
-const PAIR_FEATURE_ENABLED = process.env.OVERSKY_ENABLE_PAIR === '1';
-/**
- * Canonical AAD bytes for the pair-response (C4). Mobile builds the
- * same string, ASCII-encodes, prepends a 2-byte big-endian length, and
- * appends to the ciphertext bundle. The CLI rebuilds locally and
- * compares before decrypting — so a tampered or misdirected ciphertext
- * fails AAD before tweetnacl ever sees it.
- *
- * Format: `oversky:pair:v1:daemonId=<daemonId>:responseUserId=<responseUserId>`
- *
- * The version tag (`v1`) lets us evolve the AAD shape later without
- * silently accepting old payloads.
- */
-function buildPairAad(daemonId, responseUserId) {
-    const canonical = `oversky:pair:v1:daemonId=${daemonId}:responseUserId=${responseUserId}`;
-    return new TextEncoder().encode(canonical);
-}
-class Pair extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
-    static description = PAIR_FEATURE_ENABLED
-        ? 'Pair this daemon to a skrr account via the mobile app.'
-        : "Pair this daemon to a skrr account via the mobile app (mobile app integration pending; use 'skrr login' for now).";
-    // H16 — hide from `--help` output unless the feature flag is on at
-    // module load. oclif consults this static field when generating the
-    // top-level command list.
-    static hidden = !PAIR_FEATURE_ENABLED;
-    static examples = ['<%= config.bin %> pair', '<%= config.bin %> pair --no-qr'];
-    static flags = {
-        'no-qr': core_1.Flags.boolean({
-            description: 'Skip the QR rendering and only print the pairing URL.',
-            default: false,
-        }),
-        'poll-timeout': core_1.Flags.integer({
-            description: 'Maximum seconds to poll before giving up (default: 300).',
-            default: 300,
-        }),
-    };
-    async run() {
-        // H16 — runtime gate. Even if the user discovered the command name,
-        // we explicitly bail with a clear message and `EX_USAGE` (64) so
-        // CI scripts can distinguish "user error" from "command failed".
-        if (!PAIR_FEATURE_ENABLED) {
-            this.error('`skrr pair` is not yet available — mobile app integration is pending. Use `oversky login` instead.', { exit: 64 });
-        }
-        const { flags } = await this.parse(Pair);
-        // Step 1 — generate the CLI's ephemeral X25519 box keypair.
-        const keypair = tweetnacl_1.default.box.keyPair();
-        const publicKeyB64url = base64urlEncode(keypair.publicKey);
-        // Step 2 — ask the server to open a pairing window.
-        let start;
-        try {
-            start = await (0, api_fetch_1.apiFetch)('/api/auth/pair/start', {
-                method: 'POST',
-                body: { publicKey: publicKeyB64url },
-                // The /start endpoint is anonymous; no credential needed. Pass
-                // the resolved one anyway — apiFetch tolerates an authed call to
-                // an anon endpoint.
-                credential: this.resolvedCredential,
-            });
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            if (err instanceof api_fetch_1.ApiFetchError && err.status === 409) {
-                this.error('A pairing request already exists for this CLI session — wait for it to expire or restart the CLI.', { exit: 1 });
-            }
-            if (err instanceof api_fetch_1.ApiFetchError && err.status === 503) {
-                // H5 — global active-row cap. Surface the Retry-After hint.
-                this.error('skrr pair-request capacity is temporarily exhausted. Wait ~60s and try `skrr pair` again.', { exit: 1 });
-            }
-            this.handleApiError(err);
-        }
-        if (typeof start.pairId !== 'string' ||
-            start.pairId.length === 0 ||
-            typeof start.pairSecret !== 'string' ||
-            start.pairSecret.length === 0) {
-            this.error('Server did not return a pairId/pairSecret. Update your skrr server.', {
-                exit: 1,
-            });
-        }
-        const expiresAt = new Date(start.expiresAt);
-        const pairingUrl = `oversky://pair?pk=${start.publicKey}`;
-        // Step 3 — render the QR + URL.
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-        process.stderr.write('  Open the skrr mobile app and scan this QR code to pair this daemon:\n');
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-        if (!flags['no-qr']) {
-            const qr = renderQr(pairingUrl);
-            if (qr)
-                process.stderr.write(qr);
-        }
-        process.stderr.write('  Or open this URL on your phone:\n');
-        process.stderr.write(`    ${pairingUrl}\n`);
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-        process.stderr.write(`  Pairing window expires at ${expiresAt.toISOString()}.\n`);
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-        process.stderr.write('  Waiting for approval...\n');
-        // Step 4 — poll for the response.
-        const pollIntervalMs = Math.max(500, start.pollIntervalMs || 1000);
-        const pollDeadline = Math.min(Date.now() + flags['poll-timeout'] * 1000, expiresAt.getTime());
-        let pollResult = null;
-        while (Date.now() < pollDeadline) {
-            await sleep(pollIntervalMs);
-            try {
-                const res = await (0, api_fetch_1.apiFetch)('/api/auth/pair/poll', {
-                    method: 'POST',
-                    // H5 — authenticate by holder-of-secret, not holder-of-publicKey.
-                    // The pairSecret was returned to us once on /start; the server
-                    // stored only its hash and compares constant-time.
-                    body: { pairId: start.pairId, pairSecret: start.pairSecret },
-                    credential: this.resolvedCredential,
-                });
-                if (res.state === 'authorized') {
-                    pollResult = res;
-                    break;
-                }
-                if (res.state === 'expired') {
-                    this.error('Pairing window expired before the mobile app responded. Run `skrr pair` again.', {
-                        exit: 1,
-                    });
-                }
-                // 'pending' — keep polling.
-            }
-            catch (err) {
-                if (err instanceof api_fetch_1.ApiFetchError && err.status === 429) {
-                    // Back off doubly on rate limit.
-                    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);
-                    continue;
-                }
-                this.handleApiError(err);
-            }
-        }
-        if (!pollResult || !pollResult.response) {
-            this.error('Pairing timed out without a response. Run `skrr pair` again.', { exit: 1 });
-        }
-        // Step 5 — verify AAD, then decrypt the response (C4).
-        if (!pollResult.daemonId || !pollResult.responseUserId) {
-            this.error('Pairing response missing daemonId or responseUserId — refusing to decrypt without AAD context.', { exit: 1 });
-        }
-        const plaintext = decryptResponse(pollResult.response, keypair.secretKey, {
-            expectedDaemonId: pollResult.daemonId,
-            expectedResponseUserId: pollResult.responseUserId,
-        });
-        if (!plaintext) {
-            this.error('Pairing response failed to decrypt — the mobile app may be sending a malformed payload, or the AAD did not match.', { exit: 1 });
-        }
-        // Step 6 — install the credentials via the canonical token-save path.
-        // C4 — persist the dataEncryptionKey when the mobile app sends one.
-        // Until Tier 1 #1's mobile half ships, the field will be null and
-        // the daemon's machine-DEK path takes over instead.
-        persistPairCredentials(plaintext, this.cliConfig.baseURL);
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-        process.stderr.write('  Pairing complete. Daemon ready.\n');
-        if (plaintext.daemonId) {
-            process.stderr.write(`  Daemon ID: ${plaintext.daemonId}\n`);
-        }
-        if (plaintext.dataEncryptionKey) {
-            process.stderr.write('  Data encryption key installed.\n');
-        }
-        process.stderr.write('\n');
-    }
-}
-exports.default = Pair;
-/**
- * Decrypt the pairing response. Returns null on any failure (bad format,
- * decryption mismatch, malformed JSON, AAD mismatch) — the caller surfaces
- * a uniform "decrypt failed" error to the user. See
- * `docs/daemon-pair-protocol.md` for the byte layout.
- *
- * Bundle layout (mobile-encoded):
- *   nonce (24 bytes) || mobilePublicKey (32 bytes) || ciphertext
- *     || lenAad (2 bytes, big-endian) || aad
- *
- * The trailing `lenAad || aad` is XSalsa20-Poly1305's "no native AAD slot"
- * workaround (C4): the canonical AAD is sealed alongside the ciphertext so
- * any tampered/misdirected payload fails verification BEFORE tweetnacl
- * sees a single byte of plaintext. The CLI rebuilds the AAD locally from
- * `expectedDaemonId` + `expectedResponseUserId` and constant-time compares
- * — a leaked QR + race attack that swapped the daemonId at the server gets
- * rejected here.
- */
-function decryptResponse(responseB64, cliSecretKey, opts) {
-    if (typeof responseB64 !== 'string' || responseB64.length === 0)
-        return null;
-    if (cliSecretKey.length !== SECRET_KEY_BYTES)
-        return null;
-    let bundle;
-    try {
-        bundle = base64Decode(responseB64);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-    if (bundle.length < NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES + 1)
-        return null;
-    let cipher;
-    let trailerAad = null;
-    if (opts) {
-        // C4 — bundle MUST carry a trailing `lenAad || aad`. The 2-byte
-        // length is big-endian unsigned — caps AAD at 65535 bytes (way
-        // more headroom than the canonical AAD ever needs).
-        const expectedAad = buildPairAad(opts.expectedDaemonId, opts.expectedResponseUserId);
-        if (bundle.length < NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES + 2 + 1)
-            return null;
-        const lenOffset = bundle.length - expectedAad.length - 2;
-        if (lenOffset < NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES + 1)
-            return null;
-        const lenAad = (bundle[lenOffset] << 8) | bundle[lenOffset + 1];
-        if (lenAad !== expectedAad.length)
-            return null;
-        const trailerStart = lenOffset;
-        const aadStart = lenOffset + 2;
-        if (trailerStart < NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES + 1)
-            return null;
-        trailerAad = bundle.slice(aadStart, aadStart + lenAad);
-        if (!constantTimeBytesEqual(trailerAad, expectedAad)) {
-            // AAD mismatch — refuse to decrypt. Do NOT log or surface the
-            // mismatch shape; uniform null fits the "uniform terminal state"
-            // model the rest of the command relies on.
-            return null;
-        }
-        cipher = bundle.slice(NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES, trailerStart);
-    }
-    else {
-        cipher = bundle.slice(NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
-    }
-    const nonce = bundle.slice(0, NONCE_BYTES);
-    const mobilePublicKey = bundle.slice(NONCE_BYTES, NONCE_BYTES + PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
-    const plaintextBytes = tweetnacl_1.default.box.open(cipher, nonce, mobilePublicKey, cliSecretKey);
-    if (!plaintextBytes)
-        return null;
-    let json;
-    try {
-        json = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(plaintextBytes).toString('utf8'));
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-    if (!isValidPlaintext(json))
-        return null;
-    return json;
-}
-/**
- * Persist the pairing credentials. Token + refreshToken go to the
- * canonical auth backend (keychain or file); the optional
- * dataEncryptionKey is preserved alongside (C4) — until Tier 1 #1's
- * mobile half ships, this field will typically be null and the daemon
- * derives its machine-DEK locally instead.
- *
- * Exported for tests so the persistence path can be exercised without
- * spinning the full oclif runtime.
- */
-function persistPairCredentials(plaintext, serverOrigin) {
-    (0, auth_storage_1.writeToBackend)({
-        token: plaintext.token,
-        ...(plaintext.refreshToken ? { refreshToken: plaintext.refreshToken } : {}),
-    }, { serverOrigin, clearReauth: true, provenance: 'user_login' });
-    if (plaintext.dataEncryptionKey) {
-        // The unified `writeToBackend` API only carries token+refresh
-        // today. For now, persist the DEK as a sibling field on the next
-        // bundle write so it survives a CLI restart. When the daemon
-        // machine-DEK seam lands, this is the call site that flips to the
-        // L12 Keychain helper.
-        const existing = (0, auth_storage_1.readFromBackend)(serverOrigin);
-        if (existing.bundle) {
-            (0, auth_storage_1.writeToBackend)({
-                ...existing.bundle,
-                // dataEncryptionKey is not in the AuthBundle type yet; this is
-                // the deliberate seam for the daemon-side L12 path. We append
-                // through a typed cast so the bundle survives a round-trip.
-                ...{ dataEncryptionKey: plaintext.dataEncryptionKey },
-            });
-        }
-    }
-    // TODO: mobile DEK not yet available — daemon machine-DEK path will
-    // skip this branch entirely until Tier 1 #1's mobile half ships.
-}
-function isValidPlaintext(v) {
-    if (!v || typeof v !== 'object')
-        return false;
-    const o = v;
-    if (typeof o.token !== 'string' || o.token.length === 0)
-        return false;
-    if (typeof o.refreshToken !== 'string' || o.refreshToken.length === 0)
-        return false;
-    if (o.daemonId !== null && typeof o.daemonId !== 'string')
-        return false;
-    if (o.dataEncryptionKey !== null && typeof o.dataEncryptionKey !== 'string')
-        return false;
-    return true;
-}
-/** base64url encode (no padding) — what the protocol uses for publicKey. */
-function base64urlEncode(bytes) {
-    return Buffer.from(bytes)
-        .toString('base64')
-        .replace(/\+/g, '-')
-        .replace(/\//g, '_')
-        .replace(/=+$/, '');
-}
-/** Standard base64 decode — what the protocol uses for the response bundle. */
-function base64Decode(s) {
-    // Permissive: the protocol says base64 (with padding), but a well-meaning
-    // mobile-side base64url encoder would also work. Accept both.
-    const normalized = s.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');
-    const buf = Buffer.from(normalized, 'base64');
-    return new Uint8Array(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, buf.byteLength);
-}
-/** Constant-time Uint8Array equality. */
-function constantTimeBytesEqual(a, b) {
-    if (a.length !== b.length)
-        return false;
-    let diff = 0;
-    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
-        diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
-    }
-    return diff === 0;
-}
-function renderQr(text) {
-    try {
-        let out = '';
-        qrcode_terminal_1.default.generate(text, { small: true }, (rendered) => {
-            out = rendered;
-        });
-        return out;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return '';
-    }
-}
-function sleep(ms) {
-    return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
-}