@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.51 → 0.1.53

package/dist/base-command.d.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { type AssigneeResolution, type MemberKind, type SpaceMember } from './li
 import { type CliConfig } from './lib/config';
 import { type OutboxMethod } from './lib/outbox';
 import { type ResolvedCredential } from './lib/credential-resolver';
+import { type BrokerRefusalDescription } from './lib/daemonBrokerRefusal';
 import { type DefaultAgentResolution } from './lib/tasks';
 export declare function assigneePayloadNeedsResolution(payload: Record<string, unknown>): boolean;
 /**
@@ -68,6 +69,12 @@ export declare abstract class BaseCommand extends Command {
      */
     protected resolvedCredential: ResolvedCredential;
     protected bareMode: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Set when the auto-broker reached a live daemon and it REFUSED the hand-off.
+     * `requireAuth()` reports it instead of a bare "Not signed in", because the
+     * daemon's reason decides the repair (OSK-12149, OSK-12151).
+     */
+    protected brokerRefusal: BrokerRefusalDescription | null;
     init(): Promise<void>;
     /**
      * Read only the two global base flags. A narrow parser — oclif's

package/dist/base-command.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const task_ref_resolver_1 = require("./lib/task-ref-resolver");
 const space_resolver_1 = require("./lib/space-resolver");
 const projects_1 = require("./lib/projects");
 const config_1 = require("./lib/config");
+const cli_id_1 = require("./lib/cli-id");
 const keychain_2 = require("./lib/keychain");
 const outbox_1 = require("./lib/outbox");
 const node_adapter_1 = require("./lib/node-adapter");
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ const migrate_1 = require("./lib/migrate");
 const auth_core_init_1 = require("./lib/auth-core-init");
 const credential_resolver_1 = require("./lib/credential-resolver");
 const daemonBroker_1 = require("./lib/daemonBroker");
+const daemonBrokerRefusal_1 = require("./lib/daemonBrokerRefusal");
 const refresh_1 = require("./lib/refresh");
 const auth_storage_1 = require("./lib/auth-storage");
 const update_check_1 = require("./lib/update-check");
@@ -131,6 +133,12 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
      */
     resolvedCredential;
     bareMode = false;
+    /**
+     * Set when the auto-broker reached a live daemon and it REFUSED the hand-off.
+     * `requireAuth()` reports it instead of a bare "Not signed in", because the
+     * daemon's reason decides the repair (OSK-12149, OSK-12151).
+     */
+    brokerRefusal = null;
     async init() {
         await super.init();
         // The profile is resolved from raw argv, BEFORE oclif parses anything.
@@ -269,11 +277,13 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
         // skrr command reads it through the normal resolver chain — no
         // per-command broker round-trip.
         //
-        // Fail-quiet: any broker failure leaves resolvedCredential null and
-        // the command's own `requireAuth()` will surface the "Not signed
-        // in" error a moment later. Mismatched baseURL (a real foot-gun the
-        // user might not notice) is the one exception — we print a one-
-        // line hint so they know how to fix it.
+        // A broker failure leaves resolvedCredential null and the command's own
+        // `requireAuth()` surfaces the error a moment later. It is quiet only when
+        // no daemon was there to ask. A daemon that ANSWERED and refused is kept
+        // in `brokerRefusal`, and `requireAuth()` reports its reason and the
+        // repair that reason implies — "Not signed in. Run `skrr login`" was true
+        // and pointed at the wrong fix (OSK-12149). Rate limiting and a mismatched
+        // baseURL keep their own one-line hints below.
         if (!this.resolvedCredential.token) {
             const autoResult = await (0, daemonBroker_1.maybeAutoBroker)({
                 cliConfig: this.cliConfig,
@@ -318,6 +328,9 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
                         kind: (0, auth_core_1.classifyTokenKind)(accessToken),
                     };
                 }
+                else if ((this.brokerRefusal = (0, daemonBrokerRefusal_1.describeBrokerRefusal)(autoResult.outcome, this.config.bin))) {
+                    // Reported by requireAuth(); nothing to print here.
+                }
                 else if (autoResult.outcome.reason === 'rate_limited') {
                     // Otherwise the only thing the user sees is "Not signed in", which is
                     // true and points at the wrong repair: they are signed in, the local
@@ -340,7 +353,12 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
             }
         }
         if (!this.resolvedCredential.token && ignoredStoredCredential) {
-            if (ignoredStoredCredential.originStatus === 'mismatch') {
+            const foreign = (0, auth_storage_1.describeForeignCredential)(ignoredStoredCredential);
+            if (foreign) {
+                process.stderr.write(`[skrr] ${foreign} Run \`skrr login\` to sign this configuration in; the other ` +
+                    `configuration keeps its own credential.\n`);
+            }
+            else if (ignoredStoredCredential.originStatus === 'mismatch') {
                 process.stderr.write(`[skrr] Ignoring stored credentials issued by ${ignoredStoredCredential.storedServerOrigin}; ` +
                     `skrr is configured for ${this.cliConfig.baseURL}. Run \`skrr login --base-url ${this.cliConfig.baseURL}\` ` +
                     `or switch back to the issuing server.\n`);
@@ -616,6 +634,18 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
     /** Abort the command with a helpful message if the user isn't signed in. */
     requireAuth() {
         if (!this.resolvedCredential?.token) {
+            const refusal = this.brokerRefusal;
+            if (refusal) {
+                // Same code as the plain case — scripts branch on NOT_SIGNED_IN — with
+                // the daemon's answer in the message and in `details.broker`.
+                this.failWithCliError({
+                    message: `Not signed in. ${refusal.headline}\n→ ${refusal.remedy}`,
+                    code: 'NOT_SIGNED_IN',
+                    exit: 2,
+                    retryable: refusal.transient,
+                    details: { broker: refusal.broker, suggestion: refusal.remedy },
+                });
+            }
             this.failWithCliError({
                 message: `Not signed in. Run \`${this.config.bin} login\` first.`,
                 code: 'NOT_SIGNED_IN',
@@ -1011,7 +1041,7 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
                     ? null
                     : (0, auth_failure_1.describeRefreshRefusal)(readRefreshRefusal(), {
                         bin: this.config.bin,
-                        cliId: this.cliConfig?.cliId,
+                        cliId: this.cliConfig ? (0, cli_id_1.resolveCliId)(this.cliConfig) : undefined,
                     });
                 this.failWithCliError({
                     message: say(presentedCiToken
@@ -1309,7 +1339,7 @@ class BaseCommand extends core_1.Command {
         if (e.status === 401) {
             const refusal = (0, auth_failure_1.describeRefreshRefusal)(readRefreshRefusal(), {
                 bin: this.config.bin,
-                cliId: this.cliConfig?.cliId,
+                cliId: this.cliConfig ? (0, cli_id_1.resolveCliId)(this.cliConfig) : undefined,
             });
             const why = refusal
                 ? refusal.message.replace(/\s*Run `[^`]+` to sign in again\.$/, '')

package/dist/commands/agents/chat.js

@@ -269,7 +269,8 @@ class AgentsChat extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
                 'calls arrive as `tool.started` / `tool.completed`, once per `toolUseId`, on cloud ' +
                 'and local-harness runs alike. A `session.notice` with `notice: ' +
                 '"harness-session-reset"` means the local harness could not resume its previous ' +
-                'session and started a new one; `message` says why. A `permission.resolved` says ' +
+                'session and started a new one, which does not see earlier turns of the ' +
+                'conversation; `message` says why. A `permission.resolved` says ' +
                 'how a local harness permission request was decided: `decidedBy` in words, and ' +
                 '`basis` — `person` (with `surface`), `mode` (with `mode`), `policy` or ' +
                 '`session-grant` — beside the wire `by`.',

package/dist/commands/agents/create.js

@@ -246,22 +246,30 @@ class AgentsCreate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
                 '09:00-18:00@America/Los_Angeles',
         }),
         // Retired (OSK-11975): a Commitment turn works under the Agent's own
-        // permissions, so these three are stored but no longer read at runtime.
+        // permissions. Hidden, warned on use, and never sent (OSK-12068) — see
+        // `mergeAgentConfigFlags`. Kept parseable so an old script still runs.
         'reasoning-tool-escape': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.REASONING_TOOL_ESCAPES],
             multiple: true,
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: { message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('reasoning-tool-escape') },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'commitment-responsibility': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_RESPONSIBILITY_LEVELS],
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: {
+                message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('commitment-responsibility'),
+            },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'commitment-responsibility-ceiling': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_RESPONSIBILITY_LEVELS],
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: {
+                message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('commitment-responsibility-ceiling'),
+            },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'max-turns': core_1.Flags.integer({ description: 'Maximum turns in one agent run (1-500)' }),
         'tool-resources': core_1.Flags.string({
@@ -389,7 +397,12 @@ class AgentsCreate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
         // relationshipLoops is an input-only provisioning control. The server
         // applies it by deciding which system commitments to seed, so it is not an
         // Agent document field and is intentionally absent from the response.
-        const unapplied = unappliedPayloadKeys(payload, created, ['relationshipLoops']);
+        const unapplied = unappliedPayloadKeys(payload, created, [
+            'relationshipLoops',
+            ...(0, agent_config_1.deprecatedFieldNames)(created),
+        ]);
+        for (const warning of (0, agent_config_1.deprecatedFieldsWarnings)(created))
+            this.warn(warning);
         if (unapplied.length > 0) {
             this.warn(unappliedPayloadKeysWarning(unapplied));
         }

package/dist/commands/agents/update.d.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ export default class AgentsUpdate extends BaseCommand {
         'next-target': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string[] | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
         'working-directory': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
         'default-permission-mode': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
+        'clear-default-permission-mode': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").BooleanFlag<boolean>;
         tools: import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
         'model-parameters': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
         'agent-ids': import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").OptionFlag<string | undefined, import("@oclif/core/lib/interfaces").CustomOptions>;
@@ -55,6 +56,60 @@ export default class AgentsUpdate extends BaseCommand {
     };
     run(): Promise<void>;
 }
+/**
+ * The warnings an `agents update` prints for what the server did with the
+ * PATCH, in order: one line per field the server reported as ignored, with the
+ * SERVER's reason (`deprecatedFields`, OSK-12068), then one line for keys that
+ * came back missing for no stated reason.
+ *
+ * That last check is the one `agents create` makes. Without it, a key the
+ * server does not model, a typo of one that it does (`max_turns` for
+ * `maxTurns`), or a field only the server sets was discarded with the same
+ * "Updated agent" line as a real change. It skips:
+ * - `removeProjectIds`, an instruction rather than a stored field;
+ * - every field the server already explained in `deprecatedFields`, so it is
+ *   not ALSO called "not an agent field" with the generic guess;
+ * - every key sent as `null`. `null` is a clear, and a cleared field coming
+ *   back absent (or `null`) is the clear working. `defaultPermissionMode: null`
+ *   through `--from-json` was reported as "not an agent field" after the server
+ *   had cleared it on purpose (OSK-12167).
+ *
+ * Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function agentUpdateWarnings(payload: Record<string, unknown>, updated: unknown): string[];
+/**
+ * The per-Agent mutation fence's "another request holds this right now"
+ * refusals. `updateAgent` takes a short lease on the Agent before it writes, so
+ * a concurrent writer — or, until OSK-12138, a lagging replica read of a lease
+ * row the same request had just created — refuses the update with one of these.
+ * Nothing was written, so repeating the identical PATCH is safe.
+ */
+export declare const AGENT_FENCE_RETRY_CODES: ReadonlySet<string>;
+/**
+ * Run an Agent write, and repeat it ONCE if the fence refused it as transient.
+ *
+ * Retried only when the server said both things: a fence code AND
+ * `retryable: true`. `MARKETPLACE_SOURCE_LIFECYCLE_BUSY` also covers a source
+ * that is being deleted or published, where the server answers
+ * `retryable: false`, and those must surface rather than be repeated. One retry,
+ * after a short pause, because the dogfooded case (OSK-12138) cleared on the
+ * first identical retry; anything that survives it is worth showing.
+ *
+ * Exported for tests.
+ */
+export declare function retryOnceOnAgentFence<T>(operation: () => Promise<T>, { delayMs }?: {
+    delayMs?: number;
+}): Promise<T>;
+/**
+ * The `defaultPermissionMode` a PATCH carries for these flags. `null` is the
+ * server's clear, the same spelling `harnesses update --clear-default-permission-mode`
+ * sends; before it, a mode once set could not be removed from the CLI at all —
+ * `""` fails the flag's options and `null` failed the server (OSK-12070).
+ */
+export declare function defaultPermissionModePatch(flags: {
+    'default-permission-mode'?: string;
+    'clear-default-permission-mode'?: boolean;
+}): string | null | undefined;
 /**
  * What changing the agent's default permission mode actually changed
  * (OSK-12124). It is the AGENT's default, so it governs every conversation,

package/dist/commands/agents/update.js

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.AGENT_FENCE_RETRY_CODES = void 0;
+exports.agentUpdateWarnings = agentUpdateWarnings;
+exports.retryOnceOnAgentFence = retryOnceOnAgentFence;
+exports.defaultPermissionModePatch = defaultPermissionModePatch;
 exports.defaultPermissionModeNote = defaultPermissionModeNote;
 const core_1 = require("@oclif/core");
 const data_provider_1 = require("@skrr-ai/data-provider");
@@ -56,6 +60,12 @@ class AgentsUpdate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
                 'One-shot harnesses (gemini, opencode, cursor, copilot, goose, pi, openclaw) can only run as ' +
                 'bypassPermissions; any other mode is refused for them.',
             options: ['default', 'acceptEdits', 'bypassPermissions', 'plan'],
+            exclusive: ['clear-default-permission-mode'],
+        }),
+        'clear-default-permission-mode': core_1.Flags.boolean({
+            description: "Remove this agent's permission-mode override, so its harness's default (then the daemon's) " +
+                'applies. Allowed on every harness, including one-shot ones.',
+            exclusive: ['default-permission-mode'],
         }),
         tools: core_1.Flags.string({
             description: 'Tools JSON array of plugin keys, e.g. \'["calculator"]\'. `skrr agents tools` lists the keys, ' +
@@ -99,22 +109,30 @@ class AgentsUpdate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
                 '09:00-18:00@America/Los_Angeles',
         }),
         // Retired (OSK-11975): a Commitment turn works under the Agent's own
-        // permissions, so these three are stored but no longer read at runtime.
+        // permissions. Hidden, warned on use, and never sent (OSK-12068) — see
+        // `mergeAgentConfigFlags`. Kept parseable so an old script still runs.
         'reasoning-tool-escape': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.REASONING_TOOL_ESCAPES],
             multiple: true,
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: { message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('reasoning-tool-escape') },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'commitment-responsibility': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_RESPONSIBILITY_LEVELS],
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: {
+                message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('commitment-responsibility'),
+            },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'commitment-responsibility-ceiling': core_1.Flags.string({
-            description: "Deprecated — no longer has any effect. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
+            description: "Retired — has no effect and is not sent. Commitment runs use the agent's own permissions.",
             options: [...agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_RESPONSIBILITY_LEVELS],
-            deprecated: { message: agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED },
+            deprecated: {
+                message: (0, agent_config_1.retiredCommitmentPermissionFlagMessage)('commitment-responsibility-ceiling'),
+            },
+            hidden: true,
         }),
         'max-turns': core_1.Flags.integer({ description: 'Maximum turns in one agent run (1-500)' }),
         'tool-resources': core_1.Flags.string({
@@ -171,7 +189,7 @@ class AgentsUpdate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
             category: flags.category,
             executionPolicy,
             workingDirectory: flags['working-directory'],
-            defaultPermissionMode: flags['default-permission-mode'],
+            defaultPermissionMode: defaultPermissionModePatch(flags),
         });
         // `mergeAgentConfigFlags` parses the typed flags (avatar, scene background,
         // working hours, every JSON flag). A parse failure is the caller's input, so
@@ -184,30 +202,24 @@ class AgentsUpdate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
             this.error(err.message, { exit: 1 });
         }
         if (Object.keys(payload).length === 0) {
-            this.error('Nothing to update. Pass at least one flag (e.g. --name) or --from-json.', {
-                exit: 1,
-            });
+            const retired = agent_config_1.RETIRED_COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAGS.filter((flag) => flags[flag] !== undefined);
+            this.error(retired.length > 0
+                ? `Nothing to update: ${retired.map((flag) => `--${flag}`).join(', ')} ` +
+                    `${retired.length === 1 ? 'is' : 'are'} retired and not sent. ${agent_config_1.COMMITMENT_PERMISSION_FLAG_RETIRED}`
+                : 'Nothing to update. Pass at least one flag (e.g. --name) or --from-json.', { exit: 1 });
         }
         let updated;
         try {
-            updated = await data_provider_1.dataService.updateAgent({
+            updated = await retryOnceOnAgentFence(() => data_provider_1.dataService.updateAgent({
                 agent_id: args.id,
                 data: payload,
-            });
+            }));
         }
         catch (err) {
             this.handleApiError(err);
         }
-        // The same check `agents create` makes. Without it, a key the server does
-        // not model, a typo of one that it does (`max_turns` for `maxTurns`), or a
-        // field only the server sets was discarded with the same "Updated agent"
-        // line as a real change.
-        // `removeProjectIds` is an instruction, not a stored field, so it never
-        // comes back and is not reported.
-        const unapplied = (0, create_1.unappliedPayloadKeys)(payload, updated, ['removeProjectIds']);
-        if (unapplied.length > 0) {
-            this.warn((0, create_1.unappliedPayloadKeysWarning)(unapplied));
-        }
+        for (const warning of agentUpdateWarnings(payload, updated))
+            this.warn(warning);
         await (0, runtime_tool_support_1.warnPluginsNotLoaded)(payload.tools, (message) => this.warn(message));
         if (flags.json) {
             this.log(JSON.stringify((0, web_url_1.withAgentUrl)(this.cliConfig.baseURL, updated), null, 2));
@@ -219,9 +231,93 @@ class AgentsUpdate extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
         const modeNote = defaultPermissionModeNote(flags['default-permission-mode'], a);
         if (modeNote)
             this.log(modeNote);
+        if (flags['clear-default-permission-mode']) {
+            this.log("Permission: cleared — this agent now follows its harness's default permission mode " +
+                "(then the daemon's), starting with each conversation's next turn.");
+        }
     }
 }
 exports.default = AgentsUpdate;
+/**
+ * The warnings an `agents update` prints for what the server did with the
+ * PATCH, in order: one line per field the server reported as ignored, with the
+ * SERVER's reason (`deprecatedFields`, OSK-12068), then one line for keys that
+ * came back missing for no stated reason.
+ *
+ * That last check is the one `agents create` makes. Without it, a key the
+ * server does not model, a typo of one that it does (`max_turns` for
+ * `maxTurns`), or a field only the server sets was discarded with the same
+ * "Updated agent" line as a real change. It skips:
+ * - `removeProjectIds`, an instruction rather than a stored field;
+ * - every field the server already explained in `deprecatedFields`, so it is
+ *   not ALSO called "not an agent field" with the generic guess;
+ * - every key sent as `null`. `null` is a clear, and a cleared field coming
+ *   back absent (or `null`) is the clear working. `defaultPermissionMode: null`
+ *   through `--from-json` was reported as "not an agent field" after the server
+ *   had cleared it on purpose (OSK-12167).
+ *
+ * Exported for tests.
+ */
+function agentUpdateWarnings(payload, updated) {
+    const cleared = Object.keys(payload).filter((key) => payload[key] === null);
+    const unapplied = (0, create_1.unappliedPayloadKeys)(payload, updated, [
+        'removeProjectIds',
+        ...cleared,
+        ...(0, agent_config_1.deprecatedFieldNames)(updated),
+    ]);
+    return [
+        ...(0, agent_config_1.deprecatedFieldsWarnings)(updated),
+        ...(unapplied.length > 0 ? [(0, create_1.unappliedPayloadKeysWarning)(unapplied)] : []),
+    ];
+}
+/**
+ * The per-Agent mutation fence's "another request holds this right now"
+ * refusals. `updateAgent` takes a short lease on the Agent before it writes, so
+ * a concurrent writer — or, until OSK-12138, a lagging replica read of a lease
+ * row the same request had just created — refuses the update with one of these.
+ * Nothing was written, so repeating the identical PATCH is safe.
+ */
+exports.AGENT_FENCE_RETRY_CODES = new Set([
+    'MARKETPLACE_SOURCE_LIFECYCLE_RACE',
+    'MARKETPLACE_SOURCE_LIFECYCLE_BUSY',
+    'MARKETPLACE_SOURCE_LIFECYCLE_CAS_LOST',
+]);
+/**
+ * Run an Agent write, and repeat it ONCE if the fence refused it as transient.
+ *
+ * Retried only when the server said both things: a fence code AND
+ * `retryable: true`. `MARKETPLACE_SOURCE_LIFECYCLE_BUSY` also covers a source
+ * that is being deleted or published, where the server answers
+ * `retryable: false`, and those must surface rather than be repeated. One retry,
+ * after a short pause, because the dogfooded case (OSK-12138) cleared on the
+ * first identical retry; anything that survives it is worth showing.
+ *
+ * Exported for tests.
+ */
+async function retryOnceOnAgentFence(operation, { delayMs = 750 } = {}) {
+    try {
+        return await operation();
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        const { code, body } = (0, base_command_1.apiRefusal)(err);
+        if (!code || !exports.AGENT_FENCE_RETRY_CODES.has(code) || body?.retryable !== true)
+            throw err;
+        if (delayMs > 0)
+            await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
+        return operation();
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The `defaultPermissionMode` a PATCH carries for these flags. `null` is the
+ * server's clear, the same spelling `harnesses update --clear-default-permission-mode`
+ * sends; before it, a mode once set could not be removed from the CLI at all —
+ * `""` fails the flag's options and `null` failed the server (OSK-12070).
+ */
+function defaultPermissionModePatch(flags) {
+    if (flags['clear-default-permission-mode'])
+        return null;
+    return flags['default-permission-mode'];
+}
 /**
  * What changing the agent's default permission mode actually changed
  * (OSK-12124). It is the AGENT's default, so it governs every conversation,

package/dist/commands/commitments/next-tick.js

@@ -86,10 +86,18 @@ function formatNextTick(projection) {
     // dispatch-refusal loop can't hide behind an on_track projection.
     if (projection.health || projection.liveness) {
         const census = projection.liveness?.terminalDispositionCensus;
+        const plural = (count) => (count === 1 ? '' : 's');
         const detail = [
             projection.liveness?.diagnosisKind,
             census?.workFailures
-                ? `${census.workFailures} recent run failure${census.workFailures === 1 ? '' : 's'}`
+                ? `${census.workFailures} recent run failure${plural(census.workFailures)}`
+                : null,
+            // A run that never started is not a failure of the work (OSK-12137).
+            census?.machineFailures
+                ? `${census.machineFailures} run${plural(census.machineFailures)} never started`
+                : null,
+            census?.contractFailures
+                ? `${census.contractFailures} result${plural(census.contractFailures)} rejected`
                 : null,
         ]
             .filter(Boolean)

package/dist/commands/context.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const core_1 = require("@oclif/core");
 const data_provider_1 = require("@skrr-ai/data-provider");
 const base_command_1 = require("../base-command");
 const config_1 = require("../lib/config");
+const cli_id_1 = require("../lib/cli-id");
 const keychain_1 = require("../lib/keychain");
 const cli_runtime_1 = require("../lib/cli-runtime");
 const runtime_context_1 = require("../lib/runtime-context");
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ class Context extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
             profile: (0, keychain_1.getActiveProfile)(),
             config: {
                 path: (0, config_1.getConfigPath)(),
-                cliId: this.cliConfig.cliId ?? null,
+                cliId: (0, cli_id_1.resolveCliId)(this.cliConfig) ?? null,
             },
             auth: {
                 signedIn: Boolean(this.resolvedCredential?.token),

package/dist/commands/daemon/config.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 const core_1 = require("@oclif/core");
 const exec_runtime_binary_1 = require("../../lib/exec-runtime-binary");
+const live_runtime_binary_1 = require("../../lib/live-runtime-binary");
 /**
  * `skrr daemon config` — set this machine's daemon configuration, including
  * each tool category's permission mode (OSK-12099). Before this the only way
@@ -23,7 +24,21 @@ class DaemonConfig extends core_1.Command {
         // flag this wrapper has not redeclared (OSK-296).
         const argv = this.argv;
         try {
-            const code = await (0, exec_runtime_binary_1.execRuntimeBinary)(['config', ...argv]);
+            // Config writes the file the LIVE daemon reloads, so it must be parsed by
+            // the live daemon's own binary — the same routing status uses (OSK-12102).
+            // Forwarding to the first `skrrd` on PATH let an older build accept
+            // `--auto-approve-bash banana` as false and reject `--mode`, then write
+            // the live daemon's config anyway (OSK-12099 verifier).
+            const pathBinary = (0, exec_runtime_binary_1.findRuntimeBinary)();
+            const decision = pathBinary
+                ? (0, live_runtime_binary_1.decideStatusBinary)(pathBinary, (0, live_runtime_binary_1.profileFromArgs)(argv), (0, live_runtime_binary_1.defaultLiveRuntimeDeps)())
+                : null;
+            const note = decision ? (0, live_runtime_binary_1.describeStatusBinary)(decision) : null;
+            if (note)
+                process.stderr.write(`${note}\n`);
+            const code = await (0, exec_runtime_binary_1.execRuntimeBinary)(['config', ...argv], {
+                binary: decision?.binary,
+            });
             this.exit(code);
         }
         catch (err) {

package/dist/commands/doctor.js

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ const auth_core_1 = require("@skrr-ai/auth-core");
 const base_command_1 = require("../base-command");
 const auth_storage_1 = require("../lib/auth-storage");
 const config_1 = require("../lib/config");
+const cli_id_1 = require("../lib/cli-id");
 const keychain_1 = require("../lib/keychain");
 const cli_runtime_1 = require("../lib/cli-runtime");
 const command_manifest_1 = require("../lib/command-manifest");
@@ -272,6 +273,9 @@ class Doctor extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
                 ? ['auth_token_present_but_user_lookup_failed']
                 : []),
             ...(!checks.authToken ? ['not_signed_in_or_no_token_available'] : []),
+            ...(credential.ownerStatus === 'foreign'
+                ? ['stored_credential_belongs_to_another_skrr_config_run_skrr_login']
+                : []),
         ];
         const payload = {
             ok: issues.length === 0,
@@ -286,13 +290,16 @@ class Doctor extends base_command_1.BaseCommand {
             profile: (0, keychain_1.getActiveProfile)(),
             config: {
                 path: (0, config_1.getConfigPath)(),
-                cliId: this.cliConfig.cliId ?? null,
+                cliId: (0, cli_id_1.resolveCliId)(this.cliConfig) ?? null,
             },
             auth: {
                 signedIn: Boolean(account),
                 tokenSource: this.credentialSourceLabel(),
                 tokenKind: this.resolvedCredential?.kind ?? null,
                 refreshAvailable: Boolean(credential.bundle?.refreshToken),
+                // OSK-12135 — why a stored credential was not used, when it belongs to
+                // another skrr config on this machine. Null when there is nothing to say.
+                storedCredentialOwner: (0, auth_storage_1.describeForeignCredential)(credential),
                 accessExpiresAt: accessExpiresAt ? new Date(accessExpiresAt).toISOString() : null,
                 accessExpired: accessExpiresAt ? accessExpiresAt <= now : null,
                 refreshExpiresAt: refreshExpiresAt ? new Date(refreshExpiresAt).toISOString() : null,

package/dist/commands/login.d.ts

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ export default class Login extends BaseCommand {
      *
      * `cliId` resolution priority:
      *   1. `OVERSKY_CLI_ID` env var — explicit, wins over everything.
-     *   2. `cliConfig.cliId` — set by a prior `skrr login` on this machine.
+     *   2. `resolveCliId(cliConfig)` — the id a prior `skrr login` of this
+     *      profile presents (its own, or the machine's).
      *      Honored so a same-machine restore "just works" without forcing
      *      the operator to re-export the cliId.
      *   3. error — without a cliId the refresh row binding can't be matched