@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.49 → 0.1.51

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/refreshClassification.js

@@ -33,6 +33,33 @@ const PERMANENT_CODE_SET = new Set([
     'REFRESH_EXPIRED',
     'SESSION_REVOKED',
 ]);
+/**
+ * Server refusal codes that are permanent but are not themselves reason names.
+ *
+ * `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH` (`daemonRefreshTokens.verifyDeviceProofPinForRow`)
+ * means the proof was signed by a key other than the one enrolled on the daemon's
+ * row. Every retry is signed by the same key, so it can never succeed — but
+ * because it was not in the set above it fell through to the unknown-401 path,
+ * where a daemon retrying on a five-minute cadence never exhausted its budget:
+ * one laptop logged 741 "transient, retrying" refusals over four days, and the
+ * reason it eventually surfaced was `UNKNOWN_401` (OSK-12056).
+ */
+const PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES = {
+    REFRESH_MISSING: 'REFRESH_INVALID',
+    DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH: 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH',
+};
+/**
+ * The permanent reason a 401 refresh refusal's `code` names, or `null` when the
+ * code is missing or unrecognised (an unknown-shape 401). The ONE mapping both
+ * this classifier and the daemon's `refresh.ts` read.
+ */
+export function permanentReasonForRefreshCode(code) {
+    if (!code)
+        return null;
+    if (PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code))
+        return code;
+    return PERMANENT_CODE_ALIASES[code] ?? null;
+}
 /**
  * Classify an HTTP response from /api/auth/refresh (or /api/daemons/token/refresh)
  * into a discriminated union of success or failure.
@@ -65,17 +92,12 @@ export function classifyRefreshResponse(status, body) {
     }
     // 401 — auth failure; check for known permanent code
     if (status === 401) {
-        if (body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING') {
-            return {
-                kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure('REFRESH_INVALID', body.message ?? 'Refresh token missing'),
-            };
-        }
-        const code = body?.code;
-        if (code && PERMANENT_CODE_SET.has(code)) {
+        const reason = permanentReasonForRefreshCode(body?.code);
+        if (reason) {
+            const fallback = body?.code === 'REFRESH_MISSING' ? 'Refresh token missing' : reason;
             return {
                 kind: 'failure',
-                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure(code, body?.message ?? code),
+                failure: new PermanentAuthFailure(reason, body?.message ?? fallback),
             };
         }
         // Unknown-shape 401 (no code, or a code we don't recognise). This is NOT a

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/sessionPermissionAuthority.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * Session permission authority — the ONE rule that decides whether a session's
+ * execution contract governs the run's permissions, shared by the server and
+ * the daemon (OSK-11975 introduced it; it was implemented twice — the server
+ * read `kind !== 'commitment'`, the daemon read the `permissionSource` marker —
+ * which is exactly how a new contract kind or a new source value would drift
+ * them apart).
+ *
+ * The wire model:
+ *
+ *   - The contract is closed (`hasOnlyKeys` on the daemon), so "whose
+ *     permissions govern" can never ride INSIDE it. It is a top-level session
+ *     field: `permissionSource`.
+ *   - `'agent'` means the Agent's own configured permission mode, tool policy,
+ *     Grants, session env, MCP servers and machine consent govern the run,
+ *     exactly as for an unattended Task of the same Agent. Today only a
+ *     `commitment` contract may carry it.
+ *   - A `commitment` contract WITHOUT the marker (an older server mid-deploy)
+ *     still governs permissions — the marker is the version signal, so its
+ *     absence must keep the legacy fence, not silently lift it.
+ *   - `task_delivery` contracts always govern, marker or not.
+ *
+ * Server vs daemon asymmetry, on purpose: the server STAMPS the marker
+ * (`permissionSourceForContract`), so on its own side the predicate reduces to
+ * "a commitment never governs" — `contractGovernsPermissions(c,
+ * permissionSourceForContract(c))` is exactly `kind !== 'commitment'`. The
+ * daemon reads the marker it received, because it cannot distinguish "new
+ * server, agent permissions" from "old server, contract fence" any other way.
+ * Both call the same function; only the input differs.
+ */
+/** The wire vocabulary for `permissionSource`. Top-level session field. */
+export declare const SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES: readonly ["agent"];
+export type SessionPermissionSource = (typeof SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES)[number];
+/**
+ * The daemon capability that proves a build honours `permissionSource`. The
+ * server announces it in preflight and refuses to dispatch a Commitment Run to
+ * a daemon without it (`COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED`), so
+ * the marker never reaches a daemon that would ignore it.
+ */
+export declare const COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = "commitment_execution_contract_v2_agent_permissions";
+/**
+ * The minimal contract shape this rule reads. The predicate only ever needs
+ * `kind` — keeping the input structural means this module never imports the
+ * full `CommitmentExecutionContract` type, which lives daemon-side
+ * (`daemon/src/commitment-execution-contract.ts`) and server-side in the
+ * commitment services.
+ */
+export type PermissionContractKind = {
+    kind?: unknown;
+} | null | undefined;
+/**
+ * Untrusted wire input: anything but an exact vocabulary literal reads as
+ * absent. Never widen by coercion — an unrecognized future value must degrade
+ * to "contract governs", the conservative answer.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeSessionPermissionSource(value: unknown): SessionPermissionSource | undefined;
+/**
+ * What the server stamps on the wire for this contract. A `commitment`
+ * contract no longer carries permissions (OSK-11975); every other contract
+ * kind keeps its own authority and stamps nothing.
+ */
+export declare function permissionSourceForContract(contract: PermissionContractKind): SessionPermissionSource | undefined;
+/**
+ * Whether the contract is the run's PERMISSION authority — the single place
+ * this rule lives.
+ *
+ * True for a non-commitment contract regardless of marker, and for a
+ * commitment whose server did not declare agent permissions. False for no
+ * contract at all, and for a commitment carrying `permissionSource: 'agent'`,
+ * which then follows the Agent's own permissions exactly as a Task does while
+ * the contract keeps its non-permission roles (normalized shape, ephemeral
+ * worktree, result validation, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS`, provider restriction).
+ */
+export declare function contractGovernsPermissions(contract: PermissionContractKind, permissionSource: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * The contract when it governs permissions, else `undefined` — for the sites
+ * that used `executionContract` as "is this run permission-fenced".
+ */
+export declare function permissionGoverningContract<T extends {
+    kind?: unknown;
+}>(contract: T | null | undefined, permissionSource: unknown): T | undefined;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/sessionPermissionAuthority.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * Session permission authority — the ONE rule that decides whether a session's
+ * execution contract governs the run's permissions, shared by the server and
+ * the daemon (OSK-11975 introduced it; it was implemented twice — the server
+ * read `kind !== 'commitment'`, the daemon read the `permissionSource` marker —
+ * which is exactly how a new contract kind or a new source value would drift
+ * them apart).
+ *
+ * The wire model:
+ *
+ *   - The contract is closed (`hasOnlyKeys` on the daemon), so "whose
+ *     permissions govern" can never ride INSIDE it. It is a top-level session
+ *     field: `permissionSource`.
+ *   - `'agent'` means the Agent's own configured permission mode, tool policy,
+ *     Grants, session env, MCP servers and machine consent govern the run,
+ *     exactly as for an unattended Task of the same Agent. Today only a
+ *     `commitment` contract may carry it.
+ *   - A `commitment` contract WITHOUT the marker (an older server mid-deploy)
+ *     still governs permissions — the marker is the version signal, so its
+ *     absence must keep the legacy fence, not silently lift it.
+ *   - `task_delivery` contracts always govern, marker or not.
+ *
+ * Server vs daemon asymmetry, on purpose: the server STAMPS the marker
+ * (`permissionSourceForContract`), so on its own side the predicate reduces to
+ * "a commitment never governs" — `contractGovernsPermissions(c,
+ * permissionSourceForContract(c))` is exactly `kind !== 'commitment'`. The
+ * daemon reads the marker it received, because it cannot distinguish "new
+ * server, agent permissions" from "old server, contract fence" any other way.
+ * Both call the same function; only the input differs.
+ */
+/** The wire vocabulary for `permissionSource`. Top-level session field. */
+export const SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES = ['agent'];
+/**
+ * The daemon capability that proves a build honours `permissionSource`. The
+ * server announces it in preflight and refuses to dispatch a Commitment Run to
+ * a daemon without it (`COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED`), so
+ * the marker never reaches a daemon that would ignore it.
+ */
+export const COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = 'commitment_execution_contract_v2_agent_permissions';
+/**
+ * Untrusted wire input: anything but an exact vocabulary literal reads as
+ * absent. Never widen by coercion — an unrecognized future value must degrade
+ * to "contract governs", the conservative answer.
+ */
+export function normalizeSessionPermissionSource(value) {
+    return SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES.includes(value)
+        ? value
+        : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * What the server stamps on the wire for this contract. A `commitment`
+ * contract no longer carries permissions (OSK-11975); every other contract
+ * kind keeps its own authority and stamps nothing.
+ */
+export function permissionSourceForContract(contract) {
+    return contract?.kind === 'commitment' ? 'agent' : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether the contract is the run's PERMISSION authority — the single place
+ * this rule lives.
+ *
+ * True for a non-commitment contract regardless of marker, and for a
+ * commitment whose server did not declare agent permissions. False for no
+ * contract at all, and for a commitment carrying `permissionSource: 'agent'`,
+ * which then follows the Agent's own permissions exactly as a Task does while
+ * the contract keeps its non-permission roles (normalized shape, ephemeral
+ * worktree, result validation, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS`, provider restriction).
+ */
+export function contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) {
+    if (!contract)
+        return false;
+    return !(contract.kind === 'commitment' && normalizeSessionPermissionSource(permissionSource) === 'agent');
+}
+/**
+ * The contract when it governs permissions, else `undefined` — for the sites
+ * that used `executionContract` as "is this run permission-fenced".
+ */
+export function permissionGoverningContract(contract, permissionSource) {
+    return contract && contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) ? contract : undefined;
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/spawnEnv.d.ts

@@ -84,3 +84,25 @@ export declare const SENSITIVE_ENV_PREFIX_EXCEPTIONS: ReadonlySet<string>;
  * etc.) so legitimate tools keep working.
  */
 export declare function sanitizeSpawnEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+/**
+ * OSK-12134 — loopback names a spawned child must reach directly, never through
+ * a proxy. A harness talks to this machine constantly: the daemon's local
+ * bridges (browser, delegated CLI, message intents), the inference broker, and
+ * the engine's own loopback services (skrr Code's `session/new` reaches a local
+ * directory service and failed with "service failure" behind a shell proxy).
+ */
+export declare const LOOPBACK_NO_PROXY_HOSTS: readonly string[];
+/** True when `env` names a proxy some client in the child might honour. */
+export declare function envHasProxy(env: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>): boolean;
+/**
+ * Return `env` with the loopback hosts appended to BOTH `NO_PROXY` and
+ * `no_proxy`, when (and only when) it names a proxy. Tools disagree on which
+ * spelling they read and whether they fall back to the other, so an unset
+ * spelling is seeded from the other one before the hosts are appended —
+ * seeding only the hosts would silently drop every existing exemption for a
+ * tool that prefers the unset spelling. Existing entries keep their order.
+ *
+ * Exported for a parent that layers a proxy onto the child's env AFTER
+ * {@link sanitizeSpawnEnv}: call it again on the final map.
+ */
+export declare function withLoopbackNoProxy<T extends Record<string, string | undefined>>(env: T): T;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/spawnEnv.js

@@ -183,5 +183,62 @@ export function sanitizeSpawnEnv(env) {
             continue;
         out[key] = value;
     }
-    return out;
+    return withLoopbackNoProxy(out);
+}
+/**
+ * OSK-12134 — loopback names a spawned child must reach directly, never through
+ * a proxy. A harness talks to this machine constantly: the daemon's local
+ * bridges (browser, delegated CLI, message intents), the inference broker, and
+ * the engine's own loopback services (skrr Code's `session/new` reaches a local
+ * directory service and failed with "service failure" behind a shell proxy).
+ */
+export const LOOPBACK_NO_PROXY_HOSTS = ['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1'];
+const PROXY_ENV_VARS = [
+    'HTTP_PROXY',
+    'http_proxy',
+    'HTTPS_PROXY',
+    'https_proxy',
+    'ALL_PROXY',
+    'all_proxy',
+];
+/** True when `env` names a proxy some client in the child might honour. */
+export function envHasProxy(env) {
+    return PROXY_ENV_VARS.some((name) => typeof env[name] === 'string' && env[name].trim() !== '');
+}
+function appendNoProxyHosts(list, hosts) {
+    const entries = list
+        .split(',')
+        .map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase())
+        .filter(Boolean);
+    // `*` already exempts everything, and some clients honour it only as the
+    // entire value, so appending to it would break them.
+    if (entries.includes('*'))
+        return list;
+    const missing = hosts.filter((host) => !entries.includes(host));
+    if (missing.length === 0)
+        return list;
+    const kept = list.replace(/[\s,]+$/, '');
+    return kept ? `${kept},${missing.join(',')}` : missing.join(',');
+}
+/**
+ * Return `env` with the loopback hosts appended to BOTH `NO_PROXY` and
+ * `no_proxy`, when (and only when) it names a proxy. Tools disagree on which
+ * spelling they read and whether they fall back to the other, so an unset
+ * spelling is seeded from the other one before the hosts are appended —
+ * seeding only the hosts would silently drop every existing exemption for a
+ * tool that prefers the unset spelling. Existing entries keep their order.
+ *
+ * Exported for a parent that layers a proxy onto the child's env AFTER
+ * {@link sanitizeSpawnEnv}: call it again on the final map.
+ */
+export function withLoopbackNoProxy(env) {
+    if (!envHasProxy(env))
+        return env;
+    const upper = env.NO_PROXY?.trim() ? env.NO_PROXY : undefined;
+    const lower = env.no_proxy?.trim() ? env.no_proxy : undefined;
+    return {
+        ...env,
+        NO_PROXY: appendNoProxyHosts(upper ?? lower ?? '', LOOPBACK_NO_PROXY_HOSTS),
+        no_proxy: appendNoProxyHosts(lower ?? upper ?? '', LOOPBACK_NO_PROXY_HOSTS),
+    };
 }

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/types.d.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  *   - TOKEN_*         — access-token specific (server pushes 4402 close;
  *                       daemon classifies as TOKEN_INVALID/TOKEN_EXPIRED).
  *   - SESSION_REVOKED — admin/forensic revoke; whole family burned.
+ *   - DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH — the refresh carried a device proof signed by a key
+ *                       other than the one enrolled on this daemon's row
+ *                       (server code `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH`).
+ *                       The daemon signs every retry with the same key, so
+ *                       retrying can never succeed.
  *   - UNKNOWN_401     — server returned 401 with a code we don't
  *                       recognize. Treated as permanent (better to prompt
  *                       re-auth than to loop forever) but tagged
@@ -74,7 +79,7 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  * Without this, the client `describeAuthFailure` exhaustiveness check
  * was silently broken for the non-REFRESH branches.
  */
-export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
+export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
 export declare class PermanentAuthFailure extends Error {
     readonly code: PermanentAuthReason;
     constructor(code: PermanentAuthReason, message: string);

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@skrr-ai/auth-core",
-  "version": "0.4.4",
+  "version": "0.4.5",
   "main": "dist/cjs/index.js",
   "types": "dist/esm/index.d.ts",
   "exports": {
@@ -43,6 +43,66 @@
         "types": "./dist/cjs/harnessSkillLayout.d.ts",
         "default": "./dist/cjs/harnessSkillLayout.js"
       }
+    },
+    "./daemon-tool-approval": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/daemonToolApproval.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/daemonToolApproval.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/daemonToolApproval.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/daemonToolApproval.js"
+      }
+    },
+    "./session-permission-authority": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/sessionPermissionAuthority.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/sessionPermissionAuthority.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/sessionPermissionAuthority.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/sessionPermissionAuthority.js"
+      }
+    },
+    "./credential-session": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/credentialSession.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/credentialSession.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/credentialSession.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/credentialSession.js"
+      }
+    },
+    "./cli-handoff-wire": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/cliHandoffWire.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/cliHandoffWire.js"
+      }
+    },
+    "./loopback-http": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/loopbackHttp.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/loopbackHttp.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/loopbackHttp.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/loopbackHttp.js"
+      }
+    },
+    "./machine-uuid": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/machineUuid.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/machineUuid.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/machineUuid.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/machineUuid.js"
+      }
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {