@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.48 → 0.1.50

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/sessionPermissionAuthority.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Session permission authority — the ONE rule that decides whether a session's
+ * execution contract governs the run's permissions, shared by the server and
+ * the daemon (OSK-11975 introduced it; it was implemented twice — the server
+ * read `kind !== 'commitment'`, the daemon read the `permissionSource` marker —
+ * which is exactly how a new contract kind or a new source value would drift
+ * them apart).
+ *
+ * The wire model:
+ *
+ *   - The contract is closed (`hasOnlyKeys` on the daemon), so "whose
+ *     permissions govern" can never ride INSIDE it. It is a top-level session
+ *     field: `permissionSource`.
+ *   - `'agent'` means the Agent's own configured permission mode, tool policy,
+ *     Grants, session env, MCP servers and machine consent govern the run,
+ *     exactly as for an unattended Task of the same Agent. Today only a
+ *     `commitment` contract may carry it.
+ *   - A `commitment` contract WITHOUT the marker (an older server mid-deploy)
+ *     still governs permissions — the marker is the version signal, so its
+ *     absence must keep the legacy fence, not silently lift it.
+ *   - `task_delivery` contracts always govern, marker or not.
+ *
+ * Server vs daemon asymmetry, on purpose: the server STAMPS the marker
+ * (`permissionSourceForContract`), so on its own side the predicate reduces to
+ * "a commitment never governs" — `contractGovernsPermissions(c,
+ * permissionSourceForContract(c))` is exactly `kind !== 'commitment'`. The
+ * daemon reads the marker it received, because it cannot distinguish "new
+ * server, agent permissions" from "old server, contract fence" any other way.
+ * Both call the same function; only the input differs.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES = void 0;
+exports.normalizeSessionPermissionSource = normalizeSessionPermissionSource;
+exports.permissionSourceForContract = permissionSourceForContract;
+exports.contractGovernsPermissions = contractGovernsPermissions;
+exports.permissionGoverningContract = permissionGoverningContract;
+/** The wire vocabulary for `permissionSource`. Top-level session field. */
+exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES = ['agent'];
+/**
+ * The daemon capability that proves a build honours `permissionSource`. The
+ * server announces it in preflight and refuses to dispatch a Commitment Run to
+ * a daemon without it (`COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED`), so
+ * the marker never reaches a daemon that would ignore it.
+ */
+exports.COMMITMENT_AGENT_PERMISSIONS_CAPABILITY = 'commitment_execution_contract_v2_agent_permissions';
+/**
+ * Untrusted wire input: anything but an exact vocabulary literal reads as
+ * absent. Never widen by coercion — an unrecognized future value must degrade
+ * to "contract governs", the conservative answer.
+ */
+function normalizeSessionPermissionSource(value) {
+    return exports.SESSION_PERMISSION_SOURCES.includes(value)
+        ? value
+        : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * What the server stamps on the wire for this contract. A `commitment`
+ * contract no longer carries permissions (OSK-11975); every other contract
+ * kind keeps its own authority and stamps nothing.
+ */
+function permissionSourceForContract(contract) {
+    return contract?.kind === 'commitment' ? 'agent' : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether the contract is the run's PERMISSION authority — the single place
+ * this rule lives.
+ *
+ * True for a non-commitment contract regardless of marker, and for a
+ * commitment whose server did not declare agent permissions. False for no
+ * contract at all, and for a commitment carrying `permissionSource: 'agent'`,
+ * which then follows the Agent's own permissions exactly as a Task does while
+ * the contract keeps its non-permission roles (normalized shape, ephemeral
+ * worktree, result validation, `GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS`, provider restriction).
+ */
+function contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) {
+    if (!contract)
+        return false;
+    return !(contract.kind === 'commitment' && normalizeSessionPermissionSource(permissionSource) === 'agent');
+}
+/**
+ * The contract when it governs permissions, else `undefined` — for the sites
+ * that used `executionContract` as "is this run permission-fenced".
+ */
+function permissionGoverningContract(contract, permissionSource) {
+    return contract && contractGovernsPermissions(contract, permissionSource) ? contract : undefined;
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/types.d.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  *   - TOKEN_*         — access-token specific (server pushes 4402 close;
  *                       daemon classifies as TOKEN_INVALID/TOKEN_EXPIRED).
  *   - SESSION_REVOKED — admin/forensic revoke; whole family burned.
+ *   - DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH — the refresh carried a device proof signed by a key
+ *                       other than the one enrolled on this daemon's row
+ *                       (server code `DEVICE_PROOF_THUMBPRINT_MISMATCH`).
+ *                       The daemon signs every retry with the same key, so
+ *                       retrying can never succeed.
  *   - UNKNOWN_401     — server returned 401 with a code we don't
  *                       recognize. Treated as permanent (better to prompt
  *                       re-auth than to loop forever) but tagged
@@ -74,7 +79,7 @@ export interface TokenPair {
  * Without this, the client `describeAuthFailure` exhaustiveness check
  * was silently broken for the non-REFRESH branches.
  */
-export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
+export type PermanentAuthReason = 'REFRESH_INVALID' | 'REFRESH_REUSED' | 'REFRESH_EXPIRED' | 'SESSION_REVOKED' | 'DEVICE_KEY_MISMATCH' | 'TOKEN_INVALID' | 'TOKEN_EXPIRED' | 'UNKNOWN_401';
 export declare class PermanentAuthFailure extends Error {
     readonly code: PermanentAuthReason;
     constructor(code: PermanentAuthReason, message: string);

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/**
+ * cliHandoffWire.ts — the ONE declaration of the CLI↔daemon hand-off wire
+ * contracts, shared by the daemon (writer/server) and the CLI (reader).
+ *
+ * Two contracts live here:
+ *
+ *   1. The hand-off descriptor file (`descriptor.json` on Dedicated guests,
+ *      `daemon-island.<profile>.json` on laptops). Until now the shape was
+ *      declared twice — `DedicatedCliHandoffDescriptor` daemon-side and
+ *      `LocalBootstrap` CLI-side — two type declarations for one file format,
+ *      the same drift disease `sessionPermissionAuthority` fixed.
+ *   2. The broker-mode redeem exchange: `POST /v1/auth/cli-handoff-token`
+ *      request/response plus its error codes.
+ *
+ * Readers stay loose (unknown fields ignored, absent `handoffModes` reads as
+ * refresh-family-only) so a new field never breaks an older peer; writers
+ * must produce the full shape.
+ */
+/**
+ * What a caller may redeem the descriptor secret for.
+ *  - `refresh_family`: the legacy durable mint (90-day cli-scope family).
+ *  - `access_token`:   broker mode — a short-lived access token from a
+ *                      daemon-owned family; nothing durable leaves the daemon.
+ */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_MODES: readonly ["refresh_family", "access_token"];
+export type CliHandoffMode = (typeof CLI_HANDOFF_MODES)[number];
+/** Broker-mode redeem route on the daemon's loopback server. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATH = "/v1/auth/cli-handoff-token";
+/** Error codes this contract emits. String literals so both ends compare
+ *  without importing a symbol they may not have. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_ERROR_UNAVAILABLE = "HANDOFF_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE";
+/** Emitted by the LEGACY /v1/auth/cli-handoff route when a hand-off-secret
+ *  caller asks for a refresh family the daemon no longer mints for it. */
+export declare const CLI_HANDOFF_ERROR_BROKER_ONLY = "HANDOFF_BROKER_ONLY";
+/**
+ * The descriptor file format. `version` is absent on the oldest island files
+ * and `1` on the first dedicated-guest descriptors; `handoffModes` first
+ * appears at version 2. Every field the CLI needs to dial is validated; the
+ * rest ride along untyped.
+ */
+export interface CliHandoffDescriptor {
+    version?: number;
+    pid?: number;
+    daemonId?: string;
+    host?: string;
+    port?: number;
+    /** Base64 handshake secret — hand-off-only on guests, island on laptops. */
+    secret?: string;
+    /** Server URL the daemon is authenticated against. Older daemons omit it;
+     *  readers refuse to broker without it (never mint against an unknown
+     *  server). */
+    serverUrl?: string;
+    /** Daemon-authored epoch counter; bumped when the descriptor is republished. */
+    epoch?: number;
+    handoffModes?: CliHandoffMode[];
+}
+/**
+ * Parse an untrusted descriptor JSON value. Returns null when the fields the
+ * caller cannot proceed without — host, port, secret — are absent or
+ * mistyped. Unknown fields and future `version` values are tolerated: the
+ * reader ignores them, which is what makes additive evolution safe.
+ */
+export declare function parseCliHandoffDescriptor(value: unknown): CliHandoffDescriptor | null;
+/**
+ * Untrusted `handoffModes` input → known literals only, deduped. An
+ * unrecognized future mode is dropped rather than widening by coercion.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeHandoffModes(value: unknown): CliHandoffMode[];
+/**
+ * The versioned-default rule: a descriptor that never declares modes offers
+ * only the durable mint it has always offered. Mode negotiation is purely
+ * additive — a daemon advertises the new mode, it never un-advertises the
+ * old one by accident.
+ */
+export declare function advertisedHandoffModes(d: CliHandoffDescriptor): CliHandoffMode[];
+export declare function descriptorOffersAccessToken(d: CliHandoffDescriptor): boolean;
+export interface CliHandoffTokenRequest {
+    /** Bypass the daemon broker's cached token (the 401-recovery path). */
+    forceRefresh?: boolean;
+}
+export interface CliHandoffTokenResponse {
+    accessToken: string;
+    /** Absolute expiry in ms since epoch, when the daemon knows it. */
+    accessExpiresAt?: number;
+    /** Server the minted credential belongs to — lets the caller verify it is
+     *  about to use a token for the API it thinks it is talking to. */
+    serverUrl?: string;
+}
+/** Parse the redeem response; null when the token itself is absent. */
+export declare function parseCliHandoffTokenResponse(value: unknown): CliHandoffTokenResponse | null;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/**
+ * cliHandoffWire.ts — the ONE declaration of the CLI↔daemon hand-off wire
+ * contracts, shared by the daemon (writer/server) and the CLI (reader).
+ *
+ * Two contracts live here:
+ *
+ *   1. The hand-off descriptor file (`descriptor.json` on Dedicated guests,
+ *      `daemon-island.<profile>.json` on laptops). Until now the shape was
+ *      declared twice — `DedicatedCliHandoffDescriptor` daemon-side and
+ *      `LocalBootstrap` CLI-side — two type declarations for one file format,
+ *      the same drift disease `sessionPermissionAuthority` fixed.
+ *   2. The broker-mode redeem exchange: `POST /v1/auth/cli-handoff-token`
+ *      request/response plus its error codes.
+ *
+ * Readers stay loose (unknown fields ignored, absent `handoffModes` reads as
+ * refresh-family-only) so a new field never breaks an older peer; writers
+ * must produce the full shape.
+ */
+/**
+ * What a caller may redeem the descriptor secret for.
+ *  - `refresh_family`: the legacy durable mint (90-day cli-scope family).
+ *  - `access_token`:   broker mode — a short-lived access token from a
+ *                      daemon-owned family; nothing durable leaves the daemon.
+ */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_MODES = ['refresh_family', 'access_token'];
+/** Broker-mode redeem route on the daemon's loopback server. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATH = '/v1/auth/cli-handoff-token';
+/** Error codes this contract emits. String literals so both ends compare
+ *  without importing a symbol they may not have. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_TOKEN_ERROR_UNAVAILABLE = 'HANDOFF_TOKEN_UNAVAILABLE';
+/** Emitted by the LEGACY /v1/auth/cli-handoff route when a hand-off-secret
+ *  caller asks for a refresh family the daemon no longer mints for it. */
+export const CLI_HANDOFF_ERROR_BROKER_ONLY = 'HANDOFF_BROKER_ONLY';
+/**
+ * Parse an untrusted descriptor JSON value. Returns null when the fields the
+ * caller cannot proceed without — host, port, secret — are absent or
+ * mistyped. Unknown fields and future `version` values are tolerated: the
+ * reader ignores them, which is what makes additive evolution safe.
+ */
+export function parseCliHandoffDescriptor(value) {
+    if (value == null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const v = value;
+    if (typeof v.host !== 'string' || v.host.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof v.port !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(v.port) || v.port <= 0)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof v.secret !== 'string' || v.secret.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        ...(typeof v.version === 'number' ? { version: v.version } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.pid === 'number' ? { pid: v.pid } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.daemonId === 'string' ? { daemonId: v.daemonId } : {}),
+        host: v.host,
+        port: v.port,
+        secret: v.secret,
+        ...(typeof v.serverUrl === 'string' ? { serverUrl: v.serverUrl } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.epoch === 'number' ? { epoch: v.epoch } : {}),
+        ...(Array.isArray(v.handoffModes)
+            ? { handoffModes: normalizeHandoffModes(v.handoffModes) }
+            : {}),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Untrusted `handoffModes` input → known literals only, deduped. An
+ * unrecognized future mode is dropped rather than widening by coercion.
+ */
+export function normalizeHandoffModes(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value))
+        return [];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const m of value) {
+        if (CLI_HANDOFF_MODES.includes(m) &&
+            !out.includes(m)) {
+            out.push(m);
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * The versioned-default rule: a descriptor that never declares modes offers
+ * only the durable mint it has always offered. Mode negotiation is purely
+ * additive — a daemon advertises the new mode, it never un-advertises the
+ * old one by accident.
+ */
+export function advertisedHandoffModes(d) {
+    const declared = normalizeHandoffModes(d.handoffModes);
+    return declared.length > 0 ? declared : ['refresh_family'];
+}
+export function descriptorOffersAccessToken(d) {
+    return advertisedHandoffModes(d).includes('access_token');
+}
+/** Parse the redeem response; null when the token itself is absent. */
+export function parseCliHandoffTokenResponse(value) {
+    if (value == null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const v = value;
+    if (typeof v.accessToken !== 'string' || v.accessToken.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        accessToken: v.accessToken,
+        ...(typeof v.accessExpiresAt === 'number' ? { accessExpiresAt: v.accessExpiresAt } : {}),
+        ...(typeof v.serverUrl === 'string' ? { serverUrl: v.serverUrl } : {}),
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/credentialSession.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * credentialSession.ts — the shared credential-lifecycle kernel (policy half).
+ *
+ * A credential lifecycle is policy × mechanism. The policy — serve a cached
+ * token until its expiry-skew window, collapse concurrent acquires onto one
+ * in-flight operation, invalidate on a resource-side 401 — is identical for
+ * every surface and was being re-implemented per consumer (task token-broker,
+ * delegated-cli redemption, the human CLI refresh path). The mechanism —
+ * WHERE the durable secret lives and HOW a token is acquired — legitimately
+ * differs (in-memory daemon family vs file+envelope+lock vs loopback redeem)
+ * and stays behind the `acquire` seam.
+ *
+ * Deliberately thin: no persistence, no retry policy, no logging. Callers
+ * own their store and their error surfaces; this owns the cache/single-
+ * flight/invalidate invariants so they cannot drift between surfaces.
+ */
+/** What an acquire returns. `expiresAtMs` absent means "no known expiry" —
+ *  the token is served until `invalidate()` or an acquire replaces it. */
+export interface AcquiredCredential {
+    accessToken: string;
+    /** Absolute expiry in ms since epoch, when the issuer tells us. */
+    expiresAtMs?: number;
+}
+export interface CredentialSessionOptions {
+    /**
+     * The mechanism. Called with `forceRefresh: true` when the caller asked to
+     * bypass the cache (the 401-recovery path) — implementations should renew
+     * rather than serve their own cache. A rejected promise propagates to every
+     * waiter and is never cached.
+     */
+    acquire: (forceRefresh: boolean) => Promise<AcquiredCredential>;
+    /** Serve the cached token until this many ms before expiry. Default 30s. */
+    skewMs?: number;
+    /** Injectable clock for tests. */
+    now?: () => number;
+}
+export interface CredentialSession {
+    /**
+     * Resolves a usable access token: the cached one while it is inside its
+     * freshness window, otherwise a single shared acquire. `forceRefresh`
+     * discards the cache first (use after a resource 401).
+     */
+    getToken(forceRefresh?: boolean): Promise<string>;
+    /** Drop the cached token; the next getToken() acquires. */
+    invalidate(): void;
+}
+export declare function createCredentialSession(opts: CredentialSessionOptions): CredentialSession;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/credentialSession.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/**
+ * credentialSession.ts — the shared credential-lifecycle kernel (policy half).
+ *
+ * A credential lifecycle is policy × mechanism. The policy — serve a cached
+ * token until its expiry-skew window, collapse concurrent acquires onto one
+ * in-flight operation, invalidate on a resource-side 401 — is identical for
+ * every surface and was being re-implemented per consumer (task token-broker,
+ * delegated-cli redemption, the human CLI refresh path). The mechanism —
+ * WHERE the durable secret lives and HOW a token is acquired — legitimately
+ * differs (in-memory daemon family vs file+envelope+lock vs loopback redeem)
+ * and stays behind the `acquire` seam.
+ *
+ * Deliberately thin: no persistence, no retry policy, no logging. Callers
+ * own their store and their error surfaces; this owns the cache/single-
+ * flight/invalidate invariants so they cannot drift between surfaces.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 30_000;
+export function createCredentialSession(opts) {
+    const skewMs = opts.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS;
+    const now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
+    let cached = null;
+    let inFlight = null;
+    let inFlightForced = false;
+    // Monotonic generation so a superseded in-flight acquire (a forceRefresh
+    // launched while a plain acquire was still running) cannot write its stale
+    // result back over the newer one.
+    let generation = 0;
+    const fresh = (t) => t.expiresAtMs == null || now() < t.expiresAtMs - skewMs;
+    const acquireShared = (force) => {
+        // A forced acquire must not join a non-forced in-flight one — that would
+        // serve the very credential a 401 just invalidated. A forced in-flight
+        // DOES satisfy non-forced waiters: it is already renewing.
+        if (inFlight && (inFlightForced || !force))
+            return inFlight;
+        const gen = ++generation;
+        const p = opts.acquire(force).then((t) => {
+            if (gen === generation)
+                cached = t;
+            return t;
+        });
+        inFlight = p;
+        inFlightForced = force;
+        // `then(cleanup, cleanup)` not `.finally(cleanup)`: finally propagates the
+        // rejection into a derived promise nobody awaits — an unhandledRejection.
+        const cleanup = () => {
+            if (inFlight === p) {
+                inFlight = null;
+                inFlightForced = false;
+            }
+        };
+        p.then(cleanup, cleanup);
+        return p;
+    };
+    return {
+        async getToken(forceRefresh = false) {
+            if (forceRefresh)
+                cached = null;
+            if (cached && fresh(cached))
+                return cached.accessToken;
+            return (await acquireShared(forceRefresh)).accessToken;
+        },
+        invalidate() {
+            cached = null;
+        },
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/daemonToolApproval.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Server-attested tool approval (OSK-11975 follow-up to the `manual` mode
+ * refusal on `daemon:tool:request`).
+ *
+ * A daemon category in `manual` mode means "a PERSON approves each call". On
+ * the harness-session path the daemon asks through the permission bridge; on
+ * the daemon-tool path a cloud agent's call used to be refused outright,
+ * because the request carried no approval and there was no channel back to a
+ * person. The attested-approval protocol closes that gap without weakening
+ * the guarantee:
+ *
+ *   1. The daemon announces `daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1` and its
+ *      resolved per-category posture (`toolPermissionModes`) at register time.
+ *   2. Before proxying a call, the server reads the announced posture for the
+ *      tool's category. `manual` means it must ask first — through the same
+ *      permission surface (`canUseTool` → `permission:request`) an in-process
+ *      SDK turn would have used — and only then dispatch, carrying an
+ *      `attestedApproval` object on the request.
+ *   3. The daemon verifies the attestation's SHAPE and BINDING — it is bound
+ *      to this exact (toolUseId, toolName, toolInput digest) and expires
+ *      quickly — and allows the call. A missing or malformed attestation gets
+ *      the same named refusal as before.
+ *
+ * What the daemon verifies is the binding, not the server's honesty: the
+ * request already arrives over the daemon's authenticated server channel, so
+ * the field IS the attestation. What the binding buys is that the model —
+ * which authors `toolInput` — cannot mint an approval, and an approval for
+ * one call cannot be replayed onto another.
+ */
+/** Announced by a daemon that honours `attestedApproval` on daemon:tool:request. */
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_ATTESTED_APPROVAL_CAPABILITY = "daemon_tool_attested_approval_v1";
+/**
+ * Announced by a daemon that honours `toolPosture: 'read_only'` on
+ * daemon:tool:request — the daemon-tool-path expression of the wire `plan`
+ * session mode: reads run, every mutating category is refused with a named
+ * reason. Carries INTENT like `browserPolicy: 'read_only'` — the daemon owns
+ * what read-only means, so the server cannot widen the fence by shipping a
+ * wider value.
+ */
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_READ_ONLY_CAPABILITY = "daemon_tool_read_only_v1";
+/**
+ * Tool categories the daemon recognizes for permission purposes. This is the
+ * wire vocabulary the daemon's announced `toolPermissionModes` is keyed on —
+ * shared so the server's pre-dispatch check and the daemon's own enforcement
+ * classify a tool name identically (a third map was exactly the drift this
+ * package exists to prevent).
+ */
+export type DaemonToolCategory = 'read' | 'write' | 'bash' | 'browser' | 'claude_session' | 'native_ui';
+export declare const DAEMON_TOOL_CATEGORIES: readonly DaemonToolCategory[];
+/** Map a tool name to its category. Unknown tools take the restrictive answer. */
+export declare function categoryForDaemonTool(toolName: string): DaemonToolCategory;
+/**
+ * The posture a daemon announces per category for the daemon-tool path:
+ *  - `auto`      — the call runs once guardrails pass; no attestation needed
+ *  - `manual`    — the call needs a person; the server must attach a fresh
+ *                  `attestedApproval` or the daemon refuses it
+ *  - `delegated` — the category's own policy decides per action (browser,
+ *                  native UI); asking up front would ask the wrong question
+ */
+export type DaemonToolPathPosture = 'auto' | 'manual' | 'delegated';
+export type DaemonToolPermissionModes = Readonly<Partial<Record<DaemonToolCategory, DaemonToolPathPosture>>>;
+/** The wire field values `toolPosture` accepts. Unknown values must be ignored. */
+export type DaemonToolPosture = 'read_only';
+/**
+ * How long an attestation stays valid. Short: it answers ONE person, about
+ * THIS call, moments ago — it is not a standing grant. The server asks and
+ * dispatches back-to-back, so the window only has to outlive publish latency.
+ */
+export declare const ATTESTED_TOOL_APPROVAL_TTL_MS: number;
+export interface AttestedToolApproval {
+    v: 1;
+    /** Binds the approval to this exact call — a different call gets nothing. */
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    /** SHA-256 of the canonical tool input (see `canonicalToolInputDigest`). */
+    inputSha256: string;
+    /** Who answered on the server's permission surface. */
+    decidedBy: 'user';
+    issuedAt: number;
+    expiresAt: number;
+}
+/** The digest both sides compute over `toolInput`. */
+export declare function canonicalToolInputDigest(toolInput: unknown): string;
+/** Server side: mint the attestation after a person approved THIS call. */
+export declare function mintAttestedToolApproval(args: {
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    toolInput: unknown;
+    now?: number;
+    ttlMs?: number;
+}): AttestedToolApproval;
+export type AttestedToolApprovalVerdict = {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: 'absent' | 'malformed' | 'binding' | 'expired';
+};
+/**
+ * Daemon side: verify an attestation against the call it claims to approve.
+ * Untrusted wire input — every field is checked, and any mismatch is a plain
+ * "no approval", never a partial credit. `reason` is for daemon logs; the
+ * refusal text stays generic so a probing caller learns nothing new.
+ */
+export declare function verifyAttestedToolApproval(approval: unknown, call: {
+    toolUseId: string;
+    toolName: string;
+    toolInput: unknown;
+    now?: number;
+}): AttestedToolApprovalVerdict;