@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.104 → 0.1.106

package/dist/lib/triggers.js

@@ -25,12 +25,18 @@ exports.mergeObjectField = mergeObjectField;
 exports.mergeTriggerKindConfig = mergeTriggerKindConfig;
 exports.assertKindFlagsApply = assertKindFlagsApply;
 exports.describeScheduledFire = describeScheduledFire;
+exports.fireWasAccepted = fireWasAccepted;
+exports.describeFireDetail = describeFireDetail;
+exports.formatFireInZone = formatFireInZone;
+exports.nextFireLines = nextFireLines;
+exports.destinationLine = destinationLine;
 exports.withQuery = withQuery;
 exports.agentScope = agentScope;
 exports.spaceSubscriberScope = spaceSubscriberScope;
 exports.agentRefEntity = agentRefEntity;
 exports.fetchAgentScopedTrigger = fetchAgentScopedTrigger;
 exports.scopeLabel = scopeLabel;
+exports.onceDueAt = onceDueAt;
 exports.nextRunLabel = nextRunLabel;
 exports.armedLabel = armedLabel;
 exports.degradedMarker = degradedMarker;
@@ -766,6 +772,116 @@ function describeScheduledFire(result) {
     }
     return undefined;
 }
+/**
+ * Was the fire admitted? `in_progress` and `awaiting_runtime` are admissions whose terminal arrives
+ * later (every agent-turn fire answers `in_progress`), and a repeat of a fire that was admitted is
+ * `duplicate` with the original beside it; none of them is a refusal (OSK-3867 made the same mistake
+ * about `in_progress` once). Only these are success for `triggers fire --strict`.
+ */
+function fireWasAccepted(result) {
+    const accepted = data_provider_1.ACCEPTED_AGENT_TRIGGER_FIRE_OUTCOMES;
+    if (typeof result.outcome === 'string' && accepted.includes(result.outcome))
+        return true;
+    return (result.outcome === 'duplicate' &&
+        typeof result.originalOutcome === 'string' &&
+        accepted.includes(result.originalOutcome));
+}
+/**
+ * The lines a fire or replay owes beyond `outcome=… reason=…` (OSK-15494): the sentence the
+ * server wrote ("Replayed fire … resolved a step that was not waiting when that fire ran:
+ * run …, step …"), or, for a debounced fire, when a retry will be accepted. Empty when the server
+ * reported nothing more.
+ */
+function describeFireDetail(result) {
+    const lines = [];
+    if (typeof result.detail === 'string' && result.detail.trim())
+        lines.push(result.detail.trim());
+    else if (typeof result.retryAt === 'string' && result.retryAt) {
+        lines.push(`Try again after ${result.retryAt}.`);
+    }
+    // A fire option the server does not read is named, because dropping it without a word left a caller
+    // unable to tell whether `--from-json` was honoured (OSK-15498).
+    if (Array.isArray(result.ignoredOptions) && result.ignoredOptions.length > 0) {
+        lines.push(`Ignored fire options (a fire does not read them): ${result.ignoredOptions.map(String).join(', ')}`);
+    }
+    // Only a fire that resolved a step: an executionRef is a job id, a message id or a
+    // notification id for every other executor, and "Resolved:" would be wrong for them.
+    if (typeof result.executionRef === 'string' &&
+        result.executionRef &&
+        result.outcome === 'succeeded' &&
+        typeof result.reason === 'string' &&
+        result.reason.startsWith('resolved:')) {
+        lines.push(`Resolved: ${result.executionRef}`);
+    }
+    return lines;
+}
+const FIRE_DENIAL_WORDS = {
+    outside_working_hours: 'outside working hours',
+    inside_quiet_hours: 'inside quiet hours',
+};
+/**
+ * A projected fire as the trigger's own clock reads it. The header said `America/New_York` over
+ * values that were UTC instants, so nothing on the line was in the zone it named (OSK-15407). The
+ * instant itself stays beside it, exact.
+ */
+function formatFireInZone(iso, timeZone) {
+    const date = new Date(iso);
+    if (!timeZone || Number.isNaN(date.getTime()))
+        return iso;
+    try {
+        const parts = new Intl.DateTimeFormat('en-CA', {
+            timeZone,
+            year: 'numeric',
+            month: '2-digit',
+            day: '2-digit',
+            hour: '2-digit',
+            minute: '2-digit',
+            hourCycle: 'h23',
+            timeZoneName: 'short',
+        }).formatToParts(date);
+        const part = (type) => parts.find((entry) => entry.type === type)?.value ?? '';
+        return `${part('year')}-${part('month')}-${part('day')} ${part('hour')}:${part('minute')} ${part('timeZoneName')} (${iso})`;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return iso;
+    }
+}
+function nextFireLines(schedule) {
+    if (!schedule?.nextFires?.length)
+        return [];
+    const windows = new Map((schedule.nextFireWindows ?? []).map((entry) => [entry.at, entry]));
+    const lines = [`Next fires (${schedule.timezone}):`];
+    for (const at of schedule.nextFires) {
+        const window = windows.get(at);
+        const mark = window && !window.runs
+            ? `   ✗ would be skipped: ${FIRE_DENIAL_WORDS[window.reason ?? ''] ?? window.reason ?? 'window'}`
+            : '';
+        lines.push(`  ${formatFireInZone(at, schedule.timezone)}${mark}`);
+    }
+    return lines;
+}
+/**
+ * A destination as `key=value` pairs, without Mongo's storage fields.
+ *
+ * A nested object that is longer than a short locator (`agentChat` is the Agent's whole chat row,
+ * with the preview of its last message) is named by its id, not dumped: the line printed ~700
+ * characters of unrelated chat state into a preflight (OSK-16200). `--json` carries all of it.
+ */
+function destinationLine(destination) {
+    const fields = Object.entries(destination).filter(([key]) => key !== '_id' && key !== '__v');
+    return fields.map(([key, value]) => `${key}=${destinationValue(value)}`).join(' ');
+}
+const DESTINATION_INLINE_MAX = 80;
+function destinationValue(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null)
+        return String(value);
+    const json = JSON.stringify(value);
+    if (json.length <= DESTINATION_INLINE_MAX)
+        return json;
+    const record = value;
+    const id = [record.agentChatId, record.id, record.conversationId].find((candidate) => typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate);
+    return id ? String(id) : `{${Object.keys(record).length} fields; see --json}`;
+}
 function withQuery(path, params) {
     const search = new URLSearchParams();
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
@@ -849,9 +965,24 @@ function scopeLabel(trigger) {
         .join(',');
     return refText ? `${kind}:${refText}` : kind;
 }
+/**
+ * When an armed `once` trigger is due: its `once.runAt` (or `once.at`), and only while it has not
+ * fired. A follow-up check-in due next month had no `schedule.nextRunAt`, so every table said `-` and
+ * `triggers show` said `Armed: yes` with no time (OSK-15416).
+ */
+function onceDueAt(trigger) {
+    if (trigger.kind !== 'once' || !trigger.once)
+        return null;
+    const once = trigger.once;
+    if (once.firedAt || trigger.enabled === false)
+        return null;
+    const due = once.runAt ?? once.at;
+    return due ? String(due) : null;
+}
 function nextRunLabel(trigger) {
     const next = trigger.schedule?.nextRunAt ??
         trigger.selfScheduled?.nextRunAt ??
+        onceDueAt(trigger) ??
         trigger.audit?.lastFiredAt ??
         '';
     return next ? String(next) : '-';
@@ -1073,8 +1204,11 @@ function renderTriggerSummary(trigger, log, options = {}) {
     if (effect?.writeMode)
         log(`Writes:   ${writeModeLabel(String(effect.writeMode))}`);
     const next = nextRunLabel(trigger);
-    if (next !== '-')
-        log(`Next/last:${next.length > 0 ? ` ${next}` : ''}`);
+    if (next !== '-') {
+        // `nextRunLabel` falls back to the last fire when nothing is scheduled; say which it is.
+        const upcoming = Boolean(trigger.schedule?.nextRunAt ?? trigger.selfScheduled?.nextRunAt ?? onceDueAt(trigger));
+        log(`${upcoming ? 'Next run:' : 'Last run:'}${next.length > 0 ? ` ${next}` : ''}`);
+    }
     /*
      * What actually happened when it fired.
      *

package/dist/lib/widgetTerminalText.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/**
+ * @param text   the answer so far, widget blocks included
+ * @param final  the answer will not grow any more (release held-back text, and report
+ *               a block still open as cut off)
+ */
+export declare function widgetsAsText(text: string, { final }: {
+    final: boolean;
+}): string;

package/dist/lib/widgetTerminalText.js

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.widgetsAsText = widgetsAsText;
+/**
+ * An agent's answer as a TERMINAL can show it: each widget block replaced by its
+ * fallback sentence.
+ *
+ * An agent may answer with a widget: a fenced block of CSS, HTML and JavaScript
+ * that the web and mobile apps draw in a sandboxed frame. A terminal cannot draw
+ * one, and printing the block is not a faithful rendering of it: it is a program,
+ * dumped between two paragraphs of prose, that can run to hundreds of kilobytes.
+ * The design record is explicit that the CLI is one of the consumers that "gets the
+ * sentence" (docs/architecture/generative-ui-2026-10-13.md section 15.4), the same
+ * sentence the server stores as `Message.text` and sends to a channel. The block
+ * itself is in the persisted message for the app to draw.
+ *
+ * WHICH LANES THIS COVERS. The streaming lane (`text.delta`), the final answer
+ * (`run.result`, `--no-stream`, `--json`'s `response`) and the comparison against the
+ * persisted record all read the ANSWER, and now all read this. The raw lane does
+ * not: a `session.output` envelope is the wire, and `--jsonl` keeps mirroring it
+ * unchanged for a consumer that wants the block itself (a coding agent that asked a
+ * cloud agent for a widget, say). That is where the source is.
+ *
+ * ONE PARSER. The grammar is read only through the shared incremental parser
+ * (`createUiWidgetFenceParser`), the one the web client and the server use, so a
+ * block is recognised, bounded and refused identically on every surface; this file
+ * never spells the fence. What it adds is the JOIN: how a substituted sentence sits
+ * among the prose. That rule is the server's (`GenerativeUi/ingest.js`
+ * `createTextDeriver`, which produces `Message.text`) and is mirrored here, because
+ * a terminal-side answer that spaced the sentence differently would be a second,
+ * quietly different text, and the whitespace-insensitive comparison against the
+ * record (`streamShowsRecordedText`) would no longer be the only thing keeping the
+ * two honest. The join: a fallback is its own paragraph, preceded by a blank line
+ * unless the text so far already ends in one, and followed by a blank line before
+ * whatever comes next; the break is written only when something follows, so the
+ * result only ever grows by appending while the input grows, which is what a
+ * terminal that prints "what is new" needs (`renderableDelta`).
+ *
+ * `final: false` holds back a trailing line that could still turn into a block
+ * opener, so text a terminal has already printed is never retracted.
+ */
+const data_provider_1 = require("@skrr-ai/data-provider");
+const PARAGRAPH_BREAK = '\n\n';
+/** The last line of `text` starts with a colon: the shape a held-back opener has. */
+function endsInColonLine(text) {
+    const start = Math.max(text.lastIndexOf('\n'), text.lastIndexOf('\r')) + 1;
+    return text.charCodeAt(start) === 58;
+}
+/** What must precede a paragraph so a blank line separates it from `tail`. */
+function leadForBlankLine(tail) {
+    if (tail.endsWith('\n\n'))
+        return '';
+    if (tail.endsWith('\n'))
+        return '\n';
+    return PARAGRAPH_BREAK;
+}
+/** Fence-looking lines in a substituted sentence are pushed off column 0, so nothing re-reads them as a block. */
+const OPENER_AT_LINE_START = new RegExp(`^(:{${data_provider_1.UI_WIDGET_FENCE.minColons},})`, 'gm');
+function fallbackFor(event) {
+    if (event.type === 'widget-complete')
+        return (0, data_provider_1.uiWidgetFallbackText)(event.payload);
+    // A cut-off block contributes nothing: its sentence is not known yet, and adding the
+    // title now would make a later, shorter sentence shrink the text.
+    if (event.type === 'widget-error' && event.partial && event.reason !== 'truncated') {
+        return (0, data_provider_1.uiWidgetFallbackText)(event.partial);
+    }
+    return '';
+}
+/**
+ * @param text   the answer so far, widget blocks included
+ * @param final  the answer will not grow any more (release held-back text, and report
+ *               a block still open as cut off)
+ */
+function widgetsAsText(text, { final }) {
+    // Cheap necessary condition for any work at all: a block needs the fence name, and
+    // while text is still streaming a trailing colon line may be an opener not yet decided.
+    if (text.indexOf(data_provider_1.UI_WIDGET_FENCE.name) === -1 && !(!final && endsInColonLine(text))) {
+        return text;
+    }
+    const parser = (0, data_provider_1.createUiWidgetFenceParser)();
+    const events = parser.push(text).slice();
+    if (final)
+        events.push(...parser.end());
+    let out = '';
+    let tail = '';
+    let started = false;
+    let pendingBreak = false;
+    const emit = (chunk) => {
+        if (chunk === '')
+            return;
+        started = true;
+        tail = (tail + chunk).slice(-2);
+        out += chunk;
+    };
+    for (const event of events) {
+        if (event.type === 'text') {
+            if (event.text === '')
+                continue;
+            const lead = pendingBreak ? PARAGRAPH_BREAK : '';
+            pendingBreak = false;
+            emit(lead + event.text);
+            continue;
+        }
+        const fallback = fallbackFor(event);
+        if (!fallback)
+            continue;
+        let lead = '';
+        if (pendingBreak)
+            lead = PARAGRAPH_BREAK;
+        else if (started)
+            lead = leadForBlankLine(tail);
+        pendingBreak = true;
+        emit(lead + fallback.replace(OPENER_AT_LINE_START, ' $1'));
+    }
+    return out;
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/cliHandoffWire.d.ts

@@ -133,3 +133,36 @@ export declare function parseCliHandoffDpopProofResponse(value: unknown): CliHan
 export declare const DELEGATED_AGENT_CLI_ID_PREFIX = "oversky-daemon-agent-cli-";
 export declare const WORKLOAD_CLI_ID_PREFIX = "oversky-daemon-workload-cli-";
 export declare function classifyCliFamilyId(id: unknown): 'agent' | 'workload' | 'person';
+/**
+ * Who keeps a daemon running, which decides how it is signed in again.
+ *  - `desktop`: the Skrr desktop app hosts it (Electron-as-Node under the
+ *    app's LaunchAgent). The app mints the daemon's credential itself at
+ *    `POST /api/daemons/token`, with a device proof, on every start of its
+ *    daemon client (OSK-15990), so reopening the app IS the sign-in. Neither
+ *    login command repairs it: `skrr daemon login` refuses an Electron-hosted
+ *    daemon (its program is the app, not a `skrrd`), and a `skrrd` on PATH is
+ *    usually not installed, or is a different build from the one running.
+ *  - `service`: `skrrd install` (launchd/systemd/schtasks) or a hand start;
+ *    `skrrd login` for that profile, server and working directory is the fix.
+ */
+export type DaemonSupervisor = 'desktop' | 'service';
+/**
+ * The ONE sentence for "only a new daemon sign-in repairs this hand-off
+ * refusal" (OSK-16216). The daemon fills it in with what it knows about
+ * itself and sends it as the loopback 503's `remedy`; the CLI uses it, with
+ * nothing filled in, when an older daemon sent none. Before this the two were
+ * written separately and disagreed — the CLI said `skrr daemon login`, the
+ * daemon said `skrrd --profile … login` — and neither was right for a daemon
+ * the desktop app runs.
+ *
+ * Returned without a leading capital or trailing period so callers can put it
+ * after "Fix: " or "— ".
+ */
+export declare function daemonSignInRemedy(opts?: {
+    /** How the daemon is run; absent when the caller cannot tell. */
+    supervisor?: DaemonSupervisor;
+    /** The exact `skrrd … login` for this profile, when the daemon knows it. */
+    loginCommand?: string;
+    /** The refusal was DEVICE_PROOF_PIN_MISMATCH: say that a sign-in re-pins. */
+    repinsDeviceKey?: boolean;
+}): string;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/cliHandoffWire.js

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ exports.descriptorOffersDpop = descriptorOffersDpop;
 exports.parseCliHandoffTokenResponse = parseCliHandoffTokenResponse;
 exports.parseCliHandoffDpopProofResponse = parseCliHandoffDpopProofResponse;
 exports.classifyCliFamilyId = classifyCliFamilyId;
+exports.daemonSignInRemedy = daemonSignInRemedy;
 /**
  * What a caller may redeem the descriptor secret for.
  *  - `refresh_family`: the legacy durable mint (90-day cli-scope family).
@@ -156,3 +157,29 @@ function classifyCliFamilyId(id) {
         return 'workload';
     return 'person';
 }
+/**
+ * The ONE sentence for "only a new daemon sign-in repairs this hand-off
+ * refusal" (OSK-16216). The daemon fills it in with what it knows about
+ * itself and sends it as the loopback 503's `remedy`; the CLI uses it, with
+ * nothing filled in, when an older daemon sent none. Before this the two were
+ * written separately and disagreed — the CLI said `skrr daemon login`, the
+ * daemon said `skrrd --profile … login` — and neither was right for a daemon
+ * the desktop app runs.
+ *
+ * Returned without a leading capital or trailing period so callers can put it
+ * after "Fix: " or "— ".
+ */
+function daemonSignInRemedy(opts = {}) {
+    const repin = opts.repinsDeviceKey === true;
+    if (opts.supervisor === 'desktop') {
+        return ('quit and reopen the Skrr desktop app on the machine running the daemon (install its update ' +
+            `first if one is offered): the app signs its daemon in again on start${repin ? ' and re-pins the device key' : ''}`);
+    }
+    if (opts.supervisor === 'service') {
+        const login = opts.loginCommand ? `\`${opts.loginCommand}\`` : '`skrr daemon login`';
+        return `run ${login}${repin ? ' — an interactive login re-pins the device key' : ''}`;
+    }
+    return ('sign the daemon in again on the machine running it: if the Skrr desktop app runs it, quit ' +
+        'and reopen the app; otherwise run `skrr daemon login`' +
+        (repin ? ' (either one re-pins the device key)' : ''));
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.d.ts

@@ -16,10 +16,30 @@
  * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
  * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
  *
+ * THE OTHER PATH CREDENTIALS (OSK-16174). Four more bearer credentials travel in a URL, and until they were added here
+ * only the request logger's path rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) knew them, so the same address that was scrubbed from a
+ * log line reached a trace and an error report in full: a workspace invitation (`wsi_`), a platform invitation
+ * (`pinv_`), a member's invitation link (`usr_`) and an operator's (`adm2_`, and the older `adm_`). Unlike `pvw_`, whose
+ * prefix is rare enough to match on its own, `usr_` and `adm_` begin ordinary words and identifiers (`/usr_local`,
+ * `adm_users`), so each of these is recognised by the SHAPE its minting code gives it, and a lookalike is left alone:
+ *
+ *   wsi_ / pinv_ / usr_ / adm2_   `<prefix>_<32 hex>.<version>.<key id>.<43 base64url>`, from `buildCredential` in
+ *                                 `api/models/WorkspaceInvite.js` and `PlatformInvitation.js` and `buildUserCode` and
+ *                                 `buildAdminCode` in `InvitationCode.js`. The older member link, `usr_<32 hex>.<24
+ *                                 base64url>`, has the same first two fields. Matched from the prefix to the end of the
+ *                                 token's characters once the 32-hex id and its dot are there, so a credential cut off
+ *                                 later in the log line is still redacted whole.
+ *   adm_                          `adm_<43 base64url>`, the older operator code (`generateCode`: 32 random bytes).
+ *                                 Exactly 43 characters, because that is the only length it has.
+ *
+ * `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` mints credentials with the real minting
+ * code and requires every one to come out as the marker, so a change to either side fails there.
+ *
  * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
- * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
- * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
- * stays as it is.
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. A
+ * credential cut off before its id is whole (`pinv_0123abc`) is an identifier, not yet the secret, and is left as it
+ * is. The request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite stays as it is, and is looser (any `wsi_`, `pinv_`, `usr_`,
+ * `adm_`, `adm2_` or `pvw_` path segment), because a path segment is a place a credential is known to be.
  *
  * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
  * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
@@ -31,8 +51,11 @@
 /** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
 export declare const PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION: "pvw_[redacted]";
 /**
- * Replace every preview token in a string with {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}. The rest of the string is
- * untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything that is not a string comes back as it came.
+ * Replace every credential that travels in a URL with a marker: a Hosted Machine preview token with
+ * {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}, and a workspace invitation, platform invitation, member link or operator code with
+ * its own prefix and `_[redacted]`. The rest of the string is untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything
+ * that is not a string comes back as it came. (The name is the preview token's, which this began as; the sinks
+ * and the boundary specs import it by that name.)
  */
 export declare function redactPreviewTokens(value: string): string;
 export declare function redactPreviewTokens<T>(value: T): T;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.js

@@ -17,10 +17,30 @@
  * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
  * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
  *
+ * THE OTHER PATH CREDENTIALS (OSK-16174). Four more bearer credentials travel in a URL, and until they were added here
+ * only the request logger's path rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) knew them, so the same address that was scrubbed from a
+ * log line reached a trace and an error report in full: a workspace invitation (`wsi_`), a platform invitation
+ * (`pinv_`), a member's invitation link (`usr_`) and an operator's (`adm2_`, and the older `adm_`). Unlike `pvw_`, whose
+ * prefix is rare enough to match on its own, `usr_` and `adm_` begin ordinary words and identifiers (`/usr_local`,
+ * `adm_users`), so each of these is recognised by the SHAPE its minting code gives it, and a lookalike is left alone:
+ *
+ *   wsi_ / pinv_ / usr_ / adm2_   `<prefix>_<32 hex>.<version>.<key id>.<43 base64url>`, from `buildCredential` in
+ *                                 `api/models/WorkspaceInvite.js` and `PlatformInvitation.js` and `buildUserCode` and
+ *                                 `buildAdminCode` in `InvitationCode.js`. The older member link, `usr_<32 hex>.<24
+ *                                 base64url>`, has the same first two fields. Matched from the prefix to the end of the
+ *                                 token's characters once the 32-hex id and its dot are there, so a credential cut off
+ *                                 later in the log line is still redacted whole.
+ *   adm_                          `adm_<43 base64url>`, the older operator code (`generateCode`: 32 random bytes).
+ *                                 Exactly 43 characters, because that is the only length it has.
+ *
+ * `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` mints credentials with the real minting
+ * code and requires every one to come out as the marker, so a change to either side fails there.
+ *
  * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
- * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
- * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
- * stays as it is.
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. A
+ * credential cut off before its id is whole (`pinv_0123abc`) is an identifier, not yet the secret, and is left as it
+ * is. The request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite stays as it is, and is looser (any `wsi_`, `pinv_`, `usr_`,
+ * `adm_`, `adm2_` or `pvw_` path segment), because a path segment is a place a credential is known to be.
  *
  * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
  * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
@@ -49,11 +69,36 @@ const TOKEN_CHAR = '(?:[A-Za-z0-9._-]|%(?:25)*(?:2[DdEe]|3[0-9]|4[1-9A-Fa-f]|5[0
  * nothing and redacting twice changes nothing.
  */
 const PREVIEW_TOKEN = new RegExp(`pvw(?:_|%(?:25)*5[Ff])${TOKEN_CHAR}+`, 'g');
+/**
+ * A prefix's underscore, which (like the token's own characters) may be written as a percent-escape, once or several
+ * times; and the dot that ends an id.
+ */
+const UNDERSCORE = '(?:_|%(?:25)*5[Ff])';
+const DOT = '(?:\\.|%(?:25)*2[Ee])';
+/**
+ * `wsi`, `pinv`, `usr` or `adm2`, an underscore, and then a lookahead that insists on what the minting code writes
+ * next: 32 lowercase hex characters and the dot that ends them. Everything the credential is made of follows, and the
+ * prefix is captured so the marker can say which kind it was. `usr_<40 hex>`, `usr_00000001` and `/usr_profile` have no
+ * dot after exactly 32 hex characters, so they match nothing.
+ */
+const SIGNED_CREDENTIAL = new RegExp(`(wsi|pinv|usr|adm2)${UNDERSCORE}(?=[0-9a-f]{32}${DOT})${TOKEN_CHAR}+`, 'g');
+/**
+ * The older operator code: `adm_` and exactly 43 base64url characters (32 random bytes), not followed by another one.
+ * A shorter or longer run of letters is a name, not this credential. The characters are the plain alphabet and not
+ * `TOKEN_CHAR`, whose dot would swallow the full stop at the end of a sentence.
+ */
+const LEGACY_OPERATOR_CODE = new RegExp(`(adm)${UNDERSCORE}(?=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-]))[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}`, 'g');
+/** Cheap test before any of the expressions: a string with none of these cannot hold a credential. */
+const CREDENTIAL_HINTS = ['pvw', 'wsi', 'pinv', 'usr', 'adm'];
+const credentialMarker = (_match, prefix) => `${prefix}_[redacted]`;
 function redactPreviewTokens(value) {
-    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.indexOf('pvw') === -1) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || !CREDENTIAL_HINTS.some((hint) => value.indexOf(hint) !== -1)) {
         return value;
     }
-    return value.replace(PREVIEW_TOKEN, exports.PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION);
+    return value
+        .replace(PREVIEW_TOKEN, exports.PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION)
+        .replace(SIGNED_CREDENTIAL, credentialMarker)
+        .replace(LEGACY_OPERATOR_CODE, credentialMarker);
 }
 const DEFAULT_MAX_NODES = 50_000;
 const DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 32;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.d.ts

@@ -133,3 +133,36 @@ export declare function parseCliHandoffDpopProofResponse(value: unknown): CliHan
 export declare const DELEGATED_AGENT_CLI_ID_PREFIX = "oversky-daemon-agent-cli-";
 export declare const WORKLOAD_CLI_ID_PREFIX = "oversky-daemon-workload-cli-";
 export declare function classifyCliFamilyId(id: unknown): 'agent' | 'workload' | 'person';
+/**
+ * Who keeps a daemon running, which decides how it is signed in again.
+ *  - `desktop`: the Skrr desktop app hosts it (Electron-as-Node under the
+ *    app's LaunchAgent). The app mints the daemon's credential itself at
+ *    `POST /api/daemons/token`, with a device proof, on every start of its
+ *    daemon client (OSK-15990), so reopening the app IS the sign-in. Neither
+ *    login command repairs it: `skrr daemon login` refuses an Electron-hosted
+ *    daemon (its program is the app, not a `skrrd`), and a `skrrd` on PATH is
+ *    usually not installed, or is a different build from the one running.
+ *  - `service`: `skrrd install` (launchd/systemd/schtasks) or a hand start;
+ *    `skrrd login` for that profile, server and working directory is the fix.
+ */
+export type DaemonSupervisor = 'desktop' | 'service';
+/**
+ * The ONE sentence for "only a new daemon sign-in repairs this hand-off
+ * refusal" (OSK-16216). The daemon fills it in with what it knows about
+ * itself and sends it as the loopback 503's `remedy`; the CLI uses it, with
+ * nothing filled in, when an older daemon sent none. Before this the two were
+ * written separately and disagreed — the CLI said `skrr daemon login`, the
+ * daemon said `skrrd --profile … login` — and neither was right for a daemon
+ * the desktop app runs.
+ *
+ * Returned without a leading capital or trailing period so callers can put it
+ * after "Fix: " or "— ".
+ */
+export declare function daemonSignInRemedy(opts?: {
+    /** How the daemon is run; absent when the caller cannot tell. */
+    supervisor?: DaemonSupervisor;
+    /** The exact `skrrd … login` for this profile, when the daemon knows it. */
+    loginCommand?: string;
+    /** The refusal was DEVICE_PROOF_PIN_MISMATCH: say that a sign-in re-pins. */
+    repinsDeviceKey?: boolean;
+}): string;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/cliHandoffWire.js

@@ -145,3 +145,29 @@ export function classifyCliFamilyId(id) {
         return 'workload';
     return 'person';
 }
+/**
+ * The ONE sentence for "only a new daemon sign-in repairs this hand-off
+ * refusal" (OSK-16216). The daemon fills it in with what it knows about
+ * itself and sends it as the loopback 503's `remedy`; the CLI uses it, with
+ * nothing filled in, when an older daemon sent none. Before this the two were
+ * written separately and disagreed — the CLI said `skrr daemon login`, the
+ * daemon said `skrrd --profile … login` — and neither was right for a daemon
+ * the desktop app runs.
+ *
+ * Returned without a leading capital or trailing period so callers can put it
+ * after "Fix: " or "— ".
+ */
+export function daemonSignInRemedy(opts = {}) {
+    const repin = opts.repinsDeviceKey === true;
+    if (opts.supervisor === 'desktop') {
+        return ('quit and reopen the Skrr desktop app on the machine running the daemon (install its update ' +
+            `first if one is offered): the app signs its daemon in again on start${repin ? ' and re-pins the device key' : ''}`);
+    }
+    if (opts.supervisor === 'service') {
+        const login = opts.loginCommand ? `\`${opts.loginCommand}\`` : '`skrr daemon login`';
+        return `run ${login}${repin ? ' — an interactive login re-pins the device key' : ''}`;
+    }
+    return ('sign the daemon in again on the machine running it: if the Skrr desktop app runs it, quit ' +
+        'and reopen the app; otherwise run `skrr daemon login`' +
+        (repin ? ' (either one re-pins the device key)' : ''));
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/telemetryRedaction.d.ts

@@ -16,10 +16,30 @@
  * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
  * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
  *
+ * THE OTHER PATH CREDENTIALS (OSK-16174). Four more bearer credentials travel in a URL, and until they were added here
+ * only the request logger's path rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) knew them, so the same address that was scrubbed from a
+ * log line reached a trace and an error report in full: a workspace invitation (`wsi_`), a platform invitation
+ * (`pinv_`), a member's invitation link (`usr_`) and an operator's (`adm2_`, and the older `adm_`). Unlike `pvw_`, whose
+ * prefix is rare enough to match on its own, `usr_` and `adm_` begin ordinary words and identifiers (`/usr_local`,
+ * `adm_users`), so each of these is recognised by the SHAPE its minting code gives it, and a lookalike is left alone:
+ *
+ *   wsi_ / pinv_ / usr_ / adm2_   `<prefix>_<32 hex>.<version>.<key id>.<43 base64url>`, from `buildCredential` in
+ *                                 `api/models/WorkspaceInvite.js` and `PlatformInvitation.js` and `buildUserCode` and
+ *                                 `buildAdminCode` in `InvitationCode.js`. The older member link, `usr_<32 hex>.<24
+ *                                 base64url>`, has the same first two fields. Matched from the prefix to the end of the
+ *                                 token's characters once the 32-hex id and its dot are there, so a credential cut off
+ *                                 later in the log line is still redacted whole.
+ *   adm_                          `adm_<43 base64url>`, the older operator code (`generateCode`: 32 random bytes).
+ *                                 Exactly 43 characters, because that is the only length it has.
+ *
+ * `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` mints credentials with the real minting
+ * code and requires every one to come out as the marker, so a change to either side fails there.
+ *
  * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
- * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
- * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
- * stays as it is.
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. A
+ * credential cut off before its id is whole (`pinv_0123abc`) is an identifier, not yet the secret, and is left as it
+ * is. The request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite stays as it is, and is looser (any `wsi_`, `pinv_`, `usr_`,
+ * `adm_`, `adm2_` or `pvw_` path segment), because a path segment is a place a credential is known to be.
  *
  * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
  * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
@@ -31,8 +51,11 @@
 /** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
 export declare const PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION: "pvw_[redacted]";
 /**
- * Replace every preview token in a string with {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}. The rest of the string is
- * untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything that is not a string comes back as it came.
+ * Replace every credential that travels in a URL with a marker: a Hosted Machine preview token with
+ * {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}, and a workspace invitation, platform invitation, member link or operator code with
+ * its own prefix and `_[redacted]`. The rest of the string is untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything
+ * that is not a string comes back as it came. (The name is the preview token's, which this began as; the sinks
+ * and the boundary specs import it by that name.)
  */
 export declare function redactPreviewTokens(value: string): string;
 export declare function redactPreviewTokens<T>(value: T): T;