@skrr-ai/cli 0.1.102 → 0.1.104

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/deviceIdentityBridge.d.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type DeviceIdentityState = {
     profile: string;
     envelopeProtected: boolean;
 };
-type DisabledReason = 'init_failed' | 'load_failed' | 'persist_failed' | 'unreadable_key';
+type DisabledReason = 'init_failed' | 'load_failed' | 'persist_failed' | 'unreadable_key' | 'no_stored_key';
 /** @internal Test seam — force-set state. */
 export declare function __setStateForTest(next: DeviceIdentityState): DeviceIdentityState;
 /** @internal Test seam — read state. */
@@ -47,9 +47,17 @@ export declare function describeDeviceKeySplit(profile: string): {
  *        next refresh with a key the server never pinned.
  *   2. Generate fresh keypair and persist. Failure to persist is a hard
  *      error landing in disabled+persist_failed.
+ *
+ * `createIfMissing: false` stops before step 2 (disabled+no_stored_key) and
+ * never replaces anything: for a short-lived process that must only READ the
+ * daemon's key while the daemon itself may be creating it (OSK-15990's
+ * `skrrd device-proof`). The persist below is not an exclusive create, so a
+ * second creator racing the daemon could leave the daemon holding one key in
+ * memory and the disk another.
  */
 export declare function initDeviceIdentity(profile: string, options?: {
     recoverUnreadable?: boolean;
+    createIfMissing?: boolean;
 }): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Reset in-memory state. With `clearOnDisk=true` deletes both keypair files.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/deviceIdentityBridge.js

@@ -364,6 +364,13 @@ async function consolidateDeviceIdentity(profile) {
  *        next refresh with a key the server never pinned.
  *   2. Generate fresh keypair and persist. Failure to persist is a hard
  *      error landing in disabled+persist_failed.
+ *
+ * `createIfMissing: false` stops before step 2 (disabled+no_stored_key) and
+ * never replaces anything: for a short-lived process that must only READ the
+ * daemon's key while the daemon itself may be creating it (OSK-15990's
+ * `skrrd device-proof`). The persist below is not an exclusive create, so a
+ * second creator racing the daemon could leave the daemon holding one key in
+ * memory and the disk another.
  */
 async function initDeviceIdentity(profile, options = {}) {
     if (_state.kind !== 'uninit')
@@ -412,6 +419,11 @@ async function initDeviceIdentity(profile, options = {}) {
         emit('recovery_required', false, { profile, reason: 'stored_key_unreadable' });
         return;
     }
+    if (options.createIfMissing === false) {
+        _state = { kind: 'disabled', reason: 'no_stored_key' };
+        emit('no_stored_key', false, { profile });
+        return;
+    }
     let fresh;
     try {
         fresh = (0, deviceKey_js_1.generateDeviceKeyPair)();

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * Keeping a Hosted Machine preview capability out of telemetry (OSK-16174).
+ *
+ * `/api/previews/<token>/...` serves a person's machine with NO login: the token in the path is a bearer
+ * capability (`pvw_<22 chars>.<expiry>.<22 chars>`, idle TTL ten minutes). Anyone who can read a trace, an error
+ * report or a log line that carries it can open the preview, so every sink that records a URL has to run its
+ * strings through here first. This file is the ONE place that knows what to look for; the sinks (OpenTelemetry
+ * exporters, Sentry hooks, request and CSRF logs, client-log ingest) only decide WHERE to call it.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT MATCHES. The prefix `pvw_` and then every character a token is made of, however far that goes, rather
+ * than the exact 22.digits.22 shape. A truncated token is still part of the secret, a log line cut at 200
+ * characters is the ordinary way one gets truncated, and a looser match costs nothing: the marker replaces
+ * only what looked like a token. The token alphabet is base64url plus the two dots, or any of those characters
+ * written as a percent-escape, once or several times (`encodeURIComponent` of a URL that was itself in a query
+ * string). `packages/data-provider/specs/hostedPreview.spec.ts` pins this against the contract's token shape
+ * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
+ * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
+ * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
+ * stays as it is.
+ *
+ * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
+ * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
+ *
+ * NEVER THROWS. These run inside telemetry hooks, and a hook that throws takes a request or an error report
+ * with it. Whatever cannot be scrubbed is reported to the caller as such (`false`), and the caller drops the
+ * record, because a record with the token still in it is exactly what this exists to prevent.
+ */
+/** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
+export declare const PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION: "pvw_[redacted]";
+/**
+ * Replace every preview token in a string with {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}. The rest of the string is
+ * untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything that is not a string comes back as it came.
+ */
+export declare function redactPreviewTokens(value: string): string;
+export declare function redactPreviewTokens<T>(value: T): T;
+export interface PreviewTokenWalkLimits {
+    /** Objects and arrays visited before the walk gives up. Default 50 000: a Sentry transaction of a thousand spans. */
+    maxNodes?: number;
+    /** Nesting followed before the walk gives up. Default 32. */
+    maxDepth?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Redact every string inside an object graph, IN PLACE (an error report is rewritten far more cheaply than it is
+ * copied). Returns `true` when the whole graph was scrubbed and `false` when some of it could not be: past
+ * the bounds, frozen, behind a getter that throws. A `false` means the value may still hold a token and must not
+ * be sent. Binary payloads are skipped, not walked, and Error messages and stacks are scrubbed though they are
+ * not enumerable.
+ */
+export declare function redactPreviewTokensDeep(root: unknown, limits?: PreviewTokenWalkLimits): boolean;
+/**
+ * Sentry `init` options with a redacting `beforeSend`, `beforeSendTransaction` and `beforeBreadcrumb`. Those three
+ * are where an event's `request.url`, `request.query_string`, `transaction`, spans, breadcrumbs, `extra` and
+ * `contexts` pass last, so redacting the whole record there needs no list of fields and covers one added later.
+ * An existing hook runs FIRST and keeps its say (it can still drop the record, change it, or be asynchronous);
+ * what it returns is scrubbed after it, so nothing it adds escapes. The options object passed in is not modified.
+ * Every `Sentry.init` in this repository goes through this, and an architecture spec fails if one is added without.
+ */
+export declare function withPreviewTokenRedaction<T extends object>(options: T): T;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.js

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Keeping a Hosted Machine preview capability out of telemetry (OSK-16174).
+ *
+ * `/api/previews/<token>/...` serves a person's machine with NO login: the token in the path is a bearer
+ * capability (`pvw_<22 chars>.<expiry>.<22 chars>`, idle TTL ten minutes). Anyone who can read a trace, an error
+ * report or a log line that carries it can open the preview, so every sink that records a URL has to run its
+ * strings through here first. This file is the ONE place that knows what to look for; the sinks (OpenTelemetry
+ * exporters, Sentry hooks, request and CSRF logs, client-log ingest) only decide WHERE to call it.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT MATCHES. The prefix `pvw_` and then every character a token is made of, however far that goes, rather
+ * than the exact 22.digits.22 shape. A truncated token is still part of the secret, a log line cut at 200
+ * characters is the ordinary way one gets truncated, and a looser match costs nothing: the marker replaces
+ * only what looked like a token. The token alphabet is base64url plus the two dots, or any of those characters
+ * written as a percent-escape, once or several times (`encodeURIComponent` of a URL that was itself in a query
+ * string). `packages/data-provider/specs/hostedPreview.spec.ts` pins this against the contract's token shape
+ * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
+ * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
+ * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
+ * stays as it is.
+ *
+ * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
+ * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
+ *
+ * NEVER THROWS. These run inside telemetry hooks, and a hook that throws takes a request or an error report
+ * with it. Whatever cannot be scrubbed is reported to the caller as such (`false`), and the caller drops the
+ * record, because a record with the token still in it is exactly what this exists to prevent.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION = void 0;
+exports.redactPreviewTokens = redactPreviewTokens;
+exports.redactPreviewTokensDeep = redactPreviewTokensDeep;
+exports.withPreviewTokenRedaction = withPreviewTokenRedaction;
+/** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
+exports.PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION = 'pvw_[redacted]';
+/**
+ * One character of a token: base64url, a dot, or any of those written as a percent-escape. An escape that was
+ * escaped again is `%25` followed by the original two digits (`_` is `%5F`, then `%255F`, then `%25255F`), which is
+ * what the `(?:25)*` is for. `25` is not itself a digit pair of a token character, so a run of them can only be
+ * read one way.
+ */
+const TOKEN_CHAR = '(?:[A-Za-z0-9._-]|%(?:25)*(?:2[DdEe]|3[0-9]|4[1-9A-Fa-f]|5[0-9AaFf]|6[1-9A-Fa-f]|7[0-9Aa]))';
+/**
+ * `pvw` then an underscore, which may be written `%5F` (or `%255F`, ...); then at least ONE token character. Not
+ * zero: the marker is `pvw_[`, and `[` is not a token character, so a string that was already redacted matches
+ * nothing and redacting twice changes nothing.
+ */
+const PREVIEW_TOKEN = new RegExp(`pvw(?:_|%(?:25)*5[Ff])${TOKEN_CHAR}+`, 'g');
+function redactPreviewTokens(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.indexOf('pvw') === -1) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    return value.replace(PREVIEW_TOKEN, exports.PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION);
+}
+const DEFAULT_MAX_NODES = 50_000;
+const DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 32;
+/**
+ * Redact every string inside an object graph, IN PLACE (an error report is rewritten far more cheaply than it is
+ * copied). Returns `true` when the whole graph was scrubbed and `false` when some of it could not be: past
+ * the bounds, frozen, behind a getter that throws. A `false` means the value may still hold a token and must not
+ * be sent. Binary payloads are skipped, not walked, and Error messages and stacks are scrubbed though they are
+ * not enumerable.
+ */
+function redactPreviewTokensDeep(root, limits = {}) {
+    if (root === null || typeof root !== 'object') {
+        return true;
+    }
+    const maxNodes = limits.maxNodes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_NODES;
+    const maxDepth = limits.maxDepth ?? DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH;
+    try {
+        const seen = new WeakSet();
+        const stack = [[root, 0]];
+        let visited = 0;
+        let complete = true;
+        const rewrite = (holder, key, current) => {
+            const next = redactPreviewTokens(current);
+            if (next === current) {
+                return;
+            }
+            try {
+                holder[key] = next;
+            }
+            catch {
+                // a frozen object throws in strict code
+            }
+            if (holder[key] !== next) {
+                // and silently keeps the old value in sloppy code
+                complete = false;
+            }
+        };
+        while (stack.length > 0) {
+            const [node, depth] = stack.pop();
+            if (seen.has(node) || ArrayBuffer.isView(node)) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            seen.add(node);
+            visited += 1;
+            if (visited > maxNodes) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            const holder = node;
+            if (node instanceof Error) {
+                for (const key of ['message', 'stack']) {
+                    if (typeof holder[key] === 'string') {
+                        rewrite(holder, key, holder[key]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            for (const key of Object.keys(node)) {
+                let child;
+                try {
+                    child = holder[key];
+                }
+                catch {
+                    complete = false;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (typeof child === 'string') {
+                    rewrite(holder, key, child);
+                }
+                else if (child !== null && typeof child === 'object') {
+                    if (depth + 1 > maxDepth) {
+                        complete = false;
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        stack.push([child, depth + 1]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return complete;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+function isThenable(value) {
+    return (value !== null &&
+        (typeof value === 'object' || typeof value === 'function') &&
+        typeof value.then === 'function');
+}
+/** The record with its tokens redacted, or `null` (dropped) when that could not be done. */
+function scrubRecord(record) {
+    if (record === null || record === undefined) {
+        return record;
+    }
+    if (typeof record !== 'object') {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return redactPreviewTokensDeep(record) ? record : null;
+}
+function guard(existing) {
+    return (value, hint) => {
+        const result = existing ? existing(value, hint) : value;
+        return isThenable(result) ? result.then(scrubRecord) : scrubRecord(result);
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Sentry `init` options with a redacting `beforeSend`, `beforeSendTransaction` and `beforeBreadcrumb`. Those three
+ * are where an event's `request.url`, `request.query_string`, `transaction`, spans, breadcrumbs, `extra` and
+ * `contexts` pass last, so redacting the whole record there needs no list of fields and covers one added later.
+ * An existing hook runs FIRST and keeps its say (it can still drop the record, change it, or be asynchronous);
+ * what it returns is scrubbed after it, so nothing it adds escapes. The options object passed in is not modified.
+ * Every `Sentry.init` in this repository goes through this, and an architecture spec fails if one is added without.
+ */
+function withPreviewTokenRedaction(options) {
+    const hooks = options;
+    return {
+        ...options,
+        beforeSend: guard(hooks.beforeSend),
+        beforeSendTransaction: guard(hooks.beforeSendTransaction),
+        beforeBreadcrumb: guard(hooks.beforeBreadcrumb),
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/deviceIdentityBridge.d.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type DeviceIdentityState = {
     profile: string;
     envelopeProtected: boolean;
 };
-type DisabledReason = 'init_failed' | 'load_failed' | 'persist_failed' | 'unreadable_key';
+type DisabledReason = 'init_failed' | 'load_failed' | 'persist_failed' | 'unreadable_key' | 'no_stored_key';
 /** @internal Test seam — force-set state. */
 export declare function __setStateForTest(next: DeviceIdentityState): DeviceIdentityState;
 /** @internal Test seam — read state. */
@@ -47,9 +47,17 @@ export declare function describeDeviceKeySplit(profile: string): {
  *        next refresh with a key the server never pinned.
  *   2. Generate fresh keypair and persist. Failure to persist is a hard
  *      error landing in disabled+persist_failed.
+ *
+ * `createIfMissing: false` stops before step 2 (disabled+no_stored_key) and
+ * never replaces anything: for a short-lived process that must only READ the
+ * daemon's key while the daemon itself may be creating it (OSK-15990's
+ * `skrrd device-proof`). The persist below is not an exclusive create, so a
+ * second creator racing the daemon could leave the daemon holding one key in
+ * memory and the disk another.
  */
 export declare function initDeviceIdentity(profile: string, options?: {
     recoverUnreadable?: boolean;
+    createIfMissing?: boolean;
 }): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Reset in-memory state. With `clearOnDisk=true` deletes both keypair files.

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/deviceIdentityBridge.js

@@ -344,6 +344,13 @@ async function consolidateDeviceIdentity(profile) {
  *        next refresh with a key the server never pinned.
  *   2. Generate fresh keypair and persist. Failure to persist is a hard
  *      error landing in disabled+persist_failed.
+ *
+ * `createIfMissing: false` stops before step 2 (disabled+no_stored_key) and
+ * never replaces anything: for a short-lived process that must only READ the
+ * daemon's key while the daemon itself may be creating it (OSK-15990's
+ * `skrrd device-proof`). The persist below is not an exclusive create, so a
+ * second creator racing the daemon could leave the daemon holding one key in
+ * memory and the disk another.
  */
 export async function initDeviceIdentity(profile, options = {}) {
     if (_state.kind !== 'uninit')
@@ -392,6 +399,11 @@ export async function initDeviceIdentity(profile, options = {}) {
         emit('recovery_required', false, { profile, reason: 'stored_key_unreadable' });
         return;
     }
+    if (options.createIfMissing === false) {
+        _state = { kind: 'disabled', reason: 'no_stored_key' };
+        emit('no_stored_key', false, { profile });
+        return;
+    }
     let fresh;
     try {
         fresh = generateDeviceKeyPair();

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/telemetryRedaction.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * Keeping a Hosted Machine preview capability out of telemetry (OSK-16174).
+ *
+ * `/api/previews/<token>/...` serves a person's machine with NO login: the token in the path is a bearer
+ * capability (`pvw_<22 chars>.<expiry>.<22 chars>`, idle TTL ten minutes). Anyone who can read a trace, an error
+ * report or a log line that carries it can open the preview, so every sink that records a URL has to run its
+ * strings through here first. This file is the ONE place that knows what to look for; the sinks (OpenTelemetry
+ * exporters, Sentry hooks, request and CSRF logs, client-log ingest) only decide WHERE to call it.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT MATCHES. The prefix `pvw_` and then every character a token is made of, however far that goes, rather
+ * than the exact 22.digits.22 shape. A truncated token is still part of the secret, a log line cut at 200
+ * characters is the ordinary way one gets truncated, and a looser match costs nothing: the marker replaces
+ * only what looked like a token. The token alphabet is base64url plus the two dots, or any of those characters
+ * written as a percent-escape, once or several times (`encodeURIComponent` of a URL that was itself in a query
+ * string). `packages/data-provider/specs/hostedPreview.spec.ts` pins this against the contract's token shape
+ * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
+ * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
+ * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
+ * stays as it is.
+ *
+ * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
+ * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
+ *
+ * NEVER THROWS. These run inside telemetry hooks, and a hook that throws takes a request or an error report
+ * with it. Whatever cannot be scrubbed is reported to the caller as such (`false`), and the caller drops the
+ * record, because a record with the token still in it is exactly what this exists to prevent.
+ */
+/** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
+export declare const PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION: "pvw_[redacted]";
+/**
+ * Replace every preview token in a string with {@link PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION}. The rest of the string is
+ * untouched, so a trace is still readable. Anything that is not a string comes back as it came.
+ */
+export declare function redactPreviewTokens(value: string): string;
+export declare function redactPreviewTokens<T>(value: T): T;
+export interface PreviewTokenWalkLimits {
+    /** Objects and arrays visited before the walk gives up. Default 50 000: a Sentry transaction of a thousand spans. */
+    maxNodes?: number;
+    /** Nesting followed before the walk gives up. Default 32. */
+    maxDepth?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Redact every string inside an object graph, IN PLACE (an error report is rewritten far more cheaply than it is
+ * copied). Returns `true` when the whole graph was scrubbed and `false` when some of it could not be: past
+ * the bounds, frozen, behind a getter that throws. A `false` means the value may still hold a token and must not
+ * be sent. Binary payloads are skipped, not walked, and Error messages and stacks are scrubbed though they are
+ * not enumerable.
+ */
+export declare function redactPreviewTokensDeep(root: unknown, limits?: PreviewTokenWalkLimits): boolean;
+/**
+ * Sentry `init` options with a redacting `beforeSend`, `beforeSendTransaction` and `beforeBreadcrumb`. Those three
+ * are where an event's `request.url`, `request.query_string`, `transaction`, spans, breadcrumbs, `extra` and
+ * `contexts` pass last, so redacting the whole record there needs no list of fields and covers one added later.
+ * An existing hook runs FIRST and keeps its say (it can still drop the record, change it, or be asynchronous);
+ * what it returns is scrubbed after it, so nothing it adds escapes. The options object passed in is not modified.
+ * Every `Sentry.init` in this repository goes through this, and an architecture spec fails if one is added without.
+ */
+export declare function withPreviewTokenRedaction<T extends object>(options: T): T;

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/dist/esm/telemetryRedaction.js

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/**
+ * Keeping a Hosted Machine preview capability out of telemetry (OSK-16174).
+ *
+ * `/api/previews/<token>/...` serves a person's machine with NO login: the token in the path is a bearer
+ * capability (`pvw_<22 chars>.<expiry>.<22 chars>`, idle TTL ten minutes). Anyone who can read a trace, an error
+ * report or a log line that carries it can open the preview, so every sink that records a URL has to run its
+ * strings through here first. This file is the ONE place that knows what to look for; the sinks (OpenTelemetry
+ * exporters, Sentry hooks, request and CSRF logs, client-log ingest) only decide WHERE to call it.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT MATCHES. The prefix `pvw_` and then every character a token is made of, however far that goes, rather
+ * than the exact 22.digits.22 shape. A truncated token is still part of the secret, a log line cut at 200
+ * characters is the ordinary way one gets truncated, and a looser match costs nothing: the marker replaces
+ * only what looked like a token. The token alphabet is base64url plus the two dots, or any of those characters
+ * written as a percent-escape, once or several times (`encodeURIComponent` of a URL that was itself in a query
+ * string). `packages/data-provider/specs/hostedPreview.spec.ts` pins this against the contract's token shape
+ * and `api/server/services/HostedPreview/__tests__/telemetryRedaction.spec.js` against tokens the issuer really
+ * mints, so a change to either side fails there rather than in a trace nobody reads.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT. A prefix that is itself percent-encoded (`%70vw_`) is not recognised: nothing in this
+ * repository writes one, and a scan that decoded every string first would cost every sink on every record. The
+ * request log's own `/[credential]` rewrite (`requestLogger.js`) covers the other credential prefixes and
+ * stays as it is.
+ *
+ * COST. Linear in the input. The only nested repetition is `%(?:25)*XX`, and `XX` is never `25`, so the engine
+ * cannot read one run of `25`s two ways; the tests feed it a megabyte of the worst shapes.
+ *
+ * NEVER THROWS. These run inside telemetry hooks, and a hook that throws takes a request or an error report
+ * with it. Whatever cannot be scrubbed is reported to the caller as such (`false`), and the caller drops the
+ * record, because a record with the token still in it is exactly what this exists to prevent.
+ */
+/** What replaces a token. Fixed, so a trace can say a preview was involved but not which one. */
+export const PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION = 'pvw_[redacted]';
+/**
+ * One character of a token: base64url, a dot, or any of those written as a percent-escape. An escape that was
+ * escaped again is `%25` followed by the original two digits (`_` is `%5F`, then `%255F`, then `%25255F`), which is
+ * what the `(?:25)*` is for. `25` is not itself a digit pair of a token character, so a run of them can only be
+ * read one way.
+ */
+const TOKEN_CHAR = '(?:[A-Za-z0-9._-]|%(?:25)*(?:2[DdEe]|3[0-9]|4[1-9A-Fa-f]|5[0-9AaFf]|6[1-9A-Fa-f]|7[0-9Aa]))';
+/**
+ * `pvw` then an underscore, which may be written `%5F` (or `%255F`, ...); then at least ONE token character. Not
+ * zero: the marker is `pvw_[`, and `[` is not a token character, so a string that was already redacted matches
+ * nothing and redacting twice changes nothing.
+ */
+const PREVIEW_TOKEN = new RegExp(`pvw(?:_|%(?:25)*5[Ff])${TOKEN_CHAR}+`, 'g');
+export function redactPreviewTokens(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.indexOf('pvw') === -1) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    return value.replace(PREVIEW_TOKEN, PREVIEW_TOKEN_REDACTION);
+}
+const DEFAULT_MAX_NODES = 50_000;
+const DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 32;
+/**
+ * Redact every string inside an object graph, IN PLACE (an error report is rewritten far more cheaply than it is
+ * copied). Returns `true` when the whole graph was scrubbed and `false` when some of it could not be: past
+ * the bounds, frozen, behind a getter that throws. A `false` means the value may still hold a token and must not
+ * be sent. Binary payloads are skipped, not walked, and Error messages and stacks are scrubbed though they are
+ * not enumerable.
+ */
+export function redactPreviewTokensDeep(root, limits = {}) {
+    if (root === null || typeof root !== 'object') {
+        return true;
+    }
+    const maxNodes = limits.maxNodes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_NODES;
+    const maxDepth = limits.maxDepth ?? DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH;
+    try {
+        const seen = new WeakSet();
+        const stack = [[root, 0]];
+        let visited = 0;
+        let complete = true;
+        const rewrite = (holder, key, current) => {
+            const next = redactPreviewTokens(current);
+            if (next === current) {
+                return;
+            }
+            try {
+                holder[key] = next;
+            }
+            catch {
+                // a frozen object throws in strict code
+            }
+            if (holder[key] !== next) {
+                // and silently keeps the old value in sloppy code
+                complete = false;
+            }
+        };
+        while (stack.length > 0) {
+            const [node, depth] = stack.pop();
+            if (seen.has(node) || ArrayBuffer.isView(node)) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            seen.add(node);
+            visited += 1;
+            if (visited > maxNodes) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            const holder = node;
+            if (node instanceof Error) {
+                for (const key of ['message', 'stack']) {
+                    if (typeof holder[key] === 'string') {
+                        rewrite(holder, key, holder[key]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            for (const key of Object.keys(node)) {
+                let child;
+                try {
+                    child = holder[key];
+                }
+                catch {
+                    complete = false;
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (typeof child === 'string') {
+                    rewrite(holder, key, child);
+                }
+                else if (child !== null && typeof child === 'object') {
+                    if (depth + 1 > maxDepth) {
+                        complete = false;
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        stack.push([child, depth + 1]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return complete;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+function isThenable(value) {
+    return (value !== null &&
+        (typeof value === 'object' || typeof value === 'function') &&
+        typeof value.then === 'function');
+}
+/** The record with its tokens redacted, or `null` (dropped) when that could not be done. */
+function scrubRecord(record) {
+    if (record === null || record === undefined) {
+        return record;
+    }
+    if (typeof record !== 'object') {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return redactPreviewTokensDeep(record) ? record : null;
+}
+function guard(existing) {
+    return (value, hint) => {
+        const result = existing ? existing(value, hint) : value;
+        return isThenable(result) ? result.then(scrubRecord) : scrubRecord(result);
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Sentry `init` options with a redacting `beforeSend`, `beforeSendTransaction` and `beforeBreadcrumb`. Those three
+ * are where an event's `request.url`, `request.query_string`, `transaction`, spans, breadcrumbs, `extra` and
+ * `contexts` pass last, so redacting the whole record there needs no list of fields and covers one added later.
+ * An existing hook runs FIRST and keeps its say (it can still drop the record, change it, or be asynchronous);
+ * what it returns is scrubbed after it, so nothing it adds escapes. The options object passed in is not modified.
+ * Every `Sentry.init` in this repository goes through this, and an architecture spec fails if one is added without.
+ */
+export function withPreviewTokenRedaction(options) {
+    const hooks = options;
+    return {
+        ...options,
+        beforeSend: guard(hooks.beforeSend),
+        beforeSendTransaction: guard(hooks.beforeSendTransaction),
+        beforeBreadcrumb: guard(hooks.beforeBreadcrumb),
+    };
+}

package/dist/node_modules/@skrr-ai/auth-core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@skrr-ai/auth-core",
-  "version": "0.4.21",
+  "version": "0.4.23",
   "main": "dist/cjs/index.js",
   "types": "dist/esm/index.d.ts",
   "exports": {
@@ -183,6 +183,16 @@
         "types": "./dist/cjs/releasePolicy.d.ts",
         "default": "./dist/cjs/releasePolicy.js"
       }
+    },
+    "./telemetry-redaction": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/esm/telemetryRedaction.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/esm/telemetryRedaction.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/cjs/telemetryRedaction.js"
+      }
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {