@skillsmith/core 0.12.2 → 0.12.3

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.d.ts

@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_DOMAINS: string[];
 export declare const ANON_PASTE_HOSTS: string[];
 export declare const TRANSIENT_TRANSFER_HOSTS: string[];
 export declare const URL_SHORTENER_DOMAINS: string[];
-export declare const ENV_PATH_PATTERN: RegExp;
-export declare const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
-export declare const VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS: ReadonlySet<RegExp>;
+export { ENV_PATH_PATTERN, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS, VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS, PATH_FORM_PATTERNS, VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS, } from './patterns.sensitive-path.js';
 export { JAILBREAK_PATTERNS, AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS } from './patterns.jailbreak.js';
 export { EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN } from './patterns.jailbreak.evidence.js';
 /**
  * SMI-5876 §0.1/§0.2: bump on ANY pattern-array or evidence-table change in
- * this module or patterns.jailbreak.ts. The security-audit baseline
+ * this module, patterns.jailbreak.ts, or patterns.sensitive-path.ts (SMI-5207
+ * moved the sensitive_path family there; the bump obligation moved with it).
+ * The security-audit baseline
  * (packages/mcp-server/src/audit/security-baseline.ts /
  * security-audit.ts) stamps every stored entry with the version that
  * produced it and treats a mismatch as "not comparable" — forcing a re-scan
@@ -70,11 +70,21 @@ export { EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN } from './patterns.jailbreak.evidence.js';
  * produced advisory-tier findings before. All three are the
  * previously-clean-content-now-fires scenario this gate exists for. Scope
  * note (unchanged from Wave 3): this forces re-evaluation of the local MCP
- * audit baseline only (patterns.ts:100-125,
+ * audit baseline only (this constant and its `comparable` consumer,
  * packages/mcp-server/src/audit/security-audit.ts:219-222); the edge indexer
  * never reads this constant, which is why it has no edge counterpart.
+ * (SMI-5207 replaced a `patterns.ts:100-125` line-range citation here — that
+ * range addressed the sensitive_path family, which moved to
+ * patterns.sensitive-path.ts, so the numbers no longer resolve.)
+ *
+ * Bumped to `2026-09-07.1`: SMI-5207 added the MF-3 (path-form
+ * action-context, negation-aware) and MF-4 (assignment-form value,
+ * default-HIGH-unless-prose) severity gates. Unlike every bump above, this
+ * one is *previously-flagged-content-now-clean* — without it, the
+ * `comparable` gate keeps reusing a stored `malicious` verdict produced by
+ * the pre-fix ruleset, and the fix never reaches an already-scanned skill.
  */
-export declare const SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION: "2026-08-15.1";
+export declare const SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION: "2026-09-07.1";
 export declare const SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
 export { CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS, IMPERATIVE_FETCH_EXEC_PROSE } from './patterns.exec.js';
 export declare const SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PATTERNS: RegExp[];

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"patterns.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/patterns.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAGH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,UAanC,CAAA;AAWD,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,UAe5B,CAAA;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,UAAwD,CAAA;AAK7F,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,UAA6C,CAAA;AA4B/E,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAoE,CAAA;AAMjG,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,UAsBnC,CAAA;AAID,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAG3D,CAAA;AAUF,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAA;AAIjF,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAA;AAE3E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6DG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAG,cAAuB,CAAA;AAG9D,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAY/B,CAAA;AAOD,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAGzF,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,UAavC,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,UAenC,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B,UA2DtC,CAAA;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC,UAG5C,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,UA8EzC,CAAA;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,UAuBrC,CAAA;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,UAwBxB,CAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"patterns.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/patterns.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAGH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,UAanC,CAAA;AAWD,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,UAe5B,CAAA;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,UAAwD,CAAA;AAK7F,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,UAA6C,CAAA;AAW/E,OAAO,EACL,gBAAgB,EAChB,uBAAuB,EACvB,4BAA4B,EAC5B,kBAAkB,EAClB,+BAA+B,GAChC,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAA;AAUrC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAA;AAIjF,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAA;AAE3E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyEG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAG,cAAuB,CAAA;AAG9D,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAY/B,CAAA;AAOD,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAGzF,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,UAavC,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,UAenC,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B,UA2DtC,CAAA;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC,UAG5C,CAAA;AAGD,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,UA8EzC,CAAA;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,UAuBrC,CAAA;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,UAwBxB,CAAA"}

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.js

@@ -52,64 +52,16 @@ export const TRANSIENT_TRANSFER_HOSTS = ['transfer.sh', 'file.io', 'tmpfiles.org
 // execution-correlated — a shortened URL piped to a shell has no legitimate
 // install shape (a bare shortened link stays at url:medium like any tier here).
 export const URL_SHORTENER_DOMAINS = ['bit.ly', 'tinyurl.com', 't.co', 'is.gd'];
-// Sensitive file path patterns
-// SMI-4396 Wave 2: bare-keyword variants (credentials, secrets?, password) tightened
-// to require assignment/path/file-extension context. Without this tuning,
-// documentation keywords in SKILL.md frontmatter and prose (1Password integration
-// guides, security-research skill domain vocabulary) tripped HIGH severity.
-//
-// SMI-5359 Wave 4 — FP-narrowing for two over-firing entries (severity policy lives
-// in scanSensitivePaths so the array length / regression-guard baseline is unchanged):
-//   MF-1: bare /api[_-]?key/i & /auth[_-]?token/i fired HIGH on ANY substring —
-//     benign prose ("set your api_key in the dashboard"), `export API_KEY=$1`, and
-//     `apiKey: <YOUR_KEY>` placeholders. They are now VALUE-GATED: HIGH only when the
-//     line assigns a real (non-placeholder, sufficiently-entropic) secret. The
-//     value-BEARING leak is already caught at PII (PII_PATTERNS[0/2]); the
-//     credential-in-an-outbound-curl exfil is caught by DATA_EXFILTRATION_PATTERNS
-//     (the `$API_KEY`-in-a-fetched-URL pattern added below). See
-//     VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS.
-//   MF-2: lone /\.env/i fired HIGH on every `.env` mention AND on the benign committed
-//     family (.envrc, .env.example/.sample/.template/.schema/.dist). ENV_PATH_PATTERN
-//     negative-lookaheads exclude that family; scanSensitivePaths downgrades a LONE
-//     `.env` to MEDIUM and keeps HIGH when it co-occurs with a read/exfil verb or
-//     shell pipe/redirect (`cat .env | curl ...`).
-// MF-2: `.env` as a real env-file reference. Excludes `.envrc` (direnv config) and the
-// committed placeholder family (.env.example/.sample/.template/.schema/.dist). The
-// `(?![A-Za-z])` guard also drops the `.environment`/`.envision` English-word FP while
-// still matching real variants like `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`.
-export const ENV_PATH_PATTERN = /\.env(?![A-Za-z])(?!\.(?:example|sample|template|schema|dist))/i;
-// MF-1: bare credential keywords — value-gated in scanSensitivePaths, never standalone HIGH.
-const API_KEY_KEYWORD = /api[_-]?key/i;
-const AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD = /auth[_-]?token/i;
-export const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS = [
-    ENV_PATH_PATTERN,
-    // Contextual credentials: filename or assignment, not bare prose
-    /credentials\.(?:json|ya?ml|env|toml|txt)/i,
-    /credentials\s*[:=]/i,
-    // Contextual secrets: assignment or path, not bare word
-    /\bsecrets?\s*[:=]/i,
-    /\bsecrets?\/[a-z0-9_.-]+/i,
-    /\.pem$/i,
-    /\.key$/i,
-    /\.crt$/i,
-    // Contextual password: assignment or URL (postgres://user:pass@host) only
-    /password\s*[:=]/i,
-    API_KEY_KEYWORD,
-    AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD,
-    /~\/\.ssh/i,
-    /~\/\.aws/i,
-    /~\/\.config/i,
-    // SMI-4396 Wave 2: explicit system-file paths. Added so that tightening
-    // bare /credentials/i and /password/i into assignment-context variants
-    // doesn't drop coverage of obvious sensitive references like /etc/passwd.
-    /\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)\b/i,
-];
-// MF-1: the two bare-keyword patterns above emit HIGH only when accompanied by a real
-// assigned secret value; scanSensitivePaths suppresses an otherwise-bare match.
-export const VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS = new Set([
-    API_KEY_KEYWORD,
-    AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD,
-]);
+// SMI-5207: the whole `sensitive_path` family (ENV_PATH_PATTERN, the 15-entry
+// SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS array and the three ReadonlySets that classify its
+// entries by severity gate) moved to patterns.sensitive-path.ts — this file
+// had only 18 lines of headroom under the 500-line pre-commit gate, and the
+// MF-3/MF-4 classification needed ~42. Re-exported here unchanged so every
+// existing import path (index.ts, SecurityScanner.scanners.ts,
+// scanner-regression-guard.test.ts) keeps working AND reference identity is
+// preserved — scanSensitivePaths classifies patterns by reference, so this
+// re-export is load-bearing exactly like the two below it; do not remove.
+export { ENV_PATH_PATTERN, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS, VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS, PATH_FORM_PATTERNS, VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS, } from './patterns.sensitive-path.js';
 // Jailbreak attempt patterns
 // SMI-5876 Wave 1: JAILBREAK_PATTERNS and AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS (below) moved to
 // patterns.jailbreak.ts together with the evidence-tier classification map
@@ -125,7 +77,9 @@ export { JAILBREAK_PATTERNS, AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS } from './patterns.jailbreak.js
 export { EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN } from './patterns.jailbreak.evidence.js';
 /**
  * SMI-5876 §0.1/§0.2: bump on ANY pattern-array or evidence-table change in
- * this module or patterns.jailbreak.ts. The security-audit baseline
+ * this module, patterns.jailbreak.ts, or patterns.sensitive-path.ts (SMI-5207
+ * moved the sensitive_path family there; the bump obligation moved with it).
+ * The security-audit baseline
  * (packages/mcp-server/src/audit/security-baseline.ts /
  * security-audit.ts) stamps every stored entry with the version that
  * produced it and treats a mismatch as "not comparable" — forcing a re-scan
@@ -181,11 +135,21 @@ export { EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN } from './patterns.jailbreak.evidence.js';
  * produced advisory-tier findings before. All three are the
  * previously-clean-content-now-fires scenario this gate exists for. Scope
  * note (unchanged from Wave 3): this forces re-evaluation of the local MCP
- * audit baseline only (patterns.ts:100-125,
+ * audit baseline only (this constant and its `comparable` consumer,
  * packages/mcp-server/src/audit/security-audit.ts:219-222); the edge indexer
  * never reads this constant, which is why it has no edge counterpart.
+ * (SMI-5207 replaced a `patterns.ts:100-125` line-range citation here — that
+ * range addressed the sensitive_path family, which moved to
+ * patterns.sensitive-path.ts, so the numbers no longer resolve.)
+ *
+ * Bumped to `2026-09-07.1`: SMI-5207 added the MF-3 (path-form
+ * action-context, negation-aware) and MF-4 (assignment-form value,
+ * default-HIGH-unless-prose) severity gates. Unlike every bump above, this
+ * one is *previously-flagged-content-now-clean* — without it, the
+ * `comparable` gate keeps reusing a stored `malicious` verdict produced by
+ * the pre-fix ruleset, and the fix never reaches an already-scanned skill.
  */
-export const SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION = '2026-08-15.1';
+export const SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION = '2026-09-07.1';
 // Suspicious patterns that might indicate malicious intent
 export const SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS = [
     /eval\s*\(/i,

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * Security Scanner Patterns — the `sensitive_path` family
+ * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path
+ *
+ * SMI-5207: extracted from patterns.ts, which sat 18 lines under the repo's
+ * 500-line pre-commit gate (scripts/check-file-length.mjs) before this wave —
+ * not enough headroom for the 12 hoisted pattern consts plus the two new
+ * severity-gate classification sets below (~42 lines). Same
+ * move-the-family-then-re-export convention already used twice in patterns.ts
+ * (patterns.jailbreak.ts, SMI-5876; patterns.exec.ts, SMI-6033 Wave 4).
+ *
+ * Every symbol here is re-exported unchanged from patterns.ts, so every
+ * existing import path keeps working AND reference identity is preserved —
+ * load-bearing, because scanSensitivePaths() classifies patterns by reference
+ * (`pattern === ENV_PATH_PATTERN`, `VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS.has(pattern)`,
+ * and now `PATH_FORM_PATTERNS.has(pattern)` /
+ * `VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS.has(pattern)`).
+ *
+ * NOTE: a change to SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS or to the severity classification
+ * below requires bumping SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION in patterns.ts — see that
+ * constant's own doc comment.
+ */
+export declare const ENV_PATH_PATTERN: RegExp;
+export declare const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
+export declare const VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS: ReadonlySet<RegExp>;
+/**
+ * SMI-5207 (MF-3): the 9 path/filename-form entries. HIGH only when an action
+ * verb or shell operator appears within +/-1 line of the match; otherwise
+ * MEDIUM — a bare path *mention* is the common case, so evidence is required
+ * to escalate. See scanSensitivePaths' hasPathActionContext().
+ */
+export declare const PATH_FORM_PATTERNS: ReadonlySet<RegExp>;
+/**
+ * SMI-5207 (MF-4): the 3 keyword-assignment entries. HIGH BY DEFAULT —
+ * `keyword: value` is a syntactic credential-assignment shape, rare in
+ * innocent prose — downgraded to MEDIUM only on positive prose evidence about
+ * the assigned value. See scanSensitivePaths' assignmentHasRealValue().
+ *
+ * Partition check (guarded by a dedicated test): 1 (ENV) + 9 (PATH_FORM) +
+ * 3 (ASSIGNMENT) + 2 (VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD) = 15, total and disjoint. An
+ * unclassified future pattern falls through to scanSensitivePaths' fail-CLOSED
+ * `else` branch and stays HIGH.
+ */
+export declare const VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS: ReadonlySet<RegExp>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=patterns.sensitive-path.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path.d.ts.map

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package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path.js

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/**
+ * Security Scanner Patterns — the `sensitive_path` family
+ * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path
+ *
+ * SMI-5207: extracted from patterns.ts, which sat 18 lines under the repo's
+ * 500-line pre-commit gate (scripts/check-file-length.mjs) before this wave —
+ * not enough headroom for the 12 hoisted pattern consts plus the two new
+ * severity-gate classification sets below (~42 lines). Same
+ * move-the-family-then-re-export convention already used twice in patterns.ts
+ * (patterns.jailbreak.ts, SMI-5876; patterns.exec.ts, SMI-6033 Wave 4).
+ *
+ * Every symbol here is re-exported unchanged from patterns.ts, so every
+ * existing import path keeps working AND reference identity is preserved —
+ * load-bearing, because scanSensitivePaths() classifies patterns by reference
+ * (`pattern === ENV_PATH_PATTERN`, `VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS.has(pattern)`,
+ * and now `PATH_FORM_PATTERNS.has(pattern)` /
+ * `VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS.has(pattern)`).
+ *
+ * NOTE: a change to SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS or to the severity classification
+ * below requires bumping SCANNER_RULESET_VERSION in patterns.ts — see that
+ * constant's own doc comment.
+ */
+// Sensitive file path patterns
+// SMI-4396 Wave 2: bare-keyword variants (credentials, secrets?, password) tightened
+// to require assignment/path/file-extension context. Without this tuning,
+// documentation keywords in SKILL.md frontmatter and prose (1Password integration
+// guides, security-research skill domain vocabulary) tripped HIGH severity.
+//
+// SMI-5359 Wave 4 — FP-narrowing for two over-firing entries (severity policy lives
+// in scanSensitivePaths so the array length / regression-guard baseline is unchanged):
+//   MF-1: bare /api[_-]?key/i & /auth[_-]?token/i fired HIGH on ANY substring —
+//     benign prose ("set your api_key in the dashboard"), `export API_KEY=$1`, and
+//     `apiKey: <YOUR_KEY>` placeholders. They are now VALUE-GATED: HIGH only when the
+//     line assigns a real (non-placeholder, sufficiently-entropic) secret. The
+//     value-BEARING leak is already caught at PII (PII_PATTERNS[0/2]); the
+//     credential-in-an-outbound-curl exfil is caught by DATA_EXFILTRATION_PATTERNS
+//     (the `$API_KEY`-in-a-fetched-URL pattern added there). See
+//     VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS.
+//   MF-2: lone /\.env/i fired HIGH on every `.env` mention AND on the benign committed
+//     family (.envrc, .env.example/.sample/.template/.schema/.dist). ENV_PATH_PATTERN
+//     negative-lookaheads exclude that family; scanSensitivePaths downgrades a LONE
+//     `.env` to MEDIUM and keeps HIGH when it co-occurs with a read/exfil verb or
+//     shell pipe/redirect (`cat .env | curl ...`).
+//
+// SMI-5207 — the remaining 12 entries got the same treatment the two MF-1 keywords
+// and the MF-2 `.env` entry already had: severity is now context-gated rather than
+// unconditionally HIGH. MF-3 covers the 9 path-form entries (action verb or shell
+// operator within +/-1 line), MF-4 the 3 keyword-assignment entries (HIGH unless the
+// assigned value positively reads as prose). Both gates live in
+// SecurityScanner.scanners.ts; this module only supplies the classification.
+// MF-2: `.env` as a real env-file reference. Excludes `.envrc` (direnv config) and the
+// committed placeholder family (.env.example/.sample/.template/.schema/.dist). The
+// `(?![A-Za-z])` guard also drops the `.environment`/`.envision` English-word FP while
+// still matching real variants like `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`.
+export const ENV_PATH_PATTERN = /\.env(?![A-Za-z])(?!\.(?:example|sample|template|schema|dist))/i;
+// MF-1: bare credential keywords — value-gated in scanSensitivePaths, never standalone HIGH.
+const API_KEY_KEYWORD = /api[_-]?key/i;
+const AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD = /auth[_-]?token/i;
+// SMI-5207: the 12 non-`.env` entries are hoisted from inline array literals to named
+// consts so scanSensitivePaths can classify each by severity gate BY REFERENCE. The
+// array's contents, order, and length (15) are unchanged — the regression-guard floor
+// (scanner-regression-guard.test.ts) still holds.
+// Contextual credentials: filename or assignment, not bare prose
+const CREDENTIALS_FILE_PATTERN = /credentials\.(?:json|ya?ml|env|toml|txt)/i;
+const CREDENTIALS_ASSIGN_PATTERN = /credentials\s*[:=]/i;
+// Contextual secrets: assignment or path, not bare word
+const SECRETS_ASSIGN_PATTERN = /\bsecrets?\s*[:=]/i;
+const SECRETS_PATH_PATTERN = /\bsecrets?\/[a-z0-9_.-]+/i;
+const PEM_PATTERN = /\.pem$/i;
+const KEY_FILE_PATTERN = /\.key$/i;
+const CRT_PATTERN = /\.crt$/i;
+// Contextual password: assignment or URL (postgres://user:pass@host) only
+const PASSWORD_ASSIGN_PATTERN = /password\s*[:=]/i;
+const SSH_DIR_PATTERN = /~\/\.ssh/i;
+const AWS_DIR_PATTERN = /~\/\.aws/i;
+const CONFIG_DIR_PATTERN = /~\/\.config/i;
+// SMI-4396 Wave 2: explicit system-file paths. Added so that tightening
+// bare /credentials/i and /password/i into assignment-context variants
+// doesn't drop coverage of obvious sensitive references like /etc/passwd.
+const ETC_SYSTEM_FILE_PATTERN = /\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)\b/i;
+export const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS = [
+    ENV_PATH_PATTERN,
+    CREDENTIALS_FILE_PATTERN,
+    CREDENTIALS_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+    SECRETS_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+    SECRETS_PATH_PATTERN,
+    PEM_PATTERN,
+    KEY_FILE_PATTERN,
+    CRT_PATTERN,
+    PASSWORD_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+    API_KEY_KEYWORD,
+    AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD,
+    SSH_DIR_PATTERN,
+    AWS_DIR_PATTERN,
+    CONFIG_DIR_PATTERN,
+    ETC_SYSTEM_FILE_PATTERN,
+];
+// MF-1: the two bare-keyword patterns above emit HIGH only when accompanied by a real
+// assigned secret value; scanSensitivePaths suppresses an otherwise-bare match.
+export const VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD_PATTERNS = new Set([
+    API_KEY_KEYWORD,
+    AUTH_TOKEN_KEYWORD,
+]);
+/**
+ * SMI-5207 (MF-3): the 9 path/filename-form entries. HIGH only when an action
+ * verb or shell operator appears within +/-1 line of the match; otherwise
+ * MEDIUM — a bare path *mention* is the common case, so evidence is required
+ * to escalate. See scanSensitivePaths' hasPathActionContext().
+ */
+export const PATH_FORM_PATTERNS = new Set([
+    CREDENTIALS_FILE_PATTERN,
+    SECRETS_PATH_PATTERN,
+    PEM_PATTERN,
+    KEY_FILE_PATTERN,
+    CRT_PATTERN,
+    SSH_DIR_PATTERN,
+    AWS_DIR_PATTERN,
+    CONFIG_DIR_PATTERN,
+    ETC_SYSTEM_FILE_PATTERN,
+]);
+/**
+ * SMI-5207 (MF-4): the 3 keyword-assignment entries. HIGH BY DEFAULT —
+ * `keyword: value` is a syntactic credential-assignment shape, rare in
+ * innocent prose — downgraded to MEDIUM only on positive prose evidence about
+ * the assigned value. See scanSensitivePaths' assignmentHasRealValue().
+ *
+ * Partition check (guarded by a dedicated test): 1 (ENV) + 9 (PATH_FORM) +
+ * 3 (ASSIGNMENT) + 2 (VALUE_GATED_KEYWORD) = 15, total and disjoint. An
+ * unclassified future pattern falls through to scanSensitivePaths' fail-CLOSED
+ * `else` branch and stays HIGH.
+ */
+export const VALUE_GATED_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERNS = new Set([
+    CREDENTIALS_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+    SECRETS_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+    PASSWORD_ASSIGN_PATTERN,
+]);
+//# sourceMappingURL=patterns.sensitive-path.js.map

package/dist/src/security/scanner/patterns.sensitive-path.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/security/scanner/regex-utils.d.ts

@@ -11,25 +11,39 @@
  */
 export declare const MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = 10000;
 /**
- * SMI-5881: Cap for the FULL-CONTENT (multiline "pass 1") regex scan, in
- * UTF-16 code units (JavaScript `string.length` — NOT bytes/code points; see
- * SecurityScanner.ts's content-length finding message).
+ * SMI-5879 (design §3.4): Cap for the FULL-CONTENT (multiline "pass 1") regex
+ * scan, in UTF-16 code units (JavaScript `string.length` — NOT bytes/code
+ * points; see SecurityScanner.ts's content-length finding message).
  *
- * Equal to MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX today (both 10_000) but declared
- * separately because the two caps protect different scan passes (per-line vs
- * whole-document) and may need to diverge later. This is a ReDoS budget
- * input, not a free parameter — raising it requires first proving
- * AD_CRLF_INJECTION-class patterns stay linear at the new size. Measured
- * (SMI-5881): the fixed AD_CRLF_INJECTION pattern is already ~4x slower per
- * doubling of input size on some adversarial inputs at sizes past this cap,
- * extrapolating to unacceptable latency well before 1,000,000 — so this cap
- * is NOT raised as part of SMI-5881 even though larger trust tiers allow a
- * much bigger `maxContentLength`. See SecurityScanner.ts's
- * `effectiveMultilineLimit` (`Math.min(MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX,
- * maxContentLength)`) for how this interacts with the per-tier content-length
- * ceiling.
+ * SMI-5881 set this equal to MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX (10,000) and declined
+ * to raise it, citing a doubling-based extrapolation from smaller inputs that
+ * projected "unacceptable latency well before 1,000,000" for
+ * AD_CRLF_INJECTION-class patterns. SMI-5879 independently re-measured
+ * directly at 1,000,000 (not extrapolated) across the 7 ported multiline
+ * patterns (AD_CRLF_INJECTION, AD_ROLE_MARKER_BARE, AD_HTML_COMMENT_VERB/NOUN,
+ * AD_DELIMITER_BARE, AD_AN2_ROLE_BODY_NEXT_LINE, JB_JS3A/JS3B) against
+ * per-pattern adversarial near-miss shapes (not just the CRLF-pair shape
+ * SMI-5881 used) and found linear scaling with a worst case of ~56ms at
+ * 1,000,000 chars (AD_HTML_COMMENT_NOUN, "repeated HTML-comment-open"
+ * near-miss) — confirmed still linear (not superlinear) up to 4,000,000
+ * chars (~145ms), comfortably under the section 7.3 250ms per-case budget.
+ * The prior extrapolation does not hold empirically at this exact size; the
+ * measured worst case has real headroom, just less than the ~78x this
+ * design doc's own (unverified) claim asserted. Raising this cap closes the
+ * 10 KB pass-1 truncation blind spot (design §3.4) — the edge's own
+ * MAX_SKILL_CONTENT_SIZE is 1,000,000 bytes, so pass 1 previously saw only
+ * the first 1% of a large SKILL.md.
+ *
+ * Still declared separately from MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX because the two
+ * caps protect different scan passes (per-line vs whole-document) and may
+ * need to diverge again. See SecurityScanner.ts's `effectiveMultilineLimit`
+ * (`Math.min(MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX, maxContentLength)`) for how this
+ * interacts with the per-tier content-length ceiling — a trust tier with a
+ * SMALLER configured `maxContentLength` still tightens the effective limit
+ * below this cap; none currently need MORE than this cap for the multiline
+ * pass specifically.
  */
-export declare const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = 10000;
+export declare const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = 1000000;
 /**
  * SMI-882: Safe regex test with length limit
  * Applies input length limit before regex matching to prevent ReDoS attacks.

package/dist/src/security/scanner/regex-utils.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"regex-utils.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/regex-utils.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAEH;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,QAAQ,CAAA;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,QAA4B,CAAA;AAErE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,SAAS,GAAE,MAAkC,GAC5C,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAIzB;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,SAAS,GAAE,MAAkC,GAC5C,OAAO,CAIT"}
+{"version":3,"file":"regex-utils.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/regex-utils.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAEH;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,QAAQ,CAAA;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgCG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,UAAY,CAAA;AAErD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,SAAS,GAAE,MAAkC,GAC5C,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAIzB;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,SAAS,GAAE,MAAkC,GAC5C,OAAO,CAIT"}

package/dist/src/security/scanner/regex-utils.js

@@ -11,25 +11,39 @@
  */
 export const MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = 10000;
 /**
- * SMI-5881: Cap for the FULL-CONTENT (multiline "pass 1") regex scan, in
- * UTF-16 code units (JavaScript `string.length` — NOT bytes/code points; see
- * SecurityScanner.ts's content-length finding message).
+ * SMI-5879 (design §3.4): Cap for the FULL-CONTENT (multiline "pass 1") regex
+ * scan, in UTF-16 code units (JavaScript `string.length` — NOT bytes/code
+ * points; see SecurityScanner.ts's content-length finding message).
  *
- * Equal to MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX today (both 10_000) but declared
- * separately because the two caps protect different scan passes (per-line vs
- * whole-document) and may need to diverge later. This is a ReDoS budget
- * input, not a free parameter — raising it requires first proving
- * AD_CRLF_INJECTION-class patterns stay linear at the new size. Measured
- * (SMI-5881): the fixed AD_CRLF_INJECTION pattern is already ~4x slower per
- * doubling of input size on some adversarial inputs at sizes past this cap,
- * extrapolating to unacceptable latency well before 1,000,000 — so this cap
- * is NOT raised as part of SMI-5881 even though larger trust tiers allow a
- * much bigger `maxContentLength`. See SecurityScanner.ts's
- * `effectiveMultilineLimit` (`Math.min(MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX,
- * maxContentLength)`) for how this interacts with the per-tier content-length
- * ceiling.
+ * SMI-5881 set this equal to MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX (10,000) and declined
+ * to raise it, citing a doubling-based extrapolation from smaller inputs that
+ * projected "unacceptable latency well before 1,000,000" for
+ * AD_CRLF_INJECTION-class patterns. SMI-5879 independently re-measured
+ * directly at 1,000,000 (not extrapolated) across the 7 ported multiline
+ * patterns (AD_CRLF_INJECTION, AD_ROLE_MARKER_BARE, AD_HTML_COMMENT_VERB/NOUN,
+ * AD_DELIMITER_BARE, AD_AN2_ROLE_BODY_NEXT_LINE, JB_JS3A/JS3B) against
+ * per-pattern adversarial near-miss shapes (not just the CRLF-pair shape
+ * SMI-5881 used) and found linear scaling with a worst case of ~56ms at
+ * 1,000,000 chars (AD_HTML_COMMENT_NOUN, "repeated HTML-comment-open"
+ * near-miss) — confirmed still linear (not superlinear) up to 4,000,000
+ * chars (~145ms), comfortably under the section 7.3 250ms per-case budget.
+ * The prior extrapolation does not hold empirically at this exact size; the
+ * measured worst case has real headroom, just less than the ~78x this
+ * design doc's own (unverified) claim asserted. Raising this cap closes the
+ * 10 KB pass-1 truncation blind spot (design §3.4) — the edge's own
+ * MAX_SKILL_CONTENT_SIZE is 1,000,000 bytes, so pass 1 previously saw only
+ * the first 1% of a large SKILL.md.
+ *
+ * Still declared separately from MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX because the two
+ * caps protect different scan passes (per-line vs whole-document) and may
+ * need to diverge again. See SecurityScanner.ts's `effectiveMultilineLimit`
+ * (`Math.min(MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX, maxContentLength)`) for how this
+ * interacts with the per-tier content-length ceiling — a trust tier with a
+ * SMALLER configured `maxContentLength` still tightens the effective limit
+ * below this cap; none currently need MORE than this cap for the multiline
+ * pass specifically.
  */
-export const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = MAX_LINE_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX;
+export const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_FOR_REGEX = 1_000_000;
 /**
  * SMI-882: Safe regex test with length limit
  * Applies input length limit before regex matching to prevent ReDoS attacks.

package/dist/src/security/scanner/regex-utils.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"regex-utils.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/regex-utils.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAEH;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,KAAK,CAAA;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgCG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AAErD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,aAAa,CAC3B,OAAe,EACf,KAAa,EACb,YAAoB,yBAAyB;IAE7C,2DAA2D;IAC3D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAA;IAC9E,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAA;AACjC,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,CAC5B,OAAe,EACf,KAAa,EACb,YAAoB,yBAAyB;IAE7C,2DAA2D;IAC3D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAA;IAC9E,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AAChC,CAAC"}

package/dist/src/security/scanner/types.d.ts

@@ -117,6 +117,15 @@ export interface ScanReport {
     riskScore: number;
     /** Breakdown of risk score by category */
     riskBreakdown: RiskScoreBreakdown;
+    /**
+     * SMI-5879 (design §3.3.6): true when the jailbreak or ai_defence multiline
+     * pass hit its per-pattern iteration ceiling before exhausting matches on a
+     * pathological same-line-repetition input. NOT provably score-neutral — the
+     * write path must treat this scan as authoritative for RAISING a verdict
+     * only, never for lowering an existing quarantine. Absent/undefined is
+     * equivalent to `false` (not truncated) for gating purposes.
+     */
+    multilineTruncated?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Verdict returned by comparing two scans of the SAME skill to detect a

package/dist/src/security/scanner/types.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"types.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/scanner/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAEH;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAC3B,KAAK,GACL,gBAAgB,GAChB,WAAW,GACX,oBAAoB,GACpB,oBAAoB,GACpB,gBAAgB,GAChB,mBAAmB,GACnB,sBAAsB,GACtB,YAAY,GACZ,MAAM,GACN,KAAK,GACL,gBAAgB,GAChB,sBAAsB,GACtB,WAAW,GACX,mBAAmB,GACnB,iBAAiB,GACjB,kBAAkB,GAClB,iBAAiB,GACjB,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAExB;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,CAAA;AAErE;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAA;AAEzD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GACpB,SAAS,GACT,qBAAqB,GACrB,wBAAwB,GACxB,sBAAsB,GACtB,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAErB;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,IAAI,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAA;IACzB,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAA;IAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACnB,6CAA6C;IAC7C,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,iFAAiF;IACjF,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAChC,qEAAqE;IACrE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAA;IAC9B,0IAA0I;IAC1I,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,iGAAiG;IACjG,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAA;IAC3B,wGAAwG;IACxG,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACtB;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACrB;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACzB,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACrB,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACxB,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC3B,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACpB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACX,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACxB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAC1B;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACf,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAA;IAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;IACf,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,0EAA0E;IAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,0CAA0C;IAC1C,aAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAA;IACjC;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;CAC7B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,oBAAoB;IACnC,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,YAAY,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;IAC5C,8EAA8E;IAC9E,WAAW,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAA;IAC9B,qEAAqE;IACrE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,uEAAuE;IACvE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACf;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;AAE/D;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;IACzB,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;IAC1B,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACzB,4DAA4D;IAC5D,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,sEAAsE;IACtE,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAA;CACpD"}

package/dist/src/utils/index.d.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ export { logger, createLogger, silentLogger, type Logger } from './logger.js';
 export { withRetry, fetchWithRetry, isTransientError, isRetryableStatus, parseRetryAfter, RetryExhaustedError, DEFAULT_RETRY_CONFIG, type RetryConfig, } from './retry.js';
 export { checkForUpdates, formatUpdateNotification, agentInstallRemediationCommand, checkCursorMcpArtifact, type VersionCheckResult, type CursorMcpArtifactCheck, } from './version-check.js';
 export { parseRepoUrl, isGitHubUrl, type ParsedRepoUrl } from './github-url.js';
+export { VALID_SKILL_NAME_RE, validateSkillName } from './skill-name.js';
 export { safeWriteFile, SymlinkError, HardlinkError } from './safe-fs.js';
 export { isQuietModeEnabled } from './quiet-mode.js';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/utils/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/utils/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;GAEG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAC7E,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,KAAK,WAAW,GACjB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAA;AAGnB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,sBAAsB,EACtB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,sBAAsB,GAC5B,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAG3B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAG/E,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAKzE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/utils/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;GAEG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAC7E,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,KAAK,WAAW,GACjB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAA;AAGnB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,sBAAsB,EACtB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,sBAAsB,GAC5B,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAG3B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAG/E,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAGxE,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAKzE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA"}

package/dist/src/utils/index.js

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ export { withRetry, fetchWithRetry, isTransientError, isRetryableStatus, parseRe
 export { checkForUpdates, formatUpdateNotification, agentInstallRemediationCommand, checkCursorMcpArtifact, } from './version-check.js';
 // SMI-2171: GitHub URL parsing utilities
 export { parseRepoUrl, isGitHubUrl } from './github-url.js';
+// Shared skill name validation (relocated from @skillsmith/cli — canonical here now)
+export { VALID_SKILL_NAME_RE, validateSkillName } from './skill-name.js';
 // SMI-2274: Safe filesystem operations (symlink protection)
 export { safeWriteFile, SymlinkError, HardlinkError } from './safe-fs.js';
 // SMI-5897 (C-18/C-19, Wave 4 fix): shared SKILLSMITH_QUIET guard — used by

package/dist/src/utils/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/utils/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;GAEG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAe,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAC7E,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,GAErB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAA;AAEnB,wDAAwD;AACxD,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,sBAAsB,GAGvB,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAE3B,yCAAyC;AACzC,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAsB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAE/E,qFAAqF;AACrF,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAExE,4DAA4D;AAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAEzE,4EAA4E;AAC5E,sEAAsE;AACtE,6EAA6E;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA"}

package/dist/src/utils/skill-name.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * Shared skill name validation utilities.
+ *
+ * Used by both `skillsmith author init` and `skillsmith create` to enforce
+ * a consistent, registry-safe naming convention across all scaffolding paths.
+ */
+/**
+ * Valid skill names: lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens only.
+ * Must start with a lowercase letter.
+ * Matches the Skillsmith registry slug format.
+ */
+export declare const VALID_SKILL_NAME_RE: RegExp;
+/**
+ * Validate a skill name against the canonical Skillsmith naming convention.
+ *
+ * @returns `true` if valid, or a string error message if invalid.
+ */
+export declare function validateSkillName(name: string): true | string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=skill-name.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/utils/skill-name.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"skill-name.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/utils/skill-name.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,QAAsB,CAAA;AAEtD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,CAM7D"}