@skillsmith/core 0.11.7 → 0.12.1

package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.compound.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  */
 import { analyzeMarkdownContext, isDocumentationContext, isWithinInlineCode, } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
 import { safeRegexTest } from './regex-utils.js';
+import { FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN, correlationTargetBasename, isCorrelatedWithFetchDestination, } from './SecurityScanner.fetch-correlation.js';
 /**
  * SMI-5424 PR2: owner-permission chmod is a COMPOUND signal, not standalone —
  * `chmod 755 ./bin/cli` / `chmod +x build.sh` previously false-fired
@@ -34,49 +35,19 @@ import { safeRegexTest } from './regex-utils.js';
 // that bare `chmod +x foo` (no u/g/o/a prefix — the most common make-executable form
 // in install scripts and malicious droppers) still matches.
 const OWNER_PERM_CHMOD = /\bchmod\s+(?:-[A-Za-z]+\s+)?(?:[0-7]{3,4}|[ugoa]*(?:[+\-=][rwxXstugo]+(?:,[ugoa]*[+\-=][rwxXstugo]*)*)+)/i;
-// FIX-1: actual fetch COMMANDS only — bare prose tokens (`# downloaded`, `See https://…`,
-// `npx tool init`) false-fired next to a chmod. curl/wget/git-clone, and npx only with a URL.
-const CHMOD_FETCH_CONTEXT = /\b(?:curl|wget)\b|\bgit\s+clone\b|\bnpx\b[^\n]{0,80}https?:\/\//i;
 // FIX-2: capture the chmod target path so a fetch command anywhere correlates by basename.
 // SMI-5433: prefix widened to match the same extended forms as OWNER_PERM_CHMOD; capture
 // group (\S+) (the target path) is unchanged.
 const CHMOD_TARGET = /\bchmod\s+(?:-[A-Za-z]+\s+)?(?:[0-7]{3,4}|[ugoa]*(?:[+\-=][rwxXstugo]+(?:,[ugoa]*[+\-=][rwxXstugo]*)*)+)\s+(\S+)/i;
-function escapeRegExp(s) {
-    return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
-}
-// SMI-5431: the IMPLICIT download destination of a fetch command — the file written with
-// NO explicit -o/-O/--output<space>/> redirect: `wget <url>` (no -O/-o) → URL last segment;
-// `git clone <url>` → repo dir (minus `.git`); `curl --output=<file>` (equals form, missed by
-// the explicit regex). A bare `curl <url>` GET writes to STDOUT → '' (never correlates). ReDoS-safe.
-function implicitDownloadBasename(line) {
-    const lastSegment = (urlAfterScheme) => {
-        const noFrag = urlAfterScheme.split(/[?#]/)[0];
-        const slash = noFrag.indexOf('/'); // first slash = end of host
-        if (slash < 0)
-            return ''; // host only -> wget writes index.html
-        const path = noFrag.slice(slash + 1).replace(/\/+$/, '');
-        return path === '' ? '' : (path.split('/').pop() ?? '');
-    };
-    const wget = line.match(/\bwget\b(?![^\n]{0,200}\s-[oO]\b)[^\n]{0,200}?https?:\/\/(\S{1,400})/i);
-    if (wget)
-        return lastSegment(wget[1]);
-    const clone = line.match(/\bgit\s+clone\b[^\n]{0,200}?https?:\/\/(\S{1,400})/i);
-    if (clone)
-        return lastSegment(clone[1]).replace(/\.git$/i, '');
-    const curlEq = line.match(/\bcurl\b[^\n]{0,200}?--output=['"]?(\S{1,400})/i);
-    if (curlEq)
-        return curlEq[1].replace(/['"]/g, '').split('/').pop() ?? '';
-    return '';
-}
 export function scanChmodFetchCompound(content, alreadyFlaggedLines, lineContexts) {
     const findings = [];
     const lines = content.split('\n');
     const contexts = lineContexts ?? analyzeMarkdownContext(content);
     // FIX-2: lines carrying a fetch command, for distance-independent correlation.
     // H-6 (SMI-5433): route through safeRegexTest so the 10,000-char cap applies uniformly
-    // to the per-line filter too (CHMOD_FETCH_CONTEXT is provably linear, so this is
+    // to the per-line filter too (FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN is provably linear, so this is
     // defense-in-depth consistency, not a ReDoS fix).
-    const fetchLines = lines.filter((l) => safeRegexTest(CHMOD_FETCH_CONTEXT, l) !== null);
+    const fetchLines = lines.filter((l) => safeRegexTest(FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN, l) !== null);
     lines.forEach((line, index) => {
         const lineNumber = index + 1;
         // World-writable / setuid already emitted critical for this line — skip.
@@ -88,20 +59,21 @@ export function scanChmodFetchCompound(content, alreadyFlaggedLines, lineContext
         // Bounded ±1-line window for the download-then-chmod adjacency.
         const window = [lines[index - 1] ?? '', line, lines[index + 1] ?? ''].join('\n');
         // H-6 (SMI-5433): route through safeRegexTest for the 10,000-char cap.
-        const adjacentFetch = safeRegexTest(CHMOD_FETCH_CONTEXT, window) !== null;
-        // FIX-2 + SMI-5431: correlate the chmod target basename (≥3 chars) against a fetch
+        const adjacentFetch = safeRegexTest(FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN, window) !== null;
+        // FIX-2 + SMI-5431: correlate the chmod target (final segment ≥3 chars) against a fetch
         // command's DOWNLOAD DESTINATION anywhere — explicit (-o/-O/--output<space>/>, with an
         // optional leading path) via regex, OR implicit (wget/git-clone/curl --output=) via
         // exact-token equality. Anchored on the destination, NOT basename-anywhere, so a URL
         // path / query / header value (governance FP class) and a bare curl GET do not correlate.
+        // SMI-6033 Wave 3: the FULL captured path is handed to the shared utility (it used to be
+        // reduced to a bare basename here, discarding the directory the utility now compares).
         let correlated = false;
         // H-6 (SMI-5433): route through safeRegexTest for the 10,000-char cap.
         const tm = safeRegexTest(CHMOD_TARGET, line);
         if (tm) {
-            const base = tm[1].replace(/['"]/g, '').split('/').pop() ?? '';
-            if (base.length >= 3) {
-                const re = new RegExp(`(?:-o|-O|--output|>>?)\\s*['"]?(?:[^\\s'"]*/)?${escapeRegExp(base)}(?:[\\s'"?]|$)`);
-                correlated = fetchLines.some((l) => re.test(l) || implicitDownloadBasename(l) === base);
+            const targetPath = tm[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+            if (correlationTargetBasename(targetPath).length >= 3) {
+                correlated = isCorrelatedWithFetchDestination(targetPath, fetchLines);
             }
         }
         if (!adjacentFetch && !correlated)
@@ -124,4 +96,111 @@ export function scanChmodFetchCompound(content, alreadyFlaggedLines, lineContext
     });
     return findings;
 }
+/**
+ * SMI-6033 Wave 2/3 (Gap 5, tiered per the plan's "Product decision:
+ * Gatekeeper-bypass carve-out", resolved 2026-08-14): xattr Gatekeeper-bypass
+ * detector.
+ *
+ * `xattr -c <file>` (clear ALL extended attributes) or
+ * `xattr -d com.apple.quarantine <file>` (delete just the quarantine
+ * attribute — with or without a combined `-r` recursive flag) strips
+ * macOS's "downloaded from the internet" Gatekeeper warning from an
+ * unsigned binary.
+ *
+ * NOT unconditionally standalone-critical: `critical` requires the xattr
+ * target's path to be correlated with a fetch destination elsewhere in
+ * the content (the shared `isCorrelatedWithFetchDestination` utility, same
+ * as `scanChmodFetchCompound` above and `scanArchiveEvasion`'s inline-literal
+ * form) — the "download a payload, strip its quarantine bit" attack shape.
+ * Uncorrelated usage (e.g. a general macOS-troubleshooting doc mentioning
+ * `xattr -c` with no fetched file in scope) stays `medium`, regardless of
+ * `isHighTrustAuthor`.
+ *
+ * `isHighTrustAuthor` (default `false`) is the trust-tier carve-out: when the
+ * correlated (would-be-critical) form fires AND the caller has verified the
+ * skill's author is high-trust, severity downgrades to `medium` instead of
+ * `critical` — a downgrade, not a full exemption, since even a high-trust
+ * account can be compromised (a `medium` finding still counts toward the
+ * two-distinct-medium-signal escalation rule). This parameter must be sourced
+ * from a VERIFIED author signal — the indexer's own resolved GitHub repo
+ * owner, never a self-declared `SKILL.md` frontmatter field, which is
+ * trivially spoofable. `skill_validate`'s offline call site has no such
+ * verified signal (a network call to check it would break the tool's
+ * deliberately-offline design, per Gap 7) and so must never pass this
+ * parameter — it stays defaulted `false`, keeping correlated xattr
+ * always-critical there, full stop. Checksum/signature-verification prose
+ * near the command does NOT downgrade a non-high-trust correlated form: it's
+ * attacker-authored text and proves nothing about the artifact's safety, so
+ * no such logic exists here.
+ *
+ * Two bounded, ReDoS-safe TRIGGER patterns rather than one combined
+ * alternation (mirrors CHMOD_TARGET's capture-then-inspect style):
+ * XATTR_CLEAR_ALL matches any `-c`-bearing flag cluster within 40 chars of
+ * `xattr` (`-c`, `-cr`, `-rc`, ...); XATTR_DELETE_QUARANTINE matches a
+ * `-d`-bearing flag cluster immediately followed by the literal
+ * `com.apple.quarantine` attribute name (covers both a combined `-dr`/`-rd`
+ * cluster and two separate `-r -d com.apple.quarantine` tokens, since the
+ * attribute name always immediately follows whichever token carries `-d`).
+ * Reading or writing a DIFFERENT attribute (`-l`, `-p <name>`, `-w <name>
+ * <value>`) is not a bypass and does not match either pattern. A second,
+ * TARGET-capturing sibling of each pattern (below) exists ONLY to extract the
+ * xattr'd file's basename for the correlation check — it never changes
+ * whether a line trips the detector.
+ */
+const XATTR_CLEAR_ALL = /\bxattr\b[^\n]{0,40}-[a-zA-Z]*c[a-zA-Z]*\b/i;
+const XATTR_DELETE_QUARANTINE = /\bxattr\b[^\n]{0,40}-[a-zA-Z]*d[a-zA-Z]*\s+['"]?com\.apple\.quarantine\b/i;
+const XATTR_CLEAR_ALL_TARGET = /\bxattr\b[^\n]{0,40}-[a-zA-Z]*c[a-zA-Z]*\b\s+['"]?(\S+)/i;
+const XATTR_DELETE_QUARANTINE_TARGET = /\bxattr\b[^\n]{0,40}-[a-zA-Z]*d[a-zA-Z]*\s+['"]?com\.apple\.quarantine\b['"]?\s+['"]?(\S+)/i;
+/**
+ * The FILE target of an xattr Gatekeeper-bypass command (real xattr CLI
+ * syntax is `xattr [-flags] [attr_name] target...`, so the target always
+ * comes right after whichever trigger variant matched) — used only for the
+ * fetch-correlation trust-tier check. Extraction failure (no trailing token)
+ * simply yields '' (never correlates); it does not affect whether the line
+ * trips the underlying detector. SMI-6033 Wave 3: returns the FULL path
+ * (quotes stripped), not a bare basename — the shared correlation utility is
+ * now directory-aware and must not be handed a path-stripped target.
+ */
+function extractXattrTargetPath(line) {
+    const m = safeRegexTest(XATTR_CLEAR_ALL_TARGET, line) ??
+        safeRegexTest(XATTR_DELETE_QUARANTINE_TARGET, line);
+    if (!m)
+        return '';
+    return m[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+}
+export function scanGatekeeperBypass(content, lineContexts, isHighTrustAuthor = false) {
+    const findings = [];
+    const lines = content.split('\n');
+    const contexts = lineContexts ?? analyzeMarkdownContext(content);
+    // Fetch-carrying lines, for the correlation precondition (mirrors
+    // scanChmodFetchCompound/scanArchiveEvasion's own fetchLines computation).
+    const fetchLines = lines.filter((l) => safeRegexTest(FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN, l) !== null);
+    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+        const match = safeRegexTest(XATTR_CLEAR_ALL, line) ?? safeRegexTest(XATTR_DELETE_QUARANTINE, line);
+        if (!match)
+            return;
+        const ctx = contexts[index];
+        const inInlineCode = ctx?.isInlineCode && isWithinInlineCode(line, match.index ?? 0);
+        const inDocContext = ctx ? isDocumentationContext(ctx) || inInlineCode : false;
+        const targetPath = extractXattrTargetPath(line);
+        const correlated = correlationTargetBasename(targetPath).length >= 3 &&
+            isCorrelatedWithFetchDestination(targetPath, fetchLines);
+        // Product decision (2026-08-14): correlated form is standalone-critical
+        // UNLESS the caller has verified the author is high-trust (indexer path
+        // only — see this function's header). Uncorrelated usage never reaches
+        // 'critical' regardless of trust tier.
+        const critical = !inDocContext && correlated && !isHighTrustAuthor;
+        findings.push({
+            type: 'gatekeeper_bypass',
+            severity: inDocContext ? 'low' : critical ? 'critical' : 'medium',
+            message: `xattr command strips the macOS Gatekeeper quarantine attribute: "${match[0].trim().slice(0, 100)}"`,
+            location: line.trim().slice(0, 100),
+            lineNumber: index + 1,
+            category: 'gatekeeper_bypass',
+            inDocumentationContext: inDocContext,
+            confidence: inDocContext ? 'low' : 'high',
+        });
+    });
+    return findings;
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=SecurityScanner.compound.js.map

package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.compound.js.map

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package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.d.ts

@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@
  */
 import type { ScanReport, ScannerOptions } from './types.js';
 import type { LineContext } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
-import { analyzeMarkdownContext, isDocumentationContext, isWithinInlineCode, calculateRiskScore } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
+import { analyzeMarkdownContext, isDocumentationContext, isWithinInlineCode } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
+import { extractUrls } from './SecurityScanner.urls.js';
+import { calculateRiskScore } from './SecurityScanner.risk-score.js';
 import { scanSsrfPatterns } from './SecurityScanner.ssrf.js';
 import { toMinimalRefs, toSARIF, toGitHubAnnotations, toSummary } from './SecurityScanner.formatters.js';
-export { LineContext, analyzeMarkdownContext, isDocumentationContext, isWithinInlineCode, calculateRiskScore, };
+export { LineContext, analyzeMarkdownContext, isDocumentationContext, isWithinInlineCode, calculateRiskScore, extractUrls, };
 export { scanSsrfPatterns };
 export { toMinimalRefs, toSARIF, toGitHubAnnotations, toSummary };
 export declare class SecurityScanner {
@@ -17,7 +19,6 @@ export declare class SecurityScanner {
     private maxContentLength;
     private riskThreshold;
     constructor(options?: ScannerOptions);
-    private extractUrls;
     private isAllowedDomain;
     private scanUrls;
     private scanJailbreakPatterns;
@@ -25,7 +26,43 @@ export declare class SecurityScanner {
     private scanAIDefenceVulnerabilities;
     /** @deprecated Use standalone calculateRiskScore function for new code */
     calculateRiskScore: typeof calculateRiskScore;
-    scan(skillId: string, content: string): ScanReport;
+    /**
+     * Run every content-scanning detector against `content` and return the
+     * combined findings. Factored out of `scan()` (SMI-6033 Wave 2, Gap 2) so
+     * the encoded-payload detector's recursive rescan of DECODED content can
+     * reuse the exact same detector suite instead of a parallel, narrower
+     * reimplementation.
+     *
+     * `skipEncodedPayload` is the STRUCTURAL depth-1 recursion guarantee: the
+     * recursive callback passed to `scanEncodedPayload` below always calls this
+     * method with `skipEncodedPayload: true`, so a base64 blob discovered
+     * INSIDE already-decoded content can never itself be decoded — the inner
+     * call cannot reach `scanEncodedPayload` again no matter what the decoded
+     * text contains. This disables ONLY the encoded-payload detector on the
+     * inner call, not the rest of the suite — a decoded `curl|bash` still
+     * trips `code_execution`, decoded secrets still trip `sensitive_path`, etc.
+     */
+    private runDetectors;
+    /**
+     * SMI-6033 Wave 3 (Gap 5): `isHighTrustAuthor` (default `false`) is the
+     * Gatekeeper-bypass trust-tier carve-out — see `scanGatekeeperBypass`'s own
+     * header (`SecurityScanner.compound.ts`) for the full policy. No in-repo
+     * caller of this method currently has a verified author signal to pass
+     * here (the indexer scans via the edge twin, not this core class); the
+     * parameter exists so a future verified-author caller can opt in, and so
+     * every existing call site (skill_validate, skill_rescan,
+     * bundled-sibling-scan, skill-installation.*) defaults closed by
+     * construction, not by convention.
+     *
+     * SMI-6033 Wave 2 (Gap 8) fix (2026-08-17): `isMarkdown` defaults `true`,
+     * preserving byte-identical behavior for every existing caller. Pass
+     * `false` when `content` is a real source file, not markdown — see
+     * `analyzeMarkdownContext`'s own header (SecurityScanner.helpers.ts) for
+     * why the markdown-only indented-code-block heuristic must never apply to
+     * non-markdown content. `bundled-sibling-scan.ts`'s
+     * `collectExecutableCodeFiles` candidates are the first real caller.
+     */
+    scan(skillId: string, content: string, isHighTrustAuthor?: boolean, isMarkdown?: boolean): ScanReport;
     quickCheck(content: string): boolean;
     addAllowedDomain(domain: string): void;
     addBlockedPattern(pattern: RegExp): void;

package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.decoy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * Security Scanner — decoy/misdirection URL-target heuristic
+ * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.decoy
+ *
+ * SMI-6033 Wave 4 (Gap 6): reuses the typosquat detector's brand data —
+ * `BRAND_ALIASES` (typosquat.ts) and `AUTHORITY_CLAIMING_AFFIXES`
+ * (typosquat.ts, exported for exactly this reuse as part of Wave 1's Gap 6
+ * prerequisite) — to catch a fetch/exec instruction whose surrounding prose
+ * claims a specific vendor (a brand token, optionally reinforced by an
+ * authority-claiming affix like "official"/"verified") while the fetch
+ * target's actual domain does not belong to that vendor and is not in the
+ * general `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` allowlist.
+ *
+ * Per the plan's §9 reconciliation table: `decoy_misdirection` is "N/A —
+ * never standalone... Approximate NL heuristic by construction; co-signal
+ * required (medium tier), unchanged." This detector therefore NEVER emits
+ * `high`/`critical` — only `medium`, or nothing (see the doc-context
+ * downgrade below, which uses `low`, not a third severity choice for the
+ * non-doc case). The co-signal mechanism that would let this medium finding
+ * contribute toward escalating a separate weak `code_execution` finding is a
+ * SEPARATE dispatch's job — `SecurityScanner.exec.ts`'s
+ * `CO_SIGNAL_MIN_SEVERITY` replacement — and is NOT implemented in this file.
+ *
+ * Design note, NOT explicit in the plan text and flagged here for review:
+ * the plan says to compare "the claimed vendor's canonical domain" against
+ * the fetch target's domain, but `BRAND_ALIASES`'s values are GitHub OWNER
+ * SLUGS (`anthropics`, `google-gemini`, ...) — they answer "whose GitHub org
+ * publishes this," not "what is this vendor's real website." A small
+ * curated `BRAND_CANONICAL_DOMAINS` map below, scoped to the exact same six
+ * brand tokens `BRAND_ALIASES` already curates, fills that gap; a brand
+ * token with no entry here is not currently possible (the two maps share the
+ * same key set by construction) but the lookup fails safe (empty domain
+ * list -> never matches -> never suppresses) if that ever drifts.
+ *
+ * Second design note: the plan text reads "a brand token OR an
+ * authority-claiming phrase implying a specific vendor." An authority-
+ * claiming affix ALONE ("the official installer") never names a specific
+ * vendor and so cannot resolve a canonical domain to compare against — this
+ * detector therefore requires a brand-token match to identify "the claimed
+ * vendor" at all (necessary for the domain comparison to mean anything), and
+ * treats a co-occurring authority-claiming affix as a confidence booster
+ * (medium -> high), not an alternate, independently-sufficient trigger. This
+ * mirrors typosquat.ts's own rule 3 (`hasBrandToken && hasAuthorityAffix`),
+ * which also requires both signals together.
+ *
+ * Two fixes from adversarial review (2026-08-16 — see
+ * docs/internal/code_review/2026-08-15-smi6033-wave4-escalation-model.md
+ * for the full account):
+ *
+ *  1. Fetch-target correlation. The original version treated ANY URL on a
+ *     line that ALSO matched the generic FETCH_COMMAND_PATTERN as the fetch
+ *     target — including a URL that was merely mentioned in prose alongside
+ *     an unrelated fetch-verb usage on the same line (e.g.
+ *     "curl --version; see mirror documentation at <url>", where curl is
+ *     checking its own version, not fetching that URL). Replaced with
+ *     `isActualFetchTarget`, which requires the fetch verb to be
+ *     IMMEDIATELY followed (only flag-like tokens and whitespace, no
+ *     command separator, no prose) by the URL — i.e. the URL must actually
+ *     be the verb's argument.
+ *
+ *  2. Authority-affix proximity. `hasAuthorityAffix` used to scan the ENTIRE
+ *     ±5-line window independently of where the brand token itself was
+ *     found, so an unrelated authority phrase elsewhere in the window (e.g.
+ *     "for official documentation on Python packaging, see PEP 517") could
+ *     wrongly boost confidence to 'high' for a brand claim it has nothing to
+ *     do with. Now scoped to a tight window around the brand token's OWN
+ *     line (`DECOY_AUTHORITY_AFFIX_PROXIMITY_LINES`).
+ */
+import type { SecurityFinding } from './types.js';
+import type { LineContext } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
+export declare function scanDecoyMisdirection(content: string, lineContexts?: LineContext[]): SecurityFinding[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=SecurityScanner.decoy.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.decoy.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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