@sip-protocol/sdk 0.7.3 → 0.7.4

package/dist/chunk-GMDGB22A.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+// src/proofs/circuits/fulfillment_proof.json
+var noir_version = "1.0.0-beta.15+83245db91dcf63420ef4bcbbd85b98f397fee663";
+var hash = "13146944445132352806";
+var abi = { parameters: [{ name: "intent_hash", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "output_commitment_x", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "output_commitment_y", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "recipient_stealth", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "min_output_amount", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "solver_id", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "fulfillment_time", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "expiry", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "public" }, { name: "output_amount", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "output_blinding", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "solver_secret", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "attestation_recipient", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "attestation_amount", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "attestation_tx_hash", type: { kind: "field" }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "attestation_block", type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 64 }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "oracle_signature", type: { kind: "array", length: 64, type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 8 } }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "oracle_message_hash", type: { kind: "array", length: 32, type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 8 } }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "oracle_pub_key_x", type: { kind: "array", length: 32, type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 8 } }, visibility: "private" }, { name: "oracle_pub_key_y", type: { kind: "array", length: 32, type: { kind: "integer", sign: "unsigned", width: 8 } }, visibility: "private" }], return_type: null, error_types: { "1811611355587044900": { error_kind: "string", string: "Unauthorized solver" }, "5682920188479059162": { error_kind: "string", string: "Amount mismatch in attestation" }, "9350488092177273812": { error_kind: "string", string: "Recipient mismatch in attestation" }, "10078784717933725989": { error_kind: "string", string: "Invalid oracle attestation signature" }, "10879340518732620616": { error_kind: "string", string: "Commitment X mismatch" }, "12297495446303487112": { error_kind: "string", string: "Output below minimum" }, "12394005467219657293": { error_kind: "string", string: "Commitment Y mismatch" }, "15764276373176857197": { error_kind: "string", string: "Stack too deep" }, "17406200060514520896": { error_kind: "string", string: "Fulfillment after expiry" } } };
+var bytecode = "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";
+var debug_symbols = "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";
+var file_map = { "14": { source: "// docs:start:ecdsa_secp256k1\n/// Verifies a ECDSA signature over the secp256k1 curve.\n/// - inputs:\n///     - x coordinate of public key as 32 bytes\n///     - y coordinate of public key as 32 bytes\n///     - the signature, as a 64 bytes array\n///       The signature internally will be represented as `(r, s)`,\n///       where `r` and `s` are fixed-sized big endian scalar values.\n///       As the `secp256k1` has a 256-bit modulus, we have a 64 byte signature\n///       while `r` and `s` will both be 32 bytes.\n///       We expect `s` to be normalized. This means given the curve's order,\n///       `s` should be less than or equal to `order / 2`.\n///       This is done to prevent malleability.\n///       For more context regarding malleability you can reference BIP 0062.\n///     - the hash of the message, as a vector of bytes\n/// - output: false for failure and true for success\npub fn verify_signature(\n    public_key_x: [u8; 32],\n    public_key_y: [u8; 32],\n    signature: [u8; 64],\n    message_hash: [u8; 32],\n) -> bool\n// docs:end:ecdsa_secp256k1\n{\n    _verify_signature(public_key_x, public_key_y, signature, message_hash, true)\n}\n\n#[foreign(ecdsa_secp256k1)]\npub fn _verify_signature(\n    public_key_x: [u8; 32],\n    public_key_y: [u8; 32],\n    signature: [u8; 64],\n    message_hash: [u8; 32],\n    predicate: bool,\n) -> bool {}\n", path: "std/ecdsa_secp256k1.nr" }, "16": { source: "use crate::cmp::Eq;\nuse crate::hash::Hash;\nuse crate::ops::arith::{Add, Neg, Sub};\n\n/// A point on the embedded elliptic curve\n/// By definition, the base field of the embedded curve is the scalar field of the proof system curve, i.e the Noir Field.\n/// x and y denotes the Weierstrass coordinates of the point, if is_infinite is false.\npub struct EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    pub x: Field,\n    pub y: Field,\n    pub is_infinite: bool,\n}\n\nimpl EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    /// Elliptic curve point doubling operation\n    /// returns the doubled point of a point P, i.e P+P\n    pub fn double(self) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        embedded_curve_add(self, self)\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the null element of the curve; 'the point at infinity'\n    pub fn point_at_infinity() -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint { x: 0, y: 0, is_infinite: true }\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the curve's generator point.\n    pub fn generator() -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        // Generator point for the grumpkin curve (y^2 = x^3 - 17)\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 1,\n            y: 17631683881184975370165255887551781615748388533673675138860, // sqrt(-16)\n            is_infinite: false,\n        }\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Add for EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    /// Adds two points P+Q, using the curve addition formula, and also handles point at infinity\n    fn add(self, other: EmbeddedCurvePoint) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        embedded_curve_add(self, other)\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Sub for EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    /// Points subtraction operation, using addition and negation\n    fn sub(self, other: EmbeddedCurvePoint) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        self + other.neg()\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Neg for EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    /// Negates a point P, i.e returns -P, by negating the y coordinate.\n    /// If the point is at infinity, then the result is also at infinity.\n    fn neg(self) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint { x: self.x, y: -self.y, is_infinite: self.is_infinite }\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Eq for EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    /// Checks whether two points are equal\n    fn eq(self: Self, b: EmbeddedCurvePoint) -> bool {\n        (self.is_infinite & b.is_infinite)\n            | ((self.is_infinite == b.is_infinite) & (self.x == b.x) & (self.y == b.y))\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: crate::hash::Hasher,\n    {\n        if self.is_infinite {\n            self.is_infinite.hash(state);\n        } else {\n            self.x.hash(state);\n            self.y.hash(state);\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/// Scalar for the embedded curve represented as low and high limbs\n/// By definition, the scalar field of the embedded curve is base field of the proving system curve.\n/// It may not fit into a Field element, so it is represented with two Field elements; its low and high limbs.\npub struct EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n    pub lo: Field,\n    pub hi: Field,\n}\n\nimpl EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n    pub fn new(lo: Field, hi: Field) -> Self {\n        EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo, hi }\n    }\n\n    #[field(bn254)]\n    pub fn from_field(scalar: Field) -> EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n        let (a, b) = crate::field::bn254::decompose(scalar);\n        EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo: a, hi: b }\n    }\n\n    //Bytes to scalar: take the first (after the specified offset) 16 bytes of the input as the lo value, and the next 16 bytes as the hi value\n    #[field(bn254)]\n    pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 64], offset: u32) -> EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n        let mut v = 1;\n        let mut lo = 0 as Field;\n        let mut hi = 0 as Field;\n        for i in 0..16 {\n            lo = lo + (bytes[offset + 31 - i] as Field) * v;\n            hi = hi + (bytes[offset + 15 - i] as Field) * v;\n            v = v * 256;\n        }\n        let sig_s = crate::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo, hi };\n        sig_s\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Eq for EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n    fn eq(self, other: Self) -> bool {\n        (other.hi == self.hi) & (other.lo == self.lo)\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: crate::hash::Hasher,\n    {\n        self.hi.hash(state);\n        self.lo.hash(state);\n    }\n}\n\n// Computes a multi scalar multiplication over the embedded curve.\n// For bn254, We have Grumpkin and Baby JubJub.\n// For bls12-381, we have JubJub and Bandersnatch.\n//\n// The embedded curve being used is decided by the\n// underlying proof system.\n// docs:start:multi_scalar_mul\npub fn multi_scalar_mul<let N: u32>(\n    points: [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N],\n    scalars: [EmbeddedCurveScalar; N],\n) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint\n// docs:end:multi_scalar_mul\n{\n    multi_scalar_mul_array_return(points, scalars, true)[0]\n}\n\n#[foreign(multi_scalar_mul)]\npub(crate) fn multi_scalar_mul_array_return<let N: u32>(\n    points: [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N],\n    scalars: [EmbeddedCurveScalar; N],\n    predicate: bool,\n) -> [EmbeddedCurvePoint; 1] {}\n\n// docs:start:fixed_base_scalar_mul\npub fn fixed_base_scalar_mul(scalar: EmbeddedCurveScalar) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint\n// docs:end:fixed_base_scalar_mul\n{\n    multi_scalar_mul([EmbeddedCurvePoint::generator()], [scalar])\n}\n\n/// This function only assumes that the points are on the curve\n/// It handles corner cases around the infinity point causing some overhead compared to embedded_curve_add_not_nul and embedded_curve_add_unsafe\n// docs:start:embedded_curve_add\npub fn embedded_curve_add(\n    point1: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n    point2: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    // docs:end:embedded_curve_add\n    if crate::runtime::is_unconstrained() {\n        // `embedded_curve_add_unsafe` requires the inputs not to be the infinity point, so we check it here.\n        // This is because `embedded_curve_add_unsafe` uses the `embedded_curve_add` opcode.\n        // For efficiency, the backend does not check the inputs for the infinity point, but it assumes that they are not the infinity point\n        // so that it can apply the ec addition formula directly.\n        if point1.is_infinite {\n            point2\n        } else if point2.is_infinite {\n            point1\n        } else {\n            embedded_curve_add_unsafe(point1, point2)\n        }\n    } else {\n        // In a constrained context, we also need to check the inputs are not the infinity point because we also use `embedded_curve_add_unsafe`\n        // However we also need to identify the case where the two inputs are the same, because then\n        // the addition formula does not work and we need to use the doubling formula instead.\n        // In unconstrained context, we can check directly if the input values are the same when solving the opcode, so it is not an issue.\n\n        // x_coordinates_match is true if both abscissae are the same\n        let x_coordinates_match = point1.x == point2.x;\n        // y_coordinates_match is true if both ordinates are the same\n        let y_coordinates_match = point1.y == point2.y;\n        // double_predicate is true if both abscissae and ordinates are the same\n        let double_predicate = (x_coordinates_match & y_coordinates_match);\n        // If the abscissae are the same, but not the ordinates, then one point is the opposite of the other\n        let infinity_predicate = (x_coordinates_match & !y_coordinates_match);\n\n        // `embedded_curve_add_unsafe` would not perform doubling, even if the inputs point1 and point2 are the same, because it cannot know this without adding some logic (and some constraints)\n        // However we did this logic when we computed `double_predicate`, so we set the result to 2*point1 if point1 and point2 are the same\n        let mut result = if double_predicate {\n            // `embedded_curve_add_unsafe` is doing a doubling if the input is the same variable, because in this case it is guaranteed (at 'compile time') that the input is the same.\n            embedded_curve_add_unsafe(point1, point1)\n        } else {\n            let point1_1 = EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n                x: point1.x + (x_coordinates_match as Field),\n                y: point1.y,\n                is_infinite: false,\n            };\n            let point2_1 = EmbeddedCurvePoint { x: point2.x, y: point2.y, is_infinite: false };\n            // point1_1 is guaranteed to have a different abscissa than point2:\n            // - if x_coordinates_match is 0, that means point1.x != point2.x, and point1_1.x = point1.x + 0\n            // - if x_coordinates_match is 1, that means point1.x = point2.x, but point1_1.x = point1.x + 1 in this case\n            // Because the abscissa is different, the addition formula is guaranteed to succeed, so we can safely use `embedded_curve_add_unsafe`\n            // Note that this computation may be garbage: if x_coordinates_match is 1, or if one of the input is the point at infinity.\n            // therefore we only want to do this if we need the result, otherwise it needs to be eliminated as a dead instruction, lest we want the circuit to fail.\n            embedded_curve_add_unsafe(point1_1, point2_1)\n        };\n\n        // Same logic as above for unconstrained context, we set the proper result when one of the inputs is the infinity point\n        if point1.is_infinite {\n            result = point2;\n        }\n        if point2.is_infinite {\n            result = point1;\n        }\n\n        // Finally, we set the is_infinity flag of the result:\n        // Opposite points should sum into the infinity point, however, if one of them is point at infinity, their coordinates are not meaningful\n        // so we should not use the fact that the inputs are opposite in this case:\n        let mut result_is_infinity =\n            infinity_predicate & (!point1.is_infinite & !point2.is_infinite);\n        // However, if both of them are at infinity, then the result is also at infinity\n        result.is_infinite = result_is_infinity | (point1.is_infinite & point2.is_infinite);\n        result\n    }\n}\n\n#[foreign(embedded_curve_add)]\nfn embedded_curve_add_array_return(\n    _point1: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n    _point2: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n    _predicate: bool,\n) -> [EmbeddedCurvePoint; 1] {}\n\n/// This function assumes that:\n/// The points are on the curve, and\n/// The points don't share an x-coordinate, and\n/// Neither point is the infinity point.\n/// If it is used with correct input, the function ensures the correct non-zero result is returned.\n/// Except for points on the curve, the other assumptions are checked by the function. It will cause assertion failure if they are not respected.\npub fn embedded_curve_add_not_nul(\n    point1: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n    point2: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    assert(point1.x != point2.x);\n    assert(!point1.is_infinite);\n    assert(!point2.is_infinite);\n    // Ensure is_infinite is comptime\n    let point1_1 = EmbeddedCurvePoint { x: point1.x, y: point1.y, is_infinite: false };\n    let point2_1 = EmbeddedCurvePoint { x: point2.x, y: point2.y, is_infinite: false };\n    embedded_curve_add_unsafe(point1_1, point2_1)\n}\n\n/// Unsafe ec addition\n/// If the inputs are the same, it will perform a doubling, but only if point1 and point2 are the same variable.\n/// If they have the same value but are different variables, the result will be incorrect because in this case\n/// it assumes (but does not check) that the points' x-coordinates are not equal.\n/// It also assumes neither point is the infinity point.\npub fn embedded_curve_add_unsafe(\n    point1: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n    point2: EmbeddedCurvePoint,\n) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    embedded_curve_add_array_return(point1, point2, true)[0]\n}\n", path: "std/embedded_curve_ops.nr" }, "17": { source: `use crate::field::field_less_than;
+use crate::runtime::is_unconstrained;
+
+// The low and high decomposition of the field modulus
+global PLO: Field = 53438638232309528389504892708671455233;
+global PHI: Field = 64323764613183177041862057485226039389;
+
+pub(crate) global TWO_POW_128: Field = 0x100000000000000000000000000000000;
+
+// Decomposes a single field into two 16 byte fields.
+fn compute_decomposition(x: Field) -> (Field, Field) {
+    // Here's we're taking advantage of truncating 128 bit limbs from the input field
+    // and then subtracting them from the input such the field division is equivalent to integer division.
+    let low = (x as u128) as Field;
+    let high = (x - low) / TWO_POW_128;
+
+    (low, high)
+}
+
+pub(crate) unconstrained fn decompose_hint(x: Field) -> (Field, Field) {
+    compute_decomposition(x)
+}
+
+unconstrained fn lte_hint(x: Field, y: Field) -> bool {
+    if x == y {
+        true
+    } else {
+        field_less_than(x, y)
+    }
+}
+
+// Assert that (alo > blo && ahi >= bhi) || (alo <= blo && ahi > bhi)
+fn assert_gt_limbs(a: (Field, Field), b: (Field, Field)) {
+    let (alo, ahi) = a;
+    let (blo, bhi) = b;
+    // Safety: borrow is enforced to be boolean due to its type.
+    // if borrow is 0, it asserts that (alo > blo && ahi >= bhi)
+    // if borrow is 1, it asserts that (alo <= blo && ahi > bhi)
+    unsafe {
+        let borrow = lte_hint(alo, blo);
+
+        let rlo = alo - blo - 1 + (borrow as Field) * TWO_POW_128;
+        let rhi = ahi - bhi - (borrow as Field);
+
+        rlo.assert_max_bit_size::<128>();
+        rhi.assert_max_bit_size::<128>();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decompose a single field into two 16 byte fields.
+pub fn decompose(x: Field) -> (Field, Field) {
+    if is_unconstrained() {
+        compute_decomposition(x)
+    } else {
+        // Safety: decomposition is properly checked below
+        unsafe {
+            // Take hints of the decomposition
+            let (xlo, xhi) = decompose_hint(x);
+
+            // Range check the limbs
+            xlo.assert_max_bit_size::<128>();
+            xhi.assert_max_bit_size::<128>();
+
+            // Check that the decomposition is correct
+            assert_eq(x, xlo + TWO_POW_128 * xhi);
+
+            // Assert that the decomposition of P is greater than the decomposition of x
+            assert_gt_limbs((PLO, PHI), (xlo, xhi));
+            (xlo, xhi)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn assert_gt(a: Field, b: Field) {
+    if is_unconstrained() {
+        assert(
+            // Safety: already unconstrained
+            unsafe { field_less_than(b, a) },
+        );
+    } else {
+        // Decompose a and b
+        let a_limbs = decompose(a);
+        let b_limbs = decompose(b);
+
+        // Assert that a_limbs is greater than b_limbs
+        assert_gt_limbs(a_limbs, b_limbs)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn assert_lt(a: Field, b: Field) {
+    assert_gt(b, a);
+}
+
+pub fn gt(a: Field, b: Field) -> bool {
+    if is_unconstrained() {
+        // Safety: unsafe in unconstrained
+        unsafe {
+            field_less_than(b, a)
+        }
+    } else if a == b {
+        false
+    } else {
+        // Safety: Take a hint of the comparison and verify it
+        unsafe {
+            if field_less_than(a, b) {
+                assert_gt(b, a);
+                false
+            } else {
+                assert_gt(a, b);
+                true
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn lt(a: Field, b: Field) -> bool {
+    gt(b, a)
+}
+
+mod tests {
+    // TODO: Allow imports from "super"
+    use crate::field::bn254::{assert_gt, decompose, gt, lt, lte_hint, PHI, PLO, TWO_POW_128};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_decompose() {
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128), (0, 1));
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128 + 0x1234567890), (0x1234567890, 1));
+        assert_eq(decompose(0x1234567890), (0x1234567890, 0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    unconstrained fn check_lte_hint() {
+        assert(lte_hint(0, 1));
+        assert(lte_hint(0, 0x100));
+        assert(lte_hint(0x100, TWO_POW_128 - 1));
+        assert(!lte_hint(0 - 1, 0));
+
+        assert(lte_hint(0, 0));
+        assert(lte_hint(0x100, 0x100));
+        assert(lte_hint(0 - 1, 0 - 1));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_gt() {
+        assert(gt(1, 0));
+        assert(gt(0x100, 0));
+        assert(gt((0 - 1), (0 - 2)));
+        assert(gt(TWO_POW_128, 0));
+        assert(!gt(0, 0));
+        assert(!gt(0, 0x100));
+        assert(gt(0 - 1, 0 - 2));
+        assert(!gt(0 - 2, 0 - 1));
+        assert_gt(0 - 1, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_plo_phi() {
+        assert_eq(PLO + PHI * TWO_POW_128, 0);
+        let p_bytes = crate::field::modulus_le_bytes();
+        let mut p_low: Field = 0;
+        let mut p_high: Field = 0;
+
+        let mut offset = 1;
+        for i in 0..16 {
+            p_low += (p_bytes[i] as Field) * offset;
+            p_high += (p_bytes[i + 16] as Field) * offset;
+            offset *= 256;
+        }
+        assert_eq(p_low, PLO);
+        assert_eq(p_high, PHI);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_decompose_edge_cases() {
+        assert_eq(decompose(0), (0, 0));
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128 - 1), (TWO_POW_128 - 1, 0));
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128 + 1), (1, 1));
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128 * 2), (0, 2));
+        assert_eq(decompose(TWO_POW_128 * 2 + 0x1234567890), (0x1234567890, 2));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_decompose_large_values() {
+        let large_field = 0xffffffffffffffff;
+        let (lo, hi) = decompose(large_field);
+        assert_eq(large_field, lo + TWO_POW_128 * hi);
+
+        let large_value = large_field - TWO_POW_128;
+        let (lo2, hi2) = decompose(large_value);
+        assert_eq(large_value, lo2 + TWO_POW_128 * hi2);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_lt_comprehensive() {
+        assert(lt(0, 1));
+        assert(!lt(1, 0));
+        assert(!lt(0, 0));
+        assert(!lt(42, 42));
+
+        assert(lt(TWO_POW_128 - 1, TWO_POW_128));
+        assert(!lt(TWO_POW_128, TWO_POW_128 - 1));
+    }
+}
+`, path: "std/field/bn254.nr" }, "19": { source: '// Exposed only for usage in `std::meta`\npub(crate) mod poseidon2;\n\nuse crate::default::Default;\nuse crate::embedded_curve_ops::{\n    EmbeddedCurvePoint, EmbeddedCurveScalar, multi_scalar_mul, multi_scalar_mul_array_return,\n};\nuse crate::meta::derive_via;\n\n#[foreign(sha256_compression)]\n// docs:start:sha256_compression\npub fn sha256_compression(input: [u32; 16], state: [u32; 8]) -> [u32; 8] {}\n// docs:end:sha256_compression\n\n#[foreign(keccakf1600)]\n// docs:start:keccakf1600\npub fn keccakf1600(input: [u64; 25]) -> [u64; 25] {}\n// docs:end:keccakf1600\n\npub mod keccak {\n    #[deprecated("This function has been moved to std::hash::keccakf1600")]\n    pub fn keccakf1600(input: [u64; 25]) -> [u64; 25] {\n        super::keccakf1600(input)\n    }\n}\n\n#[foreign(blake2s)]\n// docs:start:blake2s\npub fn blake2s<let N: u32>(input: [u8; N]) -> [u8; 32]\n// docs:end:blake2s\n{}\n\n// docs:start:blake3\npub fn blake3<let N: u32>(input: [u8; N]) -> [u8; 32]\n// docs:end:blake3\n{\n    if crate::runtime::is_unconstrained() {\n        // Temporary measure while Barretenberg is main proving system.\n        // Please open an issue if you\'re working on another proving system and running into problems due to this.\n        crate::static_assert(\n            N <= 1024,\n            "Barretenberg cannot prove blake3 hashes with inputs larger than 1024 bytes",\n        );\n    }\n    __blake3(input)\n}\n\n#[foreign(blake3)]\nfn __blake3<let N: u32>(input: [u8; N]) -> [u8; 32] {}\n\n// docs:start:pedersen_commitment\npub fn pedersen_commitment<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N]) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    // docs:end:pedersen_commitment\n    pedersen_commitment_with_separator(input, 0)\n}\n\n#[inline_always]\npub fn pedersen_commitment_with_separator<let N: u32>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    separator: u32,\n) -> EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n    let mut points = [EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo: 0, hi: 0 }; N];\n    for i in 0..N {\n        // we use the unsafe version because the multi_scalar_mul will constrain the scalars.\n        points[i] = from_field_unsafe(input[i]);\n    }\n    let generators = derive_generators("DEFAULT_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR".as_bytes(), separator);\n    multi_scalar_mul(generators, points)\n}\n\n// docs:start:pedersen_hash\npub fn pedersen_hash<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N]) -> Field\n// docs:end:pedersen_hash\n{\n    pedersen_hash_with_separator(input, 0)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn pedersen_hash_with_separator<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], separator: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut scalars: [EmbeddedCurveScalar; N + 1] = [EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo: 0, hi: 0 }; N + 1];\n    let mut generators: [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N + 1] =\n        [EmbeddedCurvePoint::point_at_infinity(); N + 1];\n    let domain_generators: [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N] =\n        derive_generators("DEFAULT_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR".as_bytes(), separator);\n\n    for i in 0..N {\n        scalars[i] = from_field_unsafe(input[i]);\n        generators[i] = domain_generators[i];\n    }\n    scalars[N] = EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo: N as Field, hi: 0 as Field };\n\n    let length_generator: [EmbeddedCurvePoint; 1] =\n        derive_generators("pedersen_hash_length".as_bytes(), 0);\n    generators[N] = length_generator[0];\n    multi_scalar_mul_array_return(generators, scalars, true)[0].x\n}\n\n#[field(bn254)]\n#[inline_always]\npub fn derive_generators<let N: u32, let M: u32>(\n    domain_separator_bytes: [u8; M],\n    starting_index: u32,\n) -> [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N] {\n    crate::assert_constant(domain_separator_bytes);\n    // TODO(https://github.com/noir-lang/noir/issues/5672): Add back assert_constant on starting_index\n    __derive_generators(domain_separator_bytes, starting_index)\n}\n\n#[builtin(derive_pedersen_generators)]\n#[field(bn254)]\nfn __derive_generators<let N: u32, let M: u32>(\n    domain_separator_bytes: [u8; M],\n    starting_index: u32,\n) -> [EmbeddedCurvePoint; N] {}\n\n#[field(bn254)]\n// Same as from_field but:\n// does not assert the limbs are 128 bits\n// does not assert the decomposition does not overflow the EmbeddedCurveScalar\nfn from_field_unsafe(scalar: Field) -> EmbeddedCurveScalar {\n    // Safety: xlo and xhi decomposition is checked below\n    let (xlo, xhi) = unsafe { crate::field::bn254::decompose_hint(scalar) };\n    // Check that the decomposition is correct\n    assert_eq(scalar, xlo + crate::field::bn254::TWO_POW_128 * xhi);\n    EmbeddedCurveScalar { lo: xlo, hi: xhi }\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_permutation<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], state_len: u32) -> [Field; N] {\n    assert_eq(input.len(), state_len);\n    poseidon2_permutation_internal(input)\n}\n\n#[foreign(poseidon2_permutation)]\nfn poseidon2_permutation_internal<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N]) -> [Field; N] {}\n\n// Generic hashing support.\n// Partially ported and impacted by rust.\n\n// Hash trait shall be implemented per type.\n#[derive_via(derive_hash)]\npub trait Hash {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher;\n}\n\n// docs:start:derive_hash\ncomptime fn derive_hash(s: TypeDefinition) -> Quoted {\n    let name = quote { $crate::hash::Hash };\n    let signature = quote { fn hash<H>(_self: Self, _state: &mut H) where H: $crate::hash::Hasher };\n    let for_each_field = |name| quote { _self.$name.hash(_state); };\n    crate::meta::make_trait_impl(\n        s,\n        name,\n        signature,\n        for_each_field,\n        quote {},\n        |fields| fields,\n    )\n}\n// docs:end:derive_hash\n\n// Hasher trait shall be implemented by algorithms to provide hash-agnostic means.\n// TODO: consider making the types generic here ([u8], [Field], etc.)\npub trait Hasher {\n    fn finish(self) -> Field;\n\n    fn write(&mut self, input: Field);\n}\n\n// BuildHasher is a factory trait, responsible for production of specific Hasher.\npub trait BuildHasher {\n    type H: Hasher;\n\n    fn build_hasher(self) -> H;\n}\n\npub struct BuildHasherDefault<H>;\n\nimpl<H> BuildHasher for BuildHasherDefault<H>\nwhere\n    H: Hasher + Default,\n{\n    type H = H;\n\n    fn build_hasher(_self: Self) -> H {\n        H::default()\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<H> Default for BuildHasherDefault<H>\nwhere\n    H: Hasher + Default,\n{\n    fn default() -> Self {\n        BuildHasherDefault {}\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for Field {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u1 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u8 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u16 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u32 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u64 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for u128 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for i8 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as u8 as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for i16 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as u16 as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for i32 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as u32 as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for i64 {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as u64 as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for bool {\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        H::write(state, self as Field);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl Hash for () {\n    fn hash<H>(_self: Self, _state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {}\n}\n\nimpl<T, let N: u32> Hash for [T; N]\nwhere\n    T: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        for elem in self {\n            elem.hash(state);\n        }\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<T> Hash for [T]\nwhere\n    T: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        self.len().hash(state);\n        for elem in self {\n            elem.hash(state);\n        }\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<A, B> Hash for (A, B)\nwhere\n    A: Hash,\n    B: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        self.0.hash(state);\n        self.1.hash(state);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<A, B, C> Hash for (A, B, C)\nwhere\n    A: Hash,\n    B: Hash,\n    C: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        self.0.hash(state);\n        self.1.hash(state);\n        self.2.hash(state);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<A, B, C, D> Hash for (A, B, C, D)\nwhere\n    A: Hash,\n    B: Hash,\n    C: Hash,\n    D: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        self.0.hash(state);\n        self.1.hash(state);\n        self.2.hash(state);\n        self.3.hash(state);\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<A, B, C, D, E> Hash for (A, B, C, D, E)\nwhere\n    A: Hash,\n    B: Hash,\n    C: Hash,\n    D: Hash,\n    E: Hash,\n{\n    fn hash<H>(self, state: &mut H)\n    where\n        H: Hasher,\n    {\n        self.0.hash(state);\n        self.1.hash(state);\n        self.2.hash(state);\n        self.3.hash(state);\n        self.4.hash(state);\n    }\n}\n\n// Some test vectors for Pedersen hash and Pedersen Commitment.\n// They have been generated using the same functions so the tests are for now useless\n// but they will be useful when we switch to Noir implementation.\n#[test]\nfn assert_pedersen() {\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1], 1),\n        0x1b3f4b1a83092a13d8d1a59f7acb62aba15e7002f4440f2275edb99ebbc2305f,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1], 1),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x054aa86a73cb8a34525e5bbed6e43ba1198e860f5f3950268f71df4591bde402,\n            y: 0x209dcfbf2cfb57f9f6046f44d71ac6faf87254afc7407c04eb621a6287cac126,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2], 2),\n        0x26691c129448e9ace0c66d11f0a16d9014a9e8498ee78f4d69f0083168188255,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2], 2),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x2e2b3b191e49541fe468ec6877721d445dcaffe41728df0a0eafeb15e87b0753,\n            y: 0x2ff4482400ad3a6228be17a2af33e2bcdf41be04795f9782bd96efe7e24f8778,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], 3),\n        0x0bc694b7a1f8d10d2d8987d07433f26bd616a2d351bc79a3c540d85b6206dbe4,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3], 3),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x1fee4e8cf8d2f527caa2684236b07c4b1bad7342c01b0f75e9a877a71827dc85,\n            y: 0x2f9fedb9a090697ab69bf04c8bc15f7385b3e4b68c849c1536e5ae15ff138fd1,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4], 4),\n        0xdae10fb32a8408521803905981a2b300d6a35e40e798743e9322b223a5eddc,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4], 4),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x07ae3e202811e1fca39c2d81eabe6f79183978e6f12be0d3b8eda095b79bdbc9,\n            y: 0x0afc6f892593db6fbba60f2da558517e279e0ae04f95758587760ba193145014,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5], 5),\n        0xfc375b062c4f4f0150f7100dfb8d9b72a6d28582dd9512390b0497cdad9c22,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5], 5),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x1754b12bd475a6984a1094b5109eeca9838f4f81ac89c5f0a41dbce53189bb29,\n            y: 0x2da030e3cfcdc7ddad80eaf2599df6692cae0717d4e9f7bfbee8d073d5d278f7,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], 6),\n        0x1696ed13dc2730062a98ac9d8f9de0661bb98829c7582f699d0273b18c86a572,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], 6),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x190f6c0e97ad83e1e28da22a98aae156da083c5a4100e929b77e750d3106a697,\n            y: 0x1f4b60f34ef91221a0b49756fa0705da93311a61af73d37a0c458877706616fb,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], 7),\n        0x128c0ff144fc66b6cb60eeac8a38e23da52992fc427b92397a7dffd71c45ede3,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], 7),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x015441e9d29491b06563fac16fc76abf7a9534c715421d0de85d20dbe2965939,\n            y: 0x1d2575b0276f4e9087e6e07c2cb75aa1baafad127af4be5918ef8a2ef2fea8fc,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 8),\n        0x2f960e117482044dfc99d12fece2ef6862fba9242be4846c7c9a3e854325a55c,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], 8),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x1657737676968887fceb6dd516382ea13b3a2c557f509811cd86d5d1199bc443,\n            y: 0x1f39f0cb569040105fa1e2f156521e8b8e08261e635a2b210bdc94e8d6d65f77,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], 9),\n        0x0c96db0790602dcb166cc4699e2d306c479a76926b81c2cb2aaa92d249ec7be7,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], 9),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x0a3ceae42d14914a432aa60ec7fded4af7dad7dd4acdbf2908452675ec67e06d,\n            y: 0xfc19761eaaf621ad4aec9a8b2e84a4eceffdba78f60f8b9391b0bd9345a2f2,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], 10),\n        0x2cd37505871bc460a62ea1e63c7fe51149df5d0801302cf1cbc48beb8dff7e94,\n    );\n    assert_eq(\n        pedersen_commitment_with_separator([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], 10),\n        EmbeddedCurvePoint {\n            x: 0x2fb3f8b3d41ddde007c8c3c62550f9a9380ee546fcc639ffbb3fd30c8d8de30c,\n            y: 0x300783be23c446b11a4c0fabf6c91af148937cea15fcf5fb054abf7f752ee245,\n            is_infinite: false,\n        },\n    );\n}\n', path: "std/hash/mod.nr" }, "50": { source: `/// Fulfillment Proof Circuit
+///
+/// Proves: "The solver correctly executed the intent and delivered
+/// the required output to the recipient, without revealing execution
+/// path, liquidity sources, or intermediate transactions."
+///
+/// @see docs/specs/FULFILLMENT-PROOF.md
+
+use std::hash::pedersen_hash;
+use std::hash::pedersen_commitment;
+use std::ecdsa_secp256k1::verify_signature;
+
+// --- Main Circuit ---
+
+/// Main fulfillment proof entry point
+///
+/// Public inputs: intent_hash, output_commitment, recipient_stealth,
+///                min_output_amount, solver_id, fulfillment_time, expiry
+/// Private inputs: output_amount, output_blinding, attestation data, solver_secret
+///
+/// Constraints:
+/// 1. output_amount >= min_output_amount (range proof via u64)
+/// 2. output_commitment = Pedersen(output_amount, output_blinding)
+/// 3. Oracle attestation is valid and matches claimed values
+/// 4. Solver is authorized (solver_id derived from solver_secret)
+/// 5. fulfillment_time <= expiry
+pub fn main(
+    // Public inputs
+    intent_hash: pub Field,
+    output_commitment_x: pub Field,
+    output_commitment_y: pub Field,
+    recipient_stealth: pub Field,
+    min_output_amount: pub u64,
+    solver_id: pub Field,
+    fulfillment_time: pub u64,
+    expiry: pub u64,
+    
+    // Private inputs
+    output_amount: u64,
+    output_blinding: Field,
+    solver_secret: Field,
+    
+    // Oracle attestation (private)
+    attestation_recipient: Field,
+    attestation_amount: u64,
+    attestation_tx_hash: Field,
+    attestation_block: u64,
+    oracle_signature: [u8; 64],
+    oracle_message_hash: [u8; 32],
+    oracle_pub_key_x: [u8; 32],
+    oracle_pub_key_y: [u8; 32],
+) {
+    // Constraint 1: Output meets minimum requirement
+    // Range proof is implicit via u64 type comparison
+    assert(output_amount >= min_output_amount, "Output below minimum");
+    
+    // Constraint 2: Output commitment is valid
+    // C = Pedersen(output_amount, output_blinding)
+    let commitment = pedersen_commitment([output_amount as Field, output_blinding]);
+    assert(commitment.x == output_commitment_x, "Commitment X mismatch");
+    assert(commitment.y == output_commitment_y, "Commitment Y mismatch");
+    
+    // Constraint 3a: Attestation matches claimed values
+    assert(attestation_recipient == recipient_stealth, "Recipient mismatch in attestation");
+    assert(attestation_amount == output_amount, "Amount mismatch in attestation");
+    
+    // Constraint 3b: Oracle signature is valid
+    let valid_attestation = verify_signature(
+        oracle_pub_key_x,
+        oracle_pub_key_y,
+        oracle_signature,
+        oracle_message_hash
+    );
+    assert(valid_attestation, "Invalid oracle attestation signature");
+    
+    // Constraint 4: Solver authorization
+    // solver_id = pedersen_hash(solver_secret)
+    let computed_solver_id = pedersen_hash([solver_secret]);
+    assert(computed_solver_id == solver_id, "Unauthorized solver");
+    
+    // Constraint 5: Time constraint
+    assert(fulfillment_time <= expiry, "Fulfillment after expiry");
+    
+    // Intent hash binding (ensures this proof is for this specific intent)
+    // The intent_hash is a public input, binding this proof to the intent
+    // No additional constraint needed - it's enforced by the verifier checking public inputs
+    let _ = intent_hash;
+
+    // Attestation metadata (tx_hash and block) are included for auditability
+    // but not strictly constrained in circuit (oracle signature covers them)
+    let _ = attestation_tx_hash;
+    let _ = attestation_block;
+}
+
+// --- Tests ---
+
+#[test]
+fn test_output_commitment() {
+    // Test that commitment is correctly computed
+    let output_amount: u64 = 1000000;
+    let output_blinding: Field = 0x123456789;
+    
+    let commitment1 = pedersen_commitment([output_amount as Field, output_blinding]);
+    let commitment2 = pedersen_commitment([output_amount as Field, output_blinding]);
+    
+    // Commitment should be deterministic
+    assert(commitment1.x == commitment2.x, "Commitment X should be deterministic");
+    assert(commitment1.y == commitment2.y, "Commitment Y should be deterministic");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_solver_authorization() {
+    // Test solver_id derivation
+    let solver_secret: Field = 0x1234567890ABCDEF;
+
+    let solver_id1 = pedersen_hash([solver_secret]);
+    let solver_id2 = pedersen_hash([solver_secret]);
+
+    // Solver ID should be deterministic
+    assert(solver_id1 == solver_id2, "Solver ID should be deterministic");
+
+    // Different secret should give different solver_id
+    let different_secret: Field = 0xFEDCBA0987654321;
+    let different_id = pedersen_hash([different_secret]);
+    assert(solver_id1 != different_id, "Different secrets should give different solver IDs");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_range_proof_passes() {
+    // Test that output >= min passes
+    let output_amount: u64 = 1050000;
+    let min_output_amount: u64 = 1000000;
+    
+    assert(output_amount >= min_output_amount, "Output should be >= minimum");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_time_constraint_valid() {
+    // Test valid time constraint
+    let fulfillment_time: u64 = 1732650000;
+    let expiry: u64 = 1732686400;
+    
+    assert(fulfillment_time <= expiry, "Fulfillment time should be <= expiry");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_time_constraint_edge_case() {
+    // Edge case: exactly at expiry should be valid
+    let fulfillment_time: u64 = 1732686400;
+    let expiry: u64 = 1732686400;
+    
+    assert(fulfillment_time <= expiry, "Fulfillment at exactly expiry should be valid");
+}
+
+// NOTE: Full integration tests with ECDSA oracle signatures require TypeScript SDK
+// The NoirProofProvider will generate valid oracle signature test vectors
+`, path: "/Users/rz/local-dev/sip-protocol/packages/circuits/fulfillment_proof/src/main.nr" } };
+var expression_width = { Bounded: { width: 4 } };
+var fulfillment_proof_default = { noir_version, hash, abi, bytecode, debug_symbols, file_map, expression_width };
+
+export {
+  noir_version,
+  hash,
+  abi,
+  bytecode,
+  debug_symbols,
+  file_map,
+  expression_width,
+  fulfillment_proof_default
+};