@simplelayer/graniteer-core 0.3.6 → 0.3.8

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@@ -22,6 +22,43 @@ const corsHeaders = {
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  'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
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  'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type, x-lovable-signature, x-lovable-timestamp, x-supabase-client-platform, x-supabase-client-platform-version, x-supabase-client-runtime, x-supabase-client-runtime-version',
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  };
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+ // `data.url` for magiclink (and recovery) arrives as Supabase's own
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+ // `{SUPABASE_URL}/auth/v1/verify?token=<hash>&type=<type>&redirect_to=<dest>`
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+ // action link. That link performs the OTP verification on a plain GET, so an
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+ // email-scanner prefetch (M365 Safe Links, etc.) silently burns the token
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+ // before the real recipient ever clicks -- confirmed live 2026-09-23 against
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+ // kyle+qatest@simplelayer.io (M365-hosted inbox): the link arrived, was
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+ // pre-fetched, and the user's own click then hit an already-consumed token
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+ // (otp_expired).
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+ //
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+ // Fix (magiclink only, for now): rewrite the emailed link to point at our own
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+ // /portal/confirm page instead, carrying the same token/type/redirect_to as
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+ // query params. That page does nothing on load -- it renders a "Continue to
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+ // sign in" button and only calls supabase.auth.verifyOtp({token_hash, type})
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+ // on an actual click, so a scanner's GET can no longer consume the token.
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+ //
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+ // Fails open: if the URL doesn't parse or is missing an expected param
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+ // (Supabase changes the link shape, a non-magiclink call site reuses this),
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+ // return the original link unchanged rather than break the login/reset flow.
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+ function toClickToContinueUrl(rawUrl) {
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+ try {
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+ const u = new URL(rawUrl);
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+ const token = u.searchParams.get('token');
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+ const type = u.searchParams.get('type');
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+ const redirectTo = u.searchParams.get('redirect_to');
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+ if (!token || !type || !redirectTo)
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+ return rawUrl;
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+ const dest = new URL(redirectTo);
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+ const confirm = new URL('/portal/confirm', dest.origin);
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+ confirm.searchParams.set('token_hash', token);
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+ confirm.searchParams.set('type', type);
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+ confirm.searchParams.set('redirect_to', redirectTo);
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+ return confirm.toString();
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return rawUrl;
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+ }
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+ }
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  // Template mapping for preview mode
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  const EMAIL_TEMPLATES = {
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  signup: SignupEmail,
@@ -164,7 +201,10 @@ export function createAuthEmailHook(config) {
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  subject: 'Your login link',
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  render: (data) => React.createElement(MagicLinkEmail, {
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  siteName: SITE_NAME,
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- confirmationUrl: data.url,
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+ // Click-to-continue (2026-09-23): route through our own confirm
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+ // page instead of Supabase's direct, scanner-vulnerable /verify
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+ // GET link. See toClickToContinueUrl() above.
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+ confirmationUrl: toClickToContinueUrl(data.url),
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  colors: BRAND_COLORS,
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  footerLine: FOOTER_LINE,
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  }),
@@ -17,6 +17,24 @@ const corsHeaders = {
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  'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, GET, OPTIONS',
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  };
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  const TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
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+ // D32 item #3 (2026-09-23): a two-pin grant's UniFi collision-retry logic
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+ // can, in the corrected worst case, take up to ~65-70s inside ftw-middleware
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+ // alone (one wall-clock-budget-gated retry attempt can itself make up to 3
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+ // UniFi calls before the budget check ever gets a chance to abort it -- see
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+ // event_access.py's _TWO_PIN_PROVISION_BUDGET_SEC comment for the full
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+ // derivation). The original 20s TIMEOUT_MS fired long before the middleware
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+ // could ever return a real (success or definitive-failure) response for a
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+ // grant, forcing staff to see a spurious 502 middleware_unreachable while
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+ // the middleware kept working in the background -- wasting a minted PIN and
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+ // requiring a manual Revoke+Grant. GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS gives grant-only
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+ // headroom (95s) that sits comfortably above ftw-middleware's own
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+ // _GRANT_HANDLER_TIMEOUT_SEC (85s, itself raised in the same pass to clear
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+ // the corrected worst case) while staying under the Cloudflare Tunnel
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+ // edge's own ~100s proxied-HTTP limit for ftw.granitecity.io -- past that,
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+ // Cloudflare cuts the connection with a 524 regardless of what this signal
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+ // says, so there is no point setting this any higher. door/revoke keep the
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+ // original 20s: neither has a retry loop and both should fail fast.
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+ const GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS = 95_000;
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  const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
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  const JWKS_URL_SUFFIX = '/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json';
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  let jwksCache = null;
@@ -226,7 +244,7 @@ export function createEventAccessAdminHandler(config) {
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  'X-Event-Access-Timestamp': ts,
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  },
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  body: rawBody,
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- signal: AbortSignal.timeout(TIMEOUT_MS),
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+ signal: AbortSignal.timeout(action === 'grant' ? GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS : TIMEOUT_MS),
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  });
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  }
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  catch (e) {
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@simplelayer/graniteer-core",
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- "version": "0.3.6",
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+ "version": "0.3.8",
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  "description": "Shared platform core for Graniteer",
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  "main": "./dist/index.js",
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  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",