@simplelayer/graniteer-core 0.3.22 → 0.3.24

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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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+ import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js';
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+ export type SupabaseLike = SupabaseClient<any, any, any>;
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+ export declare const ORGANIZER_GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS = 95000;
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+ export interface RequestOrganizerGrantOptions {
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+ bookingId: string;
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+ /** gc-io doors.id (uuid), NOT the UniFi id; resolved from the doors table. */
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+ doorId: string;
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+ organizer: {
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+ name?: string | null;
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+ email?: string | null;
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+ phone?: string | null;
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+ };
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+ startUtc: string;
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+ endUtc: string;
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+ /** Caller supplied, e.g. commons:<bookingId>:<doorId>. */
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+ idempotencyKey: string;
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+ actingUserId: string;
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+ busBase?: string;
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+ fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
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+ timeoutMs?: number;
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+ }
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+ export type RequestOrganizerGrantError = 'invalid_input' | 'door_lookup_failed' | 'door_not_found' | 'door_not_provisioned' | 'door_not_live' | 'lockdown_not_verified' | 'secret_missing' | 'middleware_unreachable' | 'middleware_rejected' | 'middleware_error' | 'bad_response' | 'unexpected';
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+ export type RequestOrganizerGrantResult = {
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+ ok: true;
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+ grant_id: string;
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+ idempotent: boolean;
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+ } | {
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+ ok: false;
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+ error: RequestOrganizerGrantError;
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+ status?: number;
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+ };
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+ export declare function requestOrganizerGrant(admin: SupabaseLike, opts: RequestOrganizerGrantOptions): Promise<RequestOrganizerGrantResult>;
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
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+ // Request an organizer door-access grant for a booking via the tenant
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+ // middleware's signed /admin/event-access/grant path (same e1 HMAC contract and
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+ // outbound body as the staff "grant" branch in event-access-admin.ts).
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+ //
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+ // Unattended path that can open physical doors: every step fails closed, the
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+ // function never throws, and nothing sensitive (PINs, organizer PII, secret,
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+ // signature, raw response) is returned or logged.
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+ import { logOps } from '../ops.js';
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+ import { sha256Hex, signBusMessage } from '../busSignature.js';
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+ import { getEventAccessBusBase } from '../tenant-config.js';
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+ // Grant-only headroom, same as event-access-admin's GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS: the
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+ // middleware mints PINs with a retry loop (worst case ~85s) and the Cloudflare
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+ // Tunnel edge cuts proxied HTTP at ~100s, so 95s clears the former and there
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+ // is no point going higher.
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+ export const ORGANIZER_GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS = 95_000;
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+ const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
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+ const SAFE_ERROR_CODE = /^[a-z_]{1,64}$/;
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+ // Explicit zone required: a zone-less string would be parsed as server-local time.
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+ const ISO_INSTANT = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}(:\d{2}(\.\d+)?)?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})$/i;
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+ const MAX_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_LENGTH = 200;
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+ function errorName(e) {
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+ if (e instanceof Error && e.name)
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+ return e.name;
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+ return 'Error';
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+ }
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+ async function safeLog(admin, kind, detail, bookingId) {
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+ try {
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+ await logOps(admin, kind, detail, { severity: 'error', ...(bookingId ? { bookingId } : {}) });
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+ }
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+ catch { /* logging must never throw or change the result */ }
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+ }
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+ function optionalText(v) {
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+ if (v === undefined || v === null)
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+ return null;
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+ if (typeof v !== 'string')
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+ return undefined;
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+ const t = v.trim();
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+ return t === '' ? null : t;
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+ }
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+ function requiredText(v) {
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+ if (typeof v !== 'string')
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+ return null;
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+ const t = v.trim();
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+ return t === '' ? null : t;
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+ }
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+ function instant(v) {
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+ if (typeof v !== 'string')
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+ return null;
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+ const t = v.trim();
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+ if (!ISO_INSTANT.test(t))
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+ return null;
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+ const ms = Date.parse(t);
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+ if (!Number.isFinite(ms))
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+ return null;
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+ return new Date(ms).toISOString();
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+ }
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+ function validate(opts) {
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+ if (!opts || typeof opts !== 'object')
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+ return null;
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+ const bookingId = requiredText(opts.bookingId);
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+ const doorId = requiredText(opts.doorId);
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+ if (!bookingId || !UUID.test(bookingId) || !doorId || !UUID.test(doorId))
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+ return null;
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+ const start = instant(opts.startUtc);
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+ const end = instant(opts.endUtc);
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+ if (!start || !end)
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+ return null;
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+ if (!(Date.parse(end) > Date.parse(start)))
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+ return null;
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+ const idempotencyKey = requiredText(opts.idempotencyKey);
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+ const actingUserId = requiredText(opts.actingUserId);
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+ if (!idempotencyKey || idempotencyKey.length > MAX_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_LENGTH || !actingUserId)
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+ return null;
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+ const org = opts.organizer;
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+ if (!org || typeof org !== 'object')
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+ return null;
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+ const name = optionalText(org.name);
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+ const email = optionalText(org.email);
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+ const phone = optionalText(org.phone);
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+ if (name === undefined || email === undefined || phone === undefined)
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+ return null;
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+ return { bookingId, doorId, person: { name, email, phone }, start, end, idempotencyKey, actingUserId };
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+ }
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+ export async function requestOrganizerGrant(admin, opts) {
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+ let logBookingId;
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+ try {
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+ const input = validate(opts);
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+ if (!input)
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'invalid_input' };
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+ logBookingId = input.bookingId;
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+ // Door resolution: doors.id -> UniFi door id. Stricter than the staff path
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+ // (this is the unattended path): must be live and lockdown-verified.
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+ const { data: doorData, error: doorErr } = await admin
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+ .from('doors').select('id,unifi_door_id,status,lockdown_verified').eq('id', input.doorId).maybeSingle();
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+ if (doorErr) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_door_rejected', { reason: 'door_lookup_failed' }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'door_lookup_failed' };
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+ }
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+ if (!doorData) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_door_rejected', { reason: 'door_not_found' }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'door_not_found' };
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+ }
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+ const door = doorData;
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+ const unifi = typeof door.unifi_door_id === 'string' ? door.unifi_door_id.trim() : '';
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+ if (!unifi || unifi === 'PENDING') {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_door_rejected', { reason: 'door_not_provisioned' }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'door_not_provisioned' };
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+ }
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+ if (door.status !== 'live') {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_door_rejected', { reason: 'door_not_live' }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'door_not_live' };
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+ }
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+ if (door.lockdown_verified !== true) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_door_rejected', { reason: 'lockdown_not_verified' }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'lockdown_not_verified' };
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+ }
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+ const { data: secretRaw, error: secretErr } = await admin.rpc('get_event_access_hmac_secret');
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+ const secret = typeof secretRaw === 'string' ? secretRaw : null;
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+ if (secretErr || !secret) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_secret_missing', {}, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'secret_missing' };
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+ }
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+ // Mirrors event-access-admin.ts's grant branch (key order is part of the signed bytes).
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+ const outbound = {
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+ acting_user_id: input.actingUserId,
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+ person: {
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+ name: input.person.name,
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+ email: input.person.email,
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+ phone: input.person.phone,
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+ },
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+ room: { booking_id: input.bookingId },
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+ door_id: unifi,
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+ start: input.start,
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+ end: input.end,
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+ idempotency_key: input.idempotencyKey,
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+ };
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+ const rawBody = JSON.stringify(outbound);
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+ const bodyHash = await sha256Hex(rawBody);
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+ const ts = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
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+ const signature = await signBusMessage(['e1', 'grant', ts, bodyHash].join('\n'), secret);
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+ const busBase = opts.busBase ?? getEventAccessBusBase();
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+ const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
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+ const timeoutMs = typeof opts.timeoutMs === 'number' && Number.isFinite(opts.timeoutMs) && opts.timeoutMs > 0
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+ ? opts.timeoutMs
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+ : ORGANIZER_GRANT_TIMEOUT_MS;
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+ let res;
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+ try {
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+ res = await doFetch(`${busBase}/admin/event-access/grant`, {
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+ method: 'POST',
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+ headers: {
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+ 'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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+ 'X-Event-Access-Signature': signature,
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+ 'X-Event-Access-Timestamp': ts,
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+ },
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+ body: rawBody,
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+ signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs),
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+ });
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+ }
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+ catch (e) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_call_error', { error_name: errorName(e) }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'middleware_unreachable' };
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+ }
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+ let parsed = null;
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+ try {
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+ const text = await res.text();
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+ parsed = text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ parsed = null;
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+ }
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+ const parsedObj = parsed && typeof parsed === 'object' ? parsed : null;
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+ if (!res.ok) {
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+ const detail = { status: res.status };
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+ const code = parsedObj?.error;
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+ if (typeof code === 'string' && SAFE_ERROR_CODE.test(code))
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+ detail.error_code = code;
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_call_failed', detail, logBookingId);
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+ return {
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+ ok: false,
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+ error: res.status === 401 || res.status === 403 ? 'middleware_rejected' : 'middleware_error',
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+ status: res.status,
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+ };
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+ }
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+ const grantId = parsedObj?.grant_id;
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+ if (!parsedObj || parsedObj.ok !== true || typeof grantId !== 'string' || grantId.trim() === '') {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_bad_response', { status: res.status }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'bad_response', status: res.status };
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+ }
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+ return { ok: true, grant_id: grantId, idempotent: parsedObj.idempotent === true };
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+ }
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+ catch (e) {
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+ await safeLog(admin, 'commons_organizer_grant_call_error', { error_name: errorName(e) }, logBookingId);
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+ return { ok: false, error: 'unexpected' };
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+ }
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+ }
@@ -9,3 +9,10 @@ export declare function bookingRowRequiresBackstopRevoke(booking: {
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  access_revoke_required_at?: string | null;
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  }): boolean;
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  export declare function handle(req: Request): Promise<Response>;
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+ export interface BookingAccessRevokeBackstopConfig {
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+ /** Hand-maintained deploy-verification marker returned by the GET branch. */
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+ buildMarker: string;
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+ }
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+ /** Wraps `handle` with an unauthenticated deploy-verification GET (no DB, no secrets);
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+ * every other method is delegated to `handle` unchanged. */
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+ export declare function createBookingAccessRevokeBackstopHandler(config: BookingAccessRevokeBackstopConfig): (req: Request) => Promise<Response>;
@@ -119,3 +119,14 @@ export async function handle(req) {
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  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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  });
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  }
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+ /** Wraps `handle` with an unauthenticated deploy-verification GET (no DB, no secrets);
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+ * every other method is delegated to `handle` unchanged. */
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+ export function createBookingAccessRevokeBackstopHandler(config) {
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+ const buildMarker = config.buildMarker;
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+ return (req) => {
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+ if (req.method === 'GET') {
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+ return Promise.resolve(new Response(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, function: 'booking-access-revoke-backstop', build: buildMarker }), { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } }));
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+ }
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+ return handle(req);
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+ };
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+ }
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { buildSubscriptionSessionParams } from '../checkoutSessionParams.js';
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  // migration-checkout functions can reuse the exact same clamp/validation
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  // arithmetic instead of duplicating it. Pure refactor: no behavior change.
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  import { MAX_START_DATE_DAYS, pacificDateStr, addDaysStr } from '../pacificDate.js';
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+ import { escapeLikePattern, isValidReferralCode } from '../referralCodeLookup.js';
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  const Body = z.object({
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  plan_slug: z.string().min(1).max(80).regex(/^[a-z0-9-]+$/),
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  email: z.string().email().max(255),
@@ -19,7 +20,13 @@ const Body = z.object({
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  // Referral program Phase 1. Case-sensitive exact match against
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  // memberships.referral_code, resolved just below. An unresolvable code is
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  // silently ignored -- it must never block or error checkout.
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- referral_code: z.string().trim().min(1).max(32).optional(),
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+ // Payment must never be blocked by a referral code: anything that is not a
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+ // string passing the allowlist (empty, whitespace, over-long, wildcard,
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+ // non-string) is dropped before validation, as if the field were absent.
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+ referral_code: z.preprocess((v) => {
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+ const t = typeof v === 'string' ? v.trim() : v;
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+ return isValidReferralCode(t) ? t : undefined;
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+ }, z.string().optional()),
23
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  // Internal `coupons` code. Unlike referral_code, an unusable code here is a
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  // hard 400 -- the member typed it expecting a discount, so charging them
25
32
  // full price silently is the wrong failure mode.
@@ -205,12 +212,16 @@ export async function handle(req, operator) {
205
212
  // code, malicious input) is NOT an error -- it just means no referral
206
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  // metadata gets attached, same as if the field had been omitted.
207
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  let referralCode;
208
- if (referral_code) {
215
+ // Allowlist BEFORE any query: a code outside [A-Za-z0-9]{1,32} (e.g. a '*'
216
+ // wildcard) is treated exactly like an omitted/unknown code -- no lookup.
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+ if (referral_code && isValidReferralCode(referral_code)) {
209
218
  try {
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  const { data: referrer, error: refErr } = await supabase
211
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  .from('memberships')
212
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  .select('id')
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- .eq('referral_code', referral_code)
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+ .ilike('referral_code', escapeLikePattern(referral_code))
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+ .order('id', { ascending: true })
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+ .limit(1)
214
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  .maybeSingle();
215
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  if (!refErr && referrer)
216
227
  referralCode = referral_code;
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ import { isDepositOnly, parseTstzRange } from '../bookingEffects.js';
6
6
  import { extractDoorAccess } from '../busClient.js';
7
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  import { logWelcomeSkipped, WELCOME_OK_STATUSES, } from '../membershipWelcome.js';
8
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  import { sendDunningEmail } from '../dunningEmails.js';
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- import { recordReferralFailure, maybeGrantReferralCredit } from '../referralGrant.js';
9
+ import { recordReferralFailure } from '../referralGrant.js';
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+ import { escapeLikePattern, isValidReferralCode } from '../referralCodeLookup.js';
10
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  import { findBaseItem } from '../membershipSubscriptionItems.js';
11
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  import { cancelUnpaidSignedBooking, isSignedUnpaidCancelDue, isCommonsSignedUnpaidPolicyEligible, readCommonsSignedPaymentLinkDryRun } from '../commonsSignedUnpaidCancellation.js';
12
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  import { sendBookingCancelledUnpaidEmailOnce } from '../bookingAgreementEmail.js';
@@ -576,8 +577,8 @@ function buildStripeWebhookHandler(config, connect) {
576
577
  * fallback baked in), not re-derived from sub.metadata here.
577
578
  *
578
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  * Inserts a 'signed_up' referrals row only -- no credit amounts, no Stripe
579
- * balance calls. Those happen later, at first-invoice-paid (see
580
- * maybeGrantReferralCredit below). We do NOT call computeReferralCredits
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+ * balance calls. The grant happens later, at day 30, via the daily
581
+ * qualify job in gc-io (not at first-invoice-paid). We do NOT call computeReferralCredits
581
582
  * here to "validate" plan.price_cents -- Math.max/Math.round never throw,
582
583
  * so that validated nothing. Instead we check price_cents directly and
583
584
  * refuse to insert a referrals row at all if it's missing, rather than
@@ -590,10 +591,16 @@ function buildStripeWebhookHandler(config, connect) {
590
591
  const refCode = sub.metadata?.referral_code;
591
592
  if (!refCode)
592
593
  return; // no referral on this signup -- normal case
594
+ // Allowlist BEFORE any query: a code outside [A-Za-z0-9]{1,32} (e.g. a
595
+ // '*' wildcard) is treated exactly like no referral code at all.
596
+ if (!isValidReferralCode(refCode))
597
+ return;
593
598
  const { data: referrer, error: referrerErr } = await supabase
594
599
  .from('memberships')
595
600
  .select('id')
596
- .eq('referral_code', refCode)
601
+ .ilike('referral_code', escapeLikePattern(refCode))
602
+ .order('id', { ascending: true })
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+ .limit(1)
597
604
  .maybeSingle();
598
605
  if (referrerErr || !referrer)
599
606
  return; // unresolvable code -- silently skip, never block signup
@@ -646,8 +653,9 @@ function buildStripeWebhookHandler(config, connect) {
646
653
  // maybeGrantReferralCredit moved verbatim to ../_shared/referralGrant.ts
647
654
  // (2026-08-24) so admin-referral-retry can call the exact same, already-
648
655
  // idempotent function on a grant_failed row instead of a second
649
- // hand-written copy of this Stripe balance-transaction logic. Imported
650
- // above; the call site below now passes supabase/stripe explicitly.
656
+ // hand-written copy of this Stripe balance-transaction logic. The grant
657
+ // is no longer made at first-invoice-paid: it happens at day 30 via the
658
+ // daily qualify job in gc-io (this file makes no balance call).
651
659
  /**
652
660
  * Referral program Phase 1, step 3 (clawback on fast cancel).
653
661
  *
@@ -2530,31 +2538,15 @@ function buildStripeWebhookHandler(config, connect) {
2530
2538
  // an earlier migration) -- this is the actual ongoing writer.
2531
2539
  const isGenuineInvoicePayment = inv.billing_reason !== 'subscription_create' || (inv.amount_paid ?? 0) > 0;
2532
2540
  if (isGenuineInvoicePayment) {
2533
- // .select('id') added so the referral-credit step below can tell
2534
- // whether this call actually WON the compare-and-swap (this was
2535
- // genuinely the first real paid invoice) vs. a repeat event that
2536
- // found the column already set -- the update's own predicate and
2537
- // payload are unchanged.
2538
- const { data: fipRows, error: fipErr } = await supabase
2541
+ const { error: fipErr } = await supabase
2539
2542
  .from('memberships')
2540
2543
  .update({ first_invoice_paid_at: new Date().toISOString() })
2541
2544
  .eq('stripe_subscription_id', subId)
2542
- .is('first_invoice_paid_at', null)
2543
- .select('id');
2545
+ .is('first_invoice_paid_at', null);
2544
2546
  if (fipErr)
2545
2547
  console.warn('[stripe-webhook] first_invoice_paid_at write failed', fipErr);
2546
- // Round-3 review finding: isGenuineInvoicePayment is an OR that
2547
- // only blocks a $0 invoice when billing_reason ===
2548
- // 'subscription_create' -- every other billing_reason
2549
- // (subscription_cycle after a 100%-off code, a $0 invoice
2550
- // covered entirely by account balance, etc.) bypasses the
2551
- // amount check entirely. Gate the referral grant itself on a
2552
- // genuinely nonzero amount_paid, separately from
2553
- // first_invoice_paid_at (which has other consumers and should
2554
- // keep its existing, broader semantics).
2555
- if (!fipErr && fipRows && fipRows.length > 0 && (inv.amount_paid ?? 0) > 0) {
2556
- await maybeGrantReferralCredit(supabase, stripe, fipRows[0].id);
2557
- }
2548
+ // Referral crediting is NOT done here any more: gc-io's
2549
+ // referral-qualify-daily job pays it 30 days after signup.
2558
2550
  }
2559
2551
  }
2560
2552
  break;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
1
+ export declare function escapeLikePattern(input: string): string;
2
+ /**
3
+ * Allowlist for referral codes (issued codes are 8-char uppercase alphanumeric;
4
+ * the 1..32 range matches the zod bound on the checkout input and tolerates
5
+ * lowercase typos, which ilike matches case-insensitively).
6
+ *
7
+ * Why an allowlist and not just escapeLikePattern: PostgREST treats '*' in an
8
+ * ilike value as a wildcard alias for '%', and escapeLikePattern does not
9
+ * escape it, so '*' would match the first membership's code. Anything outside
10
+ * [A-Za-z0-9] is treated by callers as "no referral code supplied" and the
11
+ * lookup is skipped entirely. escapeLikePattern is kept as defense in depth.
12
+ */
13
+ export declare function isValidReferralCode(input: unknown): input is string;
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
1
+ export function escapeLikePattern(input) {
2
+ return input.replace(/[\\%_]/g, (ch) => '\\' + ch);
3
+ }
4
+ /**
5
+ * Allowlist for referral codes (issued codes are 8-char uppercase alphanumeric;
6
+ * the 1..32 range matches the zod bound on the checkout input and tolerates
7
+ * lowercase typos, which ilike matches case-insensitively).
8
+ *
9
+ * Why an allowlist and not just escapeLikePattern: PostgREST treats '*' in an
10
+ * ilike value as a wildcard alias for '%', and escapeLikePattern does not
11
+ * escape it, so '*' would match the first membership's code. Anything outside
12
+ * [A-Za-z0-9] is treated by callers as "no referral code supplied" and the
13
+ * lookup is skipped entirely. escapeLikePattern is kept as defense in depth.
14
+ */
15
+ export function isValidReferralCode(input) {
16
+ return typeof input === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9]{1,32}$/.test(input);
17
+ }
@@ -2,4 +2,9 @@ export interface ReferralCredits {
2
2
  referrerCents: number;
3
3
  referredCents: number;
4
4
  }
5
+ /**
6
+ * @deprecated gc-io's referralQualify owns the referral credit formula now
7
+ * (50% of the referred member's first-month price, floored). Retained
8
+ * unchanged for published-package compatibility.
9
+ */
5
10
  export declare function computeReferralCredits(planPriceCents: number, isPrivateOffice: boolean): ReferralCredits;
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
13
13
  // price + a private-office flag into two credit amounts.
14
14
  const PRIVATE_OFFICE_REFERRER_CENTS = 30000; // flat $300
15
15
  const MIN_CREDIT_CENTS = 2500; // $25 floor on both sides
16
+ /**
17
+ * @deprecated gc-io's referralQualify owns the referral credit formula now
18
+ * (50% of the referred member's first-month price, floored). Retained
19
+ * unchanged for published-package compatibility.
20
+ */
16
21
  export function computeReferralCredits(planPriceCents, isPrivateOffice) {
17
22
  const referrerCents = isPrivateOffice
18
23
  ? PRIVATE_OFFICE_REFERRER_CENTS
@@ -14,36 +14,9 @@ type SupabaseLike = SupabaseClient<any, 'public', any>;
14
14
  */
15
15
  export declare function recordReferralFailure(supabase: SupabaseLike, referralId: string, fromStatus: 'signed_up' | 'grant_failed' | 'credited', toStatus: 'grant_failed' | 'clawback_failed', error: unknown): Promise<void>;
16
16
  /**
17
- * Referral program Phase 1, step 2 (grant at first-invoice-paid).
18
- *
19
- * Called from the webhook only when the first_invoice_paid_at compare-and-
20
- * swap in the invoice.paid handler actually affected a row (genuinely the
21
- * first real paid invoice for this membership) -- that call passes no
22
- * `fromStatuses` override, so it only ever matches a 'signed_up' row.
23
- *
24
- * admin-referral-retry calls this SAME function with
25
- * `fromStatuses: ['grant_failed']` to retry a previously-failed grant --
26
- * see that function's own header comment for why it gates on the referred
27
- * membership's live status first, and why it does NOT reset the row to
28
- * 'signed_up' before calling this (that reset-then-call shape was tried and
29
- * reverted after a second-model review found it opened a stranded-row
30
- * window and a same-row race between two concurrent retries).
31
- *
32
- * Computes real credit amounts, grants a NEGATIVE Stripe Customer Balance
33
- * Transaction (a credit) on each of the two Stripe customers, and marks the
34
- * referral 'credited'.
35
- *
36
- * Entirely wrapped in try/catch and logs with the referral id on failure --
37
- * a Stripe failure here must never break invoice.paid processing for an
38
- * unrelated membership.
39
- *
40
- * IDEMPOTENT BY DESIGN -- this is also what makes it safe for
41
- * admin-referral-retry to call again on a grant_failed row: before each
42
- * Stripe call it checks whether this referral already has a txn id
43
- * persisted, and each Stripe call carries a fixed idempotency key derived
44
- * from the referral id, so a retry only attempts whichever side didn't
45
- * already complete. Never write a second, separate recovery path -- retry
46
- * by calling this function again.
17
+ * @deprecated SUPERSEDED -- no-op. Crediting is owned by gc-io's
18
+ * referral-qualify-daily job (30 days after signup). Never touches Stripe or
19
+ * the database; signature kept for published-package compatibility.
47
20
  */
48
- export declare function maybeGrantReferralCredit(supabase: SupabaseLike, stripe: Stripe, referredMembershipId: string, fromStatuses?: readonly ('signed_up' | 'grant_failed')[]): Promise<void>;
21
+ export declare function maybeGrantReferralCredit(_supabase: SupabaseLike, _stripe: Stripe, referredMembershipId: string, _fromStatuses?: readonly ('signed_up' | 'grant_failed')[]): Promise<void>;
49
22
  export {};
@@ -1,38 +1,15 @@
1
- // Referral program grant logic + failure recorder.
1
+ // Referral program failure recorder + SUPERSEDED grant entry point.
2
2
  //
3
- // Originally moved verbatim out of stripe-webhook/index.ts so the SAME
4
- // grant logic could be re-invoked on demand by admin-referral-retry (a
5
- // grant_failed referral needs to re-run this exact function, not a second
6
- // hand-written copy of Stripe balance-transaction logic that could drift
7
- // from it over time). Since then (second-model review, 2026-08-24) it has
8
- // picked up real behavioral fixes on top of that extraction -- it is no
9
- // longer byte-identical to the original inline version, and should not be
10
- // described that way again:
11
- // - `fromStatuses` is now a parameter (default ['signed_up'], the
12
- // webhook's original single case) instead of a hardcoded 'signed_up'
13
- // literal, so admin-referral-retry can call this SAME function on a
14
- // grant_failed row directly -- no separate reset-to-signed_up step,
15
- // no window where the row sits in a state nothing recognizes.
16
- // - A failed persist of either side's Stripe transaction id is now a
17
- // hard stop with a loud last_error, not a console.error-and-continue
18
- // (see the two `partialUpdErr` blocks below) -- see "24h idempotency
19
- // key" comment for why this matters.
20
- // The Supabase and Stripe clients are explicit parameters (same convention
21
- // as _shared/membershipWelcome.ts and _shared/bookingEffects.ts) instead of
22
- // closure captures, and console.error tags read [referralGrant] instead of
23
- // [stripe-webhook] since this code now runs from two different callers.
3
+ // maybeGrantReferralCredit is now an immediate no-op. Referral credits are no
4
+ // longer paid at first-invoice-paid under the old terms; gc-io's
5
+ // referral-qualify-daily job pays 50% of the referred member's first-month
6
+ // plan price to each side, 30 days after signup. The export and its signature
7
+ // are kept only because other repos import them from the published package.
8
+ // It never touches Stripe or the database.
24
9
  //
25
- // The two clawback functions (maybeClawbackReferralCredit and
26
- // maybeClawbackReferralCreditForRefundOrDispute) stay in stripe-webhook/
27
- // index.ts -- they're deliberately NOT extracted here. There are two
28
- // different clawback code paths and a clawback_failed row alone doesn't
29
- // say which one failed, so clawback retry is a human decision for now
30
- // (see AdminReferrals.tsx), not an automated one. recordReferralFailure is
31
- // still exported here since both index.ts's clawback functions and this
32
- // file's grant function need it -- index.ts imports it from here rather
33
- // than keeping a second copy.
10
+ // recordReferralFailure is still live: the clawback functions in
11
+ // stripe-webhook.ts use it to mark a referrals row clawback_failed.
34
12
  import { logOps } from './ops.js';
35
- import { computeReferralCredits } from './referralCredits.js';
36
13
  /**
37
14
  * Records a permanent grant/clawback failure on the referrals row itself
38
15
  * (fix #4 from the round-2 review) instead of only console.error/warn --
@@ -62,207 +39,10 @@ export async function recordReferralFailure(supabase, referralId, fromStatus, to
62
39
  await logOps(supabase, 'referral_' + toStatus, { referral_id: referralId, message }, { severity: 'error' }).catch(() => { });
63
40
  }
64
41
  /**
65
- * Referral program Phase 1, step 2 (grant at first-invoice-paid).
66
- *
67
- * Called from the webhook only when the first_invoice_paid_at compare-and-
68
- * swap in the invoice.paid handler actually affected a row (genuinely the
69
- * first real paid invoice for this membership) -- that call passes no
70
- * `fromStatuses` override, so it only ever matches a 'signed_up' row.
71
- *
72
- * admin-referral-retry calls this SAME function with
73
- * `fromStatuses: ['grant_failed']` to retry a previously-failed grant --
74
- * see that function's own header comment for why it gates on the referred
75
- * membership's live status first, and why it does NOT reset the row to
76
- * 'signed_up' before calling this (that reset-then-call shape was tried and
77
- * reverted after a second-model review found it opened a stranded-row
78
- * window and a same-row race between two concurrent retries).
79
- *
80
- * Computes real credit amounts, grants a NEGATIVE Stripe Customer Balance
81
- * Transaction (a credit) on each of the two Stripe customers, and marks the
82
- * referral 'credited'.
83
- *
84
- * Entirely wrapped in try/catch and logs with the referral id on failure --
85
- * a Stripe failure here must never break invoice.paid processing for an
86
- * unrelated membership.
87
- *
88
- * IDEMPOTENT BY DESIGN -- this is also what makes it safe for
89
- * admin-referral-retry to call again on a grant_failed row: before each
90
- * Stripe call it checks whether this referral already has a txn id
91
- * persisted, and each Stripe call carries a fixed idempotency key derived
92
- * from the referral id, so a retry only attempts whichever side didn't
93
- * already complete. Never write a second, separate recovery path -- retry
94
- * by calling this function again.
42
+ * @deprecated SUPERSEDED -- no-op. Crediting is owned by gc-io's
43
+ * referral-qualify-daily job (30 days after signup). Never touches Stripe or
44
+ * the database; signature kept for published-package compatibility.
95
45
  */
96
- export async function maybeGrantReferralCredit(supabase, stripe, referredMembershipId, fromStatuses = ['signed_up']) {
97
- let referralId = null;
98
- // Guard used by every recordReferralFailure call below -- always the
99
- // row's REAL current status as read from the DB just now, never an
100
- // assumption, so the optimistic-concurrency guard inside
101
- // recordReferralFailure actually protects against a concurrent winner.
102
- let currentStatus = 'signed_up';
103
- try {
104
- const { data: rawReferral, error: refErr } = await supabase
105
- .from('referrals')
106
- .select('id,status,referring_membership_id,referred_membership_id,referred_plan_price_cents,is_private_office,' +
107
- 'stripe_balance_txn_id_referrer,stripe_balance_txn_id_referred')
108
- .eq('referred_membership_id', referredMembershipId)
109
- .in('status', fromStatuses)
110
- .maybeSingle();
111
- if (refErr) {
112
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral lookup failed', {
113
- membership_id: referredMembershipId, message: refErr.message,
114
- });
115
- return;
116
- }
117
- if (!rawReferral)
118
- return; // this membership has no referral in a retryable state -- normal case
119
- const typedReferral = rawReferral;
120
- referralId = typedReferral.id;
121
- currentStatus = typedReferral.status;
122
- const { referrerCents, referredCents } = computeReferralCredits(typedReferral.referred_plan_price_cents ?? 0, typedReferral.is_private_office === true);
123
- const { data: parties, error: partiesErr } = await supabase
124
- .from('memberships')
125
- .select('id,stripe_customer_id')
126
- .in('id', [typedReferral.referring_membership_id, typedReferral.referred_membership_id]);
127
- if (partiesErr || !parties) {
128
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral credit membership lookup failed', {
129
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, message: partiesErr?.message ?? 'no rows',
130
- });
131
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', partiesErr ?? new Error('membership lookup returned no rows'));
132
- return;
133
- }
134
- const referringCustomerId = parties.find((m) => m.id === typedReferral.referring_membership_id)?.stripe_customer_id ?? null;
135
- const referredCustomerId = parties.find((m) => m.id === typedReferral.referred_membership_id)?.stripe_customer_id ?? null;
136
- if (!referringCustomerId || !referredCustomerId) {
137
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral credit missing stripe_customer_id', { referral_id: typedReferral.id });
138
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', new Error('missing stripe_customer_id on one or both parties'));
139
- return;
140
- }
141
- // Each call carries a deterministic idempotency key derived from the
142
- // referral row's own id -- a webhook redelivery, or our own retry after
143
- // a transient failure below, can never double-credit either party even
144
- // if our own DB state is momentarily inconsistent; Stripe itself
145
- // refuses to apply the same key twice.
146
- //
147
- // Round-3 review foot-gun: idempotency keys expire after 24h (Stripe),
148
- // but a `grant_failed` row can be manually flipped back for retry well
149
- // after that -- at which point a stale key would no longer protect
150
- // against a double charge. The real guard is checking whether this
151
- // referral ALREADY has a txn id persisted (from a prior partial
152
- // attempt) and skipping straight past re-charging Stripe for that side
153
- // if so -- which is exactly why a failure to PERSIST that txn id after
154
- // a successful Stripe call (the `partialUpdErr`/`partialUpdErr2` blocks
155
- // below) must be treated as fatal, not logged-and-ignored: if the id
156
- // never lands in the DB, a later retry past the 24h window has no way
157
- // to know the money already moved, and will move it again.
158
- let referrerTxnId = typedReferral.stripe_balance_txn_id_referrer ?? null;
159
- if (!referrerTxnId) {
160
- try {
161
- // A NEGATIVE amount on a Customer Balance Transaction decreases what
162
- // the customer owes -- i.e. grants them a credit against their next
163
- // invoice. POST /v1/customers/{customer}/balance_transactions.
164
- const referrerTxn = await stripe.customers.createBalanceTransaction(referringCustomerId, {
165
- amount: -referrerCents,
166
- currency: 'usd',
167
- description: `Referral credit: friend joined via your referral link (referral ${typedReferral.id})`,
168
- }, { idempotencyKey: `ref-${typedReferral.id}-referrer-grant` });
169
- referrerTxnId = referrerTxn.id;
170
- }
171
- catch (e) {
172
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral referrer balance transaction creation failed', {
173
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
174
- });
175
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', e);
176
- return;
177
- }
178
- // Persist immediately -- if the referred-side call below throws, this
179
- // row already shows real money moved once, with the txn id needed to
180
- // reconcile or manually complete the pair. A failure to persist THIS
181
- // txn id is fatal (see the 24h-idempotency-key comment above): the
182
- // Stripe transaction already exists for real, so silently continuing
183
- // would leave a retry blind to that fact.
184
- const { error: partialUpdErr } = await supabase
185
- .from('referrals')
186
- .update({ stripe_balance_txn_id_referrer: referrerTxnId, referrer_credit_cents: referrerCents })
187
- .eq('id', typedReferral.id);
188
- if (partialUpdErr) {
189
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral partial grant persist failed -- REFERRER STRIPE CREDIT ALREADY GRANTED', {
190
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, referrer_txn_id: referrerTxnId, message: partialUpdErr.message,
191
- });
192
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', new Error(`REFERRER CREDIT GRANTED (txn ${referrerTxnId}) BUT TXN ID NOT PERSISTED (${partialUpdErr.message}) -- reconcile in Stripe before retrying; a retry past 24h without this id would charge again`));
193
- return;
194
- }
195
- }
196
- let referredTxnId = typedReferral.stripe_balance_txn_id_referred ?? null;
197
- if (!referredTxnId) {
198
- try {
199
- const referredTxn = await stripe.customers.createBalanceTransaction(referredCustomerId, {
200
- amount: -referredCents,
201
- currency: 'usd',
202
- description: `Referral credit: welcome credit for signing up with a referral code (referral ${typedReferral.id})`,
203
- }, { idempotencyKey: `ref-${typedReferral.id}-referred-grant` });
204
- referredTxnId = referredTxn.id;
205
- }
206
- catch (e) {
207
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral referred balance transaction creation failed -- referrer side already credited above', {
208
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, referrer_txn_id: referrerTxnId, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
209
- });
210
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', e);
211
- return;
212
- }
213
- // Same reasoning as the referrer side above -- a failed persist here
214
- // means a real Stripe credit exists with no durable record of its id.
215
- const { error: partialUpdErr2 } = await supabase
216
- .from('referrals')
217
- .update({ stripe_balance_txn_id_referred: referredTxnId, referred_credit_cents: referredCents })
218
- .eq('id', typedReferral.id);
219
- if (partialUpdErr2) {
220
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral partial grant persist (referred side) failed -- REFERRED STRIPE CREDIT ALREADY GRANTED', {
221
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, referred_txn_id: referredTxnId, message: partialUpdErr2.message,
222
- });
223
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, typedReferral.id, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', new Error(`REFERRED CREDIT GRANTED (txn ${referredTxnId}) BUT TXN ID NOT PERSISTED (${partialUpdErr2.message}) -- reconcile in Stripe before retrying; a retry past 24h without this id would charge again`));
224
- return;
225
- }
226
- }
227
- // referrer_credit_cents/referred_credit_cents are NOT set here -- each
228
- // was already persisted, atomically with its own txn id, above (round-4
229
- // review finding) -- so the amount recorded always matches what that
230
- // specific Stripe transaction actually charged, even across a retry
231
- // where the formula or the referral's price_cents might have changed.
232
- //
233
- // Guarded on `currentStatus` (the row's real status as read at the top
234
- // of this call), not a hardcoded 'signed_up' -- a retry from
235
- // grant_failed must flip FROM grant_failed, not from a status the row
236
- // was never actually in.
237
- const { error: creditUpdErr } = await supabase
238
- .from('referrals')
239
- .update({
240
- status: 'credited',
241
- credited_at: new Date().toISOString(),
242
- clawback_eligible_until: new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString(),
243
- })
244
- .eq('id', typedReferral.id)
245
- .eq('status', currentStatus);
246
- if (creditUpdErr) {
247
- console.error('[referralGrant] referral row update after crediting failed -- BOTH stripe transactions already succeeded, only this status flip failed', {
248
- referral_id: typedReferral.id, referrer_txn_id: referrerTxnId, referred_txn_id: referredTxnId,
249
- message: creditUpdErr.message,
250
- });
251
- await logOps(supabase, 'referral_credited_status_flip_failed', { referral_id: typedReferral.id, referrer_txn_id: referrerTxnId, referred_txn_id: referredTxnId, message: creditUpdErr.message }, { severity: 'error' }).catch(() => { });
252
- // Deliberately NOT recordReferralFailure here -- both Stripe
253
- // transactions already succeeded, so 'grant_failed' would misleadingly
254
- // imply the grant itself failed. The row stays at `currentStatus` with
255
- // both txn ids already persisted above, so a later retry of this
256
- // function is now SAFE: it will skip both createBalanceTransaction
257
- // calls (already have referrerTxnId/referredTxnId) and just
258
- // re-attempt this status flip.
259
- }
260
- }
261
- catch (e) {
262
- console.error('[referralGrant] maybeGrantReferralCredit failed', {
263
- membership_id: referredMembershipId, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
264
- });
265
- if (referralId)
266
- await recordReferralFailure(supabase, referralId, currentStatus, 'grant_failed', e);
267
- }
46
+ export async function maybeGrantReferralCredit(_supabase, _stripe, referredMembershipId, _fromStatuses = ['signed_up']) {
47
+ console.warn('[referralGrant] maybeGrantReferralCredit is superseded and does nothing: referral credits are paid by gc-io referral-qualify-daily 30 days after signup', { membership_id: referredMembershipId });
268
48
  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@simplelayer/graniteer-core",
3
- "version": "0.3.22",
3
+ "version": "0.3.24",
4
4
  "description": "Shared platform core for Graniteer",
5
5
  "main": "./dist/index.js",
6
6
  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -417,6 +417,14 @@
417
417
  "types": "./dist/functions/boldsign-sender-identity.d.ts",
418
418
  "default": "./dist/functions/boldsign-sender-identity.js"
419
419
  },
420
+ "./functions/booking-access-grant": {
421
+ "types": "./dist/functions/booking-access-grant.d.ts",
422
+ "default": "./dist/functions/booking-access-grant.js"
423
+ },
424
+ "./functions/booking-access-revoke": {
425
+ "types": "./dist/functions/booking-access-revoke.d.ts",
426
+ "default": "./dist/functions/booking-access-revoke.js"
427
+ },
420
428
  "./functions/booking-access-revoke-backstop": {
421
429
  "types": "./dist/functions/booking-access-revoke-backstop.d.ts",
422
430
  "default": "./dist/functions/booking-access-revoke-backstop.js"