@simplelayer/graniteer-core 0.2.1 → 0.2.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (124) hide show
  1. package/index.js +2 -2
  2. package/package.json +1 -1
  3. package/src/agreementCheckout.ts +250 -250
  4. package/src/agreementPortalEmail.ts +128 -128
  5. package/src/billingPortalLinkEmail.ts +117 -117
  6. package/src/bookingAgreementEmail.ts +149 -149
  7. package/src/bookingEffects.ts +388 -388
  8. package/src/busClient.ts +268 -268
  9. package/src/busSignature.ts +71 -71
  10. package/src/checkoutCoupon.test.ts +675 -675
  11. package/src/checkoutCoupon.ts +455 -455
  12. package/src/commonsDeposit.ts +298 -298
  13. package/src/commonsDepositWebhook.ts +237 -237
  14. package/src/dayPassConfirmation.ts +230 -230
  15. package/src/dunningEmails.test.ts +263 -263
  16. package/src/dunningEmails.ts +203 -203
  17. package/src/email-templates/brand.ts +93 -93
  18. package/src/email-templates/magic-link.tsx +59 -59
  19. package/src/email-templates/recovery.tsx +59 -59
  20. package/src/email-templates/signup.tsx +67 -67
  21. package/src/functions/admin-cancel-membership.ts +311 -311
  22. package/src/functions/admin-change-membership-plan.ts +312 -312
  23. package/src/functions/admin-charge-guest-print.ts +229 -229
  24. package/src/functions/admin-correct-booking.ts +333 -333
  25. package/src/functions/admin-create-booking.ts +460 -460
  26. package/src/functions/admin-create-commons-event.ts +244 -244
  27. package/src/functions/admin-debug-boldsign-doc.ts +93 -93
  28. package/src/functions/admin-door-write.ts +272 -272
  29. package/src/functions/admin-issue-day-pass.ts +231 -231
  30. package/src/functions/admin-mark-booking-paid.ts +203 -203
  31. package/src/functions/admin-mint-billing-portal-link.ts +168 -168
  32. package/src/functions/admin-mint-portal-link.ts +62 -62
  33. package/src/functions/admin-photo-upload.ts +128 -128
  34. package/src/functions/admin-remove-team-member.ts +150 -150
  35. package/src/functions/admin-request-trial.ts +366 -366
  36. package/src/functions/admin-resend-commons-deposit-link.ts +323 -323
  37. package/src/functions/admin-reset-mfa.ts +138 -138
  38. package/src/functions/admin-retry-invoice-payment.ts +333 -333
  39. package/src/functions/admin-reverse-coupon-redemption.ts +98 -98
  40. package/src/functions/admin-revoke-agreement.ts +467 -467
  41. package/src/functions/admin-send-commons-agreement.ts +214 -214
  42. package/src/functions/admin-set-credit-amount.ts +123 -123
  43. package/src/functions/admin-skip-commons-contract.ts +165 -165
  44. package/src/functions/admin-undo-membership-cancel.ts +144 -144
  45. package/src/functions/admin-wall-photo-write.ts +141 -141
  46. package/src/functions/auth-email-hook.ts +259 -259
  47. package/src/functions/boldsign-sender-identity.ts +114 -114
  48. package/src/functions/booking-availability.ts +419 -419
  49. package/src/functions/booking-member-preview.ts +136 -136
  50. package/src/functions/booking-status.ts +149 -149
  51. package/src/functions/create-booking.ts +648 -648
  52. package/src/functions/create-day-pass-checkout.ts +218 -218
  53. package/src/functions/create-portal-session.ts +142 -142
  54. package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.test.ts +222 -222
  55. package/src/functions/create-subscription-checkout.ts +440 -440
  56. package/src/functions/day-pass-status.ts +89 -89
  57. package/src/functions/diag-webpush-test.ts +45 -45
  58. package/src/functions/event-access-admin.ts +277 -277
  59. package/src/functions/event-access-store.ts +334 -334
  60. package/src/functions/ezeep-print-webhook.ts +213 -213
  61. package/src/functions/ezeep-usage-reconcile.ts +299 -299
  62. package/src/functions/fetch-avatar-original.ts +457 -457
  63. package/src/functions/get-provider-sign-link.ts +155 -155
  64. package/src/functions/get-signing-link.ts +211 -211
  65. package/src/functions/guest-print-setup-confirm.ts +128 -128
  66. package/src/functions/guest-print-submit.ts +149 -149
  67. package/src/functions/luma-webhook.ts +165 -165
  68. package/src/functions/mcp.ts +67 -67
  69. package/src/functions/member-door-action.test.ts +1248 -1248
  70. package/src/functions/member-door-action.ts +863 -863
  71. package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.test.ts +516 -516
  72. package/src/functions/member-unifi-mapping.ts +206 -206
  73. package/src/functions/membership-door-sync.ts +956 -956
  74. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.copy.ts +232 -232
  75. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.test.ts +349 -349
  76. package/src/functions/migration-collision-alert.ts +232 -232
  77. package/src/functions/office-assignment-end.ts +146 -146
  78. package/src/functions/portal-booking-access.ts +217 -217
  79. package/src/functions/portal-list-invoices.ts +99 -99
  80. package/src/functions/portal-request-login.ts +219 -192
  81. package/src/functions/portal-resend-invite.ts +248 -248
  82. package/src/functions/portal-submit-event.ts +168 -168
  83. package/src/functions/print-billing-recover.ts +97 -97
  84. package/src/functions/print-billing-run.ts +183 -183
  85. package/src/functions/public-facts.ts +168 -168
  86. package/src/functions/push-send.ts +348 -348
  87. package/src/functions/push-test.ts +234 -234
  88. package/src/functions/request-portal-link.ts +211 -211
  89. package/src/functions/review-ratings.ts +113 -113
  90. package/src/functions/space-availability-range.acceptance.test.ts +161 -161
  91. package/src/functions/space-availability-range.ts +142 -142
  92. package/src/functions/stripe-db-reconcile.ts +319 -319
  93. package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.moved-regression.test.ts +78 -78
  94. package/src/functions/stripe-webhook.ts +2595 -2595
  95. package/src/functions/sync-gcal-blackouts.ts +298 -298
  96. package/src/functions/timetable-event-register.ts +162 -162
  97. package/src/functions/timetable-event-status.ts +90 -90
  98. package/src/functions/timetable-spaces.ts +219 -219
  99. package/src/functions/touch-pass-reconciler.ts +689 -689
  100. package/src/functions/touch-pass-signup.ts +478 -478
  101. package/src/functions/upload-booking-display-image.ts +179 -179
  102. package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-purge.ts +134 -134
  103. package/src/functions/virtual-onboarding-submit.ts +315 -315
  104. package/src/functions/voice-booking.ts +453 -453
  105. package/src/functions/voice-day-pass.ts +346 -346
  106. package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.test.ts +301 -301
  107. package/src/functions/voice-inquiry.ts +198 -198
  108. package/src/functions/voice-membership-signup.ts +355 -355
  109. package/src/functions/voice-tour-availability.ts +204 -204
  110. package/src/functions/voice-tour-booking.ts +429 -429
  111. package/src/ghlEventInquiry.ts +143 -143
  112. package/src/mailArrivalEmail.ts +121 -121
  113. package/src/manageToken.ts +363 -363
  114. package/src/membershipBusClient.ts +537 -537
  115. package/src/membershipWelcome.ts +683 -683
  116. package/src/migrationCheckout.ts +366 -366
  117. package/src/paymentLinkEmail.ts +123 -123
  118. package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.test.ts +246 -246
  119. package/src/signedUnpaidReminderEmail.ts +132 -132
  120. package/src/stripeCoworkingPortal.ts +91 -91
  121. package/src/supabaseTestFakes.ts +131 -131
  122. package/src/supportTicketEmail.ts +119 -119
  123. package/src/unifiAccessPolicies.ts +228 -228
  124. package/src/unifiGroups.ts +129 -129
@@ -1,457 +1,457 @@
1
- // Member wall photo -- best-effort link-fetch of a pasted external avatar
2
- // URL, so it can be captured at full quality for the physical member wall.
3
- // See member-wall-photo-plan-v1.md §3.4 for the full design and the Opus
4
- // adversarial review (§8) that hardened this from a v1 IP-deny-list draft
5
- // into the design below. This function is the direct, reviewed result of
6
- // that process -- do not weaken any of the guards below without re-running
7
- // that review, in particular:
8
- // - the bucket path (`fetched/{sub}/original`) is NOT the member's own
9
- // RLS-readable prefix -- writing here instead of `{sub}/original` is
10
- // what keeps this blind SSRF rather than full-read SSRF (review finding
11
- // B1). Never change this path to something the member can read back.
12
- // - the guard is a HOSTNAME ALLOW-LIST, not an IP deny-list. An IP
13
- // deny-list cannot be made sound in this runtime: Deno's fetch() has no
14
- // way to pin a DNS resolution, so DNS rebinding defeats any pre-connect
15
- // IP check unconditionally (review finding B2). The IP-literal checks
16
- // below are defense-in-depth on redirect targets only, not the primary
17
- // control.
18
- // - the URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from member_profiles.avatar_url
19
- // server-side, never a client-supplied body parameter (review finding
20
- // S3) -- this keeps every probe attributable to a real, rate-limited
21
- // profile write instead of making this an open URL-fetch primitive.
22
- // - the HTTP response is ALWAYS a constant `{ ok: true }` regardless of
23
- // outcome (review finding S4) -- the real reason lives only in
24
- // ops_events / last_fetch_error, never in the response body, because
25
- // that is the only oracle a direct caller has.
26
-
27
- import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
28
- import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet } from 'npm:jose@5.9.6';
29
- import { clientIp, checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
30
- import { logOps } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/ops';
31
-
32
- const corsHeaders = {
33
- 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
34
- 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
35
- 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
36
- };
37
-
38
- function json(status: number, body: unknown) {
39
- return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
40
- status,
41
- headers: { ...corsHeaders, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
42
- });
43
- }
44
-
45
- // Always this, regardless of what actually happened -- see file header, S4.
46
- const OK_RESPONSE = () => json(200, { ok: true });
47
-
48
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
49
- // Auth -- deliberately NOT the admin-door-write pattern (no aal2, no
50
- // admin_users check). Any authenticated member may trigger this, scoped
51
- // strictly to their own claims.sub -- the function does nothing the caller
52
- // isn't entitled to do on their own behalf. What IS required, per review
53
- // finding B4: issuer/audience-bound JWT verification, role==='authenticated'
54
- // explicitly, is_anonymous rejected, and a real member_profiles row.
55
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
56
-
57
- interface CallerClaims {
58
- sub: string;
59
- email?: string;
60
- role?: string;
61
- is_anonymous?: boolean;
62
- }
63
-
64
- const JWKS_URL_SUFFIX = '/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json';
65
- let jwksCache: ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> | null = null;
66
- function getJwks(supabaseUrl: string) {
67
- if (!jwksCache) jwksCache = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${supabaseUrl}${JWKS_URL_SUFFIX}`));
68
- return jwksCache;
69
- }
70
-
71
- async function verifyCaller(authHeader: string | null, supabaseUrl: string): Promise<CallerClaims | null> {
72
- if (!authHeader?.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null;
73
- try {
74
- const { payload } = await jwtVerify(authHeader.slice(7).trim(), getJwks(supabaseUrl), {
75
- issuer: `${supabaseUrl}/auth/v1`,
76
- audience: 'authenticated',
77
- });
78
- const claims = payload as unknown as CallerClaims;
79
- if (!claims.sub) return null;
80
- if (claims.role !== 'authenticated') return null;
81
- if (claims.is_anonymous === true) return null;
82
- return claims;
83
- } catch {
84
- return null;
85
- }
86
- }
87
-
88
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89
- // URL guard -- hostname allow-list (review finding B2). Parse once, validate
90
- // only the parsed fields, fetch the parsed .href -- never the raw string
91
- // (review finding B2c). This alone disposes of the userinfo trick
92
- // (https://trusted.com@169.254.169.254/ puts the real host in .hostname) and
93
- // unicode/punycode confusion (.hostname is already IDNA-normalized).
94
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95
-
96
- const ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES = [
97
- 'licdn.com', // LinkedIn CDN (media.licdn.com, etc.)
98
- 'googleusercontent.com', // Google account photos (lh3.googleusercontent.com, etc.)
99
- 'gravatar.com', // secure.gravatar.com, www.gravatar.com
100
- 'githubusercontent.com', // avatars.githubusercontent.com
101
- ];
102
-
103
- class GuardError extends Error {
104
- constructor(public code: string) {
105
- super(code);
106
- }
107
- }
108
-
109
- function hostAllowed(hostname: string): boolean {
110
- const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, '');
111
- return ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((s) => h === s || h.endsWith('.' + s));
112
- }
113
-
114
- // Defense-in-depth only (review finding B3) -- applied to IP literals at
115
- // every hop, including the initial URL. Not the primary control; the host
116
- // allow-list above is. v4-mapped/compatible v6 forms are normalized to their
117
- // embedded v4 address before the v4 list is applied, since Linux dual-stack
118
- // sockets connect those straight through.
119
- const V4_DENY_RANGES: Array<[number, number]> = (() => {
120
- const toInt = (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number) => ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;
121
- const cidr = (base: [number, number, number, number], bits: number): [number, number] => {
122
- const start = toInt(...base);
123
- const size = 2 ** (32 - bits);
124
- return [start >>> 0, (start + size - 1) >>> 0];
125
- };
126
- return [
127
- cidr([0, 0, 0, 0], 8), // 0.0.0.0/8 -- reaches loopback on Linux
128
- cidr([10, 0, 0, 0], 8),
129
- cidr([100, 64, 0, 0], 10), // CGNAT -- includes Alibaba metadata 100.100.100.200
130
- cidr([127, 0, 0, 0], 8),
131
- cidr([169, 254, 0, 0], 16), // link-local -- cloud metadata endpoints
132
- cidr([172, 16, 0, 0], 12),
133
- cidr([192, 0, 0, 0], 24),
134
- cidr([192, 168, 0, 0], 16),
135
- cidr([198, 18, 0, 0], 15),
136
- cidr([224, 0, 0, 0], 4), // multicast
137
- cidr([240, 0, 0, 0], 4), // reserved
138
- [toInt(255, 255, 255, 255), toInt(255, 255, 255, 255)],
139
- ];
140
- })();
141
-
142
- function v4ToInt(v4: string): number | null {
143
- const parts = v4.split('.').map(Number);
144
- if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((p) => !Number.isInteger(p) || p < 0 || p > 255)) return null;
145
- return ((parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8) | parts[3]) >>> 0;
146
- }
147
-
148
- function v4Denied(v4: string): boolean {
149
- const n = v4ToInt(v4);
150
- if (n === null) return true; // unparseable literal -- fail closed
151
- return V4_DENY_RANGES.some(([lo, hi]) => n >= lo && n <= hi);
152
- }
153
-
154
- // Extract an embedded v4 address from common IPv4-in-IPv6 forms
155
- // (::ffff:a.b.c.d, ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX, ::a.b.c.d, 64:ff9b::a.b.c.d NAT64,
156
- // 2002:XXXX:XXXX::/16 6to4). Returns null if none found.
157
- function embeddedV4(v6: string): string | null {
158
- const lower = v6.toLowerCase();
159
- const dotted = lower.match(/(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/);
160
- if (dotted && (lower.startsWith('::ffff:') || lower.startsWith('::') || lower.startsWith('64:ff9b::'))) {
161
- return dotted[1];
162
- }
163
- // ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX (hex form) or 6to4 2002:XXXX:XXXX::
164
- const hexMatch = lower.match(/^(?:::ffff:|2002:)([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})/);
165
- if (hexMatch) {
166
- const hi = parseInt(hexMatch[1], 16);
167
- const lo = parseInt(hexMatch[2], 16);
168
- return `${(hi >> 8) & 0xff}.${hi & 0xff}.${(lo >> 8) & 0xff}.${lo & 0xff}`;
169
- }
170
- return null;
171
- }
172
-
173
- function ipLiteralDenied(hostname: string): boolean {
174
- // v6 literal comes bracketed in a URL's .hostname per WHATWG (e.g. "::1")
175
- const isV6 = hostname.includes(':');
176
- if (!isV6) {
177
- return /^[0-9.]+$/.test(hostname) ? v4Denied(hostname) : false; // not an IP literal at all -> not this check's job
178
- }
179
- const bare = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
180
- if (['::', '::1'].includes(bare)) return true;
181
- if (/^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(bare) || /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i.test(bare)) return true; // fc00::/7, fe80::/10
182
- if (/^ff/i.test(bare)) return true; // ff00::/8 multicast
183
- if (bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001:0:') || bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001::')) return true; // Teredo 2001::/32
184
- const embedded = embeddedV4(bare);
185
- if (embedded) return v4Denied(embedded);
186
- return false;
187
- }
188
-
189
- function validate(raw: string): URL {
190
- if (raw.length > 2048) throw new GuardError('url_too_long');
191
- let u: URL;
192
- try {
193
- u = new URL(raw);
194
- } catch {
195
- throw new GuardError('bad_url');
196
- }
197
- if (u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new GuardError('scheme_not_allowed');
198
- if (u.port !== '') throw new GuardError('port_not_allowed'); // WHATWG strips :443; '' is the only legal value
199
- if (u.username || u.password) throw new GuardError('userinfo_not_allowed');
200
- if (ipLiteralDenied(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('ip_range_blocked');
201
- if (!hostAllowed(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('host_not_allowed');
202
- return u; // fetch u.href -- the parsed/normalized form -- never `raw`
203
- }
204
-
205
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
206
- // Fetch, with redirect handling, one shared deadline, streamed size cap, and
207
- // magic-byte content sniffing.
208
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
209
-
210
- const MAX_BYTES = 15 * 1024 * 1024;
211
- const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 8000;
212
- const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
213
-
214
- const MAGIC: Array<{ type: string; bytes: number[]; mask?: (b: Uint8Array) => boolean }> = [
215
- { type: 'image/jpeg', bytes: [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff] },
216
- { type: 'image/png', bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a] },
217
- { type: 'image/gif', bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38] },
218
- {
219
- type: 'image/webp',
220
- bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46],
221
- mask: (b) => b.length >= 12 && b[8] === 0x57 && b[9] === 0x45 && b[10] === 0x42 && b[11] === 0x50,
222
- },
223
- ];
224
-
225
- function sniffType(head: Uint8Array): string | null {
226
- for (const m of MAGIC) {
227
- if (head.length < m.bytes.length) continue;
228
- if (m.bytes.every((byte, i) => head[i] === byte) && (!m.mask || m.mask(head))) return m.type;
229
- }
230
- return null;
231
- }
232
-
233
- interface FetchResult {
234
- bytes: Uint8Array;
235
- contentType: string;
236
- finalHost: string;
237
- }
238
-
239
- async function guardedFetch(startUrl: URL, deadline: number, userAgent: string): Promise<FetchResult> {
240
- let current = startUrl;
241
- for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
242
- const remaining = deadline - Date.now();
243
- if (remaining <= 0) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
244
- const controller = new AbortController();
245
- const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), remaining);
246
- let res: Response;
247
- try {
248
- res = await fetch(current.href, {
249
- redirect: 'manual',
250
- signal: controller.signal,
251
- headers: { 'User-Agent': userAgent, Accept: 'image/*' },
252
- });
253
- } catch (e) {
254
- clearTimeout(timer);
255
- if ((e as Error)?.name === 'AbortError') throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
256
- throw new GuardError('fetch_failed');
257
- }
258
-
259
- if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
260
- clearTimeout(timer);
261
- const loc = res.headers.get('location');
262
- if (!loc) throw new GuardError('redirect_missing_location');
263
- if (hop === MAX_REDIRECTS) throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
264
- let next: URL;
265
- try {
266
- next = new URL(loc, current.href); // resolve against the CURRENT hop, not the origin
267
- } catch {
268
- throw new GuardError('redirect_unparseable');
269
- }
270
- current = validate(next.href); // re-run the FULL guard, not just the IP check
271
- continue;
272
- }
273
-
274
- if (!res.ok) {
275
- clearTimeout(timer);
276
- throw new GuardError(`fetch_status_${res.status}`);
277
- }
278
-
279
- const rawType = (res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
280
- if (!['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'image/gif'].includes(rawType)) {
281
- clearTimeout(timer);
282
- throw new GuardError('not_an_image');
283
- }
284
-
285
- if (!res.body) {
286
- clearTimeout(timer);
287
- throw new GuardError('empty_body');
288
- }
289
-
290
- const reader = res.body.getReader();
291
- const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
292
- let total = 0;
293
- try {
294
- for (;;) {
295
- if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
296
- const { done, value } = await reader.read();
297
- if (done) break;
298
- total += value.byteLength;
299
- if (total > MAX_BYTES) throw new GuardError('too_large');
300
- chunks.push(value);
301
- }
302
- } finally {
303
- clearTimeout(timer);
304
- try {
305
- reader.releaseLock();
306
- } catch {
307
- /* already released */
308
- }
309
- }
310
-
311
- const bytes = new Uint8Array(total);
312
- let offset = 0;
313
- for (const c of chunks) {
314
- bytes.set(c, offset);
315
- offset += c.byteLength;
316
- }
317
-
318
- const sniffed = sniffType(bytes.subarray(0, 12));
319
- if (!sniffed) throw new GuardError('not_an_image'); // header claimed image/*, bytes say otherwise
320
-
321
- return { bytes, contentType: sniffed, finalHost: current.hostname };
322
- }
323
- throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
324
- }
325
-
326
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
327
- // Handler
328
- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
329
-
330
- export async function handle(req: Request, operator: { userAgent: string }): Promise<Response> {
331
- if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: corsHeaders });
332
- if (req.method !== 'POST') return OK_RESPONSE(); // S4: constant response even for a malformed call shape
333
-
334
- const SUPABASE_URL = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!;
335
- const SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!;
336
-
337
- const caller = await verifyCaller(req.headers.get('Authorization') ?? req.headers.get('authorization'), SUPABASE_URL);
338
- if (!caller) return OK_RESPONSE(); // never reveal auth failure via response shape
339
-
340
- const admin = createClient(SUPABASE_URL, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, {
341
- auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false },
342
- });
343
-
344
- const ip = clientIp(req);
345
-
346
- // Charged BEFORE any URL validation (review finding B4b) -- otherwise
347
- // rejected probes against the guard itself are free.
348
- const [subHourOk, subDayOk, ipHourOk] = await Promise.all([
349
- checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-hour', caller.sub, 5, 3600),
350
- checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-day', caller.sub, 20, 86400),
351
- checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-ip-hour', ip, 20, 3600),
352
- ]);
353
- if (!subHourOk || !subDayOk || !ipHourOk) {
354
- await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'rate_limited' }, { severity: 'warning' });
355
- return OK_RESPONSE();
356
- }
357
-
358
- // "Authenticated" needs a floor beyond the JWT alone (review finding B4c):
359
- // require a real member_profiles row for this caller.
360
- const { data: profile, error: profileErr } = await admin
361
- .from('member_profiles')
362
- .select('avatar_url')
363
- .eq('auth_user_id', caller.sub)
364
- .maybeSingle();
365
- if (profileErr || !profile) {
366
- await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'no_member_profile' }, { severity: 'warning' });
367
- return OK_RESPONSE();
368
- }
369
-
370
- // The URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from the DB, never a client-supplied
371
- // body parameter (review finding S3) -- keeps this from being a generic
372
- // authenticated URL-fetch primitive.
373
- const target = profile.avatar_url as string | null;
374
-
375
- const writeFailure = async (reason: string, host: string | null) => {
376
- await admin
377
- .from('member_wall_photo_queue')
378
- .upsert(
379
- {
380
- auth_user_id: caller.sub,
381
- last_fetch_error: reason,
382
- last_fetch_at: new Date().toISOString(),
383
- last_fetch_host: host,
384
- },
385
- { onConflict: 'auth_user_id' },
386
- );
387
- await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason, host }, { severity: 'info' });
388
- };
389
-
390
- if (!target) {
391
- await writeFailure('no_avatar_url', null);
392
- return OK_RESPONSE();
393
- }
394
-
395
- let validated: URL;
396
- try {
397
- validated = validate(target);
398
- } catch (e) {
399
- const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'bad_url';
400
- let host: string | null = null;
401
- try {
402
- host = new URL(target).hostname;
403
- } catch {
404
- /* not even parseable -- host stays null */
405
- }
406
- await writeFailure(code, host);
407
- return OK_RESPONSE();
408
- }
409
-
410
- const deadline = Date.now() + FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
411
- let result: FetchResult;
412
- try {
413
- result = await guardedFetch(validated, deadline, operator.userAgent);
414
- } catch (e) {
415
- const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'fetch_failed';
416
- await writeFailure(code, validated.hostname);
417
- return OK_RESPONSE();
418
- }
419
-
420
- // Success path: write under fetched/{sub}/original -- NOT {sub}/original.
421
- // This is the RLS-inaccessible-to-members prefix (plan §3.1, review B1).
422
- // Never change this without re-running the review.
423
- const objectPath = `fetched/${caller.sub}/original`;
424
- const { error: uploadErr } = await admin.storage
425
- .from('member-photo-originals')
426
- .upload(objectPath, result.bytes, { contentType: result.contentType, upsert: true });
427
- if (uploadErr) {
428
- await writeFailure('storage_write_failed', result.finalHost);
429
- return OK_RESPONSE();
430
- }
431
-
432
- const { error: rpcErr } = await admin.rpc('upsert_wall_photo_queue_entry_for', {
433
- p_auth_user_id: caller.sub,
434
- p_object_path: objectPath,
435
- p_content_type: result.contentType,
436
- p_byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
437
- p_source_url: validated.href, // normalized, post-validation form only -- never the raw pasted string (review S1)
438
- });
439
- if (rpcErr) {
440
- await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'queue_upsert_failed', detail: rpcErr.message }, { severity: 'error' });
441
- return OK_RESPONSE();
442
- }
443
-
444
- await logOps(
445
- admin,
446
- 'wall_photo_fetch_succeeded',
447
- {
448
- sub: caller.sub,
449
- host: result.finalHost,
450
- content_type: result.contentType,
451
- byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
452
- },
453
- { severity: 'info' }, // logOps defaults to 'error' (which pages Slack) -- a
454
- // successful fetch is the routine case, not an alert.
455
- );
456
- return OK_RESPONSE();
457
- }
1
+ // Member wall photo -- best-effort link-fetch of a pasted external avatar
2
+ // URL, so it can be captured at full quality for the physical member wall.
3
+ // See member-wall-photo-plan-v1.md §3.4 for the full design and the Opus
4
+ // adversarial review (§8) that hardened this from a v1 IP-deny-list draft
5
+ // into the design below. This function is the direct, reviewed result of
6
+ // that process -- do not weaken any of the guards below without re-running
7
+ // that review, in particular:
8
+ // - the bucket path (`fetched/{sub}/original`) is NOT the member's own
9
+ // RLS-readable prefix -- writing here instead of `{sub}/original` is
10
+ // what keeps this blind SSRF rather than full-read SSRF (review finding
11
+ // B1). Never change this path to something the member can read back.
12
+ // - the guard is a HOSTNAME ALLOW-LIST, not an IP deny-list. An IP
13
+ // deny-list cannot be made sound in this runtime: Deno's fetch() has no
14
+ // way to pin a DNS resolution, so DNS rebinding defeats any pre-connect
15
+ // IP check unconditionally (review finding B2). The IP-literal checks
16
+ // below are defense-in-depth on redirect targets only, not the primary
17
+ // control.
18
+ // - the URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from member_profiles.avatar_url
19
+ // server-side, never a client-supplied body parameter (review finding
20
+ // S3) -- this keeps every probe attributable to a real, rate-limited
21
+ // profile write instead of making this an open URL-fetch primitive.
22
+ // - the HTTP response is ALWAYS a constant `{ ok: true }` regardless of
23
+ // outcome (review finding S4) -- the real reason lives only in
24
+ // ops_events / last_fetch_error, never in the response body, because
25
+ // that is the only oracle a direct caller has.
26
+
27
+ import { createClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2';
28
+ import { jwtVerify, createRemoteJWKSet } from 'npm:jose@5.9.6';
29
+ import { clientIp, checkRateLimit } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/rateLimit';
30
+ import { logOps } from 'npm:@simplelayer/graniteer-core/ops';
31
+
32
+ const corsHeaders = {
33
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
34
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'authorization, x-client-info, apikey, content-type',
35
+ 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
36
+ };
37
+
38
+ function json(status: number, body: unknown) {
39
+ return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
40
+ status,
41
+ headers: { ...corsHeaders, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
42
+ });
43
+ }
44
+
45
+ // Always this, regardless of what actually happened -- see file header, S4.
46
+ const OK_RESPONSE = () => json(200, { ok: true });
47
+
48
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
49
+ // Auth -- deliberately NOT the admin-door-write pattern (no aal2, no
50
+ // admin_users check). Any authenticated member may trigger this, scoped
51
+ // strictly to their own claims.sub -- the function does nothing the caller
52
+ // isn't entitled to do on their own behalf. What IS required, per review
53
+ // finding B4: issuer/audience-bound JWT verification, role==='authenticated'
54
+ // explicitly, is_anonymous rejected, and a real member_profiles row.
55
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
56
+
57
+ interface CallerClaims {
58
+ sub: string;
59
+ email?: string;
60
+ role?: string;
61
+ is_anonymous?: boolean;
62
+ }
63
+
64
+ const JWKS_URL_SUFFIX = '/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json';
65
+ let jwksCache: ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet> | null = null;
66
+ function getJwks(supabaseUrl: string) {
67
+ if (!jwksCache) jwksCache = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(`${supabaseUrl}${JWKS_URL_SUFFIX}`));
68
+ return jwksCache;
69
+ }
70
+
71
+ async function verifyCaller(authHeader: string | null, supabaseUrl: string): Promise<CallerClaims | null> {
72
+ if (!authHeader?.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null;
73
+ try {
74
+ const { payload } = await jwtVerify(authHeader.slice(7).trim(), getJwks(supabaseUrl), {
75
+ issuer: `${supabaseUrl}/auth/v1`,
76
+ audience: 'authenticated',
77
+ });
78
+ const claims = payload as unknown as CallerClaims;
79
+ if (!claims.sub) return null;
80
+ if (claims.role !== 'authenticated') return null;
81
+ if (claims.is_anonymous === true) return null;
82
+ return claims;
83
+ } catch {
84
+ return null;
85
+ }
86
+ }
87
+
88
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89
+ // URL guard -- hostname allow-list (review finding B2). Parse once, validate
90
+ // only the parsed fields, fetch the parsed .href -- never the raw string
91
+ // (review finding B2c). This alone disposes of the userinfo trick
92
+ // (https://trusted.com@169.254.169.254/ puts the real host in .hostname) and
93
+ // unicode/punycode confusion (.hostname is already IDNA-normalized).
94
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95
+
96
+ const ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES = [
97
+ 'licdn.com', // LinkedIn CDN (media.licdn.com, etc.)
98
+ 'googleusercontent.com', // Google account photos (lh3.googleusercontent.com, etc.)
99
+ 'gravatar.com', // secure.gravatar.com, www.gravatar.com
100
+ 'githubusercontent.com', // avatars.githubusercontent.com
101
+ ];
102
+
103
+ class GuardError extends Error {
104
+ constructor(public code: string) {
105
+ super(code);
106
+ }
107
+ }
108
+
109
+ function hostAllowed(hostname: string): boolean {
110
+ const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, '');
111
+ return ALLOWED_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((s) => h === s || h.endsWith('.' + s));
112
+ }
113
+
114
+ // Defense-in-depth only (review finding B3) -- applied to IP literals at
115
+ // every hop, including the initial URL. Not the primary control; the host
116
+ // allow-list above is. v4-mapped/compatible v6 forms are normalized to their
117
+ // embedded v4 address before the v4 list is applied, since Linux dual-stack
118
+ // sockets connect those straight through.
119
+ const V4_DENY_RANGES: Array<[number, number]> = (() => {
120
+ const toInt = (a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number) => ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;
121
+ const cidr = (base: [number, number, number, number], bits: number): [number, number] => {
122
+ const start = toInt(...base);
123
+ const size = 2 ** (32 - bits);
124
+ return [start >>> 0, (start + size - 1) >>> 0];
125
+ };
126
+ return [
127
+ cidr([0, 0, 0, 0], 8), // 0.0.0.0/8 -- reaches loopback on Linux
128
+ cidr([10, 0, 0, 0], 8),
129
+ cidr([100, 64, 0, 0], 10), // CGNAT -- includes Alibaba metadata 100.100.100.200
130
+ cidr([127, 0, 0, 0], 8),
131
+ cidr([169, 254, 0, 0], 16), // link-local -- cloud metadata endpoints
132
+ cidr([172, 16, 0, 0], 12),
133
+ cidr([192, 0, 0, 0], 24),
134
+ cidr([192, 168, 0, 0], 16),
135
+ cidr([198, 18, 0, 0], 15),
136
+ cidr([224, 0, 0, 0], 4), // multicast
137
+ cidr([240, 0, 0, 0], 4), // reserved
138
+ [toInt(255, 255, 255, 255), toInt(255, 255, 255, 255)],
139
+ ];
140
+ })();
141
+
142
+ function v4ToInt(v4: string): number | null {
143
+ const parts = v4.split('.').map(Number);
144
+ if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((p) => !Number.isInteger(p) || p < 0 || p > 255)) return null;
145
+ return ((parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8) | parts[3]) >>> 0;
146
+ }
147
+
148
+ function v4Denied(v4: string): boolean {
149
+ const n = v4ToInt(v4);
150
+ if (n === null) return true; // unparseable literal -- fail closed
151
+ return V4_DENY_RANGES.some(([lo, hi]) => n >= lo && n <= hi);
152
+ }
153
+
154
+ // Extract an embedded v4 address from common IPv4-in-IPv6 forms
155
+ // (::ffff:a.b.c.d, ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX, ::a.b.c.d, 64:ff9b::a.b.c.d NAT64,
156
+ // 2002:XXXX:XXXX::/16 6to4). Returns null if none found.
157
+ function embeddedV4(v6: string): string | null {
158
+ const lower = v6.toLowerCase();
159
+ const dotted = lower.match(/(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/);
160
+ if (dotted && (lower.startsWith('::ffff:') || lower.startsWith('::') || lower.startsWith('64:ff9b::'))) {
161
+ return dotted[1];
162
+ }
163
+ // ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX (hex form) or 6to4 2002:XXXX:XXXX::
164
+ const hexMatch = lower.match(/^(?:::ffff:|2002:)([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})/);
165
+ if (hexMatch) {
166
+ const hi = parseInt(hexMatch[1], 16);
167
+ const lo = parseInt(hexMatch[2], 16);
168
+ return `${(hi >> 8) & 0xff}.${hi & 0xff}.${(lo >> 8) & 0xff}.${lo & 0xff}`;
169
+ }
170
+ return null;
171
+ }
172
+
173
+ function ipLiteralDenied(hostname: string): boolean {
174
+ // v6 literal comes bracketed in a URL's .hostname per WHATWG (e.g. "::1")
175
+ const isV6 = hostname.includes(':');
176
+ if (!isV6) {
177
+ return /^[0-9.]+$/.test(hostname) ? v4Denied(hostname) : false; // not an IP literal at all -> not this check's job
178
+ }
179
+ const bare = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
180
+ if (['::', '::1'].includes(bare)) return true;
181
+ if (/^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(bare) || /^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i.test(bare)) return true; // fc00::/7, fe80::/10
182
+ if (/^ff/i.test(bare)) return true; // ff00::/8 multicast
183
+ if (bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001:0:') || bare.toLowerCase().startsWith('2001::')) return true; // Teredo 2001::/32
184
+ const embedded = embeddedV4(bare);
185
+ if (embedded) return v4Denied(embedded);
186
+ return false;
187
+ }
188
+
189
+ function validate(raw: string): URL {
190
+ if (raw.length > 2048) throw new GuardError('url_too_long');
191
+ let u: URL;
192
+ try {
193
+ u = new URL(raw);
194
+ } catch {
195
+ throw new GuardError('bad_url');
196
+ }
197
+ if (u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new GuardError('scheme_not_allowed');
198
+ if (u.port !== '') throw new GuardError('port_not_allowed'); // WHATWG strips :443; '' is the only legal value
199
+ if (u.username || u.password) throw new GuardError('userinfo_not_allowed');
200
+ if (ipLiteralDenied(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('ip_range_blocked');
201
+ if (!hostAllowed(u.hostname)) throw new GuardError('host_not_allowed');
202
+ return u; // fetch u.href -- the parsed/normalized form -- never `raw`
203
+ }
204
+
205
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
206
+ // Fetch, with redirect handling, one shared deadline, streamed size cap, and
207
+ // magic-byte content sniffing.
208
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
209
+
210
+ const MAX_BYTES = 15 * 1024 * 1024;
211
+ const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 8000;
212
+ const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
213
+
214
+ const MAGIC: Array<{ type: string; bytes: number[]; mask?: (b: Uint8Array) => boolean }> = [
215
+ { type: 'image/jpeg', bytes: [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff] },
216
+ { type: 'image/png', bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a] },
217
+ { type: 'image/gif', bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38] },
218
+ {
219
+ type: 'image/webp',
220
+ bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46],
221
+ mask: (b) => b.length >= 12 && b[8] === 0x57 && b[9] === 0x45 && b[10] === 0x42 && b[11] === 0x50,
222
+ },
223
+ ];
224
+
225
+ function sniffType(head: Uint8Array): string | null {
226
+ for (const m of MAGIC) {
227
+ if (head.length < m.bytes.length) continue;
228
+ if (m.bytes.every((byte, i) => head[i] === byte) && (!m.mask || m.mask(head))) return m.type;
229
+ }
230
+ return null;
231
+ }
232
+
233
+ interface FetchResult {
234
+ bytes: Uint8Array;
235
+ contentType: string;
236
+ finalHost: string;
237
+ }
238
+
239
+ async function guardedFetch(startUrl: URL, deadline: number, userAgent: string): Promise<FetchResult> {
240
+ let current = startUrl;
241
+ for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
242
+ const remaining = deadline - Date.now();
243
+ if (remaining <= 0) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
244
+ const controller = new AbortController();
245
+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), remaining);
246
+ let res: Response;
247
+ try {
248
+ res = await fetch(current.href, {
249
+ redirect: 'manual',
250
+ signal: controller.signal,
251
+ headers: { 'User-Agent': userAgent, Accept: 'image/*' },
252
+ });
253
+ } catch (e) {
254
+ clearTimeout(timer);
255
+ if ((e as Error)?.name === 'AbortError') throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
256
+ throw new GuardError('fetch_failed');
257
+ }
258
+
259
+ if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
260
+ clearTimeout(timer);
261
+ const loc = res.headers.get('location');
262
+ if (!loc) throw new GuardError('redirect_missing_location');
263
+ if (hop === MAX_REDIRECTS) throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
264
+ let next: URL;
265
+ try {
266
+ next = new URL(loc, current.href); // resolve against the CURRENT hop, not the origin
267
+ } catch {
268
+ throw new GuardError('redirect_unparseable');
269
+ }
270
+ current = validate(next.href); // re-run the FULL guard, not just the IP check
271
+ continue;
272
+ }
273
+
274
+ if (!res.ok) {
275
+ clearTimeout(timer);
276
+ throw new GuardError(`fetch_status_${res.status}`);
277
+ }
278
+
279
+ const rawType = (res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
280
+ if (!['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'image/gif'].includes(rawType)) {
281
+ clearTimeout(timer);
282
+ throw new GuardError('not_an_image');
283
+ }
284
+
285
+ if (!res.body) {
286
+ clearTimeout(timer);
287
+ throw new GuardError('empty_body');
288
+ }
289
+
290
+ const reader = res.body.getReader();
291
+ const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
292
+ let total = 0;
293
+ try {
294
+ for (;;) {
295
+ if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new GuardError('fetch_timeout');
296
+ const { done, value } = await reader.read();
297
+ if (done) break;
298
+ total += value.byteLength;
299
+ if (total > MAX_BYTES) throw new GuardError('too_large');
300
+ chunks.push(value);
301
+ }
302
+ } finally {
303
+ clearTimeout(timer);
304
+ try {
305
+ reader.releaseLock();
306
+ } catch {
307
+ /* already released */
308
+ }
309
+ }
310
+
311
+ const bytes = new Uint8Array(total);
312
+ let offset = 0;
313
+ for (const c of chunks) {
314
+ bytes.set(c, offset);
315
+ offset += c.byteLength;
316
+ }
317
+
318
+ const sniffed = sniffType(bytes.subarray(0, 12));
319
+ if (!sniffed) throw new GuardError('not_an_image'); // header claimed image/*, bytes say otherwise
320
+
321
+ return { bytes, contentType: sniffed, finalHost: current.hostname };
322
+ }
323
+ throw new GuardError('too_many_redirects');
324
+ }
325
+
326
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
327
+ // Handler
328
+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
329
+
330
+ export async function handle(req: Request, operator: { userAgent: string }): Promise<Response> {
331
+ if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') return new Response('ok', { headers: corsHeaders });
332
+ if (req.method !== 'POST') return OK_RESPONSE(); // S4: constant response even for a malformed call shape
333
+
334
+ const SUPABASE_URL = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!;
335
+ const SERVICE_ROLE_KEY = Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!;
336
+
337
+ const caller = await verifyCaller(req.headers.get('Authorization') ?? req.headers.get('authorization'), SUPABASE_URL);
338
+ if (!caller) return OK_RESPONSE(); // never reveal auth failure via response shape
339
+
340
+ const admin = createClient(SUPABASE_URL, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, {
341
+ auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false },
342
+ });
343
+
344
+ const ip = clientIp(req);
345
+
346
+ // Charged BEFORE any URL validation (review finding B4b) -- otherwise
347
+ // rejected probes against the guard itself are free.
348
+ const [subHourOk, subDayOk, ipHourOk] = await Promise.all([
349
+ checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-hour', caller.sub, 5, 3600),
350
+ checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-sub-day', caller.sub, 20, 86400),
351
+ checkRateLimit(admin, 'fetch-avatar-original-ip-hour', ip, 20, 3600),
352
+ ]);
353
+ if (!subHourOk || !subDayOk || !ipHourOk) {
354
+ await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'rate_limited' }, { severity: 'warning' });
355
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
356
+ }
357
+
358
+ // "Authenticated" needs a floor beyond the JWT alone (review finding B4c):
359
+ // require a real member_profiles row for this caller.
360
+ const { data: profile, error: profileErr } = await admin
361
+ .from('member_profiles')
362
+ .select('avatar_url')
363
+ .eq('auth_user_id', caller.sub)
364
+ .maybeSingle();
365
+ if (profileErr || !profile) {
366
+ await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_rejected', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'no_member_profile' }, { severity: 'warning' });
367
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
368
+ }
369
+
370
+ // The URL fetched is ALWAYS read fresh from the DB, never a client-supplied
371
+ // body parameter (review finding S3) -- keeps this from being a generic
372
+ // authenticated URL-fetch primitive.
373
+ const target = profile.avatar_url as string | null;
374
+
375
+ const writeFailure = async (reason: string, host: string | null) => {
376
+ await admin
377
+ .from('member_wall_photo_queue')
378
+ .upsert(
379
+ {
380
+ auth_user_id: caller.sub,
381
+ last_fetch_error: reason,
382
+ last_fetch_at: new Date().toISOString(),
383
+ last_fetch_host: host,
384
+ },
385
+ { onConflict: 'auth_user_id' },
386
+ );
387
+ await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason, host }, { severity: 'info' });
388
+ };
389
+
390
+ if (!target) {
391
+ await writeFailure('no_avatar_url', null);
392
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
393
+ }
394
+
395
+ let validated: URL;
396
+ try {
397
+ validated = validate(target);
398
+ } catch (e) {
399
+ const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'bad_url';
400
+ let host: string | null = null;
401
+ try {
402
+ host = new URL(target).hostname;
403
+ } catch {
404
+ /* not even parseable -- host stays null */
405
+ }
406
+ await writeFailure(code, host);
407
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
408
+ }
409
+
410
+ const deadline = Date.now() + FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
411
+ let result: FetchResult;
412
+ try {
413
+ result = await guardedFetch(validated, deadline, operator.userAgent);
414
+ } catch (e) {
415
+ const code = e instanceof GuardError ? e.code : 'fetch_failed';
416
+ await writeFailure(code, validated.hostname);
417
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
418
+ }
419
+
420
+ // Success path: write under fetched/{sub}/original -- NOT {sub}/original.
421
+ // This is the RLS-inaccessible-to-members prefix (plan §3.1, review B1).
422
+ // Never change this without re-running the review.
423
+ const objectPath = `fetched/${caller.sub}/original`;
424
+ const { error: uploadErr } = await admin.storage
425
+ .from('member-photo-originals')
426
+ .upload(objectPath, result.bytes, { contentType: result.contentType, upsert: true });
427
+ if (uploadErr) {
428
+ await writeFailure('storage_write_failed', result.finalHost);
429
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
430
+ }
431
+
432
+ const { error: rpcErr } = await admin.rpc('upsert_wall_photo_queue_entry_for', {
433
+ p_auth_user_id: caller.sub,
434
+ p_object_path: objectPath,
435
+ p_content_type: result.contentType,
436
+ p_byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
437
+ p_source_url: validated.href, // normalized, post-validation form only -- never the raw pasted string (review S1)
438
+ });
439
+ if (rpcErr) {
440
+ await logOps(admin, 'wall_photo_fetch_failed', { sub: caller.sub, reason: 'queue_upsert_failed', detail: rpcErr.message }, { severity: 'error' });
441
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
442
+ }
443
+
444
+ await logOps(
445
+ admin,
446
+ 'wall_photo_fetch_succeeded',
447
+ {
448
+ sub: caller.sub,
449
+ host: result.finalHost,
450
+ content_type: result.contentType,
451
+ byte_size: result.bytes.byteLength,
452
+ },
453
+ { severity: 'info' }, // logOps defaults to 'error' (which pages Slack) -- a
454
+ // successful fetch is the routine case, not an alert.
455
+ );
456
+ return OK_RESPONSE();
457
+ }