@sigil-security/policy 0.0.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+// src/types.ts
+var DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS = ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"];
+var DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES = [
+  "application/json",
+  "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+  "multipart/form-data"
+];
+var DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME = "x-csrf-token";
+var DEFAULT_ONESHOT_HEADER_NAME = "x-csrf-one-shot-token";
+var DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME = "csrf_token";
+var DEFAULT_FORM_FIELD_NAME = "csrf_token";
+var DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
+
+// src/fetch-metadata.ts
+var VALID_FETCH_SITE_VALUES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "same-origin",
+  "same-site",
+  "cross-site",
+  "none"
+]);
+function createFetchMetadataPolicy(config) {
+  const legacyMode = config?.legacyBrowserMode ?? "degraded";
+  return {
+    name: "fetch-metadata",
+    validate(metadata) {
+      const secFetchSite = metadata.secFetchSite;
+      if (secFetchSite === null || secFetchSite === "") {
+        if (legacyMode === "strict") {
+          return {
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: "fetch_metadata_missing_strict"
+          };
+        }
+        return { allowed: true };
+      }
+      const normalized = secFetchSite.toLowerCase();
+      if (!VALID_FETCH_SITE_VALUES.has(normalized)) {
+        return {
+          allowed: false,
+          reason: `fetch_metadata_invalid_value:${normalized}`
+        };
+      }
+      if (normalized === "same-origin") {
+        return { allowed: true };
+      }
+      if (normalized === "same-site") {
+        return { allowed: true };
+      }
+      if (normalized === "cross-site") {
+        return {
+          allowed: false,
+          reason: "fetch_metadata_cross_site"
+        };
+      }
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: "fetch_metadata_none"
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/origin.ts
+function extractOriginFromReferer(referer) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(referer);
+    return url.origin;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function normalizeOrigin(origin) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(origin);
+    return url.origin;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function createOriginPolicy(config) {
+  const normalizedAllowed = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (const o of config.allowedOrigins) {
+    const normalized = normalizeOrigin(o);
+    if (normalized !== null) {
+      normalizedAllowed.add(normalized);
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    name: "origin",
+    validate(metadata) {
+      const { origin, referer } = metadata;
+      if (origin !== null && origin !== "") {
+        const normalizedOrigin = normalizeOrigin(origin);
+        if (normalizedOrigin !== null && normalizedAllowed.has(normalizedOrigin)) {
+          return { allowed: true };
+        }
+        return {
+          allowed: false,
+          reason: `origin_mismatch:${normalizedOrigin ?? origin}`
+        };
+      }
+      if (referer !== null && referer !== "") {
+        const refererOrigin = extractOriginFromReferer(referer);
+        if (refererOrigin === null) {
+          return {
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: "origin_referer_invalid"
+          };
+        }
+        const normalizedRefererOrigin = normalizeOrigin(refererOrigin);
+        if (normalizedRefererOrigin !== null && normalizedAllowed.has(normalizedRefererOrigin)) {
+          return { allowed: true };
+        }
+        return {
+          allowed: false,
+          reason: `origin_referer_mismatch:${normalizedRefererOrigin ?? refererOrigin}`
+        };
+      }
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: "origin_missing"
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/method.ts
+var DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET = new Set(
+  DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS.map((m) => m.toUpperCase())
+);
+function createMethodPolicy(config) {
+  const _protectedMethods = config?.protectedMethods ? new Set(config.protectedMethods.map((m) => m.toUpperCase())) : DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET;
+  return {
+    name: "method",
+    validate(_metadata) {
+      return { allowed: true };
+    }
+  };
+}
+function isProtectedMethod(method, protectedMethods) {
+  const methods = protectedMethods ? new Set(protectedMethods.map((m) => m.toUpperCase())) : DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET;
+  return methods.has(method.toUpperCase());
+}
+
+// src/content-type.ts
+function extractMimeType(contentType) {
+  const semicolonIndex = contentType.indexOf(";");
+  const mimeType = semicolonIndex >= 0 ? contentType.slice(0, semicolonIndex) : contentType;
+  return mimeType.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+function createContentTypePolicy(config) {
+  const allowedTypes = new Set(
+    (config?.allowedContentTypes ?? DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES).map((t) => t.toLowerCase())
+  );
+  const stateChangingMethods = new Set(DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS);
+  return {
+    name: "content-type",
+    validate(metadata) {
+      const { contentType, method } = metadata;
+      if (contentType === null || contentType === "") {
+        if (stateChangingMethods.has(method.toUpperCase())) {
+          return {
+            allowed: false,
+            reason: "content_type_missing_on_state_change"
+          };
+        }
+        return { allowed: true };
+      }
+      const mimeType = extractMimeType(contentType);
+      if (allowedTypes.has(mimeType)) {
+        return { allowed: true };
+      }
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: `content_type_disallowed:${mimeType}`
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/mode-detection.ts
+function detectClientMode(metadata, config) {
+  if (config?.disableClientModeOverride !== true && metadata.clientType !== void 0 && metadata.clientType.toLowerCase() === "api") {
+    return "api";
+  }
+  if (metadata.secFetchSite !== null && metadata.secFetchSite !== "") {
+    return "browser";
+  }
+  return "api";
+}
+
+// src/context-binding.ts
+function evaluateContextBinding(contextMatches, config, sessionAge) {
+  const { tier } = config;
+  const gracePeriodMs = config.gracePeriodMs ?? DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS;
+  if (contextMatches) {
+    return {
+      matches: true,
+      enforced: false,
+      inGracePeriod: false,
+      tier
+    };
+  }
+  switch (tier) {
+    case "low":
+      return {
+        matches: false,
+        enforced: false,
+        inGracePeriod: false,
+        tier
+      };
+    case "medium": {
+      const inGrace = sessionAge !== void 0 && sessionAge >= 0 && sessionAge < gracePeriodMs;
+      return {
+        matches: false,
+        enforced: !inGrace,
+        // enforce only if NOT in grace period
+        inGracePeriod: inGrace,
+        tier
+      };
+    }
+    case "high":
+      return {
+        matches: false,
+        enforced: true,
+        inGracePeriod: false,
+        tier
+      };
+  }
+}
+function createContextBindingPolicy(_config) {
+  return {
+    name: "context-binding",
+    validate(_metadata) {
+      return { allowed: true };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// src/policy-chain.ts
+function createPolicyChain(policies) {
+  return {
+    name: "policy-chain",
+    validate(metadata) {
+      return evaluatePolicyChain(policies, metadata);
+    }
+  };
+}
+function evaluatePolicyChain(policies, metadata) {
+  if (policies.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: "empty_policy_chain",
+      evaluated: [],
+      failures: []
+    };
+  }
+  let allAllowed = true;
+  let firstReason = "";
+  const evaluated = [];
+  const failures = [];
+  for (const policy of policies) {
+    evaluated.push(policy.name);
+    const result = policy.validate(metadata);
+    if (!result.allowed) {
+      failures.push(policy.name);
+      if (allAllowed) {
+        firstReason = result.reason;
+        allAllowed = false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (allAllowed) {
+    return {
+      allowed: true,
+      evaluated,
+      failures
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    allowed: false,
+    reason: firstReason,
+    evaluated,
+    failures
+  };
+}
+
+// src/token-transport.ts
+function resolveTokenTransport(metadata, _config) {
+  const { tokenSource } = metadata;
+  if (tokenSource.from === "none") {
+    return {
+      found: false,
+      reason: "no_token_present"
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    found: true,
+    source: tokenSource,
+    warnings: []
+  };
+}
+function isValidTokenTransport(source) {
+  return source.from === "header" || source.from === "body-json" || source.from === "body-form";
+}
+function getTokenHeaderName(config) {
+  return config?.headerName ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME;
+}
+function getTokenJsonFieldName(config) {
+  return config?.jsonFieldName ?? DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME;
+}
+function getTokenFormFieldName(config) {
+  return config?.formFieldName ?? DEFAULT_FORM_FIELD_NAME;
+}
+export {
+  DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES,
+  DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS,
+  DEFAULT_FORM_FIELD_NAME,
+  DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME,
+  DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME,
+  DEFAULT_ONESHOT_HEADER_NAME,
+  DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS,
+  createContentTypePolicy,
+  createContextBindingPolicy,
+  createFetchMetadataPolicy,
+  createMethodPolicy,
+  createOriginPolicy,
+  createPolicyChain,
+  detectClientMode,
+  evaluateContextBinding,
+  evaluatePolicyChain,
+  getTokenFormFieldName,
+  getTokenHeaderName,
+  getTokenJsonFieldName,
+  isProtectedMethod,
+  isValidTokenTransport,
+  resolveTokenTransport
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/types.ts","../src/fetch-metadata.ts","../src/origin.ts","../src/method.ts","../src/content-type.ts","../src/mode-detection.ts","../src/context-binding.ts","../src/policy-chain.ts","../src/token-transport.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// @sigil-security/policy — Types and interfaces\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md Sections 5, 6, 8\n\n// ============================================================\n// Token Source (how the token was transported)\n// ============================================================\n\n/**\n * Describes where a CSRF token was found in the request.\n *\n * Transport precedence (strict order per SPECIFICATION.md §8.3):\n * 1. Custom header (X-CSRF-Token)\n * 2. Request body (JSON)\n * 3. Request body (form)\n * 4. None (no token found)\n *\n * Query parameter transport is NEVER allowed.\n */\nexport type TokenSource =\n  | { readonly from: 'header'; readonly value: string }\n  | { readonly from: 'body-json'; readonly value: string }\n  | { readonly from: 'body-form'; readonly value: string }\n  | { readonly from: 'none' }\n\n// ============================================================\n// Request Metadata (normalized, framework-agnostic)\n// ============================================================\n\n/**\n * Normalized request metadata extracted from HTTP requests.\n *\n * **CRITICAL:** This is a plain object — NOT a framework-specific Request, req, res,\n * or any HTTP object. The runtime layer is responsible for extracting RequestMetadata\n * from framework objects (Express, Fastify, Hono, etc.).\n *\n * The policy layer NEVER touches raw HTTP objects.\n */\nexport interface RequestMetadata {\n  /** HTTP method (uppercase: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, etc.) */\n  readonly method: string\n\n  /** Origin header value, or null if absent */\n  readonly origin: string | null\n\n  /** Referer header value, or null if absent */\n  readonly referer: string | null\n\n  /** Sec-Fetch-Site header: same-origin, same-site, cross-site, none, or null */\n  readonly secFetchSite: string | null\n\n  /** Sec-Fetch-Mode header: cors, navigate, no-cors, same-origin, websocket, or null */\n  readonly secFetchMode: string | null\n\n  /** Sec-Fetch-Dest header: document, embed, font, image, script, style, etc., or null */\n  readonly secFetchDest: string | null\n\n  /** Content-Type header value (without parameters), or null if absent */\n  readonly contentType: string | null\n\n  /** Describes how the CSRF token was transported */\n  readonly tokenSource: TokenSource\n\n  /** Optional: explicit client type override header (X-Client-Type) */\n  readonly clientType?: string | undefined\n}\n\n// ============================================================\n// Policy Result\n// ============================================================\n\n/**\n * Result of a policy validation check.\n *\n * - `allowed: true` — request passes this policy check\n * - `allowed: false` — request fails with an internal reason (NEVER exposed to client)\n */\nexport type PolicyResult =\n  | { readonly allowed: true }\n  | { readonly allowed: false; readonly reason: string }\n\n// ============================================================\n// Policy Validator Interface\n// ============================================================\n\n/**\n * A single validation policy that examines request metadata.\n *\n * Policies are composable via `createPolicyChain`.\n * Each policy is a pure function of `RequestMetadata` — no side effects, no I/O.\n */\nexport interface PolicyValidator {\n  /** Unique identifier for this policy (for logging/metrics) */\n  readonly name: string\n\n  /** Validate request metadata against this policy */\n  validate(metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult\n}\n\n// ============================================================\n// Configuration Types\n// ============================================================\n\n/** Legacy browser handling mode for Fetch Metadata policy */\nexport type LegacyBrowserMode = 'degraded' | 'strict'\n\n/** Configuration for Fetch Metadata policy */\nexport interface FetchMetadataConfig {\n  /** How to handle requests without Fetch Metadata headers (default: 'degraded') */\n  readonly legacyBrowserMode?: LegacyBrowserMode | undefined\n}\n\n/** Configuration for Origin policy */\nexport interface OriginConfig {\n  /** List of allowed origins (e.g., ['https://example.com', 'https://api.example.com']) */\n  readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/** Configuration for Method policy */\nexport interface MethodConfig {\n  /** HTTP methods that require CSRF protection (default: POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) */\n  readonly protectedMethods?: readonly string[] | undefined\n}\n\n/** Configuration for Content-Type policy */\nexport interface ContentTypeConfig {\n  /** Allowed Content-Type values (default: application/json, application/x-www-form-urlencoded, multipart/form-data) */\n  readonly allowedContentTypes?: readonly string[] | undefined\n}\n\n// ============================================================\n// Context Binding Types (Risk Tier Model)\n// ============================================================\n\n/** Risk tier for context binding per SPECIFICATION.md §6.2 */\nexport type RiskTier = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high'\n\n/** Configuration for context binding policy */\nexport interface ContextBindingConfig {\n  /** Risk tier determining binding strictness */\n  readonly tier: RiskTier\n\n  /**\n   * Grace period in milliseconds for session rotation tolerance.\n   * Only applies to 'medium' tier (soft-fail with grace period).\n   * Default: 5 minutes (300_000 ms)\n   */\n  readonly gracePeriodMs?: number | undefined\n}\n\n// ============================================================\n// Token Transport Types\n// ============================================================\n\n/** Configuration for token transport extraction */\nexport interface TokenTransportConfig {\n  /** Custom header name (default: 'x-csrf-token') */\n  readonly headerName?: string | undefined\n\n  /** JSON body field name (default: 'csrf_token') */\n  readonly jsonFieldName?: string | undefined\n\n  /** Form body field name (default: 'csrf_token') */\n  readonly formFieldName?: string | undefined\n}\n\n/** Result of token transport extraction */\nexport type TokenTransportResult =\n  | { readonly found: true; readonly source: TokenSource; readonly warnings: readonly string[] }\n  | { readonly found: false; readonly reason: string }\n\n// ============================================================\n// Client Mode\n// ============================================================\n\n/** Detected client mode per SPECIFICATION.md §8.2 */\nexport type ClientMode = 'browser' | 'api'\n\n// ============================================================\n// Default Constants\n// ============================================================\n\n/** Default HTTP methods requiring CSRF protection */\nexport const DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS: readonly string[] = ['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']\n\n/** Default allowed Content-Type values */\nexport const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES: readonly string[] = [\n  'application/json',\n  'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n  'multipart/form-data',\n]\n\n/** Default token header name */\nexport const DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME = 'x-csrf-token'\n\n/** Default one-shot token header name */\nexport const DEFAULT_ONESHOT_HEADER_NAME = 'x-csrf-one-shot-token'\n\n/** Default JSON body field name for CSRF token */\nexport const DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME = 'csrf_token'\n\n/** Default form body field name for CSRF token */\nexport const DEFAULT_FORM_FIELD_NAME = 'csrf_token'\n\n/** Default grace period for medium-tier context binding (5 minutes) */\nexport const DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Fetch Metadata validation\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §5.1, §8.4\n\nimport type {\n  FetchMetadataConfig,\n  LegacyBrowserMode,\n  PolicyResult,\n  PolicyValidator,\n  RequestMetadata,\n} from './types.js'\n\n/** Valid Sec-Fetch-Site header values */\nconst VALID_FETCH_SITE_VALUES = new Set([\n  'same-origin',\n  'same-site',\n  'cross-site',\n  'none',\n])\n\n/**\n * Creates a Fetch Metadata policy validator.\n *\n * Validates requests using the `Sec-Fetch-Site` header (W3C Fetch Metadata):\n * - `same-origin` → allow\n * - `same-site` → allow (log warning for cross-origin subdomain)\n * - `cross-site` → reject (state-changing request from external origin)\n * - `none` → reject (browser extension or untrusted origin)\n * - Header absent → depends on `legacyBrowserMode`:\n *   - `'degraded'` (default) → allow (fallback to Origin + Token validation)\n *   - `'strict'` → reject (modern browser required)\n *\n * @param config - Optional configuration for legacy browser handling\n * @returns PolicyValidator for Fetch Metadata\n */\nexport function createFetchMetadataPolicy(config?: FetchMetadataConfig): PolicyValidator {\n  const legacyMode: LegacyBrowserMode = config?.legacyBrowserMode ?? 'degraded'\n\n  return {\n    name: 'fetch-metadata',\n\n    validate(metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      const secFetchSite = metadata.secFetchSite\n\n      // Header absent → legacy browser or non-browser client\n      if (secFetchSite === null || secFetchSite === '') {\n        if (legacyMode === 'strict') {\n          return {\n            allowed: false,\n            reason: 'fetch_metadata_missing_strict',\n          }\n        }\n        // Degraded mode: allow, rely on other validation layers (Origin + Token)\n        return { allowed: true }\n      }\n\n      // Normalize to lowercase for consistent comparison\n      const normalized = secFetchSite.toLowerCase()\n\n      // Unrecognized value → reject\n      if (!VALID_FETCH_SITE_VALUES.has(normalized)) {\n        return {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: `fetch_metadata_invalid_value:${normalized}`,\n        }\n      }\n\n      // same-origin → allow (trusted)\n      if (normalized === 'same-origin') {\n        return { allowed: true }\n      }\n\n      // same-site → allow (subdomain, cross-origin but same site)\n      // Per SPECIFICATION.md §8.4: Allow but log (cross-origin)\n      if (normalized === 'same-site') {\n        return { allowed: true }\n      }\n\n      // cross-site → reject (external origin)\n      if (normalized === 'cross-site') {\n        return {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'fetch_metadata_cross_site',\n        }\n      }\n\n      // none → reject (browser extension or untrusted origin)\n      // Per SPECIFICATION.md §8.4: Browser extension initiated requests are rejected\n      // This is the last valid value in VALID_FETCH_SITE_VALUES, so no else needed\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: 'fetch_metadata_none',\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Origin / Referer validation\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §5.2, RFC 6454\n\nimport type { OriginConfig, PolicyResult, PolicyValidator, RequestMetadata } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Extracts origin from a Referer URL.\n *\n * Example: \"https://example.com/path/page?q=1\" → \"https://example.com\"\n *\n * Returns null if the Referer is not a valid URL.\n */\nfunction extractOriginFromReferer(referer: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(referer)\n    return url.origin\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalizes an origin string by removing trailing slashes and lowering the scheme/host.\n *\n * **Security (L5 fix):** Returns `null` on URL parse failure instead of a\n * fallback string comparison. A malformed origin can never match any entry\n * in `allowedOrigins`, eliminating unintentional string-level matches.\n *\n * @param origin - Origin string (e.g., \"https://Example.COM/\")\n * @returns Normalized origin (e.g., \"https://example.com\"), or null if invalid\n */\nfunction normalizeOrigin(origin: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(origin)\n    return url.origin\n  } catch {\n    // Invalid origin — return null so it never matches any allowed origin\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an Origin/Referer policy validator.\n *\n * Validates request provenance using Origin and Referer headers:\n * - If Origin header present → strict match against allowed origins\n * - If Origin absent → Referer header fallback (extract origin from URL)\n * - Both absent → reject (no provenance signal)\n *\n * @param config - Configuration with list of allowed origins\n * @returns PolicyValidator for Origin/Referer\n */\nexport function createOriginPolicy(config: OriginConfig): PolicyValidator {\n  // Pre-normalize allowed origins — filter out invalid entries (null from parse failure)\n  const normalizedAllowed = new Set<string>()\n  for (const o of config.allowedOrigins) {\n    const normalized = normalizeOrigin(o)\n    if (normalized !== null) {\n      normalizedAllowed.add(normalized)\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    name: 'origin',\n\n    validate(metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      const { origin, referer } = metadata\n\n      // Try Origin header first\n      if (origin !== null && origin !== '') {\n        const normalizedOrigin = normalizeOrigin(origin)\n\n        // null = malformed origin → automatic mismatch (L5 fix)\n        if (normalizedOrigin !== null && normalizedAllowed.has(normalizedOrigin)) {\n          return { allowed: true }\n        }\n\n        return {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: `origin_mismatch:${normalizedOrigin ?? origin}`,\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Origin absent → fallback to Referer\n      if (referer !== null && referer !== '') {\n        const refererOrigin = extractOriginFromReferer(referer)\n\n        if (refererOrigin === null) {\n          return {\n            allowed: false,\n            reason: 'origin_referer_invalid',\n          }\n        }\n\n        const normalizedRefererOrigin = normalizeOrigin(refererOrigin)\n\n        // null = malformed → automatic mismatch\n        if (normalizedRefererOrigin !== null && normalizedAllowed.has(normalizedRefererOrigin)) {\n          return { allowed: true }\n        }\n\n        return {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: `origin_referer_mismatch:${normalizedRefererOrigin ?? refererOrigin}`,\n        }\n      }\n\n      // Both absent → reject (no provenance signal)\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: 'origin_missing',\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — HTTP Method filtering\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §5.4\n\nimport type { MethodConfig, PolicyResult, PolicyValidator, RequestMetadata } from './types.js'\nimport { DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Pre-built Set of default protected methods for hot-path lookups.\n * Avoids creating a new Set on every `isProtectedMethod` call.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET = new Set(\n  DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS.map((m) => m.toUpperCase()),\n)\n\n/**\n * Creates an HTTP Method policy validator.\n *\n * This policy acts as a **gate**: it determines whether the request's HTTP method\n * requires CSRF protection. Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) are allowed through\n * immediately. Protected methods (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) pass the gate too —\n * the actual token validation is done by the runtime layer.\n *\n * **Usage in policy chains:** This policy never rejects. The runtime layer uses\n * `isProtectedMethod()` to decide whether to run the CSRF validation pipeline\n * at all. This policy is included in the chain for audit/metrics purposes\n * (knowing which policies were evaluated).\n *\n * @param config - Optional configuration with custom protected methods\n * @returns PolicyValidator for HTTP method classification\n */\nexport function createMethodPolicy(config?: MethodConfig): PolicyValidator {\n  const _protectedMethods = config?.protectedMethods\n    ? new Set(config.protectedMethods.map((m) => m.toUpperCase()))\n    : DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET\n\n  return {\n    name: 'method',\n\n    validate(_metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      // This policy is a classifier, not a gatekeeper.\n      // The runtime layer uses isProtectedMethod() to decide whether to\n      // run the full validation pipeline. This always allows through.\n      return { allowed: true }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks whether an HTTP method requires CSRF protection.\n *\n * This is the primary utility used by the runtime layer to determine\n * whether to run the full policy chain + token validation for a request.\n *\n * Uses a pre-built Set for default methods to avoid per-call allocation.\n *\n * @param method - HTTP method string\n * @param protectedMethods - Custom protected methods list (default: POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE)\n * @returns true if the method requires CSRF protection\n */\nexport function isProtectedMethod(\n  method: string,\n  protectedMethods?: readonly string[],\n): boolean {\n  const methods = protectedMethods\n    ? new Set(protectedMethods.map((m) => m.toUpperCase()))\n    : DEFAULT_PROTECTED_SET\n  return methods.has(method.toUpperCase())\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Content-Type restriction\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §5.5\n\nimport type {\n  ContentTypeConfig,\n  PolicyResult,\n  PolicyValidator,\n  RequestMetadata,\n} from './types.js'\nimport { DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES, DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Extracts the MIME type from a Content-Type header value,\n * stripping any parameters (charset, boundary, etc.).\n *\n * Example: \"application/json; charset=utf-8\" → \"application/json\"\n * Example: \"multipart/form-data; boundary=---\" → \"multipart/form-data\"\n *\n * @param contentType - Raw Content-Type header value\n * @returns Normalized MIME type (lowercase, no parameters)\n */\nfunction extractMimeType(contentType: string): string {\n  const semicolonIndex = contentType.indexOf(';')\n  const mimeType = semicolonIndex >= 0 ? contentType.slice(0, semicolonIndex) : contentType\n  return mimeType.trim().toLowerCase()\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a Content-Type policy validator.\n *\n * Restricts requests to known-safe Content-Type values:\n * - `application/json` (default)\n * - `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` (default)\n * - `multipart/form-data` (default)\n *\n * **Security (L6 fix):** State-changing methods (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE)\n * WITHOUT a Content-Type header are now rejected. Safe methods (GET, HEAD,\n * OPTIONS) without Content-Type are still allowed (no body expected).\n *\n * Content-Type parameters (charset, boundary) are stripped before comparison.\n *\n * Per SPECIFICATION.md §8.3: Content-Type mismatch (e.g., claiming JSON but\n * sending form data) is handled by the runtime layer, not the policy layer.\n *\n * @param config - Optional configuration with custom allowed Content-Types\n * @returns PolicyValidator for Content-Type restriction\n */\nexport function createContentTypePolicy(config?: ContentTypeConfig): PolicyValidator {\n  const allowedTypes = new Set(\n    (config?.allowedContentTypes ?? DEFAULT_ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES).map((t) => t.toLowerCase()),\n  )\n  const stateChangingMethods = new Set(DEFAULT_PROTECTED_METHODS)\n\n  return {\n    name: 'content-type',\n\n    validate(metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      const { contentType, method } = metadata\n\n      // No Content-Type header\n      if (contentType === null || contentType === '') {\n        // State-changing methods MUST have a Content-Type (L6 fix)\n        if (stateChangingMethods.has(method.toUpperCase())) {\n          return {\n            allowed: false,\n            reason: 'content_type_missing_on_state_change',\n          }\n        }\n        // Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) — allow without Content-Type\n        return { allowed: true }\n      }\n\n      // Extract MIME type without parameters\n      const mimeType = extractMimeType(contentType)\n\n      if (allowedTypes.has(mimeType)) {\n        return { allowed: true }\n      }\n\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `content_type_disallowed:${mimeType}`,\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Browser vs API Mode Detection\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §8.2\n\nimport type { ClientMode, RequestMetadata } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Configuration for client mode detection.\n */\nexport interface ModeDetectionConfig {\n  /**\n   * When true, the `X-Client-Type: api` header override is disabled.\n   * Clients cannot self-declare as API mode to bypass Fetch Metadata and\n   * Origin validation. Mode is determined solely by `Sec-Fetch-Site` presence.\n   *\n   * **Security (M3 fix):** A server with permissive CORS configuration\n   * (`Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *`) would allow cross-origin attackers\n   * to set `X-Client-Type: api` and bypass browser-specific policies.\n   * Set this to `true` if CORS cannot be tightly controlled.\n   *\n   * Default: `false` (override allowed for backward compatibility)\n   */\n  readonly disableClientModeOverride?: boolean | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Detects client mode (browser vs API) from request metadata.\n *\n * Mode detection logic (per SPECIFICATION.md §8.2):\n *\n * 1. Manual override: `X-Client-Type: api` → Force API Mode (unless disabled)\n * 2. `Sec-Fetch-Site` header present → Browser Mode\n *    (modern browsers always send Fetch Metadata headers)\n * 3. `Sec-Fetch-Site` header absent → API Mode\n *    (non-browser clients: mobile apps, CLI, services)\n *\n * **Browser Mode:**\n * - Full multi-layer validation: Fetch Metadata + Origin + Token\n * - All policies in the chain are enforced\n *\n * **API Mode:**\n * - Token-only validation (no Fetch Metadata enforcement)\n * - Context binding recommended (API key hash)\n * - Fetch Metadata and Origin policies are relaxed\n *\n * @param metadata - Normalized request metadata\n * @param config - Optional mode detection configuration\n * @returns 'browser' or 'api'\n */\nexport function detectClientMode(\n  metadata: RequestMetadata,\n  config?: ModeDetectionConfig,\n): ClientMode {\n  // Manual override via X-Client-Type header (unless disabled)\n  if (\n    config?.disableClientModeOverride !== true &&\n    metadata.clientType !== undefined &&\n    metadata.clientType.toLowerCase() === 'api'\n  ) {\n    return 'api'\n  }\n\n  // Sec-Fetch-Site present → Browser Mode\n  // Modern browsers (Chrome 76+, Firefox 90+, Edge 79+, Safari 16.4+)\n  // always send this header on navigation and subresource requests\n  if (metadata.secFetchSite !== null && metadata.secFetchSite !== '') {\n    return 'browser'\n  }\n\n  // No Fetch Metadata → API Mode (non-browser client)\n  return 'api'\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Context Binding (Risk Tier Model)\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §6.2, §6.3\n\nimport type {\n  ContextBindingConfig,\n  PolicyResult,\n  PolicyValidator,\n  RequestMetadata,\n  RiskTier,\n} from './types.js'\nimport { DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Result of context binding validation with tier-specific behavior.\n */\nexport interface ContextBindingResult {\n  /** Whether the context matches */\n  readonly matches: boolean\n\n  /** Whether the result should be enforced (fail-closed) or logged (soft-fail) */\n  readonly enforced: boolean\n\n  /** Whether the request is within the grace period (medium tier only) */\n  readonly inGracePeriod: boolean\n\n  /** Risk tier that was applied */\n  readonly tier: RiskTier\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates context binding based on risk tier.\n *\n * Risk Tier Model (per SPECIFICATION.md §6.2):\n *\n * | Tier   | Binding              | Failure Mode           | Use Case       |\n * |--------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------|\n * | Low    | Optional / soft-fail | Log only               | Read endpoints |\n * | Medium | Session ID hash      | Log + allow (grace)    | Settings       |\n * | High   | Session+User+Origin  | Reject + audit         | Transfers      |\n *\n * @param contextMatches - Whether the context hash matches\n * @param config - Context binding configuration with risk tier\n * @param sessionAge - Age of the current session in milliseconds (for grace period)\n * @returns ContextBindingResult with tier-specific behavior\n */\nexport function evaluateContextBinding(\n  contextMatches: boolean,\n  config: ContextBindingConfig,\n  sessionAge?: number,\n): ContextBindingResult {\n  const { tier } = config\n  const gracePeriodMs = config.gracePeriodMs ?? DEFAULT_CONTEXT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS\n\n  if (contextMatches) {\n    return {\n      matches: true,\n      enforced: false,\n      inGracePeriod: false,\n      tier,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Context does NOT match — behavior depends on tier\n  switch (tier) {\n    case 'low':\n      // Low assurance: soft-fail, log only, allow the request\n      return {\n        matches: false,\n        enforced: false,\n        inGracePeriod: false,\n        tier,\n      }\n\n    case 'medium': {\n      // Medium assurance: soft-fail with grace period\n      // If session was recently rotated, allow within grace period\n      const inGrace =\n        sessionAge !== undefined && sessionAge >= 0 && sessionAge < gracePeriodMs\n      return {\n        matches: false,\n        enforced: !inGrace, // enforce only if NOT in grace period\n        inGracePeriod: inGrace,\n        tier,\n      }\n    }\n\n    case 'high':\n      // High assurance: fail-closed, no grace period\n      return {\n        matches: false,\n        enforced: true,\n        inGracePeriod: false,\n        tier,\n      }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a context binding policy validator.\n *\n * This policy checks whether context binding validation should result in\n * a hard rejection. For low-tier endpoints, context mismatch is logged\n * but allowed. For high-tier, it's a hard reject.\n *\n * **Note:** The actual context hash comparison is performed by `@sigil-security/core`.\n * This policy determines the *enforcement behavior* based on the risk tier.\n *\n * Since the policy layer doesn't have access to token internals, this validator\n * works with pre-computed context match results passed via metadata extensions.\n *\n * @param config - Context binding configuration\n * @returns PolicyValidator for context binding enforcement\n */\nexport function createContextBindingPolicy(_config: ContextBindingConfig): PolicyValidator {\n  return {\n    name: 'context-binding',\n\n    validate(_metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      // Context binding validation is tier-dependent and requires\n      // context match information that comes from core token validation.\n      //\n      // The actual enforcement is done by `evaluateContextBinding()` at\n      // the runtime layer after core validation provides the match result.\n      //\n      // This policy always allows — the runtime layer uses\n      // `evaluateContextBinding()` for the actual decision.\n      //\n      // This exists in the policy chain primarily as a marker/placeholder\n      // that context binding is configured for this endpoint.\n      return { allowed: true }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Policy Composition (no short-circuit)\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §5.8 (Deterministic Failure Model)\n\nimport type { PolicyResult, PolicyValidator, RequestMetadata } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Result of a policy chain evaluation.\n *\n * Includes all PolicyResult fields plus metadata about which policies\n * were evaluated and which ones failed (for internal logging only).\n */\nexport type PolicyChainResult =\n  | {\n      readonly allowed: true\n      readonly evaluated: readonly string[]\n      readonly failures: readonly string[]\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly allowed: false\n      readonly reason: string\n      readonly evaluated: readonly string[]\n      readonly failures: readonly string[]\n    }\n\n/**\n * Creates a composite policy validator from multiple individual policies.\n *\n * **CRITICAL:** All policies in the chain are executed regardless of individual\n * results. There is NO short-circuit evaluation. This follows the Deterministic\n * Failure Model from SPECIFICATION.md §5.8:\n *\n * - Every policy runs, even if an earlier one fails\n * - First failure reason is captured (for internal logging)\n * - All failure names are collected (for metrics)\n * - Single exit point, deterministic execution path\n *\n * @param policies - Array of PolicyValidator instances to compose\n * @returns A composite PolicyValidator that runs all policies\n */\nexport function createPolicyChain(policies: readonly PolicyValidator[]): PolicyValidator {\n  return {\n    name: 'policy-chain',\n\n    validate(metadata: RequestMetadata): PolicyResult {\n      return evaluatePolicyChain(policies, metadata)\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates a chain of policies against request metadata.\n *\n * Returns a detailed result including all evaluated and failed policy names.\n * No short-circuit: ALL policies execute regardless of individual results.\n *\n * **Security (M4 fix):** An empty policy chain fails closed. A configuration\n * bug that produces an empty chain MUST NOT silently approve all requests.\n *\n * @param policies - Array of policies to evaluate\n * @param metadata - Normalized request metadata\n * @returns Detailed chain evaluation result\n */\nexport function evaluatePolicyChain(\n  policies: readonly PolicyValidator[],\n  metadata: RequestMetadata,\n): PolicyChainResult {\n  // Fail closed on empty policy chain — prevent accidental misconfiguration\n  // from silently approving all requests\n  if (policies.length === 0) {\n    return {\n      allowed: false,\n      reason: 'empty_policy_chain',\n      evaluated: [],\n      failures: [],\n    }\n  }\n\n  let allAllowed = true\n  let firstReason = ''\n  const evaluated: string[] = []\n  const failures: string[] = []\n\n  // Execute ALL policies — no short-circuit (deterministic timing)\n  for (const policy of policies) {\n    evaluated.push(policy.name)\n    const result = policy.validate(metadata)\n\n    if (!result.allowed) {\n      failures.push(policy.name)\n\n      if (allAllowed) {\n        // Capture first failure reason (for internal logging)\n        firstReason = result.reason\n        allAllowed = false\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (allAllowed) {\n    return {\n      allowed: true,\n      evaluated,\n      failures,\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    allowed: false,\n    reason: firstReason,\n    evaluated,\n    failures,\n  }\n}\n","// @sigil-security/policy — Token Transport Precedence\n// Reference: SPECIFICATION.md §8.3\n\nimport type {\n  RequestMetadata,\n  TokenSource,\n  TokenTransportConfig,\n  TokenTransportResult,\n} from './types.js'\nimport {\n  DEFAULT_FORM_FIELD_NAME,\n  DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME,\n  DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME,\n} from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Resolves token transport from request metadata.\n *\n * Transport precedence (strict order per SPECIFICATION.md §8.3):\n *\n * 1. **Custom Header** (recommended): `X-CSRF-Token`\n * 2. **Request Body** (JSON): `{ \"csrf_token\": \"...\" }`\n * 3. **Request Body** (form): `csrf_token=...`\n * 4. **Query Parameter**: NEVER allowed (deprecated, insecure — reject with warning)\n *\n * Rules:\n * - First valid token found is used\n * - Multiple tokens → first match wins, warning logged\n * - Token source is captured for audit logging\n *\n * @param metadata - Normalized request metadata with token source\n * @param _config - Optional transport configuration\n * @returns TokenTransportResult with found token and any warnings\n */\nexport function resolveTokenTransport(\n  metadata: RequestMetadata,\n  _config?: TokenTransportConfig,\n): TokenTransportResult {\n  const { tokenSource } = metadata\n\n  // Token already extracted by the runtime layer and normalized into TokenSource\n  if (tokenSource.from === 'none') {\n    return {\n      found: false,\n      reason: 'no_token_present',\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Token found from a valid source\n  return {\n    found: true,\n    source: tokenSource,\n    warnings: [],\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates that a token source is acceptable.\n *\n * Verifies the token was transported via an approved channel:\n * - Header: always acceptable\n * - Body (JSON or form): acceptable\n * - Query parameter: NEVER acceptable\n *\n * @param source - The token source to validate\n * @returns true if the transport method is acceptable\n */\nexport function isValidTokenTransport(source: TokenSource): boolean {\n  return source.from === 'header' || source.from === 'body-json' || source.from === 'body-form'\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the expected header name for CSRF tokens.\n *\n * @param config - Optional transport configuration\n * @returns Header name (lowercase)\n */\nexport function getTokenHeaderName(config?: TokenTransportConfig): string {\n  return config?.headerName ?? DEFAULT_HEADER_NAME\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the expected JSON field name for CSRF tokens.\n *\n * @param config - Optional transport configuration\n * @returns JSON field name\n */\nexport function getTokenJsonFieldName(config?: TokenTransportConfig): string {\n  return config?.jsonFieldName ?? DEFAULT_JSON_FIELD_NAME\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the expected form field name for CSRF tokens.\n *\n * @param config - Optional transport configuration\n * @returns Form field name\n */\nexport function getTokenFormFieldName(config?: TokenTransportConfig): string {\n  return config?.formFieldName ?? 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package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+{
+  "name": "@sigil-security/policy",
+  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "description": "Validation policies for request metadata — Fetch Metadata, Origin, context binding",
+  "type": "module",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/index.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/index.d.cts",
+        "default": "./dist/index.cjs"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
+  "module": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "files": [
+    "dist"
+  ],
+  "keywords": [
+    "csrf",
+    "security",
+    "policy",
+    "fetch-metadata",
+    "origin"
+  ],
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://github.com/laphilosophia/sigil-security.git",
+    "directory": "packages/policy"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@sigil-security/core": "0.0.0"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "tsup": "^8.0.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.7.0"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsup",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  }
+}