@sig-net/midnight-contract 0.0.2 → 0.0.3

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@sig-net/midnight-contract",
-  "version": "0.0.2",
+  "version": "0.0.3",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "The central signet Compact contract on Midnight: the MPC posts signature responses (unauthenticated counted log, verified off-chain) and remote execution responses (Schnorr attestations, verified in-circuit at post time) here; clients poll it. src/index.ts is the curated export surface.",
   "exports": {
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@
     "./managed/*": "./dist/managed/*"
   },
   "files": [
-    "dist",
-    "src",
-    "!src/managed"
+    "dist"
   ],
   "scripts": {
     "compile": "COMPACT_PATH=../../node_modules compact compile --skip-zk src/signet-contract.compact src/managed",
@@ -39,7 +37,7 @@
     "@midnight-ntwrk/midnight-js": "5.0.0-beta.3"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@sig-net/midnight": "^0.0.2",
+    "@sig-net/midnight": "^0.0.3",
     "@types/node": "^26.1.0",
     "typescript": "^6.0.3",
     "vitest": "^4.1.9"

package/src/contract-surface.ts

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-// The contract's platform-agnostic client surface: the circuit-id union, the
-// private-state store key, and the provider-set TYPE. Deliberately nothing
-// runnable — no wallet flavor, no zk-config source, no state store, no proof
-// provider. Composing a live midnight-js provider set is CONSUMER territory
-// (it differs per environment: Node fs vs browser fetch, LevelDB vs
-// IndexedDB, WalletFacade vs a connector API), so each consumer declares its
-// own — see this monorepo's signet-contract-deploy package for the Node
-// operator composition, and the fakenet response server for a consumer's.
-
-import type { MidnightProviders } from "@midnight-ntwrk/midnight-js/types";
-
-import { Contract } from "./managed/contract/index.js";
-import { type SignetContractPrivateState } from "./witnesses.ts";
-
-/** The contract's provable circuit ids, straight from the generated contract. */
-export type SignetContractCircuitId = keyof InstanceType<typeof Contract>["provableCircuits"] & string;
-
-/**
- * Literal of the private-state storage key. Just a string, but a single-value
- * union so the providers/`findDeployedContract` pairing is enforced by the
- * type system.
- */
-export type SignetContractPrivateStateId = "signet-contract";
-
-/**
- * Key under which midnight-js persists this contract's private state locally
- * (in whatever private-state store the consumer's provider set uses).
- * Distinct per contract so two clients don't share an entry.
- */
-export const SIGNET_CONTRACT_PRIVATE_STATE_ID: SignetContractPrivateStateId = "signet-contract";
-
-/** The full midnight-js provider set, typed to the signet contract. */
-export type SignetContractProviders = MidnightProviders<
-  // PCK: the union of the contract's provable circuit names.
-  SignetContractCircuitId,
-  // PSI: the private-state storage key literal.
-  SignetContractPrivateStateId,
-  // PS: the shape of the contract's (empty) private state object.
-  SignetContractPrivateState
->;

package/src/index.ts

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-// Curated export surface — this IS the "sdk" face of the package.
-// Everything the compiler emitted, the handwritten witnesses, and the
-// platform-agnostic contract surface (ids + provider TYPE). Environment
-// bindings (zk-config source, state store, wallet adapter) deliberately
-// live with each consumer, not here.
-
-export * from "./managed/contract/index.js";
-export * from "./witnesses.ts";
-export * from "./contract-surface.ts";

package/src/signet-contract.compact

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-pragma language_version >= 0.25;
-
-import CompactStandardLibrary;
-
-// Shared signet library: request/response structs, request-id hashing,
-// path<->identity binding, and the attestation message. See the module header
-// in Signet.compact and https://docs.sig.network/ for the protocol.
-import "@sig-net/midnight/src/Signet";
-
-// The CENTRAL signet contract: clients register their signature-request
-// notifications here, the MPC delivers all its responses here, and both sides
-// poll it — there is deliberately no push/websocket channel. Ledger layout per
-// "Signet Contract Ledger Layout" in Signet.compact, so pollers need only this
-// contract's address.
-export ledger signatureResponseCounterIndex: SignatureResponseCounterIndex;
-
-export ledger signatureResponseIndex: SignatureResponseIndex;
-
-export ledger respondBidirectionalIndex: RespondBidirectionalIndex;
-
-// The MPC attestation key, pinned at deploy time: postRespondBidirectional
-// accepts only responses signed by this key.
-export sealed ledger mpcPubKeyHash: Bytes<32>;
-
-// The notification registry (field 4): clients register "a request was stored
-// in MY ledger at THIS index field" pointers here; the MPC polls by
-// enumerating the map. Append-only, idempotent overwrite, no removal.
-export ledger signBidirectionalNotificationIndex: SignBidirectionalNotificationIndex;
-
-constructor(mpcPk: JubjubPoint) {
-    mpcPubKeyHash = disclose(persistentHash<JubjubPoint>(mpcPk));
-}
-
-// notifyBidirectionalSignatureRequest should be called (cross-contract) by
-// clients after (or within) a transaction that writes a
-// SignBidirectionalRequest to their canonical SignBidirectionalRequestIndex
-// state map. Registers the notification in the registry the MPC polls; a
-// repeat call for the same request id overwrites idempotently. Unauthenticated
-// by design: the notification is a pointer, and the MPC trusts only what it
-// reads back from the named caller's own ledger.
-export circuit notifyBidirectionalSignatureRequest(
-    requestId: RequestId,
-    notification: SignBidirectionalNotification
-): [] {
-    signBidirectionalNotificationIndex.insert(
-        disclose(requestId),
-        disclose(notification),
-    );
-}
-
-// postSignatureResponse appends a signature response for requestId.
-// Unauthenticated by NECESSITY (secp256k1 ECDSA cannot be verified
-// in-circuit): anyone may post, and nothing is ever overwritten — each post
-// lands under the next (requestId, count) key. Callers poll the log by
-// request id and verify the posted signatures off-chain to pick out the
-// genuine one.
-export circuit postSignatureResponse(requestId: RequestId, signatureResponse: SignatureResponse): [] {
-    // Everything stored here is public by construction.
-    const disclosedRequestId = disclose(requestId);
-
-    // Ensure the request's counter exists (a fresh Counter reads 0).
-    if (!signatureResponseCounterIndex.member(disclosedRequestId)) {
-        signatureResponseCounterIndex.insertDefault(disclosedRequestId);
-    }
-
-    // Posts so far == this post's 0-based count. Read ONCE into a local so
-    // the stored key and the counter update cannot disagree.
-    const count = signatureResponseCounterIndex.lookup(disclosedRequestId).read();
-    signatureResponseCounterIndex.lookup(disclosedRequestId).increment(1);
-
-    // Store the response under (requestId, count).
-    signatureResponseIndex.insert(
-        SignetResponseKey{
-            requestId: disclosedRequestId,
-            count: count,
-        },
-        disclose(signatureResponse),
-    );
-}
-
-// postRespondBidirectional records the MPC's attestation of requestId's
-// remote execution. Anyone may POST, but nothing unauthentic can LAND: the
-// Schnorr signature over (requestId, hash(serializedOutput, outputLen)) is
-// verified in-circuit against the sealed MPC key, so the stored record is
-// authentic by construction and one slot per request suffices — clients read
-// it without re-verifying.
-export circuit postRespondBidirectional(
-    requestId: RequestId,
-    respondBidirectional: RespondBidirectional
-): [] {
-    // Everything stored here is public by construction.
-    const disclosedRequestId = disclose(requestId);
-    const disclosedResponse = disclose(respondBidirectional);
-
-    // Only the pinned MPC key may attest.
-    assert(
-        persistentHash<JubjubPoint>(disclosedResponse.pk) == mpcPubKeyHash,
-        "unauthorized: attestation pk is not the MPC key"
-    );
-
-    // The attestation must sign THIS request and THIS output.
-    assert(
-        jubjubSchnorrVerify<4>(
-            signetAttestationMessage(
-                disclosedRequestId,
-                disclosedResponse.serializedOutput,
-                disclosedResponse.outputLen
-            ),
-            JubjubSchnorrSignature {
-                announcement: disclosedResponse.announcement,
-                response: disclosedResponse.response,
-            },
-            disclosedResponse.pk
-        ),
-        "Invalid attestation signature"
-    );
-
-    // First valid write wins. A re-post is a no-op, never an overwrite —
-    // Schnorr is randomized, so even the MPC re-signing the same output
-    // yields bytewise-different records; asserting equality would misfire.
-    // The no-op leaves the single authenticated slot untouched. Clients poll
-    // the index by request id; no off-chain verification follows — the
-    // in-circuit checks above already authenticated the stored record.
-    if (respondBidirectionalIndex.member(disclosedRequestId)) {
-        return [];
-    }
-    respondBidirectionalIndex.insert(disclosedRequestId, disclosedResponse);
-}

package/src/witnesses.ts

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-// The signet contract has no witnesses: Schnorr verification is
-// CompactStandardLibrary's `jubjubSchnorrVerify` (fully in-circuit), and
-// there is no private state — posting carries no caller secrets.
-
-import type { Witnesses } from "./managed/contract/index.js";
-
-/** Private state carried through signet-contract circuit calls: none. */
-export type SignetContractPrivateState = Record<string, never>;
-
-/**
- * Build the contract's (empty) private state.
- *
- * @returns A fresh, empty private state.
- */
-export const createSignetContractPrivateState =
-  (): SignetContractPrivateState => ({});
-
-/**
- * Witness implementations, typed against the generated `Witnesses` shape:
- * the contract declares none.
- */
-export const witnesses: Witnesses<SignetContractPrivateState> = {};