@shware/workflow 3.3.0 → 4.1.0

package/dist/fcm.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"fcm.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/fcm.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { MessageSender, OutboundMessage, SendResult } from './engine';\nimport { base64url, pemToDer } from './jwt';\nimport type { PushRenderer } from './push';\n\n/**\n * `@shware/workflow/fcm` — push delivery through Firebase Cloud Messaging's\n * HTTP v1 API, from a service account. No dependencies: the OAuth2 access\n * token is minted by signing a JWT with WebCrypto (Workers, Node 20+, Deno,\n * Bun), so this runs wherever the engine runs.\n *\n * The recipient is an FCM registration token the app registered for the user\n * (`registerDevice`); the engine sends one message per device.\n */\n\n/** The fields of a Google service-account JSON this sender needs. */\nexport interface FcmServiceAccount {\n  project_id: string;\n  client_email: string;\n  /** PEM, `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----` (PKCS #8). */\n  private_key: string;\n  token_uri?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface FcmPushOptions {\n  serviceAccount: FcmServiceAccount;\n  render: PushRenderer;\n  /** Android-specific delivery options, e.g. `{ channel_id: 'default' }` (FCM v1 `android.notification`). */\n  android?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** APNs-specific payload options merged into `aps`, e.g. `{ sound: 'default' }`. */\n  apns?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Fetch implementation (defaults to the global one). */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Called for a token FCM reports as gone (`UNREGISTERED`); `channelsFromConfig` removes the device. */\n  onUnregistered?: (message: OutboundMessage) => Promise<void> | void;\n}\n\n/** Errors FCM reports for a token that will never deliver again — not worth a retry. */\nconst DEAD_TOKEN_CODES = new Set(['UNREGISTERED', 'INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'SENDER_ID_MISMATCH']);\n\nconst SCOPE = 'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/firebase.messaging';\n\nexport class FcmPushSender implements MessageSender {\n  private token: { value: string; expiresAt: number } | undefined;\n\n  constructor(private readonly options: FcmPushOptions) {}\n\n  async send(message: OutboundMessage): Promise<void | SendResult> {\n    if (message.channel !== 'push') {\n      throw new Error(`FcmPushSender: unsupported channel '${message.channel}'`);\n    }\n    if (message.recipient === undefined) {\n      throw new Error(`FcmPushSender: no push token for user '${message.userId}'`);\n    }\n    const { title, body, image, url } = await this.options.render(message.template, message.props);\n    const { serviceAccount, android, apns } = this.options;\n    const doFetch = this.options.fetch ?? fetch;\n\n    const response = await doFetch(\n      `https://fcm.googleapis.com/v1/projects/${serviceAccount.project_id}/messages:send`,\n      {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: {\n          authorization: `Bearer ${await this.accessToken()}`,\n          'content-type': 'application/json',\n        },\n        body: JSON.stringify({\n          message: {\n            token: message.recipient,\n            notification: { title, body, ...(image === undefined ? {} : { image }) },\n            // The template key travels as data so the app can route a tap; the\n            // idempotency key lets the app de-duplicate a redelivered push.\n            data: {\n              template: message.template,\n              idempotencyKey: message.idempotencyKey,\n              ...(url === undefined ? {} : { url }),\n              ...message.tracking?.data,\n            },\n            ...(android === undefined ? {} : { android: { notification: android } }),\n            apns: { payload: { aps: { sound: 'default', ...apns } } },\n          },\n        }),\n      }\n    );\n    if (response.ok) return;\n\n    const text = await response.text();\n    if (DEAD_TOKEN_CODES.has(fcmErrorCode(text))) {\n      // A dead token is a fact about the recipient, not a transient failure:\n      // report it and move on, so the step does not retry into the same wall.\n      console.warn(`[fcm] token gone for user ${message.userId}: ${fcmErrorCode(text)}`);\n      await this.options.onUnregistered?.(message);\n      return { delivered: false, reason: fcmErrorCode(text) };\n    }\n    throw new Error(`FCM send failed: ${response.status} ${text}`);\n  }\n\n  private async accessToken(): Promise<string> {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    if (this.token !== undefined && this.token.expiresAt - 60_000 > now) return this.token.value;\n\n    const { serviceAccount } = this.options;\n    const tokenUri = serviceAccount.token_uri ?? 'https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token';\n    const assertion = await signJwt(serviceAccount, tokenUri, SCOPE, now);\n    const doFetch = this.options.fetch ?? fetch;\n    const response = await doFetch(tokenUri, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },\n      body: new URLSearchParams({\n        grant_type: 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer',\n        assertion,\n      }),\n    });\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      throw new Error(`FCM token exchange failed: ${response.status} ${await response.text()}`);\n    }\n    const json = (await response.json()) as { access_token: string; expires_in: number };\n    this.token = { value: json.access_token, expiresAt: now + json.expires_in * 1000 };\n    return json.access_token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** FCM v1 error bodies carry the code at `error.status` and, for messaging, in `error.details[].errorCode`. */\nexport function fcmErrorCode(body: string): string {\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as {\n      error?: { status?: string; details?: { errorCode?: string }[] };\n    };\n    const detail = parsed.error?.details?.find((d) => d.errorCode !== undefined)?.errorCode;\n    return detail ?? parsed.error?.status ?? '';\n  } catch {\n    return '';\n  }\n}\n\n/** RS256-sign the OAuth2 JWT assertion for a service account. */\nexport async function signJwt(\n  account: FcmServiceAccount,\n  audience: string,\n  scope: string,\n  nowMs = Date.now()\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iat = Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);\n  const header = base64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'RS256', typ: 'JWT' }));\n  const claims = base64url(\n    JSON.stringify({ iss: account.client_email, scope, aud: audience, iat, exp: iat + 3600 })\n  );\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    pemToDer(account.private_key),\n    { name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign']\n  );\n  const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(\n    'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5',\n    key,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(`${header}.${claims}`)\n  );\n  return `${header}.${claims}.${base64url(new Uint8Array(signature))}`;\n}\n\n/** Parse the service-account JSON as it is usually shipped: base64 of the file, in one secret. */\nexport function serviceAccountFromBase64(value: string): FcmServiceAccount {\n  const json = JSON.parse(atob(value)) as Partial<FcmServiceAccount>;\n  if (!json.project_id || !json.client_email || !json.private_key) {\n    throw new Error('service account JSON is missing project_id, client_email or private_key');\n  }\n  return json as FcmServiceAccount;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAqCA,MAAM,mCAAmB,IAAI,IAAI;CAAC;CAAgB;CAAoB;AAAoB,CAAC;AAE3F,MAAM,QAAQ;AAEd,IAAa,gBAAb,MAAoD;CAGrB;CAF7B;CAEA,YAAY,SAA0C;EAAzB,KAAA,UAAA;CAA0B;CAEvD,MAAM,KAAK,SAAsD;EAC/D,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,QACtB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uCAAuC,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;EAE3E,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,KAAA,GACxB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0CAA0C,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;EAE7E,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK;EAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK;EAG/C,MAAM,WAAW,OAFD,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAA,CAGpC,0CAA0C,eAAe,WAAW,iBACpE;GACE,QAAQ;GACR,SAAS;IACP,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY;IAChD,gBAAgB;GAClB;GACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,EACnB,SAAS;IACP,OAAO,QAAQ;IACf,cAAc;KAAE;KAAO;KAAM,GAAI,UAAU,KAAA,IAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM;IAAG;IAGvE,MAAM;KACJ,UAAU,QAAQ;KAClB,gBAAgB,QAAQ;KACxB,GAAI,QAAQ,KAAA,IAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI;KACnC,GAAG,QAAQ,UAAU;IACvB;IACA,GAAI,YAAY,KAAA,IAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,QAAQ,EAAE;IACtE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK;KAAE,OAAO;KAAW,GAAG;IAAK,EAAE,EAAE;GAC1D,EACF,CAAC;EACH,CACF;EACA,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI;EAEjB,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;EACjC,IAAI,iBAAiB,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG;GAG5C,QAAQ,KAAK,6BAA6B,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,GAAG;GACjF,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,iBAAiB,OAAO;GAC3C,OAAO;IAAE,WAAW;IAAO,QAAQ,aAAa,IAAI;GAAE;EACxD;EACA,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM;CAC/D;CAEA,MAAc,cAA+B;EAC3C,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;EACrB,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,KAAA,KAAa,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,MAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;EAEvF,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,KAAK;EAChC,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe,aAAa;EAC7C,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;EAEpE,MAAM,WAAW,OADD,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAA,CACP,UAAU;GACvC,QAAQ;GACR,SAAS,EAAE,gBAAgB,oCAAoC;GAC/D,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;IACxB,YAAY;IACZ;GACF,CAAC;EACH,CAAC;EACD,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IACZ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8BAA8B,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;EAE1F,MAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;EAClC,KAAK,QAAQ;GAAE,OAAO,KAAK;GAAc,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa;EAAK;EACjF,OAAO,KAAK;CACd;AACF;;AAGA,SAAgB,aAAa,MAAsB;CACjD,IAAI;EACF,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;EAI9B,OADe,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,KAAA,CAAS,CAAC,EAAE,aAC7D,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU;CAC3C,QAAQ;EACN,OAAO;CACT;AACF;;AAGA,eAAsB,QACpB,SACA,UACA,OACA,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,GACA;CACjB,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAI;CACnC,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,UAAU;EAAE,KAAK;EAAS,KAAK;CAAM,CAAC,CAAC;CACrE,MAAM,SAAS,UACb,KAAK,UAAU;EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ;EAAc;EAAO,KAAK;EAAU;EAAK,KAAK,MAAM;CAAK,CAAC,CAC1F;CACA,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAC9B,SACA,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW,GAC5B;EAAE,MAAM;EAAqB,MAAM;CAAU,GAC7C,OACA,CAAC,MAAM,CACT;CACA,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KACpC,qBACA,KACA,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,CAChD;CACA,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AACnE;;AAGA,SAAgB,yBAAyB,OAAkC;CACzE,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;CACnC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,aAClD,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yEAAyE;CAE3F,OAAO;AACT"}
+{"version":3,"file":"fcm.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/fcm.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { MessageSender, OutboundMessage, SendResult } from './engine';\nimport { PermanentError, isRetryableStatus } from './engine/retry';\nimport { base64url, pemToDer } from './jwt';\nimport type { PushRenderer } from './push';\n\n/**\n * `@shware/workflow/fcm` — push delivery through Firebase Cloud Messaging's\n * HTTP v1 API, from a service account. No dependencies: the OAuth2 access\n * token is minted by signing a JWT with WebCrypto (Workers, Node 20+, Deno,\n * Bun), so this runs wherever the engine runs.\n *\n * The recipient is an FCM registration token the app registered for the user\n * (`registerDevice`); the engine sends one message per device.\n */\n\n/** The fields of a Google service-account JSON this sender needs. */\nexport interface FcmServiceAccount {\n  project_id: string;\n  client_email: string;\n  /** PEM, `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----` (PKCS #8). */\n  private_key: string;\n  token_uri?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface FcmAccessTokenOptions {\n  serviceAccount: FcmServiceAccount;\n  /** Fetch implementation for the token exchange (defaults to the global one). */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\nexport interface FcmPushOptions {\n  /** The access token the requests carry — shared by every sender on the same service account. */\n  credentials: FcmAccessToken;\n  render: PushRenderer;\n  /** Android-specific delivery options, e.g. `{ channel_id: 'default' }` (FCM v1 `android.notification`). */\n  android?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** APNs-specific payload options merged into `aps`, e.g. `{ sound: 'default' }`. */\n  apns?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Fetch implementation (defaults to the global one). */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * How an FCM v1 answer is classified, after the API's error codes\n * (https://firebase.google.com/docs/reference/fcm/rest/v1/ErrorCode):\n *\n * - dead token: 404 `UNREGISTERED` (the app was uninstalled, or the token expired) — also a 404\n *   whose only code is the gRPC status `NOT_FOUND`. The copy settles undelivered and the host\n *   forgets the token.\n * - undelivered, device kept: 400 `INVALID_ARGUMENT`. FCM gives it for a malformed token but\n *   just as well for a payload problem (a message too big, a bad data key, a bad TTL), which\n *   would hit every device of the template at once; the copy settles with the reason, so the\n *   report shows it, and nothing is deleted on a guess.\n * - configuration: 403 `SENDER_ID_MISMATCH` (the token belongs to another Firebase project) and\n *   401 `THIRD_PARTY_AUTH_ERROR` (the APNs or web push credentials in the Firebase project):\n *   `PermanentError`, devices kept.\n * - transient: 401 `UNAUTHENTICATED` (the cached access token is dropped first), 429\n *   `QUOTA_EXCEEDED`, 503 `UNAVAILABLE`, 500 `INTERNAL` and any other 429 / 5xx.\n * - everything else (another 4xx) is this request itself: a `PermanentError`.\n */\nexport const DEAD_TOKEN_REASONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['UNREGISTERED', 'NOT_FOUND']);\n\nconst CONFIGURATION_CODES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'SENDER_ID_MISMATCH',\n  'THIRD_PARTY_AUTH_ERROR',\n]);\nconst TRANSIENT_CODES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['QUOTA_EXCEEDED', 'UNAVAILABLE', 'INTERNAL']);\n\nconst SCOPE = 'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/firebase.messaging';\n\n/**\n * The OAuth2 access token for one service account, exchanged once and reused until a minute\n * before it expires. Concurrent callers without a usable token share the one exchange in flight,\n * and an exchange that failed is not kept, so the next call tries again. One instance serves every\n * sender built on the account — a host keeps it across runs, and builds the senders per run.\n */\nexport class FcmAccessToken {\n  /** The Firebase project the account belongs to — the `messages:send` URL names it. */\n  readonly projectId: string;\n  private minted: { value: string; expiresAt: number } | undefined;\n  private minting: Promise<string> | undefined;\n\n  constructor(private readonly options: FcmAccessTokenOptions) {\n    this.projectId = options.serviceAccount.project_id;\n  }\n\n  /** The current token, exchanged now if there is none or it is about to expire. */\n  async token(now = Date.now()): Promise<string> {\n    if (this.minted !== undefined && this.minted.expiresAt - 60_000 > now) {\n      return this.minted.value;\n    }\n    this.minting ??= this.exchange(now)\n      .then((minted) => {\n        this.minted = minted;\n        return minted.value;\n      })\n      .finally(() => {\n        this.minting = undefined;\n      });\n    return this.minting;\n  }\n\n  /** Forget the token: FCM refused it (401), so the next call exchanges a new one. */\n  invalidate(): void {\n    this.minted = undefined;\n  }\n\n  private async exchange(now: number): Promise<{ value: string; expiresAt: number }> {\n    const { serviceAccount } = this.options;\n    const tokenUri = serviceAccount.token_uri ?? 'https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token';\n    const assertion = await signJwt(serviceAccount, tokenUri, SCOPE, now);\n    const doFetch = this.options.fetch ?? fetch;\n    const response = await doFetch(tokenUri, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },\n      body: new URLSearchParams({\n        grant_type: 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer',\n        assertion,\n      }),\n    });\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const detail = `${response.status} ${await response.text()}`;\n      // A 4xx from the token endpoint (`invalid_grant`: the key was revoked, `invalid_client`)\n      // is the service account itself; only a throttled or failing endpoint is worth a retry\n      if (isRetryableStatus(response.status)) {\n        throw new Error(`FCM token exchange failed: ${detail}`);\n      }\n      throw new PermanentError(\n        `FCM token exchange refused for '${serviceAccount.client_email}': ${detail}`\n      );\n    }\n    const json = (await response.json()) as { access_token: string; expires_in: number };\n    return { value: json.access_token, expiresAt: now + json.expires_in * 1000 };\n  }\n}\n\nexport class FcmPushSender implements MessageSender {\n  constructor(private readonly options: FcmPushOptions) {}\n\n  async send(message: OutboundMessage): Promise<void | SendResult> {\n    if (message.channel !== 'push') {\n      throw new Error(`FcmPushSender: unsupported channel '${message.channel}'`);\n    }\n    if (message.recipient === undefined) {\n      throw new Error(`FcmPushSender: no push token for user '${message.userId}'`);\n    }\n    const { title, body, image, url } = await this.options.render(message.template, message.props);\n    const { credentials, android, apns } = this.options;\n    const doFetch = this.options.fetch ?? fetch;\n\n    const response = await doFetch(\n      `https://fcm.googleapis.com/v1/projects/${credentials.projectId}/messages:send`,\n      {\n        method: 'POST',\n        headers: {\n          authorization: `Bearer ${await credentials.token()}`,\n          'content-type': 'application/json',\n        },\n        body: JSON.stringify({\n          message: {\n            token: message.recipient,\n            notification: { title, body, ...(image === undefined ? {} : { image }) },\n            // The template key travels as data so the app can route a tap; the\n            // idempotency key lets the app de-duplicate a redelivered push.\n            data: {\n              template: message.template,\n              idempotencyKey: message.idempotencyKey,\n              ...(url === undefined ? {} : { url }),\n              ...message.tracking?.data,\n            },\n            ...(android === undefined ? {} : { android: { notification: android } }),\n            apns: { payload: { aps: { sound: 'default', ...apns } } },\n          },\n        }),\n      }\n    );\n    if (response.ok) return;\n\n    const text = await response.text();\n    const { status } = response;\n    const code = fcmErrorCode(text);\n    if (code === 'UNREGISTERED' || (status === 404 && DEAD_TOKEN_REASONS.has(code))) {\n      // A dead token is a fact about the recipient, not a transient failure:\n      // report it and move on, so the step does not retry into the same wall.\n      console.warn(`[fcm] token gone for user ${message.userId}: ${code}`);\n      return { delivered: false, reason: code };\n    }\n    if (code === 'INVALID_ARGUMENT') {\n      // The token or our payload: settled so the report says which device, nothing deleted\n      console.warn(`[fcm] refused for user ${message.userId}: ${status} ${text}`);\n      return { delivered: false, reason: code };\n    }\n    if (CONFIGURATION_CODES.has(code)) {\n      throw new PermanentError(\n        `FCM refused the request for project '${credentials.projectId}': ${status} ${code}`\n      );\n    }\n    if (status === 401 || code === 'UNAUTHENTICATED') {\n      // The access token was revoked before it expired: mint a new one on the retry\n      credentials.invalidate();\n      throw new Error(\n        `FCM send failed: ${status} ${code || text} (access token renewed for the retry)`\n      );\n    }\n    if (TRANSIENT_CODES.has(code) || isRetryableStatus(status)) {\n      throw new Error(`FCM send failed: ${status} ${code || text}`);\n    }\n    throw new PermanentError(`FCM refused the request: ${status} ${code || text}`);\n  }\n}\n\n/** FCM v1 error bodies carry the code at `error.status` and, for messaging, in `error.details[].errorCode`. */\nexport function fcmErrorCode(body: string): string {\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as {\n      error?: { status?: string; details?: { errorCode?: string }[] };\n    };\n    const detail = parsed.error?.details?.find((d) => d.errorCode !== undefined)?.errorCode;\n    return detail ?? parsed.error?.status ?? '';\n  } catch {\n    return '';\n  }\n}\n\n/** RS256-sign the OAuth2 JWT assertion for a service account. */\nexport async function signJwt(\n  account: FcmServiceAccount,\n  audience: string,\n  scope: string,\n  nowMs = Date.now()\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iat = Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);\n  const header = base64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'RS256', typ: 'JWT' }));\n  const claims = base64url(\n    JSON.stringify({ iss: account.client_email, scope, aud: audience, iat, exp: iat + 3600 })\n  );\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'pkcs8',\n    pemToDer(account.private_key),\n    { name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign']\n  );\n  const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(\n    'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5',\n    key,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(`${header}.${claims}`)\n  );\n  return `${header}.${claims}.${base64url(new Uint8Array(signature))}`;\n}\n\n/** Parse the service-account JSON as it is usually shipped: base64 of the file, in one secret. */\nexport function serviceAccountFromBase64(value: string): FcmServiceAccount {\n  let json: Partial<FcmServiceAccount>;\n  try {\n    json = JSON.parse(atob(value)) as Partial<FcmServiceAccount>;\n  } catch (error) {\n    // A secret that is not base64 JSON is the same on every attempt: not worth a retry\n    throw new PermanentError('service account is not base64-encoded JSON', { cause: error });\n  }\n  if (!json.project_id || !json.client_email || !json.private_key) {\n    throw new PermanentError(\n      'service account JSON is missing project_id, client_email or private_key'\n    );\n  }\n  return json as 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package/dist/hash.cjs

@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ const PROVENANCE_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["loc"]);
 * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution
 * data and is hashed whole.
 *
-* This is what keeps the exclusion above positional. Stripping by name at every
-* depth used to reach inside these maps, so a prop or payload field that
-* happened to be called `label` (or `meta`) vanished from the hash: two sends
-* carrying different values hashed identically, `plan` reported a real change
-* as metadata-only, and the deploy wrote different content under the same KV
-* key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.
+* This is what keeps the exclusion above positional: stripping by name at every
+* depth would reach inside these maps, and a prop or payload field that happens
+* to be called `label` (or `meta`) would vanish from the hash — two sends
+* carrying different values would hash identically, `plan` would report a real
+* change as metadata-only, and the deploy would write different content under
+* the same key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.
 *
 * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one
 * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.

package/dist/hash.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"hash.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/hash.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Content hashing — contentHash covers execution semantics only.\n *\n * Human-facing metadata (name / description, node labels) is excluded,\n * because it cannot change which path a user takes:\n * - rewording a description must not invalidate the version an in-flight\n *   journey is pinned to;\n * - nor should it surface as a change in `plan`.\n *\n * Storage, by contrast, always keeps the full IR (including the latest\n * description). contentHash carries exactly two responsibilities: deciding\n * whether semantics moved (plan / migration), and pinning a version for\n * in-flight instances. So after a description edit: the UI shows the new text,\n * plan reports no change, and in-flight users are untouched.\n */\n\n/**\n * Keys excluded from hashing.\n * - meta: metadata at any level — workflow (name / description) and\n *   node/segment provenance (`loc`, the callsite source map)\n * - label: node and branch-arm names (UI titles / observability, never routing)\n * - reason: the exit / filter audit string. It is written into the audit log\n *   and shown in the studio, but no user takes a different path because of it —\n *   the same test as a description, so rewording one must not repin in-flight\n *   journeys or report as a semantic change in plan.\n * - contentHash: the hash itself\n *\n * Note that a cohort arm's `name` IS hashed: it becomes part of the node id\n * (`{id}.{armName}.{j}`), and node ids are durable step names — renaming an arm\n * changes execution identity.\n */\nconst UNHASHED_KEYS = new Set(['meta', 'label', 'reason', 'contentHash']);\n\n/**\n * Provenance only. `loc` is a source map, not content: it moves with the\n * machine and with the directory the compile ran from, so plan compares full\n * content with it removed (see plan.ts) — otherwise CI, compiling from the\n * workspace root, reports every definition as metadata_only against a deploy\n * compiled from a package directory.\n */\nconst PROVENANCE_KEYS = new Set(['loc']);\n\n/**\n * Fields whose values are maps the *author* keys, not the IR: message props,\n * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution\n * data and is hashed whole.\n *\n * This is what keeps the exclusion above positional. Stripping by name at every\n * depth used to reach inside these maps, so a prop or payload field that\n * happened to be called `label` (or `meta`) vanished from the hash: two sends\n * carrying different values hashed identically, `plan` reported a real change\n * as metadata-only, and the deploy wrote different content under the same KV\n * key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.\n *\n * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one\n * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.\n *\n * It matters for every key above: a send_event payload may well carry a field\n * called `reason` (subscription_cancelled does), and dropping it would hash two\n * different sends the same.\n */\nconst AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS = new Set(['props', 'payload', 'args']);\n\n/** Drop `keys` at the positions the IR defines them, never inside an author-keyed map. */\nfunction stripKeys(value: unknown, keys: ReadonlySet<string>): unknown {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => stripKeys(item, keys));\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (keys.has(key)) continue;\n      // Author-keyed: hashed verbatim, never walked into\n      out[key] = AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS.has(key) ? item : stripKeys(item, keys);\n    }\n    return out;\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\n/** Drop metadata at the positions the IR defines it, leaving execution semantics. */\nexport function stripMeta(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, UNHASHED_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Drop provenance, keeping the rest of the metadata — what plan compares. */\nexport function stripProvenance(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, PROVENANCE_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Canonical JSON: sorted keys, no whitespace — a stable hash input. */\nexport function canonicalJSON(value: unknown): string {\n  // JSON.stringify(undefined) returns undefined, not a string; absent fields become null\n  if (value === undefined) return 'null';\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJSON).join(',')}]`;\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const entries = Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .sort()\n      .map(\n        (key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJSON((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key])}`\n      );\n    return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value);\n}\n\n/*\n * SHA-256, hand-written and synchronous: crypto.subtle is async (and absent in\n * some embedders), node:crypto is Node-only — the compiler must stay sync and\n * portable. Like the Murmur3 bucketing hash, the known-answer tests pin this\n * implementation to the reference vectors. contentHash is a permanent contract\n * (it addresses stored versions and pins in-flight journeys), so the algorithm\n * must never change once production data exists.\n */\n\n// prettier-ignore\nconst K = new Uint32Array([\n  0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,\n  0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,\n  0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,\n  0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,\n  0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,\n  0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,\n  0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,\n  0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,\n]);\n\nconst rotr = (x: number, n: number): number => (x >>> n) | (x << (32 - n));\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** SHA-256 over the UTF-8 bytes of `input`, as 64 hex chars. */\nexport function sha256Hex(input: string): string {\n  const data = utf8.encode(input);\n  const bitLenLo = (data.length << 3) >>> 0;\n  const bitLenHi = Math.floor(data.length / 0x20000000);\n\n  // Pad to a multiple of 64 bytes: 0x80, zeros, then the 64-bit big-endian bit length\n  const padded = new Uint8Array((((data.length + 8) >> 6) + 1) << 6);\n  padded.set(data);\n  padded[data.length] = 0x80;\n  const view = new DataView(padded.buffer);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 8, bitLenHi);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 4, bitLenLo);\n\n  // prettier-ignore\n  const state = new Uint32Array([\n    0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 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+{"version":3,"file":"hash.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/hash.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Content hashing — contentHash covers execution semantics only.\n *\n * Human-facing metadata (name / description, node labels) is excluded,\n * because it cannot change which path a user takes:\n * - rewording a description must not invalidate the version an in-flight\n *   journey is pinned to;\n * - nor should it surface as a change in `plan`.\n *\n * Storage, by contrast, always keeps the full IR (including the latest\n * description). contentHash carries exactly two responsibilities: deciding\n * whether semantics moved (plan / migration), and pinning a version for\n * in-flight instances. So after a description edit: the UI shows the new text,\n * plan reports no change, and in-flight users are untouched.\n */\n\n/**\n * Keys excluded from hashing.\n * - meta: metadata at any level — workflow (name / description) and\n *   node/segment provenance (`loc`, the callsite source map)\n * - label: node and branch-arm names (UI titles / observability, never routing)\n * - reason: the exit / filter audit string. It is written into the audit log\n *   and shown in the studio, but no user takes a different path because of it —\n *   the same test as a description, so rewording one must not repin in-flight\n *   journeys or report as a semantic change in plan.\n * - contentHash: the hash itself\n *\n * Note that a cohort arm's `name` IS hashed: it becomes part of the node id\n * (`{id}.{armName}.{j}`), and node ids are durable step names — renaming an arm\n * changes execution identity.\n */\nconst UNHASHED_KEYS = new Set(['meta', 'label', 'reason', 'contentHash']);\n\n/**\n * Provenance only. `loc` is a source map, not content: it moves with the\n * machine and with the directory the compile ran from, so plan compares full\n * content with it removed (see plan.ts) — otherwise CI, compiling from the\n * workspace root, reports every definition as metadata_only against a deploy\n * compiled from a package directory.\n */\nconst PROVENANCE_KEYS = new Set(['loc']);\n\n/**\n * Fields whose values are maps the *author* keys, not the IR: message props,\n * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution\n * data and is hashed whole.\n *\n * This is what keeps the exclusion above positional: stripping by name at every\n * depth would reach inside these maps, and a prop or payload field that happens\n * to be called `label` (or `meta`) would vanish from the hash — two sends\n * carrying different values would hash identically, `plan` would report a real\n * change as metadata-only, and the deploy would write different content under\n * the same key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.\n *\n * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one\n * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.\n *\n * It matters for every key above: a send_event payload may well carry a field\n * called `reason` (subscription_cancelled does), and dropping it would hash two\n * different sends the same.\n */\nconst AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS = new Set(['props', 'payload', 'args']);\n\n/** Drop `keys` at the positions the IR defines them, never inside an author-keyed map. */\nfunction stripKeys(value: unknown, keys: ReadonlySet<string>): unknown {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => stripKeys(item, keys));\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (keys.has(key)) continue;\n      // Author-keyed: hashed verbatim, never walked into\n      out[key] = AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS.has(key) ? item : stripKeys(item, keys);\n    }\n    return out;\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\n/** Drop metadata at the positions the IR defines it, leaving execution semantics. */\nexport function stripMeta(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, UNHASHED_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Drop provenance, keeping the rest of the metadata — what plan compares. */\nexport function stripProvenance(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, PROVENANCE_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Canonical JSON: sorted keys, no whitespace — a stable hash input. */\nexport function canonicalJSON(value: unknown): string {\n  // JSON.stringify(undefined) returns undefined, not a string; absent fields become null\n  if (value === undefined) return 'null';\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJSON).join(',')}]`;\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const entries = Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .sort()\n      .map(\n        (key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJSON((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key])}`\n      );\n    return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value);\n}\n\n/*\n * SHA-256, hand-written and synchronous: crypto.subtle is async (and absent in\n * some embedders), node:crypto is Node-only — the compiler must stay sync and\n * portable. Like the Murmur3 bucketing hash, the known-answer tests pin this\n * implementation to the reference vectors. contentHash is a permanent contract\n * (it addresses stored versions and pins in-flight journeys), so the algorithm\n * must never change once production data exists.\n */\n\n// prettier-ignore\nconst K = new Uint32Array([\n  0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,\n  0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,\n  0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,\n  0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,\n  0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,\n  0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,\n  0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,\n  0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,\n]);\n\nconst rotr = (x: number, n: number): number => (x >>> n) | (x << (32 - n));\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** SHA-256 over the UTF-8 bytes of `input`, as 64 hex chars. */\nexport function sha256Hex(input: string): string {\n  const data = utf8.encode(input);\n  const bitLenLo = (data.length << 3) >>> 0;\n  const bitLenHi = Math.floor(data.length / 0x20000000);\n\n  // Pad to a multiple of 64 bytes: 0x80, zeros, then the 64-bit big-endian bit length\n  const padded = new Uint8Array((((data.length + 8) >> 6) + 1) << 6);\n  padded.set(data);\n  padded[data.length] = 0x80;\n  const view = new DataView(padded.buffer);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 8, bitLenHi);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 4, bitLenLo);\n\n  // prettier-ignore\n  const state = new Uint32Array([\n    0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,\n  ]);\n  const w = new Uint32Array(64);\n\n  for (let offset = 0; offset < padded.length; offset += 64) {\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) w[i] = view.getUint32(offset + i * 4);\n    for (let i = 16; i < 64; i++) {\n      const w15 = w[i - 15];\n      const w2 = w[i - 2];\n      const s0 = rotr(w15, 7) ^ rotr(w15, 18) ^ (w15 >>> 3);\n      const s1 = rotr(w2, 17) ^ rotr(w2, 19) ^ (w2 >>> 10);\n      w[i] = (w[i - 16] + s0 + w[i - 7] + s1) >>> 0;\n    }\n\n    let [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h] = state as unknown as [\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n    ];\n    for (let i = 0; i < 64; i++) {\n      const s1 = rotr(e, 6) ^ rotr(e, 11) ^ rotr(e, 25);\n      const ch = (e & f) ^ (~e & g);\n      const t1 = (h + s1 + ch + K[i] + w[i]) >>> 0;\n      const s0 = rotr(a, 2) ^ rotr(a, 13) ^ rotr(a, 22);\n      const maj = (a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c);\n      const t2 = (s0 + maj) >>> 0;\n      h = g;\n      g = f;\n      f = e;\n      e = (d + t1) >>> 0;\n      d = c;\n      c = b;\n      b = a;\n      a = (t1 + t2) >>> 0;\n    }\n    state[0] = (state[0] + a) >>> 0;\n    state[1] = (state[1] + b) >>> 0;\n    state[2] = (state[2] + c) >>> 0;\n    state[3] = (state[3] + d) >>> 0;\n    state[4] = (state[4] + e) >>> 0;\n    state[5] = (state[5] + f) >>> 0;\n    state[6] = (state[6] + g) >>> 0;\n    state[7] = (state[7] + h) >>> 0;\n  }\n\n  return [...state].map((word) => word.toString(16).padStart(8, '0')).join('');\n}\n\n/**\n * Truncate to 128 bits (32 hex chars): collision-safe for content addressing at\n * any realistic definition count, and short enough for KV keys and instance ids.\n */\nconst contentHashOf = (input: string): string => sha256Hex(input).slice(0, 32);\n\n/** Content hash of execution semantics (strip metadata → canonical JSON → truncated SHA-256). */\nexport function semanticHash(value: unknown): string {\n  return 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package/dist/hash.mjs

@@ -48,12 +48,12 @@ const PROVENANCE_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["loc"]);
 * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution
 * data and is hashed whole.
 *
-* This is what keeps the exclusion above positional. Stripping by name at every
-* depth used to reach inside these maps, so a prop or payload field that
-* happened to be called `label` (or `meta`) vanished from the hash: two sends
-* carrying different values hashed identically, `plan` reported a real change
-* as metadata-only, and the deploy wrote different content under the same KV
-* key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.
+* This is what keeps the exclusion above positional: stripping by name at every
+* depth would reach inside these maps, and a prop or payload field that happens
+* to be called `label` (or `meta`) would vanish from the hash — two sends
+* carrying different values would hash identically, `plan` would report a real
+* change as metadata-only, and the deploy would write different content under
+* the same key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.
 *
 * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one
 * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.

package/dist/hash.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"hash.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/hash.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Content hashing — contentHash covers execution semantics only.\n *\n * Human-facing metadata (name / description, node labels) is excluded,\n * because it cannot change which path a user takes:\n * - rewording a description must not invalidate the version an in-flight\n *   journey is pinned to;\n * - nor should it surface as a change in `plan`.\n *\n * Storage, by contrast, always keeps the full IR (including the latest\n * description). contentHash carries exactly two responsibilities: deciding\n * whether semantics moved (plan / migration), and pinning a version for\n * in-flight instances. So after a description edit: the UI shows the new text,\n * plan reports no change, and in-flight users are untouched.\n */\n\n/**\n * Keys excluded from hashing.\n * - meta: metadata at any level — workflow (name / description) and\n *   node/segment provenance (`loc`, the callsite source map)\n * - label: node and branch-arm names (UI titles / observability, never routing)\n * - reason: the exit / filter audit string. It is written into the audit log\n *   and shown in the studio, but no user takes a different path because of it —\n *   the same test as a description, so rewording one must not repin in-flight\n *   journeys or report as a semantic change in plan.\n * - contentHash: the hash itself\n *\n * Note that a cohort arm's `name` IS hashed: it becomes part of the node id\n * (`{id}.{armName}.{j}`), and node ids are durable step names — renaming an arm\n * changes execution identity.\n */\nconst UNHASHED_KEYS = new Set(['meta', 'label', 'reason', 'contentHash']);\n\n/**\n * Provenance only. `loc` is a source map, not content: it moves with the\n * machine and with the directory the compile ran from, so plan compares full\n * content with it removed (see plan.ts) — otherwise CI, compiling from the\n * workspace root, reports every definition as metadata_only against a deploy\n * compiled from a package directory.\n */\nconst PROVENANCE_KEYS = new Set(['loc']);\n\n/**\n * Fields whose values are maps the *author* keys, not the IR: message props,\n * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution\n * data and is hashed whole.\n *\n * This is what keeps the exclusion above positional. Stripping by name at every\n * depth used to reach inside these maps, so a prop or payload field that\n * happened to be called `label` (or `meta`) vanished from the hash: two sends\n * carrying different values hashed identically, `plan` reported a real change\n * as metadata-only, and the deploy wrote different content under the same KV\n * key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.\n *\n * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one\n * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.\n *\n * It matters for every key above: a send_event payload may well carry a field\n * called `reason` (subscription_cancelled does), and dropping it would hash two\n * different sends the same.\n */\nconst AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS = new Set(['props', 'payload', 'args']);\n\n/** Drop `keys` at the positions the IR defines them, never inside an author-keyed map. */\nfunction stripKeys(value: unknown, keys: ReadonlySet<string>): unknown {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => stripKeys(item, keys));\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (keys.has(key)) continue;\n      // Author-keyed: hashed verbatim, never walked into\n      out[key] = AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS.has(key) ? item : stripKeys(item, keys);\n    }\n    return out;\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\n/** Drop metadata at the positions the IR defines it, leaving execution semantics. */\nexport function stripMeta(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, UNHASHED_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Drop provenance, keeping the rest of the metadata — what plan compares. */\nexport function stripProvenance(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, PROVENANCE_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Canonical JSON: sorted keys, no whitespace — a stable hash input. */\nexport function canonicalJSON(value: unknown): string {\n  // JSON.stringify(undefined) returns undefined, not a string; absent fields become null\n  if (value === undefined) return 'null';\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJSON).join(',')}]`;\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const entries = Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .sort()\n      .map(\n        (key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJSON((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key])}`\n      );\n    return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value);\n}\n\n/*\n * SHA-256, hand-written and synchronous: crypto.subtle is async (and absent in\n * some embedders), node:crypto is Node-only — the compiler must stay sync and\n * portable. Like the Murmur3 bucketing hash, the known-answer tests pin this\n * implementation to the reference vectors. contentHash is a permanent contract\n * (it addresses stored versions and pins in-flight journeys), so the algorithm\n * must never change once production data exists.\n */\n\n// prettier-ignore\nconst K = new Uint32Array([\n  0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,\n  0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,\n  0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,\n  0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,\n  0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,\n  0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,\n  0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,\n  0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,\n]);\n\nconst rotr = (x: number, n: number): number => (x >>> n) | (x << (32 - n));\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** SHA-256 over the UTF-8 bytes of `input`, as 64 hex chars. */\nexport function sha256Hex(input: string): string {\n  const data = utf8.encode(input);\n  const bitLenLo = (data.length << 3) >>> 0;\n  const bitLenHi = Math.floor(data.length / 0x20000000);\n\n  // Pad to a multiple of 64 bytes: 0x80, zeros, then the 64-bit big-endian bit length\n  const padded = new Uint8Array((((data.length + 8) >> 6) + 1) << 6);\n  padded.set(data);\n  padded[data.length] = 0x80;\n  const view = new DataView(padded.buffer);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 8, bitLenHi);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 4, bitLenLo);\n\n  // prettier-ignore\n  const state = new Uint32Array([\n    0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,\n  ]);\n  const w = new Uint32Array(64);\n\n  for (let offset = 0; offset < padded.length; offset += 64) {\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) w[i] = view.getUint32(offset + i * 4);\n    for (let i = 16; i < 64; i++) {\n      const w15 = w[i - 15];\n      const w2 = w[i - 2];\n      const s0 = rotr(w15, 7) ^ rotr(w15, 18) ^ (w15 >>> 3);\n      const s1 = rotr(w2, 17) ^ rotr(w2, 19) ^ (w2 >>> 10);\n      w[i] = (w[i - 16] + s0 + w[i - 7] + s1) >>> 0;\n    }\n\n    let [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h] = state as unknown as [\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n    ];\n    for (let i = 0; i < 64; i++) {\n      const s1 = rotr(e, 6) ^ rotr(e, 11) ^ rotr(e, 25);\n      const ch = (e & f) ^ (~e & g);\n      const t1 = (h + s1 + ch + K[i] + w[i]) >>> 0;\n      const s0 = rotr(a, 2) ^ rotr(a, 13) ^ rotr(a, 22);\n      const maj = (a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c);\n      const t2 = (s0 + 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+{"version":3,"file":"hash.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/hash.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Content hashing — contentHash covers execution semantics only.\n *\n * Human-facing metadata (name / description, node labels) is excluded,\n * because it cannot change which path a user takes:\n * - rewording a description must not invalidate the version an in-flight\n *   journey is pinned to;\n * - nor should it surface as a change in `plan`.\n *\n * Storage, by contrast, always keeps the full IR (including the latest\n * description). contentHash carries exactly two responsibilities: deciding\n * whether semantics moved (plan / migration), and pinning a version for\n * in-flight instances. So after a description edit: the UI shows the new text,\n * plan reports no change, and in-flight users are untouched.\n */\n\n/**\n * Keys excluded from hashing.\n * - meta: metadata at any level — workflow (name / description) and\n *   node/segment provenance (`loc`, the callsite source map)\n * - label: node and branch-arm names (UI titles / observability, never routing)\n * - reason: the exit / filter audit string. It is written into the audit log\n *   and shown in the studio, but no user takes a different path because of it —\n *   the same test as a description, so rewording one must not repin in-flight\n *   journeys or report as a semantic change in plan.\n * - contentHash: the hash itself\n *\n * Note that a cohort arm's `name` IS hashed: it becomes part of the node id\n * (`{id}.{armName}.{j}`), and node ids are durable step names — renaming an arm\n * changes execution identity.\n */\nconst UNHASHED_KEYS = new Set(['meta', 'label', 'reason', 'contentHash']);\n\n/**\n * Provenance only. `loc` is a source map, not content: it moves with the\n * machine and with the directory the compile ran from, so plan compares full\n * content with it removed (see plan.ts) — otherwise CI, compiling from the\n * workspace root, reports every definition as metadata_only against a deploy\n * compiled from a package directory.\n */\nconst PROVENANCE_KEYS = new Set(['loc']);\n\n/**\n * Fields whose values are maps the *author* keys, not the IR: message props,\n * send_event payloads and action args. Everything inside them is execution\n * data and is hashed whole.\n *\n * This is what keeps the exclusion above positional: stripping by name at every\n * depth would reach inside these maps, and a prop or payload field that happens\n * to be called `label` (or `meta`) would vanish from the hash — two sends\n * carrying different values would hash identically, `plan` would report a real\n * change as metadata-only, and the deploy would write different content under\n * the same key that in-flight journeys are pinned to.\n *\n * These three are the only `z.record` fields in the IR (see ir.ts). A new one\n * has to be added here, or its contents become strippable by name again.\n *\n * It matters for every key above: a send_event payload may well carry a field\n * called `reason` (subscription_cancelled does), and dropping it would hash two\n * different sends the same.\n */\nconst AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS = new Set(['props', 'payload', 'args']);\n\n/** Drop `keys` at the positions the IR defines them, never inside an author-keyed map. */\nfunction stripKeys(value: unknown, keys: ReadonlySet<string>): unknown {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => stripKeys(item, keys));\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (keys.has(key)) continue;\n      // Author-keyed: hashed verbatim, never walked into\n      out[key] = AUTHOR_KEYED_FIELDS.has(key) ? item : stripKeys(item, keys);\n    }\n    return out;\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\n/** Drop metadata at the positions the IR defines it, leaving execution semantics. */\nexport function stripMeta(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, UNHASHED_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Drop provenance, keeping the rest of the metadata — what plan compares. */\nexport function stripProvenance(value: unknown): unknown {\n  return stripKeys(value, PROVENANCE_KEYS);\n}\n\n/** Canonical JSON: sorted keys, no whitespace — a stable hash input. */\nexport function canonicalJSON(value: unknown): string {\n  // JSON.stringify(undefined) returns undefined, not a string; absent fields become null\n  if (value === undefined) return 'null';\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJSON).join(',')}]`;\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const entries = Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .sort()\n      .map(\n        (key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJSON((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key])}`\n      );\n    return `{${entries.join(',')}}`;\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value);\n}\n\n/*\n * SHA-256, hand-written and synchronous: crypto.subtle is async (and absent in\n * some embedders), node:crypto is Node-only — the compiler must stay sync and\n * portable. Like the Murmur3 bucketing hash, the known-answer tests pin this\n * implementation to the reference vectors. contentHash is a permanent contract\n * (it addresses stored versions and pins in-flight journeys), so the algorithm\n * must never change once production data exists.\n */\n\n// prettier-ignore\nconst K = new Uint32Array([\n  0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,\n  0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,\n  0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,\n  0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,\n  0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,\n  0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,\n  0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,\n  0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,\n]);\n\nconst rotr = (x: number, n: number): number => (x >>> n) | (x << (32 - n));\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/** SHA-256 over the UTF-8 bytes of `input`, as 64 hex chars. */\nexport function sha256Hex(input: string): string {\n  const data = utf8.encode(input);\n  const bitLenLo = (data.length << 3) >>> 0;\n  const bitLenHi = Math.floor(data.length / 0x20000000);\n\n  // Pad to a multiple of 64 bytes: 0x80, zeros, then the 64-bit big-endian bit length\n  const padded = new Uint8Array((((data.length + 8) >> 6) + 1) << 6);\n  padded.set(data);\n  padded[data.length] = 0x80;\n  const view = new DataView(padded.buffer);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 8, bitLenHi);\n  view.setUint32(padded.length - 4, bitLenLo);\n\n  // prettier-ignore\n  const state = new Uint32Array([\n    0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19,\n  ]);\n  const w = new Uint32Array(64);\n\n  for (let offset = 0; offset < padded.length; offset += 64) {\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) w[i] = view.getUint32(offset + i * 4);\n    for (let i = 16; i < 64; i++) {\n      const w15 = w[i - 15];\n      const w2 = w[i - 2];\n      const s0 = rotr(w15, 7) ^ rotr(w15, 18) ^ (w15 >>> 3);\n      const s1 = rotr(w2, 17) ^ rotr(w2, 19) ^ (w2 >>> 10);\n      w[i] = (w[i - 16] + s0 + w[i - 7] + s1) >>> 0;\n    }\n\n    let [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h] = state as unknown as [\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n      number,\n    ];\n    for (let i = 0; i < 64; i++) {\n      const s1 = rotr(e, 6) ^ rotr(e, 11) ^ rotr(e, 25);\n      const ch = (e & f) ^ (~e & g);\n      const t1 = (h + s1 + ch + K[i] + w[i]) >>> 0;\n      const s0 = rotr(a, 2) ^ rotr(a, 13) ^ rotr(a, 22);\n      const maj = (a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c);\n      const t2 = (s0 + maj) >>> 0;\n      h = g;\n      g = f;\n      f = e;\n      e = (d + t1) >>> 0;\n      d = c;\n      c = b;\n      b = a;\n      a = (t1 + t2) >>> 0;\n    }\n    state[0] = (state[0] + a) >>> 0;\n    state[1] = (state[1] + b) >>> 0;\n    state[2] = (state[2] + c) >>> 0;\n    state[3] = (state[3] + d) >>> 0;\n    state[4] = (state[4] + e) >>> 0;\n    state[5] = (state[5] + f) >>> 0;\n    state[6] = (state[6] + g) >>> 0;\n    state[7] = (state[7] + h) >>> 0;\n  }\n\n  return [...state].map((word) => word.toString(16).padStart(8, '0')).join('');\n}\n\n/**\n * Truncate to 128 bits (32 hex chars): collision-safe for content addressing at\n * any realistic definition count, and short enough for KV keys and instance ids.\n */\nconst contentHashOf = (input: string): string => sha256Hex(input).slice(0, 32);\n\n/** Content hash of execution semantics (strip metadata → canonical JSON → truncated SHA-256). */\nexport function semanticHash(value: unknown): string {\n  return 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package/dist/host/auth.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+let node_crypto = require("node:crypto");
+//#region src/host/auth.ts
+const utf8 = new TextEncoder();
+/**
+* `node:crypto`'s constant-time compare — on Node, Lambda, and a Worker with `nodejs_compat`
+* (which the host needs anyway). It demands equal lengths, so callers hash first or check the
+* length; a mismatch on length answers at once, which reveals the length and nothing else.
+*/
+function constantTimeEqual(a, b) {
+	return a.length === b.length && (0, node_crypto.timingSafeEqual)(a, b);
+}
+/**
+* Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are
+* hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an
+* authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.
+*/
+async function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
+	const [x, y] = await Promise.all([crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", utf8.encode(a)), crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", utf8.encode(b))]);
+	return constantTimeEqual(new Uint8Array(x), new Uint8Array(y));
+}
+/**
+* Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+* The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared
+* in constant time.
+*/
+function bearerMatches(request, token) {
+	const header = request.headers.get("authorization");
+	if (header === null) return false;
+	const space = header.indexOf(" ");
+	if (space === -1) return false;
+	if (header.slice(0, space).toLowerCase() !== "bearer") return false;
+	const presented = header.slice(space + 1).trim();
+	return constantTimeEqual(utf8.encode(presented), utf8.encode(token));
+}
+/**
+* Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development
+* instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with
+* the matching bearer.
+*/
+function authorized(request, env) {
+	return env.API_TOKEN === void 0 || bearerMatches(request, env.API_TOKEN);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.authorized = authorized;
+exports.bearerMatches = bearerMatches;
+exports.timingSafeEqual = timingSafeEqual;
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.cjs.map

package/dist/host/auth.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.cjs","names":["timingSafeEqualBytes"],"sources":["../../src/host/auth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqualBytes } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/**\n * Who may call the host's protected routes. By default the env's `API_TOKEN` as a bearer; a host\n * replaces it with its own `Authorize` (an HMAC over the body, a JWT, a header its proxy adds).\n * The helpers here are what such an authorizer builds on.\n */\n\n/**\n * The host's authorization: receives a copy of the request (so it may read the body) and the\n * env. True lets the request through, false answers 401, a throw answers 500 and is logged — an\n * authorizer that fails never lets a request in. The tracking routes (`/t/...`) and `/health`\n * are public and never reach it.\n */\nexport type Authorize<Env> = (request: Request, env: Env) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/**\n * `node:crypto`'s constant-time compare — on Node, Lambda, and a Worker with `nodejs_compat`\n * (which the host needs anyway). It demands equal lengths, so callers hash first or check the\n * length; a mismatch on length answers at once, which reveals the length and nothing else.\n */\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqualBytes(a, b);\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are\n * hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an\n * authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.\n */\nexport async function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const [x, y] = await Promise.all([\n    crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', utf8.encode(a)),\n    crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', utf8.encode(b)),\n  ]);\n  return constantTimeEqual(new Uint8Array(x), new Uint8Array(y));\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).\n * The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared\n * in constant time.\n */\nexport function bearerMatches(request: Request, token: string): boolean {\n  const header = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (header === null) return false;\n  const space = header.indexOf(' ');\n  if (space === -1) return false;\n  if (header.slice(0, space).toLowerCase() !== 'bearer') return false;\n  const presented = header.slice(space + 1).trim();\n  return constantTimeEqual(utf8.encode(presented), utf8.encode(token));\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development\n * instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with\n * the matching bearer.\n */\nexport function authorized(request: Request, env: { API_TOKEN?: string | undefined }): boolean {\n  return env.API_TOKEN === undefined || bearerMatches(request, env.API_TOKEN);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAgBA,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY;;;;;;AAO7B,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAe,GAAwB;CAChE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAA,GAAUA,YAAAA,gBAAAA,CAAqB,GAAG,CAAC;AAC3D;;;;;;AAOA,eAAsB,gBAAgB,GAAW,GAA6B;CAC5E,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAC/B,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAC9C,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAChD,CAAC;CACD,OAAO,kBAAkB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/D;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,cAAc,SAAkB,OAAwB;CACtE,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe;CAClD,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO;CAC5B,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;CAChC,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO;CACzB,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO;CAC9D,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK;CAC/C,OAAO,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACrE;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,WAAW,SAAkB,KAAkD;CAC7F,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,KAAA,KAAa,cAAc,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS;AAC5E"}

package/dist/host/auth.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+//#region src/host/auth.d.ts
+/**
+ * Who may call the host's protected routes. By default the env's `API_TOKEN` as a bearer; a host
+ * replaces it with its own `Authorize` (an HMAC over the body, a JWT, a header its proxy adds).
+ * The helpers here are what such an authorizer builds on.
+ */
+/**
+ * The host's authorization: receives a copy of the request (so it may read the body) and the
+ * env. True lets the request through, false answers 401, a throw answers 500 and is logged — an
+ * authorizer that fails never lets a request in. The tracking routes (`/t/...`) and `/health`
+ * are public and never reach it.
+ */
+export type Authorize<Env> = (request: Request, env: Env) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are
+ * hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an
+ * authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.
+ */
+export declare function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+ * The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared
+ * in constant time.
+ */
+export declare function bearerMatches(request: Request, token: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development
+ * instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with
+ * the matching bearer.
+ */
+export declare function authorized(request: Request, env: {
+  API_TOKEN?: string | undefined;
+}): boolean;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.d.cts.map

package/dist/host/auth.d.cts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/host/auth.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;YAcY,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,kBAAkB;;;;;;wBAkBjD,gBAAgB,WAAW,YAAY;;;;;;wBAa7C,cAAc,SAAS,SAAS;;;;;;wBAehC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;EAAO"}

package/dist/host/auth.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+//#region src/host/auth.d.ts
+/**
+ * Who may call the host's protected routes. By default the env's `API_TOKEN` as a bearer; a host
+ * replaces it with its own `Authorize` (an HMAC over the body, a JWT, a header its proxy adds).
+ * The helpers here are what such an authorizer builds on.
+ */
+/**
+ * The host's authorization: receives a copy of the request (so it may read the body) and the
+ * env. True lets the request through, false answers 401, a throw answers 500 and is logged — an
+ * authorizer that fails never lets a request in. The tracking routes (`/t/...`) and `/health`
+ * are public and never reach it.
+ */
+export type Authorize<Env> = (request: Request, env: Env) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are
+ * hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an
+ * authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.
+ */
+export declare function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+ * The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared
+ * in constant time.
+ */
+export declare function bearerMatches(request: Request, token: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development
+ * instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with
+ * the matching bearer.
+ */
+export declare function authorized(request: Request, env: {
+  API_TOKEN?: string | undefined;
+}): boolean;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.d.mts.map

package/dist/host/auth.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/host/auth.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;YAcY,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,kBAAkB;;;;;;wBAkBjD,gBAAgB,WAAW,YAAY;;;;;;wBAa7C,cAAc,SAAS,SAAS;;;;;;wBAehC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;EAAO"}

package/dist/host/auth.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqual$1 } from "node:crypto";
+//#region src/host/auth.ts
+const utf8 = new TextEncoder();
+/**
+* `node:crypto`'s constant-time compare — on Node, Lambda, and a Worker with `nodejs_compat`
+* (which the host needs anyway). It demands equal lengths, so callers hash first or check the
+* length; a mismatch on length answers at once, which reveals the length and nothing else.
+*/
+function constantTimeEqual(a, b) {
+	return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual$1(a, b);
+}
+/**
+* Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are
+* hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an
+* authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.
+*/
+async function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
+	const [x, y] = await Promise.all([crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", utf8.encode(a)), crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", utf8.encode(b))]);
+	return constantTimeEqual(new Uint8Array(x), new Uint8Array(y));
+}
+/**
+* Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).
+* The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared
+* in constant time.
+*/
+function bearerMatches(request, token) {
+	const header = request.headers.get("authorization");
+	if (header === null) return false;
+	const space = header.indexOf(" ");
+	if (space === -1) return false;
+	if (header.slice(0, space).toLowerCase() !== "bearer") return false;
+	const presented = header.slice(space + 1).trim();
+	return constantTimeEqual(utf8.encode(presented), utf8.encode(token));
+}
+/**
+* Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development
+* instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with
+* the matching bearer.
+*/
+function authorized(request, env) {
+	return env.API_TOKEN === void 0 || bearerMatches(request, env.API_TOKEN);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { authorized, bearerMatches, timingSafeEqual };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.mjs.map

package/dist/host/auth.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.mjs","names":["timingSafeEqualBytes"],"sources":["../../src/host/auth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqualBytes } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/**\n * Who may call the host's protected routes. By default the env's `API_TOKEN` as a bearer; a host\n * replaces it with its own `Authorize` (an HMAC over the body, a JWT, a header its proxy adds).\n * The helpers here are what such an authorizer builds on.\n */\n\n/**\n * The host's authorization: receives a copy of the request (so it may read the body) and the\n * env. True lets the request through, false answers 401, a throw answers 500 and is logged — an\n * authorizer that fails never lets a request in. The tracking routes (`/t/...`) and `/health`\n * are public and never reach it.\n */\nexport type Authorize<Env> = (request: Request, env: Env) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n\nconst utf8 = new TextEncoder();\n\n/**\n * `node:crypto`'s constant-time compare — on Node, Lambda, and a Worker with `nodejs_compat`\n * (which the host needs anyway). It demands equal lengths, so callers hash first or check the\n * length; a mismatch on length answers at once, which reveals the length and nothing else.\n */\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqualBytes(a, b);\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether two secrets are equal, in time that does not depend on where they differ: both are\n * hashed first, so the comparison runs over equal-length digests whatever their lengths — for an\n * authorizer comparing a signature or a token of its own.\n */\nexport async function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const [x, y] = await Promise.all([\n    crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', utf8.encode(a)),\n    crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', utf8.encode(b)),\n  ]);\n  return constantTimeEqual(new Uint8Array(x), new Uint8Array(y));\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request carries `token` as a bearer credential (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`).\n * The scheme is matched case-insensitively, as RFC 9110 says schemes are; the token is compared\n * in constant time.\n */\nexport function bearerMatches(request: Request, token: string): boolean {\n  const header = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (header === null) return false;\n  const space = header.indexOf(' ');\n  if (space === -1) return false;\n  if (header.slice(0, space).toLowerCase() !== 'bearer') return false;\n  const presented = header.slice(space + 1).trim();\n  return constantTimeEqual(utf8.encode(presented), utf8.encode(token));\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the request may use the API: always when no token is configured (an open development\n * instance — production refuses to run that way, see `createJourneyHost`), otherwise only with\n * the matching bearer.\n */\nexport function authorized(request: Request, env: { API_TOKEN?: string | undefined }): boolean {\n  return env.API_TOKEN === undefined || bearerMatches(request, env.API_TOKEN);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AAgBA,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY;;;;;;AAO7B,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAe,GAAwB;CAChE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,UAAUA,kBAAqB,GAAG,CAAC;AAC3D;;;;;;AAOA,eAAsB,gBAAgB,GAAW,GAA6B;CAC5E,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAC/B,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAC9C,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAChD,CAAC;CACD,OAAO,kBAAkB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/D;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,cAAc,SAAkB,OAAwB;CACtE,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe;CAClD,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO;CAC5B,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;CAChC,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO;CACzB,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO;CAC9D,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK;CAC/C,OAAO,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACrE;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,WAAW,SAAkB,KAAkD;CAC7F,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,KAAA,KAAa,cAAc,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS;AAC5E"}