@shware/security 9.1.0 → 9.2.0

package/README.md

@@ -430,6 +430,37 @@ export async function onAuthorized(request: Request, { attributes }: Authorizati
 - They come from the browser that started the flow: trust them like a cookie — fine for
   attribution or a post-login destination, not for authorization decisions.
 
+#### Carrying data back to the app (`redirectParams`)
+
+`attributes` stay on the server. What the page needs back goes in `redirectParams`: query
+parameters added to the flow's redirect to `successUri` and to `errorUri` alike. For example, the
+page that opened a sign-in popup can tag the attempt, and match the result against it when the
+popup reports back without `window.opener` (cut off by a provider's
+`Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`):
+
+```ts
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+
+app.get(PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION, (c) => {
+  // From the browser: checked here, since an oversized value is an invariant failure (a 500).
+  const attempt = c.req.query('attempt');
+  return auth.oauth2Authorization(c.req.raw, {
+    redirectParams: { attempt: attempt && UUID.test(attempt) ? attempt : undefined },
+  });
+});
+// → https://app.example.com/?status=success&provider=google&attempt=…
+```
+
+- Stored with the authorization request like `attributes`, so every redirect of that flow carries
+  them, success or error, except the two that cannot find the request (no session, or no
+  authorization request in it).
+- The names the redirects use themselves — `status`, `provider`, `error`, `error_description`,
+  `reason` — are dropped, even on a redirect that leaves one out (a cancel has no `reason`): the
+  page would read it as the SDK's. A refusal's metadata wins over a parameter of the same name.
+- String values only; `undefined` values are dropped; at most 2 KB serialized, checked as an
+  invariant like `attributes`: validate a value taken from the request before passing it.
+- They reach the browser and its history: put nothing secret in them.
+
 ### Native login
 
 Mobile apps sign in with the platform SDK and post the result to

package/dist/auth/index.cjs

@@ -37,15 +37,42 @@ const CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
 	"access_denied",
 	"temporarily_unavailable"
 ]);
-function authorizationAttributes(attributes) {
+/**
+* The host's values for the flow (`attributes`, `redirectParams`), `undefined` ones dropped; `name`
+* is what the size invariant calls them.
+*/
+function authorizationAttributes(attributes, name = "attributes") {
 	if (!attributes) return void 0;
 	const defined = {};
 	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) if (value !== void 0) defined[key] = value;
 	if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return void 0;
 	const size = require_auth_attributes.attributesSize(defined);
-	(0, _shware_utils.invariant)(size <= require_auth_attributes.MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES, `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${require_auth_attributes.MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`);
+	(0, _shware_utils.invariant)(size <= require_auth_attributes.MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES, `oauth2 authorization ${name} are ${size} bytes, at most ${require_auth_attributes.MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`);
 	return defined;
 }
+/**
+* What the callback's redirects say themselves. A host's `redirectParams` never carry these, even
+* on a redirect that leaves one out (a cancel has no `reason`): the page would read it as the SDK's.
+*/
+const REDIRECT_PARAMS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+	"status",
+	"provider",
+	"error",
+	"error_description",
+	"reason"
+]);
+/** The host's `redirectParams` without the names the redirects keep for themselves. */
+function redirectParams(params) {
+	if (!params) return void 0;
+	const own = Object.entries(params).filter(([key]) => !REDIRECT_PARAMS.has(key));
+	return authorizationAttributes(Object.fromEntries(own), "redirectParams");
+}
+/** `base` with `params` added, none replacing one it carries itself. */
+function withParams(base, params = {}) {
+	const uri = new URL(base);
+	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);
+	return uri;
+}
 /** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */
 function isFormPost(request) {
 	const contentType = request.headers.get("content-type")?.toLowerCase();
@@ -186,11 +213,16 @@ var Auth = class {
 			throw error;
 		}
 	}
-	/** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */
-	redirect(error, description, refusal) {
+	/**
+	* The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the
+	* flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.
+	*/
+	redirect(error, { description, refusal, params } = {}) {
 		(0, _shware_utils.invariant)(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
-		const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);
-		for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(refusal?.metadata ?? {})) if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);
+		const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.errorUri, {
+			...params,
+			...refusal?.metadata
+		});
 		uri.searchParams.set("error", error);
 		if (description) uri.searchParams.set("error_description", description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));
 		if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set("reason", refusal.reason);
@@ -293,6 +325,7 @@ var Auth = class {
 	oauth2Authorization = (request, options) => this.guard(async () => {
 		(0, _shware_utils.invariant)(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
 		const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);
+		const params = redirectParams(options?.redirectParams);
 		const { mark, setTiming } = require_utils_timing.timing({ enabled: this.timing });
 		const { provider } = require_utils_http.param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);
 		const state = (0, node_crypto.randomUUID)();
@@ -316,7 +349,8 @@ var Auth = class {
 			authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,
 			additionalParameters: pkce,
 			...nonce ? { nonce } : {},
-			...attributes ? { attributes } : {}
+			...attributes ? { attributes } : {},
+			...params ? { redirectParams: params } : {}
 		};
 		session.setAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST, JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest));
 		await this.repository.save(session);
@@ -332,23 +366,42 @@ var Auth = class {
 		(0, _shware_utils.invariant)(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
 		const { mark, setTiming } = require_utils_timing.timing({ enabled: this.timing });
 		const session = await this.loadSession(request);
-		if (!session) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "session not found");
+		if (!session) return this.redirect("invalid_request", { description: "session not found" });
 		mark("load_session");
 		const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST);
-		if (!json) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "authorization request not found");
+		if (!json) return this.redirect("invalid_request", { description: "authorization request not found" });
 		const cached = JSON.parse(json);
+		const params = cached.redirectParams;
 		const { provider } = require_utils_http.param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);
 		const data = isFormPost(request) ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text())) : require_utils_http.query(request);
 		const parsed = require_oauth2_client.oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);
-		if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "invalid redirect query");
+		if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "invalid redirect query",
+			params
+		});
 		if (parsed.data.error) {
-			if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect state mismatch");
-			return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, "server_error"), parsed.data.error_description);
+			if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+				description: "redirect state mismatch",
+				params
+			});
+			return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, "server_error"), {
+				description: parsed.data.error_description,
+				params
+			});
 		}
 		const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;
-		if (!code || !state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "invalid redirect query");
-		if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect state mismatch");
-		if (provider !== cached.provider) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect provider mismatch");
+		if (!code || !state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "invalid redirect query",
+			params
+		});
+		if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "redirect state mismatch",
+			params
+		});
+		if (provider !== cached.provider) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "redirect provider mismatch",
+			params
+		});
 		mark("validate_session");
 		let signedIn;
 		try {
@@ -385,16 +438,19 @@ var Auth = class {
 			if (error instanceof require_oauth2_error.OAuth2Error) {
 				console.warn("OAuth2 callback failed", error);
 				const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : "server_error";
-				return this.redirect(type);
+				return this.redirect(type, { params });
 			}
 			if (error instanceof require_auth_error.AuthenticationError) {
 				console.warn("OAuth2 sign-in refused", error.reason, error.metadata);
-				return this.redirect("access_denied", void 0, error);
+				return this.redirect("access_denied", {
+					refusal: error,
+					params
+				});
 			}
 			console.error("OAuth2 callback failed", error);
-			return this.redirect("server_error");
+			return this.redirect("server_error", { params });
 		}
-		const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);
+		const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.successUri, params);
 		uri.searchParams.set("status", "success");
 		uri.searchParams.set("provider", provider);
 		const response = new Response(null, {

package/dist/auth/index.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["isKnownOAuth2ErrorType","attributesSize","MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES","extend","googleOneTapSchema","attributesSchema","object","string","regex","literal","EmailVerificationCodes","DesktopCodes","OAuth2Client","getCookie","PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME","errorResponse","randomUUID","randomBytes","createHash","AuthenticationError","param","timing","query","oauth2RedirectQuerySchema","OAuth2Error","readJson","bodyAttributes","invalidArgument","readForm","parse","sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema","verifyTurnstileToken","loginEmailSchema","unauthenticated"],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport { extend, literal, object, regex, string } from 'zod/mini';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n  NativeCredential,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n  PkceParameters,\n  StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n  type CookieOptions,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookie,\n  param,\n  query,\n  setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { parse, readForm, readJson, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport {\n  MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n  attributesSchema,\n  attributesSize,\n  bodyAttributes,\n} from './attributes';\nimport { DesktopCodes } from './desktop-codes';\nimport { type EmailSender, EmailVerificationCodes } from './email-codes';\nimport { AuthenticationError } from './error';\nimport { errorResponse, invalidArgument, unauthenticated } from './respond';\nimport type {\n  AuthConfig,\n  AuthService,\n  Authorization,\n  AuthorizedHandler,\n  LoggedHandler,\n  LogoutOptions,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\n/** The header a session id travels in besides the cookie, with `session.header` on. */\nconst SESSION_HEADER = 'X-Auth-Token';\n\n/** Seconds an OAuth2 state or nonce may be used within. */\nconst OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n  return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n  'invalid_grant',\n  'access_denied',\n  'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n  attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes']\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!attributes) return undefined;\n  const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n    if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n  }\n  if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n  // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n  const size = attributesSize(defined);\n  invariant(\n    size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n    `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n  );\n  return defined;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n  const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n  return (\n    request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n  );\n}\n\n/** Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them. */\nconst oneTapBodySchema = extend(googleOneTapSchema, { attributes: attributesSchema });\n\nconst desktopAuthorizeSchema = object({\n  code_challenge: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n  code_challenge_method: literal('S256'),\n});\n\nconst desktopExchangeSchema = object({\n  code: string(),\n  code_verifier: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n});\n\nexport const PATH = {\n  CSRF: '/csrf',\n  LOGOUT: '/logout',\n  LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n  OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n  LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n  SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n\n  // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n  //   1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n  //   2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n  //   3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n  //      Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n  // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n  // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n  DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n  DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n  CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the\n * request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and\n * answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a\n * `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see\n * `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).\n */\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n  private readonly timing: boolean;\n  private readonly cookieName;\n  private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n  private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n  private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n  private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n  private readonly emailCodes: EmailVerificationCodes;\n  private readonly desktopCodes: DesktopCodes;\n  private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n  /** Provider keys whose logins may come without a nonce (`oauth2.nonce.optional`). */\n  private readonly nonceOptional: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly touchInterval: number;\n  private readonly sessionHeader: boolean;\n  private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n  constructor({\n    sessionRepository,\n    kvRepository,\n    turnstileSecretKey,\n    verificationCode,\n    oauth2,\n    cookie,\n    session,\n    timing,\n  }: AuthConfig) {\n    this.timing = timing ?? false;\n    this.kv = kvRepository;\n    this.repository = sessionRepository;\n    this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n    const maxAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n    const resendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n    invariant(maxAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n    invariant(resendCooldown >= 1, 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second');\n    this.emailCodes = new EmailVerificationCodes(kvRepository, { maxAttempts, resendCooldown });\n    this.desktopCodes = new DesktopCodes(kvRepository);\n    const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n    this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n    this.cookieOptions = {\n      path: '/',\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: true,\n      ...cookieOptions,\n    };\n    this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n    this.nonceOptional = new Set(oauth2?.nonce?.optional);\n    this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n    this.sessionHeader = session?.header ?? false;\n    invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n  }\n\n  // ---- sessions and responses ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n    const fromCookie = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n    if (fromCookie) return fromCookie;\n    return (this.sessionHeader && request.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER)) || undefined;\n  }\n\n  /** The session the request carries, if it exists. */\n  private async loadSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null> {\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    return sessionId ? this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n  }\n\n  /** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */\n  private principalOf(session: Session): Principal | null {\n    const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n    return name ? { name: String(name) } : null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login\n   * session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow\n   * attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier\n   * sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been\n   * planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).\n   */\n  private async signIn(principal: Principal, carryOver?: Session): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = this.repository.createSession();\n    for (const attribute of carryOver?.getAttributeNames() ?? []) {\n      if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n      if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n      const value = carryOver?.getAttribute(attribute);\n      if (value !== null && value !== undefined) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n    }\n    session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n    return session;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with\n   * `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.\n   */\n  private withSession(response: Response, session: Session, cookie?: CookieOptions): Response {\n    const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n    setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), {\n      ...this.cookieOptions,\n      ...cookie,\n      maxAge,\n    });\n    if (this.sessionHeader) response.headers.set(SESSION_HEADER, session.getId());\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */\n  private async guard(run: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<Response> {\n    try {\n      return await run();\n    } catch (error) {\n      const response = errorResponse(error);\n      if (response) return response;\n      throw error;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */\n  private redirect(\n    error: OAuth2ErrorType,\n    description?: string,\n    refusal?: AuthenticationError\n  ): Response {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);\n    // Metadata never replaces a parameter: not one errorUri carries itself, nor one set below.\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(refusal?.metadata ?? {})) {\n      if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);\n    }\n    uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n    if (description) {\n      uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n    }\n    if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set('reason', refusal.reason);\n    return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n  }\n\n  // ---- basic -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const token = randomUUID();\n    const response = Response.json({\n      token,\n      parameterName: '_csrf',\n      headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n    });\n\n    // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n    setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n      path: '/',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: false,\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n    });\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logout = async (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions): Promise<Response> => {\n    const scope = options?.scope ?? 'local';\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    // `global` and `others` reach the principal's other sessions through the one the request\n    // carries; a request without a signed-in session has no principal to widen to, and ends as\n    // `local` would.\n    if (scope !== 'local' && sessionId) {\n      const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n      const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n      if (principal) {\n        const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n        for (const id of sessions.keys()) {\n          if (id !== sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(id);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    const response = Response.json({});\n    if (scope === 'others') return response;\n    if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n    // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n    deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n\n    const principal = this.principalOf(session);\n    if (principal) await onLogged?.(principal);\n    return this.withSession(Response.json({ data: principal !== null }), session);\n  };\n\n  // ---- oauth2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n    // 32 random bytes: a 43-char base64url verifier, the RFC 7636 minimum (a UUID is 36).\n    const code_verifier = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n    const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(code_verifier)\n      .digest()\n      .toString('base64url');\n\n    return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n    return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n    return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,\n   * or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes\n   * it sign in once.\n   */\n  private async consumeNonce(nonce: string, provider: string): Promise<void> {\n    const key = this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce);\n    if ((await this.kv.getItem(key)) !== provider) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n    await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The nonce check of the JSON logins (One Tap, native), where the client obtained the id token\n   * and the nonce came from `oauth2Nonce`: spends the one the token carries, and refuses a token\n   * without one when the provider's flow echoes nonces (`required`) and the host has not listed the\n   * provider as optional. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce makes it sign in\n   * once.\n   */\n  private async checkIssuedNonce(\n    userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'],\n    provider: string,\n    required: boolean\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n    if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n      await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n      return true;\n    }\n    if (required && !this.nonceOptional.has(provider)) {\n      throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n    const state = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ state });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n    const nonce = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ nonce });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Authorization = (\n    request: Request,\n    options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n      const state = randomUUID();\n      const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n      // Sent only to a provider whose id token echoes it: the callback then requires it back, so\n      // a code that was swapped in for another sign-in's yields a token the session refuses.\n      const nonce = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web ? randomUUID() : undefined;\n      const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce, nonce });\n      let session = await this.loadSession(request);\n      if (!session) {\n        // A session made for the flow only has to outlive the state: an abandoned flow must not\n        // keep a row for the default interval. Sign-in moves to a new session, with the default.\n        session = this.repository.createSession();\n        session.setMaxInactiveInterval(OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n      }\n      mark('fetch_session');\n\n      const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n        state,\n        provider,\n        authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n        additionalParameters: pkce,\n        ...(nonce ? { nonce } : {}),\n        ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n      };\n      session.setAttribute(\n        this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST,\n        JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest)\n      );\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      mark('save_session');\n\n      const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n      setTiming(response);\n      return this.withSession(response, session);\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n    // 1. the session the flow started on, and the authorization request it stored\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'session not found');\n    mark('load_session');\n    const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n    if (!json) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'authorization request not found');\n    const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n\n    // 2. the provider's answer: query, or a form for Apple's response_mode=form_post\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n    const data = isFormPost(request)\n      ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()))\n      : query(request);\n    const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n    if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n    // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n    // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n    // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n    // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n    // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n    // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n    if (parsed.data.error) {\n      if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n        return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n      }\n      return this.redirect(\n        safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'),\n        parsed.data.error_description\n      );\n    }\n    const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;\n    if (!code || !state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n    if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n    if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect provider mismatch');\n    }\n    mark('validate_session');\n\n    // 3. exchange the code, load the user, sign in. Everything here can fail (an expired or reused\n    // code, a network error, the host's handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup\n    // the user is looking at, so every failure must land on errorUri, never as a JSON error.\n    let signedIn: Session;\n    try {\n      const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n        provider,\n        code,\n        pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n      });\n      // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n      const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        token,\n        response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n      });\n      mark('exchange_code');\n      // The id token must carry the nonce this flow sent (stored with the state, not in KV: it\n      // is bound to this session's request). A provider that gave no id token has nothing to\n      // carry it, as has a request stored before nonces were sent.\n      if (cached.nonce && token.id_token) {\n        const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n        if (typeof nonce !== 'string' || !nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n        if (nonce !== cached.nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n        mark('check_nonce');\n      }\n\n      const principal = await handler(request, {\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        userInfo,\n        token,\n        attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n      });\n      mark('save_principal');\n\n      signedIn = await this.signIn(principal, session);\n      await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n      mark('update_session');\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n      // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n      if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n        const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n        return this.redirect(type);\n      }\n      // A refusal is something the user can act on, so its reason and metadata reach the page,\n      // as they reach a JSON client through the ErrorInfo.\n      if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 sign-in refused', error.reason, error.metadata);\n        return this.redirect('access_denied', undefined, error);\n      }\n      console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n      return this.redirect('server_error');\n    }\n\n    const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);\n    uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n    uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n    const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, signedIn);\n  };\n\n  /** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */\n  private async authorize(\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    authorization: Authorization,\n    setTiming: (response: Response) => void\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const principal = await handler(request, authorization);\n    const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n    const response = Response.json(principal);\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, session);\n  }\n\n  loginOAuth2Native = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n      const body = await readJson(request);\n      // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n      const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n      // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n      const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n      const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n      if (\n        code_verifier !== undefined &&\n        (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n      ) {\n        throw invalidArgument(\n          'INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER',\n          'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]'\n        );\n      }\n      const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n        provider,\n        credentials,\n      });\n      mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n      // Required when the provider's native id token echoes a nonce and the login produced one\n      // (Facebook's access_token login has none to carry it).\n      const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).native && !!token.id_token;\n      if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Onetap = (\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    provider = 'google'\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n      // Google's own form post, or an app's JSON.\n      const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n      const body = contentType.includes('application/json')\n        ? await readJson(request)\n        : await readForm(request);\n      const { attributes = {}, ...parsed } = parse(oneTapBodySchema, body);\n\n      // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n      let clientId: string;\n      let token: Authorization['token'];\n      let userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'];\n      if (parsed.credential) {\n        ({ clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n          provider,\n          credential: parsed.credential,\n        }));\n        mark('verify_credential');\n\n        // The credential must carry a single-use nonce from `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end\n        // passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which\n        // FedCM mode no longer sets.\n        const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web;\n        if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n      } else if (parsed.code) {\n        ({ clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n          provider,\n          code: parsed.code,\n        }));\n        userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n      } else {\n        throw invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'credential or code is required');\n      }\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- email -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  sendEmailVerificationCode = (request: Request, sender: EmailSender): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n      const { email, turnstileToken } = parse(\n        sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema,\n        await readJson(request)\n      );\n      await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n      await this.emailCodes.send(email, sender);\n      return Response.json({});\n    });\n\n  verifyEmailCode = (email: string, verificationCode: string): Promise<void> =>\n    this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n\n  loginEmail = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const {\n        email,\n        verificationCode,\n        attributes = {},\n      } = parse(loginEmailSchema, await readJson(request));\n      await this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n      const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider: 'EMAIL', userInfo: { claims, data: {} }, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- desktop ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  /**\n   * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal\n   * sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that\n   * the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n   *\n   * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the\n   * browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge\n   * through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`\n   * enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n   * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)\n   * from exchanging it.\n   *\n   * Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse\n   * protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does\n   * not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n   */\n  desktopAuthorize = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n      if (!principal) throw unauthenticated('Sign in first');\n      const { code_challenge } = parse(desktopAuthorizeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const code = await this.desktopCodes.issue(principal, code_challenge);\n      return Response.json({ code });\n    });\n\n  /**\n   * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth\n   * code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent\n   * of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side\n   * does not cascade to the other.\n   *\n   * Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the\n   * desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide\n   * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the\n   * SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by\n   * Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n   *\n   * No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,\n   * and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.\n   */\n  desktopExchange = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { code, code_verifier } = parse(desktopExchangeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const principal = await this.desktopCodes.redeem(code, code_verifier);\n      const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n      session.setAttribute('client_type', 'desktop');\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      return this.withSession(Response.json({ ok: true }), session, {\n        sameSite: 'none',\n        secure: true,\n      });\n    });\n\n  // ---- session management ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  kick = async (principal: Principal): Promise<void> => {\n    const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n    for (const sessionId of sessions.keys()) {\n      await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    }\n  };\n\n  /**\n   * Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user\n   * who keeps using the app is never signed out after `maxInactiveInterval` of not calling one\n   * particular endpoint. No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n   * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n   * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n   */\n  private async touch(session: Session) {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n  }\n\n  getPrincipal = async (request: Request): Promise<Principal | null> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n    if (!principal) return null;\n    await this.touch(session);\n    return principal;\n  };\n\n  isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n    return (await this.getPrincipal(request)) !== null;\n  };\n\n  getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n    request: Request,\n    create: T\n  ): Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null> => {\n    type Result = T extends true ? Session : Session | null;\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (session || !create) return session as Result;\n    const created = this.repository.createSession();\n    await this.repository.save(created);\n    return created;\n  };\n\n  deleteSession = async (sessionId: string): Promise<void> => {\n    await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n  };\n\n  listSessions = async (principal: Principal): Promise<Session[]> => {\n    const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n    return Array.from(sessions.values());\n  };\n\n  cleanupExpiredSessions = async (cleanupCount?: number): Promise<Response> => {\n    await this.repository.cleanupExpiredSessions(cleanupCount);\n    return Response.json({});\n  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+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["isKnownOAuth2ErrorType","attributesSize","MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES","extend","googleOneTapSchema","attributesSchema","object","string","regex","literal","EmailVerificationCodes","DesktopCodes","OAuth2Client","getCookie","PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME","errorResponse","randomUUID","randomBytes","createHash","AuthenticationError","param","timing","query","oauth2RedirectQuerySchema","OAuth2Error","readJson","bodyAttributes","invalidArgument","readForm","parse","sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema","verifyTurnstileToken","loginEmailSchema","unauthenticated"],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport { extend, literal, object, regex, string } from 'zod/mini';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n  NativeCredential,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n  PkceParameters,\n  StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n  type CookieOptions,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookie,\n  param,\n  query,\n  setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { parse, readForm, readJson, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport {\n  MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n  attributesSchema,\n  attributesSize,\n  bodyAttributes,\n} from './attributes';\nimport { DesktopCodes } from './desktop-codes';\nimport { type EmailSender, EmailVerificationCodes } from './email-codes';\nimport { AuthenticationError } from './error';\nimport { errorResponse, invalidArgument, unauthenticated } from './respond';\nimport type {\n  AuthConfig,\n  AuthService,\n  Authorization,\n  AuthorizedHandler,\n  LoggedHandler,\n  LogoutOptions,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\n/** The header a session id travels in besides the cookie, with `session.header` on. */\nconst SESSION_HEADER = 'X-Auth-Token';\n\n/** Seconds an OAuth2 state or nonce may be used within. */\nconst OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n  return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n  'invalid_grant',\n  'access_denied',\n  'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The host's values for the flow (`attributes`, `redirectParams`), `undefined` ones dropped; `name`\n * is what the size invariant calls them.\n */\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n  attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes'],\n  name = 'attributes'\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!attributes) return undefined;\n  const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n    if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n  }\n  if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n  // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n  const size = attributesSize(defined);\n  invariant(\n    size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n    `oauth2 authorization ${name} are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n  );\n  return defined;\n}\n\ninterface RedirectDetails {\n  description?: string;\n  refusal?: AuthenticationError;\n  /** The flow's `redirectParams`. */\n  params?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * What the callback's redirects say themselves. A host's `redirectParams` never carry these, even\n * on a redirect that leaves one out (a cancel has no `reason`): the page would read it as the SDK's.\n */\nconst REDIRECT_PARAMS = new Set(['status', 'provider', 'error', 'error_description', 'reason']);\n\n/** The host's `redirectParams` without the names the redirects keep for themselves. */\nfunction redirectParams(params: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['redirectParams']) {\n  if (!params) return undefined;\n  const own = Object.entries(params).filter(([key]) => !REDIRECT_PARAMS.has(key));\n  return authorizationAttributes(Object.fromEntries(own), 'redirectParams');\n}\n\n/** `base` with `params` added, none replacing one it carries itself. */\nfunction withParams(base: string, params: Record<string, string> = {}) {\n  const uri = new URL(base);\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {\n    if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);\n  }\n  return uri;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n  const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n  return (\n    request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n  );\n}\n\n/** Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them. */\nconst oneTapBodySchema = extend(googleOneTapSchema, { attributes: attributesSchema });\n\nconst desktopAuthorizeSchema = object({\n  code_challenge: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n  code_challenge_method: literal('S256'),\n});\n\nconst desktopExchangeSchema = object({\n  code: string(),\n  code_verifier: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n});\n\nexport const PATH = {\n  CSRF: '/csrf',\n  LOGOUT: '/logout',\n  LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n  OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n  LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n  SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n\n  // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n  //   1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n  //   2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n  //   3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n  //      Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n  // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n  // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n  DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n  DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n  CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the\n * request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and\n * answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a\n * `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see\n * `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).\n */\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n  private readonly timing: boolean;\n  private readonly cookieName;\n  private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n  private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n  private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n  private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n  private readonly emailCodes: EmailVerificationCodes;\n  private readonly desktopCodes: DesktopCodes;\n  private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n  /** Provider keys whose logins may come without a nonce (`oauth2.nonce.optional`). */\n  private readonly nonceOptional: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly touchInterval: number;\n  private readonly sessionHeader: boolean;\n  private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n  constructor({\n    sessionRepository,\n    kvRepository,\n    turnstileSecretKey,\n    verificationCode,\n    oauth2,\n    cookie,\n    session,\n    timing,\n  }: AuthConfig) {\n    this.timing = timing ?? false;\n    this.kv = kvRepository;\n    this.repository = sessionRepository;\n    this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n    const maxAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n    const resendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n    invariant(maxAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n    invariant(resendCooldown >= 1, 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second');\n    this.emailCodes = new EmailVerificationCodes(kvRepository, { maxAttempts, resendCooldown });\n    this.desktopCodes = new DesktopCodes(kvRepository);\n    const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n    this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n    this.cookieOptions = {\n      path: '/',\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: true,\n      ...cookieOptions,\n    };\n    this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n    this.nonceOptional = new Set(oauth2?.nonce?.optional);\n    this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n    this.sessionHeader = session?.header ?? false;\n    invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n  }\n\n  // ---- sessions and responses ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n    const fromCookie = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n    if (fromCookie) return fromCookie;\n    return (this.sessionHeader && request.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER)) || undefined;\n  }\n\n  /** The session the request carries, if it exists. */\n  private async loadSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null> {\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    return sessionId ? this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n  }\n\n  /** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */\n  private principalOf(session: Session): Principal | null {\n    const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n    return name ? { name: String(name) } : null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login\n   * session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow\n   * attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier\n   * sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been\n   * planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).\n   */\n  private async signIn(principal: Principal, carryOver?: Session): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = this.repository.createSession();\n    for (const attribute of carryOver?.getAttributeNames() ?? []) {\n      if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n      if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n      const value = carryOver?.getAttribute(attribute);\n      if (value !== null && value !== undefined) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n    }\n    session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n    return session;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with\n   * `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.\n   */\n  private withSession(response: Response, session: Session, cookie?: CookieOptions): Response {\n    const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n    setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), {\n      ...this.cookieOptions,\n      ...cookie,\n      maxAge,\n    });\n    if (this.sessionHeader) response.headers.set(SESSION_HEADER, session.getId());\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */\n  private async guard(run: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<Response> {\n    try {\n      return await run();\n    } catch (error) {\n      const response = errorResponse(error);\n      if (response) return response;\n      throw error;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the\n   * flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.\n   */\n  private redirect(\n    error: OAuth2ErrorType,\n    { description, refusal, params }: RedirectDetails = {}\n  ): Response {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    // A refusal's metadata wins over the host's parameters of the same name: it is about this answer.\n    const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.errorUri, { ...params, ...refusal?.metadata });\n    uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n    if (description) {\n      uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n    }\n    if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set('reason', refusal.reason);\n    return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n  }\n\n  // ---- basic -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const token = randomUUID();\n    const response = Response.json({\n      token,\n      parameterName: '_csrf',\n      headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n    });\n\n    // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n    setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n      path: '/',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: false,\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n    });\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logout = async (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions): Promise<Response> => {\n    const scope = options?.scope ?? 'local';\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    // `global` and `others` reach the principal's other sessions through the one the request\n    // carries; a request without a signed-in session has no principal to widen to, and ends as\n    // `local` would.\n    if (scope !== 'local' && sessionId) {\n      const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n      const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n      if (principal) {\n        const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n        for (const id of sessions.keys()) {\n          if (id !== sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(id);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    const response = Response.json({});\n    if (scope === 'others') return response;\n    if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n    // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n    deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n\n    const principal = this.principalOf(session);\n    if (principal) await onLogged?.(principal);\n    return this.withSession(Response.json({ data: principal !== null }), session);\n  };\n\n  // ---- oauth2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n    // 32 random bytes: a 43-char base64url verifier, the RFC 7636 minimum (a UUID is 36).\n    const code_verifier = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n    const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(code_verifier)\n      .digest()\n      .toString('base64url');\n\n    return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n    return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n    return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,\n   * or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes\n   * it sign in once.\n   */\n  private async consumeNonce(nonce: string, provider: string): Promise<void> {\n    const key = this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce);\n    if ((await this.kv.getItem(key)) !== provider) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n    await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The nonce check of the JSON logins (One Tap, native), where the client obtained the id token\n   * and the nonce came from `oauth2Nonce`: spends the one the token carries, and refuses a token\n   * without one when the provider's flow echoes nonces (`required`) and the host has not listed the\n   * provider as optional. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce makes it sign in\n   * once.\n   */\n  private async checkIssuedNonce(\n    userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'],\n    provider: string,\n    required: boolean\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n    if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n      await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n      return true;\n    }\n    if (required && !this.nonceOptional.has(provider)) {\n      throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n    const state = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ state });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n    const nonce = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ nonce });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Authorization = (\n    request: Request,\n    options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n      const params = redirectParams(options?.redirectParams);\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n      const state = randomUUID();\n      const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n      // Sent only to a provider whose id token echoes it: the callback then requires it back, so\n      // a code that was swapped in for another sign-in's yields a token the session refuses.\n      const nonce = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web ? randomUUID() : undefined;\n      const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce, nonce });\n      let session = await this.loadSession(request);\n      if (!session) {\n        // A session made for the flow only has to outlive the state: an abandoned flow must not\n        // keep a row for the default interval. Sign-in moves to a new session, with the default.\n        session = this.repository.createSession();\n        session.setMaxInactiveInterval(OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n      }\n      mark('fetch_session');\n\n      const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n        state,\n        provider,\n        authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n        additionalParameters: pkce,\n        ...(nonce ? { nonce } : {}),\n        ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n        ...(params ? { redirectParams: params } : {}),\n      };\n      session.setAttribute(\n        this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST,\n        JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest)\n      );\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      mark('save_session');\n\n      const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n      setTiming(response);\n      return this.withSession(response, session);\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n    // 1. the session the flow started on, and the authorization request it stored\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'session not found' });\n    mark('load_session');\n    const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n    if (!json) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'authorization request not found' });\n    }\n    const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n    // From here on the redirect back to the app is this flow's, with the host's parameters.\n    const params = cached.redirectParams;\n\n    // 2. the provider's answer: query, or a form for Apple's response_mode=form_post\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n    const data = isFormPost(request)\n      ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()))\n      : query(request);\n    const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n    if (!parsed.success) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'invalid redirect query', params });\n    }\n    // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n    // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n    // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n    // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n    // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n    // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n    if (parsed.data.error) {\n      if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n        return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'redirect state mismatch', params });\n      }\n      return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'), {\n        description: parsed.data.error_description,\n        params,\n      });\n    }\n    const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;\n    if (!code || !state) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'invalid redirect query', params });\n    }\n    if (state !== cached.state) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'redirect state mismatch', params });\n    }\n    if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', {\n        description: 'redirect provider mismatch',\n        params,\n      });\n    }\n    mark('validate_session');\n\n    // 3. exchange the code, load the user, sign in. Everything here can fail (an expired or reused\n    // code, a network error, the host's handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup\n    // the user is looking at, so every failure must land on errorUri, never as a JSON error.\n    let signedIn: Session;\n    try {\n      const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n        provider,\n        code,\n        pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n      });\n      // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n      const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        token,\n        response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n      });\n      mark('exchange_code');\n      // The id token must carry the nonce this flow sent (stored with the state, not in KV: it\n      // is bound to this session's request). A provider that gave no id token has nothing to\n      // carry it, as has a request stored before nonces were sent.\n      if (cached.nonce && token.id_token) {\n        const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n        if (typeof nonce !== 'string' || !nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n        if (nonce !== cached.nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n        mark('check_nonce');\n      }\n\n      const principal = await handler(request, {\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        userInfo,\n        token,\n        attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n      });\n      mark('save_principal');\n\n      signedIn = await this.signIn(principal, session);\n      await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n      mark('update_session');\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n      // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n      if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n        const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n        return this.redirect(type, { params });\n      }\n      // A refusal is something the user can act on, so its reason and metadata reach the page,\n      // as they reach a JSON client through the ErrorInfo.\n      if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 sign-in refused', error.reason, error.metadata);\n        return this.redirect('access_denied', { refusal: error, params });\n      }\n      console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n      return this.redirect('server_error', { params });\n    }\n\n    const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.successUri, params);\n    uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n    uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n    const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, signedIn);\n  };\n\n  /** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */\n  private async authorize(\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    authorization: Authorization,\n    setTiming: (response: Response) => void\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const principal = await handler(request, authorization);\n    const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n    const response = Response.json(principal);\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, session);\n  }\n\n  loginOAuth2Native = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n      const body = await readJson(request);\n      // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n      const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n      // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n      const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n      const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n      if (\n        code_verifier !== undefined &&\n        (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n      ) {\n        throw invalidArgument(\n          'INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER',\n          'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]'\n        );\n      }\n      const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n        provider,\n        credentials,\n      });\n      mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n      // Required when the provider's native id token echoes a nonce and the login produced one\n      // (Facebook's access_token login has none to carry it).\n      const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).native && !!token.id_token;\n      if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Onetap = (\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    provider = 'google'\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n      // Google's own form post, or an app's JSON.\n      const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n      const body = contentType.includes('application/json')\n        ? await readJson(request)\n        : await readForm(request);\n      const { attributes = {}, ...parsed } = parse(oneTapBodySchema, body);\n\n      // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n      let clientId: string;\n      let token: Authorization['token'];\n      let userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'];\n      if (parsed.credential) {\n        ({ clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n          provider,\n          credential: parsed.credential,\n        }));\n        mark('verify_credential');\n\n        // The credential must carry a single-use nonce from `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end\n        // passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which\n        // FedCM mode no longer sets.\n        const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web;\n        if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n      } else if (parsed.code) {\n        ({ clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n          provider,\n          code: parsed.code,\n        }));\n        userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n      } else {\n        throw invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'credential or code is required');\n      }\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- email -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  sendEmailVerificationCode = (request: Request, sender: EmailSender): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n      const { email, turnstileToken } = parse(\n        sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema,\n        await readJson(request)\n      );\n      await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n      await this.emailCodes.send(email, sender);\n      return Response.json({});\n    });\n\n  verifyEmailCode = (email: string, verificationCode: string): Promise<void> =>\n    this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n\n  loginEmail = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const {\n        email,\n        verificationCode,\n        attributes = {},\n      } = parse(loginEmailSchema, await readJson(request));\n      await this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n      const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider: 'EMAIL', userInfo: { claims, data: {} }, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- desktop ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  /**\n   * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal\n   * sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that\n   * the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n   *\n   * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the\n   * browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge\n   * through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`\n   * enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n   * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)\n   * from exchanging it.\n   *\n   * Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse\n   * protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does\n   * not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n   */\n  desktopAuthorize = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n      if (!principal) throw unauthenticated('Sign in first');\n      const { code_challenge } = parse(desktopAuthorizeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const code = await this.desktopCodes.issue(principal, code_challenge);\n      return Response.json({ code });\n    });\n\n  /**\n   * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth\n   * code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent\n   * of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side\n   * does not cascade to the other.\n   *\n   * Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the\n   * desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide\n   * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the\n   * SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by\n   * Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n   *\n   * No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,\n   * and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.\n   */\n  desktopExchange = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { code, code_verifier } = parse(desktopExchangeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const principal = await this.desktopCodes.redeem(code, code_verifier);\n      const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n      session.setAttribute('client_type', 'desktop');\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      return this.withSession(Response.json({ ok: true }), session, {\n        sameSite: 'none',\n        secure: true,\n      });\n    });\n\n  // ---- session management ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  kick = async (principal: Principal): Promise<void> => {\n    const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n    for (const sessionId of sessions.keys()) {\n      await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    }\n  };\n\n  /**\n   * Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user\n   * who keeps using the app is never signed out after `maxInactiveInterval` of not calling one\n   * particular endpoint. No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n   * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n   * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n   */\n  private async touch(session: Session) {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n  }\n\n  getPrincipal = async (request: Request): Promise<Principal | null> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n    if (!principal) return null;\n    await this.touch(session);\n    return principal;\n  };\n\n  isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n    return (await this.getPrincipal(request)) !== null;\n  };\n\n  getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n    request: Request,\n    create: T\n  ): Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null> => {\n    type Result = T extends true ? 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package/dist/auth/index.d.cts

@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ export declare class Auth implements AuthService {
   private withSession;
   /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */
   private guard;
-  /** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */
+  /**
+   * The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the
+   * flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.
+   */
   private redirect;
   csrf: (_request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
   logout: (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions) => Promise<Response>;

package/dist/auth/index.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBA0Ha;WACX;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WASA;WACA;WAEA;;;;;;;;;qBAUW,gBAAgB;mBACV;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;;mBAEA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;EAEjB,cACE,mBACA,cACA,oBACA,kBACA,QACA,QACA,SACA,UACC;UA6BK;;UAOM;;UAMN;;;;;;;;UAYM;;;;;UAiBN;;UAYM;;UAWN;EAqBR,OAAI,UAAoB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAmB1C,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,UAAY,kBAAgB,QAAQ;EAyBpE,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,WAAa,kBAAgB,QAAQ;UAc7D;UAWA;UAIA;;;;;;UASM;;;;;;;;UAaA;EAgBd,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,sBAAmB,SACR,SAAO,UACN,+BACT,QAAQ;EAyCX,kBAAe,SAAmB,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;UA6GlE;EAad,oBAAiB,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;EAuC5E,oBAAiB,SACN,SAAO,SACP,mBAAiB,sBAEzB,QAAQ;EAgDX,4BAAyB,SAAa,SAAO,QAAU,gBAAc,QAAQ;EAY7E,kBAAe,eAAiB,6BAA6B;EAG7D,aAAU,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAoCrE,mBAAgB,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAwB/C,kBAAe,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;EAe9C,OAAI,WAAqB,cAAY;;;;;;;;UAcvB;EAOd,eAAY,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAQjD,kBAAe,SAAmB,YAAU;EAI5C,aAAoB,mBAAiB,SAC1B,SAAO,QACR,MACP,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EAStC,gBAAa,sBAA8B;EAI3C,eAAY,WAAqB,cAAY,QAAQ;EAKrD,yBAAsB,0BAAkC,QAAQ"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBA4Ja;WACX;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WASA;WACA;WAEA;;;;;;;;;qBAUW,gBAAgB;mBACV;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;;mBAEA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;EAEjB,cACE,mBACA,cACA,oBACA,kBACA,QACA,QACA,SACA,UACC;UA6BK;;UAOM;;UAMN;;;;;;;;UAYM;;;;;UAiBN;;UAYM;;;;;UAcN;EAiBR,OAAI,UAAoB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAmB1C,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,UAAY,kBAAgB,QAAQ;EAyBpE,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,WAAa,kBAAgB,QAAQ;UAc7D;UAWA;UAIA;;;;;;UASM;;;;;;;;UAaA;EAgBd,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,sBAAmB,SACR,SAAO,UACN,+BACT,QAAQ;EA2CX,kBAAe,SAAmB,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;UA0HlE;EAad,oBAAiB,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;EAuC5E,oBAAiB,SACN,SAAO,SACP,mBAAiB,sBAEzB,QAAQ;EAgDX,4BAAyB,SAAa,SAAO,QAAU,gBAAc,QAAQ;EAY7E,kBAAe,eAAiB,6BAA6B;EAG7D,aAAU,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAoCrE,mBAAgB,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAwB/C,kBAAe,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;EAe9C,OAAI,WAAqB,cAAY;;;;;;;;UAcvB;EAOd,eAAY,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAQjD,kBAAe,SAAmB,YAAU;EAI5C,aAAoB,mBAAiB,SAC1B,SAAO,QACR,MACP,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EAStC,gBAAa,sBAA8B;EAI3C,eAAY,WAAqB,cAAY,QAAQ;EAKrD,yBAAsB,0BAAkC,QAAQ"}

package/dist/auth/index.d.mts

@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ export declare class Auth implements AuthService {
   private withSession;
   /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */
   private guard;
-  /** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */
+  /**
+   * The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the
+   * flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.
+   */
   private redirect;
   csrf: (_request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
   logout: (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions) => Promise<Response>;

package/dist/auth/index.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBA0Ha;WACX;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WASA;WACA;WAEA;;;;;;;;;qBAUW,gBAAgB;mBACV;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;;mBAEA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;EAEjB,cACE,mBACA,cACA,oBACA,kBACA,QACA,QACA,SACA,UACC;UA6BK;;UAOM;;UAMN;;;;;;;;UAYM;;;;;UAiBN;;UAYM;;UAWN;EAqBR,OAAI,UAAoB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAmB1C,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,UAAY,kBAAgB,QAAQ;EAyBpE,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,WAAa,kBAAgB,QAAQ;UAc7D;UAWA;UAIA;;;;;;UASM;;;;;;;;UAaA;EAgBd,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,sBAAmB,SACR,SAAO,UACN,+BACT,QAAQ;EAyCX,kBAAe,SAAmB,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;UA6GlE;EAad,oBAAiB,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;EAuC5E,oBAAiB,SACN,SAAO,SACP,mBAAiB,sBAEzB,QAAQ;EAgDX,4BAAyB,SAAa,SAAO,QAAU,gBAAc,QAAQ;EAY7E,kBAAe,eAAiB,6BAA6B;EAG7D,aAAU,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAoCrE,mBAAgB,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAwB/C,kBAAe,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;EAe9C,OAAI,WAAqB,cAAY;;;;;;;;UAcvB;EAOd,eAAY,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAQjD,kBAAe,SAAmB,YAAU;EAI5C,aAAoB,mBAAiB,SAC1B,SAAO,QACR,MACP,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EAStC,gBAAa,sBAA8B;EAI3C,eAAY,WAAqB,cAAY,QAAQ;EAKrD,yBAAsB,0BAAkC,QAAQ"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBA4Ja;WACX;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WASA;WACA;WAEA;;;;;;;;;qBAUW,gBAAgB;mBACV;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;;mBAEA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;EAEjB,cACE,mBACA,cACA,oBACA,kBACA,QACA,QACA,SACA,UACC;UA6BK;;UAOM;;UAMN;;;;;;;;UAYM;;;;;UAiBN;;UAYM;;;;;UAcN;EAiBR,OAAI,UAAoB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAmB1C,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,UAAY,kBAAgB,QAAQ;EAyBpE,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,WAAa,kBAAgB,QAAQ;UAc7D;UAWA;UAIA;;;;;;UASM;;;;;;;;UAaA;EAgBd,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,sBAAmB,SACR,SAAO,UACN,+BACT,QAAQ;EA2CX,kBAAe,SAAmB,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;UA0HlE;EAad,oBAAiB,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;EAuC5E,oBAAiB,SACN,SAAO,SACP,mBAAiB,sBAEzB,QAAQ;EAgDX,4BAAyB,SAAa,SAAO,QAAU,gBAAc,QAAQ;EAY7E,kBAAe,eAAiB,6BAA6B;EAG7D,aAAU,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAoCrE,mBAAgB,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAwB/C,kBAAe,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;EAe9C,OAAI,WAAqB,cAAY;;;;;;;;UAcvB;EAOd,eAAY,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAQjD,kBAAe,SAAmB,YAAU;EAI5C,aAAoB,mBAAiB,SAC1B,SAAO,QACR,MACP,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EAStC,gBAAa,sBAA8B;EAI3C,eAAY,WAAqB,cAAY,QAAQ;EAKrD,yBAAsB,0BAAkC,QAAQ"}

package/dist/auth/index.mjs

@@ -36,15 +36,42 @@ const CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
 	"access_denied",
 	"temporarily_unavailable"
 ]);
-function authorizationAttributes(attributes) {
+/**
+* The host's values for the flow (`attributes`, `redirectParams`), `undefined` ones dropped; `name`
+* is what the size invariant calls them.
+*/
+function authorizationAttributes(attributes, name = "attributes") {
 	if (!attributes) return void 0;
 	const defined = {};
 	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) if (value !== void 0) defined[key] = value;
 	if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return void 0;
 	const size = attributesSize(defined);
-	invariant(size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES, `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`);
+	invariant(size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES, `oauth2 authorization ${name} are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`);
 	return defined;
 }
+/**
+* What the callback's redirects say themselves. A host's `redirectParams` never carry these, even
+* on a redirect that leaves one out (a cancel has no `reason`): the page would read it as the SDK's.
+*/
+const REDIRECT_PARAMS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+	"status",
+	"provider",
+	"error",
+	"error_description",
+	"reason"
+]);
+/** The host's `redirectParams` without the names the redirects keep for themselves. */
+function redirectParams(params) {
+	if (!params) return void 0;
+	const own = Object.entries(params).filter(([key]) => !REDIRECT_PARAMS.has(key));
+	return authorizationAttributes(Object.fromEntries(own), "redirectParams");
+}
+/** `base` with `params` added, none replacing one it carries itself. */
+function withParams(base, params = {}) {
+	const uri = new URL(base);
+	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);
+	return uri;
+}
 /** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */
 function isFormPost(request) {
 	const contentType = request.headers.get("content-type")?.toLowerCase();
@@ -185,11 +212,16 @@ var Auth = class {
 			throw error;
 		}
 	}
-	/** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */
-	redirect(error, description, refusal) {
+	/**
+	* The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the
+	* flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.
+	*/
+	redirect(error, { description, refusal, params } = {}) {
 		invariant(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
-		const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);
-		for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(refusal?.metadata ?? {})) if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);
+		const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.errorUri, {
+			...params,
+			...refusal?.metadata
+		});
 		uri.searchParams.set("error", error);
 		if (description) uri.searchParams.set("error_description", description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));
 		if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set("reason", refusal.reason);
@@ -292,6 +324,7 @@ var Auth = class {
 	oauth2Authorization = (request, options) => this.guard(async () => {
 		invariant(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
 		const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);
+		const params = redirectParams(options?.redirectParams);
 		const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });
 		const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);
 		const state = randomUUID();
@@ -315,7 +348,8 @@ var Auth = class {
 			authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,
 			additionalParameters: pkce,
 			...nonce ? { nonce } : {},
-			...attributes ? { attributes } : {}
+			...attributes ? { attributes } : {},
+			...params ? { redirectParams: params } : {}
 		};
 		session.setAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST, JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest));
 		await this.repository.save(session);
@@ -331,23 +365,42 @@ var Auth = class {
 		invariant(this.oauth2Client, "oauth2Client is not initialized");
 		const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });
 		const session = await this.loadSession(request);
-		if (!session) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "session not found");
+		if (!session) return this.redirect("invalid_request", { description: "session not found" });
 		mark("load_session");
 		const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST);
-		if (!json) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "authorization request not found");
+		if (!json) return this.redirect("invalid_request", { description: "authorization request not found" });
 		const cached = JSON.parse(json);
+		const params = cached.redirectParams;
 		const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);
 		const data = isFormPost(request) ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text())) : query(request);
 		const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);
-		if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "invalid redirect query");
+		if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "invalid redirect query",
+			params
+		});
 		if (parsed.data.error) {
-			if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect state mismatch");
-			return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, "server_error"), parsed.data.error_description);
+			if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+				description: "redirect state mismatch",
+				params
+			});
+			return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, "server_error"), {
+				description: parsed.data.error_description,
+				params
+			});
 		}
 		const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;
-		if (!code || !state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "invalid redirect query");
-		if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect state mismatch");
-		if (provider !== cached.provider) return this.redirect("invalid_request", "redirect provider mismatch");
+		if (!code || !state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "invalid redirect query",
+			params
+		});
+		if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "redirect state mismatch",
+			params
+		});
+		if (provider !== cached.provider) return this.redirect("invalid_request", {
+			description: "redirect provider mismatch",
+			params
+		});
 		mark("validate_session");
 		let signedIn;
 		try {
@@ -384,16 +437,19 @@ var Auth = class {
 			if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {
 				console.warn("OAuth2 callback failed", error);
 				const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : "server_error";
-				return this.redirect(type);
+				return this.redirect(type, { params });
 			}
 			if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {
 				console.warn("OAuth2 sign-in refused", error.reason, error.metadata);
-				return this.redirect("access_denied", void 0, error);
+				return this.redirect("access_denied", {
+					refusal: error,
+					params
+				});
 			}
 			console.error("OAuth2 callback failed", error);
-			return this.redirect("server_error");
+			return this.redirect("server_error", { params });
 		}
-		const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);
+		const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.successUri, params);
 		uri.searchParams.set("status", "success");
 		uri.searchParams.set("provider", provider);
 		const response = new Response(null, {

package/dist/auth/index.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport { extend, literal, object, regex, string } from 'zod/mini';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n  NativeCredential,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n  PkceParameters,\n  StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n  type CookieOptions,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookie,\n  param,\n  query,\n  setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { parse, readForm, readJson, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport {\n  MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n  attributesSchema,\n  attributesSize,\n  bodyAttributes,\n} from './attributes';\nimport { DesktopCodes } from './desktop-codes';\nimport { type EmailSender, EmailVerificationCodes } from './email-codes';\nimport { AuthenticationError } from './error';\nimport { errorResponse, invalidArgument, unauthenticated } from './respond';\nimport type {\n  AuthConfig,\n  AuthService,\n  Authorization,\n  AuthorizedHandler,\n  LoggedHandler,\n  LogoutOptions,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\n/** The header a session id travels in besides the cookie, with `session.header` on. */\nconst SESSION_HEADER = 'X-Auth-Token';\n\n/** Seconds an OAuth2 state or nonce may be used within. */\nconst OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n  return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n  'invalid_grant',\n  'access_denied',\n  'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n  attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes']\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!attributes) return undefined;\n  const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n    if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n  }\n  if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n  // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n  const size = attributesSize(defined);\n  invariant(\n    size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n    `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n  );\n  return defined;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n  const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n  return (\n    request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n  );\n}\n\n/** Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them. */\nconst oneTapBodySchema = extend(googleOneTapSchema, { attributes: attributesSchema });\n\nconst desktopAuthorizeSchema = object({\n  code_challenge: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n  code_challenge_method: literal('S256'),\n});\n\nconst desktopExchangeSchema = object({\n  code: string(),\n  code_verifier: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n});\n\nexport const PATH = {\n  CSRF: '/csrf',\n  LOGOUT: '/logout',\n  LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n  OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n  LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n  SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n\n  // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n  //   1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n  //   2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n  //   3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n  //      Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n  // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n  // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n  DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n  DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n  CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the\n * request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and\n * answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a\n * `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see\n * `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).\n */\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n  private readonly timing: boolean;\n  private readonly cookieName;\n  private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n  private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n  private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n  private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n  private readonly emailCodes: EmailVerificationCodes;\n  private readonly desktopCodes: DesktopCodes;\n  private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n  /** Provider keys whose logins may come without a nonce (`oauth2.nonce.optional`). */\n  private readonly nonceOptional: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly touchInterval: number;\n  private readonly sessionHeader: boolean;\n  private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n  constructor({\n    sessionRepository,\n    kvRepository,\n    turnstileSecretKey,\n    verificationCode,\n    oauth2,\n    cookie,\n    session,\n    timing,\n  }: AuthConfig) {\n    this.timing = timing ?? false;\n    this.kv = kvRepository;\n    this.repository = sessionRepository;\n    this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n    const maxAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n    const resendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n    invariant(maxAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n    invariant(resendCooldown >= 1, 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second');\n    this.emailCodes = new EmailVerificationCodes(kvRepository, { maxAttempts, resendCooldown });\n    this.desktopCodes = new DesktopCodes(kvRepository);\n    const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n    this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n    this.cookieOptions = {\n      path: '/',\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: true,\n      ...cookieOptions,\n    };\n    this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n    this.nonceOptional = new Set(oauth2?.nonce?.optional);\n    this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n    this.sessionHeader = session?.header ?? false;\n    invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n  }\n\n  // ---- sessions and responses ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n    const fromCookie = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n    if (fromCookie) return fromCookie;\n    return (this.sessionHeader && request.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER)) || undefined;\n  }\n\n  /** The session the request carries, if it exists. */\n  private async loadSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null> {\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    return sessionId ? this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n  }\n\n  /** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */\n  private principalOf(session: Session): Principal | null {\n    const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n    return name ? { name: String(name) } : null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login\n   * session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow\n   * attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier\n   * sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been\n   * planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).\n   */\n  private async signIn(principal: Principal, carryOver?: Session): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = this.repository.createSession();\n    for (const attribute of carryOver?.getAttributeNames() ?? []) {\n      if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n      if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n      const value = carryOver?.getAttribute(attribute);\n      if (value !== null && value !== undefined) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n    }\n    session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n    return session;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with\n   * `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.\n   */\n  private withSession(response: Response, session: Session, cookie?: CookieOptions): Response {\n    const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n    setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), {\n      ...this.cookieOptions,\n      ...cookie,\n      maxAge,\n    });\n    if (this.sessionHeader) response.headers.set(SESSION_HEADER, session.getId());\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */\n  private async guard(run: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<Response> {\n    try {\n      return await run();\n    } catch (error) {\n      const response = errorResponse(error);\n      if (response) return response;\n      throw error;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */\n  private redirect(\n    error: OAuth2ErrorType,\n    description?: string,\n    refusal?: AuthenticationError\n  ): Response {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);\n    // Metadata never replaces a parameter: not one errorUri carries itself, nor one set below.\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(refusal?.metadata ?? {})) {\n      if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);\n    }\n    uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n    if (description) {\n      uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n    }\n    if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set('reason', refusal.reason);\n    return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n  }\n\n  // ---- basic -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const token = randomUUID();\n    const response = Response.json({\n      token,\n      parameterName: '_csrf',\n      headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n    });\n\n    // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n    setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n      path: '/',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: false,\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n    });\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logout = async (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions): Promise<Response> => {\n    const scope = options?.scope ?? 'local';\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    // `global` and `others` reach the principal's other sessions through the one the request\n    // carries; a request without a signed-in session has no principal to widen to, and ends as\n    // `local` would.\n    if (scope !== 'local' && sessionId) {\n      const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n      const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n      if (principal) {\n        const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n        for (const id of sessions.keys()) {\n          if (id !== sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(id);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    const response = Response.json({});\n    if (scope === 'others') return response;\n    if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n    // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n    deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n\n    const principal = this.principalOf(session);\n    if (principal) await onLogged?.(principal);\n    return this.withSession(Response.json({ data: principal !== null }), session);\n  };\n\n  // ---- oauth2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n    // 32 random bytes: a 43-char base64url verifier, the RFC 7636 minimum (a UUID is 36).\n    const code_verifier = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n    const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(code_verifier)\n      .digest()\n      .toString('base64url');\n\n    return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n    return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n    return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,\n   * or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes\n   * it sign in once.\n   */\n  private async consumeNonce(nonce: string, provider: string): Promise<void> {\n    const key = this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce);\n    if ((await this.kv.getItem(key)) !== provider) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n    await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The nonce check of the JSON logins (One Tap, native), where the client obtained the id token\n   * and the nonce came from `oauth2Nonce`: spends the one the token carries, and refuses a token\n   * without one when the provider's flow echoes nonces (`required`) and the host has not listed the\n   * provider as optional. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce makes it sign in\n   * once.\n   */\n  private async checkIssuedNonce(\n    userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'],\n    provider: string,\n    required: boolean\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n    if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n      await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n      return true;\n    }\n    if (required && !this.nonceOptional.has(provider)) {\n      throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n    const state = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ state });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n    const nonce = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ nonce });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Authorization = (\n    request: Request,\n    options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n      const state = randomUUID();\n      const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n      // Sent only to a provider whose id token echoes it: the callback then requires it back, so\n      // a code that was swapped in for another sign-in's yields a token the session refuses.\n      const nonce = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web ? randomUUID() : undefined;\n      const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce, nonce });\n      let session = await this.loadSession(request);\n      if (!session) {\n        // A session made for the flow only has to outlive the state: an abandoned flow must not\n        // keep a row for the default interval. Sign-in moves to a new session, with the default.\n        session = this.repository.createSession();\n        session.setMaxInactiveInterval(OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n      }\n      mark('fetch_session');\n\n      const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n        state,\n        provider,\n        authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n        additionalParameters: pkce,\n        ...(nonce ? { nonce } : {}),\n        ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n      };\n      session.setAttribute(\n        this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST,\n        JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest)\n      );\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      mark('save_session');\n\n      const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n      setTiming(response);\n      return this.withSession(response, session);\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n    // 1. the session the flow started on, and the authorization request it stored\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'session not found');\n    mark('load_session');\n    const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n    if (!json) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'authorization request not found');\n    const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n\n    // 2. the provider's answer: query, or a form for Apple's response_mode=form_post\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n    const data = isFormPost(request)\n      ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()))\n      : query(request);\n    const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n    if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n    // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n    // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n    // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n    // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n    // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n    // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n    if (parsed.data.error) {\n      if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n        return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n      }\n      return this.redirect(\n        safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'),\n        parsed.data.error_description\n      );\n    }\n    const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;\n    if (!code || !state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n    if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n    if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect provider mismatch');\n    }\n    mark('validate_session');\n\n    // 3. exchange the code, load the user, sign in. Everything here can fail (an expired or reused\n    // code, a network error, the host's handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup\n    // the user is looking at, so every failure must land on errorUri, never as a JSON error.\n    let signedIn: Session;\n    try {\n      const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n        provider,\n        code,\n        pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n      });\n      // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n      const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        token,\n        response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n      });\n      mark('exchange_code');\n      // The id token must carry the nonce this flow sent (stored with the state, not in KV: it\n      // is bound to this session's request). A provider that gave no id token has nothing to\n      // carry it, as has a request stored before nonces were sent.\n      if (cached.nonce && token.id_token) {\n        const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n        if (typeof nonce !== 'string' || !nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n        if (nonce !== cached.nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n        mark('check_nonce');\n      }\n\n      const principal = await handler(request, {\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        userInfo,\n        token,\n        attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n      });\n      mark('save_principal');\n\n      signedIn = await this.signIn(principal, session);\n      await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n      mark('update_session');\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n      // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n      if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n        const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n        return this.redirect(type);\n      }\n      // A refusal is something the user can act on, so its reason and metadata reach the page,\n      // as they reach a JSON client through the ErrorInfo.\n      if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 sign-in refused', error.reason, error.metadata);\n        return this.redirect('access_denied', undefined, error);\n      }\n      console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n      return this.redirect('server_error');\n    }\n\n    const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);\n    uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n    uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n    const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, signedIn);\n  };\n\n  /** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */\n  private async authorize(\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    authorization: Authorization,\n    setTiming: (response: Response) => void\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const principal = await handler(request, authorization);\n    const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n    const response = Response.json(principal);\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, session);\n  }\n\n  loginOAuth2Native = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n      const body = await readJson(request);\n      // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n      const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n      // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n      const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n      const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n      if (\n        code_verifier !== undefined &&\n        (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n      ) {\n        throw invalidArgument(\n          'INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER',\n          'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]'\n        );\n      }\n      const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n        provider,\n        credentials,\n      });\n      mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n      // Required when the provider's native id token echoes a nonce and the login produced one\n      // (Facebook's access_token login has none to carry it).\n      const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).native && !!token.id_token;\n      if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Onetap = (\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    provider = 'google'\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n      // Google's own form post, or an app's JSON.\n      const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n      const body = contentType.includes('application/json')\n        ? await readJson(request)\n        : await readForm(request);\n      const { attributes = {}, ...parsed } = parse(oneTapBodySchema, body);\n\n      // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n      let clientId: string;\n      let token: Authorization['token'];\n      let userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'];\n      if (parsed.credential) {\n        ({ clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n          provider,\n          credential: parsed.credential,\n        }));\n        mark('verify_credential');\n\n        // The credential must carry a single-use nonce from `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end\n        // passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which\n        // FedCM mode no longer sets.\n        const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web;\n        if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n      } else if (parsed.code) {\n        ({ clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n          provider,\n          code: parsed.code,\n        }));\n        userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n      } else {\n        throw invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'credential or code is required');\n      }\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- email -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  sendEmailVerificationCode = (request: Request, sender: EmailSender): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n      const { email, turnstileToken } = parse(\n        sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema,\n        await readJson(request)\n      );\n      await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n      await this.emailCodes.send(email, sender);\n      return Response.json({});\n    });\n\n  verifyEmailCode = (email: string, verificationCode: string): Promise<void> =>\n    this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n\n  loginEmail = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const {\n        email,\n        verificationCode,\n        attributes = {},\n      } = parse(loginEmailSchema, await readJson(request));\n      await this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n      const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider: 'EMAIL', userInfo: { claims, data: {} }, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- desktop ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  /**\n   * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal\n   * sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that\n   * the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n   *\n   * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the\n   * browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge\n   * through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`\n   * enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n   * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)\n   * from exchanging it.\n   *\n   * Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse\n   * protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does\n   * not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n   */\n  desktopAuthorize = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n      if (!principal) throw unauthenticated('Sign in first');\n      const { code_challenge } = parse(desktopAuthorizeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const code = await this.desktopCodes.issue(principal, code_challenge);\n      return Response.json({ code });\n    });\n\n  /**\n   * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth\n   * code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent\n   * of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side\n   * does not cascade to the other.\n   *\n   * Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the\n   * desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide\n   * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the\n   * SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by\n   * Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n   *\n   * No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,\n   * and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.\n   */\n  desktopExchange = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { code, code_verifier } = parse(desktopExchangeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const principal = await this.desktopCodes.redeem(code, code_verifier);\n      const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n      session.setAttribute('client_type', 'desktop');\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      return this.withSession(Response.json({ ok: true }), session, {\n        sameSite: 'none',\n        secure: true,\n      });\n    });\n\n  // ---- session management ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  kick = async (principal: Principal): Promise<void> => {\n    const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n    for (const sessionId of sessions.keys()) {\n      await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    }\n  };\n\n  /**\n   * Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user\n   * who keeps using the app is never signed out after `maxInactiveInterval` of not calling one\n   * particular endpoint. No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n   * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n   * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n   */\n  private async touch(session: Session) {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n  }\n\n  getPrincipal = async (request: Request): Promise<Principal | null> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n    if (!principal) return null;\n    await this.touch(session);\n    return principal;\n  };\n\n  isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n    return (await this.getPrincipal(request)) !== null;\n  };\n\n  getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n    request: Request,\n    create: T\n  ): Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null> => {\n    type Result = T extends true ? 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+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomBytes, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport { extend, literal, object, regex, string } from 'zod/mini';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n  NativeCredential,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n  PkceParameters,\n  StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n  type CookieOptions,\n  deleteCookie,\n  getCookie,\n  param,\n  query,\n  setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { parse, readForm, readJson, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport {\n  MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n  attributesSchema,\n  attributesSize,\n  bodyAttributes,\n} from './attributes';\nimport { DesktopCodes } from './desktop-codes';\nimport { type EmailSender, EmailVerificationCodes } from './email-codes';\nimport { AuthenticationError } from './error';\nimport { errorResponse, invalidArgument, unauthenticated } from './respond';\nimport type {\n  AuthConfig,\n  AuthService,\n  Authorization,\n  AuthorizedHandler,\n  LoggedHandler,\n  LogoutOptions,\n  OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\n/** The header a session id travels in besides the cookie, with `session.header` on. */\nconst SESSION_HEADER = 'X-Auth-Token';\n\n/** Seconds an OAuth2 state or nonce may be used within. */\nconst OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n  return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n  'invalid_grant',\n  'access_denied',\n  'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The host's values for the flow (`attributes`, `redirectParams`), `undefined` ones dropped; `name`\n * is what the size invariant calls them.\n */\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n  attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes'],\n  name = 'attributes'\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!attributes) return undefined;\n  const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n    if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n  }\n  if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n  // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n  const size = attributesSize(defined);\n  invariant(\n    size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n    `oauth2 authorization ${name} are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n  );\n  return defined;\n}\n\ninterface RedirectDetails {\n  description?: string;\n  refusal?: AuthenticationError;\n  /** The flow's `redirectParams`. */\n  params?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * What the callback's redirects say themselves. A host's `redirectParams` never carry these, even\n * on a redirect that leaves one out (a cancel has no `reason`): the page would read it as the SDK's.\n */\nconst REDIRECT_PARAMS = new Set(['status', 'provider', 'error', 'error_description', 'reason']);\n\n/** The host's `redirectParams` without the names the redirects keep for themselves. */\nfunction redirectParams(params: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['redirectParams']) {\n  if (!params) return undefined;\n  const own = Object.entries(params).filter(([key]) => !REDIRECT_PARAMS.has(key));\n  return authorizationAttributes(Object.fromEntries(own), 'redirectParams');\n}\n\n/** `base` with `params` added, none replacing one it carries itself. */\nfunction withParams(base: string, params: Record<string, string> = {}) {\n  const uri = new URL(base);\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {\n    if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);\n  }\n  return uri;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n  const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n  return (\n    request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n  );\n}\n\n/** Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them. */\nconst oneTapBodySchema = extend(googleOneTapSchema, { attributes: attributesSchema });\n\nconst desktopAuthorizeSchema = object({\n  code_challenge: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n  code_challenge_method: literal('S256'),\n});\n\nconst desktopExchangeSchema = object({\n  code: string(),\n  code_verifier: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n});\n\nexport const PATH = {\n  CSRF: '/csrf',\n  LOGOUT: '/logout',\n  LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n  OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n  OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n  LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n  LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n  SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n\n  // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n  //   1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n  //   2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n  //   3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n  //      Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n  // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n  // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n  DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n  DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n  CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the\n * request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and\n * answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a\n * `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see\n * `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).\n */\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n  private readonly timing: boolean;\n  private readonly cookieName;\n  private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n  private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n  private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n  private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n  private readonly emailCodes: EmailVerificationCodes;\n  private readonly desktopCodes: DesktopCodes;\n  private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n  /** Provider keys whose logins may come without a nonce (`oauth2.nonce.optional`). */\n  private readonly nonceOptional: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly touchInterval: number;\n  private readonly sessionHeader: boolean;\n  private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n  constructor({\n    sessionRepository,\n    kvRepository,\n    turnstileSecretKey,\n    verificationCode,\n    oauth2,\n    cookie,\n    session,\n    timing,\n  }: AuthConfig) {\n    this.timing = timing ?? false;\n    this.kv = kvRepository;\n    this.repository = sessionRepository;\n    this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n    const maxAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n    const resendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n    invariant(maxAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n    invariant(resendCooldown >= 1, 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second');\n    this.emailCodes = new EmailVerificationCodes(kvRepository, { maxAttempts, resendCooldown });\n    this.desktopCodes = new DesktopCodes(kvRepository);\n    const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n    this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n    this.cookieOptions = {\n      path: '/',\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: true,\n      ...cookieOptions,\n    };\n    this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n    this.nonceOptional = new Set(oauth2?.nonce?.optional);\n    this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n    this.sessionHeader = session?.header ?? false;\n    invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n  }\n\n  // ---- sessions and responses ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n    const fromCookie = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n    if (fromCookie) return fromCookie;\n    return (this.sessionHeader && request.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER)) || undefined;\n  }\n\n  /** The session the request carries, if it exists. */\n  private async loadSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null> {\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    return sessionId ? this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n  }\n\n  /** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */\n  private principalOf(session: Session): Principal | null {\n    const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n    return name ? { name: String(name) } : null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login\n   * session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow\n   * attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier\n   * sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been\n   * planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).\n   */\n  private async signIn(principal: Principal, carryOver?: Session): Promise<Session> {\n    const session = this.repository.createSession();\n    for (const attribute of carryOver?.getAttributeNames() ?? []) {\n      if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n      if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n      const value = carryOver?.getAttribute(attribute);\n      if (value !== null && value !== undefined) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n    }\n    session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n    return session;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with\n   * `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.\n   */\n  private withSession(response: Response, session: Session, cookie?: CookieOptions): Response {\n    const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n    setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), {\n      ...this.cookieOptions,\n      ...cookie,\n      maxAge,\n    });\n    if (this.sessionHeader) response.headers.set(SESSION_HEADER, session.getId());\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */\n  private async guard(run: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<Response> {\n    try {\n      return await run();\n    } catch (error) {\n      const response = errorResponse(error);\n      if (response) return response;\n      throw error;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The error redirect of the callback flow: `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along, and the\n   * flow's `redirectParams` once its authorization request is known.\n   */\n  private redirect(\n    error: OAuth2ErrorType,\n    { description, refusal, params }: RedirectDetails = {}\n  ): Response {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    // A refusal's metadata wins over the host's parameters of the same name: it is about this answer.\n    const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.errorUri, { ...params, ...refusal?.metadata });\n    uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n    if (description) {\n      uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n    }\n    if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set('reason', refusal.reason);\n    return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n  }\n\n  // ---- basic -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const token = randomUUID();\n    const response = Response.json({\n      token,\n      parameterName: '_csrf',\n      headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n    });\n\n    // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n    setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n      path: '/',\n      secure: true,\n      httpOnly: false,\n      sameSite: 'none',\n      domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n    });\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logout = async (request: Request, options?: LogoutOptions): Promise<Response> => {\n    const scope = options?.scope ?? 'local';\n    const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n    // `global` and `others` reach the principal's other sessions through the one the request\n    // carries; a request without a signed-in session has no principal to widen to, and ends as\n    // `local` would.\n    if (scope !== 'local' && sessionId) {\n      const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n      const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n      if (principal) {\n        const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n        for (const id of sessions.keys()) {\n          if (id !== sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(id);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    const response = Response.json({});\n    if (scope === 'others') return response;\n    if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n    // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n    deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n\n    const principal = this.principalOf(session);\n    if (principal) await onLogged?.(principal);\n    return this.withSession(Response.json({ data: principal !== null }), session);\n  };\n\n  // ---- oauth2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n    // 32 random bytes: a 43-char base64url verifier, the RFC 7636 minimum (a UUID is 36).\n    const code_verifier = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n    const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(code_verifier)\n      .digest()\n      .toString('base64url');\n\n    return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n    return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n  }\n\n  private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n    return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,\n   * or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes\n   * it sign in once.\n   */\n  private async consumeNonce(nonce: string, provider: string): Promise<void> {\n    const key = this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce);\n    if ((await this.kv.getItem(key)) !== provider) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n    await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The nonce check of the JSON logins (One Tap, native), where the client obtained the id token\n   * and the nonce came from `oauth2Nonce`: spends the one the token carries, and refuses a token\n   * without one when the provider's flow echoes nonces (`required`) and the host has not listed the\n   * provider as optional. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce makes it sign in\n   * once.\n   */\n  private async checkIssuedNonce(\n    userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'],\n    provider: string,\n    required: boolean\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n    if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n      await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n      return true;\n    }\n    if (required && !this.nonceOptional.has(provider)) {\n      throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n    const state = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ state });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n    const nonce = randomUUID();\n    await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n    return Response.json({ nonce });\n  };\n\n  oauth2Authorization = (\n    request: Request,\n    options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n      const params = redirectParams(options?.redirectParams);\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n      const state = randomUUID();\n      const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n      // Sent only to a provider whose id token echoes it: the callback then requires it back, so\n      // a code that was swapped in for another sign-in's yields a token the session refuses.\n      const nonce = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web ? randomUUID() : undefined;\n      const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce, nonce });\n      let session = await this.loadSession(request);\n      if (!session) {\n        // A session made for the flow only has to outlive the state: an abandoned flow must not\n        // keep a row for the default interval. Sign-in moves to a new session, with the default.\n        session = this.repository.createSession();\n        session.setMaxInactiveInterval(OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n      }\n      mark('fetch_session');\n\n      const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n        state,\n        provider,\n        authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n        additionalParameters: pkce,\n        ...(nonce ? { nonce } : {}),\n        ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n        ...(params ? { redirectParams: params } : {}),\n      };\n      session.setAttribute(\n        this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST,\n        JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest)\n      );\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      mark('save_session');\n\n      const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n      setTiming(response);\n      return this.withSession(response, session);\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n    invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n    const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n    // 1. the session the flow started on, and the authorization request it stored\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    if (!session) return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'session not found' });\n    mark('load_session');\n    const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n    if (!json) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'authorization request not found' });\n    }\n    const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n    // From here on the redirect back to the app is this flow's, with the host's parameters.\n    const params = cached.redirectParams;\n\n    // 2. the provider's answer: query, or a form for Apple's response_mode=form_post\n    const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n    const data = isFormPost(request)\n      ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()))\n      : query(request);\n    const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n    if (!parsed.success) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'invalid redirect query', params });\n    }\n    // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n    // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n    // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n    // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n    // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n    // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n    if (parsed.data.error) {\n      if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n        return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'redirect state mismatch', params });\n      }\n      return this.redirect(safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'), {\n        description: parsed.data.error_description,\n        params,\n      });\n    }\n    const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;\n    if (!code || !state) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'invalid redirect query', params });\n    }\n    if (state !== cached.state) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', { description: 'redirect state mismatch', params });\n    }\n    if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n      return this.redirect('invalid_request', {\n        description: 'redirect provider mismatch',\n        params,\n      });\n    }\n    mark('validate_session');\n\n    // 3. exchange the code, load the user, sign in. Everything here can fail (an expired or reused\n    // code, a network error, the host's handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup\n    // the user is looking at, so every failure must land on errorUri, never as a JSON error.\n    let signedIn: Session;\n    try {\n      const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n        provider,\n        code,\n        pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n      });\n      // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n      const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        token,\n        response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n      });\n      mark('exchange_code');\n      // The id token must carry the nonce this flow sent (stored with the state, not in KV: it\n      // is bound to this session's request). A provider that gave no id token has nothing to\n      // carry it, as has a request stored before nonces were sent.\n      if (cached.nonce && token.id_token) {\n        const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n        if (typeof nonce !== 'string' || !nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n        if (nonce !== cached.nonce) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n        mark('check_nonce');\n      }\n\n      const principal = await handler(request, {\n        provider,\n        clientId,\n        userInfo,\n        token,\n        attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n      });\n      mark('save_principal');\n\n      signedIn = await this.signIn(principal, session);\n      await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n      mark('update_session');\n    } catch (error) {\n      // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n      // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n      if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n        const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n        return this.redirect(type, { params });\n      }\n      // A refusal is something the user can act on, so its reason and metadata reach the page,\n      // as they reach a JSON client through the ErrorInfo.\n      if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {\n        console.warn('OAuth2 sign-in refused', error.reason, error.metadata);\n        return this.redirect('access_denied', { refusal: error, params });\n      }\n      console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n      return this.redirect('server_error', { params });\n    }\n\n    const uri = withParams(this.oauth2Client.successUri, params);\n    uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n    uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n    const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, signedIn);\n  };\n\n  /** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */\n  private async authorize(\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    authorization: Authorization,\n    setTiming: (response: Response) => void\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const principal = await handler(request, authorization);\n    const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n    const response = Response.json(principal);\n    setTiming(response);\n    return this.withSession(response, session);\n  }\n\n  loginOAuth2Native = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n      const body = await readJson(request);\n      // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n      const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n      // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n      const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n      const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n      if (\n        code_verifier !== undefined &&\n        (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n      ) {\n        throw invalidArgument(\n          'INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER',\n          'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]'\n        );\n      }\n      const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n        provider,\n        credentials,\n      });\n      mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n      // Required when the provider's native id token echoes a nonce and the login produced one\n      // (Facebook's access_token login has none to carry it).\n      const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).native && !!token.id_token;\n      if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  loginOAuth2Onetap = (\n    request: Request,\n    handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n    provider = 'google'\n  ): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n      const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n      // Google's own form post, or an app's JSON.\n      const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n      const body = contentType.includes('application/json')\n        ? await readJson(request)\n        : await readForm(request);\n      const { attributes = {}, ...parsed } = parse(oneTapBodySchema, body);\n\n      // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n      let clientId: string;\n      let token: Authorization['token'];\n      let userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'];\n      if (parsed.credential) {\n        ({ clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n          provider,\n          credential: parsed.credential,\n        }));\n        mark('verify_credential');\n\n        // The credential must carry a single-use nonce from `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end\n        // passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which\n        // FedCM mode no longer sets.\n        const required = (await this.oauth2Client.nonceSupport(provider)).web;\n        if (await this.checkIssuedNonce(userInfo, provider, required)) mark('check_nonce');\n      } else if (parsed.code) {\n        ({ clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n          provider,\n          code: parsed.code,\n        }));\n        userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n      } else {\n        throw invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'credential or code is required');\n      }\n\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- email -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  sendEmailVerificationCode = (request: Request, sender: EmailSender): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n      const { email, turnstileToken } = parse(\n        sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema,\n        await readJson(request)\n      );\n      await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n      await this.emailCodes.send(email, sender);\n      return Response.json({});\n    });\n\n  verifyEmailCode = (email: string, verificationCode: string): Promise<void> =>\n    this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n\n  loginEmail = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n      const {\n        email,\n        verificationCode,\n        attributes = {},\n      } = parse(loginEmailSchema, await readJson(request));\n      await this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n      const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n      return this.authorize(\n        request,\n        handler,\n        { provider: 'EMAIL', userInfo: { claims, data: {} }, attributes },\n        setTiming\n      );\n    });\n\n  // ---- desktop ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  /**\n   * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal\n   * sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that\n   * the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n   *\n   * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the\n   * browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge\n   * through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`\n   * enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n   * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)\n   * from exchanging it.\n   *\n   * Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse\n   * protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does\n   * not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n   */\n  desktopAuthorize = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n      if (!principal) throw unauthenticated('Sign in first');\n      const { code_challenge } = parse(desktopAuthorizeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const code = await this.desktopCodes.issue(principal, code_challenge);\n      return Response.json({ code });\n    });\n\n  /**\n   * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth\n   * code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent\n   * of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side\n   * does not cascade to the other.\n   *\n   * Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the\n   * desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide\n   * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the\n   * SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by\n   * Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n   *\n   * No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,\n   * and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.\n   */\n  desktopExchange = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n    this.guard(async () => {\n      const { code, code_verifier } = parse(desktopExchangeSchema, await readJson(request));\n      const principal = await this.desktopCodes.redeem(code, code_verifier);\n      const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n      session.setAttribute('client_type', 'desktop');\n      await this.repository.save(session);\n      return this.withSession(Response.json({ ok: true }), session, {\n        sameSite: 'none',\n        secure: true,\n      });\n    });\n\n  // ---- session management ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n  kick = async (principal: Principal): Promise<void> => {\n    const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n    for (const sessionId of sessions.keys()) {\n      await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n    }\n  };\n\n  /**\n   * Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user\n   * who keeps using the app is never signed out after `maxInactiveInterval` of not calling one\n   * particular endpoint. No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n   * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n   * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n   */\n  private async touch(session: Session) {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n    session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n    await this.repository.save(session);\n  }\n\n  getPrincipal = async (request: Request): Promise<Principal | null> => {\n    const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n    const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n    if (!principal) return null;\n    await this.touch(session);\n    return principal;\n  };\n\n  isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n    return (await this.getPrincipal(request)) !== null;\n  };\n\n  getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n    request: Request,\n    create: T\n  ): Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null> => {\n    type Result = T extends true ? 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package/dist/auth/types.d.cts

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ export interface OAuth2AuthorizationOptions {
    * attribution or where to go next, not for authorization decisions.
    */
   attributes?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+  /**
+   * Query parameters added to this flow's redirect back to the app, on `successUri` and on
+   * `errorUri` alike, e.g. an id the page that opened a sign-in popup matches the result against.
+   * Unlike `attributes` they reach the browser. Stored with the authorization request, so a
+   * callback that cannot find it (no session) goes without them. The names the redirects use
+   * themselves (`status`, `provider`, `error`, `error_description`, `reason`) are dropped, even
+   * where a redirect leaves one out, and a refusal's metadata wins over a parameter it shares a name
+   * with. `undefined` values are dropped, and the same 2 KB limit applies, as an invariant: a value
+   * from the browser (a query parameter) is the host's to check first.
+   */
+  redirectParams?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
 }
 export interface AuthConfig {
   timing?: boolean;

package/dist/auth/types.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"types.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/types.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;YAMY,iBAAiB,WAAW,cAAc;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAerC;EACf;EACA;EACA,UAAU;EACV,QAAQ;EACR,YAAY;;;;;;;YAQF,qBACV,SAAS,SACT,eAAe,kBACZ,QAAQ;iBAEI;;;;;;;;;;;EAWf,aAAa;;iBAGE;EACf;EACA,cAAc;EACd,mBAAmB;EACnB,SAAS;IAAkB;;EAC3B;;;;;;;;;IASE;;;;;;;;;;;IAWA;;EAEF;;EAEA;;;;;IAKE;;;;;IAKA;;EAEF;IACE,SAAS;IACT;;;;;;;;;;MAUE;;;;;;;;;;YAWM;iBAEK;EACf,QAAQ;;iBAGO;EAEf,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EACpC,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,UAAU,kBAAkB,QAAQ;EAC/D,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,WAAW,kBAAkB,QAAQ;EAGhE,cAAc,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC3C,cAAc,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC3C,sBACE,SAAS,SACT,UAAU,+BACP,QAAQ;EACb,kBAAkB,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;EAChF,oBAAoB,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;EAClF,oBACE,SAAS,SACT,cAAc,mBACd,sBACG,QAAQ;EAGb,4BAA4B,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,gBAAgB,QAAQ;EAC9E,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;;;;;;EAM3E,kBAAkB,eAAe,6BAA6B;EAG9D,mBAAmB,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAChD,kBAAkB,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAG/C,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;EAChC,kBAAkB,SAAS,YAAY;EACvC,aAAa,mBACX,SAAS,SACT,QAAQ,MACL,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EACxC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;EACtC,eAAe,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC5C,eAAe,WAAW,cAAc,QAAQ;EAChD,yBAAyB,0BAA0B,QAAQ"}
+{"version":3,"file":"types.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/types.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;YAMY,iBAAiB,WAAW,cAAc;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAerC;EACf;EACA;EACA,UAAU;EACV,QAAQ;EACR,YAAY;;;;;;;YAQF,qBACV,SAAS,SACT,eAAe,kBACZ,QAAQ;iBAEI;;;;;;;;;;;EAWf,aAAa;;;;;;;;;;;EAWb,iBAAiB;;iBAGF;EACf;EACA,cAAc;EACd,mBAAmB;EACnB,SAAS;IAAkB;;EAC3B;;;;;;;;;IASE;;;;;;;;;;;IAWA;;EAEF;;EAEA;;;;;IAKE;;;;;IAKA;;EAEF;IACE,SAAS;IACT;;;;;;;;;;MAUE;;;;;;;;;;YAWM;iBAEK;EACf,QAAQ;;iBAGO;EAEf,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EACpC,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,UAAU,kBAAkB,QAAQ;EAC/D,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,WAAW,kBAAkB,QAAQ;EAGhE,cAAc,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC3C,cAAc,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC3C,sBACE,SAAS,SACT,UAAU,+BACP,QAAQ;EACb,kBAAkB,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;EAChF,oBAAoB,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;EAClF,oBACE,SAAS,SACT,cAAc,mBACd,sBACG,QAAQ;EAGb,4BAA4B,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,gBAAgB,QAAQ;EAC9E,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,cAAc,sBAAsB,QAAQ;;;;;;EAM3E,kBAAkB,eAAe,6BAA6B;EAG9D,mBAAmB,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAChD,kBAAkB,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAG/C,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;EAChC,kBAAkB,SAAS,YAAY;EACvC,aAAa,mBACX,SAAS,SACT,QAAQ,MACL,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EACxC,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;EACtC,eAAe,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;EAC5C,eAAe,WAAW,cAAc,QAAQ;EAChD,yBAAyB,0BAA0B,QAAQ"}

package/dist/auth/types.d.mts

@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ export interface OAuth2AuthorizationOptions {
    * attribution or where to go next, not for authorization decisions.
    */
   attributes?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+  /**
+   * Query parameters added to this flow's redirect back to the app, on `successUri` and on
+   * `errorUri` alike, e.g. an id the page that opened a sign-in popup matches the result against.
+   * Unlike `attributes` they reach the browser. Stored with the authorization request, so a
+   * callback that cannot find it (no session) goes without them. The names the redirects use
+   * themselves (`status`, `provider`, `error`, `error_description`, `reason`) are dropped, even
+   * where a redirect leaves one out, and a refusal's metadata wins over a parameter it shares a name
+   * with. `undefined` values are dropped, and the same 2 KB limit applies, as an invariant: a value
+   * from the browser (a query parameter) is the host's to check first.
+   */
+  redirectParams?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
 }
 export interface AuthConfig {
   timing?: boolean;

package/dist/auth/types.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/oauth2/types.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"types.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/oauth2/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\nexport interface PkceParameters {\n  code_verifier: string;\n  code_challenge: string;\n  code_challenge_method: 'S256' | 'plain';\n}\n\nexport interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {\n  state: string;\n  /** Key of the provider in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` the flow was started for. */\n  provider: string;\n  authorizationRequestUri: string;\n  additionalParameters: PkceParameters;\n  /**\n   * The `nonce` sent with the authorization request when the provider echoes one in its id token\n   * (`Provider.nonce.web`); the callback refuses an id token that does not carry it back. Absent\n   * for a provider without one, and on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * What the host attached when the flow started (`oauth2Authorization` options), kept on the\n   * server and handed back to `onAuthorized` once the callback checks out. Never sent to the\n   * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  attributes?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\ninterface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {\n  state: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  scope: string[] | undefined;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_verifier'>;\n  /** OpenID Connect `nonce`, sent when `Provider.nonce.web` is set. */\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ExchangeCodeParams {\n  code: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for public clients (Google's installed-app clients, PKCE-only clients). */\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n}\n\nexport interface RefreshTokenParams {\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeTokenParams {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginOAuth2NativeParams {\n  /**\n   * The configured client the app signs in as (its `client_id`, or the provider's default native\n   * client). Id tokens must be issued to it: it is the only audience accepted.\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier for the code exchange, taken from `credentials.code_verifier`: the app made\n   * the challenge and keeps the verifier, so the server only ever has the verifier. Providers\n   * whose token endpoint takes `code_verifier` send it; the others ignore it.\n   */\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n  /** What the app posted, without `code_verifier`, which arrives as `pkce`. */\n  credentials: NativeCredential;\n}\n\n// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1\nexport interface OAuth2Token {\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The access token issued by the authorization server.\n   */\n  access_token: string;\n\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The type of the token issued as described in Section 7.1.  Value is case insensitive.\n   */\n  token_type: 'Bearer' | 'bearer' | 'mac' | (string & {});\n\n  /**\n   * RECOMMENDED.\n   * The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the\n   * access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the\n   * authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default\n   * value.\n   */\n  expires_in?: number;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * The refresh token, which can be used to obtain new access tokens using the same authorization\n   * grant as described in Section 6.\n   */\n  refresh_token?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * If identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the\n   * access token as described by Section 3.3.\n   */\n  scope?: string;\n\n  id_token?: string;\n\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface OidcToken extends OAuth2Token {\n  id_token: string;\n}\n\nexport type NativeCredential = {\n  state?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  redirect_uri?: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier (RFC 7636) for `code`, when the app sent a `code_challenge` with the\n   * authorization request: 43-128 characters from `[A-Za-z0-9-._~]`. Sent on to the provider's\n   * token endpoint, which refuses the code unless the verifier matches its challenge, so a code\n   * intercepted on the redirect (a custom-scheme redirect any app can claim) is useless alone.\n   * RFC 8252 §8.1 requires it for native apps, whose installed-app clients have no secret.\n   */\n  code_verifier?: string;\n  id_token?: string;\n  access_token?: string;\n  /**\n   * The user's name as the platform hands it to the app, for providers whose id token carries none\n   * (Apple sends it on the first authorization only): iOS\n   * `ASAuthorizationAppleIDCredential.fullName`, expo-apple-authentication's `credential.fullName`.\n   * The snake_case fields above are OAuth / OIDC protocol parameters; this one is not, it is the\n   * platform's object passed through unchanged, so it keeps the platform's own name and apps send\n   * `fullName: credential.fullName` as is. Unsigned client input: the provider cleans each part and\n   * ignores anything that is not a string. Parts with a standard claim become `given_name`,\n   * `family_name`, `middle_name` and `nickname`; `namePrefix` / `nameSuffix` have none and are kept\n   * in `userInfo.data.fullName` only.\n   */\n  fullName?: PersonNameComponents;\n};\n\n/** iOS `PersonNameComponents` as JSON; every part may be missing or `null`. */\nexport interface PersonNameComponents {\n  givenName?: string | null;\n  familyName?: string | null;\n  middleName?: string | null;\n  namePrefix?: string | null;\n  nameSuffix?: string | null;\n  nickname?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fields of the authorization response besides `code` and `state` that a provider uses to fill in\n * the user info: Apple posts the user's name as `user` (JSON) with the first authorization only,\n * since its id token never carries one. Unsigned, so treated as untrusted input.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationResponse {\n  user?: string;\n}\n\nexport const OIDC_SCOPES = [\n  'openid',\n  'profile',\n  'email',\n  'phone',\n  'address',\n  'offline_access',\n] as const;\n\nexport type OidcScope = (typeof OIDC_SCOPES)[number];\n\n// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#StandardClaims\nexport interface StandardClaims {\n  sub: string;\n  name?: string;\n  given_name?: string;\n  family_name?: string;\n  middle_name?: string;\n  nickname?: string;\n  preferred_username?: string;\n  profile?: string;\n  picture?: string;\n  website?: string;\n  email?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set only by providers that state it (Google, Apple, GitHub from the primary address's\n   * `verified` flag, X when it returns `confirmed_email`); Facebook leaves it unset. Trust the\n   * address only when this is `true`.\n   */\n  email_verified?: boolean;\n  gender?: 'female' | 'male' | (string & {});\n  birthdate?: string; // ISO 8601-1 [ISO8601‑1] YYYY-MM-DD format.\n  zoneinfo?: string; // IANA Time Zone Database [IANA.time‑zones]\n  locale?: string; // BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag.\n  phone_number?: string; // E.164\n  phone_number_verified?: boolean;\n  address?: {\n    formatted: string;\n    street_address: string;\n    locality: string;\n    region: string;\n    postal_code: string;\n    country: string;\n  }; // [RFC8259] JSON object\n  updated_at?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfo<T = unknown> {\n  claims: StandardClaims;\n  data: T;\n}\n\nexport interface Provider {\n  /** Authorization URI for the provider. */\n  authorizationUri: string;\n\n  /** Token URI for the provider. */\n  tokenUri: string;\n\n  /** Token revoke URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRevokeUri?: string;\n\n  /** Token refresh URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRefreshUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info URI for the provider. */\n  userInfoUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info authentication method for the provider. */\n  userInfoAuthenticationMethod?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Name of the attribute that will be used to extract the username from the call to 'userInfoUri'.\n   * */\n  userNameAttribute?: string;\n\n  /** JWK set URI for the provider */\n  jwkSetUri?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * URI that can either be an OpenID Connect discovery endpoint or an OAuth 2.0 Authorization\n   * Server Metadata endpoint defined by RFC 8414.\n   * */\n  issuerUri?: string;\n\n  /** Default scopes for the provider. */\n  defaultScope: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the provider's id token carries back the `nonce` of the request it was issued for\n   * (OpenID Connect), per flow. `web`: the redirect flow and One Tap, where `Auth` sends a nonce\n   * with the authorization request (or the front end passes an issued one to One Tap) and refuses\n   * an id token without it. `native`: the app's sign-in, where the app binds a nonce issued by\n   * `GET /oauth2/nonce/:provider` into the platform's request and the login refuses an id token\n   * without it. A flow set here is protected by default; a host relaxes it per provider with\n   * `oauth2.nonce.optional`. Absent for a plain OAuth2 provider, which has no id token.\n   */\n  nonce?: { web?: boolean; native?: boolean };\n\n  /** step 1: generate authorization uri and redirect user to it */\n  createAuthorizationUri: (params: CreateAuthorizationUriParams) => URL;\n\n  /** step 2: exchange code for token */\n  exchangeAuthorizationCode: (params: ExchangeCodeParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /**\n   * step 3: get user info. `context.clientId` is the client the token was issued to, the only\n   * audience an id token may carry; `context.response` holds what the authorization response\n   * carried besides the code, for the providers that send user data there (Apple).\n   */\n  getUserInfo: (token: OAuth2Token, context: UserInfoContext) => Promise<UserInfo>;\n\n  /** others: refresh access token */\n  refreshAccessToken?: (params: RefreshTokenParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /** others: revoke token */\n  revokeToken?: (params: RevokeTokenParams) => Promise<void>;\n\n  loginOAuth2Native?: (\n    params: LoginOAuth2NativeParams\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfoContext {\n  clientId: string;\n  response?: AuthorizationResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface OneTapProvider extends Provider {\n  /** Verifies a One Tap / FedCM credential, which must be issued to `clientId` (the web client). */\n  getTokenInfo: (\n    id_token: string,\n    clientId: string\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A client secret: a fixed string, or a function minting one for the client id it is called with\n * (Sign in with Apple's signed JWT, see `createAppleClientSecret`), called on every use so it can\n * cache and renew on its own.\n */\nexport type ClientSecret = string | ((clientId: string) => string | Promise<string>);\n\n/** The client a provider's server-side flows sign in as: the redirect flow and Google One Tap. */\nexport interface WebClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client. */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /** Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`. */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n  /** Authorization scopes. Default: the provider's `defaultScope`. */\n  scope?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A client an app signs in as on the device (an iOS bundle id, a Google iOS / Android client) and\n * whose code or id token it posts to the native login route.\n */\nexport interface NativeClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client (Google's installed-app clients have none). */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /**\n   * Redirect URI sent with the code exchange when the app sends no `redirect_uri` of its own.\n   * Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`.\n   */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * One identity source: every user it signs in has a `sub` unique within it, whichever client they\n * came through. The key in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` names it in the routes and in\n * `onAuthorized`. Two keys may share an implementation (two Google Cloud projects, one Okta per\n * tenant) when their subjects are separate namespaces.\n */\nexport interface ProviderConfig {\n  /** The implementation: `apple`, `google`, `github`, ... from `@shware/security/oauth2/provider`. */\n  provider: Provider;\n  /** The redirect flow's and One Tap's client. Required by those flows. */\n  web?: WebClient;\n  /**\n   * Clients the native login accepts besides `web`. An app names its client with `client_id`;\n   * without one, the only native client is used, or `web` when there is none.\n   */\n  native?: NativeClient[];\n}\n\nexport type ProvidersConfig = { [key: string]: ProviderConfig | undefined };\n\nexport interface OAuth2ClientConfig {\n  baseUri: string;\n  errorUri: string;\n  successUri: string;\n  /** Providers by key; a function is called per request, for secrets read at request time. */\n  providers: ProvidersConfig | (() => Promise<ProvidersConfig>);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AA0KA,MAAa,cAAc;CACzB;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"types.cjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/oauth2/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\nexport interface PkceParameters {\n  code_verifier: string;\n  code_challenge: string;\n  code_challenge_method: 'S256' | 'plain';\n}\n\nexport interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {\n  state: string;\n  /** Key of the provider in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` the flow was started for. */\n  provider: string;\n  authorizationRequestUri: string;\n  additionalParameters: PkceParameters;\n  /**\n   * The `nonce` sent with the authorization request when the provider echoes one in its id token\n   * (`Provider.nonce.web`); the callback refuses an id token that does not carry it back. Absent\n   * for a provider without one, and on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * What the host attached when the flow started (`oauth2Authorization` options), kept on the\n   * server and handed back to `onAuthorized` once the callback checks out. Never sent to the\n   * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  attributes?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Added to the callback's redirect back to the app (`oauth2Authorization` options). */\n  redirectParams?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\ninterface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {\n  state: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  scope: string[] | undefined;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_verifier'>;\n  /** OpenID Connect `nonce`, sent when `Provider.nonce.web` is set. */\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ExchangeCodeParams {\n  code: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for public clients (Google's installed-app clients, PKCE-only clients). */\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n}\n\nexport interface RefreshTokenParams {\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeTokenParams {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginOAuth2NativeParams {\n  /**\n   * The configured client the app signs in as (its `client_id`, or the provider's default native\n   * client). Id tokens must be issued to it: it is the only audience accepted.\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier for the code exchange, taken from `credentials.code_verifier`: the app made\n   * the challenge and keeps the verifier, so the server only ever has the verifier. Providers\n   * whose token endpoint takes `code_verifier` send it; the others ignore it.\n   */\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n  /** What the app posted, without `code_verifier`, which arrives as `pkce`. */\n  credentials: NativeCredential;\n}\n\n// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1\nexport interface OAuth2Token {\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The access token issued by the authorization server.\n   */\n  access_token: string;\n\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The type of the token issued as described in Section 7.1.  Value is case insensitive.\n   */\n  token_type: 'Bearer' | 'bearer' | 'mac' | (string & {});\n\n  /**\n   * RECOMMENDED.\n   * The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the\n   * access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the\n   * authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default\n   * value.\n   */\n  expires_in?: number;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * The refresh token, which can be used to obtain new access tokens using the same authorization\n   * grant as described in Section 6.\n   */\n  refresh_token?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * If identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the\n   * access token as described by Section 3.3.\n   */\n  scope?: string;\n\n  id_token?: string;\n\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface OidcToken extends OAuth2Token {\n  id_token: string;\n}\n\nexport type NativeCredential = {\n  state?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  redirect_uri?: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier (RFC 7636) for `code`, when the app sent a `code_challenge` with the\n   * authorization request: 43-128 characters from `[A-Za-z0-9-._~]`. Sent on to the provider's\n   * token endpoint, which refuses the code unless the verifier matches its challenge, so a code\n   * intercepted on the redirect (a custom-scheme redirect any app can claim) is useless alone.\n   * RFC 8252 §8.1 requires it for native apps, whose installed-app clients have no secret.\n   */\n  code_verifier?: string;\n  id_token?: string;\n  access_token?: string;\n  /**\n   * The user's name as the platform hands it to the app, for providers whose id token carries none\n   * (Apple sends it on the first authorization only): iOS\n   * `ASAuthorizationAppleIDCredential.fullName`, expo-apple-authentication's `credential.fullName`.\n   * The snake_case fields above are OAuth / OIDC protocol parameters; this one is not, it is the\n   * platform's object passed through unchanged, so it keeps the platform's own name and apps send\n   * `fullName: credential.fullName` as is. Unsigned client input: the provider cleans each part and\n   * ignores anything that is not a string. Parts with a standard claim become `given_name`,\n   * `family_name`, `middle_name` and `nickname`; `namePrefix` / `nameSuffix` have none and are kept\n   * in `userInfo.data.fullName` only.\n   */\n  fullName?: PersonNameComponents;\n};\n\n/** iOS `PersonNameComponents` as JSON; every part may be missing or `null`. */\nexport interface PersonNameComponents {\n  givenName?: string | null;\n  familyName?: string | null;\n  middleName?: string | null;\n  namePrefix?: string | null;\n  nameSuffix?: string | null;\n  nickname?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fields of the authorization response besides `code` and `state` that a provider uses to fill in\n * the user info: Apple posts the user's name as `user` (JSON) with the first authorization only,\n * since its id token never carries one. Unsigned, so treated as untrusted input.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationResponse {\n  user?: string;\n}\n\nexport const OIDC_SCOPES = [\n  'openid',\n  'profile',\n  'email',\n  'phone',\n  'address',\n  'offline_access',\n] as const;\n\nexport type OidcScope = (typeof OIDC_SCOPES)[number];\n\n// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#StandardClaims\nexport interface StandardClaims {\n  sub: string;\n  name?: string;\n  given_name?: string;\n  family_name?: string;\n  middle_name?: string;\n  nickname?: string;\n  preferred_username?: string;\n  profile?: string;\n  picture?: string;\n  website?: string;\n  email?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set only by providers that state it (Google, Apple, GitHub from the primary address's\n   * `verified` flag, X when it returns `confirmed_email`); Facebook leaves it unset. Trust the\n   * address only when this is `true`.\n   */\n  email_verified?: boolean;\n  gender?: 'female' | 'male' | (string & {});\n  birthdate?: string; // ISO 8601-1 [ISO8601‑1] YYYY-MM-DD format.\n  zoneinfo?: string; // IANA Time Zone Database [IANA.time‑zones]\n  locale?: string; // BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag.\n  phone_number?: string; // E.164\n  phone_number_verified?: boolean;\n  address?: {\n    formatted: string;\n    street_address: string;\n    locality: string;\n    region: string;\n    postal_code: string;\n    country: string;\n  }; // [RFC8259] JSON object\n  updated_at?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfo<T = unknown> {\n  claims: StandardClaims;\n  data: T;\n}\n\nexport interface Provider {\n  /** Authorization URI for the provider. */\n  authorizationUri: string;\n\n  /** Token URI for the provider. */\n  tokenUri: string;\n\n  /** Token revoke URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRevokeUri?: string;\n\n  /** Token refresh URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRefreshUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info URI for the provider. */\n  userInfoUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info authentication method for the provider. */\n  userInfoAuthenticationMethod?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Name of the attribute that will be used to extract the username from the call to 'userInfoUri'.\n   * */\n  userNameAttribute?: string;\n\n  /** JWK set URI for the provider */\n  jwkSetUri?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * URI that can either be an OpenID Connect discovery endpoint or an OAuth 2.0 Authorization\n   * Server Metadata endpoint defined by RFC 8414.\n   * */\n  issuerUri?: string;\n\n  /** Default scopes for the provider. */\n  defaultScope: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the provider's id token carries back the `nonce` of the request it was issued for\n   * (OpenID Connect), per flow. `web`: the redirect flow and One Tap, where `Auth` sends a nonce\n   * with the authorization request (or the front end passes an issued one to One Tap) and refuses\n   * an id token without it. `native`: the app's sign-in, where the app binds a nonce issued by\n   * `GET /oauth2/nonce/:provider` into the platform's request and the login refuses an id token\n   * without it. A flow set here is protected by default; a host relaxes it per provider with\n   * `oauth2.nonce.optional`. Absent for a plain OAuth2 provider, which has no id token.\n   */\n  nonce?: { web?: boolean; native?: boolean };\n\n  /** step 1: generate authorization uri and redirect user to it */\n  createAuthorizationUri: (params: CreateAuthorizationUriParams) => URL;\n\n  /** step 2: exchange code for token */\n  exchangeAuthorizationCode: (params: ExchangeCodeParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /**\n   * step 3: get user info. `context.clientId` is the client the token was issued to, the only\n   * audience an id token may carry; `context.response` holds what the authorization response\n   * carried besides the code, for the providers that send user data there (Apple).\n   */\n  getUserInfo: (token: OAuth2Token, context: UserInfoContext) => Promise<UserInfo>;\n\n  /** others: refresh access token */\n  refreshAccessToken?: (params: RefreshTokenParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /** others: revoke token */\n  revokeToken?: (params: RevokeTokenParams) => Promise<void>;\n\n  loginOAuth2Native?: (\n    params: LoginOAuth2NativeParams\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfoContext {\n  clientId: string;\n  response?: AuthorizationResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface OneTapProvider extends Provider {\n  /** Verifies a One Tap / FedCM credential, which must be issued to `clientId` (the web client). */\n  getTokenInfo: (\n    id_token: string,\n    clientId: string\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A client secret: a fixed string, or a function minting one for the client id it is called with\n * (Sign in with Apple's signed JWT, see `createAppleClientSecret`), called on every use so it can\n * cache and renew on its own.\n */\nexport type ClientSecret = string | ((clientId: string) => string | Promise<string>);\n\n/** The client a provider's server-side flows sign in as: the redirect flow and Google One Tap. */\nexport interface WebClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client. */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /** Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`. */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n  /** Authorization scopes. Default: the provider's `defaultScope`. */\n  scope?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A client an app signs in as on the device (an iOS bundle id, a Google iOS / Android client) and\n * whose code or id token it posts to the native login route.\n */\nexport interface NativeClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client (Google's installed-app clients have none). */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /**\n   * Redirect URI sent with the code exchange when the app sends no `redirect_uri` of its own.\n   * Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`.\n   */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * One identity source: every user it signs in has a `sub` unique within it, whichever client they\n * came through. The key in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` names it in the routes and in\n * `onAuthorized`. Two keys may share an implementation (two Google Cloud projects, one Okta per\n * tenant) when their subjects are separate namespaces.\n */\nexport interface ProviderConfig {\n  /** The implementation: `apple`, `google`, `github`, ... from `@shware/security/oauth2/provider`. */\n  provider: Provider;\n  /** The redirect flow's and One Tap's client. Required by those flows. */\n  web?: WebClient;\n  /**\n   * Clients the native login accepts besides `web`. An app names its client with `client_id`;\n   * without one, the only native client is used, or `web` when there is none.\n   */\n  native?: NativeClient[];\n}\n\nexport type ProvidersConfig = { [key: string]: ProviderConfig | undefined };\n\nexport interface OAuth2ClientConfig {\n  baseUri: string;\n  errorUri: string;\n  successUri: string;\n  /** Providers by key; a function is called per request, for secrets read at request time. */\n  providers: ProvidersConfig | (() => Promise<ProvidersConfig>);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;AA4KA,MAAa,cAAc;CACzB;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACF"}

package/dist/oauth2/types.d.cts

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ export interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {
    * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.
    */
   attributes?: Record<string, string>;
+  /** Added to the callback's redirect back to the app (`oauth2Authorization` options). */
+  redirectParams?: Record<string, string>;
 }
 interface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {
   state: string;

package/dist/oauth2/types.d.cts.map

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package/dist/oauth2/types.d.mts

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ export interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {
    * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.
    */
   attributes?: Record<string, string>;
+  /** Added to the callback's redirect back to the app (`oauth2Authorization` options). */
+  redirectParams?: Record<string, string>;
 }
 interface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {
   state: string;

package/dist/oauth2/types.d.mts.map

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package/dist/oauth2/types.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"types.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/oauth2/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\nexport interface PkceParameters {\n  code_verifier: string;\n  code_challenge: string;\n  code_challenge_method: 'S256' | 'plain';\n}\n\nexport interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {\n  state: string;\n  /** Key of the provider in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` the flow was started for. */\n  provider: string;\n  authorizationRequestUri: string;\n  additionalParameters: PkceParameters;\n  /**\n   * The `nonce` sent with the authorization request when the provider echoes one in its id token\n   * (`Provider.nonce.web`); the callback refuses an id token that does not carry it back. Absent\n   * for a provider without one, and on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * What the host attached when the flow started (`oauth2Authorization` options), kept on the\n   * server and handed back to `onAuthorized` once the callback checks out. Never sent to the\n   * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  attributes?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\ninterface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {\n  state: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  scope: string[] | undefined;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_verifier'>;\n  /** OpenID Connect `nonce`, sent when `Provider.nonce.web` is set. */\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ExchangeCodeParams {\n  code: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for public clients (Google's installed-app clients, PKCE-only clients). */\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n}\n\nexport interface RefreshTokenParams {\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeTokenParams {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginOAuth2NativeParams {\n  /**\n   * The configured client the app signs in as (its `client_id`, or the provider's default native\n   * client). Id tokens must be issued to it: it is the only audience accepted.\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier for the code exchange, taken from `credentials.code_verifier`: the app made\n   * the challenge and keeps the verifier, so the server only ever has the verifier. Providers\n   * whose token endpoint takes `code_verifier` send it; the others ignore it.\n   */\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n  /** What the app posted, without `code_verifier`, which arrives as `pkce`. */\n  credentials: NativeCredential;\n}\n\n// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1\nexport interface OAuth2Token {\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The access token issued by the authorization server.\n   */\n  access_token: string;\n\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The type of the token issued as described in Section 7.1.  Value is case insensitive.\n   */\n  token_type: 'Bearer' | 'bearer' | 'mac' | (string & {});\n\n  /**\n   * RECOMMENDED.\n   * The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the\n   * access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the\n   * authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default\n   * value.\n   */\n  expires_in?: number;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * The refresh token, which can be used to obtain new access tokens using the same authorization\n   * grant as described in Section 6.\n   */\n  refresh_token?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * If identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the\n   * access token as described by Section 3.3.\n   */\n  scope?: string;\n\n  id_token?: string;\n\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface OidcToken extends OAuth2Token {\n  id_token: string;\n}\n\nexport type NativeCredential = {\n  state?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  redirect_uri?: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier (RFC 7636) for `code`, when the app sent a `code_challenge` with the\n   * authorization request: 43-128 characters from `[A-Za-z0-9-._~]`. Sent on to the provider's\n   * token endpoint, which refuses the code unless the verifier matches its challenge, so a code\n   * intercepted on the redirect (a custom-scheme redirect any app can claim) is useless alone.\n   * RFC 8252 §8.1 requires it for native apps, whose installed-app clients have no secret.\n   */\n  code_verifier?: string;\n  id_token?: string;\n  access_token?: string;\n  /**\n   * The user's name as the platform hands it to the app, for providers whose id token carries none\n   * (Apple sends it on the first authorization only): iOS\n   * `ASAuthorizationAppleIDCredential.fullName`, expo-apple-authentication's `credential.fullName`.\n   * The snake_case fields above are OAuth / OIDC protocol parameters; this one is not, it is the\n   * platform's object passed through unchanged, so it keeps the platform's own name and apps send\n   * `fullName: credential.fullName` as is. Unsigned client input: the provider cleans each part and\n   * ignores anything that is not a string. Parts with a standard claim become `given_name`,\n   * `family_name`, `middle_name` and `nickname`; `namePrefix` / `nameSuffix` have none and are kept\n   * in `userInfo.data.fullName` only.\n   */\n  fullName?: PersonNameComponents;\n};\n\n/** iOS `PersonNameComponents` as JSON; every part may be missing or `null`. */\nexport interface PersonNameComponents {\n  givenName?: string | null;\n  familyName?: string | null;\n  middleName?: string | null;\n  namePrefix?: string | null;\n  nameSuffix?: string | null;\n  nickname?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fields of the authorization response besides `code` and `state` that a provider uses to fill in\n * the user info: Apple posts the user's name as `user` (JSON) with the first authorization only,\n * since its id token never carries one. Unsigned, so treated as untrusted input.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationResponse {\n  user?: string;\n}\n\nexport const OIDC_SCOPES = [\n  'openid',\n  'profile',\n  'email',\n  'phone',\n  'address',\n  'offline_access',\n] as const;\n\nexport type OidcScope = (typeof OIDC_SCOPES)[number];\n\n// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#StandardClaims\nexport interface StandardClaims {\n  sub: string;\n  name?: string;\n  given_name?: string;\n  family_name?: string;\n  middle_name?: string;\n  nickname?: string;\n  preferred_username?: string;\n  profile?: string;\n  picture?: string;\n  website?: string;\n  email?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set only by providers that state it (Google, Apple, GitHub from the primary address's\n   * `verified` flag, X when it returns `confirmed_email`); Facebook leaves it unset. Trust the\n   * address only when this is `true`.\n   */\n  email_verified?: boolean;\n  gender?: 'female' | 'male' | (string & {});\n  birthdate?: string; // ISO 8601-1 [ISO8601‑1] YYYY-MM-DD format.\n  zoneinfo?: string; // IANA Time Zone Database [IANA.time‑zones]\n  locale?: string; // BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag.\n  phone_number?: string; // E.164\n  phone_number_verified?: boolean;\n  address?: {\n    formatted: string;\n    street_address: string;\n    locality: string;\n    region: string;\n    postal_code: string;\n    country: string;\n  }; // [RFC8259] JSON object\n  updated_at?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfo<T = unknown> {\n  claims: StandardClaims;\n  data: T;\n}\n\nexport interface Provider {\n  /** Authorization URI for the provider. */\n  authorizationUri: string;\n\n  /** Token URI for the provider. */\n  tokenUri: string;\n\n  /** Token revoke URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRevokeUri?: string;\n\n  /** Token refresh URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRefreshUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info URI for the provider. */\n  userInfoUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info authentication method for the provider. */\n  userInfoAuthenticationMethod?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Name of the attribute that will be used to extract the username from the call to 'userInfoUri'.\n   * */\n  userNameAttribute?: string;\n\n  /** JWK set URI for the provider */\n  jwkSetUri?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * URI that can either be an OpenID Connect discovery endpoint or an OAuth 2.0 Authorization\n   * Server Metadata endpoint defined by RFC 8414.\n   * */\n  issuerUri?: string;\n\n  /** Default scopes for the provider. */\n  defaultScope: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the provider's id token carries back the `nonce` of the request it was issued for\n   * (OpenID Connect), per flow. `web`: the redirect flow and One Tap, where `Auth` sends a nonce\n   * with the authorization request (or the front end passes an issued one to One Tap) and refuses\n   * an id token without it. `native`: the app's sign-in, where the app binds a nonce issued by\n   * `GET /oauth2/nonce/:provider` into the platform's request and the login refuses an id token\n   * without it. A flow set here is protected by default; a host relaxes it per provider with\n   * `oauth2.nonce.optional`. Absent for a plain OAuth2 provider, which has no id token.\n   */\n  nonce?: { web?: boolean; native?: boolean };\n\n  /** step 1: generate authorization uri and redirect user to it */\n  createAuthorizationUri: (params: CreateAuthorizationUriParams) => URL;\n\n  /** step 2: exchange code for token */\n  exchangeAuthorizationCode: (params: ExchangeCodeParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /**\n   * step 3: get user info. `context.clientId` is the client the token was issued to, the only\n   * audience an id token may carry; `context.response` holds what the authorization response\n   * carried besides the code, for the providers that send user data there (Apple).\n   */\n  getUserInfo: (token: OAuth2Token, context: UserInfoContext) => Promise<UserInfo>;\n\n  /** others: refresh access token */\n  refreshAccessToken?: (params: RefreshTokenParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /** others: revoke token */\n  revokeToken?: (params: RevokeTokenParams) => Promise<void>;\n\n  loginOAuth2Native?: (\n    params: LoginOAuth2NativeParams\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfoContext {\n  clientId: string;\n  response?: AuthorizationResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface OneTapProvider extends Provider {\n  /** Verifies a One Tap / FedCM credential, which must be issued to `clientId` (the web client). */\n  getTokenInfo: (\n    id_token: string,\n    clientId: string\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A client secret: a fixed string, or a function minting one for the client id it is called with\n * (Sign in with Apple's signed JWT, see `createAppleClientSecret`), called on every use so it can\n * cache and renew on its own.\n */\nexport type ClientSecret = string | ((clientId: string) => string | Promise<string>);\n\n/** The client a provider's server-side flows sign in as: the redirect flow and Google One Tap. */\nexport interface WebClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client. */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /** Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`. */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n  /** Authorization scopes. Default: the provider's `defaultScope`. */\n  scope?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A client an app signs in as on the device (an iOS bundle id, a Google iOS / Android client) and\n * whose code or id token it posts to the native login route.\n */\nexport interface NativeClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client (Google's installed-app clients have none). */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /**\n   * Redirect URI sent with the code exchange when the app sends no `redirect_uri` of its own.\n   * Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`.\n   */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * One identity source: every user it signs in has a `sub` unique within it, whichever client they\n * came through. The key in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` names it in the routes and in\n * `onAuthorized`. Two keys may share an implementation (two Google Cloud projects, one Okta per\n * tenant) when their subjects are separate namespaces.\n */\nexport interface ProviderConfig {\n  /** The implementation: `apple`, `google`, `github`, ... from `@shware/security/oauth2/provider`. */\n  provider: Provider;\n  /** The redirect flow's and One Tap's client. Required by those flows. */\n  web?: WebClient;\n  /**\n   * Clients the native login accepts besides `web`. An app names its client with `client_id`;\n   * without one, the only native client is used, or `web` when there is none.\n   */\n  native?: NativeClient[];\n}\n\nexport type ProvidersConfig = { [key: string]: ProviderConfig | undefined };\n\nexport interface OAuth2ClientConfig {\n  baseUri: string;\n  errorUri: string;\n  successUri: string;\n  /** Providers by key; a function is called per request, for secrets read at request time. */\n  providers: ProvidersConfig | (() => Promise<ProvidersConfig>);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AA0KA,MAAa,cAAc;CACzB;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"types.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/oauth2/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636\nexport interface PkceParameters {\n  code_verifier: string;\n  code_challenge: string;\n  code_challenge_method: 'S256' | 'plain';\n}\n\nexport interface OAuth2AuthorizationRequest {\n  state: string;\n  /** Key of the provider in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` the flow was started for. */\n  provider: string;\n  authorizationRequestUri: string;\n  additionalParameters: PkceParameters;\n  /**\n   * The `nonce` sent with the authorization request when the provider echoes one in its id token\n   * (`Provider.nonce.web`); the callback refuses an id token that does not carry it back. Absent\n   * for a provider without one, and on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * What the host attached when the flow started (`oauth2Authorization` options), kept on the\n   * server and handed back to `onAuthorized` once the callback checks out. Never sent to the\n   * provider, unlike `additionalParameters`. Absent on requests stored before this field existed.\n   */\n  attributes?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Added to the callback's redirect back to the app (`oauth2Authorization` options). */\n  redirectParams?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\ninterface CreateAuthorizationUriParams {\n  state: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  scope: string[] | undefined;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_verifier'>;\n  /** OpenID Connect `nonce`, sent when `Provider.nonce.web` is set. */\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ExchangeCodeParams {\n  code: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for public clients (Google's installed-app clients, PKCE-only clients). */\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n}\n\nexport interface RefreshTokenParams {\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RevokeTokenParams {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginOAuth2NativeParams {\n  /**\n   * The configured client the app signs in as (its `client_id`, or the provider's default native\n   * client). Id tokens must be issued to it: it is the only audience accepted.\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  redirectUri: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier for the code exchange, taken from `credentials.code_verifier`: the app made\n   * the challenge and keeps the verifier, so the server only ever has the verifier. Providers\n   * whose token endpoint takes `code_verifier` send it; the others ignore it.\n   */\n  pkce?: Omit<PkceParameters, 'code_challenge' | 'code_challenge_method'>;\n  /** What the app posted, without `code_verifier`, which arrives as `pkce`. */\n  credentials: NativeCredential;\n}\n\n// reference: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1\nexport interface OAuth2Token {\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The access token issued by the authorization server.\n   */\n  access_token: string;\n\n  /**\n   * REQUIRED.\n   * The type of the token issued as described in Section 7.1.  Value is case insensitive.\n   */\n  token_type: 'Bearer' | 'bearer' | 'mac' | (string & {});\n\n  /**\n   * RECOMMENDED.\n   * The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For example, the value \"3600\" denotes that the\n   * access token will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated. If omitted, the\n   * authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration time via other means or document the default\n   * value.\n   */\n  expires_in?: number;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * The refresh token, which can be used to obtain new access tokens using the same authorization\n   * grant as described in Section 6.\n   */\n  refresh_token?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL.\n   * If identical to the scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the\n   * access token as described by Section 3.3.\n   */\n  scope?: string;\n\n  id_token?: string;\n\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface OidcToken extends OAuth2Token {\n  id_token: string;\n}\n\nexport type NativeCredential = {\n  state?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  redirect_uri?: string;\n  /**\n   * The PKCE verifier (RFC 7636) for `code`, when the app sent a `code_challenge` with the\n   * authorization request: 43-128 characters from `[A-Za-z0-9-._~]`. Sent on to the provider's\n   * token endpoint, which refuses the code unless the verifier matches its challenge, so a code\n   * intercepted on the redirect (a custom-scheme redirect any app can claim) is useless alone.\n   * RFC 8252 §8.1 requires it for native apps, whose installed-app clients have no secret.\n   */\n  code_verifier?: string;\n  id_token?: string;\n  access_token?: string;\n  /**\n   * The user's name as the platform hands it to the app, for providers whose id token carries none\n   * (Apple sends it on the first authorization only): iOS\n   * `ASAuthorizationAppleIDCredential.fullName`, expo-apple-authentication's `credential.fullName`.\n   * The snake_case fields above are OAuth / OIDC protocol parameters; this one is not, it is the\n   * platform's object passed through unchanged, so it keeps the platform's own name and apps send\n   * `fullName: credential.fullName` as is. Unsigned client input: the provider cleans each part and\n   * ignores anything that is not a string. Parts with a standard claim become `given_name`,\n   * `family_name`, `middle_name` and `nickname`; `namePrefix` / `nameSuffix` have none and are kept\n   * in `userInfo.data.fullName` only.\n   */\n  fullName?: PersonNameComponents;\n};\n\n/** iOS `PersonNameComponents` as JSON; every part may be missing or `null`. */\nexport interface PersonNameComponents {\n  givenName?: string | null;\n  familyName?: string | null;\n  middleName?: string | null;\n  namePrefix?: string | null;\n  nameSuffix?: string | null;\n  nickname?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fields of the authorization response besides `code` and `state` that a provider uses to fill in\n * the user info: Apple posts the user's name as `user` (JSON) with the first authorization only,\n * since its id token never carries one. Unsigned, so treated as untrusted input.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationResponse {\n  user?: string;\n}\n\nexport const OIDC_SCOPES = [\n  'openid',\n  'profile',\n  'email',\n  'phone',\n  'address',\n  'offline_access',\n] as const;\n\nexport type OidcScope = (typeof OIDC_SCOPES)[number];\n\n// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#StandardClaims\nexport interface StandardClaims {\n  sub: string;\n  name?: string;\n  given_name?: string;\n  family_name?: string;\n  middle_name?: string;\n  nickname?: string;\n  preferred_username?: string;\n  profile?: string;\n  picture?: string;\n  website?: string;\n  email?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set only by providers that state it (Google, Apple, GitHub from the primary address's\n   * `verified` flag, X when it returns `confirmed_email`); Facebook leaves it unset. Trust the\n   * address only when this is `true`.\n   */\n  email_verified?: boolean;\n  gender?: 'female' | 'male' | (string & {});\n  birthdate?: string; // ISO 8601-1 [ISO8601‑1] YYYY-MM-DD format.\n  zoneinfo?: string; // IANA Time Zone Database [IANA.time‑zones]\n  locale?: string; // BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag.\n  phone_number?: string; // E.164\n  phone_number_verified?: boolean;\n  address?: {\n    formatted: string;\n    street_address: string;\n    locality: string;\n    region: string;\n    postal_code: string;\n    country: string;\n  }; // [RFC8259] JSON object\n  updated_at?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfo<T = unknown> {\n  claims: StandardClaims;\n  data: T;\n}\n\nexport interface Provider {\n  /** Authorization URI for the provider. */\n  authorizationUri: string;\n\n  /** Token URI for the provider. */\n  tokenUri: string;\n\n  /** Token revoke URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRevokeUri?: string;\n\n  /** Token refresh URI for the provider. */\n  tokenRefreshUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info URI for the provider. */\n  userInfoUri?: string;\n\n  /** User info authentication method for the provider. */\n  userInfoAuthenticationMethod?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Name of the attribute that will be used to extract the username from the call to 'userInfoUri'.\n   * */\n  userNameAttribute?: string;\n\n  /** JWK set URI for the provider */\n  jwkSetUri?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * URI that can either be an OpenID Connect discovery endpoint or an OAuth 2.0 Authorization\n   * Server Metadata endpoint defined by RFC 8414.\n   * */\n  issuerUri?: string;\n\n  /** Default scopes for the provider. */\n  defaultScope: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the provider's id token carries back the `nonce` of the request it was issued for\n   * (OpenID Connect), per flow. `web`: the redirect flow and One Tap, where `Auth` sends a nonce\n   * with the authorization request (or the front end passes an issued one to One Tap) and refuses\n   * an id token without it. `native`: the app's sign-in, where the app binds a nonce issued by\n   * `GET /oauth2/nonce/:provider` into the platform's request and the login refuses an id token\n   * without it. A flow set here is protected by default; a host relaxes it per provider with\n   * `oauth2.nonce.optional`. Absent for a plain OAuth2 provider, which has no id token.\n   */\n  nonce?: { web?: boolean; native?: boolean };\n\n  /** step 1: generate authorization uri and redirect user to it */\n  createAuthorizationUri: (params: CreateAuthorizationUriParams) => URL;\n\n  /** step 2: exchange code for token */\n  exchangeAuthorizationCode: (params: ExchangeCodeParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /**\n   * step 3: get user info. `context.clientId` is the client the token was issued to, the only\n   * audience an id token may carry; `context.response` holds what the authorization response\n   * carried besides the code, for the providers that send user data there (Apple).\n   */\n  getUserInfo: (token: OAuth2Token, context: UserInfoContext) => Promise<UserInfo>;\n\n  /** others: refresh access token */\n  refreshAccessToken?: (params: RefreshTokenParams) => Promise<OAuth2Token>;\n\n  /** others: revoke token */\n  revokeToken?: (params: RevokeTokenParams) => Promise<void>;\n\n  loginOAuth2Native?: (\n    params: LoginOAuth2NativeParams\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\nexport interface UserInfoContext {\n  clientId: string;\n  response?: AuthorizationResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface OneTapProvider extends Provider {\n  /** Verifies a One Tap / FedCM credential, which must be issued to `clientId` (the web client). */\n  getTokenInfo: (\n    id_token: string,\n    clientId: string\n  ) => Promise<{ token: OAuth2Token; userInfo: UserInfo }>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A client secret: a fixed string, or a function minting one for the client id it is called with\n * (Sign in with Apple's signed JWT, see `createAppleClientSecret`), called on every use so it can\n * cache and renew on its own.\n */\nexport type ClientSecret = string | ((clientId: string) => string | Promise<string>);\n\n/** The client a provider's server-side flows sign in as: the redirect flow and Google One Tap. */\nexport interface WebClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client. */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /** Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`. */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n  /** Authorization scopes. Default: the provider's `defaultScope`. */\n  scope?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A client an app signs in as on the device (an iOS bundle id, a Google iOS / Android client) and\n * whose code or id token it posts to the native login route.\n */\nexport interface NativeClient {\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Absent for a public client (Google's installed-app clients have none). */\n  clientSecret?: ClientSecret;\n  /**\n   * Redirect URI sent with the code exchange when the app sends no `redirect_uri` of its own.\n   * Default: `${baseUri}/login/oauth2/code/<provider key>`.\n   */\n  redirectUri?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * One identity source: every user it signs in has a `sub` unique within it, whichever client they\n * came through. The key in `OAuth2ClientConfig.providers` names it in the routes and in\n * `onAuthorized`. Two keys may share an implementation (two Google Cloud projects, one Okta per\n * tenant) when their subjects are separate namespaces.\n */\nexport interface ProviderConfig {\n  /** The implementation: `apple`, `google`, `github`, ... from `@shware/security/oauth2/provider`. */\n  provider: Provider;\n  /** The redirect flow's and One Tap's client. Required by those flows. */\n  web?: WebClient;\n  /**\n   * Clients the native login accepts besides `web`. An app names its client with `client_id`;\n   * without one, the only native client is used, or `web` when there is none.\n   */\n  native?: NativeClient[];\n}\n\nexport type ProvidersConfig = { [key: string]: ProviderConfig | undefined };\n\nexport interface OAuth2ClientConfig {\n  baseUri: string;\n  errorUri: string;\n  successUri: string;\n  /** Providers by key; a function is called per request, for secrets read at request time. */\n  providers: ProvidersConfig | (() => Promise<ProvidersConfig>);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AA4KA,MAAa,cAAc;CACzB;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;AACF"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@shware/security",
-  "version": "9.1.0",
+  "version": "9.2.0",
   "private": false,
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",