@shware/security 7.1.0 → 8.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +108 -30
- package/dist/auth/attributes.cjs +5 -5
- package/dist/auth/attributes.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/attributes.d.cts +3 -5
- package/dist/auth/attributes.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/attributes.d.mts +3 -5
- package/dist/auth/attributes.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/attributes.mjs +5 -5
- package/dist/auth/attributes.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.cjs +57 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.d.cts +24 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.d.cts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.d.mts +24 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.mjs +55 -0
- package/dist/auth/desktop-codes.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.cjs +77 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.d.cts +39 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.d.cts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.d.mts +39 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.mjs +75 -0
- package/dist/auth/email-codes.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.cjs +47 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.d.cts +88 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.d.cts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.d.mts +88 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.mjs +45 -0
- package/dist/auth/error.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/index.cjs +245 -385
- package/dist/auth/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/index.d.cts +66 -57
- package/dist/auth/index.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/index.d.mts +66 -57
- package/dist/auth/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/index.mjs +248 -388
- package/dist/auth/index.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/respond.cjs +99 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.d.cts +39 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.d.cts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.d.mts +39 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.d.mts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.mjs +92 -0
- package/dist/auth/respond.mjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/auth/types.d.cts +27 -13
- package/dist/auth/types.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth/types.d.mts +27 -13
- package/dist/auth/types.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/index.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/core/index.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/core/index.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/index.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/core/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/index.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/email/schema.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/email/schema.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/email/schema.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/email/schema.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/email/schema.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/email/schema.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/index.cjs +5 -0
- package/dist/index.d.cts +4 -1
- package/dist/index.d.mts +4 -1
- package/dist/index.mjs +3 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/client.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/client.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/client.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/client.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/client.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/client.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/error.cjs +1 -9
- package/dist/oauth2/error.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/error.d.cts +0 -5
- package/dist/oauth2/error.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/error.d.mts +0 -5
- package/dist/oauth2/error.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/error.mjs +2 -9
- package/dist/oauth2/error.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/name.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/name.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/name.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/name.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/name.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/name.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple-client-secret.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/apple.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.cjs +2 -3
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.mjs +2 -3
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/common.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.cjs +3 -6
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.d.cts +0 -3
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.d.mts +0 -3
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.mjs +3 -6
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/facebook.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/github.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/google.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/wechat.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.cjs +7 -6
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.d.cts +3 -4
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.d.mts +3 -4
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.mjs +7 -6
- package/dist/oauth2/provider/x.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/types.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/types.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/types.d.cts +5 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/types.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/types.d.mts +5 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/types.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/oauth2/types.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/oauth2/types.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/common.cjs +11 -15
- package/dist/session/common.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/common.d.cts +7 -5
- package/dist/session/common.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/common.d.mts +7 -5
- package/dist/session/common.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/common.mjs +11 -14
- package/dist/session/common.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/db.cjs +3 -4
- package/dist/session/db.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/db.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/db.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/db.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/db.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/db.mjs +4 -5
- package/dist/session/db.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/map-session.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/session/map-session.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/map-session.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/map-session.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/map-session.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/map-session.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/session/redis.cjs +7 -10
- package/dist/session/redis.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/redis.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/redis.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/redis.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/session/redis.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/redis.mjs +8 -11
- package/dist/session/redis.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/types.d.cts +0 -14
- package/dist/session/types.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/session/types.d.mts +0 -14
- package/dist/session/types.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/http.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/http.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/http.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/http.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/http.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/http.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/oauth2.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/timing.cjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/timing.d.cts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/timing.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/timing.d.mts +0 -2
- package/dist/utils/timing.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/timing.mjs +1 -2
- package/dist/utils/valid.cjs +35 -54
- package/dist/utils/valid.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/valid.d.cts +8 -25
- package/dist/utils/valid.d.cts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/valid.d.mts +8 -25
- package/dist/utils/valid.d.mts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/valid.mjs +33 -52
- package/dist/utils/valid.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +4 -4
package/dist/auth/index.cjs.map
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{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["isKnownOAuth2ErrorType","attributesSize","MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES","OAuth2Client","getCookie","randomUUID","PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME","createHash","param","timing","query","oauth2RedirectQuerySchema","OAuth2Error","bodyAttributes","googleOneTapSchema","valid","sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema","verifyTurnstileToken","resourceExhausted","randomInt","invalidArgument","loginEmailSchema","timingSafeEqual"],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomInt, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n NativeCredential,\n OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n PkceParameters,\n StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n type CookieOptions,\n deleteCookie,\n getCookie,\n param,\n query,\n setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { invalidArgument, resourceExhausted, valid, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport { MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES, attributesSize, bodyAttributes } from './attributes';\nimport type {\n AuthConfig,\n AuthService,\n AuthorizedHandler,\n LoggedHandler,\n OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\nconst INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER = {\n error: 'invalid_request',\n error_description: 'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]',\n};\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n 'invalid_grant',\n 'access_denied',\n 'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes']\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n if (!attributes) return undefined;\n const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n }\n if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n const size = attributesSize(defined);\n invariant(\n size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n );\n return defined;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nconst INVALID_ATTRIBUTES = {\n error: 'invalid_request',\n error_description: `attributes must map strings to strings, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} bytes`,\n};\n\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n return (\n request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n );\n}\n\ninterface DesktopCodeRecord {\n /** principal.name from the upstream cookie session */\n name: string;\n /** code_challenge (S256, base64url) — verifier must hash to this */\n cc: string;\n}\n\nexport const PATH = {\n CSRF: '/csrf',\n LOGOUT: '/logout',\n LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n LOGIN_PHONE: '/login/phone',\n SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n SEND_PHONE_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendPhoneVerificationCode',\n\n // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n // 1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n // 2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n // 3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n // Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/** Seconds an email verification code, and its attempt counter, stay valid. */\nconst EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n private readonly timing: boolean;\n private readonly cookieName;\n private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n private readonly maxVerificationAttempts: number;\n private readonly verificationResendCooldown: number;\n private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n private readonly onetapRequireNonce: boolean;\n private readonly touchInterval: number;\n private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n constructor({\n sessionRepository,\n kvRepository,\n turnstileSecretKey,\n verificationCode,\n oauth2,\n cookie,\n session,\n timing,\n }: AuthConfig) {\n this.timing = timing ?? false;\n this.kv = kvRepository;\n this.repository = sessionRepository;\n this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n this.maxVerificationAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n this.verificationResendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n invariant(this.maxVerificationAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n invariant(\n this.verificationResendCooldown >= 1,\n 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second'\n );\n const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n this.cookieOptions = {\n path: '/',\n sameSite: 'none',\n secure: true,\n httpOnly: true,\n ...cookieOptions,\n };\n this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n this.onetapRequireNonce = oauth2?.onetap?.requireNonce ?? true;\n this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n }\n\n private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n let sessionId: string | undefined;\n const header = request.headers.get('Authorization');\n if (header?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n sessionId = header.replace('Bearer ', '');\n }\n if (!sessionId) {\n sessionId = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n }\n return sessionId;\n }\n\n csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const token = randomUUID();\n const response = Response.json({\n token,\n parameterName: '_csrf',\n headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n });\n\n // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n path: '/',\n secure: true,\n httpOnly: false,\n sameSite: 'none',\n domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n });\n return response;\n };\n\n logout = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n const response = Response.json({});\n // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n return response;\n };\n\n logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n // 1. get session from header or cookie\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n if (!sessionId) return Response.json({ data: false });\n const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n // 2. get principal name from session\n const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n await this.repository.save(session);\n\n // 3. call onLogged\n if (name !== null) await onLogged?.({ name: String(name) });\n\n // 4. renew cookie\n const response = Response.json({ data: name !== null });\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n return response;\n };\n\n private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n const code_verifier = randomUUID();\n const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n .update(code_verifier)\n .digest()\n .toString('base64url');\n\n return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n }\n\n private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n }\n\n private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n }\n\n private getEmailVerificationCodeKey(email: string) {\n return `email:verification:${email}`;\n }\n\n private getEmailVerificationAttemptsKey(email: string) {\n return `email:verification-attempts:${email}`;\n }\n\n private getEmailVerificationCooldownKey(email: string) {\n return `email:verification-cooldown:${email}`;\n }\n\n private getPhoneVerificationCodeKey(phone: string) {\n return `phone:verification:${phone}`;\n }\n\n private getDesktopCodeKey(code: string) {\n return `desktop:code:${code}`;\n }\n\n oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n const state = randomUUID();\n await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, 10 * 60);\n return Response.json({ state });\n };\n\n oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n const nonce = randomUUID();\n await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, 10 * 60);\n return Response.json({ nonce });\n };\n\n oauth2Authorization = async (\n request: Request,\n options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n ): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n const state = randomUUID();\n const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce });\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n const session = sessionId\n ? ((await this.repository.findById(sessionId)) ?? this.repository.createSession())\n : this.repository.createSession();\n mark('fetch_session');\n\n const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n state,\n provider,\n authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n additionalParameters: pkce,\n ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n };\n\n const value = JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest);\n session.setAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST, value);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n mark('save_session');\n\n const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n setTiming(response);\n\n return response;\n };\n\n private readonly redirect = (error: OAuth2ErrorType, description?: string): Response => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);\n uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n if (description) {\n uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n }\n return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n };\n\n loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n // 1. get session from header or cookie\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n const session = sessionId ? await this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n if (!session) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'session not found');\n }\n mark('load_session');\n\n // 2. get cached authorization request from session\n const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n if (!json) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'authorization request not found');\n }\n const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n\n // 3. validate redirect query/formdata\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n let data: Record<string, string>;\n // apple redirect: response_mode=form_post\n if (isFormPost(request)) {\n const params = new URLSearchParams(await request.text());\n data = Object.fromEntries(params.entries());\n } else {\n data = query(request);\n }\n\n const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n if (!parsed.success) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n }\n // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n if (parsed.data.error) {\n if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n }\n return this.redirect(\n safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'),\n parsed.data.error_description\n );\n }\n if (!parsed.data.code || !parsed.data.state) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n }\n if (parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n }\n if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect provider mismatch');\n }\n mark('validate_session');\n\n // 4. exchange authorization code for token and get user info\n const { code, user } = parsed.data;\n\n // Everything past validation can fail (an expired or reused code, a network error, the host's\n // handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup the user is looking at, so every\n // failure must land on errorUri instead of surfacing as a raw JSON error response.\n let signedIn: Session;\n try {\n const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n provider,\n code,\n pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n });\n // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n provider,\n clientId,\n token,\n response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n });\n mark('exchange_code');\n\n // 5. create or update principal, with what the host attached when the flow started\n const principal = await handler(request, {\n provider,\n clientId,\n userInfo,\n token,\n attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n });\n mark('save_principal');\n\n // 6. sign in on a new session: the id the browser brought may have been planted by an\n // attacker who started the flow (session fixation), so it must not become authenticated.\n signedIn = this.signedInSession(session, principal.name);\n await this.repository.save(signedIn);\n await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n mark('update_session');\n } catch (error) {\n // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n return this.redirect(type);\n }\n console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n return this.redirect('server_error');\n }\n\n const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);\n uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n\n const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n const maxAge = signedIn.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, signedIn.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n setTiming(response);\n\n return response;\n };\n\n /**\n * A fresh session for `name`, carrying over what the host kept in the pre-login one. The\n * authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow attributes) is single-use and was consumed\n * by this callback, and a principal left there from an earlier sign-in is replaced.\n */\n private signedInSession(previous: Session, name: string): Session {\n const session = this.repository.createSession();\n for (const attribute of previous.getAttributeNames()) {\n if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n const value = previous.getAttribute(attribute);\n if (value !== null) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n }\n session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, name);\n return session;\n }\n\n loginOAuth2Native = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n const body: unknown = await request.json();\n // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n if (!attributes) return Response.json(INVALID_ATTRIBUTES, { status: 400 });\n // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n if (\n code_verifier !== undefined &&\n (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n ) {\n return Response.json(INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER, { status: 400 });\n }\n const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n provider,\n credentials,\n });\n mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: string };\n if (nonce) {\n const value = await this.kv.getItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce));\n if (value !== provider) {\n const json = { error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'nonce mismatch' };\n return Response.json(json, { status: 400 });\n }\n await this.kv.removeItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce));\n mark('check_nonce');\n }\n\n const principal = await handler(request, { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes });\n mark('save_principal');\n\n const session = this.repository.createSession();\n session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n const response = new Response(JSON.stringify(principal), {\n status: 200,\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n });\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n setTiming(response);\n\n return response;\n };\n\n loginOAuth2Onetap = async (\n request: Request,\n handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n provider = 'google'\n ): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n // should support application/x-www-form-urlencoded and application/json\n // Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them.\n let body: Record<string, string>;\n let attributes: Record<string, string> | null = {};\n if (request.headers.get('Content-Type')?.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {\n const text = await request.text();\n body = Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(text));\n } else if (request.headers.get('Content-Type')?.includes('application/json')) {\n const json: unknown = await request.json();\n attributes = bodyAttributes(json);\n body = json as Record<string, string>;\n } else {\n const json = { error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'invalid content type' };\n return Response.json(json, { status: 400 });\n }\n\n if (!attributes) return Response.json(INVALID_ATTRIBUTES, { status: 400 });\n const parsed = googleOneTapSchema.parse(body);\n\n // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n let principal: Principal;\n if (parsed.credential) {\n const { clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n provider,\n credential: parsed.credential,\n });\n mark('verify_credential');\n\n // A credential is replayable until it expires, so it must carry a single-use nonce from\n // `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's\n // `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which FedCM mode no longer sets.\n const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n const value = await this.kv.getItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce));\n if (value !== provider) {\n const json = { error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'nonce mismatch' };\n return Response.json(json, { status: 401 });\n }\n await this.kv.removeItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce));\n mark('check_nonce');\n } else if (this.onetapRequireNonce) {\n const json = { error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'nonce missing' };\n return Response.json(json, { status: 401 });\n }\n\n principal = await handler(request, { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes });\n } else if (parsed.code) {\n const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n provider,\n code: parsed.code,\n });\n const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n principal = await handler(request, { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes });\n } else {\n throw new Error('invalid request');\n }\n\n mark('save_principal');\n\n const session = this.repository.createSession();\n session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n const response = new Response(JSON.stringify(principal), {\n status: 200,\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n });\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n setTiming(response);\n\n return response;\n };\n\n sendEmailVerificationCode = async (\n request: Request,\n sender: (data: { email: string; verificationCode: string }) => Promise<void>\n ): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n\n const { data, error } = valid(sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema, await request.json());\n if (error) return Response.json(error, { status: error.error.code });\n const { email, turnstileToken } = data;\n\n const result = await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n if (result.error) return Response.json(result.error, { status: result.error.error.code });\n\n // The cooldown is claimed before sending, so of concurrent requests exactly one sends. A failed\n // delivery releases it again: no code was stored, so an immediate retry gains an attacker\n // nothing, while keeping it would lock the user out of signing in for the whole cooldown.\n const cooldownKey = this.getEmailVerificationCooldownKey(email);\n if ((await this.kv.increment(cooldownKey, this.verificationResendCooldown)) > 1) {\n const error = resourceExhausted(\n 'VERIFICATION_CODE_RESEND_TOO_SOON',\n 'Verification code was sent recently'\n );\n return Response.json(error, { status: error.error.code });\n }\n\n try {\n // Sent before it is stored, so a failed delivery leaves the previous code usable.\n const verificationCode = randomInt(1_000_000).toString().padStart(6, '0');\n await sender({ email, verificationCode });\n // The new code gets the full attempt budget; the cooldown bounds how often that happens.\n // Reset before storing, so every comparison against the new code is counted.\n await this.kv.removeItem(this.getEmailVerificationAttemptsKey(email));\n await this.kv.setItem(\n this.getEmailVerificationCodeKey(email),\n verificationCode,\n EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE_TTL\n );\n return Response.json({});\n } catch (e) {\n console.error('Failed to send email verification code', e);\n await this.kv.removeItem(cooldownKey);\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('EMAIL_DELIVERY_FAILED'), { status: 400 });\n }\n };\n\n loginEmail = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n const { data, error } = valid(loginEmailSchema, await request.json());\n if (error) return Response.json(error, { status: error.error.code });\n const { email, verificationCode, attributes } = data;\n\n const key = this.getEmailVerificationCodeKey(email);\n const attemptsKey = this.getEmailVerificationAttemptsKey(email);\n const stored = await this.kv.getItem(key);\n if (typeof stored !== 'string') {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_VERIFICATION_CODE'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n // Count the attempt before comparing: the atomic increment hands every request, parallel ones\n // included, a distinct count, so at most maxAttempts comparisons are ever made against a code.\n const attempts = await this.kv.increment(attemptsKey, EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE_TTL);\n if (attempts > this.maxVerificationAttempts) {\n // Only the code is discarded. The counter stays until it expires (or a new code is sent):\n // removing it would hand requests that already read the code a fresh budget.\n await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n const error = invalidArgument('VERIFICATION_CODE_ATTEMPTS_EXCEEDED');\n return Response.json(error, { status: error.error.code });\n }\n if (\n stored.length !== verificationCode.length ||\n !timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(stored), Buffer.from(verificationCode))\n ) {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_VERIFICATION_CODE'), { status: 400 });\n }\n await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n await this.kv.removeItem(attemptsKey);\n const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n const principal = await handler(request, {\n provider: 'EMAIL',\n userInfo: { claims, data: {} },\n attributes: attributes ?? {},\n });\n\n // save session\n const session = this.repository.createSession();\n session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n const response = new Response(JSON.stringify(principal), {\n status: 200,\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n });\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), { ...this.cookieOptions, maxAge });\n\n return response;\n };\n\n /**\n * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already\n * completed normal sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this\n * issues a 5-minute single-use code that the web page hands off to the\n * desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n *\n * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier`\n * before opening the browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`,\n * and threads the challenge through the URL → web page → here. We pin\n * the challenge to the code in KV; `desktopExchange` enforces that the\n * caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet\n * capture on loopback) from exchanging it.\n *\n * Requires an authenticated cookie session — anonymous callers get 401.\n * Throttling / abuse protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job\n * (rate-limit per principal); the SDK doesn't gate it because the\n * upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n */\n desktopAuthorize = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n if (!principal) {\n const body = {\n error: {\n code: 401,\n status: 'UNAUTHENTICATED',\n message: 'sign in first',\n details: [],\n },\n };\n return Response.json(body, { status: 401 });\n }\n\n let body: { code_challenge?: unknown; code_challenge_method?: unknown };\n try {\n body = (await request.json()) as {\n code_challenge?: unknown;\n code_challenge_method?: unknown;\n };\n } catch {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n const codeChallenge = typeof body.code_challenge === 'string' ? body.code_challenge : null;\n if (\n !codeChallenge ||\n body.code_challenge_method !== 'S256' ||\n !PKCE_FORMAT.test(codeChallenge)\n ) {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n const code = randomUUID();\n const record: DesktopCodeRecord = { name: principal.name, cc: codeChallenge };\n await this.kv.setItem(this.getDesktopCodeKey(code), JSON.stringify(record), 5 * 60);\n\n return Response.json({ code });\n };\n\n /**\n * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop\n * client hands back the auth code it received via the loopback callback,\n * and we mint a fresh session for it — independent of the web cookie\n * session that originally `authorize`'d the code, so logging out on\n * either side doesn't cascade to the other.\n *\n * Cookie attributes: defaults to `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie\n * survives cross-site fetches from the desktop renderer's `file://` /\n * `app://` origin. The configured base `cookieOptions` provide\n * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`, `maxAge`); the override\n * is targeted at the SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev\n * backend this combination is rejected by Chromium — see the desktop\n * sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n *\n * No CSRF check needed — the request carries no cookie, the auth code\n * itself is the credential, and KV's single-use removal blocks replay.\n */\n desktopExchange = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n let body: { code?: unknown; code_verifier?: unknown };\n try {\n body = (await request.json()) as { code?: unknown; code_verifier?: unknown };\n } catch {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n const code = typeof body.code === 'string' ? body.code : null;\n const verifier = typeof body.code_verifier === 'string' ? body.code_verifier : null;\n if (!code || !verifier || !PKCE_FORMAT.test(verifier)) {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n const key = this.getDesktopCodeKey(code);\n const raw = await this.kv.getItem(key);\n if (typeof raw !== 'string') {\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_DESKTOP_CODE'), { status: 400 });\n }\n let record: DesktopCodeRecord;\n try {\n record = JSON.parse(raw) as DesktopCodeRecord;\n } catch {\n // Malformed KV record (shouldn't happen with our own writes) — drop it\n // and surface as an invalid code; the caller can retry the whole flow.\n await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n return Response.json(invalidArgument('INVALID_DESKTOP_CODE'), { status: 400 });\n }\n\n // Verify PKCE: base64url(sha256(verifier)) === stored challenge.\n // Don't burn the code on a verifier mismatch — that would let an\n // attacker who races a network retry brick a legit exchange. 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No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n */\n private async touch(session: Session) {\n const now = Date.now();\n if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n }\n\n isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n if (!sessionId) return false;\n const session = await this.repository.findById(sessionId);\n if (!session) return false;\n const principalName = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n if (!principalName) return false;\n await this.touch(session);\n return true;\n };\n\n getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n request: Request,\n create: T\n ): Promise<T extends true ? 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{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["isKnownOAuth2ErrorType","attributesSize","MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES","extend","googleOneTapSchema","attributesSchema","object","string","regex","literal","EmailVerificationCodes","DesktopCodes","OAuth2Client","getCookie","PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME","errorResponse","randomUUID","createHash","AuthenticationError","param","timing","query","oauth2RedirectQuerySchema","OAuth2Error","readJson","bodyAttributes","invalidArgument","readForm","parse","sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema","verifyTurnstileToken","loginEmailSchema","unauthenticated"],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { invariant } from '@shware/utils';\nimport { extend, literal, object, regex, string } from 'zod/mini';\nimport type { Principal } from '../core/index';\nimport { loginEmailSchema, sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema } from '../email/schema';\nimport { OAuth2Client, googleOneTapSchema, oauth2RedirectQuerySchema } from '../oauth2/client';\nimport { OAuth2Error, type OAuth2ErrorType, isKnownOAuth2ErrorType } from '../oauth2/error';\nimport type {\n NativeCredential,\n OAuth2AuthorizationRequest,\n PkceParameters,\n StandardClaims,\n} from '../oauth2/types';\nimport { PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME } from '../session/common';\nimport type { KVRepository, Session, SessionRepository } from '../session/types';\nimport {\n type CookieOptions,\n deleteCookie,\n getCookie,\n param,\n query,\n setCookie,\n} from '../utils/http';\nimport { timing } from '../utils/timing';\nimport { parse, readForm, readJson, verifyTurnstileToken } from '../utils/valid';\nimport {\n MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n attributesSchema,\n attributesSize,\n bodyAttributes,\n} from './attributes';\nimport { DesktopCodes } from './desktop-codes';\nimport { type EmailSender, EmailVerificationCodes } from './email-codes';\nimport { AuthenticationError } from './error';\nimport { errorResponse, invalidArgument, unauthenticated } from './respond';\nimport type {\n AuthConfig,\n AuthService,\n Authorization,\n AuthorizedHandler,\n LoggedHandler,\n OAuth2AuthorizationOptions,\n} from './types';\n\n// PKCE per RFC 7636: code_verifier / code_challenge are 43-128 chars from\n// the unreserved set. We restrict to base64url (drops \".\" and \"~\") since\n// that's what S256 produces and what callers should be sending; rejecting\n// the rest shrinks the accepted input shape without losing legit clients.\n// A 32-byte random verifier base64url-encodes to exactly 43 chars.\nconst PKCE_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43,128}$/;\n\n// A native app's `code_verifier` goes on to the provider, which checks it against the challenge\n// the app sent: accept the whole RFC 7636 unreserved set here, as the provider does.\nconst CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/;\n\n/** The header a session id travels in besides the cookie, with `session.header` on. */\nconst SESSION_HEADER = 'X-Auth-Token';\n\n/** Seconds an OAuth2 state or nonce may be used within. */\nconst OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL = 10 * 60;\n\n// error_description forwarded to errorUri comes from the provider or an error message: cap it so\n// the redirect URL stays short and an attacker-crafted callback cannot stuff the page with text.\nconst MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** An error code safe to put on errorUri: a registered one as is, anything else as `fallback`. */\nfunction safeErrorType(error: string, fallback: OAuth2ErrorType): OAuth2ErrorType {\n return isKnownOAuth2ErrorType(error) ? error : fallback;\n}\n\n/**\n * The codes a failure past validation keeps on errorUri, each one the user can act on: the code\n * expired or was used (start again), they declined, or the provider is briefly down. Every other\n * failure there (a rejected client, a user info request that failed) is the app's or the\n * provider's problem, which the user sees as `server_error`.\n */\nconst CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES: ReadonlySet<OAuth2ErrorType> = new Set([\n 'invalid_grant',\n 'access_denied',\n 'temporarily_unavailable',\n]);\n\nfunction authorizationAttributes(\n attributes: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions['attributes']\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n if (!attributes) return undefined;\n const defined: Record<string, string> = {};\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {\n if (value !== undefined) defined[key] = value;\n }\n if (Object.keys(defined).length === 0) return undefined;\n // The host's own values, written with the session: oversized is a bug in the host, not a 400.\n const size = attributesSize(defined);\n invariant(\n size <= MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES,\n `oauth2 authorization attributes are ${size} bytes, at most ${MAX_ATTRIBUTES_BYTES} allowed`\n );\n return defined;\n}\n\n/** Sign in with Apple answers with `response_mode=form_post`; a charset parameter may follow. */\nfunction isFormPost(request: Request) {\n const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type')?.toLowerCase();\n return (\n request.method === 'POST' && !!contentType?.startsWith('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n );\n}\n\n/** Google's own form post carries no attributes; an app posting JSON may add them. */\nconst oneTapBodySchema = extend(googleOneTapSchema, { attributes: attributesSchema });\n\nconst desktopAuthorizeSchema = object({\n code_challenge: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n code_challenge_method: literal('S256'),\n});\n\nconst desktopExchangeSchema = object({\n code: string(),\n code_verifier: string().check(regex(PKCE_FORMAT)),\n});\n\nexport const PATH = {\n CSRF: '/csrf',\n LOGOUT: '/logout',\n LOGGED: '/logged',\n\n OAUTH2_STATE: '/oauth2/state/:provider',\n OAUTH2_NONCE: '/oauth2/nonce/:provider',\n OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION: '/oauth2/authorization/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE: '/login/oauth2/code/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider',\n LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google',\n\n LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email',\n SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode',\n\n // Desktop / native app sign-in via web loopback (RFC 8252 + OAuth 2.1 Auth Code Flow):\n // 1. user already authenticated with cookie session → POST DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE → { code }\n // 2. web redirects to desktop's loopback callback with the code\n // 3. desktop renderer POSTs DESKTOP_EXCHANGE with the code → server returns\n // Set-Cookie carrying a fresh session, single-use code is invalidated\n // The two-step flow keeps the actual session id off the redirect URL — only a\n // 5-minute single-use code transits via the loopback.\n DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize',\n DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange',\n\n CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the\n * request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and\n * answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a\n * `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see\n * `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).\n */\nexport class Auth implements AuthService {\n private readonly timing: boolean;\n private readonly cookieName;\n private readonly cookieOptions: CookieOptions;\n private readonly kv: KVRepository;\n private readonly repository: SessionRepository;\n private readonly turnstileSecretKey?: string;\n private readonly emailCodes: EmailVerificationCodes;\n private readonly desktopCodes: DesktopCodes;\n private readonly oauth2Client: OAuth2Client | null;\n private readonly onetapRequireNonce: boolean;\n private readonly touchInterval: number;\n private readonly sessionHeader: boolean;\n private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST = 'oauth2AuthorizationRequest';\n\n constructor({\n sessionRepository,\n kvRepository,\n turnstileSecretKey,\n verificationCode,\n oauth2,\n cookie,\n session,\n timing,\n }: AuthConfig) {\n this.timing = timing ?? false;\n this.kv = kvRepository;\n this.repository = sessionRepository;\n this.turnstileSecretKey = turnstileSecretKey;\n const maxAttempts = verificationCode?.maxAttempts ?? 5;\n const resendCooldown = verificationCode?.resendCooldown ?? 60;\n invariant(maxAttempts >= 1, 'verificationCode.maxAttempts must be at least 1');\n invariant(resendCooldown >= 1, 'verificationCode.resendCooldown must be at least 1 second');\n this.emailCodes = new EmailVerificationCodes(kvRepository, { maxAttempts, resendCooldown });\n this.desktopCodes = new DesktopCodes(kvRepository);\n const { name, ...cookieOptions } = cookie ?? {};\n this.cookieName = name ?? 'SESSION';\n this.cookieOptions = {\n path: '/',\n sameSite: 'none',\n secure: true,\n httpOnly: true,\n ...cookieOptions,\n };\n this.oauth2Client = oauth2?.client ? new OAuth2Client(oauth2.client) : null;\n this.onetapRequireNonce = oauth2?.onetap?.requireNonce ?? true;\n this.touchInterval = (session?.touchInterval ?? 3600) * 1000;\n this.sessionHeader = session?.header ?? false;\n invariant(this.touchInterval >= 0, 'session.touchInterval must not be negative');\n }\n\n // ---- sessions and responses ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n private getSessionId(request: Request): string | undefined {\n const fromCookie = getCookie(request, this.cookieName);\n if (fromCookie) return fromCookie;\n return (this.sessionHeader && request.headers.get(SESSION_HEADER)) || undefined;\n }\n\n /** The session the request carries, if it exists. */\n private async loadSession(request: Request): Promise<Session | null> {\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n return sessionId ? this.repository.findById(sessionId) : null;\n }\n\n /** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */\n private principalOf(session: Session): Principal | null {\n const name = session.getAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME);\n return name ? { name: String(name) } : null;\n }\n\n /**\n * A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login\n * session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow\n * attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier\n * sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been\n * planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).\n */\n private async signIn(principal: Principal, carryOver?: Session): Promise<Session> {\n const session = this.repository.createSession();\n for (const attribute of carryOver?.getAttributeNames() ?? []) {\n if (attribute === this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) continue;\n if (attribute === PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME) continue;\n const value = carryOver?.getAttribute(attribute);\n if (value !== null && value !== undefined) session.setAttribute(attribute, value);\n }\n session.setAttribute(PRINCIPAL_NAME_INDEX_NAME, principal.name);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n return session;\n }\n\n /**\n * `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with\n * `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.\n */\n private withSession(response: Response, session: Session, cookie?: CookieOptions): Response {\n const maxAge = session.getMaxInactiveInterval();\n setCookie(response, this.cookieName, session.getId(), {\n ...this.cookieOptions,\n ...cookie,\n maxAge,\n });\n if (this.sessionHeader) response.headers.set(SESSION_HEADER, session.getId());\n return response;\n }\n\n /** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */\n private async guard(run: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<Response> {\n try {\n return await run();\n } catch (error) {\n const response = errorResponse(error);\n if (response) return response;\n throw error;\n }\n }\n\n /** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */\n private redirect(\n error: OAuth2ErrorType,\n description?: string,\n refusal?: AuthenticationError\n ): Response {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.errorUri);\n // Metadata never replaces a parameter: not one errorUri carries itself, nor one set below.\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(refusal?.metadata ?? {})) {\n if (!uri.searchParams.has(key)) uri.searchParams.set(key, value);\n }\n uri.searchParams.set('error', error);\n if (description) {\n uri.searchParams.set('error_description', description.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH));\n }\n if (refusal) uri.searchParams.set('reason', refusal.reason);\n return Response.redirect(uri.href, 302);\n }\n\n // ---- basic -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n csrf = async (_request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const token = randomUUID();\n const response = Response.json({\n token,\n parameterName: '_csrf',\n headerName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',\n });\n\n // Double Submit Cookie Protection\n setCookie(response, 'XSRF-TOKEN', token, {\n path: '/',\n secure: true,\n httpOnly: false,\n sameSite: 'none',\n domain: this.cookieOptions.domain,\n });\n return response;\n };\n\n logout = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const sessionId = this.getSessionId(request);\n if (sessionId) await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n const response = Response.json({});\n // A Set-Cookie only replaces the stored cookie when Domain and Path match (RFC 6265),\n // so clear it with the same attributes it was set with.\n deleteCookie(response, this.cookieName, this.cookieOptions);\n return response;\n };\n\n logged = async (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n if (!session) return Response.json({ data: false });\n\n session.setLastAccessedTime(Date.now());\n await this.repository.save(session);\n\n const principal = this.principalOf(session);\n if (principal) await onLogged?.(principal);\n return this.withSession(Response.json({ data: principal !== null }), session);\n };\n\n // ---- oauth2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n private createPkceParameters(): PkceParameters {\n const code_verifier = randomUUID();\n const code_challenge = createHash('sha256')\n .update(code_verifier)\n .digest()\n .toString('base64url');\n\n return { code_verifier, code_challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' };\n }\n\n private getOauth2StateKey(state: string) {\n return `oauth2:state:${state}`;\n }\n\n private getOauth2NonceKey(nonce: string) {\n return `oauth2:nonce:${nonce}`;\n }\n\n /**\n * Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,\n * or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes\n * it sign in once.\n */\n private async consumeNonce(nonce: string, provider: string): Promise<void> {\n const key = this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce);\n if ((await this.kv.getItem(key)) !== provider) throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISMATCH');\n await this.kv.removeItem(key);\n }\n\n oauth2State = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_STATE);\n const state = randomUUID();\n await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2StateKey(state), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n return Response.json({ state });\n };\n\n oauth2Nonce = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_NONCE);\n const nonce = randomUUID();\n await this.kv.setItem(this.getOauth2NonceKey(nonce), provider, OAUTH2_PARAMETER_TTL);\n return Response.json({ nonce });\n };\n\n oauth2Authorization = (\n request: Request,\n options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions\n ): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const attributes = authorizationAttributes(options?.attributes);\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION);\n const state = randomUUID();\n const pkce = this.createPkceParameters();\n const uri = await this.oauth2Client.createAuthorizationUri({ provider, state, pkce });\n const session = (await this.loadSession(request)) ?? this.repository.createSession();\n mark('fetch_session');\n\n const authorizationRequest: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = {\n state,\n provider,\n authorizationRequestUri: uri.href,\n additionalParameters: pkce,\n ...(attributes ? { attributes } : {}),\n };\n session.setAttribute(\n this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST,\n JSON.stringify(authorizationRequest)\n );\n await this.repository.save(session);\n mark('save_session');\n\n const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n setTiming(response);\n return this.withSession(response, session);\n });\n\n loginOAuth2Code = async (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n // 1. the session the flow started on, and the authorization request it stored\n const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n if (!session) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'session not found');\n mark('load_session');\n const json = session.getAttribute(this.ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST) as string | null;\n if (!json) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'authorization request not found');\n const cached: OAuth2AuthorizationRequest = JSON.parse(json);\n\n // 2. the provider's answer: query, or a form for Apple's response_mode=form_post\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_CODE);\n const data = isFormPost(request)\n ? Object.fromEntries(new URLSearchParams(await request.text()))\n : query(request);\n const parsed = oauth2RedirectQuerySchema.safeParse(data);\n if (!parsed.success) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n // The provider answered with an error instead of a code (the user pressed Cancel →\n // access_denied, invalid_scope, server_error, ...). Forward it rather than reporting a\n // malformed query. This runs before the state check on purpose: providers echo state on\n // error responses, but not all reliably do, and a forged error callback can only make the\n // victim's popup show an error — nothing is exchanged or signed in. A present state that does\n // not match still wins, since that is the more accurate (and more alarming) diagnosis.\n if (parsed.data.error) {\n if (parsed.data.state && parsed.data.state !== cached.state) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n }\n return this.redirect(\n safeErrorType(parsed.data.error, 'server_error'),\n parsed.data.error_description\n );\n }\n const { code, state, user } = parsed.data;\n if (!code || !state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'invalid redirect query');\n if (state !== cached.state) return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect state mismatch');\n if (provider !== cached.provider) {\n return this.redirect('invalid_request', 'redirect provider mismatch');\n }\n mark('validate_session');\n\n // 3. exchange the code, load the user, sign in. Everything here can fail (an expired or reused\n // code, a network error, the host's handler or session store). The callback runs in a popup\n // the user is looking at, so every failure must land on errorUri, never as a JSON error.\n let signedIn: Session;\n try {\n const { clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n provider,\n code,\n pkce: cached.additionalParameters,\n });\n // Apple posts the user's name alongside the code, once: hand it to the provider with the token.\n const userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({\n provider,\n clientId,\n token,\n response: user ? { user } : undefined,\n });\n mark('exchange_code');\n\n const principal = await handler(request, {\n provider,\n clientId,\n userInfo,\n token,\n attributes: cached.attributes ?? {},\n });\n mark('save_principal');\n\n signedIn = await this.signIn(principal, session);\n await this.repository.deleteById(session.getId());\n mark('update_session');\n } catch (error) {\n // The details stay in the logs: an OAuth2Error message can carry a client id or a\n // provider's response, which has no place in a URL the browser keeps in its history.\n if (error instanceof OAuth2Error) {\n console.warn('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n const type = CALLBACK_ERROR_TYPES.has(error.error) ? error.error : 'server_error';\n return this.redirect(type);\n }\n // A refusal is something the user can act on, so its reason and metadata reach the page,\n // as they reach a JSON client through the ErrorInfo.\n if (error instanceof AuthenticationError) {\n console.warn('OAuth2 sign-in refused', error.reason, error.metadata);\n return this.redirect('access_denied', undefined, error);\n }\n console.error('OAuth2 callback failed', error);\n return this.redirect('server_error');\n }\n\n const uri = new URL(this.oauth2Client.successUri);\n uri.searchParams.set('status', 'success');\n uri.searchParams.set('provider', provider);\n const response = new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: { location: uri.href } });\n setTiming(response);\n return this.withSession(response, signedIn);\n };\n\n /** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */\n private async authorize(\n request: Request,\n handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n authorization: Authorization,\n setTiming: (response: Response) => void\n ): Promise<Response> {\n const principal = await handler(request, authorization);\n const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n const response = Response.json(principal);\n setTiming(response);\n return this.withSession(response, session);\n }\n\n loginOAuth2Native = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n const { provider } = param(request, PATH.LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE);\n const body = await readJson(request);\n // Whatever the app sends besides its credentials for `onAuthorized` (a referral code, ...).\n const attributes = bodyAttributes(body);\n // Only the credentials go on to the provider client.\n const { attributes: _, ...credentials } = body as NativeCredential & { attributes?: unknown };\n const { code_verifier } = credentials as { code_verifier?: unknown };\n if (\n code_verifier !== undefined &&\n (typeof code_verifier !== 'string' || !CODE_VERIFIER_FORMAT.test(code_verifier))\n ) {\n throw invalidArgument(\n 'INVALID_CODE_VERIFIER',\n 'code_verifier must be 43-128 characters from [A-Za-z0-9-._~]'\n );\n }\n const { clientId, userInfo, token } = await this.oauth2Client.loginOAuth2Native({\n provider,\n credentials,\n });\n mark('login_oauth2_native');\n\n const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n mark('check_nonce');\n }\n\n return this.authorize(\n request,\n handler,\n { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n setTiming\n );\n });\n\n loginOAuth2Onetap = (\n request: Request,\n handler: AuthorizedHandler,\n provider = 'google'\n ): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n invariant(this.oauth2Client, 'oauth2Client is not initialized');\n const { mark, setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n\n // Google's own form post, or an app's JSON.\n const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n const body = contentType.includes('application/json')\n ? await readJson(request)\n : await readForm(request);\n const { attributes = {}, ...parsed } = parse(oneTapBodySchema, body);\n\n // Both the credential and the code are issued to the provider's web client.\n let clientId: string;\n let token: Authorization['token'];\n let userInfo: Authorization['userInfo'];\n if (parsed.credential) {\n ({ clientId, token, userInfo } = await this.oauth2Client.getTokenInfo({\n provider,\n credential: parsed.credential,\n }));\n mark('verify_credential');\n\n // A credential is replayable until it expires, so it must carry a single-use nonce from\n // `oauth2Nonce`, which the front end passed to `prompt`. This replaces Google's\n // `g_csrf_token` double-submit cookie, which FedCM mode no longer sets.\n const { nonce } = userInfo.data as { nonce?: unknown };\n if (typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce) {\n await this.consumeNonce(nonce, provider);\n mark('check_nonce');\n } else if (this.onetapRequireNonce) {\n throw new AuthenticationError('NONCE_MISSING');\n }\n } else if (parsed.code) {\n ({ clientId, token } = await this.oauth2Client.exchangeAuthorizationCode({\n provider,\n code: parsed.code,\n }));\n userInfo = await this.oauth2Client.getUserInfo({ provider, clientId, token });\n } else {\n throw invalidArgument('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'credential or code is required');\n }\n\n return this.authorize(\n request,\n handler,\n { provider, clientId, userInfo, token, attributes },\n setTiming\n );\n });\n\n // ---- email -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n sendEmailVerificationCode = (request: Request, sender: EmailSender): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n invariant(this.turnstileSecretKey, 'turnstileSecretKey is not configured');\n const { email, turnstileToken } = parse(\n sendEmailVerificationCodeSchema,\n await readJson(request)\n );\n await verifyTurnstileToken(this.turnstileSecretKey, turnstileToken);\n await this.emailCodes.send(email, sender);\n return Response.json({});\n });\n\n verifyEmailCode = (email: string, verificationCode: string): Promise<void> =>\n this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n\n loginEmail = (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n const { setTiming } = timing({ enabled: this.timing });\n const {\n email,\n verificationCode,\n attributes = {},\n } = parse(loginEmailSchema, await readJson(request));\n await this.emailCodes.verify(email, verificationCode);\n const claims: StandardClaims = { sub: email, email, email_verified: true };\n return this.authorize(\n request,\n handler,\n { provider: 'EMAIL', userInfo: { claims, data: {} }, attributes },\n setTiming\n );\n });\n\n // ---- desktop ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n /**\n * Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal\n * sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that\n * the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.\n *\n * PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the\n * browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge\n * through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`\n * enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only\n * intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)\n * from exchanging it.\n *\n * Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse\n * protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does\n * not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.\n */\n desktopAuthorize = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n const principal = await this.getPrincipal(request);\n if (!principal) throw unauthenticated('Sign in first');\n const { code_challenge } = parse(desktopAuthorizeSchema, await readJson(request));\n const code = await this.desktopCodes.issue(principal, code_challenge);\n return Response.json({ code });\n });\n\n /**\n * Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth\n * code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent\n * of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side\n * does not cascade to the other.\n *\n * Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the\n * desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide\n * everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the\n * SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by\n * Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.\n *\n * No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,\n * and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.\n */\n desktopExchange = (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>\n this.guard(async () => {\n const { code, code_verifier } = parse(desktopExchangeSchema, await readJson(request));\n const principal = await this.desktopCodes.redeem(code, code_verifier);\n const session = await this.signIn(principal);\n session.setAttribute('client_type', 'desktop');\n await this.repository.save(session);\n return this.withSession(Response.json({ ok: true }), session, {\n sameSite: 'none',\n secure: true,\n });\n });\n\n // ---- session management ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n kick = async (principal: Principal): Promise<void> => {\n const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n for (const sessionId of sessions.keys()) {\n await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n }\n };\n\n /**\n * Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user\n * who keeps using the app is never signed out after `maxInactiveInterval` of not calling one\n * particular endpoint. No extra read: the session was just loaded to authenticate, and its\n * `lastAccessedTime` is compared in memory; writes are spaced by `session.touchInterval` (see\n * `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.\n */\n private async touch(session: Session) {\n const now = Date.now();\n if (now - session.getLastAccessedTime() < this.touchInterval) return;\n session.setLastAccessedTime(now);\n await this.repository.save(session);\n }\n\n getPrincipal = async (request: Request): Promise<Principal | null> => {\n const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n const principal = session && this.principalOf(session);\n if (!principal) return null;\n await this.touch(session);\n return principal;\n };\n\n isAuthenticated = async (request: Request): Promise<boolean> => {\n return (await this.getPrincipal(request)) !== null;\n };\n\n getSession = async <T extends boolean>(\n request: Request,\n create: T\n ): Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null> => {\n type Result = T extends true ? Session : Session | null;\n const session = await this.loadSession(request);\n if (session || !create) return session as Result;\n const created = this.repository.createSession();\n await this.repository.save(created);\n return created;\n };\n\n deleteSession = async (sessionId: string): Promise<void> => {\n await this.repository.deleteById(sessionId);\n };\n\n listSessions = async (principal: Principal): Promise<Session[]> => {\n const sessions = await this.repository.findByPrincipalName(principal.name);\n return Array.from(sessions.values());\n };\n\n cleanupExpiredSessions = async (cleanupCount?: number): Promise<Response> => {\n await this.repository.cleanupExpiredSessions(cleanupCount);\n return Response.json({});\n 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|
package/dist/auth/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { Principal } from "../core/index.cjs";
|
|
2
2
|
import { Session } from "../session/types.cjs";
|
|
3
|
+
import { EmailSender } from "./email-codes.cjs";
|
|
3
4
|
import { AuthConfig, AuthService, AuthorizedHandler, LoggedHandler, OAuth2AuthorizationOptions } from "./types.cjs";
|
|
4
|
-
//#region src/auth/index.d.ts
|
|
5
5
|
export declare const PATH: {
|
|
6
6
|
readonly CSRF: '/csrf';
|
|
7
7
|
readonly LOGOUT: '/logout';
|
|
@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@ export declare const PATH: {
|
|
|
13
13
|
readonly LOGIN_OAUTH2_NATIVE: '/login/oauth2/native/:provider';
|
|
14
14
|
readonly LOGIN_OAUTH2_ONETAP: '/login/oauth2/onetap/google';
|
|
15
15
|
readonly LOGIN_EMAIL: '/login/email';
|
|
16
|
-
readonly LOGIN_PHONE: '/login/phone';
|
|
17
16
|
readonly SEND_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendEmailVerificationCode';
|
|
18
|
-
readonly SEND_PHONE_VERIFICATION_CODE: '/auth/sendPhoneVerificationCode';
|
|
19
17
|
readonly DESKTOP_AUTHORIZE: '/auth/desktop/authorize';
|
|
20
18
|
readonly DESKTOP_EXCHANGE: '/auth/desktop/exchange';
|
|
21
19
|
readonly CLEANUP_EXPIRED_SESSIONS: '/sessions/expired/cleanup';
|
|
22
20
|
};
|
|
21
|
+
/**
|
|
22
|
+
* The login routes and session helpers. Every route is one straight line: read and validate the
|
|
23
|
+
* request, check the credential, call the host's `onAuthorized`, sign in. Failures are thrown and
|
|
24
|
+
* answered in one place per kind of route: a JSON route runs under `guard`, which maps a
|
|
25
|
+
* `RequestError`, an `AuthenticationError` or an `OAuth2Error` to its google.rpc body (see
|
|
26
|
+
* `respond.ts`); the redirect callback maps the same errors to `errorUri` parameters (`redirect`).
|
|
27
|
+
*/
|
|
23
28
|
export declare class Auth implements AuthService {
|
|
24
29
|
private readonly timing;
|
|
25
30
|
private readonly cookieName;
|
|
@@ -27,87 +32,92 @@ export declare class Auth implements AuthService {
|
|
|
27
32
|
private readonly kv;
|
|
28
33
|
private readonly repository;
|
|
29
34
|
private readonly turnstileSecretKey?;
|
|
30
|
-
private readonly
|
|
31
|
-
private readonly
|
|
35
|
+
private readonly emailCodes;
|
|
36
|
+
private readonly desktopCodes;
|
|
32
37
|
private readonly oauth2Client;
|
|
33
38
|
private readonly onetapRequireNonce;
|
|
34
39
|
private readonly touchInterval;
|
|
40
|
+
private readonly sessionHeader;
|
|
35
41
|
private readonly ATTR_OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST;
|
|
36
42
|
constructor({ sessionRepository, kvRepository, turnstileSecretKey, verificationCode, oauth2, cookie, session, timing }: AuthConfig);
|
|
37
43
|
private getSessionId;
|
|
44
|
+
/** The session the request carries, if it exists. */
|
|
45
|
+
private loadSession;
|
|
46
|
+
/** The signed-in principal of a session, if any. */
|
|
47
|
+
private principalOf;
|
|
48
|
+
/**
|
|
49
|
+
* A new session signed in as `principal`. With `carryOver`, what the host kept in the pre-login
|
|
50
|
+
* session moves to the new one; the authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow
|
|
51
|
+
* attributes) is single-use and was consumed, and a principal left there from an earlier
|
|
52
|
+
* sign-in is replaced. The new id is never the one the browser brought, which may have been
|
|
53
|
+
* planted by an attacker who started the flow (session fixation).
|
|
54
|
+
*/
|
|
55
|
+
private signIn;
|
|
56
|
+
/**
|
|
57
|
+
* `response` carrying `session`: its cookie, renewed for the whole inactive interval, and with
|
|
58
|
+
* `session.header` on, the `X-Auth-Token` header a client without a cookie jar reads.
|
|
59
|
+
*/
|
|
60
|
+
private withSession;
|
|
61
|
+
/** Runs a JSON route: a failure it knows is its response, anything else is the host's. */
|
|
62
|
+
private guard;
|
|
63
|
+
/** The error redirect of the callback flow; `refusal`'s reason and metadata ride along. */
|
|
64
|
+
private redirect;
|
|
38
65
|
csrf: (_request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
39
66
|
logout: (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
40
67
|
logged: (request: Request, onLogged?: LoggedHandler) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
41
68
|
private createPkceParameters;
|
|
42
69
|
private getOauth2StateKey;
|
|
43
70
|
private getOauth2NonceKey;
|
|
44
|
-
|
|
45
|
-
|
|
46
|
-
|
|
47
|
-
|
|
48
|
-
|
|
71
|
+
/**
|
|
72
|
+
* Spends a nonce `oauth2Nonce` issued for `provider`: `NONCE_MISMATCH` for one that was not,
|
|
73
|
+
* or was used already. An id token is replayable until it expires; the nonce it carries makes
|
|
74
|
+
* it sign in once.
|
|
75
|
+
*/
|
|
76
|
+
private consumeNonce;
|
|
49
77
|
oauth2State: (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
50
78
|
oauth2Nonce: (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
51
79
|
oauth2Authorization: (request: Request, options?: OAuth2AuthorizationOptions) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
52
|
-
private readonly redirect;
|
|
53
80
|
loginOAuth2Code: (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
54
|
-
/**
|
|
55
|
-
|
|
56
|
-
* authorization request (state, PKCE verifier, flow attributes) is single-use and was consumed
|
|
57
|
-
* by this callback, and a principal left there from an earlier sign-in is replaced.
|
|
58
|
-
*/
|
|
59
|
-
private signedInSession;
|
|
81
|
+
/** The shared tail of the JSON login routes: the host's handler, then a signed-in session. */
|
|
82
|
+
private authorize;
|
|
60
83
|
loginOAuth2Native: (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
61
84
|
loginOAuth2Onetap: (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler, provider?: string) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
62
|
-
sendEmailVerificationCode: (request: Request, sender:
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
verificationCode: string;
|
|
65
|
-
}) => Promise<void>) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
85
|
+
sendEmailVerificationCode: (request: Request, sender: EmailSender) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
86
|
+
verifyEmailCode: (email: string, verificationCode: string) => Promise<void>;
|
|
66
87
|
loginEmail: (request: Request, handler: AuthorizedHandler) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
67
88
|
/**
|
|
68
|
-
* Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already
|
|
69
|
-
*
|
|
70
|
-
*
|
|
71
|
-
* desktop client via a loopback redirect.
|
|
89
|
+
* Step 1 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The caller already completed normal
|
|
90
|
+
* sign-in on the web (so a cookie session exists); this issues a 5-minute single-use code that
|
|
91
|
+
* the web page hands off to the desktop client via a loopback redirect.
|
|
72
92
|
*
|
|
73
|
-
* PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier`
|
|
74
|
-
*
|
|
75
|
-
*
|
|
76
|
-
* the
|
|
77
|
-
*
|
|
78
|
-
*
|
|
79
|
-
* capture on loopback) from exchanging it.
|
|
93
|
+
* PKCE (RFC 7636, S256 only): the desktop generates a random `code_verifier` before opening the
|
|
94
|
+
* browser, derives `code_challenge = base64url(sha256(verifier))`, and threads the challenge
|
|
95
|
+
* through the URL → web page → here. The challenge is pinned to the code; `desktopExchange`
|
|
96
|
+
* enforces that the caller knows the matching verifier. This blocks an attacker who only
|
|
97
|
+
* intercepts the auth code (browser history, malicious extension, packet capture on loopback)
|
|
98
|
+
* from exchanging it.
|
|
80
99
|
*
|
|
81
|
-
* Requires an authenticated cookie session
|
|
82
|
-
*
|
|
83
|
-
*
|
|
84
|
-
* upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.
|
|
100
|
+
* Requires an authenticated cookie session: anonymous callers get 401. Throttling / abuse
|
|
101
|
+
* protection on this endpoint is the API layer's job (rate-limit per principal); the SDK does
|
|
102
|
+
* not gate it because the upstream sign-in flow already passed CAPTCHA / OAuth / verification.
|
|
85
103
|
*/
|
|
86
104
|
desktopAuthorize: (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
87
105
|
/**
|
|
88
|
-
* Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop
|
|
89
|
-
*
|
|
90
|
-
*
|
|
91
|
-
*
|
|
92
|
-
* either side doesn't cascade to the other.
|
|
106
|
+
* Step 2 of the desktop / native app sign-in handshake. The desktop client hands back the auth
|
|
107
|
+
* code it received via the loopback callback, and we mint a fresh session for it, independent
|
|
108
|
+
* of the web cookie session that originally authorized the code, so logging out on either side
|
|
109
|
+
* does not cascade to the other.
|
|
93
110
|
*
|
|
94
|
-
* Cookie attributes:
|
|
95
|
-
*
|
|
96
|
-
*
|
|
97
|
-
*
|
|
98
|
-
*
|
|
99
|
-
* backend this combination is rejected by Chromium — see the desktop
|
|
100
|
-
* sign-in PRD for workarounds.
|
|
111
|
+
* Cookie attributes: `SameSite=None; Secure` so the cookie survives cross-site fetches from the
|
|
112
|
+
* desktop renderer's `file://` / `app://` origin. The configured `cookieOptions` provide
|
|
113
|
+
* everything else (`domain`, `path`, `httpOnly`); the override is targeted at the
|
|
114
|
+
* SameSite/Secure pair only. In a non-HTTPS dev backend this combination is rejected by
|
|
115
|
+
* Chromium, see the desktop sign-in PRD for workarounds.
|
|
101
116
|
*
|
|
102
|
-
* No CSRF check needed
|
|
103
|
-
*
|
|
117
|
+
* No CSRF check needed: the request carries no cookie, the auth code itself is the credential,
|
|
118
|
+
* and the code's single-use removal blocks replay.
|
|
104
119
|
*/
|
|
105
120
|
desktopExchange: (request: Request) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
106
|
-
sendPhoneVerificationCode: (_request: Request, _sender: (data: {
|
|
107
|
-
phone: string;
|
|
108
|
-
verificationCode: string;
|
|
109
|
-
}) => Promise<void>) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
110
|
-
loginPhone: (_request: Request, _handler: AuthorizedHandler) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
111
121
|
kick: (principal: Principal) => Promise<void>;
|
|
112
122
|
/**
|
|
113
123
|
* Sliding expiration: an authenticated request renews the session, as `logged` does, so a user
|
|
@@ -117,12 +127,11 @@ export declare class Auth implements AuthService {
|
|
|
117
127
|
* `AuthConfig`), so a session accessed again within the interval is not rewritten.
|
|
118
128
|
*/
|
|
119
129
|
private touch;
|
|
130
|
+
getPrincipal: (request: Request) => Promise<Principal | null>;
|
|
120
131
|
isAuthenticated: (request: Request) => Promise<boolean>;
|
|
121
132
|
getSession: <T extends boolean>(request: Request, create: T) => Promise<T extends true ? Session : Session | null>;
|
|
122
133
|
deleteSession: (sessionId: string) => Promise<void>;
|
|
123
|
-
getPrincipal: (request: Request) => Promise<Principal | null>;
|
|
124
134
|
listSessions: (principal: Principal) => Promise<Session[]>;
|
|
125
135
|
cleanupExpiredSessions: (cleanupCount?: number) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
126
136
|
}
|
|
127
|
-
//#endregion
|
|
128
137
|
//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.cts.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/auth/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBAyHa;WACX;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WACA;WAEA;WACA;WASA;WACA;WAEA;;;;;;;;;qBAUW,gBAAgB;mBACV;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;mBACA;EAEjB,cACE,mBACA,cACA,oBACA,kBACA,QACA,QACA,SACA,UACC;UA6BK;;UAOM;;UAMN;;;;;;;;UAYM;;;;;UAiBN;;UAYM;;UAWN;EAqBR,OAAI,UAAoB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAmB1C,SAAM,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAU3C,SAAM,SAAmB,SAAO,WAAa,kBAAgB,QAAQ;UAc7D;UAUA;UAIA;;;;;;UASM;EAMd,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,cAAW,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAOhD,sBAAmB,SACR,SAAO,UACN,+BACT,QAAQ;EA+BX,kBAAe,SAAmB,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;UAoGlE;EAad,oBAAiB,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;EAwC5E,oBAAiB,SACN,SAAO,SACP,mBAAiB,sBAEzB,QAAQ;EAqDX,4BAAyB,SAAa,SAAO,QAAU,gBAAc,QAAQ;EAY7E,kBAAe,eAAiB,6BAA6B;EAG7D,aAAU,SAAa,SAAO,SAAW,sBAAoB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAoCrE,mBAAgB,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAwB/C,kBAAe,SAAa,YAAU,QAAQ;EAe9C,OAAI,WAAqB,cAAY;;;;;;;;UAcvB;EAOd,eAAY,SAAmB,YAAU,QAAQ;EAQjD,kBAAe,SAAmB,YAAU;EAI5C,aAAoB,mBAAiB,SAC1B,SAAO,QACR,MACP,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAU;EAStC,gBAAa,sBAA8B;EAI3C,eAAY,WAAqB,cAAY,QAAQ;EAKrD,yBAAsB,0BAAkC,QAAQ"}
|