@shipstatic/types 2.6.0 → 2.7.0-beta.1

package/README.md

@@ -131,10 +131,20 @@ import {
   validateApiUrl,
   isDeployment,
   isBlockedExtension,
-  BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS,
 } from '@shipstatic/types';
 ```
 
+`isBlockedExtension(filename, blocked)` takes the blocklist rather than owning
+one — the platform's list is hosting policy that the API owns and evolves, and
+it reaches clients as `PlatformLimits.blockedExtensions` from `GET /limits`.
+The field is optional: an API that predates it sends nothing, which means "no
+client-side check", never "an empty policy".
+
+```typescript
+const limits = await ship.getLimits();
+isBlockedExtension('virus.exe', limits.blockedExtensions ?? []);
+```
+
 ### File Upload Types
 
 ```typescript

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -863,14 +863,17 @@ export declare class ShipError extends Error {
  */
 export declare function isShipError(error: unknown): error is ShipError;
 /**
- * Plan-based platform limits returned by the `/limits` endpoint.
+ * What the platform will refuse, returned by the `/limits` endpoint.
  *
- * The SDK fetches these once on first API call to drive client-side
- * file-size / file-count / total-size validation that mirrors what the API
- * would enforce server-side. Limits vary by account plan.
+ * The SDK fetches this once on first API call to drive client-side validation
+ * that mirrors what the API would enforce server-side. The caps vary by
+ * account plan; the blocklist does not.
  *
- * These are the *platform's* posted caps for the current account — server
- * truth delivered at runtime, never hard-coded on the client.
+ * These are the *platform's* posted rules for the current account — server
+ * truth delivered at runtime, never hard-coded on the client. That is the
+ * whole point of the shape: a rule the server owns and may change reaches the
+ * client as data, so a pinned client cannot enforce a policy the platform has
+ * moved on from (`npm/types/CLAUDE.md`, "Validation: format vs policy").
  *
  * A report: it answers a question and carries only the answer (`CLAUDE.md`,
  * "A report answers a question").
@@ -882,38 +885,61 @@ export interface PlatformLimits {
     maxFilesCount: number;
     /** Maximum total size in bytes across all files in a deployment. */
     maxTotalSize: number;
+    /**
+     * Lowercase extensions, without the dot, that the platform refuses to host
+     * (`exe`, `dmg`, …). Owned and evolved by the API — see
+     * `cloudflare/api/src/lib/blocklist.ts`.
+     *
+     * **Optional, and the absence is load-bearing.** An API deployed before this
+     * field existed sends nothing, so a client MUST read absence as "no
+     * client-side check" rather than as an empty policy. The hint fails open,
+     * the boundary fails closed: the server refuses the file either way, and a
+     * client that guessed would only ever be wrong in the direction that refuses
+     * a file the platform accepts.
+     *
+     * The optionality follows the additive-evolution law and retires with its
+     * reason: once every environment serves the field, it hardens to required at
+     * the entity's next natural break, and the clients' fail-open spellings
+     * retire with it (tracked in root `backlog.md`).
+     */
+    readonly blockedExtensions?: readonly string[];
 }
 /**
- * Blocked file extensions — files that cannot be uploaded.
+ * Whether a file is one the platform refuses to host.
  *
- * We accept any file type by default and derive Content-Type from the
- * extension at serve time (via mime-db in the API worker). Unknown extensions
- * are served as `application/octet-stream` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+ * **The list is not this package's, and that separation is the point.** What
+ * counts as a blocked extension is hosting POLICY — it evolves, it is enforced
+ * at one security boundary, and `virus.exe` is a perfectly well-formed
+ * filename that breaks nothing about the upload→serve round-trip. So the API
+ * owns the list (`cloudflare/api/src/lib/blocklist.ts`) and delivers it as
+ * `PlatformLimits.blockedExtensions`; a client passes what it was given.
  *
- * The blocklist targets file types that pose direct security risks when hosted:
- * executables, disk images, malware vectors, dangerous scripts, and shortcuts.
- */
-export declare const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string>;
-/**
- * Check if a filename has a blocked extension.
- * Extracts the extension from the filename and checks against the blocklist.
- * Case-insensitive. Returns false for files without extensions.
+ * What lives here is the MATCHING RULE, and it earns its place by the
+ * constellation law's own test. The list's drift is loud in both directions —
+ * a stale client uploads a file the API refuses by name, on the first try.
+ * A second *matcher* drifts SILENTLY in the one direction that matters: a
+ * client stricter than the server refuses a legal file without the server ever
+ * being asked, and no error names it. Two holders, silent drift, one owner.
+ *
+ * The `blocked` collection is required rather than defaulted: this predicate
+ * guards a security boundary in the API, and a defaulted-empty argument there
+ * would block nothing while reading as though it did. Callers holding a
+ * possibly-absent wire field spell the fail-open themselves.
  *
  * @example
- * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe')     // true
- * isBlockedExtension('app.dmg')       // true
- * isBlockedExtension('style.css')     // false
- * isBlockedExtension('data.custom')   // false
- * isBlockedExtension('README')        // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe', ['exe'])   // true
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.EXE', ['exe'])   // true — case-insensitive
+ * isBlockedExtension('style.css', ['exe'])   // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('README', ['exe'])      // false — no extension
  */
-export declare function isBlockedExtension(filename: string): boolean;
+export declare function isBlockedExtension(filename: string, blocked: ReadonlySet<string> | readonly string[]): boolean;
 /**
  * The `accept` attribute value for a browser file picker offering web files.
  *
- * **This is a hint, never a rule.** `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` is the platform's
- * gate and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant
- * decides what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one
- * policy, and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
+ * **This is a hint, never a rule.** The API's blocklist is the platform's gate
+ * and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant decides
+ * what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one policy,
+ * and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
  *
  * The distinction is structural, not stylistic. `accept` can express only an
  * allowlist, while the platform's rule is a blocklist — so this list is
@@ -924,9 +950,12 @@ export declare function isBlockedExtension(filename: string): boolean;
  * dropzone and the picker must reach the same verdict on the same files, and
  * they do — because the verdict is `validateFiles`, downstream of both.
  *
- * Kept beside `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` so one file holds both, which is what lets
- * `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` fence the invariant that matters: the
- * picker must never offer a file the platform will refuse.
+ * The invariant that matters — the picker must never offer a file the platform
+ * will refuse — is fenced where the authority lives, in the API's own suite
+ * (`cloudflare/api/tests/lib/blocklist.test.ts`), which reads this published
+ * string and holds it against the list it owns. It sat here until the
+ * blocklist became the API's, and moving it was the price of that: a fence
+ * belongs with whichever side can change and break it.
  */
 export declare const WEB_FILE_ACCEPT: string;
 /**

package/dist/index.js

@@ -633,80 +633,81 @@ export function isShipError(error) {
         'status' in error);
 }
 // =============================================================================
-// EXTENSION BLOCKLIST
+// EXTENSION MATCHING
 // =============================================================================
 /**
- * Blocked file extensions — files that cannot be uploaded.
+ * The rule for reading a file's extension: lowercase, after the last dot of
+ * the last path segment. `null` when there is no extension to read.
  *
- * We accept any file type by default and derive Content-Type from the
- * extension at serve time (via mime-db in the API worker). Unknown extensions
- * are served as `application/octet-stream` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+ * A leading dot names the file rather than its type, so `.gitignore` and
+ * `.htaccess` have no extension — but `.env.exe` has `exe`.
  *
- * The blocklist targets file types that pose direct security risks when hosted:
- * executables, disk images, malware vectors, dangerous scripts, and shortcuts.
+ * Segment-aware on purpose: the callers pass deploy PATHS, not basenames, and
+ * a naive `lastIndexOf('.')` over `dir.v1/README` reads the extension
+ * `v1/README` — safe only by accident, since no entry in a real blocklist
+ * contains a slash, which is the kind of correctness nobody should have to
+ * re-derive.
+ *
+ * **Private, and the reason is the asymmetry rather than any hazard.** Nothing
+ * outside this file reads it: `isBlockedExtension` is the only question anyone
+ * asks, and the API's refusal names the FILE, not its extension. Exporting a
+ * pure function is harmless, which is exactly the argument that talks a
+ * published package into surface it has not earned — and the costs do not
+ * match, since adding an export later is free under the additive law while
+ * removing one is a major. So it stays private until a caller exists. Its
+ * behaviour is fenced through `isBlockedExtension`, which is where it is
+ * observable.
+ *
+ * (`WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS` above is private for a different reason — publishing
+ * it would invite a wrong question. Both are private; only one is a hazard.)
+ *
+ * @example
+ * fileExtension('virus.exe')          // 'exe'
+ * fileExtension('assets/style.CSS')   // 'css'
+ * fileExtension('dir.v1/README')      // null
+ * fileExtension('.gitignore')         // null
+ * fileExtension('file.')              // null
  */
-export const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
-    // Executables
-    'exe',
-    'msi',
-    'dll',
-    'scr',
-    'bat',
-    'cmd',
-    'com',
-    'pif',
-    'app',
-    'deb',
-    'rpm',
-    // Installers
-    'pkg',
-    'mpkg',
-    // Disk images
-    'dmg',
-    'iso',
-    'img',
-    // Malware vectors
-    'cab',
-    'cpl',
-    'chm',
-    // Dangerous scripts
-    'ps1',
-    'vbs',
-    'vbe',
-    'ws',
-    'wsf',
-    'wsc',
-    'wsh',
-    'reg',
-    // Java
-    'jar',
-    'jnlp',
-    // Mobile/browser packages
-    'apk',
-    'crx',
-    // Shortcut/link
-    'lnk',
-    'inf',
-    'hta',
-]);
+function fileExtension(filename) {
+    const basename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/').split('/').pop() ?? '';
+    const dotIndex = basename.lastIndexOf('.');
+    if (dotIndex <= 0 || dotIndex === basename.length - 1)
+        return null;
+    return basename.slice(dotIndex + 1).toLowerCase();
+}
 /**
- * Check if a filename has a blocked extension.
- * Extracts the extension from the filename and checks against the blocklist.
- * Case-insensitive. Returns false for files without extensions.
+ * Whether a file is one the platform refuses to host.
+ *
+ * **The list is not this package's, and that separation is the point.** What
+ * counts as a blocked extension is hosting POLICY — it evolves, it is enforced
+ * at one security boundary, and `virus.exe` is a perfectly well-formed
+ * filename that breaks nothing about the upload→serve round-trip. So the API
+ * owns the list (`cloudflare/api/src/lib/blocklist.ts`) and delivers it as
+ * `PlatformLimits.blockedExtensions`; a client passes what it was given.
+ *
+ * What lives here is the MATCHING RULE, and it earns its place by the
+ * constellation law's own test. The list's drift is loud in both directions —
+ * a stale client uploads a file the API refuses by name, on the first try.
+ * A second *matcher* drifts SILENTLY in the one direction that matters: a
+ * client stricter than the server refuses a legal file without the server ever
+ * being asked, and no error names it. Two holders, silent drift, one owner.
+ *
+ * The `blocked` collection is required rather than defaulted: this predicate
+ * guards a security boundary in the API, and a defaulted-empty argument there
+ * would block nothing while reading as though it did. Callers holding a
+ * possibly-absent wire field spell the fail-open themselves.
  *
  * @example
- * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe')     // true
- * isBlockedExtension('app.dmg')       // true
- * isBlockedExtension('style.css')     // false
- * isBlockedExtension('data.custom')   // false
- * isBlockedExtension('README')        // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe', ['exe'])   // true
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.EXE', ['exe'])   // true — case-insensitive
+ * isBlockedExtension('style.css', ['exe'])   // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('README', ['exe'])      // false — no extension
  */
-export function isBlockedExtension(filename) {
-    const dotIndex = filename.lastIndexOf('.');
-    if (dotIndex === -1 || dotIndex === filename.length - 1)
+export function isBlockedExtension(filename, blocked) {
+    const ext = fileExtension(filename);
+    if (ext === null)
         return false;
-    const ext = filename.slice(dotIndex + 1).toLowerCase();
-    return BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS.has(ext);
+    return Array.isArray(blocked) ? blocked.includes(ext) : blocked.has(ext);
 }
 // =============================================================================
 // PICKER ACCEPT HINT
@@ -808,10 +809,10 @@ const WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS = [
 /**
  * The `accept` attribute value for a browser file picker offering web files.
  *
- * **This is a hint, never a rule.** `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` is the platform's
- * gate and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant
- * decides what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one
- * policy, and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
+ * **This is a hint, never a rule.** The API's blocklist is the platform's gate
+ * and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant decides
+ * what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one policy,
+ * and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
  *
  * The distinction is structural, not stylistic. `accept` can express only an
  * allowlist, while the platform's rule is a blocklist — so this list is
@@ -822,9 +823,12 @@ const WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS = [
  * dropzone and the picker must reach the same verdict on the same files, and
  * they do — because the verdict is `validateFiles`, downstream of both.
  *
- * Kept beside `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` so one file holds both, which is what lets
- * `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` fence the invariant that matters: the
- * picker must never offer a file the platform will refuse.
+ * The invariant that matters — the picker must never offer a file the platform
+ * will refuse — is fenced where the authority lives, in the API's own suite
+ * (`cloudflare/api/tests/lib/blocklist.test.ts`), which reads this published
+ * string and holds it against the list it owns. It sat here until the
+ * blocklist became the API's, and moving it was the price of that: a fence
+ * belongs with whichever side can change and break it.
  */
 export const WEB_FILE_ACCEPT = WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS.map((ext) => `.${ext}`).join(',');
 // =============================================================================
@@ -887,27 +891,34 @@ export function hasUnbuiltMarker(filePath) {
 // the single dispatch over them (TokenKind, classifyToken), and the
 // delegated-access scopes (OAuthScope).
 //
-// THE SHAPE LAW, in three clauses. Every secret the platform mints obeys it,
-// and `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` holds all three mechanically.
+// THE SHAPE LAW, in three clauses, over the `Authorization: Bearer` slot's
+// two populations below. The deployment claim code is the API's own
+// (`AUTH.CLAIM`, server-side: the API mints it and the API validates it, so
+// it has one holder and stays there) and shares only clause 1 — it is the
+// platform's one deliberately BARE secret, because it never enters the
+// Bearer slot: minted into one URL, consumed by one endpoint's one field,
+// its context names it and a prefix would restate its route.
+// `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` holds the clauses over this file's
+// populations; the API's suite holds its own.
 //
-//  1. ONE ENTROPY STANDARD. Every minted random secret is `HEX_LENGTH` hex
-//     characters — one width for the whole platform, so "how long is a
-//     credential" has a single answer rather than one per population.
+//  1. ONE ENTROPY STANDARD. Every minted secret is `HEX_LENGTH` hex characters
+//     — one width for the whole platform, so "how long is a credential" has a
+//     single answer rather than one per population. Generators read the width
+//     from the population's own constant, so a minted value and an accepted
+//     value cannot differ.
 //
-//  2. A PREFIX MARKS A SHARED SLOT, AND NOTHING ELSE. API keys and deploy
-//     tokens both arrive as `Authorization: Bearer`, so something must say
-//     which population a value belongs to: that is what the prefix IS, and
-//     `classifyToken` below is its only reader. Secrets that arrive somewhere
-//     unambiguous carry none — the deployment claim code reaches its own
-//     route in its own field, inside a URL whose path already says `/claim/`,
-//     so a prefix there would be a second name for what the route states.
+//  2. EVERY BEARER POPULATION IS NAMED BY ITS PREFIX. A credential says what
+//     it is before anything parses it — which is what lets `classifyToken`
+//     below dispatch two populations sharing one `Authorization: Bearer`
+//     slot, and what lets a value found in a log, a support ticket or a
+//     pasted URL be recognised and revoked on sight.
 //
 //  3. NO PREFIX IS A PREFIX OF ANOTHER. This is what makes the dispatch
 //     order-independent, and it is the reason the populations are named on
 //     different axes (`ship-` for the product, `deploy-` for the capability)
-//     rather than sharing a stem. A `ship-` / `ship-deploy-` pair reads tidier
-//     and is a trap: every deploy token would also match the API-key branch,
-//     leaving correctness resting on the order of two `if`s.
+//     rather than sharing a stem. A `ship-` / `ship-deploy-` pair
+//     reads tidier and is a trap: every deploy token would also match the
+//     API-key branch, leaving correctness resting on the order of two `if`s.
 /**
  * Where human identity is mounted on the API host. The API mounts Better
  * Auth at this path (sign-in, sign-out, session reads, admin impersonation)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@shipstatic/types",
-  "version": "2.6.0",
+  "version": "2.7.0-beta.1",
   "description": "Shared types for ShipStatic platform",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",

package/src/index.ts

@@ -1234,14 +1234,17 @@ export function isShipError(error: unknown): error is ShipError {
 // =============================================================================
 
 /**
- * Plan-based platform limits returned by the `/limits` endpoint.
+ * What the platform will refuse, returned by the `/limits` endpoint.
  *
- * The SDK fetches these once on first API call to drive client-side
- * file-size / file-count / total-size validation that mirrors what the API
- * would enforce server-side. Limits vary by account plan.
+ * The SDK fetches this once on first API call to drive client-side validation
+ * that mirrors what the API would enforce server-side. The caps vary by
+ * account plan; the blocklist does not.
  *
- * These are the *platform's* posted caps for the current account — server
- * truth delivered at runtime, never hard-coded on the client.
+ * These are the *platform's* posted rules for the current account — server
+ * truth delivered at runtime, never hard-coded on the client. That is the
+ * whole point of the shape: a rule the server owns and may change reaches the
+ * client as data, so a pinned client cannot enforce a policy the platform has
+ * moved on from (`npm/types/CLAUDE.md`, "Validation: format vs policy").
  *
  * A report: it answers a question and carries only the answer (`CLAUDE.md`,
  * "A report answers a question").
@@ -1253,84 +1256,105 @@ export interface PlatformLimits {
   maxFilesCount: number;
   /** Maximum total size in bytes across all files in a deployment. */
   maxTotalSize: number;
+  /**
+   * Lowercase extensions, without the dot, that the platform refuses to host
+   * (`exe`, `dmg`, …). Owned and evolved by the API — see
+   * `cloudflare/api/src/lib/blocklist.ts`.
+   *
+   * **Optional, and the absence is load-bearing.** An API deployed before this
+   * field existed sends nothing, so a client MUST read absence as "no
+   * client-side check" rather than as an empty policy. The hint fails open,
+   * the boundary fails closed: the server refuses the file either way, and a
+   * client that guessed would only ever be wrong in the direction that refuses
+   * a file the platform accepts.
+   *
+   * The optionality follows the additive-evolution law and retires with its
+   * reason: once every environment serves the field, it hardens to required at
+   * the entity's next natural break, and the clients' fail-open spellings
+   * retire with it (tracked in root `backlog.md`).
+   */
+  readonly blockedExtensions?: readonly string[];
 }
 
 // =============================================================================
-// EXTENSION BLOCKLIST
+// EXTENSION MATCHING
 // =============================================================================
 
 /**
- * Blocked file extensions — files that cannot be uploaded.
- *
- * We accept any file type by default and derive Content-Type from the
- * extension at serve time (via mime-db in the API worker). Unknown extensions
- * are served as `application/octet-stream` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
- *
- * The blocklist targets file types that pose direct security risks when hosted:
- * executables, disk images, malware vectors, dangerous scripts, and shortcuts.
- */
-export const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
-  // Executables
-  'exe',
-  'msi',
-  'dll',
-  'scr',
-  'bat',
-  'cmd',
-  'com',
-  'pif',
-  'app',
-  'deb',
-  'rpm',
-  // Installers
-  'pkg',
-  'mpkg',
-  // Disk images
-  'dmg',
-  'iso',
-  'img',
-  // Malware vectors
-  'cab',
-  'cpl',
-  'chm',
-  // Dangerous scripts
-  'ps1',
-  'vbs',
-  'vbe',
-  'ws',
-  'wsf',
-  'wsc',
-  'wsh',
-  'reg',
-  // Java
-  'jar',
-  'jnlp',
-  // Mobile/browser packages
-  'apk',
-  'crx',
-  // Shortcut/link
-  'lnk',
-  'inf',
-  'hta',
-]);
+ * The rule for reading a file's extension: lowercase, after the last dot of
+ * the last path segment. `null` when there is no extension to read.
+ *
+ * A leading dot names the file rather than its type, so `.gitignore` and
+ * `.htaccess` have no extension — but `.env.exe` has `exe`.
+ *
+ * Segment-aware on purpose: the callers pass deploy PATHS, not basenames, and
+ * a naive `lastIndexOf('.')` over `dir.v1/README` reads the extension
+ * `v1/README` — safe only by accident, since no entry in a real blocklist
+ * contains a slash, which is the kind of correctness nobody should have to
+ * re-derive.
+ *
+ * **Private, and the reason is the asymmetry rather than any hazard.** Nothing
+ * outside this file reads it: `isBlockedExtension` is the only question anyone
+ * asks, and the API's refusal names the FILE, not its extension. Exporting a
+ * pure function is harmless, which is exactly the argument that talks a
+ * published package into surface it has not earned — and the costs do not
+ * match, since adding an export later is free under the additive law while
+ * removing one is a major. So it stays private until a caller exists. Its
+ * behaviour is fenced through `isBlockedExtension`, which is where it is
+ * observable.
+ *
+ * (`WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS` above is private for a different reason — publishing
+ * it would invite a wrong question. Both are private; only one is a hazard.)
+ *
+ * @example
+ * fileExtension('virus.exe')          // 'exe'
+ * fileExtension('assets/style.CSS')   // 'css'
+ * fileExtension('dir.v1/README')      // null
+ * fileExtension('.gitignore')         // null
+ * fileExtension('file.')              // null
+ */
+function fileExtension(filename: string): string | null {
+  const basename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/').split('/').pop() ?? '';
+  const dotIndex = basename.lastIndexOf('.');
+  if (dotIndex <= 0 || dotIndex === basename.length - 1) return null;
+  return basename.slice(dotIndex + 1).toLowerCase();
+}
 
 /**
- * Check if a filename has a blocked extension.
- * Extracts the extension from the filename and checks against the blocklist.
- * Case-insensitive. Returns false for files without extensions.
+ * Whether a file is one the platform refuses to host.
+ *
+ * **The list is not this package's, and that separation is the point.** What
+ * counts as a blocked extension is hosting POLICY — it evolves, it is enforced
+ * at one security boundary, and `virus.exe` is a perfectly well-formed
+ * filename that breaks nothing about the upload→serve round-trip. So the API
+ * owns the list (`cloudflare/api/src/lib/blocklist.ts`) and delivers it as
+ * `PlatformLimits.blockedExtensions`; a client passes what it was given.
+ *
+ * What lives here is the MATCHING RULE, and it earns its place by the
+ * constellation law's own test. The list's drift is loud in both directions —
+ * a stale client uploads a file the API refuses by name, on the first try.
+ * A second *matcher* drifts SILENTLY in the one direction that matters: a
+ * client stricter than the server refuses a legal file without the server ever
+ * being asked, and no error names it. Two holders, silent drift, one owner.
+ *
+ * The `blocked` collection is required rather than defaulted: this predicate
+ * guards a security boundary in the API, and a defaulted-empty argument there
+ * would block nothing while reading as though it did. Callers holding a
+ * possibly-absent wire field spell the fail-open themselves.
  *
  * @example
- * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe')     // true
- * isBlockedExtension('app.dmg')       // true
- * isBlockedExtension('style.css')     // false
- * isBlockedExtension('data.custom')   // false
- * isBlockedExtension('README')        // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.exe', ['exe'])   // true
+ * isBlockedExtension('virus.EXE', ['exe'])   // true — case-insensitive
+ * isBlockedExtension('style.css', ['exe'])   // false
+ * isBlockedExtension('README', ['exe'])      // false — no extension
  */
-export function isBlockedExtension(filename: string): boolean {
-  const dotIndex = filename.lastIndexOf('.');
-  if (dotIndex === -1 || dotIndex === filename.length - 1) return false;
-  const ext = filename.slice(dotIndex + 1).toLowerCase();
-  return BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS.has(ext);
+export function isBlockedExtension(
+  filename: string,
+  blocked: ReadonlySet<string> | readonly string[],
+): boolean {
+  const ext = fileExtension(filename);
+  if (ext === null) return false;
+  return Array.isArray(blocked) ? blocked.includes(ext) : (blocked as ReadonlySet<string>).has(ext);
 }
 
 // =============================================================================
@@ -1435,10 +1459,10 @@ const WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS = [
 /**
  * The `accept` attribute value for a browser file picker offering web files.
  *
- * **This is a hint, never a rule.** `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` is the platform's
- * gate and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant
- * decides what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one
- * policy, and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
+ * **This is a hint, never a rule.** The API's blocklist is the platform's gate
+ * and the only thing that decides what may be hosted; this constant decides
+ * what a *file dialog* shows first. The two are not two halves of one policy,
+ * and this one must never be consulted to accept or reject a file.
  *
  * The distinction is structural, not stylistic. `accept` can express only an
  * allowlist, while the platform's rule is a blocklist — so this list is
@@ -1449,9 +1473,12 @@ const WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS = [
  * dropzone and the picker must reach the same verdict on the same files, and
  * they do — because the verdict is `validateFiles`, downstream of both.
  *
- * Kept beside `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` so one file holds both, which is what lets
- * `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` fence the invariant that matters: the
- * picker must never offer a file the platform will refuse.
+ * The invariant that matters — the picker must never offer a file the platform
+ * will refuse — is fenced where the authority lives, in the API's own suite
+ * (`cloudflare/api/tests/lib/blocklist.test.ts`), which reads this published
+ * string and holds it against the list it owns. It sat here until the
+ * blocklist became the API's, and moving it was the price of that: a fence
+ * belongs with whichever side can change and break it.
  */
 export const WEB_FILE_ACCEPT: string = WEB_FILE_EXTENSIONS.map((ext) => `.${ext}`).join(',');
 
@@ -1542,27 +1569,34 @@ export interface PingResponse {
 // the single dispatch over them (TokenKind, classifyToken), and the
 // delegated-access scopes (OAuthScope).
 //
-// THE SHAPE LAW, in three clauses. Every secret the platform mints obeys it,
-// and `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` holds all three mechanically.
+// THE SHAPE LAW, in three clauses, over the `Authorization: Bearer` slot's
+// two populations below. The deployment claim code is the API's own
+// (`AUTH.CLAIM`, server-side: the API mints it and the API validates it, so
+// it has one holder and stays there) and shares only clause 1 — it is the
+// platform's one deliberately BARE secret, because it never enters the
+// Bearer slot: minted into one URL, consumed by one endpoint's one field,
+// its context names it and a prefix would restate its route.
+// `tests/validation-constants.test.ts` holds the clauses over this file's
+// populations; the API's suite holds its own.
 //
-//  1. ONE ENTROPY STANDARD. Every minted random secret is `HEX_LENGTH` hex
-//     characters — one width for the whole platform, so "how long is a
-//     credential" has a single answer rather than one per population.
+//  1. ONE ENTROPY STANDARD. Every minted secret is `HEX_LENGTH` hex characters
+//     — one width for the whole platform, so "how long is a credential" has a
+//     single answer rather than one per population. Generators read the width
+//     from the population's own constant, so a minted value and an accepted
+//     value cannot differ.
 //
-//  2. A PREFIX MARKS A SHARED SLOT, AND NOTHING ELSE. API keys and deploy
-//     tokens both arrive as `Authorization: Bearer`, so something must say
-//     which population a value belongs to: that is what the prefix IS, and
-//     `classifyToken` below is its only reader. Secrets that arrive somewhere
-//     unambiguous carry none — the deployment claim code reaches its own
-//     route in its own field, inside a URL whose path already says `/claim/`,
-//     so a prefix there would be a second name for what the route states.
+//  2. EVERY BEARER POPULATION IS NAMED BY ITS PREFIX. A credential says what
+//     it is before anything parses it — which is what lets `classifyToken`
+//     below dispatch two populations sharing one `Authorization: Bearer`
+//     slot, and what lets a value found in a log, a support ticket or a
+//     pasted URL be recognised and revoked on sight.
 //
 //  3. NO PREFIX IS A PREFIX OF ANOTHER. This is what makes the dispatch
 //     order-independent, and it is the reason the populations are named on
 //     different axes (`ship-` for the product, `deploy-` for the capability)
-//     rather than sharing a stem. A `ship-` / `ship-deploy-` pair reads tidier
-//     and is a trap: every deploy token would also match the API-key branch,
-//     leaving correctness resting on the order of two `if`s.
+//     rather than sharing a stem. A `ship-` / `ship-deploy-` pair
+//     reads tidier and is a trap: every deploy token would also match the
+//     API-key branch, leaving correctness resting on the order of two `if`s.
 
 /**
  * Where human identity is mounted on the API host. The API mounts Better