@shanepadgett/tau-agent 0.46.1 → 0.46.3
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/extensions/script-runner/README.md +1 -1
- package/extensions/script-runner/index.ts +2 -1
- package/extensions/soul/README.md +2 -0
- package/extensions/soul/index.ts +1 -1
- package/extensions/soul/prompt.ts +4 -1
- package/extensions/tau-help/help.md +6 -2
- package/extensions/tool-approval/README.md +8 -2
- package/extensions/tool-approval/evidence.ts +13 -10
- package/extensions/tool-approval/index.ts +26 -8
- package/package.json +2 -2
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# Script Runner
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Gives the agent a first-class `script_runner` tool for running Python 3, Node.js, and Deno scripts
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Gives the agent a first-class `script_runner` tool for running Python 3, Node.js, and Deno scripts. The agent uses dedicated tools for ordinary reads, searches, and edits. Scripts are for work those tools cannot reasonably handle, or substantial bulk transformations and computation that would otherwise require many repetitive or error-prone calls. When a script is justified, the agent uses this tool rather than embedding it in bash and picks the runtime that fits the task.
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When a run fails, the tool keeps the script and returns a `scriptId`. The agent retries with targeted `{oldText, newText}` edits against what it just wrote instead of resending the whole script, saving output tokens and keeping duplicate scripts out of context. Only the source the agent already sent is referenced; no script source file path is exposed.
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@@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ export default function scriptRunnerExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void {
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].join("\n"),
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promptSnippet: `Run ${langPhrase} scripts; on failure retry with edits + scriptId.`,
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promptGuidelines: [
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"Use dedicated tools for ordinary reads, searches, and edits. Use scripts only when those tools cannot reasonably do the work, or for substantial bulk transformations or computation that would otherwise require many repetitive or error-prone calls.",
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`When a ${langPhrase} script is justified, use script_runner rather than embedding it in bash. A shorter script alone is not a reason to replace a dedicated tool.`,
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"script_runner never exposes the script path; you already have the source. Never try to read it back.",
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],
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parameters: paramsSchema,
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Soul supplies Tau's system prompt: communication, discussion, planning, execution, coding, and tool-use guidance. It is always on.
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The agent uses dedicated tools first for ordinary reads, searches, and edits. Bash handles shell commands such as builds and tests. Scripts are reserved for work the available tools cannot reasonably handle, or substantial bulk transformations and computation that would otherwise require many repetitive or error-prone calls. A shorter script alone is not a reason to replace a dedicated tool.
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Soul adds Pi documentation pointers, tool guidance, and the context that other Tau extensions supply, such as the local date, directory snapshot, and automatic-check instructions. The date and directory snapshot are captured on the first prompt and again after successful compaction, so they stay fixed across turns, reload, resume, and tree navigation.
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Everything else is read each turn. When an instruction changes, such as an edited `AGENTS.md` after `/reload`, a changed automatic-check configuration, or a different set of active tools, Pi appends the updated section without rewriting earlier instructions. Models that cannot take later system messages receive the change in the leading instructions, which costs one cache miss on the next request.
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package/extensions/soul/index.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ export default function soulExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void {
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...new Set([
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...(active.includes("bash")
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? [
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"Use bash for
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"Use bash for shell commands such as builds and tests, and for ls, rg, or find when no suitable dedicated tool is available.",
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"Bash already runs in the working directory; do not cd into it.",
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]
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: []),
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<tool-use>
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Use the tools available to you for the purpose each is designed for.
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Default to dedicated tools for reading, searching, inspecting, editing, and writing files. Use the available tool designed for the task rather than recreating it in bash, Python, or another script.
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Do not choose a script for an ordinary read or edit merely because it is familiar, shorter, or uses fewer tokens. Use bash for actual shell commands, such as builds, tests, and installed command-line tools, when no dedicated tool reasonably handles the task.
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Use scripts when the available tools cannot reasonably accomplish the work, or when a substantial bulk transformation or computation would otherwise require many repetitive or error-prone tool calls. Applying one deterministic transformation across 100 files is a good use; replacing text in one file is not.
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When a script is justified, use the available script-running tool instead of embedding it in bash. Keep its file scope and intended effects explicit. Do not switch tools to evade an approval request.
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Batch independent calls into one response: independent reads, searches, and edits go together, and only calls that depend on earlier results are sequenced.
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Keep tool output small: request only the data you need and prefer compact, high-signal commands over ones that flood the context.
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</tool-use>
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## script-runner
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Gives the agent a first-class `script_runner` tool to execute Python 3, Node.js, and Deno scripts
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Gives the agent a first-class `script_runner` tool to execute Python 3, Node.js, and Deno scripts. Dedicated tools come first for ordinary reads, searches, and edits. Scripts are for work those tools cannot reasonably handle, or substantial bulk transformations and computation that would otherwise require many repetitive or error-prone calls; justified scripts use this tool rather than bash. On failure it returns a `scriptId`; the agent retries with targeted `{oldText,newText}` edits against the script it already wrote rather than resending the whole script. Runtimes are detected from the environment (Python 3 via `python3`; `node` is the local Node.js runtime with `--experimental-strip-types`, Node 22.6+ — full Node APIs, TypeScript with erasable syntax or plain JavaScript; `deno` via `deno run -A` — full permissions, native TypeScript/JavaScript, Deno APIs). The tool registers only available runtimes and is hidden from the prompt if none are present.
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## silent-command-runner
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@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ Runs configured commands while keeping their output out of agent context when th
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Supplies Tau's communication, discussion, planning, execution, and coding instructions, plus tool-use rules, tool guidance, and context from other Tau extensions. The date and directory snapshot stay fixed until successful compaction. Other changes, such as an edited `AGENTS.md` after `/reload`, arrive as appended updates without rewriting earlier instructions.
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Tool-use guidance defaults to dedicated tools for ordinary file work, bash for shell commands, and scripts only when dedicated tools cannot reasonably do the work or when substantial bulk work would otherwise need many repetitive or error-prone calls.
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## stash
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Adds `Alt+S` to stash the current prompt draft and `/pop` to browse stashed drafts and put one back in the editor.
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## tool-approval
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Reviews agent `bash` and `script_runner` requests before they run. Common read-only bash commands skip review. Visible, understood requests need one review; hidden local execution targets get bounded inspection and one final review, without repository exploration.
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Reviews agent `bash` and `script_runner` requests before they run. Common read-only bash commands skip review. Visible, understood requests need one review; hidden local execution targets get bounded inspection and one final review, without repository exploration. Set `extensions.toolApproval.autoApprove` to run every reviewer-approved request without another confirmation. Those auto-approvals show a user-only marker. The reviewer approves routine, low-impact local and external-service work, including read-only Jira or Confluence requests, additive document creation without consequential side effects, and normal authentication with existing credentials. It asks before meaningful data loss, disruptive system or production changes, privilege or access changes, secret or sensitive-data disclosure, substantial payments, or consequential publication and workflows. Inspection gaps alone do not require confirmation; uninspected executable code, unresolved code loading, and missing information that leaves a substantial risk unresolved do. Approval explanations cover the effect, affected target, risk, and recovery difficulty in plain language. Changes to inspected files invalidate approval. Reviewer failures fall back to human approval and send an attention notification. In the terminal approval panel, press `n` to add a note to Approve or Reject before choosing. Rejection notes tell the agent why the request was blocked; approval notes reach it with the tool result without changing the request. Reject with a note to ask for a revised request.
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Approval decisions are saved privately in the session JSONL, including allowlist skips, review stages and models, inspected paths, evidence-gap categories, and user decisions. These records stay out of model context and do not copy scripts, arguments, file contents, or raw errors.
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Scoped project edits, builds, tests, and generated-file cleanup should be approved whether they use Python, Node, or bash. Reading, replacing, and writing project text is ordinary editing; computed data paths and a less suitable tool choice do not themselves require confirmation. Destructive changes to valuable databases, remote objects, backups, or unrelated work do. Clearly disposable local test data remains routine validation. Hidden executable code still requires inspection.
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## tool-loader
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Keeps specialist tool groups out of every request as deferred tools and lets the agent load them with Pi's `tool_search`. Tau registers `web`, `image`, and `appshot`; project or global package extensions can add groups with `registerDeferredToolGroup()` from `@shanepadgett/tau-agent`. All models can load tools. Compatible models preserve the cached prefix; other models can incur a cache miss when tools are activated. Loading never triggers compaction.
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Common read-only bash commands skip review and run immediately. Other bash and every `script_runner` request go to a separate reviewer. The first review can approve, ask you, or request inspection of directly referenced code. Visible, understood requests need only one review. When inspection is needed, Tau reads exact execution targets and supported direct local dependencies, then makes one final review with the same reviewer model policy. Obvious local script execution cannot be automatically approved without inspection, even if the first reviewer misses it.
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Inspection is limited to four files, 48 KiB of source, and a two-second file-work budget. Tau does not browse directories, search the repository, run code, or fetch remote code during review. It can inspect common literal Python, Node, Deno, and shell script invocations, local imports, subprocess targets, and package task definitions. Project npm execution settings are included without sending registry credentials.
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Inspection is limited to four files, 48 KiB of source, and a two-second file-work budget. Tau does not browse directories, search the repository, run code, or fetch remote code during review. It can inspect common literal Python, Node, Deno, and shell script invocations, local imports, subprocess targets, and package task definitions. Project npm execution settings are included without sending registry credentials. Missing executable source, unchecked execution targets, and unresolved code-loading configuration, including unsupported Yarn executable configuration, require confirmation. Other inspection gaps are not automatic reasons to ask: the reviewer can approve when the visible request and inspected code establish routine, low-impact effects. It asks when dynamic execution, exhausted limits, or other missing information leave executable code or a substantial risk unresolved. Installed tools and libraries retain their normal trust assumption; approval is a risk filter, not a sandbox or a proof that arbitrary code is safe.
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For a `script_runner` retry with `scriptId` and edits, Tau reconstructs the full resulting script before review and runs that exact source after approval. A retry with missing or invalid stored source is blocked. When the agent requests several tools at once, Tau reviews up to three requests concurrently, with each review focused on one request. Tau rechecks inspected file contents before using a decision and after human confirmation. Changed files invalidate approval; repeated changes or changes during confirmation block the request until the agent submits it again. These checks do not make shell execution atomic with file inspection.
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Each handled request saves a private decision record in the session JSONL under `tau.tool-approval.decision`. Records include the tool-call ID, tool name, approval or block decision, decision source and reason, review stages and reviewer models, inspected paths, evidence-gap categories, and elapsed time. They also cover allowlist skips, disabled approval, failed reviews, cancellations, and user rejection. These records are excluded from model context and follow the session's storage and deletion lifecycle. They do not copy command arguments, scripts, file contents, reviewer explanations, approval notes, or raw errors. Inspected paths are retained, so file names remain visible in the session.
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With `autoApprove` enabled, reviewer-approved requests run without another confirmation. Tau shows a user-only marker with the reviewer model after those auto-approvals. Common read-only bash that skips review does not get a marker. Routine
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With `autoApprove` enabled, reviewer-approved requests run without another confirmation. Tau shows a user-only marker with the reviewer model after those auto-approvals. Common read-only bash that skips review does not get a marker. Routine, low-impact work should be approved locally and in external services. This includes project file edits, inspected scripts, read-only Jira or Confluence requests, and creating documents, pages, drafts, or records without replacing valuable content or causing consequential side effects. Reading an environment token and using it to authenticate with its intended service is normal authentication, not secret disclosure. An external destination, a write, or the use of a credential alone is not a reason to ask.
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The reviewer asks before meaningful data loss, difficult-to-recover overwrites, disruptive production or system changes, elevated privileges or access/security changes, credential exposure, sensitive-data disclosure to unintended audiences, substantial payments, or consequential publication, messages, and workflows. Additive writes still require confirmation if they change access, expose private material, or trigger hard-to-reverse effects. Deleting a public post cannot undo disclosure; deleting a record cannot undo a message or charge it already triggered. Ordinary internal document creation does not count as consequential publication by itself. Missing information requires confirmation when it leaves executable code or one of these substantial risks unresolved, not merely because every implementation detail or response field is unknown.
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Approval depends on effects, not language or tool choice. Scoped project edits, formatting, code generation, builds, tests, and cleanup of generated or temporary files are routine work even when performed through Python, Node, or bash. Reading a file, replacing text, and writing the updated contents is an ordinary edit. Computed project paths and bulk edits are not reasons to ask by themselves. Files edited as data do not need execution inspection merely because they contain source code, and ordinary edits do not require a backup or a clean Git tree.
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Destructive database operations, loss of unrelated work through Git resets or cleans, deletion of backups, and destructive overwrites of valuable remote objects or shared records require confirmation when they risk meaningful loss or disruption. Read-only database queries and clearly disposable local test databases and fixtures are routine validation. Local data can still be valuable; remote reads and additive writes can still be low-impact. Hidden executable dependencies retain the inspection requirements above.
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When approval is required, Tau shows one plain-language paragraph explaining what you are allowing, who or what is affected, why approval is needed, and what recovery might involve. It summarizes consequences rather than listing script steps or specialized APIs. If the issue is missing evidence rather than a known danger, it says what could not be checked. For `script_runner`, human confirmation also shows the complete script that will run. If several requests need approval, their confirmation windows open one at a time. If the reviewer fails or returns a malformed decision, Tau asks for direct human approval instead of running it automatically. Tau also sends an attention notification when the approval window opens.
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private reference(path: string, cwd: string, required: boolean, task: string | undefined): void {
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this.gap(
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);
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/(?:\bfrom\s*|\bimport\s*\(?\s*|\brequire\s*\(\s*)["']((?:\.|\/)[^"'\n]+)["']/g,
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"Default to approved for understood routine, low-impact actions, locally or in external services. Approve ordinary file edits, builds, tests, package tools, scripts, quotes, pipes, redirects, and other recoverable effects.",
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"Judge the actual effects and affected data, not the programming language or choice of tool. A Python or shell edit is not riskier merely because a dedicated edit tool could have done it. Tool-choice preferences are not reasons to require human approval.",
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"Routine development is authorized: approve scoped edits to project source, configuration, documentation, and tests; formatting, code generation, builds, local validation, and creation or cleanup of generated output and temporary files. This includes Python read_text/replace/write_text, Node readFile/writeFile, shell redirects, and bulk edits with an understood project scope. Writing updated file contents is a normal edit, not inherently destructive overwriting.",
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"Computed filenames, loops, globbing, and replacement strings are normal ways to implement project edits. Do not ask merely because paths or arguments are computed when the visible code establishes their scope and effects. Do not require a backup, a clean Git tree, or inspection of every data file before an ordinary scoped edit. Ask when the code discards unrelated work, deletes valuable contents, or has an unresolved materially destructive scope.",
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"Files read, searched, parsed, or rewritten as data are not executable dependencies. Source code in a replacement string is data until the request executes or loads it. Do not request execution inspection merely to read the current contents of a file being edited. The supplied inline script is already visible code; only code it actually imports, loads, or executes can require additional execution evidence.",
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"Approve routine read-only service requests, including Jira searches, fetching Confluence pages, listing records, and checking status. Reading a remote or production service is not changing it. Ordinary response output is not an unauthorized export merely because it may contain private work data.",
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"Approve additive writes such as creating a document, page, draft, or record when they do not replace valuable content, change access, disclose sensitive data to an unintended audience, incur substantial costs, or trigger consequential workflows. An external or shared destination alone is not a reason to ask the user.",
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"Approve normal authentication: reading existing credentials from environment variables or the usual credential store and using them with their intended service, without printing, exposing, or persisting the secret elsewhere. Passing a token through a request header or an SDK's normal authentication mechanism is not credential disclosure.",
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+
"Require user approval only for concrete substantial risk: meaningful data loss or difficult-to-recover overwrites; disruptive production or system changes; elevated privileges or access/security changes; exposing credentials or sensitive data to an unintended audience or untrusted destination; substantial payments; or consequential publication, messages, or workflows that cannot be meaningfully undone. A routine internal document creation is not consequential publication by itself.",
|
|
66
|
+
"Protect valuable state: database DROP/TRUNCATE, broad DELETE/UPDATE, destructive schema migrations, deletion of backups, destructive Git resets or cleans that discard unrelated work, and replacing or deleting valuable remote objects or shared records require approval when they risk meaningful loss or disruption. Read-only database queries and setup, reset, or cleanup of clearly disposable local test databases and fixtures are routine validation. A database is not disposable merely because it is local; an external service is not destructive merely because it is remote.",
|
|
67
|
+
"Non-destructive does not always mean reversible: deleting a public post later cannot undo disclosure, and deleting a record cannot undo messages, charges, or workflow effects it already triggered. Evaluate those actual side effects, not the service name or the mere presence of a write or credential.",
|
|
68
|
+
"Do not require approval merely because the request writes files, invokes code, uses shell composition, accesses an external service, authenticates, could fail, or has ordinary recoverable side effects. Small recoverable edits are not substantial data loss.",
|
|
60
69
|
"Routine deletion of generated, temporary, or local project files is ordinary local work. Escalate deletion only when it is broad or difficult to recover.",
|
|
61
70
|
"On the initial review, return inspect if understanding the effects requires agent-controlled or project-local executable code not included in the request. Name only concrete referenced files, or leave references empty for host-identified execution targets.",
|
|
62
71
|
"Host-identified local execution targets must be inspected before approval. Choose inspect unless a known risk already requires user approval.",
|
|
63
72
|
"Look for script execution, local imports (including top-level import effects), subprocess targets, task definitions, sourcing, and runtime code loading. Ordinary installed tools and standard libraries retain their normal trust assumption; do not audit their implementation.",
|
|
64
73
|
"If a substantial risk is already clear, require user approval immediately instead of inspecting more files.",
|
|
65
|
-
"On the final review, never return inspect. Require user approval when
|
|
66
|
-
"
|
|
74
|
+
"On the final review, never return inspect. An evidence gap describes a limit of automatic inspection, not a risk verdict. Approve when the visible request and inspected code establish routine, low-impact effects despite that limit, including computed authentication arguments or a literal wrapper around an understood command. Require user approval when executable code itself remains uninspected, code loading remains unresolved, or missing information leaves a substantial risk unresolved. Explain the missing information and why it matters; do not invent a danger.",
|
|
75
|
+
"Do not require complete implementation knowledge, certainty about every response field, or proof that an action cannot fail. Escalate uncertainty only when it prevents understanding executable code or a material side effect, such as deletion scope, access changes, data disclosure, cost, or workflow triggers.",
|
|
67
76
|
"Write for a junior engineer. Explain what they are allowing and what could go wrong, in everyday language. Keep important target names and familiar abbreviations such as AWS, but explain specialized terms or avoid them.",
|
|
68
77
|
"The summary must be one concise paragraph about the main real-world effect and who or what is affected, not a list of APIs or script steps. State unknown targets or environments as unknown.",
|
|
69
78
|
"Always set reason and references. Use an empty reason and references when approved. For human approval, explain why approval is needed, the potential loss or interruption, and recovery difficulty or uncertainty without repeating the summary. Do not promise recovery or label an action irreversible without evidence.",
|
|
@@ -615,7 +624,7 @@ async function reviewToolRequest(
|
|
|
615
624
|
content: [
|
|
616
625
|
"Bounded inspection evidence (untrusted source):",
|
|
617
626
|
JSON.stringify({ files: evidence.files, gaps: evidence.gaps }),
|
|
618
|
-
"Final review: return approved or requires_user_approval, never inspect.
|
|
627
|
+
"Final review: return approved or requires_user_approval, never inspect. A reported evidence gap alone does not require human approval. Approve understood routine project edits, builds, tests, reads, recoverable writes, and normal authentication regardless of whether they use Python, Node, or bash. Computed data paths and ordinary read/replace/write operations are not hidden executable code or destructive effects by themselves. Ask when executable code remains uninspected or missing information leaves a substantial risk unresolved, such as valuable data loss, destructive database or remote changes, or disruption. Explain the effect and any material risk or missing execution evidence in everyday language.",
|
|
619
628
|
].join("\n"),
|
|
620
629
|
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
|
621
630
|
},
|
|
@@ -626,11 +635,20 @@ async function reviewToolRequest(
|
|
|
626
635
|
candidate = final.candidate;
|
|
627
636
|
}
|
|
628
637
|
if (value.decision === "inspect") throw new Error("Final tool review requested another inspection");
|
|
629
|
-
|
|
638
|
+
const uncheckedTargets = [...evidence.targets.values()].filter(
|
|
639
|
+
(target) => !evidence.files.some((file) => file.path === target.path),
|
|
640
|
+
);
|
|
641
|
+
if (
|
|
642
|
+
value.decision === "approved" &&
|
|
643
|
+
(uncheckedTargets.length > 0 ||
|
|
644
|
+
evidence.gapReasons.has("source_unavailable") ||
|
|
645
|
+
evidence.gapReasons.has("code_loading_configuration"))
|
|
646
|
+
) {
|
|
630
647
|
value = {
|
|
631
648
|
decision: "requires_user_approval",
|
|
632
649
|
summary: value.summary,
|
|
633
|
-
reason:
|
|
650
|
+
reason:
|
|
651
|
+
"Tau could not verify executable code, its loading configuration, or its dependencies within the inspection limits. Unchecked code could have effects beyond the visible request; confirmation is required before it runs.",
|
|
634
652
|
};
|
|
635
653
|
}
|
|
636
654
|
metadata.outcome = "completed";
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@shanepadgett/tau-agent",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.46.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.46.3",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Tau is a custom agentic harness built with pi extensions",
|
|
5
5
|
"type": "module",
|
|
6
6
|
"main": "./src/index.ts",
|
|
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
|
|
|
35
35
|
],
|
|
36
36
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
37
37
|
"@ast-grep/wasm": "0.45.3",
|
|
38
|
-
"@shanepadgett/tau-tui": "0.46.
|
|
38
|
+
"@shanepadgett/tau-tui": "0.46.3",
|
|
39
39
|
"@vscode/tree-sitter-wasm": "0.3.1",
|
|
40
40
|
"image-size": "2.0.4",
|
|
41
41
|
"smol-toml": "1.8.0",
|