@serve.zone/interfaces 32.28.0 → 32.30.0

package/ts/data/networkprojection.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import type { TSha256Digest } from './immutableimage.js';
 import type { IRuntimeAssignmentReference, IRuntimeAuthorityReference, IRuntimeController } from './runtimeassignment.js';
 import { isRuntimeReplicaId, snapshotRuntimeAssignment, validateRuntimeAssignment } from './runtimeassignment.js';
 import type { IRuntimeNetworkHandoffLease, IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority } from './networkauthority.js';
-import { bindRuntimeNetworkHandoffLease, computeRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthorityDigest,
+import { bindRuntimeNetworkHandoffLease, computeRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthorityDigest, runtimeNetworkAuthorityContract,
   snapshotRuntimeNetworkHandoffLease, snapshotRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority } from './networkauthority.js';
 import type { IPrivateNetwork, IServicePrivateNetworks, IServicePrivateNetworkDnsPolicy } from './privatenetwork.js';
 import { routerPacketGrantsOf, snapshotRouterProjection,
@@ -95,7 +95,12 @@ export interface IRuntimeNetworkPublishedPortRequest {
   targetPort: number;
 }
 
-/** Current authorized published-port policy for one service. */
+/**
+ * Current authorized published-port policy for one service.
+ *
+ * The published-port half of the service's one policy document; `IServiceNetworkEgress` reads the
+ * egress half of the same document, so both carry the same `revision`.
+ */
 export interface IServicePublishedPorts {
   organizationId: string;
   serviceId: string;
@@ -104,17 +109,82 @@ export interface IServicePublishedPorts {
   publishedPorts: IRuntimeNetworkPublishedPortRequest[];
 }
 
-/** Exact desired policy. Node-level host-port placement remains Cloudly's decision. */
+/**
+ * Exact desired policy. Node-level host-port placement remains Cloudly's decision.
+ *
+ * One document per service holds its published ports and its egress under one `revision`. The
+ * first accepted write of either (`expectedRevision: null`) creates it: `setServicePublishedPorts`
+ * with egress `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []`, `setServiceNetworkEgress` with
+ * no published ports. From then on both reads return it, never null. It is an explicit policy: an
+ * attached spec stating `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []` matches it and reaches
+ * no public address and no platform endpoint; `network-policy-missing` means the service has no
+ * document at all.
+ */
 export interface ISetServicePublishedPorts {
   organizationId: string;
   serviceId: string;
   /** Retain the exact body and this identifier across retries. */
   mutationId: string;
-  /** null means the service has never had a published-port document; not an empty list. */
+  /**
+   * The revision of the service's one policy document the caller read, shared with its egress: an
+   * accepted `ISetServiceNetworkEgress` advances it too. null means the service has never had a
+   * policy document, neither published ports nor egress; it is not an empty list.
+   */
   expectedRevision: number | null;
   publishedPorts: IRuntimeNetworkPublishedPortRequest[];
 }
 
+/**
+ * Current authorized egress policy for one service: whether its attached workloads reach the public
+ * internet, and which platform endpoints of the protected authority they reach.
+ *
+ * The egress half of the service's one policy document; `IServicePublishedPorts` reads the
+ * published-port half of the same document, so both carry the same `revision`. Every projection
+ * endpoint of the service carries exactly these values (`IRuntimeNetworkEndpoint`), and an attached
+ * runtime spec (`TServiceRuntimeNetwork`) is admitted only while it states the same ones: its
+ * disagreement is `network-policy-mismatch`, a service without a document `network-policy-missing`.
+ * Nothing else grants a workload egress.
+ */
+export interface IServiceNetworkEgress {
+  organizationId: string;
+  serviceId: string;
+  revision: number;
+  /** TCP/UDP only; the complete protected union remains denied. */
+  publicEgress: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Ids of `IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority.platformEndpoints`, sorted and unique, at most
+   * `runtimeNetworkAuthorityContract.maximumPlatformEndpoints`. Empty selects none.
+   */
+  platformEndpointIds: string[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Exact desired egress. The published ports of the same document are carried forward unchanged.
+ * Whether each id names a current platform endpoint is Cloudly's decision at acceptance.
+ *
+ * One document per service holds its published ports and its egress under one `revision`. The
+ * first accepted write of either (`expectedRevision: null`) creates it: `setServicePublishedPorts`
+ * with egress `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []`, `setServiceNetworkEgress` with
+ * no published ports. From then on both reads return it, never null. It is an explicit policy: an
+ * attached spec stating `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []` matches it and reaches
+ * no public address and no platform endpoint; `network-policy-missing` means the service has no
+ * document at all.
+ */
+export interface ISetServiceNetworkEgress {
+  organizationId: string;
+  serviceId: string;
+  /** Retain the exact body and this identifier across retries. */
+  mutationId: string;
+  /**
+   * The revision of the service's one policy document the caller read, shared with its published
+   * ports: an accepted `ISetServicePublishedPorts` advances it too. null means the service has
+   * never had a policy document, neither published ports nor egress.
+   */
+  expectedRevision: number | null;
+  publicEgress: boolean;
+  platformEndpointIds: string[];
+}
+
 /** Controller-owned readiness evidence. A signature does not prove this evidence's provenance. */
 export interface IRuntimeNetworkEndpoint {
   lease: IRuntimeNetworkWorkloadLease;
@@ -313,6 +383,28 @@ export const snapshotSetServicePublishedPorts = (value: unknown): ISetServicePub
     publishedPorts: publishedPortRequests(item.publishedPorts) };
 });
 
+const servicePlatformEndpointIds = (value: unknown): string[] => networkSorted(
+  networkList(value, runtimeNetworkAuthorityContract.maximumPlatformEndpoints, networkId), id => id);
+const servicePublicEgress = (value: unknown): boolean => {
+  requireNetwork(typeof value === 'boolean'); return value;
+};
+
+/** Structural snapshot only; whether each id names a current platform endpoint remains Cloudly's decision. */
+export const snapshotServiceNetworkEgress = (value: unknown): IServiceNetworkEgress => networkSafe(() => {
+  const item = networkRecord(value, ['organizationId', 'serviceId', 'revision', 'publicEgress', 'platformEndpointIds']);
+  return { organizationId: networkId(item.organizationId), serviceId: networkId(item.serviceId),
+    revision: networkCounter(item.revision), publicEgress: servicePublicEgress(item.publicEgress),
+    platformEndpointIds: servicePlatformEndpointIds(item.platformEndpointIds) };
+});
+
+export const snapshotSetServiceNetworkEgress = (value: unknown): ISetServiceNetworkEgress => networkSafe(() => {
+  const item = networkRecord(value, ['organizationId', 'serviceId', 'mutationId', 'expectedRevision', 'publicEgress',
+    'platformEndpointIds']);
+  return { organizationId: networkId(item.organizationId), serviceId: networkId(item.serviceId),
+    mutationId: networkId(item.mutationId), expectedRevision: item.expectedRevision === null ? null : networkCounter(item.expectedRevision),
+    publicEgress: servicePublicEgress(item.publicEgress), platformEndpointIds: servicePlatformEndpointIds(item.platformEndpointIds) };
+});
+
 const endpoint = (value: unknown): IRuntimeNetworkEndpoint => {
   const hasPublishedPorts = value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && Object.hasOwn(value, 'publishedPorts');
   const item = networkRecord(value, ['lease', 'ready', 'observation', 'publicEgress', 'platformEndpointIds',

package/ts/data/secret.ts

@@ -1893,6 +1893,22 @@ export const createAppStoreInstallSecretEnvelopeContext = (contextArg: {
     : null,
 });
 
+/**
+ * The context a dcrouter admin bootstrap token is sealed under for `bootstrapExternalGatewayCredential`.
+ *
+ * It binds the envelope to the dcrouter URL and the gateway client id the administrator named, so a
+ * sealed token opens only for a request that states the same target, and Cloudly hands it only to
+ * a gateway its own settings name.
+ */
+export const createGatewayBootstrapEnvelopeContext = (contextArg: {
+  gatewayUrl: string;
+  gatewayClientId: string;
+}): Uint8Array => contextBytes({
+  purpose: 'serve.zone/gateway-bootstrap',
+  gatewayUrl: contextArg.gatewayUrl,
+  gatewayClientId: contextArg.gatewayClientId,
+});
+
 export const createResolvedSecretMaterialEnvelopeContext = (contextArg: {
   recipientKeyId: string;
   organizationId: string;

package/ts/data/serviceruntime.ts

@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ export interface IServiceRuntimeProfile {
 
 /**
  * `isolated` gives the workload no network authority. `attached` joins the runtime network with
- * public egress on or off and the platform endpoints it may reach, by id: sorted and unique.
+ * public egress on or off and the platform endpoints it may reach, by id: sorted and unique. The
+ * service's `IServiceNetworkEgress` must state the same values, or the workload is not admitted.
  */
 export type TServiceRuntimeNetwork =
   | { mode: 'isolated' }
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ const serviceRuntimeRefusals = [
   'volume-driver-unsupported', 'volume-options-unsupported', 'volume-shared-unsupported',
   'volume-placement-unsupported', 'volume-initialization-unknown', 'volume-ownership-unknown',
   'objectstorage-endpoint-missing', 'objectstorage-binding-invalid', 'objectstorage-environment-conflict',
-  'database-endpoint-missing',
+  'objectstorage-endpoint-unselected', 'database-endpoint-missing', 'database-endpoint-unselected',
 ] as const;
 
 /**
@@ -114,7 +115,8 @@ export type TServiceRuntimeWaitingReason = typeof serviceRuntimeWaitingReasons[n
  * `port-protocol-unsupported` is about one port's protocol — and `node-authority-unsupported` is a
  * node whose session resolved fewer workload authorities than this spec needs, which the admit step
  * refuses rather than handing the node work it would silently park. An attached network needs an
- * explicit matching policy and a current workload address pool; neither is defaulted.
+ * explicit matching policy (`IServiceNetworkEgress`, written by `setServiceNetworkEgress`) and a
+ * current workload address pool; neither is defaulted.
  *
  * The volume refusals name what a local storage claim cannot express: `volume-driver-unsupported`
  * a volume of a driver other than a node-local directory, `volume-options-unsupported` driver or
@@ -133,6 +135,20 @@ export type TServiceRuntimeWaitingReason = typeof serviceRuntimeWaitingReasons[n
  * `database-endpoint-missing` is an enabled database binding placed on a node that states no valid
  * `corestoreDatabase`: its credential cannot be addressed to any host a workload reaches, so it is
  * neither granted nor published, and the workload is not started with a guessed one.
+ *
+ * The two `-unselected` refusals name a binding endpoint the workload's network cannot reach, so a
+ * workload is refused rather than started against a connection that stays dark. A workload reaches
+ * a platform endpoint only when its spec's attached network selects it (`platformEndpointIds`), and
+ * an `isolated` network selects none. `database-endpoint-unselected` is an enabled database binding
+ * whose node's valid `corestoreDatabase` is not a selected endpoint: none of the selected
+ * `IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority.platformEndpoints` has the endpoint's `host` as its `address`,
+ * `tcp` as its `protocol` and the endpoint's `port` as its `port`. `objectstorage-endpoint-unselected`
+ * is the same for an enabled object-storage binding's node's valid `corestoreObjectStorage`, whose
+ * `endpoint` origin states the host and the port (the scheme's default, 80 for `http:` and 443 for
+ * `https:`, when it states none). Platform endpoints are IPv4, so an endpoint whose host is a DNS name
+ * or an IPv6 literal is never selected. Each is judged only for an endpoint that is valid: a node
+ * stating none, or an invalid one, stays `database-endpoint-missing` or `objectstorage-endpoint-missing`.
+ * `platform.findUnselectedCorestoreEndpoints` is this rule; a producer answers what it returns.
  */
 export type TServiceRuntimeRefusal = typeof serviceRuntimeRefusals[number];
 

package/ts/data/settings.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { TServiceMailSubmissionTlsMode } from './mail.js';
 import type { ISystemSecretOwner, TSecretManagementScope } from './secret.js';
+import { hasExactKeys, readDataProperties } from '../private/dataproperties.js';
 
 export interface ICloudlyS3BackupTargetDescriptor {
   type: 's3';
@@ -109,3 +110,129 @@ export const cloudlySystemSecretKeys = Object.freeze({
   coreMailSmtpTlsCertificatePem: 'COREMAIL_SMTP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_PEM',
   coreMailSmtpTlsPrivateKeyPem: 'COREMAIL_SMTP_TLS_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM',
 } as const);
+
+/**
+ * How far Cloudly's enrollment as a dcrouter gateway client has come.
+ *
+ * - `unconfigured` — no `dcrouterGatewayUrl` is set, so there is nothing to enroll with.
+ * - `checking` — Cloudly is validating or provisioning its credential right now.
+ * - `ready` — Cloudly holds a validated gateway-client credential whose policy matches its settings.
+ * - `degraded` — dcrouter could not be reached; Cloudly retries on its own.
+ * - `admin-bootstrap-required` — the held credential is missing, rejected or stale (its policy no
+ *   longer matches Cloudly's settings or the runtime network address plan's DNS record allowance),
+ *   and only a dcrouter admin token handed in with `bootstrapExternalGatewayCredential` moves it on.
+ */
+export type TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus =
+  | 'unconfigured'
+  | 'checking'
+  | 'ready'
+  | 'degraded'
+  | 'admin-bootstrap-required';
+
+/** Cloudly's gateway-client enrollment as an administrator reads it; it never carries a credential. */
+export interface IExternalGatewayEnrollmentState {
+  status: TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus;
+  /** Why the state is what it is, in Cloudly's words; absent when there is nothing to say. */
+  reason?: string;
+  /** When Cloudly last finished a check, in milliseconds since the epoch. */
+  lastCheckedAt?: number;
+  /** When Cloudly retries on its own, for a `degraded` state. */
+  nextRetryAt?: number;
+  /** Whether Cloudly still holds a validated runtime credential it can serve gateway calls with. */
+  cachedValidationProof: boolean;
+  /** Whether a provisioned candidate credential still awaits finalization at dcrouter. */
+  finalizationPending: boolean;
+}
+
+export const externalGatewayEnrollmentStatuses = Object.freeze([
+  'unconfigured',
+  'checking',
+  'ready',
+  'degraded',
+  'admin-bootstrap-required',
+] as const satisfies readonly TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus[]);
+
+export const externalGatewayBootstrapContract = Object.freeze({
+  /**
+   * The longest admin bootstrap token Cloudly accepts, in bytes. A dcrouter API token is far
+   * shorter; the bound only keeps an unopened envelope from carrying an arbitrary payload.
+   */
+  maximumTokenBytes: 1_024,
+  /** The longest `reason` an enrollment state carries, in characters. */
+  maximumReasonLength: 4_096,
+  /** The longest `expectedGatewayUrl` a bootstrap request states, in characters. */
+  maximumGatewayUrlLength: 2_048,
+  /** The longest `expectedGatewayClientId` a bootstrap request states, in characters. */
+  maximumGatewayClientIdLength: 253,
+} as const);
+
+/** Every reason Cloudly answers instead of bootstrapping its gateway-client credential. */
+export const externalGatewayBootstrapRefusals = Object.freeze([
+  /** Cloudly has no `dcrouterGatewayUrl` or no `dcrouterGatewayClientId` to enroll under. */
+  'gateway-unconfigured',
+  /**
+   * The request's `expectedGatewayUrl` or `expectedGatewayClientId` is not what Cloudly's settings
+   * state, so the token would reach a dcrouter or a client the administrator did not name.
+   */
+  'gateway-target-mismatch',
+  /** The sealed token does not open, or what it opens to breaks the bootstrap token rule. */
+  'bootstrap-token-invalid',
+  /** dcrouter did not accept the token at all: unknown, revoked, disabled or expired. */
+  'bootstrap-token-rejected',
+  /** dcrouter accepted the token, but its role is not `admin`, so it cannot provision a client. */
+  'bootstrap-token-not-admin',
+  /** A candidate credential from an earlier provisioning is still being finalized; retry later. */
+  'bootstrap-candidate-pending',
+  /** dcrouter could not be reached; the held credential is unchanged and the call may be repeated. */
+  'gateway-unreachable',
+  /** dcrouter refused provisioning, or the credential it issued failed Cloudly's validation. */
+  'bootstrap-provisioning-refused',
+] as const);
+
+export type TExternalGatewayBootstrapRefusal = typeof externalGatewayBootstrapRefusals[number];
+
+/**
+ * The bootstrap token rule, judged on the opened bytes: 1 to `maximumTokenBytes` bytes of visible
+ * ASCII, with no whitespace or control character. The token is dcrouter's; this only refuses what
+ * could never be one, so a pasted line break or an empty pipe never reaches dcrouter.
+ */
+export const isExternalGatewayBootstrapToken = (valueArg: unknown): valueArg is Uint8Array => (
+  valueArg instanceof Uint8Array
+  && valueArg.length > 0
+  && valueArg.length <= externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumTokenBytes
+  && valueArg.every((byteArg) => byteArg >= 0x21 && byteArg <= 0x7e)
+);
+
+const isEpochMilliseconds = (valueArg: unknown): boolean => (
+  Number.isSafeInteger(valueArg) && (valueArg as number) >= 0
+);
+
+/** Structural check of an enrollment state as a client receives it; every problem is named. */
+export const validateExternalGatewayEnrollmentState = (valueArg: unknown): string[] => {
+  const state = readDataProperties(valueArg);
+  if (state === null) return ['external gateway enrollment state must be a plain record'];
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  if (!hasExactKeys(state, ['status', 'cachedValidationProof', 'finalizationPending'],
+    ['reason', 'lastCheckedAt', 'nextRetryAt'])) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment state contains fields outside its schema');
+  }
+  if (!externalGatewayEnrollmentStatuses.some((statusArg) => statusArg === state.status)) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment status is unknown');
+  }
+  if (state.reason !== undefined && (typeof state.reason !== 'string'
+    || state.reason.length === 0
+    || state.reason.length > externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumReasonLength)) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment reason must be a bounded non-empty string');
+  }
+  for (const key of ['lastCheckedAt', 'nextRetryAt'] as const) {
+    if (state[key] !== undefined && !isEpochMilliseconds(state[key])) {
+      errors.push(`external gateway enrollment ${key} must be epoch milliseconds`);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const key of ['cachedValidationProof', 'finalizationPending'] as const) {
+    if (typeof state[key] !== 'boolean') {
+      errors.push(`external gateway enrollment ${key} must be a boolean`);
+    }
+  }
+  return errors;
+};

package/ts/platform/corestoreendpointselection.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import type { IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority } from '../data/networkauthority.js';
+import type { TServiceRuntimeNetwork, TServiceRuntimeRefusal } from '../data/serviceruntime.js';
+import { isNetworkIpv4 } from '../private/networkcontract.js';
+import { validatePlatformDatabaseEndpoint, type IPlatformDatabaseEndpoint } from './database.js';
+import { validatePlatformObjectStorageEndpoint, type IPlatformObjectStorageEndpoint } from './objectstorage.js';
+
+/** The service runtime refusals a Corestore endpoint the workload's network does not select raises. */
+export type TCorestoreEndpointSelectionRefusal = Extract<TServiceRuntimeRefusal,
+  'database-endpoint-unselected' | 'objectstorage-endpoint-unselected'>;
+
+/** What `findUnselectedCorestoreEndpoints` judges for one node a service's bindings are placed on. */
+export interface ICorestoreEndpointSelection {
+  /**
+   * The node's `corestoreDatabase` when an enabled database binding of the service is placed on it,
+   * otherwise `null`. A node stating none is `database-endpoint-missing`, never judged here.
+   */
+  database: IPlatformDatabaseEndpoint | null;
+  /**
+   * The node's `corestoreObjectStorage` when an enabled object-storage binding of the service is
+   * placed on it, otherwise `null`. A node stating none is `objectstorage-endpoint-missing`.
+   */
+  objectStorage: IPlatformObjectStorageEndpoint | null;
+  /** The current protected authority's platform endpoints, which the selected ids resolve against. */
+  platformEndpoints: IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority['platformEndpoints'];
+  /** The runtime spec's network: `attached` selects its `platformEndpointIds`, `isolated` selects none. */
+  network: TServiceRuntimeNetwork;
+}
+
+type TPlatformEndpoint = IRuntimeNetworkProtectedAuthority['platformEndpoints'][number];
+
+const selectedPlatformEndpoints = (selectionArg: ICorestoreEndpointSelection): TPlatformEndpoint[] => {
+  if (selectionArg.network.mode !== 'attached') return [];
+  const selectedIds = new Set(selectionArg.network.platformEndpointIds);
+  return selectionArg.platformEndpoints.filter((endpointArg) => selectedIds.has(endpointArg.id));
+};
+
+/** Platform endpoints are IPv4, so only a canonical IPv4 host can be one; a DNS name or IPv6 literal never is. */
+const selectsTcp = (endpointsArg: TPlatformEndpoint[], hostArg: string, portArg: number): boolean => (
+  isNetworkIpv4(hostArg) && endpointsArg.some((endpointArg) => endpointArg.address === hostArg
+    && endpointArg.protocol === 'tcp' && endpointArg.port === portArg)
+);
+
+/** The origin's port, or the scheme's default (80 for `http:`, 443 for `https:`) when it states none. */
+const objectStorageOriginPort = (originArg: URL): number => (
+  originArg.port === '' ? (originArg.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80) : Number(originArg.port)
+);
+
+/**
+ * Which of a node's Corestore endpoints a service's workload would dial without its network
+ * selecting them, as the service runtime refusals that name them; empty when none.
+ *
+ * An endpoint is selected when one of the spec's selected platform endpoints has the endpoint's host
+ * as its `address`, `tcp` as its `protocol` and the endpoint's port as its `port`: the database
+ * endpoint's `host` and `port`, and the object-storage endpoint origin's host and port, or 80 for
+ * `http:` and 443 for `https:` when the origin states none. An `isolated` network selects nothing, a
+ * selected id the protected authority does not hold selects nothing, and a DNS-name or IPv6 host is
+ * never selected. Only a valid endpoint is judged: one `validatePlatformDatabaseEndpoint` or
+ * `validatePlatformObjectStorageEndpoint` refuses is the `-missing` refusal's, not this one's. The
+ * answer is sorted, so it does not depend on the order of the inputs.
+ */
+export const findUnselectedCorestoreEndpoints = (
+  selectionArg: ICorestoreEndpointSelection,
+): TCorestoreEndpointSelectionRefusal[] => {
+  const selected = selectedPlatformEndpoints(selectionArg);
+  const refusals: TCorestoreEndpointSelectionRefusal[] = [];
+  const database = selectionArg.database;
+  if (database !== null && validatePlatformDatabaseEndpoint(database).length === 0
+    && !selectsTcp(selected, database.host, database.port)) {
+    refusals.push('database-endpoint-unselected');
+  }
+  const objectStorage = selectionArg.objectStorage;
+  if (objectStorage !== null && validatePlatformObjectStorageEndpoint(objectStorage).length === 0) {
+    const origin = new URL(objectStorage.endpoint);
+    if (!selectsTcp(selected, origin.hostname, objectStorageOriginPort(origin))) {
+      refusals.push('objectstorage-endpoint-unselected');
+    }
+  }
+  return refusals;
+};

package/ts/platform/index.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import * as ai from './ai.js';
 import * as backup from './backup.js';
+import * as corestoreendpointselection from './corestoreendpointselection.js';
 import * as database from './database.js';
 import * as email from './email.js';
 import * as letter from './letter.js';
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ import * as types from './types.js';
 export {
   ai,
   backup,
+  corestoreendpointselection,
   database,
   email,
   letter,
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ export {
   types,
 };
 
+export * from './corestoreendpointselection.js';
 export * from './database.js';
 export * from './storage.js';
 export * from './objectstorage.js';

package/ts/platform/objectstorage.ts

@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ export const validatePlatformObjectStorageEndpoint = (
         errors.push(`${pathArg} endpoint must be a canonical origin without a path, query, `
           + 'fragment, trailing slash or default port');
       }
+      // A URL parser refuses a port above 65535 but reads port 0 as stated; no workload dials it.
+      if (parsedEndpoint.port !== '' && Number(parsedEndpoint.port) < 1) {
+        errors.push(`${pathArg} endpoint port must be from 1 to 65535`);
+      }
     }
   }
   if (typeof valueArg.region !== 'string'

package/ts/private/networkcontract.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,42 @@ export const failNetwork = (): never => { throw new Error('Runtime network proje
 export function requireNetwork(value: unknown): asserts value { if (!value) failNetwork(); }
 export const networkCanonical = (value: unknown): string => canonicalizeStrictJson(value, failNetwork);
 export const networkEqual = (left: unknown, right: unknown): boolean => networkCanonical(left) === networkCanonical(right);
-export const networkSafe = <T>(operation: () => T): T => { try { return operation(); } catch { return failNetwork(); } };
+
+/** The runtime network address plan's lists that must be stated in their one canonical order. */
+export type TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanOrderedField = 'prefixes' | 'pools' | 'resolvers' | 'platformEndpoints';
+
+/** The structure rules an address plan refusal names; `order` is the only one named so far. */
+export type TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureRule = 'order';
+
+/** Which list of a plan broke which structure rule; never a value from the plan. */
+export interface IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation {
+  field: TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanOrderedField;
+  rule: TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureRule;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A plan refused for a structure rule the contract names, rather than with the contract's generic
+ * rejection. It is the one error `networkSafe` lets through, so a caller can tell an administrator
+ * which list to fix; its message names the field and the rule and quotes nothing from the plan.
+ */
+export class RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError extends Error {
+  public readonly violation: IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation;
+
+  public constructor(violationArg: IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation) {
+    super(`Runtime network address plan rejected: ${violationArg.field} breaks the ${violationArg.rule} rule.`);
+    this.name = 'RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError';
+    this.violation = { field: violationArg.field, rule: violationArg.rule };
+  }
+}
+
+export const networkSafe = <T>(operation: () => T): T => {
+  try {
+    return operation();
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError) throw error;
+    return failNetwork();
+  }
+};
 
 /** Bound decoded transport input before canonicalization; never execute getters/toJSON. */
 export const captureNetwork = (value: unknown): unknown => networkSafe(() => {
@@ -174,10 +209,14 @@ export const networkHash = async (domain: string, value: { digest: TSha256Digest
   const { digest: omitted, ...payload } = value;
   return `sha256:${await createCanonicalJsonSha256Hex(networkCanonical({ domain, payload }), failNetwork)}`;
 };
-export const networkIpv4 = (value: unknown): string => {
-  requireNetwork(typeof value === 'string' && value.length <= 15);
+/** A canonical dotted-quad IPv4 literal: four decimal octets, no leading zeros. */
+export const isNetworkIpv4 = (value: unknown): value is string => {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length > 15) return false;
   const parts = value.split('.');
-  requireNetwork(parts.length === 4 && parts.every(part => /^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]{0,2})$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255));
+  return parts.length === 4 && parts.every(part => /^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]{0,2})$/.test(part) && Number(part) <= 255);
+};
+export const networkIpv4 = (value: unknown): string => {
+  requireNetwork(isNetworkIpv4(value));
   return value;
 };
 export const networkIpv4Number = (value: string): number => value.split('.').reduce((sum, part) => sum * 256 + Number(part), 0);

package/ts/requests/network.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ import type {
   IPrivateNetwork, IServicePrivateNetworks, ISetServicePrivateNetworks,
   TPrivateNetworkMutation,
 } from '../data/privatenetwork.js';
-import type { IServicePublishedPorts, ISetServicePublishedPorts } from '../data/networkprojection.js';
+import type {
+  IServiceNetworkEgress, IServicePublishedPorts, ISetServiceNetworkEgress, ISetServicePublishedPorts,
+} from '../data/networkprojection.js';
 
 /** Current organization picker data. Entries are never cached authorization grants. */
 export interface IReq_Cloudly_ListOwnedOrganizations extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ export interface IReq_Cloudly_SetServicePrivateNetworks extends plugins.typedreq
   response: { membership: IServicePrivateNetworks; replayed: boolean };
 }
 
-/** null means the service has never had an authorized published-port policy. */
+/** null means the service has never had a policy document, neither published ports nor egress. */
 export interface IReq_Cloudly_GetServicePublishedPorts extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
   plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Cloudly_GetServicePublishedPorts
 > {
@@ -80,6 +82,17 @@ export interface IReq_Cloudly_GetServicePublishedPorts extends plugins.typedrequ
   response: { publishedPorts: IServicePublishedPorts | null };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Writes the published-port half of one service's policy document, carrying its egress forward.
+ *
+ * One document per service holds its published ports and its egress under one `revision`. The
+ * first accepted write of either (`expectedRevision: null`) creates it: `setServicePublishedPorts`
+ * with egress `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []`, `setServiceNetworkEgress` with
+ * no published ports. From then on both reads return it, never null. It is an explicit policy: an
+ * attached spec stating `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []` matches it and reaches
+ * no public address and no platform endpoint; `network-policy-missing` means the service has no
+ * document at all.
+ */
 export interface IReq_Cloudly_SetServicePublishedPorts extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
   plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Cloudly_SetServicePublishedPorts
 > {
@@ -93,6 +106,47 @@ export interface IReq_Cloudly_SetServicePublishedPorts extends plugins.typedrequ
   response: { publishedPorts: IServicePublishedPorts; replayed: boolean };
 }
 
+/**
+ * The egress half of one service's policy document; null means the service has never had a policy
+ * document. Only a verified administrator reads it: platform endpoints are platform authority.
+ */
+export interface IReq_Admin_Cloudly_GetServiceNetworkEgress extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
+  plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Admin_Cloudly_GetServiceNetworkEgress
+> {
+  method: 'getServiceNetworkEgress';
+  request: { identity: IIdentityCredential; organizationId: string; serviceId: string };
+  response: { networkEgress: IServiceNetworkEgress | null };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes the egress half of one service's policy document, carrying its published ports forward.
+ *
+ * Only a verified administrator writes it, as only an administrator writes the runtime spec whose
+ * attached network must state the same values. `expectedRevision` is the revision of the one
+ * document shared with the published ports; any other stored revision refuses the write, and an id
+ * that names no current platform endpoint refuses it. A retry of the exact body under the same
+ * `mutationId` answers the stored document with `replayed: true`.
+ *
+ * One document per service holds its published ports and its egress under one `revision`. The
+ * first accepted write of either (`expectedRevision: null`) creates it: `setServicePublishedPorts`
+ * with egress `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []`, `setServiceNetworkEgress` with
+ * no published ports. From then on both reads return it, never null. It is an explicit policy: an
+ * attached spec stating `publicEgress: false` and `platformEndpointIds: []` matches it and reaches
+ * no public address and no platform endpoint; `network-policy-missing` means the service has no
+ * document at all.
+ */
+export interface IReq_Admin_Cloudly_SetServiceNetworkEgress extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
+  plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Admin_Cloudly_SetServiceNetworkEgress
+> {
+  method: 'setServiceNetworkEgress';
+  request: { identity: IIdentityCredential; mutation: ISetServiceNetworkEgress };
+  /**
+   * The accepted document including its `revision`; historical on replay. Acceptance is neither an
+   * admitted workload nor applied packet state.
+   */
+  response: { networkEgress: IServiceNetworkEgress; replayed: boolean };
+}
+
 export interface IRequest_Any_Cloudly_GetNetworkNodes {
   method: 'getNetworkNodes';
   request: {};
@@ -108,7 +162,8 @@ export interface IRequest_Any_Cloudly_GetNetworkNodes {
  * validates the plan with `snapshotRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan`, decides the change with
  * `admitRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanChange`, refuses the change while a resolver or platform endpoint
  * it removes or changes is still referenced, and answers with the stored plan: at its new revision,
- * or unchanged.
+ * or unchanged. A list stated out of its canonical order (see `IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan`) is
+ * refused `plan-unsorted`, naming the list as the refusal's reference; the plan is never reordered.
  */
 export interface IReq_Any_Cloudly_SetRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
   plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Any_Cloudly_SetRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan