@serve.zone/interfaces 32.28.0 → 32.29.0

package/ts/data/settings.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { TServiceMailSubmissionTlsMode } from './mail.js';
 import type { ISystemSecretOwner, TSecretManagementScope } from './secret.js';
+import { hasExactKeys, readDataProperties } from '../private/dataproperties.js';
 
 export interface ICloudlyS3BackupTargetDescriptor {
   type: 's3';
@@ -109,3 +110,129 @@ export const cloudlySystemSecretKeys = Object.freeze({
   coreMailSmtpTlsCertificatePem: 'COREMAIL_SMTP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_PEM',
   coreMailSmtpTlsPrivateKeyPem: 'COREMAIL_SMTP_TLS_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM',
 } as const);
+
+/**
+ * How far Cloudly's enrollment as a dcrouter gateway client has come.
+ *
+ * - `unconfigured` — no `dcrouterGatewayUrl` is set, so there is nothing to enroll with.
+ * - `checking` — Cloudly is validating or provisioning its credential right now.
+ * - `ready` — Cloudly holds a validated gateway-client credential whose policy matches its settings.
+ * - `degraded` — dcrouter could not be reached; Cloudly retries on its own.
+ * - `admin-bootstrap-required` — the held credential is missing, rejected or stale (its policy no
+ *   longer matches Cloudly's settings or the runtime network address plan's DNS record allowance),
+ *   and only a dcrouter admin token handed in with `bootstrapExternalGatewayCredential` moves it on.
+ */
+export type TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus =
+  | 'unconfigured'
+  | 'checking'
+  | 'ready'
+  | 'degraded'
+  | 'admin-bootstrap-required';
+
+/** Cloudly's gateway-client enrollment as an administrator reads it; it never carries a credential. */
+export interface IExternalGatewayEnrollmentState {
+  status: TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus;
+  /** Why the state is what it is, in Cloudly's words; absent when there is nothing to say. */
+  reason?: string;
+  /** When Cloudly last finished a check, in milliseconds since the epoch. */
+  lastCheckedAt?: number;
+  /** When Cloudly retries on its own, for a `degraded` state. */
+  nextRetryAt?: number;
+  /** Whether Cloudly still holds a validated runtime credential it can serve gateway calls with. */
+  cachedValidationProof: boolean;
+  /** Whether a provisioned candidate credential still awaits finalization at dcrouter. */
+  finalizationPending: boolean;
+}
+
+export const externalGatewayEnrollmentStatuses = Object.freeze([
+  'unconfigured',
+  'checking',
+  'ready',
+  'degraded',
+  'admin-bootstrap-required',
+] as const satisfies readonly TExternalGatewayEnrollmentStatus[]);
+
+export const externalGatewayBootstrapContract = Object.freeze({
+  /**
+   * The longest admin bootstrap token Cloudly accepts, in bytes. A dcrouter API token is far
+   * shorter; the bound only keeps an unopened envelope from carrying an arbitrary payload.
+   */
+  maximumTokenBytes: 1_024,
+  /** The longest `reason` an enrollment state carries, in characters. */
+  maximumReasonLength: 4_096,
+  /** The longest `expectedGatewayUrl` a bootstrap request states, in characters. */
+  maximumGatewayUrlLength: 2_048,
+  /** The longest `expectedGatewayClientId` a bootstrap request states, in characters. */
+  maximumGatewayClientIdLength: 253,
+} as const);
+
+/** Every reason Cloudly answers instead of bootstrapping its gateway-client credential. */
+export const externalGatewayBootstrapRefusals = Object.freeze([
+  /** Cloudly has no `dcrouterGatewayUrl` or no `dcrouterGatewayClientId` to enroll under. */
+  'gateway-unconfigured',
+  /**
+   * The request's `expectedGatewayUrl` or `expectedGatewayClientId` is not what Cloudly's settings
+   * state, so the token would reach a dcrouter or a client the administrator did not name.
+   */
+  'gateway-target-mismatch',
+  /** The sealed token does not open, or what it opens to breaks the bootstrap token rule. */
+  'bootstrap-token-invalid',
+  /** dcrouter did not accept the token at all: unknown, revoked, disabled or expired. */
+  'bootstrap-token-rejected',
+  /** dcrouter accepted the token, but its role is not `admin`, so it cannot provision a client. */
+  'bootstrap-token-not-admin',
+  /** A candidate credential from an earlier provisioning is still being finalized; retry later. */
+  'bootstrap-candidate-pending',
+  /** dcrouter could not be reached; the held credential is unchanged and the call may be repeated. */
+  'gateway-unreachable',
+  /** dcrouter refused provisioning, or the credential it issued failed Cloudly's validation. */
+  'bootstrap-provisioning-refused',
+] as const);
+
+export type TExternalGatewayBootstrapRefusal = typeof externalGatewayBootstrapRefusals[number];
+
+/**
+ * The bootstrap token rule, judged on the opened bytes: 1 to `maximumTokenBytes` bytes of visible
+ * ASCII, with no whitespace or control character. The token is dcrouter's; this only refuses what
+ * could never be one, so a pasted line break or an empty pipe never reaches dcrouter.
+ */
+export const isExternalGatewayBootstrapToken = (valueArg: unknown): valueArg is Uint8Array => (
+  valueArg instanceof Uint8Array
+  && valueArg.length > 0
+  && valueArg.length <= externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumTokenBytes
+  && valueArg.every((byteArg) => byteArg >= 0x21 && byteArg <= 0x7e)
+);
+
+const isEpochMilliseconds = (valueArg: unknown): boolean => (
+  Number.isSafeInteger(valueArg) && (valueArg as number) >= 0
+);
+
+/** Structural check of an enrollment state as a client receives it; every problem is named. */
+export const validateExternalGatewayEnrollmentState = (valueArg: unknown): string[] => {
+  const state = readDataProperties(valueArg);
+  if (state === null) return ['external gateway enrollment state must be a plain record'];
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  if (!hasExactKeys(state, ['status', 'cachedValidationProof', 'finalizationPending'],
+    ['reason', 'lastCheckedAt', 'nextRetryAt'])) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment state contains fields outside its schema');
+  }
+  if (!externalGatewayEnrollmentStatuses.some((statusArg) => statusArg === state.status)) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment status is unknown');
+  }
+  if (state.reason !== undefined && (typeof state.reason !== 'string'
+    || state.reason.length === 0
+    || state.reason.length > externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumReasonLength)) {
+    errors.push('external gateway enrollment reason must be a bounded non-empty string');
+  }
+  for (const key of ['lastCheckedAt', 'nextRetryAt'] as const) {
+    if (state[key] !== undefined && !isEpochMilliseconds(state[key])) {
+      errors.push(`external gateway enrollment ${key} must be epoch milliseconds`);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const key of ['cachedValidationProof', 'finalizationPending'] as const) {
+    if (typeof state[key] !== 'boolean') {
+      errors.push(`external gateway enrollment ${key} must be a boolean`);
+    }
+  }
+  return errors;
+};

package/ts/private/networkcontract.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,42 @@ export const failNetwork = (): never => { throw new Error('Runtime network proje
 export function requireNetwork(value: unknown): asserts value { if (!value) failNetwork(); }
 export const networkCanonical = (value: unknown): string => canonicalizeStrictJson(value, failNetwork);
 export const networkEqual = (left: unknown, right: unknown): boolean => networkCanonical(left) === networkCanonical(right);
-export const networkSafe = <T>(operation: () => T): T => { try { return operation(); } catch { return failNetwork(); } };
+
+/** The runtime network address plan's lists that must be stated in their one canonical order. */
+export type TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanOrderedField = 'prefixes' | 'pools' | 'resolvers' | 'platformEndpoints';
+
+/** The structure rules an address plan refusal names; `order` is the only one named so far. */
+export type TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureRule = 'order';
+
+/** Which list of a plan broke which structure rule; never a value from the plan. */
+export interface IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation {
+  field: TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanOrderedField;
+  rule: TRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureRule;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A plan refused for a structure rule the contract names, rather than with the contract's generic
+ * rejection. It is the one error `networkSafe` lets through, so a caller can tell an administrator
+ * which list to fix; its message names the field and the rule and quotes nothing from the plan.
+ */
+export class RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError extends Error {
+  public readonly violation: IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation;
+
+  public constructor(violationArg: IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureViolation) {
+    super(`Runtime network address plan rejected: ${violationArg.field} breaks the ${violationArg.rule} rule.`);
+    this.name = 'RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError';
+    this.violation = { field: violationArg.field, rule: violationArg.rule };
+  }
+}
+
+export const networkSafe = <T>(operation: () => T): T => {
+  try {
+    return operation();
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof RuntimeNetworkAddressPlanStructureError) throw error;
+    return failNetwork();
+  }
+};
 
 /** Bound decoded transport input before canonicalization; never execute getters/toJSON. */
 export const captureNetwork = (value: unknown): unknown => networkSafe(() => {

package/ts/requests/network.ts

@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ export interface IRequest_Any_Cloudly_GetNetworkNodes {
  * validates the plan with `snapshotRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan`, decides the change with
  * `admitRuntimeNetworkAddressPlanChange`, refuses the change while a resolver or platform endpoint
  * it removes or changes is still referenced, and answers with the stored plan: at its new revision,
- * or unchanged.
+ * or unchanged. A list stated out of its canonical order (see `IRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan`) is
+ * refused `plan-unsorted`, naming the list as the refusal's reference; the plan is never reordered.
  */
 export interface IReq_Any_Cloudly_SetRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
   plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest, IReq_Any_Cloudly_SetRuntimeNetworkAddressPlan

package/ts/requests/settings.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 import * as plugins from '../plugins.js';
-import type { ICloudlySettings } from '../data/settings.js';
-import type { IIdentity } from '../data/user.js';
+import * as secretData from '../data/secret.js';
+import * as settingsData from '../data/settings.js';
+import type { IActiveSecretRecipientMetadata } from '../data/secret.js';
+import type { ICloudlySettings, IExternalGatewayEnrollmentState } from '../data/settings.js';
+import type { IIdentity, IIdentityCredential } from '../data/user.js';
+import { readDataProperties, hasExactKeys } from '../private/dataproperties.js';
 
 // Get Settings
 export interface IRequest_GetSettings extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest {
@@ -64,3 +68,159 @@ export interface IRequest_GetSetting extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITyp
     value: ICloudlySettings[keyof ICloudlySettings] | undefined;
   };
 }
+
+/** A dcrouter admin bootstrap token, sealed to Cloudly's active secret ingress recipient. */
+export interface IExternalGatewayBootstrapTokenInput {
+  mode: 'sealed';
+  /** Sealed under `data.createGatewayBootstrapEnvelopeContext` for the request's expected target. */
+  envelope: plugins.smartcrypto.IX25519EnvelopeV1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Enrolls Cloudly as its dcrouter gateway client with a dcrouter admin token an administrator
+ * hands in once.
+ *
+ * Cloudly opens the token, checks the target the request names against its own settings, asks
+ * dcrouter whether the token is an admin token, and provisions, finalizes and stores its own
+ * least-privilege gateway-client credential with it — under the policy its settings and the runtime
+ * network address plan state now. The admin token is used for this one call and never stored; the
+ * administrator revokes it at dcrouter afterwards. A refusal leaves the credential Cloudly already
+ * holds unchanged and is answered with one of `data.externalGatewayBootstrapRefusals`.
+ *
+ * This is the one way a gateway credential enters Cloudly, for a first enrollment and for the
+ * re-bootstrap a changed address plan or gateway setting asks for (`admin-bootstrap-required`).
+ */
+export interface IReq_Any_Cloudly_BootstrapExternalGatewayCredential
+extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
+  plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest,
+  IReq_Any_Cloudly_BootstrapExternalGatewayCredential
+> {
+  method: 'bootstrapExternalGatewayCredential';
+  request: {
+    identity: IIdentityCredential;
+    /** The `dcrouterGatewayUrl` the administrator read from Cloudly's settings. */
+    expectedGatewayUrl: string;
+    /** The `dcrouterGatewayClientId` the administrator read from Cloudly's settings. */
+    expectedGatewayClientId: string;
+    bootstrapToken: IExternalGatewayBootstrapTokenInput;
+  };
+  response: {
+    /** The enrollment after the bootstrap: `ready` when the new credential is Cloudly's runtime authority. */
+    state: IExternalGatewayEnrollmentState;
+  };
+}
+
+/** Cloudly's gateway-client enrollment state, for an administrator; it never carries a credential. */
+export interface IReq_Any_Cloudly_GetExternalGatewayEnrollmentState
+extends plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.implementsTR<
+  plugins.typedrequestInterfaces.ITypedRequest,
+  IReq_Any_Cloudly_GetExternalGatewayEnrollmentState
+> {
+  method: 'getExternalGatewayEnrollmentState';
+  request: {
+    identity: IIdentityCredential;
+  };
+  response: {
+    state: IExternalGatewayEnrollmentState;
+  };
+}
+
+const hasJwtIdentity = (valueArg: unknown): boolean => {
+  const identity = readDataProperties(valueArg);
+  return identity !== null && typeof identity.jwt === 'string' && identity.jwt.length > 0;
+};
+
+/** Structural check of the target a bootstrap request names; empty when both are well formed. */
+const validateExpectedGatewayTarget = (urlArg: unknown, clientIdArg: unknown): string[] => {
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  let url: URL | undefined;
+  if (typeof urlArg === 'string'
+    && urlArg.length > 0
+    && urlArg.length <= settingsData.externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumGatewayUrlLength) {
+    try {
+      url = new URL(urlArg);
+    } catch {
+      url = undefined;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!url
+    || url.protocol !== 'https:'
+    || url.username !== ''
+    || url.password !== ''
+    || url.search !== ''
+    || url.hash !== '') {
+    errors.push('bootstrap expectedGatewayUrl must be an HTTPS URL without credentials, query or fragment');
+  }
+  if (typeof clientIdArg !== 'string'
+    || clientIdArg.length === 0
+    || clientIdArg.length > settingsData.externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumGatewayClientIdLength
+    || !/^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(clientIdArg)) {
+    errors.push('bootstrap expectedGatewayClientId must be a bounded identifier without whitespace');
+  }
+  return errors;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Checks a bootstrap request against its schema and the active ingress recipient, without opening
+ * the envelope: the recipient, the context digest of the named target and the ciphertext bound of
+ * `data.externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumTokenBytes`. Every problem is named.
+ */
+export const validateBootstrapExternalGatewayCredentialRequest = async (
+  requestArg: unknown,
+  activeIngressRecipientArg: IActiveSecretRecipientMetadata,
+): Promise<string[]> => {
+  const request = readDataProperties(requestArg);
+  if (request === null) return ['bootstrap request must be a plain record'];
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  if (!hasExactKeys(request, ['identity', 'expectedGatewayUrl', 'expectedGatewayClientId', 'bootstrapToken'])) {
+    errors.push('bootstrap request contains fields outside its schema');
+  }
+  if (!hasJwtIdentity(request.identity)) {
+    errors.push('bootstrap identity must be a JWT credential');
+  }
+  const targetErrors = validateExpectedGatewayTarget(
+    request.expectedGatewayUrl,
+    request.expectedGatewayClientId,
+  );
+  errors.push(...targetErrors);
+  const tokenInput = readDataProperties(request.bootstrapToken);
+  if (tokenInput === null || tokenInput.mode !== 'sealed') {
+    errors.push('bootstrap token must be a sealed input');
+    return errors;
+  }
+  const expectedContext = targetErrors.length === 0
+    ? secretData.createGatewayBootstrapEnvelopeContext({
+        gatewayUrl: request.expectedGatewayUrl as string,
+        gatewayClientId: request.expectedGatewayClientId as string,
+      })
+    : new Uint8Array();
+  errors.push(...await secretData.validateSecretValueInputForRecipient(
+    tokenInput,
+    activeIngressRecipientArg,
+    expectedContext,
+  ));
+  const envelope = readDataProperties(tokenInput.envelope);
+  if (envelope !== null
+    && typeof envelope.ciphertext === 'string'
+    && envelope.ciphertext.length
+      > Math.ceil(settingsData.externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumTokenBytes * 4 / 3)) {
+    errors.push(
+      `bootstrap token must not exceed ${settingsData.externalGatewayBootstrapContract.maximumTokenBytes} bytes`,
+    );
+  }
+  return errors;
+};
+
+/** Checks an enrollment state read; every problem is named. */
+export const validateGetExternalGatewayEnrollmentStateRequest = (requestArg: unknown): string[] => {
+  const request = readDataProperties(requestArg);
+  if (request === null) return ['enrollment state request must be a plain record'];
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  if (!hasExactKeys(request, ['identity'])) {
+    errors.push('enrollment state request contains fields outside its schema');
+  }
+  if (!hasJwtIdentity(request.identity)) {
+    errors.push('enrollment state identity must be a JWT credential');
+  }
+  return errors;
+};