@serfab/cadre-host 0.10.0 → 0.12.0

package/src/server/origin-guard.ts

@@ -1,84 +1,84 @@
-/**
- * Origin guard — defeats DNS-rebind attacks against the loopback listener.
- *
- * The listener is bound to 127.0.0.1 only, but a malicious page on
- * `evil.example.com` can still resolve its own hostname to 127.0.0.1 and
- * speak HTTP to us. We mitigate by requiring that:
- *   - `Host` is `127.0.0.1[:port]` or `localhost[:port]` (case-insensitive),
- *   - `Origin` (when present) matches one of those origins.
- *
- * Forbidden requests return 403 with the standard error envelope.
- *
- * The expected port can be supplied as a constant or as a getter — the
- * server's port-fallback loop discovers the bound port only after `listen`,
- * but Fastify hooks must be registered before `ready`, so the guard reads
- * the port at request time via the getter.
- */
-
-import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-
-export interface OriginGuardOptions {
-  /** Bound port (constant) or a getter for the current bound port. */
-  port: number | (() => number);
-  /** Allow these additional hosts (test harnesses, integrations). */
-  extraAllowedHosts?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
-}
-
-const ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES = ['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1'] as const;
-
-export function registerOriginGuard(app: FastifyInstance, opts: OriginGuardOptions): void {
-  const getPort = typeof opts.port === 'function' ? opts.port : () => opts.port as number;
-  const extras = (opts.extraAllowedHosts ?? []).map((e) => e.toLowerCase());
-
-  app.addHook('onRequest', async (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => {
-    const port = getPort();
-    const allowedHosts = buildAllowedHostHeaders(port, extras);
-    const allowedOrigins = buildAllowedOrigins(port, extras);
-
-    const hostHeader = (request.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase();
-    if (!hostHeader || !allowedHosts.has(hostHeader)) {
-      return reply.code(403).send({
-        ok: false,
-        error: {
-          code: 'forbidden_origin',
-          message: `Host header "${request.headers.host ?? ''}" is not allowed`,
-        },
-      });
-    }
-    const origin = request.headers.origin;
-    if (typeof origin === 'string' && origin.length > 0) {
-      if (!allowedOrigins.has(origin.toLowerCase())) {
-        return reply.code(403).send({
-          ok: false,
-          error: {
-            code: 'forbidden_origin',
-            message: `Origin "${origin}" is not allowed`,
-          },
-        });
-      }
-    }
-    return undefined;
-  });
-}
-
-function buildAllowedHostHeaders(port: number, extras: ReadonlyArray<string>): Set<string> {
-  const set = new Set<string>();
-  for (const host of ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES) {
-    set.add(host);
-    set.add(`${host}:${port}`);
-  }
-  for (const e of extras) set.add(e);
-  return set;
-}
-
-function buildAllowedOrigins(port: number, extras: ReadonlyArray<string>): Set<string> {
-  const set = new Set<string>();
-  for (const host of ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES) {
-    set.add(`http://${host}`);
-    set.add(`http://${host}:${port}`);
-    set.add(`https://${host}`);
-    set.add(`https://${host}:${port}`);
-  }
-  for (const e of extras) set.add(e);
-  return set;
-}
+/**
+ * Origin guard — defeats DNS-rebind attacks against the loopback listener.
+ *
+ * The listener is bound to 127.0.0.1 only, but a malicious page on
+ * `evil.example.com` can still resolve its own hostname to 127.0.0.1 and
+ * speak HTTP to us. We mitigate by requiring that:
+ *   - `Host` is `127.0.0.1[:port]` or `localhost[:port]` (case-insensitive),
+ *   - `Origin` (when present) matches one of those origins.
+ *
+ * Forbidden requests return 403 with the standard error envelope.
+ *
+ * The expected port can be supplied as a constant or as a getter — the
+ * server's port-fallback loop discovers the bound port only after `listen`,
+ * but Fastify hooks must be registered before `ready`, so the guard reads
+ * the port at request time via the getter.
+ */
+
+import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+
+export interface OriginGuardOptions {
+  /** Bound port (constant) or a getter for the current bound port. */
+  port: number | (() => number);
+  /** Allow these additional hosts (test harnesses, integrations). */
+  extraAllowedHosts?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+}
+
+const ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES = ['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1'] as const;
+
+export function registerOriginGuard(app: FastifyInstance, opts: OriginGuardOptions): void {
+  const getPort = typeof opts.port === 'function' ? opts.port : () => opts.port as number;
+  const extras = (opts.extraAllowedHosts ?? []).map((e) => e.toLowerCase());
+
+  app.addHook('onRequest', async (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => {
+    const port = getPort();
+    const allowedHosts = buildAllowedHostHeaders(port, extras);
+    const allowedOrigins = buildAllowedOrigins(port, extras);
+
+    const hostHeader = (request.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase();
+    if (!hostHeader || !allowedHosts.has(hostHeader)) {
+      return reply.code(403).send({
+        ok: false,
+        error: {
+          code: 'forbidden_origin',
+          message: `Host header "${request.headers.host ?? ''}" is not allowed`,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+    const origin = request.headers.origin;
+    if (typeof origin === 'string' && origin.length > 0) {
+      if (!allowedOrigins.has(origin.toLowerCase())) {
+        return reply.code(403).send({
+          ok: false,
+          error: {
+            code: 'forbidden_origin',
+            message: `Origin "${origin}" is not allowed`,
+          },
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  });
+}
+
+function buildAllowedHostHeaders(port: number, extras: ReadonlyArray<string>): Set<string> {
+  const set = new Set<string>();
+  for (const host of ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES) {
+    set.add(host);
+    set.add(`${host}:${port}`);
+  }
+  for (const e of extras) set.add(e);
+  return set;
+}
+
+function buildAllowedOrigins(port: number, extras: ReadonlyArray<string>): Set<string> {
+  const set = new Set<string>();
+  for (const host of ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES) {
+    set.add(`http://${host}`);
+    set.add(`http://${host}:${port}`);
+    set.add(`https://${host}`);
+    set.add(`https://${host}:${port}`);
+  }
+  for (const e of extras) set.add(e);
+  return set;
+}

package/src/server/routes/grants-admin.ts

@@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
-/**
- * Donation grant **admin** HTTP routes — thin adapters around
- * `GrantAdminHandlers` (`createGrantAdminHandlers(service)`).
- *
- * Mount path: `/grants-admin` — the admin surface the `cadre-host grant` CLI
- * targets. It is **loopback, no bearer**: same-machine admin, matching
- * cadre-host's local-UI "no login" posture (see docs/cadre-host.md §
- * Security posture). This is distinct from the grantee-facing `/grants`
- * provisioning surface that carries the bearer gate — that arrives in the
- * `2-donation-service` ticket.
- */
-
-import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
-
-import type { GrantAdminHandlers } from '../../donation/types.js';
-
-export interface GrantsAdminRoutesOptions {
-  handlers: GrantAdminHandlers;
-}
-
-export function registerGrantsAdminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, opts: GrantsAdminRoutesOptions): void {
-  const { handlers } = opts;
-
-  app.get('/grants-admin', async () => {
-    return handlers.listGrants();
-  });
-
-  app.post('/grants-admin', async (request) => {
-    const body = (request.body ?? {}) as { label?: unknown; maxNodes?: unknown; ttlMs?: unknown };
-    const label = typeof body.label === 'string' ? body.label : '';
-    const args: { label: string; maxNodes?: number; ttlMs?: number } = { label };
-    if (typeof body.maxNodes === 'number') args.maxNodes = body.maxNodes;
-    if (typeof body.ttlMs === 'number') args.ttlMs = body.ttlMs;
-    return handlers.postGrant(args);
-  });
-
-  app.delete<{ Params: { token: string } }>('/grants-admin/:token', async (request) => {
-    await handlers.deleteGrant(request.params.token);
-    return { ok: true };
-  });
-}
+/**
+ * Donation grant **admin** HTTP routes — thin adapters around
+ * `GrantAdminHandlers` (`createGrantAdminHandlers(service)`).
+ *
+ * Mount path: `/grants-admin` — the admin surface the `cadre-host grant` CLI
+ * targets. It is **loopback, no bearer**: same-machine admin, matching
+ * cadre-host's local-UI "no login" posture (see docs/cadre-host.md §
+ * Security posture). This is distinct from the grantee-facing `/grants`
+ * provisioning surface that carries the bearer gate — that arrives in the
+ * `2-donation-service` ticket.
+ */
+
+import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
+
+import type { GrantAdminHandlers } from '../../donation/types.js';
+
+export interface GrantsAdminRoutesOptions {
+  handlers: GrantAdminHandlers;
+}
+
+export function registerGrantsAdminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, opts: GrantsAdminRoutesOptions): void {
+  const { handlers } = opts;
+
+  app.get('/grants-admin', async () => {
+    return handlers.listGrants();
+  });
+
+  app.post('/grants-admin', async (request) => {
+    const body = (request.body ?? {}) as { label?: unknown; maxNodes?: unknown; ttlMs?: unknown };
+    const label = typeof body.label === 'string' ? body.label : '';
+    const args: { label: string; maxNodes?: number; ttlMs?: number } = { label };
+    if (typeof body.maxNodes === 'number') args.maxNodes = body.maxNodes;
+    if (typeof body.ttlMs === 'number') args.ttlMs = body.ttlMs;
+    return handlers.postGrant(args);
+  });
+
+  app.delete<{ Params: { token: string } }>('/grants-admin/:token', async (request) => {
+    await handlers.deleteGrant(request.params.token);
+    return { ok: true };
+  });
+}