@serfab/cadre-core 1.16.0 → 1.18.0

package/dist/control-database.js

@@ -4,14 +4,19 @@ import { Database, FunctionFlags, TEXT_RETURN, createScalarFunction, registerPlu
 import cryptoPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto/plugin';
 import optimysticPlugin from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-optimystic/plugin';
 import { digest, randomBytes } from '@optimystic/quereus-plugin-crypto';
-import { CONTROL_SCHEMA } from './control-schema.js';
+import { createEmptyCollections } from '@serfab/quereus-plugin-sereus';
+import { APPLY_CONTROL_SCHEMA, CONTROL_SCHEMA_DECLARATION, CONTROL_SCHEMA_NAME, controlSchemaFileDeclaration } from './control-schema.js';
+import { refuseIncompatibleControlStore } from './control-schema-version.js';
 import { canonicalDatetime } from './canonical-datetime.js';
-import { controlAuthorizationFields, unboundAuthorizationFields, cadreInviteRowFields, CONTROL_TABLES } from './control-authorization.js';
-import { ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId, requireEd25519PublicKeyB64 } from './ed25519-key.js';
-import { verifyCadreInviteRow } from './peer-authorization.js';
-import { retryControlWrite, SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY } from './control-write-retry.js';
+import { controlAuthorizationFields, unboundAuthorizationFields, cadreInviteRowFields, ownerGrantRowFields, CONTROL_TABLES } from './control-authorization.js';
+import { requireEd25519PublicKeyB64 } from './ed25519-key.js';
+import { verifyCadreInviteRow, verifyOwnerGrantRow } from './peer-authorization.js';
+import { OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL } from './owner-key-export.js';
+import { retryControlWrite, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY, SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY } from './control-write-retry.js';
 import { isCohortUnreachableRead, retryControlRead } from './control-read-retry.js';
 import { chainMessages } from './control-retry.js';
+import { TableWatchRegistry } from './table-change-watch.js';
+import { MembershipView } from './membership-view.js';
 const log = debug('sereus:cadre:control-db');
 const timing = debug('sereus:cadre:timing');
 /**
@@ -40,12 +45,11 @@ export function generateStampId(peerId) {
  * present locally.
  *
  * Consent is bound to the strand's one-off `StampId` (see the consent branch of
- * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so the writer must read the live row before inserting.
- * The ordinary "host strand has not converged on this responder yet" case is caught
- * earlier and reported as `missing` by `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`;
- * reaching here means the row vanished between that check and the write, which is a
- * genuine race and is surfaced rather than left to fail the deferred `StrandExists`
- * CHECK at commit (which would drop the write with a far less legible error).
+ * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`), so a writer not handed the stamp reads the live row before
+ * inserting, and throws this when the row is absent rather than leaving it to fail the
+ * deferred `StrandExists` CHECK at commit (a far less legible error). The formation
+ * responder hands the stamp over from `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand`, which
+ * reports an absent row as `missing`; a row removed after that read fails the CHECK instead.
  */
 export class MissingHostStrandError extends Error {
     constructor(strandId, token) {
@@ -78,22 +82,23 @@ export class FormationAbortedError extends Error {
 /**
  * The invitation's seat budget is already spent: the count of recorded usage rows for the
  * invitation has reached its `TotalUses`, so this redemption cannot be given a seat. `token`
- * is the `FormationInvite.Token` or the `CadreInvite.Key`, whichever table the caller
- * redeemed against.
+ * is the `FormationInvite.Token`, the `CadreInvite.Key` or the `OwnerGrant.Key`, whichever
+ * table the caller redeemed against.
  *
  * Raised off the committed-count check ({@link ControlDatabase.assertSeatRemains}) ahead of
  * the write, inside {@link ControlDatabase.redeemInvitation} /
  * {@link ControlDatabase.recordFormationUsage}, off the same check for a cadre invitation
- * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemCadreInvite}), and off the unlocked pre-check
- * `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.authorizeUsage` runs before the manager issues a membership
- * pass — and off nothing else. It exists because
+ * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemCadreInvite}) and an owner grant
+ * ({@link ControlDatabase.redeemOwnerGrant}), and off the unlocked re-check
+ * `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.authorizeUsage` runs after an outside approval, before the
+ * manager issues a membership pass — and off nothing else. It exists because
  * without it the refusal surfaces as a generic `CHECK constraint failed: Authorized` from the
  * schema's own count-based cap clause, which the manager reports as a retryable
  * `Formation conflict, retry` — telling the joiner to retry something that can never succeed.
  * Two redemptions of one token racing on the SAME node serialize behind the local write
- * queue, so the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused here by name —
- * `StrandFormationManager.validateToken`'s `isTokenUsed` check cannot catch that, since it
- * ran before either redemption wrote anything.
+ * queue, so the loser reads the winner's committed row and is refused here by name — the
+ * use count `StrandFormationManager.validateToken` reads cannot catch that, since it was
+ * read before either redemption wrote anything.
  */
 export class InvitationExhaustedError extends Error {
     constructor(token, usesRecorded, totalUses) {
@@ -119,8 +124,42 @@ export class CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError extends Error {
         this.name = 'CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError';
     }
 }
-/** The refusal {@link CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError} wraps — the constraint named, as the engine words it. */
-const CADRE_INVITE_UNAUTHORIZED = /CHECK constraint failed: AuthorizedInsert\b/;
+/**
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.seatOwnerGrant} was refused by `OwnerGrant.AuthorizedInsert`: the
+ * grant twin of {@link CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError}, for the same two causes (the issuer's
+ * `OwnerKey` row has not replicated here yet or has since been removed; or a tampered row).
+ * Its own class rather than a shared one so a caller that handles invitation and grant
+ * bundles can tell by `instanceof` which credential was refused.
+ */
+export class OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError extends Error {
+    constructor(grantKey, issuerKey, options) {
+        super(`Owner grant ${grantKey} cannot be seated here: its issuer ${issuerKey} is not an owner on this node, or its signature does not verify`, options);
+        this.grantKey = grantKey;
+        this.issuerKey = issuerKey;
+        this.name = 'OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * An issued row (a `CadreInvite` or an `OwnerGrant`) the cadre holds that this node cannot read
+ * yet: {@link ControlDatabase.seatCadreInvite} / {@link ControlDatabase.seatOwnerGrant} had its
+ * insert refused by a cohort member already holding the row, and a refreshed read here still
+ * finds nothing; or the redemption that follows the seat finds no row. It clears once this
+ * node's store catches up, which is why the redemption paths answer it with the retryable
+ * `conflict` code.
+ */
+export class IssuedRowNotHereYetError extends Error {
+    constructor(table, key, options) {
+        super(`${table} ${key} is held by the cadre but not readable on this node yet; try again once it has synced`, options);
+        this.table = table;
+        this.key = key;
+        this.name = 'IssuedRowNotHereYetError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The refusal {@link CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError} and {@link OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError}
+ * wrap — the constraint named, as the engine words it; both tables name theirs `AuthorizedInsert`.
+ */
+const ISSUER_UNAUTHORIZED = /CHECK constraint failed: AuthorizedInsert\b/;
 /**
  * Parse a stored Quereus `datetime` value into epoch milliseconds.
  *
@@ -288,6 +327,39 @@ export function cadreInviteConsentMessage(partyId, fields) {
         fields.inviteKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.peerKey,
     ]);
 }
+/**
+ * The exact bytes an owner signs to seat an `OwnerGrant` row — the TS mirror of the `'add'`
+ * digest in `OwnerGrant.AuthorizedInsert`, over the whole row in the schema's order with
+ * nullable columns as `''` (`ownerGrantRowFields`, shared with the base64url verifier
+ * `peer-authorization.ts`'s `ownerGrantAddDigest`). `expiresAt` must already be the stored
+ * canonical `datetime` string, as {@link ControlDatabase.insertOwnerGrant} produces it, for
+ * the reason on {@link cadreInviteAddMessage}.
+ */
+export function ownerGrantAddMessage(partyId, row) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.OwnerGrant', 'add', partyId, ownerGrantRowFields(row));
+}
+/**
+ * The exact bytes the HOLDER of an owner grant signs, with the grant's private key, to redeem
+ * it once — the TS mirror of the `'redeem'` digest `OwnerGrantUsage.GrantPossessed` verifies
+ * against the grant's public key. Binding the seated key and the nonce means a captured
+ * redemption can seat no other key and spend no other use.
+ */
+export function ownerGrantRedeemMessage(partyId, fields) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage', 'redeem', partyId, [
+        fields.grantKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.seatedKey,
+    ]);
+}
+/**
+ * The exact bytes the SEATED key signs, proving the holder holds it — the TS mirror of the
+ * `'consent'` digest `OwnerGrantUsage.OwnerConsented` verifies against `SeatedKey`. Same
+ * fields as {@link ownerGrantRedeemMessage} under a distinct action tag, so neither
+ * signature can stand in for the other.
+ */
+export function ownerGrantConsentMessage(partyId, fields) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage', 'consent', partyId, [
+        fields.grantKey, fields.usageStampId, fields.seatedKey,
+    ]);
+}
 /** Runtime guard for the dynamic-`from` count, over the one table list. */
 const CONTROL_TABLE_SET = new Set(CONTROL_TABLES);
 /**
@@ -306,13 +378,15 @@ const GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN = {
     JoinRequest: 'Id',
     DeviceToken: 'PeerId',
     CadreInvite: 'Key',
+    OwnerGrant: 'Key',
 };
+/** The write-reason prefix each {@link IssuedTable}'s seat and withdrawal log under. */
+const ISSUED_TABLE_REASON = { CadreInvite: 'cadre-invite', OwnerGrant: 'owner-grant' };
 /**
  * The exact bytes an owner signs to append one `Revocation` tombstone — `Revocation.Authorized`
- * binds the whole (TableName, RowKey, StampId) row under its own domain tag. Shared by every
- * tombstone writer (a guarded removal, a `CadreInvite` withdrawal, the ledger marker) so the
- * field order lives in one place; the base64url verifier is `peer-authorization.ts`'s
- * `revocationDigest`.
+ * binds the whole (TableName, RowKey, StampId) row under its own domain tag. Shared by both
+ * tombstone writers (a guarded removal, an issued row's withdrawal) so the field order lives
+ * in one place; the base64url verifier is `peer-authorization.ts`'s `revocationDigest`.
  */
 function revocationTombstoneMessage(partyId, ref) {
     return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'remove', partyId, [ref.tableName, ref.rowKey, ref.stampId]);
@@ -321,28 +395,46 @@ function revocationTombstoneMessage(partyId, ref) {
  * The exact bytes an owner signs to seat a further `OwnerKey` row (the signed-add branch of
  * `OwnerKey.Authorized`); the base64url twin is `peer-authorization.ts`'s `ownerKeyAddDigest`.
  */
-function ownerKeyAddMessage(partyId, key, stampId) {
-    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', partyId, [key, stampId]);
+function ownerKeyAddMessage(partyId, key, label, stampId) {
+    return buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.OwnerKey', 'add', partyId, [key, label ?? '', stampId]);
 }
-function signGuardedRemoval(partyId, tableName, rowKey, stampId, signMessage) {
+/**
+ * An owner key's label as its row stores it: trimmed, a blank one left out, and refused past
+ * {@link OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL} by name rather than by the schema's `LabelLength` check.
+ * Idempotent, so a caller that checks before opening an owner approval can pass the result on.
+ */
+export function ownerKeyLabel(label) {
+    const trimmed = label?.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (trimmed.length > OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL) {
+        throw new Error(`An owner key's label must be at most ${OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL} characters (this one has ${trimmed.length})`);
+    }
+    return trimmed;
+}
+async function signGuardedRemoval(partyId, tableName, rowKey, stampId, signMessage) {
     const ref = { tableName, rowKey, stampId };
     return {
         ref,
-        signature: signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage(`CadreControl.${tableName}`, 'remove', partyId, [rowKey, stampId])),
-        revocationSignature: signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(partyId, ref)),
+        signature: await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage(`CadreControl.${tableName}`, 'remove', partyId, [rowKey, stampId])),
+        revocationSignature: await signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(partyId, ref)),
     };
 }
 /**
- * The rejection a second insert of an already-seated id into `table` produces, as the
+ * The rejection a second insert of an already-seated key into `table` produces, as the
  * optimystic vtab words it (`uniqueConstraintMessage`, qualified by table name only — no
- * schema prefix, matching `test/control-constraint-helpers.ts`'s `expectUniqueViolation`).
+ * schema prefix, matching `test/control-constraint-helpers.ts`'s `expectUniqueViolation`),
+ * naming the table's {@link GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN}.
  *
  * Each table's `StampId` is unique too, but a fresh stamp is minted per insert attempt, so
- * only the primary key can collide on a repeat insert. Matching the column explicitly
- * keeps any OTHER uniqueness failure out of the caller's idempotency branch.
+ * only the primary key can collide on a repeat insert. An issued row's bundle copy repeats its
+ * stamp as well, and the engine still names the key (`control-owner-grant.spec.ts` pins it).
+ * Matching the column explicitly keeps any OTHER uniqueness failure out of the caller's
+ * idempotency branch.
  */
-function idConflictPattern(table) {
-    return new RegExp(`UNIQUE constraint failed: ${table}\\.Id\\b`, 'i');
+function keyConflictPattern(table) {
+    return new RegExp(`UNIQUE constraint failed: ${table}\\.${GUARDED_KEY_COLUMN[table]}\\b`, 'i');
 }
 /**
  * Did this write to `table` fail because the strand id is already seated there?
@@ -350,7 +442,8 @@ function idConflictPattern(table) {
  * {@link CadreNode.publishStrand} uses this to tell "my own earlier publish already
  * landed" (re-read, and no-op when the row matches) apart from every other rejection —
  * an unauthorized signer, a retired stamp — which must keep surfacing. For `JoinedStrand`
- * the same test tells "another machine of this party already published this join" apart.
+ * the same test tells "another machine of this party already published this join" apart, and
+ * for `StrandPartyKey` it tells a founding that this party's key for the id is already seated.
  *
  * Matched by TEXT, not by type: the typed engine error does not survive the trip out of
  * optimystic (same constraint the retry classifiers in `control-write-retry.ts` document).
@@ -360,7 +453,16 @@ function idConflictPattern(table) {
  * reword reddens there.
  */
 export function isStrandIdConflict(error, table) {
-    return errorChainMatches(error, idConflictPattern(table));
+    return errorChainMatches(error, keyConflictPattern(table));
+}
+/**
+ * Did a seat of an issued row fail because a cohort member already holds a row under its key?
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.seatCadreInvite} / {@link ControlDatabase.seatOwnerGrant} reach this
+ * on a node whose store lags the cohort: its guard read missed the row, and the member that
+ * checked the commit refused the insert. Text-matched, failing closed, like {@link isStrandIdConflict}.
+ */
+export function isIssuedRowKeyConflict(error, table) {
+    return errorChainMatches(error, keyConflictPattern(table));
 }
 /**
  * Did {@link ControlDatabase.insertJoinRequest} fail because the party already holds a
@@ -372,7 +474,7 @@ export function isStrandIdConflict(error, table) {
  * until the next reap pass.
  */
 export function isPendingJoinConflict(error) {
-    return errorChainMatches(error, idConflictPattern('JoinRequest'));
+    return errorChainMatches(error, keyConflictPattern('JoinRequest'));
 }
 /**
  * The `JoinRequest.Id` of an invitation: the base64url sha256 `digest` of its token. One row
@@ -396,69 +498,48 @@ export class PendingJoinChangedError extends Error {
     }
 }
 /**
- * The one `CadreControl.Revocation` row that retires nothing, filed once by an owner
- * ({@link ControlDatabase.openRevocationLedger}) so the table is never a never-written
- * block. The schema's table comment says why that matters and why the row can never read
- * as a retirement; `RowIsGone` pins this exact triple.
+ * A `CadreControl.Revocation` row that retires nothing, which parties founded before
+ * `control-collections-created-at-cadre-founding` may hold: an owner filed it so the table
+ * had a collection, which genesis now creates. Nothing files it now. `RowIsGone` still admits
+ * this exact triple, and {@link ControlDatabase.queryRevocations} skips it.
  */
-export const REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER = {
+const REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER = {
     tableName: 'Revocation',
     rowKey: 'ledger',
     stampId: 'opened',
 };
-/**
- * The rejection a second insert of the ledger marker produces: the optimystic vtab's
- * primary-key wording (see {@link idConflictPattern}), naming both columns of
- * `Revocation`'s composite key. Applied only to the marker's own insert, whose key
- * ('Revocation', 'opened') no row but the marker can hold (`RowIsGone`), and `Revocation`
- * has no other unique constraint.
- */
-const REVOCATION_LEDGER_CONFLICT = /UNIQUE constraint failed: Revocation\.TableName, Revocation\.StampId\b/i;
-/** Did the ledger marker's insert fail because the marker is already filed? Text-matched, failing closed, like {@link isStrandIdConflict}. */
-function isRevocationLedgerConflict(error) {
-    return errorChainMatches(error, REVOCATION_LEDGER_CONFLICT);
-}
 /** Whether any message in `error`'s cause chain matches `pattern`; false for a non-`Error`. */
 function errorChainMatches(error, pattern) {
     return error instanceof Error && chainMessages(error).some(message => pattern.test(message));
 }
 /**
  * Project `CadrePeer` rows into the {@link SeedPeer} list a seed, or a cadre invitation
- * redemption reply, carries.
+ * redemption reply, carries. `minterPeerId` is the machine minting the seed or answering the
+ * redemption; it contributes an entry only through its own `CadrePeer` row.
  *
- * Owner identity is sourced from the `OwnerKey` table, not from the transport peer id. An
- * Ed25519 libp2p peer id embeds its public key (identity multihash), so each peer's ed25519
- * key is derivable from its `PeerId`; a peer is an owner iff that derived key is in
- * `ownerKeys`. This makes any owner node markable — not just the local one. A non-Ed25519
- * or unparsable id yields a non-owner rather than failing the whole projection.
- *
- * NOTE: this is the one owner lookup deliberately left on the REPLICATED table rather than
- * the node-local anchor. `SeedPeer.isOwner` is a dial hint — the receiver dials owner-flagged
- * peers first — not a trust decision, and the receiver re-derives real trust from its own
- * anchor. So a polluted table costs at most a wasted dial, while anchoring here would
- * silently drop legitimate co-owners this node never pinned. If `isOwner` ever gates
- * anything the receiver TRUSTS, move it to the anchor.
+ * A peer is `preferred` when it is the minter, the one machine certain to be reachable by the
+ * receiver at that moment, since it is delivering the seed or the reply, or an always-on
+ * machine (`Profile = 'storage'`), the ones that stay dialable. Preference is a dial hint and
+ * reads no `OwnerKey` row: owner keys are not machines, and a receiver derives trust from its
+ * own anchor, never from this list. A `Profile` is self-declared and not checked here, so a
+ * machine misdeclaring one costs the receiver a wasted dial at most.
  */
-export function projectSeedPeers(rows, ownerKeys) {
-    return rows.map(({ peerId, multiaddr }) => {
-        const pubKeyB64 = ed25519PublicKeyB64FromPeerId(peerId);
-        const isOwner = pubKeyB64 !== null && ownerKeys.has(pubKeyB64);
-        return {
-            peerId,
-            multiaddrs: multiaddr ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
-            isOwner,
-            ...(isOwner ? { publicKey: pubKeyB64 } : {}),
-        };
-    });
+export function projectSeedPeers(rows, minterPeerId) {
+    return rows.map(({ peerId, multiaddr, profile }) => ({
+        peerId,
+        multiaddrs: multiaddr ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
+        preferred: peerId === minterPeerId || profile === 'storage',
+    }));
 }
 /**
- * The conditions a cadre invitation must still meet to be redeemed, short of its use count:
- * not withdrawn, unexpired (`expiresAt <= now` is expired, as the redemption refuses it),
- * and issued by a current owner. Shared by {@link ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite},
- * {@link ControlDatabase.isCadreInviteLive} and {@link ControlDatabase.listCadreInviteStatuses}
- * so they cannot drift from each other, or from `CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`.
+ * The conditions an issued credential (a cadre invitation or an owner grant) must still meet
+ * to be redeemed, short of its use count: not withdrawn, unexpired (`expiresAt <= now` is
+ * expired, as the redemption refuses it), and issued by a current owner. Shared by
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.hasLiveCadreInvite}, {@link ControlDatabase.isCadreInviteLive},
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.listCadreInviteStatuses} and their owner-grant twins so they cannot
+ * drift from each other, or from `CadreInviteUsage.Authorized` / `OwnerGrantUsage.Authorized`.
  */
-function cadreInviteStillOpen(row, withdrawn, owners, nowMs) {
+function issuedRowStillOpen(row, withdrawn, owners, nowMs) {
     if (withdrawn.has(row.stampId) || !owners.has(row.issuerKey)) {
         return false;
     }
@@ -476,31 +557,97 @@ function cadreInviteStillOpen(row, withdrawn, owners, nowMs) {
  * hold, so a reaped row is recoverable by re-forming. `JoinRequest` is reapable for the same
  * reason: the inviting party and the user also hold its invitation. `OwnerKey` has no
  * production removal path and `MinOneOwner` makes an automated owner-key reap a
- * party-bricking hazard. `CadreInvite` is never deleted at all (its tombstone is a
- * withdrawal over a row that stays), so there is nothing to reap.
+ * party-bricking hazard. `CadreInvite` and `OwnerGrant` are never deleted at all (their
+ * tombstones are withdrawals over rows that stay), so there is nothing to reap.
  */
 export const REAPABLE_TABLES = ['CadrePeer', 'DeviceToken', 'ValidationKey', 'JoinedStrand', 'JoinRequest'];
 /**
  * Runtime membership test for {@link REAPABLE_TABLES}, narrowing a tombstone's
  * `TableName` to the subset {@link ControlDatabase.reapRevokedRow} accepts. A tombstone
- * naming an excluded table (`Strand`, `OwnerKey`, `CadreInvite`) is skipped silently —
+ * naming an excluded table (`Strand`, `OwnerKey`, `CadreInvite`, `OwnerGrant`) is skipped silently —
  * `Strand` tombstones are the common case in a party that has unpublished a strand, so a
  * log line per skip would be per-pass noise.
  */
 const REAPABLE_TABLE_SET = new Set(REAPABLE_TABLES);
 const isReapableTable = (table) => REAPABLE_TABLE_SET.has(table);
-/** Every `CadreInvite` column, in the order {@link cadreInviteRowOf} reads them; callers append their `where`. */
-const CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, PeerId, GrantsOwner, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId from CadreControl.CadreInvite';
+/**
+ * The full-table scans the `Revocation`, `CadrePeer` and `OwnerKey` membership views load
+ * ({@link ControlDatabase.readMembershipRows}); the four chain tables' scans sit beside their
+ * row mappers below. Specs rig these reads by their text: `from CadreControl.Revocation`, and
+ * the `CadrePeer` scan by its `select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId` prefix, which no other
+ * `CadrePeer` statement shares.
+ */
+const REVOCATION_SELECT_SQL = 'select TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt, SignerKey, SignerSig from CadreControl.Revocation';
+const CADRE_PEER_SELECT_SQL = 'select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage, PublicKey, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer';
+const OWNER_KEY_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, Label, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage from CadreControl.OwnerKey';
+/** A stored `CadrePeer` row as a {@link CadrePeerRow}. */
+function cadrePeerRowOf(row) {
+    return {
+        peerId: row.PeerId,
+        publicKey: row.PublicKey ?? null,
+        multiaddr: row.Multiaddr ?? null,
+        updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
+        profile: row.Profile ?? null,
+        sig: row.Sig ?? null,
+        stampId: row.StampId ?? null,
+        vouchOwner: row.VouchOwner ?? null,
+        vouchSig: row.VouchSig ?? null,
+        vouchUsage: row.VouchUsage ?? null,
+    };
+}
+/** A {@link CadrePeerRow} as the address record its machine signed ({@link PeerAddressRecord}); see {@link ControlDatabase.queryPeerRecord} for the coalescing. */
+function peerAddressRecordOf(row) {
+    const multiaddr = row.multiaddr ?? '';
+    return {
+        peerId: row.peerId,
+        publicKey: row.publicKey ?? '',
+        addrs: multiaddr.length > 0 ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
+        updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
+        profile: row.profile,
+        sig: row.sig ?? '',
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * {@link ControlDatabase.reauthorizeCadrePeer}'s decision over the row as read: the row to write,
+ * or the {@link CadrePeerRetouchOutcome} that says why nothing is written — no readable row (a
+ * stampless row counts, since the voucher digest binds the stamp), or a self-published row in
+ * `'rebroadcast'` mode. One function so the pre-check outside the lock and the re-check inside it
+ * cannot disagree.
+ */
+function retouchTarget(row, mode) {
+    if (row === null || row.stampId === null) {
+        return 'absent';
+    }
+    if (mode === 'rebroadcast' && row.sig !== null) {
+        return 'self-published';
+    }
+    return { stampId: row.stampId, updatedAt: row.updatedAt };
+}
+/** A stored `Revocation` row as a {@link RevocationRow}; the caller has already skipped {@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}. */
+function revocationRowOf(row) {
+    return {
+        tableName: row.TableName,
+        rowKey: row.RowKey,
+        stampId: row.StampId,
+        reissuedAt: row.ReissuedAt ?? 0,
+        signerKey: row.SignerKey,
+        signerSig: row.SignerSig,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Every `CadreInvite` column, in the order {@link cadreInviteRowOf} reads them: the full scan the
+ * `CadreInvite` membership view loads, and the base the point reads append their `where` to.
+ */
+const CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, PeerId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId from CadreControl.CadreInvite';
 /**
  * A stored `CadreInvite` row as a {@link CadreInviteRow}. `ExpiresAt` is kept as the
  * engine-canonical string it reads back as — the form the `'add'` signature covers — never
- * parsed to ms here; `GrantsOwner` is the schema's 0/1 integer.
+ * parsed to ms here.
  */
 function cadreInviteRowOf(row) {
     return {
         key: row.Key,
         peerId: row.PeerId ?? null,
-        grantsOwner: Number(row.GrantsOwner) === 1,
         expiresAt: row.ExpiresAt == null ? null : String(row.ExpiresAt),
         totalUses: row.TotalUses ?? null,
         issuerKey: row.IssuerKey,
@@ -508,6 +655,8 @@ function cadreInviteRowOf(row) {
         stampId: row.StampId,
     };
 }
+/** The full scan the `CadreInviteUsage` membership view loads, in the order {@link cadreInviteUsageRowOf} reads it. */
+const CADRE_INVITE_USAGE_SELECT_SQL = 'select UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage';
 /** A stored `CadreInviteUsage` row as a {@link CadreInviteUsageRow}. */
 function cadreInviteUsageRowOf(row) {
     return {
@@ -516,11 +665,37 @@ function cadreInviteUsageRowOf(row) {
         peerId: row.PeerId,
         peerKey: row.PeerKey,
         peerStampId: row.PeerStampId,
-        ownerStampId: row.OwnerStampId ?? null,
         inviteSig: row.InviteSig,
         peerSig: row.PeerSig,
     };
 }
+/** Every `OwnerGrant` column, in the order {@link ownerGrantRowOf} reads them; as {@link CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL}, the view's scan and the point read's base. */
+const OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL = 'select Key, Label, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId from CadreControl.OwnerGrant';
+/** A stored `OwnerGrant` row as an {@link OwnerGrantRow}; `ExpiresAt` kept canonical, as {@link cadreInviteRowOf} keeps it. */
+function ownerGrantRowOf(row) {
+    return {
+        key: row.Key,
+        label: row.Label ?? null,
+        expiresAt: row.ExpiresAt == null ? null : String(row.ExpiresAt),
+        totalUses: row.TotalUses ?? null,
+        issuerKey: row.IssuerKey,
+        issuerSig: row.IssuerSig,
+        stampId: row.StampId,
+    };
+}
+/** The full scan the `OwnerGrantUsage` membership view loads, in the order {@link ownerGrantUsageRowOf} reads it. */
+const OWNER_GRANT_USAGE_SELECT_SQL = 'select UsageStampId, GrantKey, SeatedKey, SeatedStampId, GrantSig, OwnerSig from CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage';
+/** A stored `OwnerGrantUsage` row as an {@link OwnerGrantUsageRow}. */
+function ownerGrantUsageRowOf(row) {
+    return {
+        usageStampId: row.UsageStampId,
+        grantKey: row.GrantKey,
+        seatedKey: row.SeatedKey,
+        seatedStampId: row.SeatedStampId,
+        grantSig: row.GrantSig,
+        ownerSig: row.OwnerSig,
+    };
+}
 /** A `JoinedStrand` row as a {@link StrandRow}; the schema's `KnownType` check backs the `Type` cast. */
 function joinedStrandRow(row) {
     return {
@@ -528,8 +703,20 @@ function joinedStrandRow(row) {
         MemberPrivateKey: row.MemberPrivateKey,
         Type: row.Type,
         FounderOwnerKey: null,
+        FounderPeerId: null,
     };
 }
+/** A party-own `Strand` row as a {@link StrandRow}; the `Type` cast as {@link joinedStrandRow}'s. */
+function strandRow(row) {
+    return {
+        Id: row.Id,
+        MemberPrivateKey: row.MemberPrivateKey,
+        Type: row.Type,
+        FounderOwnerKey: row.FounderOwnerKey,
+        FounderPeerId: row.FounderPeerId,
+    };
+}
+const STRAND_COLUMNS = 'Id, MemberPrivateKey, Type, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId';
 const FORMATION_INVITE_SELECT_SQL = 'select Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId from CadreControl.FormationInvite';
 function formationInviteRowOf(row) {
     return {
@@ -599,7 +786,7 @@ function joinRequestAddFields(row) {
  * `JoinSuccess` / `JoinFailure` row and the signature its `AuthorizedInsert` verifies, over the
  * row's columns in the schema's order (a null column signs as `''`, an integer as its text).
  */
-function signJoinOutcomeInsert(partyId, requestStampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+async function signJoinOutcomeInsert(partyId, requestStampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage) {
     const at = String(outcome.RecordedAt);
     const { table, sql, fields, values } = outcome.kind === 'joined'
         ? {
@@ -612,9 +799,28 @@ function signJoinOutcomeInsert(partyId, requestStampId, outcome, ownerKey, signM
             fields: [requestStampId, at, outcome.Code, outcome.Reason],
             values: [requestStampId, outcome.RecordedAt, outcome.Code, outcome.Reason],
         };
-    const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage(`CadreControl.${table}`, 'add', partyId, fields));
+    const signature = await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage(`CadreControl.${table}`, 'add', partyId, fields));
     return { sql, params: [ownerKey, signature, ...values] };
 }
+/** The text of a {@link ControlDatabaseConfig.schemaPath} file; Node.js only. */
+async function readSchemaFile(schemaPath) {
+    if (typeof process === 'undefined' || !process.versions?.node) {
+        throw new Error('Loading schema from file is not supported in React Native. ' +
+            'Remove the schemaPath option to use the embedded schema instead.');
+    }
+    try {
+        // Use require to conditionally load fs only in Node.js.
+        // This won't be bundled by React Native's Metro bundler — a dynamic
+        // import() would be statically picked up by Metro, so require is
+        // intentional here (cross-platform constraint, not lazy CommonJS).
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+        const fs = require('fs/promises');
+        return await fs.readFile(schemaPath, 'utf-8');
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        throw new Error(`Failed to load schema from ${schemaPath}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, { cause: error });
+    }
+}
 /**
  * ControlDatabase manages the CadreControl schema using Quereus with Optimystic backend.
  * It provides typed query methods for accessing control network data.
@@ -623,12 +829,33 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     constructor(config) {
         this.db = null;
         this.collectionFactory = null;
+        this.txnBridge = null;
         this.initialized = false;
         this.membershipListener = null;
         this.guardedDeleteListener = null;
         this.controlWriteAbandonedListener = null;
         /** Tail of the local-write chain — see {@link withWriteLock}. */
         this.writeQueue = Promise.resolve();
+        /** Subscriptions handed out by {@link watchTables}. */
+        this.tableWatches = new TableWatchRegistry();
+        /** The cached membership tables; see {@link readMembershipRows}. */
+        this.revocationView = this.membershipView(REVOCATION_SELECT_SQL, 'revocations');
+        this.cadrePeerView = this.membershipView(CADRE_PEER_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-peers');
+        this.ownerKeyView = this.membershipView(OWNER_KEY_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-keys');
+        this.cadreInviteView = this.membershipView(CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-invites');
+        this.cadreInviteUsageView = this.membershipView(CADRE_INVITE_USAGE_SELECT_SQL, 'cadre-invite-usages');
+        this.ownerGrantView = this.membershipView(OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-grants');
+        this.ownerGrantUsageView = this.membershipView(OWNER_GRANT_USAGE_SELECT_SQL, 'owner-grant-usages');
+        /** Each membership view by the qualified table it copies, for {@link watchMembershipViews}, {@link watchMembershipTables} and {@link invalidateMembershipViews}. */
+        this.membershipViews = new Map([
+            ['CadreControl.Revocation', this.revocationView],
+            ['CadreControl.CadrePeer', this.cadrePeerView],
+            ['CadreControl.OwnerKey', this.ownerKeyView],
+            ['CadreControl.CadreInvite', this.cadreInviteView],
+            ['CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', this.cadreInviteUsageView],
+            ['CadreControl.OwnerGrant', this.ownerGrantView],
+            ['CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage', this.ownerGrantUsageView],
+        ]);
         /**
          * Locked write bodies currently running (see {@link runWriteBody}); what
          * {@link readRowsOnce} consults to route an unlocked read around a write that has
@@ -664,6 +891,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             return;
         }
         log('Initializing ControlDatabase for party: %s', this.config.partyId);
+        this.invalidateMembershipViews();
         // Create database instance
         this.db = new Database();
         // Register crypto plugin (provides digest, sign, verify functions)
@@ -691,6 +919,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // Before hydrate: a warm restart parses the persisted CHECK text, which calls party_id().
         registerPartyIdFunction(this.db, this.config.partyId);
         this.collectionFactory = pluginResult.collectionFactory;
+        this.txnBridge = pluginResult.txnBridge;
         // Inject the libp2p node into the collection factory
         t0 = performance.now();
         this.collectionFactory.registerLibp2pNode(networkName, this.config.libp2pNode, this.config.coordinatedRepo);
@@ -737,48 +966,77 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         t0 = performance.now();
         await this.loadSchema();
         timing('[controlDb] loadSchema: %dms', Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
+        this.watchMembershipViews();
         this.initialized = true;
         log('ControlDatabase initialized successfully');
     }
+    /**
+     * Drop a membership view whenever its table changes: a commit made here, or a change this
+     * node's storage takes in from elsewhere. `onInvalidate` is the whole consumer, so the run
+     * does nothing; no backstop, since {@link MEMBERSHIP_VIEW_MAX_AGE_MS} bounds what the
+     * subscription cannot hear. {@link close} disposes it with the rest.
+     */
+    watchMembershipViews() {
+        this.tableWatches.watch(this.db, [...this.membershipViews.keys()], () => Promise.resolve(), {
+            label: 'membership-view',
+            onInvalidate: (table) => this.membershipViews.get(table)?.invalidate(),
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link watchTables} on the membership tables: the seven the membership views copy
+     * (`CadrePeer`, `OwnerKey`, `Revocation`, `CadreInvite`, `CadreInviteUsage`, `OwnerGrant`,
+     * `OwnerGrantUsage`), which are exactly what the membership gate and the owner-anchor sync
+     * read. `CadreNode.start` takes its gate watch here, so the gate hears every table its
+     * reads can depend on and no list of them lives outside this class.
+     */
+    watchMembershipTables(onChange, options) {
+        return this.watchTables([...this.membershipViews.keys()], onChange, options);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Empty every membership view, so the next read of each loads afresh and no load in
+     * flight installs. Besides {@link initialize} and {@link close}, `CadreNode` calls it when
+     * a sibling becomes reachable (its identify on a new connection): a machine that was offline
+     * while that sibling committed learns of the commit only when it next reads the block from
+     * storage, and dropping the views makes the pass that starts then read now rather than after
+     * `MEMBERSHIP_VIEW_MAX_AGE_MS`.
+     */
+    invalidateMembershipViews() {
+        for (const view of this.membershipViews.values()) {
+            view.invalidate();
+        }
+    }
     async loadSchema() {
-        let schemaContent;
+        let declaration;
         if (this.config.schemaPath) {
-            // Load from file if explicitly provided (for testing or custom schemas)
-            // This only works in Node.js environments
             log('Loading schema from file: %s', this.config.schemaPath);
-            // Check if we're in a Node.js environment
-            if (typeof process !== 'undefined' && process.versions?.node) {
-                try {
-                    // Use require to conditionally load fs only in Node.js.
-                    // This won't be bundled by React Native's Metro bundler — a dynamic
-                    // import() would be statically picked up by Metro, so require is
-                    // intentional here (cross-platform constraint, not lazy CommonJS).
-                    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-                    const fs = require('fs/promises');
-                    schemaContent = await fs.readFile(this.config.schemaPath, 'utf-8');
-                }
-                catch (error) {
-                    throw new Error(`Failed to load schema from ${this.config.schemaPath}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, { cause: error });
-                }
-            }
-            else {
-                throw new Error('Loading schema from file is not supported in React Native. ' +
-                    'Remove the schemaPath option to use the embedded schema instead.');
-            }
+            declaration = controlSchemaFileDeclaration(await readSchemaFile(this.config.schemaPath));
         }
         else {
-            // Use embedded schema for cross-platform compatibility
             log('Using embedded control schema');
-            schemaContent = CONTROL_SCHEMA;
+            declaration = CONTROL_SCHEMA_DECLARATION;
         }
+        // Declaring runs no DDL; it only records the declaration the check and the apply both read.
+        await this.db.exec(declaration);
+        // The apply below is also the MIGRATION of a warm store written under an older control
+        // schema version: its diff runs each version's changes in order, every one applied to a
+        // table's catalog record without a row rewritten, and ends by recording this build's version
+        // on the store. A store the apply must not touch is refused HERE, before it runs anything: one
+        // a newer release migrated (this machine is the one to update), one from before migrations,
+        // or one whose diff would rewrite or discard rows (`control-schema-version.ts`).
+        await refuseIncompatibleControlStore(this.db, this.config.partyId);
+        await this.applyControlSchema();
+        log('Schema loaded and executed');
+    }
+    /** Apply the declared control schema, retrying transient cohort failures. */
+    async applyControlSchema() {
         // Schema init is a DISTRIBUTED write, so it gets the same bounded transient-failure
         // retry every other control write does ({@link lockedWithRetry}). Every CadreControl
-        // table is optimystic-backed (the default vtab was routed to optimystic just above),
+        // table is optimystic-backed (`initialize` routes the default vtab to optimystic),
         // so each `create table` needs a super-majority of the party's peers to answer. On a
         // node joining a party that already has two live members a single unanswered peer
         // during any one create otherwise kills startup outright.
         //
-        // Re-running the WHOLE `exec` after a partial failure is safe, and this is the
+        // Re-running the apply after a partial failure is safe, and this is the
         // non-obvious part:
         //
         //  - `apply schema` is a DIFF, not a replay. Quereus collects the live catalog, diffs
@@ -786,11 +1044,6 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         //    exactly why `initialize` hydrates persisted optimystic schemas BEFORE getting here.
         //    A table the live catalog already lists generates no statements at all, which is what
         //    makes an apply over an already-complete schema (a warm start) a no-op.
-        //    NOTE: a table the catalog lists with DIFFERENT constraint text diffs to
-        //    `alter table ... drop constraint`, which the optimystic module refuses, so a store
-        //    written by a build with older constraint text fails here on every start (policy:
-        //    recreate, docs/architecture.md after the Control Network table). If backwards
-        //    compatibility becomes a requirement, this apply is the migration site.
         //  - a failed apply is taken back WHOLE (Quereus 4.20.0). The migration loop keeps an
         //    undo journal; when a step fails it runs that journal in reverse, re-renders the
         //    catalog, compares it against a fingerprint taken BEFORE the apply, and only then
@@ -812,6 +1065,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // argument is a statement about the pair, not about Quereus alone — pinned by
         // `test/control-schema-apply-unwind.spec.ts`.
         //
+        // The same argument covers the statements a MIGRATION runs (`control-schema-version.ts`'s
+        // `catalog-only` kinds, from Optimystic 1.16.0): the plugin's `alterTable` arms (add column,
+        // drop column, add and drop CHECK) and the tag change write the table's catalog record under
+        // the batch's per-statement checkpoint, so a step that throws withdraws its own write, and a
+        // batch whose commit fails is discarded whole and the tables it wrote re-persist on their next
+        // touch. A change the record already holds — another machine migrated first — is adopted with
+        // nothing written, and an undo of an adopted change touches this machine's catalog only. The
+        // one arm Quereus marks irreversible is `drop column`: once it has run, a later failure
+        // unwinds nothing (the apply reports the schema as partially migrated), the plugin's
+        // `endSchemaBatch` commits the steps that landed — or, when that commit fails, marks their
+        // tables to re-persist on next touch — and the retry's diff runs only the steps still
+        // missing. No row is lost either way: rows keep a dropped column's field until they are
+        // rewritten, and nothing reads it.
+        //
         // Only the "cohort did not answer, nothing committed" class is retried; the classifier
         // vetoes indeterminate commits and does not match `Missing block`, which is a durable
         // convergence fault a retry cannot heal (tracked separately) and must keep propagating.
@@ -823,8 +1090,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // also what lets schema init absorb optimystic's self-coordination grace refusal, which
         // is unsafe for control writes in general. Why, on
         // `RETRIABLE_SCHEMA_INIT_MATCHERS` in `control-write-retry.ts`.
-        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.db.exec(schemaContent), SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY, 'schema-init');
-        log('Schema loaded and executed');
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.db.exec(APPLY_CONTROL_SCHEMA), SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY, 'schema-init');
     }
     /**
      * One UNRETRIED drain of a control read to rows — every read in this class bottoms out
@@ -904,8 +1170,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * statement to its transaction opening.
      */
     async readRowsOnce(sql, params, underWriteLock) {
+        const committed = this.writeInFlight(underWriteLock);
         let iterator;
-        if (this.writeInFlight(underWriteLock)) {
+        if (committed) {
             log('read-eval: a write is in flight (%s), asking for a committed read: %s', this.db.getAutocommit() ? 'locked body running, no transaction open yet' : 'transaction open', sql);
             iterator = this.db.eval(sql, params, { readConcurrency: 'committed' });
         }
@@ -916,7 +1183,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         for await (const row of iterator) {
             rows.push(row);
         }
-        return rows;
+        return { rows, committed };
     }
     /**
      * Whether a control read should ask for a committed read — see {@link readRowsOnce}.
@@ -974,7 +1241,15 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * held, and its membership read is opted out at {@link queryCadrePeers}. If another
      * under-lock callback seam is ever added, audit its read graph the same way.
      */
-    readRows(sql, params, label, retry = true) {
+    async readRows(sql, params, label, retry = true) {
+        return (await this.readRowsRouted(sql, params, label, retry)).rows;
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link readRows}, also saying whether the attempt that answered took the committed-read
+     * path — which a {@link MembershipView} load needs, since it may not keep such rows (see
+     * {@link membershipView}).
+     */
+    readRowsRouted(sql, params, label, retry) {
         // `retry: false` marks the reads that may run inside a locked write body, which is
         // also what readRowsOnce's committed-read routing must know (see writeInFlight).
         // NOTE: the membership-gate refresh passes it on EVERY trigger, including the
@@ -989,21 +1264,51 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // it changes log attribution only, never behaviour (same layering as lockedWithRetry).
         return retryControlRead(() => this.readRowsOnce(sql, params, false), { ...this.controlReadRetryPacing, label });
     }
+    /**
+     * A view over one membership table, loaded by its full scan `sql` through {@link readRows}'s
+     * funnel. Rows a committed read served are never kept: that read may initialize an untouched
+     * table provisionally, and the Optimystic plugin arms a table's replicated-change bridge only
+     * on its full initialization (`OptimysticTable.initializeForCommittedRead`), so no later change
+     * event would ever drop them.
+     */
+    membershipView(sql, label) {
+        return new MembershipView(async (retry) => {
+            const { rows, committed } = await this.readRowsRouted(sql, undefined, label, retry);
+            return { rows, installable: !committed };
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * A membership table's raw rows, from its {@link MembershipView}: `Revocation`, `CadrePeer`
+     * and `OwnerKey`, the tables every membership, owner and peer-record read starts from, and
+     * `CadreInvite`, `CadreInviteUsage`, `OwnerGrant` and `OwnerGrantUsage`, the chains every
+     * membership refresh verifies invitation-admitted machines and grant-seated owner keys through.
+     * Callers build fresh result objects from them and never mutate them.
+     *
+     * Reads the table directly instead when a caller under the write lock (`retry: false`) has an
+     * explicit transaction open: such a read sees the transaction's own uncommitted rows, which
+     * the view does not hold, and a rollback fires no change event, so keeping them would cache
+     * rows that never existed. No reader of these tables runs inside {@link inTransaction} today;
+     * this keeps one added later, or a spec's raw-handle transaction, correct.
+     *
+     * Reads that stay plain SQL on purpose: {@link queryStampId} (sees retired rows), the
+     * schema's CHECK constraints, which read inside the committing transaction, the redemption's
+     * one read of the held credential row ({@link queryCadreInvite},
+     * {@link queryOwnerGrant}), and the indexed usage counts.
+     */
+    readMembershipRows(view, retry) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        if (!retry && !this.db.getAutocommit()) {
+            return view.readThrough(retry);
+        }
+        return view.read(retry);
+    }
     /**
      * Query all strands from the control database
      */
     async queryStrands() {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const results = [];
-        for (const row of await this.readRows('select Id, MemberPrivateKey, Type, FounderOwnerKey from CadreControl.Strand', undefined, 'strands')) {
-            results.push({
-                Id: row.Id,
-                MemberPrivateKey: row.MemberPrivateKey,
-                Type: row.Type,
-                FounderOwnerKey: row.FounderOwnerKey,
-            });
-        }
-        return results;
+        const rows = await this.readRows(`select ${STRAND_COLUMNS} from CadreControl.Strand`, undefined, 'strands');
+        return rows.map(strandRow);
     }
     /**
      * Read a single strand row by id, or null when absent. Single-row sibling of
@@ -1013,20 +1318,23 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async queryStrand(strandId) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        for (const row of await this.readRows('select Id, MemberPrivateKey, Type, FounderOwnerKey from CadreControl.Strand where Id = ?', [strandId], 'strand')) {
-            return {
-                Id: row.Id,
-                MemberPrivateKey: row.MemberPrivateKey,
-                Type: row.Type,
-                FounderOwnerKey: row.FounderOwnerKey,
-            };
-        }
-        return null;
+        const rows = await this.readRows(`select ${STRAND_COLUMNS} from CadreControl.Strand where Id = ?`, [strandId], 'strand');
+        return rows.length === 0 ? null : strandRow(rows[0]);
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link queryStrand} plus the row's `StampId`, in one read: the formation responder
+     * resolves a bound invite's host strand with it and later records consent against that
+     * stamp ({@link recordFormationUsage}'s `strandStampId`) without reading the row again.
+     */
+    async queryStrandWithStamp(strandId) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const rows = await this.readRows(`select ${STRAND_COLUMNS}, StampId from CadreControl.Strand where Id = ?`, [strandId], 'strand-with-stamp');
+        return rows.length === 0 ? null : { ...strandRow(rows[0]), StampId: rows[0].StampId };
     }
     /**
      * Every strand this party joined from another party (`CadreControl.JoinedStrand`), shaped
      * as a {@link StrandRow} so a reader can treat it like one of the party's own. A joiner
-     * never founds, so `FounderOwnerKey` is always null. Read raw, like {@link queryStrands}:
+     * never founds, so `FounderOwnerKey` and `FounderPeerId` are always null. Read raw, like {@link queryStrands}:
      * no retired-stamp filter.
      */
     async queryJoinedStrands() {
@@ -1101,29 +1409,72 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * Deliberately RAW (no retired-stamp filter, unlike {@link getOwnerKeys}): the genesis
      * insert is refused by the schema whenever any physical row exists, so this must see one.
+     * Served from the `OwnerKey` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}), which holds every
+     * physical row, so a genesis caller's pre-check and {@link ensureOwnerKey}'s re-check share
+     * one storage read.
      */
     async hasOwnerKey() {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        for (const row of await this.readRows('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.OwnerKey', undefined, 'owner-key-exists')) {
-            return row.Count > 0;
-        }
-        return false;
+        return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerKeyView, true)).length > 0;
     }
     /**
      * Idempotent genesis: insert `key` as the founding owner key only when
      * the party has none yet. Returns true if it inserted, false if an owner
      * key already existed (so a repeat `--owner` start is a no-op).
+     *
+     * Before the insert, gives every control table its empty collection
+     * ({@link commitEmptyControlCollections}). A collection committed while a machine is alone
+     * forks if another machine creates the same collection independently; before genesis the
+     * party has no owner, so no other machine can have been admitted and none can hold any of
+     * its collections. The order makes the step repeatable: a crash between it and the insert
+     * leaves no `OwnerKey` row, so the next start runs genesis again and commits only the
+     * collections still missing, while a founder restart finds the row and commits nothing, so
+     * it can never write an empty second history beside a table another machine has since
+     * written. A failure propagates with nothing inserted.
+     *
+     * @param label - the user's name for the key ({@link insertOwnerKey}).
      */
-    async ensureOwnerKey(key) {
+    async ensureOwnerKey(key, label) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const trimmed = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(key, 'owner key');
         if (await this.hasOwnerKey()) {
             log('Owner key already present; skipping genesis insert');
             return false;
         }
-        await this.insertOwnerKey(trimmed);
+        // Two locked steps one after the other: the lock is not re-entrant, and the insert takes it itself.
+        await this.commitEmptyControlCollections();
+        await this.insertOwnerKey(trimmed, label);
         return true;
     }
+    /**
+     * Commit an empty collection for every `CadreControl` table, index tree and unique-enforcement
+     * tree that has none, so a read of a table nobody has written is answered from this machine's
+     * storage instead of asking the block's cohort to prove the collection absent — a round trip
+     * per read on a party of several machines, and an error or a wait while they are offline.
+     * Joining machines get these collections the ordinary way, by reading them from the cohort.
+     *
+     * Under the write lock: the helper commits whatever is staged in those collections outside any
+     * SQL transaction, which is sound only while nothing else writes.
+     *
+     * Parties founded before this step, and tables a later control schema version adds, have no
+     * such collections, and nothing creates them later: the start-time schema apply runs on every
+     * machine, possibly alone, where committing one would be exactly the fork genesis avoids.
+     *
+     * NOTE: one `sync()` per collection, in sequence: 32 collections for today's schema (17 tables,
+     * 3 indexes, 12 `unique` columns). Measured 2026-10-20 on a lone `CadreNode` over the network
+     * transactor (started, then `ensureOwnerKey` alone, 3 runs each): 64–105 ms in memory and
+     * 750–820 ms on `FileRawStorage`, about 25 ms per collection on disk, roughly 1/75 of the edge
+     * node's 60 s `DEFAULT_OWNER_GENESIS_TIMEOUT_MS`. Under the whole cadre-core suite's load (151
+     * geneses) it took a median of 159 ms and at most 4.6 s. If genesis latency starts to matter
+     * (phone flash under launch contention runs 50–90 ms per storage operation, see the NOTE in
+     * `initialize`), ask Optimystic for an API that commits them as one batch, the one strand
+     * founding would use too; do not build a private batching path.
+     */
+    async commitEmptyControlCollections() {
+        const t0 = performance.now();
+        const committed = await this.withWriteLock(() => createEmptyCollections(this.db, this.txnBridge, [CONTROL_SCHEMA_NAME]));
+        log('Committed %d empty control collections in %dms', committed, Math.round(performance.now() - t0));
+    }
     /**
      * Collect every owner key (`CadreControl.OwnerKey.Key`) as a set.
      *
@@ -1150,8 +1501,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         return new Set((await this.queryOwnerKeyRows(retry)).map(row => row.key));
     }
     /**
-     * Every live `OwnerKey` row with its persisted proof ({@link OwnerKeyRow}) — what the
-     * trusted-owner anchor sync derives from (`CadreNode.syncOwnerAnchor`). Rows whose
+     * Every live `OwnerKey` row with its label and persisted proof ({@link OwnerKeyRow}) — what
+     * the trusted-owner anchor sync derives from (`CadreNode.syncOwnerAnchor`) and the owner-key
+     * listing shows (`CadreNode.listOwnerKeys`). Rows whose
      * `StampId` is retired in `CadreControl.Revocation` are excluded here, as
      * {@link queryCadrePeers} excludes them and for the reason on {@link getOwnerKeys}, which
      * reads through this. A row with no stamp (the schema permits it; no writer produces one)
@@ -1163,16 +1515,14 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * @param retired - the retired `OwnerKey` stamps, when the caller has already read the
      *   tombstones (`CadreNode.syncOwnerAnchor` reads {@link queryRevocations} for their
-     *   signers); omitted, they are read here. Before the ledger marker is filed every
-     *   `Revocation` read is a cohort consult, so the sync passing its own set keeps the
-     *   membership refresh at one such read for the anchor.
+     *   signers); omitted, they are read here. Both come from the same `Revocation` view
+     *   ({@link readMembershipRows}), so passing the set saves only the filtering.
      */
     async queryOwnerKeyRows(retry = true, retired) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const revoked = retired ?? await this.queryRevokedStamps('OwnerKey', retry);
         const rows = [];
-        const sql = 'select Key, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage from CadreControl.OwnerKey';
-        for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'owner-keys', retry)) {
+        for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerKeyView, retry)) {
             const stampId = row.StampId ?? null;
             if (stampId === null) {
                 log('queryOwnerKeyRows: dropping OwnerKey row %s with no StampId', row.Key);
@@ -1183,6 +1533,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             }
             rows.push({
                 key: row.Key,
+                label: row.Label ?? null,
                 stampId,
                 vouchOwner: row.VouchOwner ?? null,
                 vouchSig: row.VouchSig ?? null,
@@ -1203,12 +1554,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * {@link queryRevokedStamps} rather than inlining the SQL, so tests can interpose on
      * that seam to model the replicated live-row-plus-tombstone merge state.
      *
-     * NOTE: runs a second query (the retired-stamp set) per call, on the membership-gate
-     * refresh path. Its cost is storage consults, not rows (see {@link queryRevokedStamps}):
-     * while `Revocation` has never been written every call consults the cohort about it, and
-     * the ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) is what makes it a held block. Folding
-     * the exclusion into one statement would not help (it reads the same block), and caching
-     * the set would hide a tombstone arriving by replication.
+     * Both tables come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}), so a call after
+     * the first costs no storage read until one of the two tables changes.
      *
      * NOTE: this filter is HAND-MIRRORED by the gate suites' fake control databases
      * (`test/membership-gate-helpers.ts` and `test/cadre-node-authorized-surface.spec.ts`),
@@ -1231,42 +1578,27 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer', retry);
         const rows = [];
-        // The proof columns lead and the record columns follow, so this scan keeps a prefix no
-        // other `CadrePeer` statement shares (`queryPeerRecord` starts `PeerId, PublicKey`): the
-        // read-retry spec rigs the membership scan by that prefix.
-        const sql = 'select PeerId, Multiaddr, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage, PublicKey, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig from CadreControl.CadrePeer';
-        for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'cadre-peers', retry)) {
-            const stampId = row.StampId ?? null;
-            if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
+        for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadrePeerView, retry)) {
+            const peer = cadrePeerRowOf(row);
+            if (peer.stampId !== null && revoked.has(peer.stampId)) {
                 continue;
             }
-            rows.push({
-                peerId: row.PeerId,
-                publicKey: row.PublicKey ?? null,
-                multiaddr: row.Multiaddr ?? null,
-                updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
-                profile: row.Profile ?? null,
-                sig: row.Sig ?? null,
-                stampId,
-                vouchOwner: row.VouchOwner ?? null,
-                vouchSig: row.VouchSig ?? null,
-                vouchUsage: row.VouchUsage ?? null,
-            });
+            rows.push(peer);
         }
         return rows;
     }
     /**
      * The cadre's peers as a seed or a redemption reply carries them: every live `CadrePeer`
-     * row with its addresses, each flagged `isOwner` when the key behind its peer id is in
-     * the replicated `OwnerKey` table ({@link projectSeedPeers}).
+     * row with its addresses, the minter and every always-on machine marked preferred
+     * ({@link projectSeedPeers}).
      *
      * Read through {@link queryCadrePeers}, never a raw `CadrePeer` select, so a removed
      * member's addresses are never packed into a seed or handed to a redeeming device as a
      * dial hint: a revoked peer is off the addressable surface everywhere, and this is one of
      * its exits.
      */
-    async querySeedPeers() {
-        return projectSeedPeers(await this.queryCadrePeers(), await this.getOwnerKeys());
+    async querySeedPeers(minterPeerId) {
+        return projectSeedPeers(await this.queryCadrePeers(), minterPeerId);
     }
     /**
      * Every approver public key currently enrolled in `CadreControl.ValidationKey` — the
@@ -1305,10 +1637,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * guard. A read retrying there would sleep its backoff HOLDING the write lock
      * (`retryControlWrite`'s contract is that backoff sleeps happen with no lock held), and
      * the write funnel already re-runs the body's reads when it re-runs the body. The
-     * unlocked callers — the public stamp readers, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer} and
-     * {@link reapRevokedRow}, whose stamp reads run BEFORE their locks are taken — keep the
-     * default retried path. Explicit per call rather than an ambient flag: unlocked reads
-     * run concurrently with a locked body, so `this`-state cannot tell the two apart.
+     * unlocked callers — the public stamp readers and {@link reapRevokedRow}, whose stamp
+     * read runs BEFORE its lock is taken — keep the default retried path. Explicit per call
+     * rather than an ambient flag: unlocked reads run concurrently with a locked body, so
+     * `this`-state cannot tell the two apart. The same flag threads through
+     * {@link findCadrePeerRow} for the two writers that read the whole row inside their body.
      */
     async queryStampId(table, keyValue, retry = true) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -1321,8 +1654,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     /**
      * `CadrePeer` stamp nonce — read by {@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} as its
      * row-present gate before it delegates to {@link deleteCadrePeer}. The in-class
-     * `CadrePeer` writers ({@link insertCadrePeer}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}) go
-     * straight to {@link queryStampId}.
+     * `CadrePeer` writers go straight to {@link queryStampId} ({@link insertCadrePeer}) or read
+     * the whole row ({@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, through {@link findCadrePeerRow}).
      */
     queryCadrePeerStampId(peerId) {
         return this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
@@ -1377,18 +1710,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * ({@link queryCadrePeers}, {@link queryPeerRecord},
      * {@link CadreNode.resolveDeviceToken}) drop any row whose stamp appears here.
      *
-     * NOTE: the per-call cost that matters is the storage layer's, not the row count. While
-     * `Revocation` has never been written, this node does not hold its block, and Optimystic
-     * consults a block's cohort on every read of a block it does not hold: 1 consult per
-     * call (measured), each a round trip to every other member on a multi-machine party. The
-     * ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) ends that — a held block is re-consulted
-     * at most once per read-repair window (10 s). Do not cache the set instead: a cache
-     * cannot see a tombstone arriving by replication, so it would delay a revocation. The
-     * row count only grows (append-only) but stays small while removals are rare; revisit if
+     * Served from the `Revocation` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}), dropped by
+     * every change to the table, local or replicated into this node's storage, so a tombstone
+     * arriving by replication is seen on the next call. The cost that matters is the storage
+     * layer's, paid by a cold view's load: while `Revocation` has never been written, this node
+     * does not hold its block, and Optimystic consults a block's cohort on every read of a block
+     * it does not hold, each a round trip to every other member on a multi-machine party. The row
+     * count only grows (append-only) but stays small while removals are rare; revisit if
      * removals become routine and the scan itself shows up in a profile.
      *
      * An isolated node that has never received the `Revocation` block reads it as holding no
-     * revocations instead of throwing — see {@link readRevokedStampRows}.
+     * revocations instead of throwing — see {@link readRevocationRowsOrNone}.
      *
      * `retry: false` is forwarded by {@link queryCadrePeers} for the one caller that reads
      * under the write lock — see that method's note.
@@ -1396,21 +1728,25 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async queryRevokedStamps(tableName, retry = true) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const stamps = new Set();
-        for (const row of await this.readRevokedStampRows(tableName, retry)) {
-            stamps.add(row.StampId);
+        for (const row of await this.readRevocationRowsOrNone(retry)) {
+            if (row.TableName === tableName) {
+                stamps.add(row.StampId);
+            }
         }
         return stamps;
     }
     /**
-     * The `Revocation` scan behind {@link queryRevokedStamps}, answering NO ROWS when the read
-     * fails `cohort-unreachable` ({@link isCohortUnreachableRead}): this node does not hold
+     * The `Revocation` rows behind {@link queryRevokedStamps}, answering NO ROWS when the view's
+     * load fails `cohort-unreachable` ({@link isCohortUnreachableRead}): this node does not hold
      * the block and could ask no other cohort member about it. Every other failure rethrows.
      * The retry in {@link readRows} runs first, so a node whose connectivity returns within
-     * the read budget still gets the real answer.
+     * the read budget still gets the real answer. The empty answer is never installed in the
+     * view (a failed load keeps nothing), so the next call asks again.
      *
      * Without this, a machine cut off from every other machine in its party before it ever
-     * received the block — the block does not exist anywhere until the owner files the
-     * ledger marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}) on a connected reconcile pass — cannot
+     * received the block — a joining machine gets it only by reading it from the cohort, and
+     * on a party founded before genesis created every control collection it exists nowhere
+     * until the first tombstone or the marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}) — cannot
      * answer ANY membership, peer-record or device-token lookup, although it holds those
      * rows locally.
      *
@@ -1429,20 +1765,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * NOTE: an isolated node pays the whole read retry (up to
      * `CONTROL_READ_RETRY_BUDGET_MS`, plus the slow attempt that exhausted it) before this
-     * answers, and {@link queryPeerRecord} then issues its row scan on top. If an isolated
-     * node's lookups are seen exceeding the admission gate's 2 s deadline
-     * (`ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`), skip the retry for this read when the first attempt
-     * fails `cohort-unreachable`.
+     * answers, on every call since the answer is not kept, and {@link queryPeerRecord} may then
+     * load the `CadrePeer` view on top. If an isolated node's lookups are seen exceeding the
+     * admission gate's 2 s deadline (`ADMISSION_DECISION_TIMEOUT_MS`), skip the retry for this
+     * read when the first attempt fails `cohort-unreachable`.
      */
-    async readRevokedStampRows(tableName, retry) {
+    async readRevocationRowsOrNone(retry) {
         try {
-            return await this.readRows('select StampId from CadreControl.Revocation where TableName = ?', [tableName], 'revoked-stamps', retry);
+            return await this.readMembershipRows(this.revocationView, retry);
         }
         catch (error) {
             if (!isCohortUnreachableRead(error)) {
                 throw error;
             }
-            log('revoked-stamps(%s): no cohort member reachable and the Revocation block is not held here; reading as no revocations known: %s', tableName, error);
+            log('revoked-stamps: no cohort member reachable and the Revocation block is not held here; reading as no revocations known: %s', error);
             return [];
         }
     }
@@ -1454,10 +1790,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * `where`, so the composite-primary-key point-lookup hazard (see the statement comment in
      * {@link reissueRevocations}) does not arise. Unlocked, like every other read.
      *
-     * Skips the ledger marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}): it retires nothing, so
-     * neither sweep may reap or re-sign it, and skipping it keeps `RevocationRow.tableName`
-     * a {@link RevocableTable}. Filtered on `TableName` alone, in TypeScript: `RowIsGone`
-     * admits no other row under `'Revocation'`.
+     * Skips the ledger marker ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}) an older party may hold: it
+     * retires nothing, so neither sweep may reap or re-sign it, and skipping it keeps
+     * `RevocationRow.tableName` a {@link RevocableTable}. Filtered on `TableName` alone, in
+     * TypeScript: `RowIsGone` admits no other row under `'Revocation'`.
      *
      * `retry: false` from a caller that reads under the write lock, for the reason on
      * {@link queryCadrePeers}.
@@ -1465,24 +1801,16 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async queryRevocations(retry = true) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const rows = [];
-        const sql = 'select TableName, RowKey, StampId, ReissuedAt, SignerKey, SignerSig from CadreControl.Revocation';
-        for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, undefined, 'revocations', retry)) {
-            if (row.TableName === REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER.tableName) {
-                continue;
+        for (const row of await this.readMembershipRows(this.revocationView, retry)) {
+            if (row.TableName !== REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER.tableName) {
+                rows.push(revocationRowOf(row));
             }
-            rows.push({
-                tableName: row.TableName,
-                rowKey: row.RowKey,
-                stampId: row.StampId,
-                reissuedAt: row.ReissuedAt ?? 0,
-                signerKey: row.SignerKey,
-                signerSig: row.SignerSig,
-            });
         }
         return rows;
     }
     /**
-     * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId.
+     * Read a single peer's address record (the full `CadrePeer` row) by PeerId, found in the
+     * `CadrePeer` membership view ({@link readMembershipRows}).
      *
      * Returns null when no row exists, or when the row's `StampId` is retired in
      * `CadreControl.Revocation` — a revoked peer reads as absent, so the resolver
@@ -1498,29 +1826,34 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * The split `addrs` re-join to the exact stored `Multiaddr` (split-on-`,` is
      * the inverse of join-on-`,`), so the resolver re-verifies over the same bytes
      * the publisher signed.
+     *
+     * `retry: false` from the one caller that reads under the write lock,
+     * {@link updateSelfPeerRecord}'s body, for the reason on {@link queryCadrePeers}.
+     */
+    async queryPeerRecord(peerId, retry = true) {
+        const row = await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, retry);
+        return row === null ? null : peerAddressRecordOf(row);
+    }
+    /**
+     * One readable `CadrePeer` row by PeerId from the membership view, or null when no row exists
+     * or its stamp is retired in `Revocation` — the single-row read behind {@link queryPeerRecord}
+     * and the two writers that decide over the row inside their locked body
+     * ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}). Same retired-stamp rule as
+     * {@link queryCadrePeers}, and the same `retry` contract.
      */
-    async queryPeerRecord(peerId) {
+    async findCadrePeerRow(peerId, retry) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer');
-        for (const row of await this.readRows('select PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Profile, Sig, StampId from CadreControl.CadrePeer where PeerId = ?', [peerId], 'peer-record')) {
-            const stampId = row.StampId ?? null;
-            if (stampId !== null && revoked.has(stampId)) {
-                return null;
-            }
-            const multiaddr = row.Multiaddr ?? '';
-            return {
-                peerId: row.PeerId,
-                publicKey: row.PublicKey ?? '',
-                addrs: multiaddr.length > 0 ? multiaddr.split(',') : [],
-                updatedAt: row.UpdatedAt ?? 0,
-                profile: row.Profile ?? null,
-                sig: row.Sig ?? '',
-            };
+        const revoked = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadrePeer', retry);
+        const row = (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadrePeerView, retry)).find((candidate) => candidate.PeerId === peerId);
+        if (row === undefined) {
+            return null;
         }
-        return null;
+        const peer = cadrePeerRowOf(row);
+        return peer.stampId !== null && revoked.has(peer.stampId) ? null : peer;
     }
     /**
-     * Apply a peer's own self-signed address-record update to an existing row.
+     * Apply a peer's own self-signed address-record update to its existing row: read the row
+     * under the write lock, have `sign` build the record over it, and write that record.
      *
      * Authorization is carried entirely by the record: the `Sig` column (verified
      * by the `AuthorizedUpdate` self-branch against the stored `PublicKey`) plus
@@ -1529,6 +1862,21 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * exists. `PublicKey` is intentionally not in the SET list (it is immutable on
      * self-update and the constraint enforces `new.PublicKey = old.PublicKey`).
      *
+     * The read, the decision and the signature all run INSIDE the locked body, which is what
+     * lets it opt into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row has a second writer, the owner's
+     * re-touch ({@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}), and the two fire together while a cadre starts.
+     * When this write loses that race the commit is refused as a lost update and re-run, and the
+     * re-run reads the row the rival left — including its bumped `UpdatedAt`, which a record
+     * signed before the race could no longer exceed — and signs past it. A record signed outside
+     * the body would be re-presented unchanged and refused again, this time by the schema's
+     * monotonic rule, which is correctly never retried. The row's read inside is `retry: false`
+     * (see {@link queryStampId}'s NOTE).
+     *
+     * Returns the record actually written, so the caller's bookkeeping describes the row rather
+     * than the first record it signed; null, and nothing written, when no readable row exists:
+     * the row is absent, or its stamp is retired in `Revocation` (a revoked node reads its own row
+     * as absent every heartbeat, and must not refresh it).
+     *
      * Deliberately NOT wrapped in {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the one `CadrePeer` mutator that
      * is not: it only ever touches THIS node's own row (sole caller
      * `CadreNode.publishSelfRecord`), and `CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers` filters self out
@@ -1541,17 +1889,43 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * row, and a self insert happens once at startup, so the wasted refresh is a single read
      * — cheaper than a conditional carve-out inside the shared writer. Only the repeating
      * path is worth exempting.
+     *
+     * @param peerId - the row to refresh: this node's own.
+     * @param sign - builds the signed record over the row as read; called once per attempt.
      */
-    async updateSelfPeerRecord(record) {
+    async updateSelfPeerRecord(peerId, sign) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const multiaddr = record.addrs.join(',');
-        await this.execWrite(`
-      update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-        with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
-        set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Profile = ?, Sig = ?
-        where PeerId = ?
-    `, [record.sig, multiaddr, record.updatedAt, record.profile, record.sig, record.peerId], 'self-record-update');
-        log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', record.peerId, record.updatedAt);
+        const written = await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+            // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
+            // NOTE: this read of the Revocation and CadrePeer views is charged to the retry budget,
+            // so a cold view load that waits out a per-peer read deadline leaves the attempt no room
+            // for its one retry (the 14.7 s abandonment the policy's doc cites). The caller's read
+            // outside the funnel warms the views, so this is a cache hit except when a table change
+            // between the two reads dropped them — the racing case itself. If that residual ever
+            // matters, measure which phase of the losing attempt pays the deadline first; the
+            // retired-stamp check cannot simply move outside, since `publishSelfRecord`'s insert
+            // path reads a revoked node's row as absent and relies on this body to skip it.
+            const current = await this.queryPeerRecord(peerId, false);
+            if (current === null) {
+                return null;
+            }
+            const record = sign(current);
+            // Bare `exec` — inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
+            await this.db.exec(`
+        update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+          with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = ?
+          set Multiaddr = ?, UpdatedAt = ?, Profile = ?, Sig = ?
+          where PeerId = ?
+      `, [record.sig, record.addrs.join(','), record.updatedAt, record.profile, record.sig, peerId]);
+            return record;
+        }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY, 'self-record-update');
+        if (written === null) {
+            log('Self peer record not updated: no readable CadrePeer row for %s (absent, or its stamp retired)', peerId);
+        }
+        else {
+            log('Self peer record updated: %s (updatedAt=%d)', peerId, written.updatedAt);
+        }
+        return written;
     }
     /**
      * Read a single peer's device push token (the full `DeviceToken` row) by PeerId.
@@ -1603,9 +1977,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
     /**
      * Insert the initial owner key (bootstrap - no existing owners required)
+     *
+     * @param label - the user's name for the key, at most {@link OWNER_KEY_MAX_LABEL}
+     *   characters once trimmed; blank is stored as none.
      */
-    async insertOwnerKey(key) {
+    async insertOwnerKey(key, label) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
+        const storedLabel = ownerKeyLabel(label);
         log('Inserting owner key: %s', key);
         // Bootstrap is authorized by the schema's genesis branch — `(select count(1) from
         // committed.OwnerKey) = 0`, i.e. the party had no owner before this transaction — so no
@@ -1617,60 +1995,81 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // optimystic `StampId()` SQL function.
         const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
         await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId)
+      insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, Label, StampId)
         with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-        values (?, ?)
-    `, [key, stampId], 'owner-key-insert');
+        values (?, ?, ?)
+    `, [key, storedLabel, stampId], 'owner-key-insert');
         log('Owner key inserted');
     }
     /**
      * Owner-signed INSERT of a further `OwnerKey` row, notifying the membership listener once
      * it has committed. The signed-add branch of `OwnerKey.Authorized`: the signer must be an
      * owner in the pre-transaction snapshot, its signature covers the `'add'` digest over
-     * (Key, StampId), and the stored `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` are that same pair, so a reader
-     * can later judge the add against its own anchor (`verifyOwnerKeyVoucher`).
+     * (Key, Label, StampId), and the stored `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` are that same pair, so a
+     * reader can later judge the add against its own anchor (`verifyOwnerKeyVoucher`).
      *
      * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the membership hub. The liveness read, the stamp and the
      * signature all sit inside the locked body: a {@link lockedWithRetry} re-run starts over a
      * rolled-back attempt with a fresh stamp, as {@link redeemCadreInvite} does.
      *
-     * NOTE: re-adding a removed owner from a machine that still holds its retired physical row
-     * is refused here by name: `OwnerKey` is not reaped, so a machine that received the
-     * tombstone without the delete (see {@link getOwnerKeys}) keeps the row, and an insert there
-     * would collide on the primary key. Re-add from the machine that removed the key, or any
-     * machine the delete reached; if re-adding removed owners becomes routine, the fix is an
-     * `OwnerKey` reap branch, gated so it can never take the table below `MinOneOwner`.
-     *
+     * @param label - the user's name for the key, as {@link insertOwnerKey}'s.
      * @returns `true` when this call seated the row, `false` when `key` is already a live owner
-     *   here (nothing written).
-     * @throws when this node holds `key`'s row under a retired stamp (above), or when the
-     *   schema refuses the signer.
+     *   here (nothing written, whatever its label).
+     * @throws when this node holds `key`'s row under a retired stamp
+     *   ({@link liveOwnerKeyStamp}), or when the schema refuses the signer.
      */
-    async insertOwnerKeyVouched(key, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+    async insertOwnerKeyVouched(key, ownerKey, signMessage, label) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
+        const storedLabel = ownerKeyLabel(label);
         return await this.mutateCadrePeer('owner-key-add', async () => {
-            // retry: false on both reads — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
-            const heldStamp = await this.queryStampId('OwnerKey', key, false);
-            if (heldStamp !== null) {
-                if (!(await this.queryRevokedStamps('OwnerKey', false)).has(heldStamp)) {
-                    log('insertOwnerKeyVouched: %s is already an owner; nothing written', key);
-                    return false;
-                }
-                throw new Error(`Cannot re-add owner key ${key} here: this node still holds the row it was removed under ` +
-                    '(OwnerKey rows are not reaped); re-add it from the machine that removed it');
+            if (await this.liveOwnerKeyStamp(key) !== null) {
+                log('insertOwnerKeyVouched: %s is already an owner; nothing written', key);
+                return false;
             }
             const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
-            const signature = signMessage(ownerKeyAddMessage(this.config.partyId, key, stampId));
-            // Bare `exec`: already inside the write lock, which is NOT re-entrant.
-            await this.db.exec(`
-        insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig)
-          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-          values (?, ?, ?, ?)
-      `, [ownerKey, signature, key, stampId, ownerKey, signature]);
+            const signature = await signMessage(ownerKeyAddMessage(this.config.partyId, key, storedLabel, stampId));
+            await this.execOwnerKeyVouchedInsert({ key, label: storedLabel, stampId }, ownerKey, signature);
             log('Owner key %s added (vouched by %s)', key, ownerKey);
             return true;
         });
     }
+    /**
+     * The stamp of `key`'s live `OwnerKey` row here, or null when this node holds none: the
+     * insert-if-absent read of {@link insertOwnerKeyVouched} and {@link redeemOwnerGrant}. Inside
+     * the locked body (both reads `retry: false`; see queryStampId's NOTE).
+     *
+     * NOTE: re-adding a removed owner from a machine that still holds its retired physical row
+     * is refused here by name: `OwnerKey` is not reaped, so a machine that received the
+     * tombstone without the delete (see {@link getOwnerKeys}) keeps the row, and an insert there
+     * would collide on the primary key. Re-add from the machine that removed the key, or any
+     * machine the delete reached; if re-adding removed owners becomes routine, the fix is an
+     * `OwnerKey` reap branch, gated so it can never take the table below `MinOneOwner`.
+     *
+     * @throws when this node holds `key`'s row under a retired stamp (above).
+     */
+    async liveOwnerKeyStamp(key) {
+        const heldStamp = await this.queryStampId('OwnerKey', key, false);
+        if (heldStamp === null) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        if ((await this.queryRevokedStamps('OwnerKey', false)).has(heldStamp)) {
+            throw new Error(`Cannot re-add owner key ${key} here: this node still holds the row it was removed under ` +
+                '(OwnerKey rows are not reaped); re-add it from the machine that removed it');
+        }
+        return heldStamp;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The signed-add statement of {@link insertOwnerKeyVouched} and {@link revouchOwnerKey}, the
+     * stored voucher being the signing pair. Bare `exec`: callers hold the write lock, which is
+     * NOT re-entrant.
+     */
+    async execOwnerKeyVouchedInsert(row, ownerKey, signature) {
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, Label, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig)
+        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [ownerKey, signature, row.key, row.label, row.stampId, ownerKey, signature]);
+    }
     /**
      * Owner-signed removal of one `OwnerKey` row plus the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its
      * stamp, notifying the membership listener once it has committed. The remove branch of
@@ -1708,14 +2107,14 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     /**
      * Re-vouch a live `OwnerKey` row under this owner's signature: in ONE transaction, the
      * current row's guarded delete plus tombstone ({@link deleteOwnerKey}'s body) and an insert
-     * of the same key under a fresh stamp, signed by `ownerKey` ({@link insertOwnerKeyVouched}'s
-     * body), as {@link rewritePendingJoin} re-seats a request. `OwnerKey` has `NoUpdate`, so
+     * of the same key and label under a fresh stamp, signed by `ownerKey`
+     * ({@link insertOwnerKeyVouched}'s body), as {@link rewritePendingJoin} re-seats a request. `OwnerKey` has `NoUpdate`, so
      * this is the only way to rebind a row's voucher; the anchor derivation lets the re-add
      * under a fresh stamp beat the older tombstone (`deriveOwnerAnchor`). For
-     * {@link removeMachine}: the owners a machine being removed had added keep their anchor
-     * place everywhere once their row stands on a remaining owner's signature.
+     * `CadreNode.removeOwner`: the owners a key being removed had added keep their anchor place
+     * everywhere once their row stands on a remaining owner's signature.
      *
-     * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the membership hub. The stamp read runs inside the locked
+     * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the membership hub. The row read runs inside the locked
      * body; a row whose stamp is already retired (held without its delete) is reported as absent
      * rather than tombstoned twice.
      *
@@ -1727,59 +2126,55 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             throw new Error(`Cannot re-vouch owner key ${key}: an owner cannot re-vouch itself`);
         }
         return await this.mutateCadrePeer('owner-key-revouch', async () => {
-            // retry: false on both reads — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
-            const stampId = await this.queryStampId('OwnerKey', key, false);
-            if (stampId === null || (await this.queryRevokedStamps('OwnerKey', false)).has(stampId)) {
+            // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
+            const live = (await this.queryOwnerKeyRows(false)).find((row) => row.key === key);
+            if (live === undefined) {
                 log('revouchOwnerKey: %s is not a live owner here (nothing to re-vouch)', key);
                 return false;
             }
-            const removal = signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'OwnerKey', key, stampId, signMessage);
-            const freshStampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
-            const signature = signMessage(ownerKeyAddMessage(this.config.partyId, key, freshStampId));
+            const removal = await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'OwnerKey', key, live.stampId, signMessage);
+            const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
+            const signature = await signMessage(ownerKeyAddMessage(this.config.partyId, key, live.label, stampId));
             await this.inTransaction('revouch OwnerKey', async () => {
                 await this.execGuardedRemoval(removal, ownerKey);
-                await this.db.exec(`
-          insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig)
-            with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-            values (?, ?, ?, ?)
-        `, [ownerKey, signature, key, freshStampId, ownerKey, signature]);
+                await this.execOwnerKeyVouchedInsert({ key, label: live.label, stampId }, ownerKey, signature);
             });
-            log('Owner key %s re-vouched by %s (stamp %s retired)', key, ownerKey, stampId);
+            log('Owner key %s re-vouched by %s (stamp %s retired)', key, ownerKey, live.stampId);
             this.notifyGuardedDelete(removal.ref);
             return true;
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Remove one machine completely, in ONE transaction: its `CadrePeer` row, its `OwnerKey`
-     * row when `target.ownerKey` names one, its `DeviceToken` row when it has one, each with
-     * the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its stamp ({@link deleteGuardedRow}'s statement pair,
-     * composed bare as {@link deleteStrandAndPartyKey} composes it), plus a withdrawal tombstone
-     * for every `CadreInvite` in `target.inviteKeys` that is still live here
-     * ({@link withdrawCadreInvite}'s body). One transaction so no reader sees the machine half
-     * removed: a row gone but its push token resolvable, or its owner key gone but an invitation
-     * it could redeem again still open.
+     * Remove one machine completely, in ONE transaction: its `CadrePeer` row and its
+     * `DeviceToken` row when it has one, each with the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its stamp
+     * ({@link deleteGuardedRow}'s statement pair, composed bare as {@link deleteStrandAndPartyKey}
+     * composes it), plus a withdrawal tombstone for every `CadreInvite` in `target.inviteKeys`
+     * that is still live here ({@link withdrawCadreInvite}'s body). One transaction so no reader
+     * sees the machine half removed: a row gone but its push token resolvable, or an invitation
+     * it could redeem again still open. Owner keys are never touched: they are the person's, and
+     * removing one is {@link deleteOwnerKey}.
      *
      * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, the membership hub. Every stamp is read inside the locked
      * body, and a row whose stamp is already retired (held without its delete) is skipped rather
-     * than tombstoned twice. The by-name owner refusals of {@link deleteOwnerKey} apply to the
-     * owner-key arm. Nothing to remove writes nothing and returns all false.
+     * than tombstoned twice. Nothing to remove writes nothing and returns all false.
      *
-     * The caller decides WHAT to remove, which owner key is the machine's and which invitations
-     * it could use, from its plan (`CadreNode.planMachineRemoval`); this method only refuses to
-     * write an inconsistent set.
+     * Opted into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY} for the reason on {@link deleteCadrePeer}: every
+     * stamp and signature is minted inside the body, and the invitation keys come from the
+     * caller's plan, which a self-publish does not touch (a withdrawal of an invitation withdrawn
+     * since collides on `Revocation`'s primary key — a constraint failure, never retried, as
+     * before). A lost update after a sibling tree of the transaction already synced arrives as a
+     * partial commit and stays declined.
      *
-     * @throws when `target.ownerKey` is `ownerKey`, or is the only live owner here.
+     * The caller decides which invitations the machine could use, from its plan
+     * (`CadreNode.planMachineRemoval`).
      */
     async removeMachine(target, ownerKey, signMessage) {
-        if (target.ownerKey === ownerKey) {
-            throw new Error(`Cannot remove owner key ${ownerKey}: an owner cannot remove itself`);
-        }
         return await this.mutateCadrePeer('machine-remove', async () => {
-            const removals = await this.signMachineRemovals(target, signMessage);
-            const withdrawals = await this.signCadreInviteWithdrawals(target.inviteKeys, signMessage);
+            const removals = await this.signMachineRemovals(target.peerId, signMessage);
+            const withdrawals = await this.signWithdrawals('CadreInvite', target.inviteKeys, signMessage);
             if (removals.length === 0 && withdrawals.length === 0) {
                 log('removeMachine: nothing live names %s here (already removed)', target.peerId);
-                return { removedPeer: false, removedOwnerKey: false, removedDeviceToken: false, withdrawnInvitations: [] };
+                return { removedPeer: false, removedDeviceToken: false, withdrawnInvitations: [] };
             }
             await this.inTransaction('remove machine', async () => {
                 for (const removal of removals) {
@@ -1799,19 +2194,18 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             }
             return {
                 removedPeer: removed.has('CadrePeer'),
-                removedOwnerKey: removed.has('OwnerKey'),
                 removedDeviceToken: removed.has('DeviceToken'),
                 withdrawnInvitations: withdrawals.map((withdrawal) => withdrawal.ref.rowKey),
             };
-        });
+        }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
     }
     /**
      * The guarded removals {@link removeMachine} runs, signed over each row's current stamp:
-     * the `CadrePeer` row, the `OwnerKey` row when named, the `DeviceToken` row when present.
-     * Inside the locked body (every read `retry: false`); one `Revocation` scan serves the
-     * retired-stamp check for all three tables and the last-owner refusal.
+     * the `CadrePeer` row and the `DeviceToken` row, each when present. Inside the locked body
+     * (every read `retry: false`); one `Revocation` scan serves the retired-stamp check for both
+     * tables.
      */
-    async signMachineRemovals(target, signMessage) {
+    async signMachineRemovals(peerId, signMessage) {
         const retiredByTable = new Map();
         for (const tombstone of await this.queryRevocations(false)) {
             const stamps = retiredByTable.get(tombstone.tableName) ?? new Set();
@@ -1824,24 +2218,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             return stampId !== null && !retired(table).has(stampId) ? stampId : null;
         };
         const removals = [];
-        const peerStamp = await liveStamp('CadrePeer', target.peerId);
-        if (peerStamp !== null) {
-            removals.push(signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'CadrePeer', target.peerId, peerStamp, signMessage));
-        }
-        if (target.ownerKey !== null) {
-            const ownerStamp = await liveStamp('OwnerKey', target.ownerKey);
-            if (ownerStamp !== null) {
-                const owners = await this.queryOwnerKeyRows(false, retired('OwnerKey'));
-                if (owners.length <= 1) {
-                    throw new Error(`Cannot remove owner key ${target.ownerKey}: cannot remove the last owner`);
-                }
-                removals.push(signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'OwnerKey', target.ownerKey, ownerStamp, signMessage));
+        for (const table of ['CadrePeer', 'DeviceToken']) {
+            const stampId = await liveStamp(table, peerId);
+            if (stampId !== null) {
+                removals.push(await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, table, peerId, stampId, signMessage));
             }
         }
-        const tokenStamp = await liveStamp('DeviceToken', target.peerId);
-        if (tokenStamp !== null) {
-            removals.push(signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'DeviceToken', target.peerId, tokenStamp, signMessage));
-        }
         return removals;
     }
     /**
@@ -1866,23 +2248,70 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async insertStrand(strandId, type, ownerKey, signMessage, memberPrivateKey) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting strand: %s (type: %s)', strandId, type);
+        const insert = await this.signStrandInsert(strandId, type, ownerKey, signMessage, memberPrivateKey);
+        await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'strand-insert');
+        log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
+    }
+    /** The stamped, owner-signed `Strand` insert that {@link insertStrand} and {@link insertFoundingRows} run. */
+    async signStrandInsert(strandId, type, ownerKey, signMessage, memberPrivateKey) {
         // Generate a unique stamp ID using the peer ID for distributed uniqueness
         const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
         const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
         // Field order MUST match the schema's Strand `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
-        // Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey ('' when null), StampId. FounderOwnerKey is
+        // Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey ('' when null), FounderPeerId, StampId. FounderOwnerKey is
         // deliberately NOT in the digest — the schema binds it by equality to the
         // verified context.OwnerKey instead (see the constraint's comment).
-        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Strand', 'add', this.config.partyId, [strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? '', stampId]);
-        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Strand', 'add', this.config.partyId, [strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? '', peerId, stampId]);
+        const signature = await signMessage(message);
         // StampId is a real, unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
         // FounderOwnerKey must equal the signing owner or the constraint rejects the row.
-        await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId, ownerKey], 'strand-insert');
-        log('Strand inserted: %s', strandId);
+        return {
+            sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+            params: [ownerKey, signature, strandId, type, memberPrivateKey ?? null, stampId, ownerKey, peerId],
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Insert one founding's control rows — the `Strand` row, a closed strand's `StrandPartyKey`
+     * row, and a formation invitation bound to the strand — in ONE transaction: one commit, and
+     * never a strand row without the key or invitation written beside it.
+     *
+     * Each row is stamped and signed exactly as its single-row writer ({@link insertStrand},
+     * {@link insertStrandPartyKey}, {@link insertFormationInvite}) does it, and all of that — the
+     * invitation's {@link canonicalDatetime} read included — happens BEFORE the write lock is
+     * taken: signing may prompt the user, and the lock held across a prompt would stall every
+     * other control write. A {@link lockedWithRetry} re-run re-presents the same signed rows.
+     *
+     * No row's `AuthorizedInsert` reads another of these rows (`StrandPartyKey` and
+     * `FormationInvite` check only `OwnerKey` and `Revocation`), so their order is free; the
+     * `Strand` row goes first, so a founding repeated over a stored row is refused on `Strand.Id`.
+     *
+     * A uniqueness rejection rolls the whole transaction back. The caller resolves it and writes
+     * again: a `Strand.Id` conflict is another founder's row, a `StrandPartyKey.Id` conflict a key
+     * stored with no strand row ({@link isStrandIdConflict}; see `CadreNode.publishStrand`).
+     */
+    async insertFoundingRows(rows, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const { strand, partyKey, formationInvite } = rows;
+        log('Inserting founding rows: strand %s (type: %s, party key: %s, invitation: %s)', strand.id, strand.type, partyKey !== undefined, formationInvite !== undefined);
+        const inserts = [await this.signStrandInsert(strand.id, strand.type, ownerKey, signMessage, strand.memberPrivateKey)];
+        if (partyKey !== undefined) {
+            inserts.push(await this.signStrandPartyKeyInsert(strand.id, partyKey, ownerKey, signMessage));
+        }
+        if (formationInvite) {
+            const { token, sAppId, ...options } = formationInvite;
+            inserts.push(await this.signFormationInviteInsert(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, { ...options, strandId: strand.id }));
+        }
+        // Bare `exec`: the lock is held, and `execWrite` would take it again and self-deadlock.
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.inTransaction('found strand', async () => {
+            for (const insert of inserts) {
+                await this.db.exec(insert.sql, insert.params);
+            }
+        }), {}, 'strand-found');
+        log('Founding rows inserted: strand %s', strand.id);
     }
     /**
      * Delete a strand from the control database using an owner signature.
@@ -1935,10 +2364,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             return false;
         }
         const partyKeyStamp = await this.queryStampId('StrandPartyKey', strandId, false);
-        const strandRemoval = signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'Strand', strandId, strandStamp, signMessage);
+        const strandRemoval = await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'Strand', strandId, strandStamp, signMessage);
         const partyKeyRemoval = partyKeyStamp === null
             ? null
-            : signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'StrandPartyKey', strandId, partyKeyStamp, signMessage);
+            : await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'StrandPartyKey', strandId, partyKeyStamp, signMessage);
         await this.inTransaction('delete Strand', async () => {
             await this.execGuardedRemoval(strandRemoval, ownerKey);
             if (partyKeyRemoval !== null) {
@@ -1971,18 +2400,25 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async insertStrandPartyKey(strandId, privateKey, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting strand party key for strand: %s', strandId);
-        const peerId = this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString();
-        const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
+        const insert = await this.signStrandPartyKeyInsert(strandId, privateKey, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'strand-party-key-insert');
+        log('Strand party key inserted for strand: %s', strandId);
+    }
+    /** The stamped, owner-signed `StrandPartyKey` insert that {@link insertStrandPartyKey} and {@link insertFoundingRows} run. */
+    async signStrandPartyKeyInsert(strandId, privateKey, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
         // Field order MUST match the schema's StrandPartyKey `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
         // Id, PrivateKey, StampId.
         const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.StrandPartyKey', 'add', this.config.partyId, [strandId, privateKey, stampId]);
-        const signature = signMessage(message);
-        await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.StrandPartyKey (Id, PrivateKey, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?)
-    `, [ownerKey, signature, strandId, privateKey, stampId], 'strand-party-key-insert');
-        log('Strand party key inserted for strand: %s', strandId);
+        const signature = await signMessage(message);
+        return {
+            sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.StrandPartyKey (Id, PrivateKey, StampId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+            params: [ownerKey, signature, strandId, privateKey, stampId],
+        };
     }
     /**
      * Owner-signed removal of one `StrandPartyKey` row — the party's own membership
@@ -2018,7 +2454,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // Field order MUST match the schema's JoinedStrand `AuthorizedInsert` verify:
         // Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey ('' when null), StampId.
         const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.JoinedStrand', 'add', this.config.partyId, [row.Id, row.Type, row.MemberPrivateKey ?? '', stampId]);
-        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        const signature = await signMessage(message);
         await this.execWrite(`
       insert into CadreControl.JoinedStrand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId)
         with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
@@ -2044,7 +2480,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async insertJoinRequest(request, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const { written, insert } = this.signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        const { written, insert } = await this.signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage);
         await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'join-request-insert');
         log('Join request inserted: %s', request.Id);
         return { ...written, outcome: null };
@@ -2064,7 +2500,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      */
     async recordJoinOutcome(expected, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const insert = signJoinOutcomeInsert(this.config.partyId, expected.StampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        const insert = await signJoinOutcomeInsert(this.config.partyId, expected.StampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage);
         return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
             const live = await this.readPendingJoin(expected.Id, false);
             if (live === null || live.StampId !== expected.StampId || live.outcome?.kind !== expected.outcome?.kind) {
@@ -2097,9 +2533,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async rewritePendingJoin(expectedStampId, next, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const { outcome, ...request } = next;
-        const removal = signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'JoinRequest', next.Id, expectedStampId, signMessage);
-        const { written, insert } = this.signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage);
-        const outcomeInsert = outcome === null ? null : signJoinOutcomeInsert(this.config.partyId, written.StampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        const removal = await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, 'JoinRequest', next.Id, expectedStampId, signMessage);
+        const { written, insert } = await this.signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        const outcomeInsert = outcome === null ? null : await signJoinOutcomeInsert(this.config.partyId, written.StampId, outcome, ownerKey, signMessage);
         return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
             // retry: false — this runs inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
             const liveStampId = await this.queryStampId('JoinRequest', next.Id, false);
@@ -2132,9 +2568,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * Mint a fresh stamp for `request` and the owner signature `JoinRequest.AuthorizedInsert`
      * verifies, returning the row as it will be written and its insert.
      */
-    signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+    async signJoinRequestInsert(request, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         const written = { ...request, StampId: generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString()) };
-        const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.JoinRequest', 'add', this.config.partyId, joinRequestAddFields(written)));
+        const signature = await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.JoinRequest', 'add', this.config.partyId, joinRequestAddFields(written)));
         const params = [ownerKey, signature, written.Id, written.Invitation, written.Disclosure, written.RequestedAt, written.ExpiresAt, written.StampId];
         return { written, insert: { sql: JOIN_REQUEST_INSERT_SQL, params } };
     }
@@ -2175,7 +2611,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         const stampId = generateStampId(peerId);
         // Field order MUST match the schema's ValidationKey `AuthorizedInsert` verify: Key, StampId.
         const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.ValidationKey', 'add', this.config.partyId, [key, stampId]);
-        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        const signature = await signMessage(message);
         await this.execWrite(`
       insert into CadreControl.ValidationKey (Key, StampId)
         with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
@@ -2244,7 +2680,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // Stamp is minted from the ADMITTED peer's id, not this node's — the nonce names the
         // row it vouches.
         const stampId = generateStampId(row.peerId);
-        const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [row.peerId, stampId]));
+        const signature = await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [row.peerId, stampId]));
         return await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-insert', async () => {
             // retry: false — this guard runs inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
             if (await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', row.peerId, false) !== null) {
@@ -2266,32 +2702,44 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         });
     }
     /**
-     * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: bump `UpdatedAt` and
-     * rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig` under the owner branch of `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate`
-     * (a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest {@link insertCadrePeer} builds), so
-     * the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting transaction.
-     *
-     * This is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that committed
-     * local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it grows, by
-     * re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because the row
-     * already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness stamp
-     * and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` / `Profile` are left intact (the
-     * owner branch requires them kept: they are the machine's own claim) — so it is safe
-     * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null); the caller must skip a row
-     * that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and bumping
-     * `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
-     *
-     * Signs over the row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch), read BEFORE the lock
-     * is taken. An absent row returns `false` WITHOUT notifying: nothing was written, so the
-     * membership snapshot cannot have changed.
-     *
-     * NOTE: that stamp read is outside the lock, same as {@link deleteGuardedRow}'s. A writer
-     * that removes the row in between makes the `update` match nothing, and this still returns
-     * `true` and notifies — harmless today (the sole caller, the write-while-alone drain, only
-     * logs the result, and a spurious notify just re-reads the member set), and a remove-then-
-     * re-add in the same window fails loudly instead, since the signature binds the retired
-     * stamp. If a caller ever acts on `true` as proof the row was written, fold the stamp read
-     * into the locked body.
+     * Owner "re-touch" of an existing `CadrePeer` membership row: rewrite `VouchOwner`/`VouchSig`
+     * (and, re-broadcasting, bump `UpdatedAt`) under the owner branch of
+     * `CadrePeer.AuthorizedUpdate` — a signature over the SAME `'vouch'`-tagged digest
+     * {@link insertCadrePeer} builds — so the row is re-emitted as a fresh, broadcasting
+     * transaction, or stands on a different owner's voucher.
+     *
+     * Re-broadcasting is the write-while-alone re-replication primitive: a membership row that
+     * committed local-only (its block's cluster ≤1 at insert) is pushed to the cohort once it
+     * grows, by re-issuing this monotonic bump. It is an UPDATE (not the original INSERT) because
+     * the row already exists locally; a re-INSERT would hit the `PeerId` PK. Only the freshness
+     * stamp and voucher change — `PublicKey` / `Multiaddr` / `Sig` / `Profile` are left intact
+     * (the owner branch requires them kept: they are the machine's own claim) — so it is safe
+     * over a row whose peer has not self-published (`Sig` null), and this method itself skips a
+     * row that already carries a self-`Sig` (that row is the owning peer's to refresh, and
+     * bumping `UpdatedAt` without re-signing would invalidate its self-signature).
+     *
+     * The two modes ({@link CadrePeerRetouchMode}) differ in what they write: `'rebroadcast'`
+     * bumps `UpdatedAt` to `max(now, current + 1)` from the row read inside the body and writes
+     * only while the row's `Sig` is null; `'revouch'` leaves `UpdatedAt` out of the `set` list and
+     * writes whether or not the machine has self-published (the owner branch has no monotonic
+     * rule, so the column simply keeps its value).
+     *
+     * The row read (stamp, `Sig`, `UpdatedAt`), the mode's decision and the signature over the
+     * row's CURRENT `StampId` (unchanged by the re-touch) all run INSIDE the locked body, which is
+     * what lets both modes opt into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row's other writer is
+     * the machine's own publish ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}), and the drain's re-broadcast fires
+     * at the moment that publish does. A re-run after losing to it reads the self-signed row and
+     * reports `'self-published'` instead of writing the owner branch over it — which would rewrite
+     * `UpdatedAt` under a `Sig` signed over the old value and make the record unverifiable to
+     * resolvers until the machine's next heartbeat. The decision has to be the body's for that;
+     * a caller's pre-check outside the lock is only a fast path (see below).
+     *
+     * An absent row — none, or its stamp retired, or a stampless row no writer produces — is
+     * `'absent'`. Checked once outside the lock too, as `'self-published'` is: the common case
+     * writes nothing, takes no lock and does NOT notify, so an absent target stays quiet
+     * ({@link SeedBootstrapService.removePeer} keeps the same gate for the same reason). The
+     * in-body re-check covers the race; a no-write outcome reached there notifies spuriously,
+     * which only re-reads the member set.
      *
      * Notifies like the insert/remove paths even though this is "only" a re-touch: it rewrites
      * VouchOwner/VouchSig, which the authorized-membership predicate judges on, so it CAN
@@ -2305,38 +2753,55 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * NOTE: this rebinds VouchOwner to the CALLING owner's key, and the authorized-membership
      * predicate (`CadreNode.listAuthorizedMembers`) now judges rows by that column against each
-     * reader's node-local anchor. Benign today because the only caller — the write-while-alone
-     * drain — re-touches solely rows this node itself authored (`pendingPeerWrites`), so the
-     * voucher is rewritten to the key that already signed it. If a future path ever lets one
-     * owner re-touch a row a DIFFERENT owner vouched, the voucher silently flips: readers that
-     * anchor the original owner but not this one would drop a legitimate member. Such a path
-     * must re-vouch deliberately (or preserve the existing VouchOwner/VouchSig) rather than
-     * inherit this rebinding.
+     * reader's node-local anchor. The two callers rebind on purpose: the write-while-alone drain
+     * re-touches solely rows this node itself authored (`pendingPeerWrites`), so the voucher is
+     * rewritten to the key that already signed it, and `CadreNode.removeOwner` moves rows off a
+     * key it is about to remove. A new caller that re-touches a row a DIFFERENT owner vouched
+     * flips the voucher silently: readers that anchor the original owner but not this one would
+     * drop a legitimate member. It must re-vouch deliberately (or preserve the existing
+     * VouchOwner/VouchSig) rather than inherit this rebinding.
      *
      * @param peerId - the membership row to re-touch.
-     * @param updatedAt - the strictly-increasing freshness stamp to write.
+     * @param mode - re-broadcast or re-vouch ({@link CadrePeerRetouchMode}).
      * @param ownerKey - public key of the re-vouching owner, rewritten into `VouchOwner`.
-     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key.
-     * @returns `true` when the row was re-touched, `false` when no row exists (no notify).
+     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes with that owner's private key;
+     *   called inside the lock, once per attempt (the NOTE on {@link ControlSign}).
+     * @returns what was found and done ({@link CadrePeerRetouchOutcome}).
      */
-    async reauthorizeCadrePeer(peerId, updatedAt, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+    async reauthorizeCadrePeer(peerId, mode, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const stampId = await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId);
-        if (stampId === null) {
-            log('reauthorizeCadrePeer: no CadrePeer row for %s (nothing to re-touch)', peerId);
-            return false;
+        const outside = retouchTarget(await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, true), mode);
+        if (typeof outside === 'string') {
+            log('reauthorizeCadrePeer(%s): %s for %s (nothing to write)', mode, outside, peerId);
+            return outside;
         }
-        const signature = signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [peerId, stampId]));
-        await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reauthorize', async () => {
+        return await this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-reauthorize', async () => {
+            // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
+            const target = retouchTarget(await this.findCadrePeerRow(peerId, false), mode);
+            if (typeof target === 'string') {
+                log('reauthorizeCadrePeer(%s): %s for %s since the pre-check (nothing to write)', mode, target, peerId);
+                return target;
+            }
+            const signature = await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.CadrePeer', 'vouch', this.config.partyId, [peerId, target.stampId]));
             // Bare `exec` — inside the non-re-entrant write lock (see insertCadrePeer).
-            await this.db.exec(`
-        update CadreControl.CadrePeer
-          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-          set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
-          where PeerId = ?
-      `, [ownerKey, signature, updatedAt, ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
-        });
-        return true;
+            if (mode === 'rebroadcast') {
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+            with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+            set UpdatedAt = ?, VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
+            where PeerId = ?
+        `, [ownerKey, signature, Math.max(Date.now(), target.updatedAt + 1), ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
+            }
+            else {
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          update CadreControl.CadrePeer
+            with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+            set VouchOwner = ?, VouchSig = ?, VouchUsage = null
+            where PeerId = ?
+        `, [ownerKey, signature, ownerKey, signature, peerId]);
+            }
+            return 'retouched';
+        }, LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
     }
     /**
      * Owner-signed removal of one `CadrePeer` membership row, notifying the membership
@@ -2357,9 +2822,15 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * A no-op (no throw, no tombstone) when the row does not exist — `false` then, `true`
      * when a row was actually removed.
+     *
+     * Opted into {@link LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY}: the row's machine may publish its own record
+     * at the moment of the removal (its first publish lands about a second after it starts), and
+     * the removal that loses is refused as a lost update. {@link deleteGuardedRow} reads the stamp
+     * and signs inside the body, and a self-publish never changes the stamp the `'remove'` digest
+     * binds, so the re-run reads the published row and removes it.
      */
     deleteCadrePeer(peerId, ownerKey, signMessage) {
-        return this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-remove', () => this.deleteGuardedRow('CadrePeer', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage));
+        return this.mutateCadrePeer('peer-remove', () => this.deleteGuardedRow('CadrePeer', peerId, ownerKey, signMessage), LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY);
     }
     /**
      * Owner-signed removal of one peer's `DeviceToken` row (logout / token invalidation).
@@ -2412,7 +2883,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             log('delete %s: no row for %s (already absent)', table, keyValue);
             return false;
         }
-        const removal = signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, table, keyValue, stampId, signMessage);
+        const removal = await signGuardedRemoval(this.config.partyId, table, keyValue, stampId, signMessage);
         await this.inTransaction(`delete ${table}`, async () => {
             await alongside?.(stampId);
             await this.execGuardedRemoval(removal, ownerKey);
@@ -2445,10 +2916,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
     /**
      * File the owner-signed `Revocation` tombstone retiring one row incarnation — the second
-     * statement of every guarded removal ({@link execGuardedRemoval}) and the whole of a
-     * `CadreInvite` withdrawal ({@link withdrawCadreInvite}), whose row stays — or the ledger
-     * marker ({@link openRevocationLedger}), which retires nothing. The caller supplies the
-     * lock and, where one is needed, the transaction.
+     * statement of every guarded removal ({@link execGuardedRemoval}) and the whole of an
+     * issued row's withdrawal ({@link withdrawIssuedRow}), whose row stays. The caller
+     * supplies the lock and, where one is needed, the transaction.
      *
      * `ReissuedAt` is named explicitly at 0 (the only value `FreshTombstone` accepts) rather
      * than leaning on the column default — the seat-at-zero rule is load-bearing for
@@ -2502,9 +2972,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * statement, and without the clause the reap would delete the owner's brand-new row.
      * With it the statement matches nothing and the reap is a silent no-op (the schema
      * branch would also refuse that delete, but as a constraint error thrown into a
-     * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). Like
-     * {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, a race lost AFTER the guard still returns `true`;
-     * harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep re-reads.
+     * background sweep — matched-nothing is the better failure mode). A race lost AFTER the
+     * guard still returns `true` here (unlike {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, which reads inside
+     * its lock and reports what it found); harmless — nothing was deleted, and the next sweep
+     * re-reads.
      *
      * Writes NOTHING to `Revocation`: `RevocationRecorded` is satisfied by the same
      * committed tombstone that authorizes the reap, so a reap files no second tombstone.
@@ -2531,7 +3002,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * present clause are the shape {@link redeemInvitation}'s consent-branch insert ships).
      *
      * Driven automatically by {@link reapRevokedRows}, which the periodic control-cohort
-     * reconcile pass runs while the node has at least one control connection.
+     * reconcile pass runs while a sibling is reachable (`CadreNode.hasReachableControlSibling`).
      */
     async reapRevokedRow(table, rowKey, stampId) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -2589,8 +3060,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * carry the delete (replaying a delete of an already-absent row is a no-op), so a node
      * that converged on a removal while holding the removed row keeps that row as inert
      * garbage until something walks the tombstones and drops it. `CadreNode`'s periodic
-     * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on the node having at least one
-     * control connection (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
+     * control-cohort reconcile pass is that something, gated on a sibling being reachable
+     * (a reap is a write, and a write committed alone is local-only).
      *
      * Enumerated UNLOCKED, deleted per-row LOCKED: {@link reapRevokedRow} takes the write
      * lock itself (via {@link mutateCadrePeer} / {@link execWrite}) and the lock is not
@@ -2623,12 +3094,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * NOTE: cost is O(tombstones), not O(live rows) — one {@link queryRevocations} scan plus
      * one {@link queryStampId} point lookup per tombstone, and the empty early return makes
-     * the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone; {@link queryRevocations} skips
-     * the ledger marker) a single scan per pass. That scan consults the cohort on every pass
-     * only while `Revocation` has never been written; the ledger marker
-     * ({@link openRevocationLedger}), filed by the same connected pass, makes it a held block.
+     * the common case (a party that has never revoked anyone) a single scan per pass, served
+     * from the `Revocation` membership view
+     * ({@link readMembershipRows}) unless the table changed since the last read.
      * But `Revocation` is append-only and unbounded, so this is O(all tombstones ever) point
-     * lookups on every reconcile tick. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
+     * lookups on every connected reconcile pass. Fine while revocations stay rare for a cadre-sized
      * party; if the table ever grows, persist a node-local high-water mark of what has
      * already been reaped instead of re-scanning everything (the same bound the sweep in
      * `CadreNode.drainPendingRevocations` wants).
@@ -2692,17 +3162,20 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      *
      * Returns how many UPDATE statements ran (`rows.length` on success).
      */
-    reissueRevocations(rows, reissuedAt, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+    async reissueRevocations(rows, reissuedAt, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         // Signatures minted OUTSIDE the locked body: a retried attempt must re-present the
         // exact signed message, never re-mint (the contract on withWriteLock). ReissuedAt
         // rides in the digest as a string — SQL-side it is cast(new.ReissuedAt as text),
         // and every digest field is TEXT on both sides (see buildAuthorizationMessage).
-        const signed = rows.map((row) => ({
-            row,
-            signature: signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'reissue', this.config.partyId, [row.tableName, row.rowKey, row.stampId, String(reissuedAt)])),
-        }));
-        return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
+        const signed = [];
+        for (const row of rows) {
+            signed.push({
+                row,
+                signature: await signMessage(buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.Revocation', 'reissue', this.config.partyId, [row.tableName, row.rowKey, row.stampId, String(reissuedAt)])),
+            });
+        }
+        return await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
             // Counter lives INSIDE the locked body so a lockedWithRetry re-run (which
             // re-executes the whole body) starts from zero instead of double-counting.
             let executed = 0;
@@ -2733,69 +3206,6 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             return executed;
         }, {}, 'revocation-reissue');
     }
-    /**
-     * Owner-signed filing of the singleton `Revocation` ledger marker
-     * ({@link REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER}), the one row in that table that retires nothing.
-     *
-     * Why it exists: while `Revocation` has never been written, this node does not hold its
-     * block, and Optimystic consults a block's cohort on EVERY read of a block it does not
-     * hold — and every membership lookup, and every guarded insert's `NotRevoked` check,
-     * reads this table. Once any row exists the block is held and re-checked at most once per
-     * read-repair window, like every other populated table. The schema's table comment says
-     * why the row can never read as a retirement.
-     *
-     * Insert-if-absent, shaped like {@link reissueRevocations}: the signature is minted
-     * OUTSIDE the locked body so a retried attempt re-presents the same one, and the guard
-     * runs INSIDE it so it sees a concurrent local writer's committed row. The guard scans
-     * the `'Revocation'` rows and compares the stamp in TypeScript rather than seeking the
-     * full composite primary key, which is served as a point lookup that can miss an existing
-     * row on a networked database (tickets/backlog/debt-composite-pk-point-lookup-unreliable-untracked).
-     *
-     * Two owners filing at once: the loser either sees the marker in its guard or is refused
-     * on the primary key, and both answer `'already-open'`.
-     *
-     * The caller decides WHEN. A marker committed while the node is alone is local-only and
-     * can fork the collection, so {@link CadreNode} files it only while connected; this
-     * method does not look at connectivity.
-     *
-     * @param ownerKey - owner public key for the write context (`Revocation.Authorized`).
-     * @param signMessage - ed25519-signs the raw message bytes (no pre-hash) with that owner's
-     *   private key, returning a base64url signature.
-     * @returns `'opened'` when this call filed the marker, `'already-open'` when it was
-     *   already there.
-     */
-    async openRevocationLedger(ownerKey, signMessage) {
-        this.ensureInitialized();
-        const signature = signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(this.config.partyId, REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER));
-        try {
-            return await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
-                if (await this.revocationLedgerFiled()) {
-                    return 'already-open';
-                }
-                // execTombstone is a bare `exec`: already inside the write lock, which is NOT re-entrant.
-                await this.execTombstone(REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER, signature, ownerKey);
-                log('Revocation ledger marker filed');
-                return 'opened';
-            }, {}, 'revocation-ledger-open');
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            if (!isRevocationLedgerConflict(error)) {
-                throw error;
-            }
-            log('Revocation ledger marker already filed (refused on the primary key, most likely by another owner filing first): %s', error);
-            return 'already-open';
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Whether the ledger marker is present locally: a scan of the `'Revocation'` rows with the
-     * stamp compared in TypeScript (see {@link openRevocationLedger} for why not a seek).
-     * Called only inside the locked write body, so never retried (see queryStampId's NOTE).
-     */
-    async revocationLedgerFiled() {
-        const { tableName, stampId } = REVOCATION_LEDGER_MARKER;
-        const rows = await this.readRows('select StampId from CadreControl.Revocation where TableName = ?', [tableName], 'revocation-ledger', false);
-        return rows.some(row => row.StampId === stampId);
-    }
     /**
      * Run `body` between `beginTransaction` and `commit`, rolling back on failure.
      *
@@ -2843,10 +3253,26 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * {@link CadreNode}, which wires this in `start()` and clears it on teardown. A
      * second call replaces the first rather than fanning out, so a stale node can
      * never keep receiving notifications for a database it no longer owns.
+     *
+     * Only this database's own writes notify here, awaited inside the write so the gate is
+     * current before the write returns. A membership change replicated in from another
+     * machine reaches the gate through the subscription `CadreNode.start` takes on the
+     * membership tables ({@link watchTables}), a coalesced run up to 50 ms after the change
+     * lands in storage; one storage never hears of waits for the reconcile pass's backstop.
      */
     setMembershipChangeListener(listener) {
         this.membershipListener = listener;
     }
+    /**
+     * Subscribe `onChange` to changes in control tables (`'CadreControl.Strand'`, …): commits
+     * made here and changes replicated into this node's storage alike, on the single-flight
+     * schedule `table-change-watch.ts` describes. {@link close} disposes every subscription
+     * still live before it drains the write queue.
+     */
+    watchTables(tables, onChange, options) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        return this.tableWatches.watch(this.db, tables, onChange, options);
+    }
     /**
      * Wire (or clear, with null) the single listener notified after every committed
      * guarded-table delete. Same ownership contract as
@@ -2876,8 +3302,9 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * Covers every write that can change who is a member or an owner: EVERY `CadrePeer`
      * writer, with one documented exception ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, which cannot
      * change the snapshot), the `OwnerKey` writers ({@link insertOwnerKeyVouched},
-     * {@link deleteOwnerKey}) and the invitation redemption ({@link redeemCadreInvite}),
-     * which seats both. That is what makes the party-membership snapshot refresh automatic
+     * {@link deleteOwnerKey}), the invitation redemption ({@link redeemCadreInvite}), which
+     * seats both, and the owner-grant redemption ({@link redeemOwnerGrant}). That is what
+     * makes the party-membership snapshot refresh automatic
      * rather than a caller obligation. The name predates the `OwnerKey` writers. A
      * writer necessarily holds the target node's ControlDatabase (the `SeedBootstrapService`'s
      * event callbacks are NOT a viable seam: the temp service `CadreNode.applySeed`
@@ -2904,8 +3331,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * exhaustion.
      *
      * @param reason - Label for the log line only (e.g. `'peer-insert'`).
+     * @param policy - The retry policy, default unless the body has earned a wider one: the three
+     *   `CadrePeer` writers whose bodies re-read the row and decide inside pass
+     *   `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` (its `NOTE:` names them and the rule).
      */
-    async mutateCadrePeer(reason, body) {
+    async mutateCadrePeer(reason, body, policy = {}) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         return this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
             this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on entry to');
@@ -2913,7 +3343,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             this.assertCommitBoundary(reason, 'on return from');
             await this.notifyMembershipChanged(reason);
             return result;
-        }, {}, reason);
+        }, policy, reason);
     }
     /**
      * Run one local write under the database-wide write lock, serializing it against
@@ -2927,8 +3357,8 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * class: every public write method of this class runs its statement(s) under it, and
      * `SeedBootstrapService` reaches it through {@link execWrite} rather than touching the
      * `Database` directly, so it is covered too. The race is
-     * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish on a control connection
-     * opening (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
+     * real, not theoretical: the background self-record publish when a sibling becomes
+     * reachable (`CadreNode.drainPendingControlReplication` → `registerSelf`) collided with
      * a foreground `authorizePeer` — both `CadrePeer` inserts — and tripped the boundary
      * assert.
      *
@@ -2952,6 +3382,11 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * re-runnable means a retry re-runs the body's reads too, which is what makes it safe.
      * Signatures and stamp ids minted OUTSIDE the body are deliberately NOT re-minted per
      * attempt: a retry re-presents the exact signed message the first attempt presented.
+     * A body opted into `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` is the exception, and must mint INSIDE:
+     * its re-run is a re-decision over a row another writer changed, not a re-presentation of
+     * the same write, so its read of the row, its decision and its signature all run in the
+     * body ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord}, {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer}, {@link deleteGuardedRow}
+     * under {@link deleteCadrePeer}, {@link removeMachine}).
      */
     async withWriteLock(fn) {
         // Chain behind the current tail regardless of how it settled, then park a
@@ -2988,13 +3423,18 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * backoff never stalls the other local writers queued behind it. Safe because every
      * locked body is atomic and re-runnable (the contract on {@link withWriteLock}).
      *
-     * Also carries {@link loadSchema}'s distributed DDL, the one caller that runs BEFORE
+     * Also carries {@link applyControlSchema}'s distributed DDL, the one caller that runs BEFORE
      * `initialized` is set — so it reaches this method directly rather than through
      * {@link execWrite}, whose {@link ensureInitialized} would reject it. The write queue is
      * necessarily empty at that point, so the lock is uncontended there; it is taken anyway
-     * rather than carving out a lockless path. It is also the ONLY caller that passes a
-     * `policy` — everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count are
-     * unchanged by that call site existing.
+     * rather than carving out a lockless path.
+     *
+     * Two policies reach here besides the default: `SCHEMA_INIT_RETRY_POLICY` from that one
+     * call site, and `LOST_UPDATE_RETRY_POLICY` from the `CadrePeer` writers that re-read the
+     * row inside their body ({@link updateSelfPeerRecord} directly; {@link reauthorizeCadrePeer},
+     * {@link deleteCadrePeer} and {@link removeMachine} through {@link mutateCadrePeer}'s
+     * policy parameter). Everything else takes the default, whose classifier and attempt count
+     * are unchanged by those call sites existing.
      *
      * `label` names the operation in this loop's debug lines and nothing else
      * ({@link ControlWriteRetryOptions.label}). Every call site in this class supplies one:
@@ -3125,6 +3565,15 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     async insertFormationInvite(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, options = {}) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         log('Inserting formation invite: %s', token);
+        const insert = await this.signFormationInviteInsert(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, options);
+        await this.execWrite(insert.sql, insert.params, 'formation-invite-insert');
+        log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
+    }
+    /**
+     * The stamped, owner-signed `FormationInvite` insert that {@link insertFormationInvite} and
+     * {@link insertFoundingRows} run. Reads the engine once, for the canonical `ExpiresAt`.
+     */
+    async signFormationInviteInsert(token, sAppId, ownerKey, signMessage, options) {
         const stampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
         // Build each bound field exactly as the deferred CHECK sees it post-coercion:
         //   - ExpiresAt: engine-canonical datetime string (or '' when absent), sourced from
@@ -3144,24 +3593,26 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         const message = buildAuthorizationMessage('CadreControl.FormationInvite', 'add', this.config.partyId, [
             token, sAppId, expiresAtField, totalUsesField, validationUrlField, strandIdField, stampId,
         ]);
-        const signature = signMessage(message);
+        const signature = await signMessage(message);
         // Persist the canonical ExpiresAt string (datetime parse is idempotent on it) so the
         // signed source-of-truth and the stored value are produced once. StampId is a real,
         // unique column (single-use anti-replay), no longer a context value.
-        await this.execWrite(`
-      insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
-        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-    `, [
-            ownerKey, signature,
-            token, sAppId,
-            expiresAtCanonical,
-            options.totalUses ?? null,
-            options.validationUrl ?? null,
-            options.strandId ?? null,
-            stampId,
-        ], 'formation-invite-insert');
-        log('Formation invite inserted: %s', token);
+        return {
+            sql: `
+        insert into CadreControl.FormationInvite (Token, sAppId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, ValidationUrl, StrandId, StampId)
+          with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+          values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `,
+            params: [
+                ownerKey, signature,
+                token, sAppId,
+                expiresAtCanonical,
+                options.totalUses ?? null,
+                options.validationUrl ?? null,
+                options.strandId ?? null,
+                stampId,
+            ],
+        };
     }
     /**
      * Redeem a `FormationInvite` by inserting the `Strand` row and a matching
@@ -3217,13 +3668,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
             await this.inTransaction('redemption', async () => {
                 // 1. Strand row — authorised by the FormationUsage branch (no owner sig),
                 //    still carrying a fresh unique StampId for the anti-replay column.
-                //    Hard-coded open + keyless + explicit null FounderOwnerKey: the
+                //    Hard-coded open + keyless + explicit null founder columns: the
                 //    consent branch admits no other shape (no signature means no
-                //    trustworthy founder machine to record — see the schema's NOTE).
+                //    trustworthy founder machine to record — see the schema's comment).
                 await this.db.exec(`
-          insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey)
+          insert into CadreControl.Strand (Id, Type, MemberPrivateKey, StampId, FounderOwnerKey, FounderPeerId)
             with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-            values (?, 'o', null, ?, null)
+            values (?, 'o', null, ?, null, null)
         `, [strandId, strandStampId]);
                 // 2. FormationUsage row — authorised by the matching FormationInvite, and
                 //    carrying the strand's stamp so it authorizes THIS row and no other.
@@ -3248,14 +3699,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * Use {@link redeemInvitation} instead when the strand must be created by
      * consent atomically with the usage.
      *
-     * The strand's live `StampId` is read first and written onto the usage row:
+     * The strand's live `StampId` is written onto the usage row:
      * `FormationUsage.StrandExists` matches the (id, stamp) PAIR, and
      * `Strand.AuthorizedInsert`'s consent branch reads the same pair back, so a consent
-     * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A missing strand
-     * THROWS here rather than being left to the deferred `StrandExists` CHECK — the
-     * ordinary "host strand has not converged yet" case is already reported as `missing`
-     * by {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder.resolveStrand}, so an absent row at this
-     * point is a genuine race and deserves a named error, not a silent rollback.
+     * record authorizes exactly the strand ROW it was recorded against. A caller that already
+     * read the stamp passes it (`strandStampId`); otherwise it is read here first, and a
+     * missing strand THROWS {@link MissingHostStrandError} rather than being left to the
+     * deferred `StrandExists` CHECK.
      *
      * The row is keyed by the joiner's own nonce (`UsageStampId` is the primary key), so this
      * path — the one production actually races on (a bound invite published by `cadre-web` /
@@ -3269,7 +3719,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         const { token, strandId, disclosure = '', peerKey, peerSignature, usageStampId, nowMs, validationKey, validationSignature, signal, totalUses, } = params;
         // The host strand is pre-existing and owner-signed; its stamp names the strand ROW the
         // consent record authorizes.
-        const strandStampId = await this.queryStrandStampId(strandId);
+        const strandStampId = params.strandStampId ?? await this.queryStrandStampId(strandId);
         if (strandStampId === null) {
             throw new MissingHostStrandError(strandId, token);
         }
@@ -3390,7 +3840,7 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * permissive PRE-check that runs ahead of it, and a transiently short read costs each of
      * them only a worse outcome for the ATTEMPT, never a seat the invitation did not pay for:
      * {@link assertSeatRemains} loses its named exhaustion error and falls back to the CHECK's
-     * generic refusal; `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.isTokenUsed` reports not-used and lets
+     * generic refusal; `ControlFormationUsageRecorder.readToken` reports a seat free and lets
      * the redemption proceed to the CHECK, which decides; {@link hasOutstandingFormationInvite}
      * holds the stranger-admission door open slightly longer.
      *
@@ -3423,12 +3873,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     /**
      * Is any `FormationInvite` row still redeemable — unexpired AND with usage
      * below its `TotalUses`? A null `ExpiresAt` never expires and a null
-     * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching {@link ControlFormationUsageRecorder}'s
-     * per-token semantics (`isTokenValid` / `isTokenUsed`).
+     * `TotalUses` is unlimited, matching the per-token semantics of `classifyTokenRead`
+     * (`formation-token.ts`).
      *
      * Answers the control-network connection gate's coarse "does this node expect
      * a stranger?" question, which has no token to ask about. The expiry
-     * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isTokenValid`'s — so an
+     * comparison is `expiresAtMs <= now` — identical to `isInviteExpired`'s — so an
      * invite the formation handler would reject can never hold the gate open.
      *
      * The scan is deliberately not pushed into SQL: nothing else here compares a
@@ -3492,73 +3942,116 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * private half to the invitee out of band. It is never stored here (`Strand.Invite` has the
      * same shape).
      *
-     * @param invite.key - the invitation public key (base64url ed25519), the row's primary key
-     * @param invite.peerId - the device the invitation is for, or null for whoever redeems first
-     * @param invite.grantsOwner - whether redemption also seats an `OwnerKey` row for the device
-     * @param invite.expiresAtMs - epoch ms after which it cannot be redeemed; omit for never
-     * @param invite.totalUses - how many redemptions it allows; omit for unlimited
      * @returns the row as stored, `expiresAt` in its canonical form
      */
     async insertCadreInvite(invite, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        const row = await this.signCadreInvite(invite, ownerKey, signMessage);
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.execCadreInviteInsert(row), {}, 'cadre-invite-insert');
+        log('Cadre invitation inserted: %s (peer=%s)', row.key, row.peerId ?? 'any');
+        return row;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Build and owner-sign a `CadreInvite` row WITHOUT inserting it: the signing half of
+     * {@link insertCadreInvite}, which `CadreNode.joinWithOwnerGrant` uses alone for the
+     * invitation a node issues to itself, since a store that holds no `OwnerKey` row for the
+     * issuer would refuse the local insert and the row is seated at a member from the bundle
+     * instead. `ExpiresAt` is canonicalized by this database's engine, which is a format, not a
+     * store, so the row reads the same wherever it is seated.
+     */
+    async signCadreInvite(invite, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const key = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(invite.key, 'cadre invitation key');
         const signed = {
             key,
             peerId: invite.peerId ?? null,
-            grantsOwner: invite.grantsOwner,
             expiresAt: invite.expiresAtMs == null ? null : await canonicalDatetime(this.db, invite.expiresAtMs),
             totalUses: invite.totalUses ?? null,
             stampId: generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString()),
         };
-        const row = {
+        return {
             ...signed,
             issuerKey: ownerKey,
-            issuerSig: signMessage(cadreInviteAddMessage(this.config.partyId, signed)),
+            issuerSig: await signMessage(cadreInviteAddMessage(this.config.partyId, signed)),
         };
-        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.execCadreInviteInsert(row), {}, 'cadre-invite-insert');
-        log('Cadre invitation inserted: %s (peer=%s owner=%s)', key, row.peerId ?? 'any', row.grantsOwner);
-        return row;
     }
     /**
      * Seat an owner-signed `CadreInvite` row received inside an invitation bundle, under its own
      * stored `IssuerKey`/`IssuerSig` as the write context — insert-if-absent, so a member that
-     * already holds the row (by replication, or from an earlier redemption attempt) is a no-op.
+     * already holds the row (by replication, or from an earlier redemption attempt) is a no-op,
+     * and so is one whose insert the cohort refuses because a member there holds it.
      *
      * @returns `true` when this call inserted the row, `false` when it was already present.
      * @throws {CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError} when `CadreInvite.AuthorizedInsert` refuses it: the
      *   issuer is not an owner on this node (not replicated yet, or removed), or the signature does
-     *   not verify. Every other refusal (a withdrawn stamp, `NotRevoked`) propagates as is.
+     *   not verify. {@link IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when the cohort holds the row and this node
+     *   cannot read it yet. Every other refusal (a withdrawn stamp, `NotRevoked`) propagates as is.
      */
     async seatCadreInvite(row) {
+        return this.seatIssuedRow('CadreInvite', row.key, () => this.execCadreInviteInsert(row), cause => new CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError(row.key, row.issuerKey, { cause }));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Insert-if-absent of an issued row from a bundle's copy, under the write lock: the body of
+     * {@link seatCadreInvite} and {@link seatOwnerGrant}. `exec` runs the bare insert under the
+     * row's own stored issuer pair.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` when this call inserted the row, `false` when it was already present —
+     *   here, or at the cohort member that refused the insert for holding it
+     *   ({@link adoptCohortHeldRow}).
+     * @throws `refuse(cause)` when the table's `AuthorizedInsert` refuses the row;
+     *   {@link IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when the cohort holds the row and this node still cannot
+     *   read it; every other refusal (a withdrawn stamp, `NotRevoked`) propagates as is.
+     */
+    async seatIssuedRow(table, key, exec, refuse) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         try {
             return await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
                 // retry: false — inside the locked write body (see queryStampId's NOTE).
-                if (await this.queryStampId('CadreInvite', row.key, false) !== null) {
-                    log('CadreInvite %s already seated; seat skipped', row.key);
+                if (await this.queryStampId(table, key, false) !== null) {
+                    log('%s %s already seated; seat skipped', table, key);
                     return false;
                 }
-                await this.execCadreInviteInsert(row);
-                log('Cadre invitation seated from its bundle: %s', row.key);
+                await exec();
+                log('%s seated from its bundle: %s', table, key);
                 return true;
-            }, {}, 'cadre-invite-seat');
+            }, {}, `${ISSUED_TABLE_REASON[table]}-seat`);
         }
         catch (error) {
-            if (errorChainMatches(error, CADRE_INVITE_UNAUTHORIZED)) {
-                throw new CadreInviteIssuerUnknownError(row.key, row.issuerKey, { cause: error });
+            if (errorChainMatches(error, ISSUER_UNAUTHORIZED)) {
+                throw refuse(error);
+            }
+            if (isIssuedRowKeyConflict(error, table)) {
+                return await this.adoptCohortHeldRow(table, key, error);
             }
             throw error;
         }
     }
+    /**
+     * The seat's insert was refused because a cohort member already holds a row under `key`, which
+     * this node's guard read missed because its store lags the cohort. A bundle's copy is verbatim
+     * and every column is under the issuer's signature, so the held row is this one: it counts as
+     * seated once a refreshing read (unlocked, so retried as any read) finds it here.
+     *
+     * @throws {IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when the read still does not find it.
+     */
+    async adoptCohortHeldRow(table, key, conflict) {
+        // NOTE: while another locked body runs here, this read takes readRowsOnce's committed path,
+        // which does not refresh from the cohort, so it can miss the row and refuse a retryable
+        // `conflict`; if that refusal shows up in practice, wait for the running body before reading.
+        if (await this.queryStampId(table, key) === null) {
+            throw new IssuedRowNotHereYetError(table, key, { cause: conflict });
+        }
+        log('%s %s is held by the cohort; seat skipped', table, key);
+        return false;
+    }
     /** Bare `CadreInvite` insert shared by {@link insertCadreInvite} and {@link seatCadreInvite}; the caller holds the lock. */
     async execCadreInviteInsert(row) {
         await this.db.exec(`
-      insert into CadreControl.CadreInvite (Key, PeerId, GrantsOwner, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId)
+      insert into CadreControl.CadreInvite (Key, PeerId, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId)
         with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
-        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
     `, [
             row.issuerKey, row.issuerSig,
-            row.key, row.peerId, row.grantsOwner ? 1 : 0, row.expiresAt, row.totalUses,
+            row.key, row.peerId, row.expiresAt, row.totalUses,
             row.issuerKey, row.issuerSig, row.stampId,
         ]);
     }
@@ -3567,8 +4060,10 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * the row is the holder's proof and never goes away; liveness is {@link hasLiveCadreInvite}'s
      * question, and `CadreInviteUsage.Authorized`'s at redemption.
      *
-     * `retry: false` is passed by {@link redeemCadreInvite}, which reads INSIDE its locked write
-     * body — the same per-call opt-out, for the same reason, as {@link queryStampId}'s.
+     * A redemption reads the row once, before its write, and carries it into
+     * {@link isCadreInviteLive} and {@link redeemCadreInvite}. `retry: false` is passed by
+     * {@link redeemCadreInvite} when it was handed none and reads INSIDE its locked write body —
+     * the same per-call opt-out, for the same reason, as {@link queryStampId}'s.
      */
     async queryCadreInvite(key, retry = true) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
@@ -3585,19 +4080,15 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * {@link queryCadrePeers}' reason.
      */
     async queryCadreInvites(retry = true) {
-        this.ensureInitialized();
-        const rows = await this.readRows(CADRE_INVITE_SELECT_SQL, undefined, 'cadre-invites', retry);
-        return rows.map(cadreInviteRowOf);
+        return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadreInviteView, retry)).map(cadreInviteRowOf);
     }
     /**
      * Every `CadreInviteUsage` row this node holds — the redemption records the membership
      * predicate verifies invitation-admitted rows against. Same `retry` contract as
-     * {@link queryCadreInvites}.
+     * {@link queryCadreInvites}; both come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}).
      */
     async queryCadreInviteUsages(retry = true) {
-        this.ensureInitialized();
-        const rows = await this.readRows('select UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, OwnerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage', undefined, 'cadre-invite-usages', retry);
-        return rows.map(cadreInviteUsageRowOf);
+        return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.cadreInviteUsageView, retry)).map(cadreInviteUsageRowOf);
     }
     /**
      * How many times a cadre invitation has been redeemed (its `CadreInviteUsage` rows), served
@@ -3607,9 +4098,12 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * `retry: false` is passed by {@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains}, inside the locked body.
      */
     async countCadreInviteUsage(key, retry = true) {
+        return this.countUsageRows('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage where InviteKey = ?', key, 'cadre-invite-usage-count', retry);
+    }
+    /** The one-row count read behind {@link countCadreInviteUsage} and {@link countOwnerGrantUsage}. */
+    async countUsageRows(sql, key, label, retry) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const sql = 'select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage where InviteKey = ?';
-        for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, [key], 'cadre-invite-usage-count', retry)) {
+        for (const row of await this.readRows(sql, [key], label, retry)) {
             return row.Count ?? 0;
         }
         return 0;
@@ -3637,10 +4131,13 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
         // counts make that free today; if a long-lived cadre accumulates thousands and inbound
         // upgrades slow down, add an expiry-ordered index or prune withdrawn/expired rows (which
         // first needs every device they admitted re-vouched, so the chain no longer needs them).
+        // NOTE: this scan reaches storage while queryCadreInvites serves the same rows from the
+        // membership view; if the stranger path's reads ever near the gate's 2 s deadline, walk
+        // queryCadreInvites() here instead.
         const metered = [];
         let unlimitedLive = false;
         for (const row of await this.readRows('select Key, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, StampId from CadreControl.CadreInvite', undefined, 'live-cadre-invites')) {
-            const open = cadreInviteStillOpen({ stampId: row.StampId, issuerKey: row.IssuerKey, expiresAt: row.ExpiresAt ?? null }, withdrawn, owners, nowMs);
+            const open = issuedRowStillOpen({ stampId: row.StampId, issuerKey: row.IssuerKey, expiresAt: row.ExpiresAt ?? null }, withdrawn, owners, nowMs);
             if (!open) {
                 continue;
             }
@@ -3667,24 +4164,36 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
     }
     /**
      * Is this one cadre invitation still redeemable here — the conditions
-     * {@link hasLiveCadreInvite} applies, for one invitation? The row judged is the one this node
-     * holds under `invite.key`; when it holds none, `invite` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated
-     * yet), but only if its issuer signature verifies, because an unsigned copy would otherwise be
-     * judged by whichever owner it names as issuer. A permissive pre-check like
-     * {@link countCadreInviteUsage}: {@link seatCadreInvite} and the redemption's own write are
-     * what enforce every condition.
+     * {@link hasLiveCadreInvite} applies, for one invitation? The row judged is `held`, the one this
+     * node holds under `invite.key` ({@link queryCadreInvite}, read by the caller); when it holds
+     * none, `invite` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated yet), but only if its issuer signature
+     * verifies, because an unsigned copy would otherwise be judged by whichever owner it names as
+     * issuer. A permissive pre-check like {@link countCadreInviteUsage}: {@link seatCadreInvite}
+     * and the redemption's own write are what enforce every condition.
+     *
+     * The use count read here is read again inside the redemption's write lock
+     * ({@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains}), on purpose: this one decides whether the device is
+     * pushed the control store before the write, so the holder of a spent invitation is refused
+     * without being sent anything; the in-lock one decides the seat, against a concurrent redemption.
      */
-    async isCadreInviteLive(invite, nowMs = Date.now()) {
+    async isCadreInviteLive(invite, held, nowMs = Date.now()) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const row = await this.queryCadreInvite(invite.key) ?? (verifyCadreInviteRow(this.config.partyId, invite) ? invite : null);
+        const row = held ?? (verifyCadreInviteRow(this.config.partyId, invite) ? invite : null);
+        return this.issuedRowLive('CadreInvite', row, nowMs, key => this.countCadreInviteUsage(key));
+    }
+    /**
+     * The body of {@link isCadreInviteLive} and {@link isOwnerGrantLive}: is `row` (the one held,
+     * or a verified bundle copy; null for neither) still open and under its use cap?
+     */
+    async issuedRowLive(table, row, nowMs, countUsage) {
         if (row === null) {
             return false;
         }
-        const [withdrawn, owners] = await Promise.all([this.queryRevokedStamps('CadreInvite'), this.getOwnerKeys()]);
-        if (!cadreInviteStillOpen(row, withdrawn, owners, nowMs)) {
+        const [withdrawn, owners] = await Promise.all([this.queryRevokedStamps(table), this.getOwnerKeys()]);
+        if (!issuedRowStillOpen(row, withdrawn, owners, nowMs)) {
             return false;
         }
-        return row.totalUses === null || await this.countCadreInviteUsage(row.key) < row.totalUses;
+        return row.totalUses === null || await countUsage(row.key) < row.totalUses;
     }
     /**
      * Every `CadreInvite` row this node holds with its standing: how many redemptions are
@@ -3694,22 +4203,28 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * occasional read, not a gate's.
      */
     async listCadreInviteStatuses(nowMs = Date.now()) {
+        const standings = await this.issuedRowStandings('CadreInvite', await this.queryCadreInvites(), nowMs, key => this.countCadreInviteUsage(key));
+        return standings.map(({ row, ...standing }) => ({ invite: row, ...standing }));
+    }
+    /**
+     * The body of {@link listCadreInviteStatuses} and {@link listOwnerGrantStatuses}: each of
+     * `rows` with its withdrawal, its recorded uses and whether it is still redeemable.
+     */
+    async issuedRowStandings(table, rows, nowMs, countUsage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const [invites, withdrawnStamps, owners] = await Promise.all([
-            this.queryCadreInvites(), this.queryRevokedStamps('CadreInvite'), this.getOwnerKeys()
-        ]);
-        const statuses = [];
-        // NOTE: one retried count read per invitation, withdrawn and expired rows included, since
-        // rows are never deleted; if a long-lived cadre's listing ever shows as slow, group the
-        // usage counts in one statement or skip the count for rows that are no longer open.
-        for (const invite of invites) {
-            const usesRecorded = await this.countCadreInviteUsage(invite.key);
-            const withdrawn = withdrawnStamps.has(invite.stampId);
-            const live = cadreInviteStillOpen(invite, withdrawnStamps, owners, nowMs)
-                && (invite.totalUses === null || usesRecorded < invite.totalUses);
-            statuses.push({ invite, live, withdrawn, usesRecorded });
+        const [withdrawnStamps, owners] = await Promise.all([this.queryRevokedStamps(table), this.getOwnerKeys()]);
+        const standings = [];
+        // NOTE: one retried count read per row, withdrawn and expired rows included, since rows
+        // are never deleted; if a long-lived cadre's listing ever shows as slow, group the usage
+        // counts in one statement or skip the count for rows that are no longer open.
+        for (const row of rows) {
+            const usesRecorded = await countUsage(row.key);
+            const withdrawn = withdrawnStamps.has(row.stampId);
+            const live = issuedRowStillOpen(row, withdrawnStamps, owners, nowMs)
+                && (row.totalUses === null || usesRecorded < row.totalUses);
+            standings.push({ row, live, withdrawn, usesRecorded });
         }
-        return statuses;
+        return standings;
     }
     /**
      * Owner-signed WITHDRAWAL of a cadre invitation: file the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its
@@ -3729,59 +4244,66 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * node was alone is queued for re-issue on cohort growth ({@link CadreNode.noteGuardedDelete}).
      */
     async withdrawCadreInvite(key, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.withdrawIssuedRow('CadreInvite', key, ownerKey, signMessage);
+    }
+    /**
+     * The body of {@link withdrawCadreInvite} and {@link withdrawOwnerGrant}: under the write
+     * lock, file the owner-signed tombstone retiring the row's stamp with the row kept, and fire
+     * the guarded-delete listener for it (so a withdrawal made while alone is re-issued).
+     */
+    async withdrawIssuedRow(table, key, ownerKey, signMessage) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
         const filed = await this.lockedWithRetry(async () => {
-            const [withdrawal] = await this.signCadreInviteWithdrawals([key], signMessage);
+            const [withdrawal] = await this.signWithdrawals(table, [key], signMessage);
             if (withdrawal === undefined) {
                 return null;
             }
             await this.execTombstone(withdrawal.ref, withdrawal.signature, ownerKey);
             return withdrawal.ref;
-        }, {}, 'cadre-invite-withdraw');
+        }, {}, `${ISSUED_TABLE_REASON[table]}-withdraw`);
         if (filed === null) {
             return false;
         }
-        log('Cadre invitation withdrawn: %s (stamp %s retired, row kept)', key, filed.stampId);
+        log('%s withdrawn: %s (stamp %s retired, row kept)', table, key, filed.stampId);
         this.notifyGuardedDelete(filed);
         return true;
     }
     /**
-     * The withdrawal tombstones for the `CadreInvite` rows among `keys` that are held here and
-     * not yet withdrawn, signed and ready for {@link execTombstone}: the body
-     * {@link withdrawCadreInvite} files one of and {@link removeMachine} files several of in one
+     * The withdrawal tombstones for the `table` rows among `keys` that are held here and not
+     * yet withdrawn, signed and ready for {@link execTombstone}: the body
+     * {@link withdrawIssuedRow} files one of and {@link removeMachine} files several of in one
      * transaction. Inside the locked body (every read `retry: false`); an absent or already
      * withdrawn key is logged and left out.
      */
-    async signCadreInviteWithdrawals(keys, signMessage) {
+    async signWithdrawals(table, keys, signMessage) {
         if (keys.length === 0) {
             return [];
         }
-        const withdrawn = await this.queryRevokedStamps('CadreInvite', false);
+        const withdrawn = await this.queryRevokedStamps(table, false);
         const withdrawals = [];
         for (const key of keys) {
-            const stampId = await this.queryStampId('CadreInvite', key, false);
+            const stampId = await this.queryStampId(table, key, false);
             if (stampId === null) {
-                log('withdrawCadreInvite: no CadreInvite row for %s (nothing to withdraw)', key);
+                log('withdraw %s: no row for %s (nothing to withdraw)', table, key);
                 continue;
             }
             if (withdrawn.has(stampId)) {
-                log('withdrawCadreInvite: %s already withdrawn (stamp %s retired)', key, stampId);
+                log('withdraw %s: %s already withdrawn (stamp %s retired)', table, key, stampId);
                 continue;
             }
-            const ref = { tableName: 'CadreInvite', rowKey: key, stampId };
-            withdrawals.push({ ref, signature: signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(this.config.partyId, ref)) });
+            const ref = { tableName: table, rowKey: key, stampId };
+            withdrawals.push({ ref, signature: await signMessage(revocationTombstoneMessage(this.config.partyId, ref)) });
         }
         return withdrawals;
     }
     /**
-     * Redeem a seated `CadreInvite` on the owner's behalf: admit `peerId` as a cadre member and,
-     * when the invitation grants ownership, as an owner — with NO owner signature. One
-     * transaction writes the `CadrePeer` row (consent branch of `AuthorizedInsert`), the
-     * `OwnerKey` row when granted (consent branch of `Authorized`), and last the
-     * `CadreInviteUsage` row that authorizes both; the usage row's own checks (`PeerExists`,
-     * `OwnerExists`) read the rows back, so the three are mutually bound to this exact
-     * redemption and none can be held in reserve. The invitation must already be committed
-     * ({@link seatCadreInvite}): every consent branch reads `committed.CadreInvite`.
+     * Redeem a seated `CadreInvite` on the owner's behalf: admit `peerId` as a cadre member —
+     * with NO owner signature, and as a machine only (ownership is {@link redeemOwnerGrant}'s).
+     * One transaction writes the `CadrePeer` row (consent branch of `AuthorizedInsert`) and then
+     * the `CadreInviteUsage` row that authorizes it; the usage row's own check (`PeerExists`)
+     * reads the peer row back, so the two are mutually bound to this exact redemption and
+     * neither can be held in reserve. The invitation must already be committed
+     * ({@link seatCadreInvite}): the consent branch reads `committed.CadreInvite`.
      *
      * The two signatures are the holder's and the device's, minted on the device over
      * {@link cadreInviteRedeemMessage} / {@link cadreInviteConsentMessage}; this machine only
@@ -3790,79 +4312,59 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * (`verifyInvitationAdmission`) — a mismatched pair is written and then never trusted.
      *
      * Idempotent for a retry after a dropped reply: when the device's row is already present
-     * (and its `OwnerKey` row too, when granted) nothing is written and no seat is spent —
-     * `alreadyMember: true`. A present row whose `OwnerKey` row is missing under an
-     * owner-granting invitation is completed: the usage row then names the existing peer stamp.
-     * The seat check ({@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains}) runs after that, so the retry of a
-     * single-use redemption is answered `alreadyMember` rather than refused as exhausted.
+     * nothing is written and no seat is spent — `alreadyMember: true`. The seat check
+     * ({@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains}) runs after that, so the retry of a single-use
+     * redemption is answered `alreadyMember` rather than refused as exhausted.
      *
      * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, so the membership hub is notified; inside the locked body
      * every read passes `retry: false` and every stamp is minted per attempt, so a
      * {@link lockedWithRetry} re-run starts clean.
      *
      * @throws {InvitationExhaustedError} when the invitation's seats are all spent (by name,
-     *   ahead of the schema's generic `Authorized` refusal — see {@link assertSeatRemains}).
+     *   ahead of the schema's generic `Authorized` refusal — see {@link assertSeatRemains});
+     *   {@link IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when no `CadreInvite` row is readable here.
      */
     async redeemCadreInvite(params) {
         this.ensureInitialized();
-        const { inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, usageStampId, inviteSig, peerSig } = params;
+        const { inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, record, usageStampId, inviteSig, peerSig } = params;
         const nowMs = params.nowMs ?? Date.now();
         const multiaddr = params.multiaddrs?.length ? params.multiaddrs.join(',') : '';
         log('Redeeming cadre invitation %s for %s', inviteKey, peerId);
         return this.mutateCadrePeer('cadre-invite-redeem', async () => {
-            const invite = await this.queryCadreInvite(inviteKey, false);
+            const invite = params.held ?? await this.queryCadreInvite(inviteKey, false);
             if (invite === null) {
-                throw new Error(`Cannot redeem cadre invitation ${inviteKey}: no CadreInvite row is seated on this node (seatCadreInvite first)`);
+                throw new IssuedRowNotHereYetError('CadreInvite', inviteKey);
             }
-            const seated = await this.readSeatedAdmission(peerId, peerKey, invite.grantsOwner);
-            if (seated.peerStampId !== null && (!invite.grantsOwner || seated.ownerStampId !== null)) {
+            // A raw stamp read (queryStampId), so a physically present row counts; inside the locked
+            // body, so never retried.
+            const seatedPeerStampId = await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId, false);
+            if (seatedPeerStampId !== null) {
                 log('redeemCadreInvite: %s already admitted; nothing written', peerId);
-                return { alreadyMember: true, peerStampId: seated.peerStampId, ownerStampId: seated.ownerStampId };
+                return { alreadyMember: true, peerStampId: seatedPeerStampId };
             }
             await this.assertCadreInviteSeatRemains(invite);
-            // Stamps minted from the ADMITTED device's id, as insertCadrePeer does: the nonce names
-            // the row it seats. Minted inside the body, so a re-run mints afresh over a rolled-back
-            // attempt rather than re-presenting a stamp the usage row may already name.
-            const peerStampId = seated.peerStampId ?? generateStampId(peerId);
-            const ownerStampId = invite.grantsOwner ? (seated.ownerStampId ?? generateStampId(peerId)) : null;
+            // The stamp is minted from the ADMITTED device's id, as insertCadrePeer does: the nonce
+            // names the row it seats. Minted inside the body, so a re-run mints afresh over a
+            // rolled-back attempt rather than re-presenting a stamp the usage row may already name.
+            const peerStampId = generateStampId(peerId);
             const nowCanonical = await canonicalDatetime(this.db, nowMs);
             await this.inTransaction('cadre-invite-redeem', async () => {
-                if (seated.peerStampId === null) {
-                    await this.db.exec(`
-            insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
-              with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-              values (?, ?, ?, ?, null, ?, ?, null, ?)
-          `, [peerId, peerKey, multiaddr, nowMs, peerStampId, invite.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
-                }
-                if (ownerStampId !== null && seated.ownerStampId === null) {
-                    await this.db.exec(`
-            insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
-              with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
-              values (?, ?, ?, null, ?)
-          `, [peerKey, ownerStampId, invite.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
-                }
                 await this.db.exec(`
-          insert into CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage (UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, OwnerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig)
+          insert into CadreControl.CadrePeer (PeerId, PublicKey, Multiaddr, UpdatedAt, Sig, Profile, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
+            with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
+            values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, null, ?)
+        `, [peerId, peerKey, multiaddr, record?.updatedAt ?? nowMs, record?.sig ?? null, record?.profile ?? null,
+                    peerStampId, invite.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          insert into CadreControl.CadreInviteUsage (UsageStampId, InviteKey, PeerId, PeerKey, PeerStampId, InviteSig, PeerSig)
             with context Now = ?
-            values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
-        `, [nowCanonical, usageStampId, inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, peerStampId, ownerStampId, inviteSig, peerSig]);
+            values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+        `, [nowCanonical, usageStampId, inviteKey, peerId, peerKey, peerStampId, inviteSig, peerSig]);
             });
-            log('Redeemed cadre invitation %s: %s admitted (owner=%s, usage %s)', inviteKey, peerId, ownerStampId !== null, usageStampId);
-            return { alreadyMember: false, peerStampId, ownerStampId };
+            log('Redeemed cadre invitation %s: %s admitted (usage %s)', inviteKey, peerId, usageStampId);
+            return { alreadyMember: false, peerStampId };
         });
     }
-    /**
-     * The rows a redemption would seat that are already present: the device's `CadrePeer`
-     * stamp, and — only when the invitation grants ownership — its `OwnerKey` stamp. Raw stamp
-     * reads ({@link queryStampId}), so a physically present row counts; inside the locked
-     * body, so never retried.
-     */
-    async readSeatedAdmission(peerId, peerKey, grantsOwner) {
-        return {
-            peerStampId: await this.queryStampId('CadrePeer', peerId, false),
-            ownerStampId: grantsOwner ? await this.queryStampId('OwnerKey', peerKey, false) : null,
-        };
-    }
     /**
      * Refuse a redemption that would consume a seat the cadre invitation does not have, by
      * name ({@link InvitationExhaustedError}) — the cadre-invitation twin of
@@ -3870,19 +4372,232 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * generic `Authorized` failure a caller would otherwise report as retryable. Reads the
      * committed count inside the locked body, so on a same-node race the loser is refused here.
      */
-    async assertCadreInviteSeatRemains(invite) {
-        if (invite.totalUses === null) {
+    assertCadreInviteSeatRemains(invite) {
+        return this.assertIssuedSeatRemains(invite, key => this.countCadreInviteUsage(key, false));
+    }
+    /** The body of {@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains} and {@link assertOwnerGrantSeatRemains}; `countUsage` reads inside the locked body. */
+    async assertIssuedSeatRemains(row, countUsage) {
+        if (row.totalUses === null) {
             return;
         }
-        const used = await this.countCadreInviteUsage(invite.key, false);
-        if (used >= invite.totalUses) {
-            throw new InvitationExhaustedError(invite.key, used, invite.totalUses);
+        const used = await countUsage(row.key);
+        if (used >= row.totalUses) {
+            throw new InvitationExhaustedError(row.key, used, row.totalUses);
         }
     }
+    // ── Owner grants (OwnerGrant / OwnerGrantUsage) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Mint and insert an owner-signed `OwnerGrant`: a grant of ownership to whoever holds the
+     * grant's private half, redeemable through any member machine ({@link redeemOwnerGrant})
+     * to seat an owner key the holder generates or already holds. No machine is admitted and no
+     * peer id is named. The grant twin of {@link insertCadreInvite}: the owner signs the whole
+     * row ({@link ownerGrantAddMessage}), `ExpiresAt` through {@link canonicalDatetime}, and
+     * the returned row is what the grant bundle carries, re-inserted verbatim by
+     * {@link seatOwnerGrant} on a member that has not received it by replication.
+     *
+     * @param grant.key - the grant's ed25519 PUBLIC key (base64url), the row's primary key; the
+     *   caller minted the pair and hands the private half to the holder out of band
+     * @param grant.label - the label every key this grant seats will carry
+     *   ({@link ownerKeyLabel}'s rule: trimmed, at most 64 characters, blank meaning none); the
+     *   issuer's choice, which the holder cannot change
+     * @param grant.expiresAtMs - epoch ms after which it cannot be redeemed; omit or null for
+     *   never. The short default lifetime is the node API's to apply, not this writer's.
+     * @param grant.totalUses - how many redemptions it allows; omit for unlimited
+     * @returns the row as stored, `expiresAt` in its canonical form
+     */
+    async insertOwnerGrant(grant, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const key = requireEd25519PublicKeyB64(grant.key, 'owner grant key');
+        const signed = {
+            key,
+            label: ownerKeyLabel(grant.label),
+            expiresAt: grant.expiresAtMs == null ? null : await canonicalDatetime(this.db, grant.expiresAtMs),
+            totalUses: grant.totalUses ?? null,
+            stampId: generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString()),
+        };
+        const row = {
+            ...signed,
+            issuerKey: ownerKey,
+            issuerSig: await signMessage(ownerGrantAddMessage(this.config.partyId, signed)),
+        };
+        await this.lockedWithRetry(() => this.execOwnerGrantInsert(row), {}, 'owner-grant-insert');
+        log('Owner grant inserted: %s (label=%s)', key, row.label ?? 'none');
+        return row;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Seat an owner-signed `OwnerGrant` row received inside a grant bundle, under its own stored
+     * `IssuerKey`/`IssuerSig` as the write context — insert-if-absent, as {@link seatCadreInvite}.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` when this call inserted the row, `false` when it was already present.
+     * @throws {OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError} when `OwnerGrant.AuthorizedInsert` refuses it: the
+     *   issuer is not an owner on this node (not replicated yet, or removed), or the signature does
+     *   not verify. {@link IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when the cohort holds the row and this node
+     *   cannot read it yet. Every other refusal (a withdrawn stamp, `NotRevoked`) propagates as is.
+     */
+    async seatOwnerGrant(row) {
+        return this.seatIssuedRow('OwnerGrant', row.key, () => this.execOwnerGrantInsert(row), cause => new OwnerGrantIssuerUnknownError(row.key, row.issuerKey, { cause }));
+    }
+    /** Bare `OwnerGrant` insert shared by {@link insertOwnerGrant} and {@link seatOwnerGrant}; the caller holds the lock. */
+    async execOwnerGrantInsert(row) {
+        await this.db.exec(`
+      insert into CadreControl.OwnerGrant (Key, Label, ExpiresAt, TotalUses, IssuerKey, IssuerSig, StampId)
+        with context OwnerKey = ?, Signature = ?
+        values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+    `, [
+            row.issuerKey, row.issuerSig,
+            row.key, row.label, row.expiresAt, row.totalUses,
+            row.issuerKey, row.issuerSig, row.stampId,
+        ]);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read one `OwnerGrant` row by key, or null when absent. Withdrawn rows are returned too,
+     * as {@link queryCadreInvite} returns them: the row is the holder's proof and never goes
+     * away. Read once per redemption and carried into {@link isOwnerGrantLive} and
+     * {@link redeemOwnerGrant}; `retry: false` is passed by {@link redeemOwnerGrant} when it was
+     * handed none and reads inside its locked body.
+     */
+    async queryOwnerGrant(key, retry = true) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        for (const row of await this.readRows(`${OWNER_GRANT_SELECT_SQL} where Key = ?`, [key], 'owner-grant', retry)) {
+            return ownerGrantRowOf(row);
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Every `OwnerGrant` row this node holds, withdrawn and expired ones included. Read by the
+     * anchor sync when at least one `OwnerKey` row is consent-seated (`CadreNode.loadOwnerGrantChain`);
+     * `retry: false` is forwarded from the membership-gate refresh for {@link queryCadrePeers}' reason.
+     */
+    async queryOwnerGrants(retry = true) {
+        return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerGrantView, retry)).map(ownerGrantRowOf);
+    }
+    /** Every `OwnerGrantUsage` row this node holds — the redemption records a grant-seated `OwnerKey` row is verified against. Same `retry` contract as {@link queryOwnerGrants}; both come from their membership views ({@link readMembershipRows}). */
+    async queryOwnerGrantUsages(retry = true) {
+        return (await this.readMembershipRows(this.ownerGrantUsageView, retry)).map(ownerGrantUsageRowOf);
+    }
+    /**
+     * How many times an owner grant has been redeemed (its `OwnerGrantUsage` rows), served
+     * through the `OwnerGrantUsageByGrant` index. A permissive PRE-check like
+     * {@link countCadreInviteUsage}: the cap is `OwnerGrantUsage.Authorized`'s own committed count.
+     */
+    async countOwnerGrantUsage(key, retry = true) {
+        return this.countUsageRows('select count(1) as Count from CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage where GrantKey = ?', key, 'owner-grant-usage-count', retry);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Is this one owner grant still redeemable here — not withdrawn, unexpired, uses left, issuer
+     * still an owner — judged as {@link isCadreInviteLive} judges an invitation: by `held`, the row
+     * this node holds under `grant.key` ({@link queryOwnerGrant}, read by the caller), else by
+     * `grant` itself (a bundle's copy, not seated yet) when its issuer signature verifies. A
+     * permissive pre-check; {@link seatOwnerGrant} and the redemption's own write enforce every
+     * condition. Its use count is read again inside the write lock, for
+     * {@link isCadreInviteLive}'s reason.
+     */
+    async isOwnerGrantLive(grant, held, nowMs = Date.now()) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const row = held ?? (verifyOwnerGrantRow(this.config.partyId, grant) ? grant : null);
+        return this.issuedRowLive('OwnerGrant', row, nowMs, key => this.countOwnerGrantUsage(key));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Every `OwnerGrant` row this node holds with its standing — recorded redemptions, withdrawal,
+     * and whether it is still redeemable — for an owner's listing, as {@link listCadreInviteStatuses}.
+     */
+    async listOwnerGrantStatuses(nowMs = Date.now()) {
+        const standings = await this.issuedRowStandings('OwnerGrant', await this.queryOwnerGrants(), nowMs, key => this.countOwnerGrantUsage(key));
+        return standings.map(({ row, ...standing }) => ({ grant: row, ...standing }));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Owner-signed WITHDRAWAL of an owner grant: file the `Revocation` tombstone retiring its
+     * stamp, with the row kept, exactly as {@link withdrawCadreInvite} withdraws an invitation
+     * and for the same reason (every key the grant seated proves itself through the row;
+     * `OwnerGrant.NoDelete`, `Revocation.RowIsGone`). Afterwards `OwnerGrantUsage.Authorized`
+     * refuses every further redemption and `OwnerGrant.NotRevoked` refuses re-seating the
+     * holder's copy on any node holding the tombstone. Keys already seated stay owners;
+     * removing one is {@link deleteOwnerKey}.
+     *
+     * Idempotent: `false` (nothing written) when the row is absent here or already withdrawn,
+     * `true` when this call filed the tombstone. Fires the guarded-delete listener, so a
+     * withdrawal committed while alone is re-issued on cohort growth.
+     */
+    async withdrawOwnerGrant(key, ownerKey, signMessage) {
+        return this.withdrawIssuedRow('OwnerGrant', key, ownerKey, signMessage);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Redeem a seated `OwnerGrant` on the issuer's behalf: seat `seatedKey` as an owner with NO
+     * owner signature. One transaction writes the `OwnerKey` row (the grant branch of
+     * `Authorized`: `VouchOwner` the issuer, `VouchSig` null, `VouchUsage` the usage stamp,
+     * `Label` the grant's) and then the `OwnerGrantUsage` row that authorizes it; the usage
+     * row's `SeatedExists` reads the owner row back, so the two are bound to this exact
+     * redemption and neither can be held in reserve. The grant must already be committed
+     * ({@link seatOwnerGrant}): both consent reads are of `committed.OwnerGrant`. No machine is
+     * admitted and no peer id is named.
+     *
+     * The two signatures are minted where the private keys are (the grant's and the seated
+     * key's), over {@link ownerGrantRedeemMessage} / {@link ownerGrantConsentMessage}; this
+     * machine only verifies them, by writing the row.
+     *
+     * Idempotent, and a no-op for a key that is already an owner: when `seatedKey` has a live
+     * `OwnerKey` row here nothing is written and no use is spent — `alreadyOwner: true` with
+     * that row's stamp. The seat check ({@link assertOwnerGrantSeatRemains}) runs after that, so
+     * the retry of a single-use redemption is answered `alreadyOwner` rather than refused as
+     * exhausted. A key removed earlier is seated afresh under a new stamp (`NotRevoked` passes),
+     * except on a machine that still holds its retired row, which refuses by name
+     * ({@link liveOwnerKeyStamp}).
+     *
+     * Through {@link mutateCadrePeer}, so the membership hub is notified and the anchors follow;
+     * inside the locked body every read passes `retry: false` and the stamp is minted per
+     * attempt, so a {@link lockedWithRetry} re-run starts clean.
+     *
+     * @throws {InvitationExhaustedError} when the grant's uses are all spent (by name, ahead of
+     *   the schema's generic `Authorized` refusal); its `token` is the grant key.
+     *   {@link IssuedRowNotHereYetError} when no `OwnerGrant` row is readable here.
+     */
+    async redeemOwnerGrant(params) {
+        this.ensureInitialized();
+        const { grantKey, seatedKey, usageStampId, grantSig, ownerSig } = params;
+        const nowMs = params.nowMs ?? Date.now();
+        log('Redeeming owner grant %s for %s', grantKey, seatedKey);
+        return this.mutateCadrePeer('owner-grant-redeem', async () => {
+            const grant = params.held ?? await this.queryOwnerGrant(grantKey, false);
+            if (grant === null) {
+                throw new IssuedRowNotHereYetError('OwnerGrant', grantKey);
+            }
+            const heldStamp = await this.liveOwnerKeyStamp(seatedKey);
+            if (heldStamp !== null) {
+                log('redeemOwnerGrant: %s is already an owner; nothing written', seatedKey);
+                return { alreadyOwner: true, seatedStampId: heldStamp };
+            }
+            await this.assertOwnerGrantSeatRemains(grant);
+            // Minted inside the body, so a re-run mints afresh over a rolled-back attempt rather
+            // than re-presenting a stamp the usage row may already name.
+            const seatedStampId = generateStampId(this.config.libp2pNode.peerId.toString());
+            const nowCanonical = await canonicalDatetime(this.db, nowMs);
+            await this.inTransaction('owner-grant-redeem', async () => {
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          insert into CadreControl.OwnerKey (Key, Label, StampId, VouchOwner, VouchSig, VouchUsage)
+            with context OwnerKey = null, Signature = null
+            values (?, ?, ?, ?, null, ?)
+        `, [seatedKey, grant.label, seatedStampId, grant.issuerKey, usageStampId]);
+                await this.db.exec(`
+          insert into CadreControl.OwnerGrantUsage (UsageStampId, GrantKey, SeatedKey, SeatedStampId, GrantSig, OwnerSig)
+            with context Now = ?
+            values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+        `, [nowCanonical, usageStampId, grantKey, seatedKey, seatedStampId, grantSig, ownerSig]);
+            });
+            log('Redeemed owner grant %s: %s seated as an owner (usage %s)', grantKey, seatedKey, usageStampId);
+            return { alreadyOwner: false, seatedStampId };
+        });
+    }
+    /** {@link assertCadreInviteSeatRemains} for an owner grant: refuse an exhausted grant by name, ahead of the write. */
+    assertOwnerGrantSeatRemains(grant) {
+        return this.assertIssuedSeatRemains(grant, key => this.countOwnerGrantUsage(key, false));
+    }
     /**
      * Close the database and cleanup resources.
      *
-     * Drains the local-write chain first: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
+     * Disposes every {@link watchTables} subscription before anything else, so a commit that
+     * lands while the write chain drains schedules no run, and again before dropping the handle.
+     *
+     * Then drains the local-write chain: {@link withWriteLock} can park a write behind
      * others across an await, and a queued closure evaluates `this.db!` only when it
      * finally runs — so nulling the handle out from under it would throw a TypeError on a
      * null handle instead of committing. The tail never rejects (it swallows both
@@ -3893,11 +4608,17 @@ export class ControlDatabase {
      * deadline) if a write can ever hang.
      */
     async close() {
+        this.tableWatches.disposeAll();
         await this.writeQueue;
         if (this.collectionFactory) {
             await this.collectionFactory.shutdown();
             this.collectionFactory = null;
         }
+        this.txnBridge = null;
+        // Again: a subscription taken during the awaits above would keep its timers past close.
+        this.tableWatches.disposeAll();
+        // Here, not first: a read started during the awaits above must not install either.
+        this.invalidateMembershipViews();
         if (this.db) {
             void this.db.close();
             this.db = null;